### 1

#### Permissibility negates – ought is a moral obligation[[1]](#footnote-1) and permissibility proves a lack of obligation. Permissibility is always valid neg ground on text – ought is in the resolution so denying ought statements is core neg ground.

#### Presumption negates – a] We assume statements to be false until proven true. That is why we don’t believe in alternate realities or conspiracy theories – b] proving a statement requires absolute certainty – statements like “I know it’s raining but I’m not sure it’s raining” are incoherent.

#### Vote neg on the error constraint – normative prescriptions require the possibility of doing otherwise else that action would lack moral significance.

Lavin, Douglas. “Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error.” Ethics, vol. 114, no. 3, The University of Chicago Press, 2004, pp. 424–57, <https://doi.org/10.1086/381695>. JS bracketed for gender

For a creature to be correctly said to have a rule, it is necessary that it should be able to break the rule. The physical or causal possibility of making a mistake, or doing what one is obliged, by what one means, intends, believes, and desires, not to do, is essential to the conception of such states and shows the essentially normative nature of their significance. An agent may be mistaken about what he has reason to do. . . . This is essential to preserving the point that statements of what people have reason to do have normative force; no account that excludes this can be adequate. Reason-giving explanations require a conception of how things ideally would be, sufficiently independent of how any actual individual’s psychological economy operates to serve as the basis for critical assessment of it. In particular, there must be a potential gap between the ideal and the specific directions in which a given agent’s motivations push [them] him. There is no normativity if you cannot be wrong.1

#### The concept of a “just government” tautologically presupposes a government that acts in a just manner – if a just government were to commit unjust actions, then they would no longer be a just government which means there is no possibility of them doing otherwise – thus under the error constraint, a just government cannot be said to have any moral obligations.

### 2

#### The ROB is to vote for the debater who proves the truth or falsity of the resolution – anything else moots 6 minutes of the NC since it’s predicated on proving the falsity of the rez – prefer it:

#### a. Five dictionaries define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm as to prove true which means the sole judge obligation is to vote on the resolution’s truth or falsity. This outweighs on common usage – it is abundantly clear that our roles are verified, meaning that only truth testing is jurisdictional.

#### b. Ground- truth testing allows for the more ground than any other ROB since it allows for a literal infinite amount of arguments on a range of argumentation style giving the most breadth and depth of topic and phil ed

#### c. Circularity- debate is a question of truth or falsity, and the aff advocacy is the focus of every round- all arguments against this concede it’s validity, since it’s premised on your own argument being true

#### Fairness is good –

### 3

#### Morality must be derived a priori:

#### 1] Naturalistic Fallacy – experience merely perceives how the world is, which cannot correlate to how the world ought to be due to the is-ought fallacy.

#### 2] Uncertainty – inability to know others’ experience due to a limited perception makes empiricism unreliable for universal ethics.

#### 3] Verification – The logic of evaluating consequences is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform but we could only reach that conclusion through an observation of past events.

#### Ethics must answer the problem of infinite regress since we could question moral principles forever and avoid following morality. Only reason solves – asking why reason is important concedes its authority as we’re asking a reason for using our reason.

#### Moral law must be both necessary and universal – only universal law can be constitutive of agency because it applies to all agents in all instances – other maxims cannot guide action in every situation. Willing coercion is a contradiction in conception because you extend your own freedom while simultaneously undermining your ability to act in the first place.

#### Thus, the standard is respecting freedom. Prefer it:

#### 1] Performativity – Argumentation presupposes one’s own freedom to act – if I violated your freedom, you wouldn’t be able to debate – this means contestations of my framework prove it true

#### 2] Culpability – if we didn’t regard agents as free, then we can’t hold them culpable for immoral actions since there would be no possibility of them doing otherwise and being moral.

#### 3] Other Frameworks Collapse – viewing others as ends in themselves is a prerequisite for moral value.

Korsgaard ’83 (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, "for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action." By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### Now negate:

#### The inherent ideology of the strike demands a right to a job they never perform – this is incoherent and requires coercion upon prospective employees else no right to strike would exist.

