### NC

#### Morality must be derived a priori:

#### 1] Naturalistic Fallacy – experience merely perceives how the world is, which cannot correlate to how the world ought to be due to the is-ought fallacy.

#### 2] Uncertainty – inability to know others’ experience due to a limited perception makes empiricism unreliable for universal ethics.

#### 3] Verification – The logic of evaluating consequences is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform but we could only reach that conclusion through an observation of past events.

#### Ethics must answer the problem of infinite regress since we could question moral principles forever and avoid following morality. Only reason solves – asking why reason is important concedes its authority as we’re asking a reason for using our reason.

#### Moral law must be both necessary and universal – only universal law can be constitutive of agency because it applies to all agents in all instances – other maxims cannot guide action in every situation. Willing coercion is a contradiction in conception because you extend your own freedom while simultaneously undermining your ability to act in the first place.

#### Thus, the standard is respecting freedom. Prefer it:

#### 1] Performativity – Argumentation presupposes one’s own freedom to act – if I violated your freedom, you wouldn’t be able to debate – this means contestations of my framework prove it true

#### 2] Culpability – if we didn’t regard agents as free, then we can’t hold them culpable for immoral actions since there would be no possibility of them doing otherwise and being moral.

#### 3] Other Frameworks Collapse – viewing others as ends in themselves is a prerequisite for moral value.

Korsgaard ’83 (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, "for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action." By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### Now negate:

#### 1] The inherent ideology of the strike demands a right to a job they never perform – this creates contradictions and requires coercion in order to be successful.

Locke, Don. [NOT john locke] “The Right to Strike.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series, vol. 18, 1984, pp. 173–202., doi:10.1017/S0957042X00003163 JS

So what is distinctive about a strike is, as I suggested before, the refusal to do a particular job, combined with the insistence that that job is none the less still yours. Now this in itself seems curious enough to require some explanation: how can someone be entitled to claim a job as his, when he isn't willing to do it? Surely if he doesn't want to do it and others do, then it should be their job, not his? But what seems to require justification is the apparent consequence of this, the attempt to prevent others from taking that job, even though they might be willing, even eager, to do it in the striker's place. Surely this is an unjust restriction of liberty, the liberty of employers to employ, the liberty of workers to work? If there is, as many claim, a right to work, how can there be a right to strike, a right, that is, to prevent others working, when they are both willing and able? Thus a strike is not just a boycott, it is an enforced boycott, an attempt to force others to join in the boycott, even though they might be perfectly willing to take that job on the terms which the striker rejects. Of course, if it were simply a matter of persuading others not to take that job, that would hardly need justification. Presumably one man may attempt to persuade another of just about, but not quite, anything he pleases. Indeed, if strikers succeed in persuading someone not to take a job, they are not in any obvious sense preventing them from taking it. What needs justifying, rather is the attempt to prevent someone from taking a job, after you have failed to persuade him not to. Much depends, of course, on the form which the prevention takes: for most of us there will be some limit somewhere, beyond which we think strikers should not go; and I have already said that I will not attempt the perhaps impossible task of determining where that limit should be. But what does seem clear to me is that, of necessity, a strike goes beyond merely attempting to persuade people not to break the strike; to use a suitably vague phrase, it involves putting pressure on those who would break the strike, to make it difficult or unpleasant for them to do so. That, surely is what the apparatus and ideology of strikes is for: not just to persuade non-strikers so that they willingly accept whatever restrictions the strikers seek to impose; but to put pressure on them so that unwillingly, if needs be, they decline to break the strike, for fear of public criticism and condemnation, of calumny and obloquy, to put it no higher. There are of course those who think that a strike should be restricted to the attempt to persuade. But if I am right this attempt to restrict strikers to friendly persuasion is an attempt to prevent a strike from being a strike, and therefore an infringement on the right to strike as such, if such there be. Indeed, since the right to persuade seems, like the right to withdraw your labour and the right to combine, at least in some things, a right which we surely have whether there is a right to strike or not, it is only this right to prevent which provides a distinctive, substantive component to the right to strike as such. (More accurately, it is a right to attempt to prevent. The right to persuade, similarly, is a right to attempt to persuade, or else those who are not persuaded have infringed your rights!) So this is the right which needs to be explained and justified: not just the boycott, but the enforced boycott.

#### 2] No turns – strikes may have good justifications such as hindering hindrances but this doesn’t prove that a right exists.

Locke, Don. [NOT john locke] “The Right to Strike.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series, vol. 18, 1984, pp. 173–202., doi:10.1017/S0957042X00003163 JS

Behind this difficulty lies a more fundamental one: that this just war or just cause justification does not, in fact, provide a right to strike at all. 'So long as the cause is just', said Cardinal Manning, 'the right to strike is undeniable' (1891/1901, p. 114); and implies thereby that where the cause is not just, there is no right to strike. But in that case it is not, strictly, a right at all: if something is already right, you need no right to justify doing it; you need a right to justify what you do only if what you do would otherwise, in the absence of that right, be wrong. As I put it earlier, a right is a right of doing wrong, and the right to strike therefore means that people are entitled to strike even if they are not in the right, even if they are mistaken or misguided. And this is precisely what the just cause justification does not provide: people are justified in striking if, but only if, their cause is just

### TT

#### The ROB is to determine whether the resolution is a true statement, the ROJ is to communicate that to tab – prefer it:

#### a) Five dictionaries~1~ define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm~2~ as to prove true which means the sole judge obligation is to vote on the resolution's truth or falsity.

