### NC

#### I negate. First, knowledge requires certainty. The statement “I know how to solve this math problem but I’m not certain how to solve it” is a contradiction. Two implications:

#### 1] A 1% risk that our epistemic viewpoints are unreliable means you vote neg on skep

#### 2] Presumption negates since it proves there is uncertainty related to the aff, meaning that we can’t justifiably believe in it.

#### Now, Determinism is true:

#### 1] Free action and moral responsibility are rendered incoherent since it would require causing one’s own actions which falls into regress.

Strawson, G. (1994). The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 75(1/2), 5–24. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320507> JS

I take it that (1) is incontrovertible, and that it is (2) that must be resisted. For if (1) and (2)) are conceded the case seems lost, because the full argument runs as follows. (1) You do what you do because of the way you are. So (2) To be truly morally responsible for what you do you must be truly responsible for the way you are - at least in certain crucial mental respects. But (3) You cannot be truly responsible for the way you are, so you cannot be truly responsible for what you do. Why can't you be truly responsible for the way you are? Because (4) To be truly responsible for the way you are, you must have intentionally brought it about that you are the way you are, and this is impossible. Why is it impossible? Well, suppose it is not. Suppose that (5) You have somehow intentionally brought it about that you are the way you now are, and that you have brought this about in such a way that you can now be said to be truly responsible for being the way you are now. For this to be true (6) You must already have had a certain nature N in the light of which you intentionally brought it about that you are as you now are. But then (7) For it to be true you and you alone are truly responsible for how you now are, you must be truly responsible for having had the nature N in the light of which you intentionally brought it about that you are the way you now are. So (8) You must have intentionally brought it about that you had that nature N, in which case you must have existed already with a prior nature in the light of which you intentionally brought it about that you had the nature N in the light of which you intentionally brought it about that you are the way you now are Here one is setting off on the regress. Nothing can be causa sui in the required way. Even if such causal 'aseity' is allowed to belong unintelligibly to God, it cannot be plausibly be supposed to be pos- sessed by ordinary finite human beings. "The causa sui is the best self- contradiction that has been conceived so far", as Nietzsche remarked in 1886

#### 2] Bivalence – a statement capable of being proved true or false must be either true or false – that means the question of whether a particular action will occur in the future is always answered by either “true” or “false,” and proves that everything in the future either happens or doesn’t happen by necessity – nothing can change that.

#### 3] Neuroscience proves conscious will is an illusion.

Wegner, Daniel M., 2002, *The Illusion of Conscious Will*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. JS

RP = Readiness Potential,

The results were truly noteworthy, although in some sense this is exactly what you would have to expect: The conscious willing of finger movement occurred at a significant interval after the onset of the RP but also at a significant interval before the actual finger movement (and also at a significant interval before the awareness of movement). The time line for the RP, W, M, and actual movement events is shown in figure 2.8. These findings suggest that the brain starts doing something first (we don’t know just what that is). Then the person becomes conscious of wanting to do the action. This would be where the conscious will kicks in, at least, in the sense that the person first becomes conscious of trying to act. Then, and still a bit prior to the movement, the person reports becoming aware of the finger actually moving.6 Finally, the finger moves. Libet and colleagues suggested that the S series could be used as a guide to estimating how long any hand-to-brain activity might take. It took about 47 milliseconds for people to report being consciously aware of a stimulus to the hand, so Libet reasoned it might be useful to subtract this number from the W and M series values to adjust for this part of the process. This doesn’t really change the overall conclusion; it just moves the “aware of wanting” time to 157 milliseconds and the “aware of moving” time to 39 milliseconds. One other quibble: You may have noticed that the RP in this study occurred later (535 milliseconds) than the one in Kornhuber and Deecke’s experiment (approximately 800 milliseconds). This is because Libet made a special point of asking participants to mention if they had done any preplanning of the finger movement and eliminated those instances from the analysis. In a separate study, Libet, Wright, and Gleason (1982) had learned that the RP occurred as much as a second or two earlier on trials when participants were allowed to plan for their movement, so the conscious will study avoided this by emphasizing spontaneous, unplanned movements. The conclusion suggested by this research is that the experience of conscious will kicks in at some point after the brain has already started preparing for the action. Libet sums up these observations by saying that “the initiation of the voluntary act appears to be an unconscious cerebral process. Clearly, free will or free choice of whether to act now could not be the initiating agent, contrary to one widely held view. This is of course also contrary to each individual’s own introspective feeling that he/she consciously initiates such voluntary acts; this provides an important empirical example of the possibility that the subjective experience of a mental causality need not necessarily reflect the actual causative relationship between mental and brain events” (Libet 1992, 269)

#### 4] Double bind – If every action happens because of previous causes, then determinism is true since a causal chain of actions structures action rather than my will – if every action has no previous cause then actions are basically random and I can’t cause my own actions to take place which disproves free will.

#### 5] Belief in free will also increases victim blaming and acceptance of inequality – this accounts for every variable.

Genschow, Oliver & Vehlow, Benjamin (2021). Free to blame? Belief in free will is related to victim blaming. Consciousness and Cognition 88:103074. JS

In three studies we tested the prediction that belief in free will is related to victim blaming. Study 1 manipulated belief in free will. Although belief in free will could be successfully manipulated, the manipulation did not affect victim blaming. However, it is important to note that on a correlational level we found evidence for our predictions that higher endorsement of free will belief is interrelated with victim blaming. This link could be reproduced in Study 2 and further replicated in Study 3. In all studies the correlation between belief in free will and victim blaming remained significant even when statistically controlling for demographics as well as other beliefs (i.e., dualism and determinism). Moreover, Study 3 revealed that belief in free will correlates with victim blaming when controlling for just world beliefs, religious worldviews and political ideology. Taken together, across all three studies we found evidence for the prediction that higher endorsement of belief in free will is positively related to victim blaming (for a mini meta-analysis, see the supplement material). Theoretical implications Past research found that belief in free will increases the tendency to punish anti-social behavior (Clark et al., 2014; Genschow et al., 2017; Martin et al., 2017; Shariff et al., 2014), but also to reward pro-social behaviors (Genschow et al., 2017). These findings can be explained by recent research showing that belief in free will is associated with an increase in perceived intentions in others’ behavior (Genschow et al., 2017, 2019) and the tendency to attribute responsibility to others for their behavior (Nahmias et al., 2005). As past research on belief in free will has neglected the view on the victims of criminal acts, in the present research we filled this gap by demonstrating that belief in free will is not only associated with the tendency to punish criminal offenders, but also with the tendency to blame victims for their bad luck. In the last couple of decades, claims that free will is nothing more than an illusion have become prevalent in the popular press (e.g., Chivers 2010; Griffin, 2016; Wolfe, 1997). Based on such claims, scholars across disciplines started debating potential societal consequences for the case that people would start disbelieving in free will. For example, some philosophers argued that disbelief in free will would have catastrophic consequences, because people would no longer try to control their behavior and start acting immorally (e.g., Smilansky, 2000, 2002). Likewise, psychological research has mainly focused on the downsides of disbelief in free will. For example, weakening free will belief led participants to behave less morally and responsibly (Baumeister et al., 2009; Protzko et al., 2016; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). In contrast to these results, our findings illustrate a more positive side of disbelief in free will, as higher levels of disbelief in free will would reduce victim blaming. Past research on studying psychological motives behind victim blaming indicated that fundamentalistic religious worldviews (Sheldon & Parent, 2002), a conservatism attitude (Lambert & Raichle, 2000; Williams, 1984), and just world beliefs (e.g., Strömwall et al., 2013; Van den Bos & Maas, 2009) contribute to victim blaming. In Study 3, we replicated these findings—a fact noteworthy in light of the current debate on the crises of confidence in psychological science (e.g., Genschow, Westfal, et al., 2020; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Moreover, our research extends past findings by demonstrating that belief in free will explains variance in predicting victim blaming in addition to other relevant predictors such as religiosity, political attitudes and just world beliefs. This allows getting a more complete understanding of the motives behind victim blaming. Research on just world beliefs (Carey & Paulhus, 2013) suggests that when an innocent person experiences misfortune, the belief that the world is inherently just is threatened. To restore belief in a just world, responsibility is attributed to the victim (Furnham, 2003). It might well be that belief in free will is a means to re-establish the belief in a just world. As people have control over their decisions and acts, they are fully responsible for the consequences that happen to them. Therefore, negative life events can be attributed to the affected people themselves. This reasoning is in line with research showing that a stronger belief in free will increases the acceptance of economic inequality (Mercier et al., 2020), the endorsement of punishment for wrongdoers (Clark et al., 2014; Genschow et al., 2017; Martin et al., 2017; Shariff et al., 2014) and support of an authoritarian worldview (e.g., Nadelhoffer & Tocchetto, 2013). Future research may aim at applying experimental manipulations to directly test whether belief in free will is a means to re-establish just world beliefs.

#### Determinism proves that there is no moral obligation to do the resolution –

#### 1] Ought implies can since it would be unjust to expect an agent to take an action when they have no capacity to choose otherwise – that’s why we don’t expect poor people to donate to charity – if it’s impossible for an unjust agent to choose otherwise, then we can’t say that they have an obligation to do it so determinism proves moral obligations incoherent.

#### 2] Free will and determinism can’t coexist since a will is not truly free if they could not change the choice they willed, which determinism denies – moral responsibility requires free will – that’s why we don’t mark people who were misguided, deceived, or coerced into taking immoral action as inherently bad people.

#### That negates: the act of assigning unjustness presumes something that is morally right that is violated.

Lexico Dictionaries, "UNJUST English Definition and Meaning," <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/unjust> JS

not based on or behaving according to what is morally right and fair.

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