Locke, Don. [NOT john locke] “The Right to Strike.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series, vol. 18, 1984, pp. 173–202., doi:10.1017/S0957042X00003163 JS

So what is distinctive about a strike is, as I suggested before, the refusal to do a particular job, combined with the insistence that that job is none the less still yours. Now this in itself seems curious enough to require some explanation: how can someone be entitled to claim a job as his, when he isn't willing to do it? Surely if he doesn't want to do it and others do, then it should be their job, not his? But what seems to require justification is the apparent consequence of this, the attempt to prevent others from taking that job, even though they might be willing, even eager, to do it in the striker's place. Surely this is an unjust restriction of liberty, the liberty of employers to employ, the liberty of workers to work? If there is, as many claim, a right to work, how can there be a right to strike, a right, that is, to prevent others working, when they are both willing and able? Thus a strike is not just a boycott, it is an enforced boycott, an attempt to force others to join in the boycott, even though they might be perfectly willing to take that job on the terms which the striker rejects. Of course, if it were simply a matter of persuading others not to take that job, that would hardly need justification. Presumably one man may attempt to persuade another of just about, but not quite, anything he pleases. Indeed, if strikers succeed in persuading someone not to take a job, they are not in any obvious sense preventing them from taking it. What needs justifying, rather is the attempt to prevent someone from taking a job, after you have failed to persuade him not to. Much depends, of course, on the form which the prevention takes: for most of us there will be some limit somewhere, beyond which we think strikers should not go; and I have already said that I will not attempt the perhaps impossible task of determining where that limit should be. But what does seem clear to me is that, of necessity, a strike goes beyond merely attempting to persuade people not to break the strike; to use a suitably vague phrase, it involves putting pressure on those who would break the strike, to make it difficult or unpleasant for them to do so. That, surely is what the apparatus and ideology of strikes is for: not just to persuade non-strikers so that they willingly accept whatever restrictions the strikers seek to impose; but to put pressure on them so that unwillingly, if needs be, they decline to break the strike, for fear of public criticism and condemnation, of calumny and obloquy, to put it no higher. There are of course those who think that a strike should be restricted to the attempt to persuade. But if I am right this attempt to restrict strikers to friendly persuasion is an attempt to prevent a strike from being a strike, and therefore an infringement on the right to strike as such, if such there be. Indeed, since the right to persuade seems, like the right to withdraw your labour and the right to combine, at least in some things, a right which we surely have whether there is a right to strike or not, it is only this right to prevent which provides a distinctive, substantive component to the right to strike as such. (More accurately, it is a right to attempt to prevent. The right to persuade, similarly, is a right to attempt to persuade, or else those who are not persuaded have infringed your rights!) So this is the right which needs to be explained and justified: not just the boycott, but the enforced boycott.

#### No turns – strikes may have good justifications such as hindering hindrances but this doesn’t prove that a right exists.

Locke, Don. [NOT john locke] “The Right to Strike.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series, vol. 18, 1984, pp. 173–202., doi:10.1017/S0957042X00003163 JS

Behind this difficulty lies a more fundamental one: that this just war or just cause justification does not, in fact, provide a right to strike at all. 'So long as the cause is just', said Cardinal Manning, 'the right to strike is undeniable' (1891/1901, p. 114); and implies thereby that where the cause is not just, there is no right to strike. But in that case it is not, strictly, a right at all: if something is already right, you need no right to justify doing it; you need a right to justify what you do only if what you do would otherwise, in the absence of that right, be wrong. As I put it earlier, a right is a right of doing wrong, and the right to strike therefore means that people are entitled to strike even if they are not in the right, even if they are mistaken or misguided. And this is precisely what the just cause justification does not provide: people are justified in striking if, but only if, their cause is just

### Overview

1. https://www.dictionary.com/browse/ought [↑](#footnote-ref-1)