#### b) ground- truth testing allows for the more ground than any other ROB since it allows for a literal infinite amount of arguments on a range of argumentation style giving the most breadth and depth of topic and phil ed

#### c) Isomorphism- ROBs that aren't phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms necessitate that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving the problem. Truth Testing solves since it's solely a question of if something is true or false, there isn't a close estimate

### T

#### A] Interp - the aff can't defend a subset of workers that have an unconditional right to strike recognized by the government.

Leslie 16 Leslie, Sarah-Jane [Sarah-Jane Leslie (Ph.D., Princeton, 2007) is the dean of the Graduate School and Class of 1943 Professor of Philosophy. She has previously served as the vice dean for faculty development in the Office of the Dean of the Faculty, director of the Program in Linguistics, and founding director of the Program in Cognitive Science at Princeton University. She is also affiliated faculty in the Department of Psychology, the University Center for Human Values, the Program in Gender and Sexuality Studies, and the Kahneman-Treisman Center for Behavioral Science and Public Policy], 4-24-2016, "Generic Generalizations (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/> SM

Isolating the Generic Interpretation Consider the following pairs of sentences: (1) a. Tigers are striped. b. Tigers are on the front lawn. (2) a. A tiger is striped. b. A tiger is on the front lawn. (3) a. The tiger is striped. b. The tiger is on the front lawn. The sentence pairs above are prima facie syntactically parallel—both are subject-predicate sentences whose subjects consist of the same common noun coupled with the same, or no, article. However, the interpretation of first sentence of each pair is intuitively quite different from the interpretation of the second sentence in the pair. In the second sentences, we are talking about some particular tigers: a group of tigers in (1b), some individual tiger in (2b), and some unique salient or familiar tiger in (3b)—a beloved pet, perhaps. In the first sentences, however, we are saying something general. There is/are no particular tiger or tigers that we are talking about. The second sentences of the pairs receive what is called an existential interpretation. The hallmark of the existential interpretation of a sentence containing a bare plural or an indefinite singular is that it may be paraphrased with “some” with little or no change in meaning; hence the terminology “existential reading”. The application of the term “existential interpretation” is perhaps less appropriate when applied to the definite singular, but it is intended there to cover interpretation of the definite singular as referring to a unique contextually salient/familiar particular individual, not to a kind. There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. Consider our examples above. In (1b), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” salva veritate, but in (1a) we cannot. If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true. However, “tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. (1a) does not entail that animals are striped, but (1b) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995). Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in (1a) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in (1b) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.) 1.2 Stage Level and Individual Level Predicates Having distinguished two quite different meanings of these seemingly similar sentence pairs, the question arises: what is the basis of these two interpretations? This is of course a matter of debate, but one important thesis is that it is the predicate that determines which of the two readings the subject will receive, particularly in the case of bare plural generics. In his 1977 dissertation, Greg Carlson argued that the distinction between “stage level” and “individual level” predicates is key here, and proposed that stage level predications give rise to existential readings of bare plurals and indefinite singulars, while individual level ones give rise to generic readings. The distinction between the two types of predicates can be drawn intuitively, and also on the basis of linguistic patterns (Milsark 1974; Carlson 1977; Stump 1985). Semantically, individual level predicates express properties that normally are had by items for quite extended periods, often comprising the items’ whole existence. Stage-level predicates, on the other hand, express properties normally had by items for relatively short time intervals. Some examples of both types are as follows: Individual level predicates “is tall”; “is intelligent”; “knows French”; “is a mammal”; “is female”; “is a singer”; “loves Bob”; “hates Bob” Stage level predicates “is drunk”; “is barking”; “is speaking French”; “is taking an exam”; “is sober”; “is sick”, “is sitting”; “is on the lawn”, “is in the room”. Clearly the semantic distinction is not hard and fast: a teetotaler may be sober for the entire course of his existence, and the chronically ill may be sick for the entire course of theirs, and Alice in Wonderland is tall at some times but short at others. In the normal course of affairs, individual level predicates express more stable and less temporally intermittent properties than stage level ones do. The distinction also manifests itself linguistically. Stage level predicates are permissible in the following constructions, while individual level ones are not: (4) John saw Bill drunk/sober/sick/naked. (5) John saw Bill speaking French/taking an exam/smoking cigarettes. (6) John saw Bill on the lawn/in the room. (7) \*John saw Bill intelligent/tall/a mammal/male. (8) \*John saw Bill knowing French/hating Bob. There-insertion constructions behave similarly: (9) There are men drunk/sober/sick/naked. (10) There are men speaking French/taking an exam/smoking cigarettes. (11) There are men on the lawn/in the room. (12) \*There are men intelligent/tall/mammals/male. (13) \*There are men knowing French/hating Bob. Stage level predicates can be modified by locatives, while individual level ones cannot: (14) John is drunk/speaking French/smoking in 1879 Hall. (15) \*John is a mammal/intelligent/male in 1879 Hall. (16) \*John knows French/hates Bob in 1879 Hall. Carlson noted the difference in syntactic behavior between individual and stage level predicates, and proposed that the distinction between the classes of predicates underlies the distinction between existential and generic readings of bare plurals: (17) Students are drunk/speaking French/on the lawn. (existential) (18) Students are intelligent/mammals/tall/male. (generic) (19) