### NC

#### Morality must be derived a priori:

#### 1] Naturalistic Fallacy – experience merely perceives how the world is, which cannot correlate to how the world ought to be due to the is-ought fallacy.

#### 2] Uncertainty – inability to know others’ experience due to a limited perception makes empiricism unreliable for universal ethics.

#### 3] Verification – The logic of evaluating consequences is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform but we could only reach that conclusion through an observation of past events.

#### Ethics must answer the problem of infinite regress since we could question moral principles forever and avoid following morality. Only reason solves – asking why reason is important concedes its authority as we’re asking a reason for using our reason.

#### Moral law must be both necessary and universal – only universal law can be constitutive of agency because it applies to all agents in all instances – other maxims cannot guide action in every situation. Willing coercion is a contradiction in conception because you extend your own freedom while simultaneously undermining your ability to act in the first place.

#### Thus, the standard is respecting freedom. Prefer it:

#### 1] Performativity – Argumentation presupposes one’s own freedom to act – if I violated your freedom, you wouldn’t be able to debate – this means contestations of my framework prove it true

#### 2] Culpability – if we didn’t regard agents as free, then we can’t hold them culpable for immoral actions since there would be no possibility of them doing otherwise and being moral.

#### 3] Other Frameworks Collapse – viewing others as ends in themselves is a prerequisite for moral value.

Korsgaard ’83 (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, "for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action." By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### Now negate:

#### The inherent ideology of the strike demands a right to a job they never perform – this is incoherent and requires coercion upon prospective employees else no right to strike would exist.

Locke, Don. [NOT john locke] “The Right to Strike.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series, vol. 18, 1984, pp. 173–202., doi:10.1017/S0957042X00003163 JS

So what is distinctive about a strike is, as I suggested before, the refusal to do a particular job, combined with the insistence that that job is none the less still yours. Now this in itself seems curious enough to require some explanation: how can someone be entitled to claim a job as his, when he isn't willing to do it? Surely if he doesn't want to do it and others do, then it should be their job, not his? But what seems to require justification is the apparent consequence of this, the attempt to prevent others from taking that job, even though they might be willing, even eager, to do it in the striker's place. Surely this is an unjust restriction of liberty, the liberty of employers to employ, the liberty of workers to work? If there is, as many claim, a right to work, how can there be a right to strike, a right, that is, to prevent others working, when they are both willing and able? Thus a strike is not just a boycott, it is an enforced boycott, an attempt to force others to join in the boycott, even though they might be perfectly willing to take that job on the terms which the striker rejects. Of course, if it were simply a matter of persuading others not to take that job, that would hardly need justification. Presumably one man may attempt to persuade another of just about, but not quite, anything he pleases. Indeed, if strikers succeed in persuading someone not to take a job, they are not in any obvious sense preventing them from taking it. What needs justifying, rather is the attempt to prevent someone from taking a job, after you have failed to persuade him not to. Much depends, of course, on the form which the prevention takes: for most of us there will be some limit somewhere, beyond which we think strikers should not go; and I have already said that I will not attempt the perhaps impossible task of determining where that limit should be. But what does seem clear to me is that, of necessity, a strike goes beyond merely attempting to persuade people not to break the strike; to use a suitably vague phrase, it involves putting pressure on those who would break the strike, to make it difficult or unpleasant for them to do so. That, surely is what the apparatus and ideology of strikes is for: not just to persuade non-strikers so that they willingly accept whatever restrictions the strikers seek to impose; but to put pressure on them so that unwillingly, if needs be, they decline to break the strike, for fear of public criticism and condemnation, of calumny and obloquy, to put it no higher. There are of course those who think that a strike should be restricted to the attempt to persuade. But if I am right this attempt to restrict strikers to friendly persuasion is an attempt to prevent a strike from being a strike, and therefore an infringement on the right to strike as such, if such there be. Indeed, since the right to persuade seems, like the right to withdraw your labour and the right to combine, at least in some things, a right which we surely have whether there is a right to strike or not, it is only this right to prevent which provides a distinctive, substantive component to the right to strike as such. (More accurately, it is a right to attempt to prevent. The right to persuade, similarly, is a right to attempt to persuade, or else those who are not persuaded have infringed your rights!) So this is the right which needs to be explained and justified: not just the boycott, but the enforced boycott.

#### No turns – strikes may have good justifications such as hindering hindrances but this doesn’t prove that a right exists.

Locke, Don. [NOT john locke] “The Right to Strike.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series, vol. 18, 1984, pp. 173–202., doi:10.1017/S0957042X00003163 JS

Behind this difficulty lies a more fundamental one: that this just war or just cause justification does not, in fact, provide a right to strike at all. 'So long as the cause is just', said Cardinal Manning, 'the right to strike is undeniable' (1891/1901, p. 114); and implies thereby that where the cause is not just, there is no right to strike. But in that case it is not, strictly, a right at all: if something is already right, you need no right to justify doing it; you need a right to justify what you do only if what you do would otherwise, in the absence of that right, be wrong. As I put it earlier, a right is a right of doing wrong, and the right to strike therefore means that people are entitled to strike even if they are not in the right, even if they are mistaken or misguided. And this is precisely what the just cause justification does not provide: people are justified in striking if, but only if, their cause is just

### T

#### Interpretation – “A” in the resolution indicates that you must defend that all just governments recognize an unconditional right to strike.

