### 1

#### Permissibility negates – ought is a moral obligation[[1]](#footnote-1) and permissibility proves a lack of obligation. Permissibility is always valid neg ground on text – ought is in the resolution so denying ought statements is core neg ground.

#### Presumption negates – a] We assume statements to be false until proven true. That is why we don’t believe in alternate realities or conspiracy theories – b] proving a statement requires absolute certainty – statements like “I know it’s raining but I’m not sure it’s raining” are incoherent.

#### Vote neg on the error constraint – normative prescriptions require the possibility of doing otherwise else that action would lack moral significance.

Lavin, Douglas. “Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error.” Ethics, vol. 114, no. 3, The University of Chicago Press, 2004, pp. 424–57, <https://doi.org/10.1086/381695>. JS bracketed for gender

For a creature to be correctly said to have a rule, it is necessary that it should be able to break the rule. The physical or causal possibility of making a mistake, or doing what one is obliged, by what one means, intends, believes, and desires, not to do, is essential to the conception of such states and shows the essentially normative nature of their significance. An agent may be mistaken about what he has reason to do. . . . This is essential to preserving the point that statements of what people have reason to do have normative force; no account that excludes this can be adequate. Reason-giving explanations require a conception of how things ideally would be, sufficiently independent of how any actual individual’s psychological economy operates to serve as the basis for critical assessment of it. In particular, there must be a potential gap between the ideal and the specific directions in which a given agent’s motivations push [them] him. There is no normativity if you cannot be wrong.1

#### The concept of a “just government” tautologically presupposes a government that acts in a just manner – if a just government were to commit unjust actions, then they would no longer be a just government which means there is no possibility of them doing otherwise – thus under the error constraint, a just government cannot be said to have any moral obligations.

### 2

#### A] Interp - the aff can't defend a subset of workers that have an unconditional right to strike recognized by the government.

Leslie 16 Leslie, Sarah-Jane [Sarah-Jane Leslie (Ph.D., Princeton, 2007) is the dean of the Graduate School and Class of 1943 Professor of Philosophy. She has previously served as the vice dean for faculty development in the Office of the Dean of the Faculty, director of the Program in Linguistics, and founding director of the Program in Cognitive Science at Princeton University. She is also affiliated faculty in the Department of Psychology, the University Center for Human Values, the Program in Gender and Sexuality Studies, and the Kahneman-Treisman Center for Behavioral Science and Public Policy], 4-24-2016, "Generic Generalizations (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/> SM