#### An indefinite article like the word “a” is a universal quantifier if the main verb applies directly to it

Michael Hess. 1985. (Michael Hess is professor of Computational Linguistics and head of the Institute of Computational Linguistics. PhD at University of Zurch). “How Does Natural Language Quantify?”. <https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/E85-1002.pdf>. Bergen AK

The indefinite article seems, on the surface, to cause much less trouble than the definite article. Its interpretation as an existential quantifier always looked quite straightforward. However, it was noticed (Kamp 1981) that indefinite articles sometimes must be represented as universal quantifiers. Prominent among these cases are the so- called donkey sentences, exemplified by sentences 7 and 8. 7) If Pedro owns a donkey he is rich. 8) If Pedro owns a donkey he beats it. The traditional, and most natural, representation of 7 is 7a 7a) EXISTS X: (donkey(X) AND owns(pedro,X)) IMPLIES rich(pedro). where the top-most syntactic connector of the English sentence, i.e. the conjunction "if", corresponds to the top-most connector of the logical form, i.e. the implication. However, if we apply the same schema mechanically to example 8 it will produce the non-sentence 8a: 8a) EXISTS X: (donkey(X) AND owns(pedro,X)) IMPLIES beats(pedro, X). This is not a logical sentence because the variable "X" in the consequent is outside the scope of the existential quantifier and remains unbound. 8 must therefore be represented as 8b 8b) ALL X: ((donkey(X) AND owns(pedro,X)) IMPLIES beats(pedro, X)) where the indefinite article is now represented as a universal quantifier. Now we are in the most unsatisfactory situation that we have to represent two syntactically very similar surface sentences by two radically different logical sentences, and that the same noun phrase has to be mapped into an existential quantifier one time, into a universal quantifier another time. If we try to consistently represent indefinite articles as universal quantfflers we get 7b as representation for 7 7b) ALL X: ((donkey(X) AND owns(pedro,X)) IMPLIES rich(pedro)). which is indeed logically equivalent to 7a, but on purely formal grounds. The scope has been artificially extended to span over terms without any variables, which certainly runs very much against our intuition about the meaning of the original sentence. The conclusion cannot be avoided that even the seemingly innocuous indefinite article cannot be represented as a straightforward existential quantifier.

#### That applies to the rez – the obligation in the resolution applies directly to the just government, which makes “A” a universal quantifier. Vote aff:

#### 1] Limits – there’s 195 different governments that you could potentially specify, which explodes the number of affs – there’s no universal disad to every government since each has different political scenarios so we lose core neg ground like the business confidence DA or the Grids/Police PIC. Limits outweighs – it controls the internal link to the possibility of engagement which turns education.

#### 2] Precision – semantics outweighs pragmatics:

#### A] Anything else allows the aff to jettison words from the resolution to moot neg ground since they’re not bound by the resolution – they’ll say they’re good enough but there’s no brightline for that which justifies straying from the rez always.

#### B] Resolvability—it’s more resolvable to compare semantics because you’re just comparing two definitions, but pragmatics involves weighing between different impacts and how well they connect to voters, which is less resolvable because pragmatics is way more subjective. Resolvability matters because otherwise the judge must intervene to determine a winner which is the worst form of abuse since the debaters can’t control it.

#### C] Jurisdiction – tournament rules mandate that we must defend the resolution, which means the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote on an advocacy that’s not topical. Fairness is a voter—the judge must vote for the better debater which is impossible if the round is skewed.

#### Drop the debater since drop the arg is severance – restarts the debate so the aff gets 7-6 time skew and too late for new neg offense.

#### Use competing interps—[a] leads to a race to the top where we find the best norms [b] reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention [c] reasonability collapses—you use offense/defense on the paradigm debate.

#### No RVIs—[a] logic – you don’t win for being fair, [b] means you bait theory and go for the RVI

### Case

#### Util autonegates – the idea of rights is bad under util since those are negative side constraints, but that only makes sense under side-constraint based frameworks – thus rights don’t exist and you reject the aff on face.

#### Reject naturalism – Suppose X represents a natural property like pleasure. If X is analytically equivalent to good, then the question "Is it true X is good" becomes "Is it true good is good." This either means A) Naturalistic frameworks result in a tautology of "Good is good" or b) X is not the same as good in which case non-naturalism is true.

#### Independently, there’s no link from naturalism to util – don’t let them do that work in the 1AR or fill in steps for them since they have 0 internal link.

Lbl work here 😊