Isolating the Generic Interpretation Consider the following pairs of sentences: (1) a. Tigers are striped. b. Tigers are on the front lawn. (2) a. A tiger is striped. b. A tiger is on the front lawn. (3) a. The tiger is striped. b. The tiger is on the front lawn. The sentence pairs above are prima facie syntactically parallel—both are subject-predicate sentences whose subjects consist of the same common noun coupled with the same, or no, article. However, the interpretation of first sentence of each pair is intuitively quite different from the interpretation of the second sentence in the pair. In the second sentences, we are talking about some particular tigers: a group of tigers in (1b), some individual tiger in (2b), and some unique salient or familiar tiger in (3b)—a beloved pet, perhaps. In the first sentences, however, we are saying something general. There is/are no particular tiger or tigers that we are talking about. The second sentences of the pairs receive what is called an existential interpretation. The hallmark of the existential interpretation of a sentence containing a bare plural or an indefinite singular is that it may be paraphrased with “some” with little or no change in meaning; hence the terminology “existential reading”. The application of the term “existential interpretation” is perhaps less appropriate when applied to the definite singular, but it is intended there to cover interpretation of the definite singular as referring to a unique contextually salient/familiar particular individual, not to a kind. There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. Consider our examples above. In (1b), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” salva veritate, but in (1a) we cannot. If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true. However, “tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. (1a) does not entail that animals are striped, but (1b) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995). Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in (1a) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in (1b) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.) 1.2 Stage Level and Individual Level Predicates Having distinguished two quite different meanings of these seemingly similar sentence pairs, the question arises: what is the basis of these two interpretations? This is of course a matter of debate, but one important thesis is that it is the predicate that determines which of the two readings the subject will receive, particularly in the case of bare plural generics. In his 1977 dissertation, Greg Carlson argued that the distinction between “stage level” and “individual level” predicates is key here, and proposed that stage level predications give rise to existential readings of bare plurals and indefinite singulars, while individual level ones give rise to generic readings. The distinction between the two types of predicates can be drawn intuitively, and also on the basis of linguistic patterns (Milsark 1974; Carlson 1977; Stump 1985). Semantically, individual level predicates express properties that normally are had by items for quite extended periods, often comprising the items’ whole existence. Stage-level predicates, on the other hand, express properties normally had by items for relatively short time intervals. Some examples of both types are as follows: Individual level predicates “is tall”; “is intelligent”; “knows French”; “is a mammal”; “is female”; “is a singer”; “loves Bob”; “hates Bob” Stage level predicates “is drunk”; “is barking”; “is speaking French”; “is taking an exam”; “is sober”; “is sick”, “is sitting”; “is on the lawn”, “is in the room”. Clearly the semantic distinction is not hard and fast: a teetotaler may be sober for the entire course of his existence, and the chronically ill may be sick for the entire course of theirs, and Alice in Wonderland is tall at some times but short at others. In the normal course of affairs, individual level predicates express more stable and less temporally intermittent properties than stage level ones do. The distinction also manifests itself linguistically. Stage level predicates are permissible in the following constructions, while individual level ones are not: (4) John saw Bill drunk/sober/sick/naked. (5) John saw Bill speaking French/taking an exam/smoking cigarettes. (6) John saw Bill on the lawn/in the room. (7) \*John saw Bill intelligent/tall/a mammal/male. (8) \*John saw Bill knowing French/hating Bob. There-insertion constructions behave similarly: (9) There are men drunk/sober/sick/naked. (10) There are men speaking French/taking an exam/smoking cigarettes. (11) There are men on the lawn/in the room. (12) \*There are men intelligent/tall/mammals/male. (13) \*There are men knowing French/hating Bob. Stage level predicates can be modified by locatives, while individual level ones cannot: (14) John is drunk/speaking French/smoking in 1879 Hall. (15) \*John is a mammal/intelligent/male in 1879 Hall. (16) \*John knows French/hates Bob in 1879 Hall. Carlson noted the difference in syntactic behavior between individual and stage level predicates, and proposed that the distinction between the classes of predicates underlies the distinction between existential and generic readings of bare plurals: (17) Students are drunk/speaking French/on the lawn. (existential) (18) Students are intelligent/mammals/tall/male. (generic) (19) Students know French/hate Bob. (generic) Stage level predicates appear to give rise to the existential reading of bare plurals, while individual level ones give rise to generic readings. Carlson also took the distinction to underwrite the difference between existential and generic readings of the indefinite singular:

#### It applies to “workers” – 1] upward entailment test – “governments ought to recognize the right of workers to strike” doesn’t entail that governments ought to recognize the right of everybody to strike since it doesn’t make sense for unemployed people to strike, 2] adverb test – adding “usually” to the res doesn’t change the meaning because “unconditionally" means no matter what

**B] Violation –**

#### C] Vote neg—

#### 1] Semantics outweigh --

#### A] Topicality is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden, they agreed to debate the topic when they came to the tournament

#### B] It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it.

#### 2] Limits: **You can spec in any sector like climate, tech, manufacturing, healthcare almost every sector has experienced strikes. There’s no universal DA since if you spec a hyper specific sector it won’t have any impact on the economy. That explodes neg prep burdens and kills engagement – even if generics solve, it’s a horrible model that leads to the same stale debates.**

#### D] Paradigm Issues –

#### Fairness is a voter – controls the internal link to every benefit of debate since clash and engagement can’t happen without an equal playing field.

#### 1] T is DTD – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start

#### 2] Comes before 1AR theory -- A] If we had to be abusive it’s because it was impossible to engage their aff B] T outweighs on scope because their abuse affected every speech that came after the 1AC C] Topic norms outweigh on urgency – we only have a few months to set them

#### 3] Use competing interps on T – A] topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical B] reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### 4] No RVIs – A] Forcing the 1NC to go all in on the shell kills substance education and neg strat B] discourages checking real abuse C] Encourages baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quickly

### 3

#### Morality must be derived a priori:

#### 1] Naturalistic Fallacy – experience merely perceives how the world is, which cannot correlate to how the world ought to be due to the is-ought fallacy.

#### 2] Uncertainty – inability to know others’ experience due to a limited perception makes empiricism unreliable for universal ethics.

#### 3] Verification – The logic of evaluating consequences is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform but we could only reach that conclusion through an observation of past events.

#### Ethics must answer the problem of infinite regress since we could question moral principles forever and avoid following morality. Only reason solves – asking why reason is important concedes its authority as we’re asking a reason for using our reason.

#### Moral law must be both necessary and universal – only universal law can be constitutive of agency because it applies to all agents in all instances – other maxims cannot guide action in every situation. Willing coercion is a contradiction in conception because you extend your own freedom while simultaneously undermining your ability to act in the first place.

#### Thus, the standard is respecting freedom. Prefer it:

#### 1] Performativity – Argumentation presupposes one’s own freedom to act – if I violated your freedom, you wouldn’t be able to debate – this means contestations of my framework prove it true

#### 2] Culpability – if we didn’t regard agents as free, then we can’t hold them culpable for immoral actions since there would be no possibility of them doing otherwise and being moral.

#### 3] Other Frameworks Collapse – viewing others as ends in themselves is a prerequisite for moral value.

Korsgaard ’83 (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, "for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action." By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### Now negate:

#### The inherent ideology of the strike demands a right to a job they never perform – this is incoherent and requires coercion upon prospective employees else no right to strike would exist.

Locke, Don. [NOT john locke] “The Right to Strike.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series, vol. 18, 1984, pp. 173–202., doi:10.1017/S0957042X00003163 JS

So what is distinctive about a strike is, as I suggested before, the refusal to do a particular job, combined with the insistence that that job is none the less still yours. Now this in itself seems curious enough to require some explanation: how can someone be entitled to claim a job as his, when he isn't willing to do it? Surely if he doesn't want to do it and others do, then it should be their job, not his? But what seems to require justification is the apparent consequence of this, the attempt to prevent others from taking that job, even though they might be willing, even eager, to do it in the striker's place. Surely this is an unjust restriction of liberty, the liberty of employers to employ, the liberty of workers to work? If there is, as many claim, a right to work, how can there be a right to strike, a right, that is, to prevent others working, when they are both willing and able? Thus a strike is not just a boycott, it is an enforced boycott, an attempt to force others to join in the boycott, even though they might be perfectly willing to take that job on the terms which the striker rejects. Of course, if it were simply a matter of persuading others not to take that job, that would hardly need justification. Presumably one man may attempt to persuade another of just about, but not quite, anything he pleases. Indeed, if strikers succeed in persuading someone not to take a job, they are not in any obvious sense preventing them from taking it. What needs justifying, rather is the attempt to prevent someone from taking a job, after you have failed to persuade him not to. Much depends, of course, on the form which the prevention takes: for most of us there will be some limit somewhere, beyond which we think strikers should not go; and I have already said that I will not attempt the perhaps impossible task of determining where that limit should be. But what does seem clear to me is that, of necessity, a strike goes beyond merely attempting to persuade people not to break the strike; to use a suitably vague phrase, it involves putting pressure on those who would break the strike, to make it difficult or unpleasant for them to do so. That, surely is what the apparatus and ideology of strikes is for: not just to persuade non-strikers so that they willingly accept whatever restrictions the strikers seek to impose; but to put pressure on them so that unwillingly, if needs be, they decline to break the strike, for fear of public criticism and condemnation, of calumny and obloquy, to put it no higher. There are of course those who think that a strike should be restricted to the attempt to persuade. But if I am right this attempt to restrict strikers to friendly persuasion is an attempt to prevent a strike from being a strike, and therefore an infringement on the right to strike as such, if such there be. Indeed, since the right to persuade seems, like the right to withdraw your labour and the right to combine, at least in some things, a right which we surely have whether there is a right to strike or not, it is only this right to prevent which provides a distinctive, substantive component to the right to strike as such. (More accurately, it is a right to attempt to prevent. The right to persuade, similarly, is a right to attempt to persuade, or else those who are not persuaded have infringed your rights!) So this is the right which needs to be explained and justified: not just the boycott, but the enforced boycott.

#### No turns – strikes may have good justifications such as hindering hindrances but this doesn’t prove that a right exists.

Locke, Don. [NOT john locke] “The Right to Strike.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series, vol. 18, 1984, pp. 173–202., doi:10.1017/S0957042X00003163 JS

Behind this difficulty lies a more fundamental one: that this just war or just cause justification does not, in fact, provide a right to strike at all. 'So long as the cause is just', said Cardinal Manning, 'the right to strike is undeniable' (1891/1901, p. 114); and implies thereby that where the cause is not just, there is no right to strike. But in that case it is not, strictly, a right at all: if something is already right, you need no right to justify doing it; you need a right to justify what you do only if what you do would otherwise, in the absence of that right, be wrong. As I put it earlier, a right is a right of doing wrong, and the right to strike therefore means that people are entitled to strike even if they are not in the right, even if they are mistaken or misguided. And this is precisely what the just cause justification does not provide: people are justified in striking if, but only if, their cause is just

### 1NC – Deportation

#### Most farmworkers are undocumented – means the risk of deportation chills exercise of the right to strike – unions can’t protect them.

The World ‘7/21

[The World is public radio’s longest-running daily global news program. Our goal is to engage domestic US audiences with international affairs through human-centered journalism that consistently connects the global to the local and builds empathy for people around the world. 07/21/2021. “Farmworkers who face extreme heat fear retaliation or deportation if they complain, says nurse,” <https://theworld.org/stories/2021-07-21/farmworkers-who-face-extreme-heat-fear-retaliation-or-deportation-if-they>] pat

In the US, many of the people who work in the fields, growing and harvesting fruits and vegetables, are immigrants. Only a handful of states have any labor standards specifically to deal with extreme heat, and workers are often reluctant to advocate for their rights, for fear of jeopardizing their jobs or getting deported.

#### That’s half the workforce.

FWD ‘21

[FWD.us is a bipartisan team of political campaigners spanning the fields of policy, advocacy, and technology working to create a stronger America. From whom we hire to whom we work with, we bring together people from a variety of backgrounds, ideologies, and lived experiences—and it makes us better at what we do. 03/18/2021. “Immigrant Farmworkers and America's Food Production: 5 Things to Know,” <https://www.fwd.us/news/immigrant-farmworkers-and-americas-food-production-5-things-to-know/>] pat

Undocumented farm workers make up approximately 50% of the farm labor workforce. Without their hard work, millions of pounds of food would otherwise go unharvested. While these workers pay taxes and contribute to the economy, they are not protected by U.S. labor laws, and they live every day under the threat of arrest and family separation – all while working in extremely difficult conditions.

### 1NC – Thumpers

#### Reducing waste and improving distribution are the issue---not production

Easterbrook 18—Author of eleven books, he has been a staff writer, national correspondent or contributing editor of The Atlantic for nearly 40 years, was a fellow in economics, then in government studies, at the Brookings Institution, and a fellow in international affairs at the Fulbright Foundation [Gregg, February 2018, *It's Better Than It Looks: Reasons for Optimism in an Age of Fear*, Chapter 6: Why Does Technology Become Safer Instead of More Dangerous?, pgs 166, Google Play] AMarb

"Agriculture has become so effective that we're producing too much calories and protein for our own good. The rich nations would be better off with 25 percent less food. Top yield in farming may be close to maxing out, but average yield can improve a great deal; reducing waste and improving distribution is more important than increasing production. We've adapted so rapidly to population growth that if the global count stops at nine or ten billion people, the world should be okay. Twenty billion people would be different.

### 1NC – BioD !D

#### No biodiversity tipping point

* Permian-Triassic extinction proves resiliency
* No data on tipping points
* Ecosystems never outright collapse
* 600 models prove no ecosystem collapse

Hance 18 [Jeremy Hance, wildlife blogger for the Guardian and a journalist with Mongabay focusing on forests, indigenous people, climate change and more. He is also the author of Life is Good: Conservation in an Age of Mass Extinction. Could biodiversity destruction lead to a global tipping point? Jan 16, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/radical-conservation/2018/jan/16/biodiversity-extinction-tipping-point-planetary-boundary]

Just over 250 million years ago, the planet suffered what may be described as its greatest holocaust: ninety-six percent of marine genera (plural of genus) and seventy percent of land vertebrate vanished for good. Even insects suffered a mass extinction – the only time before or since. Entire classes of animals – like trilobites – went out like a match in the wind.

But what’s arguably most fascinating about this event – known as the Permian-Triassic extinction or more poetically, the Great Dying – is the fact that anything survived at all. Life, it seems, is so ridiculously adaptable that not only did thousands of species make it through whatever killed off nearly everything (no one knows for certain though theories abound) but, somehow, after millions of years life even recovered and went on to write new tales.

Even as the Permian-Triassic extinction event shows the fragility of life, it also proves its resilience in the long-term. The lessons of such mass extinctions – five to date and arguably a sixth happening as I write – inform science today. Given that extinction levels are currently 1,000 (some even say 10,000) times the background rate, researchers have long worried about our current destruction of biodiversity – and what that may mean for our future Earth and ourselves.

In 2009, a group of researchers identified nine global boundaries for the planet that if passed could theoretically push the Earth into an uninhabitable state for our species. These global boundaries include climate change, freshwater use, ocean acidification and, yes, biodiversity loss (among others). The group has since updated the terminology surrounding biodiversity, now calling it “biosphere integrity,” but that hasn’t spared it from critique.

A paper last year in Trends in Ecology & Evolution scathingly attacked the idea of any global biodiversity boundary.

“It makes no sense that there exists a tipping point of biodiversity loss beyond which the Earth will collapse,” said co-author and ecologist, José Montoya, with Paul Sabatier Univeristy in France. “There is no rationale for this.”

Montoya wrote the paper along with Ian Donohue, an ecologist at Trinity College in Ireland and Stuart Pimm, one of the world’s leading experts on extinctions, with Duke University in the US.

Montoya, Donohue and Pimm argue that there isn’t evidence of a point at which loss of species leads to ecosystem collapse, globally or even locally. If the planet didn’t collapse after the Permian-Triassic extinction event, it won’t collapse now – though our descendants may well curse us for the damage we’ve done.

Instead, according to the researchers, every loss of species counts. But the damage is gradual and incremental, not a sudden plunge. Ecosystems, according to them, slowly degrade but never fail outright.

“Of more than 600 experiments of biodiversity effects on various functions, none showed a collapse,” Montoya said. “In general, the loss of species has a detrimental effect on ecosystem functions...We progressively lose pollination services, water quality, plant biomass, and many other important functions as we lose species. But we never observe a critical level of biodiversity over which functions collapse.”

1. https://www.dictionary.com/browse/ought [↑](#footnote-ref-1)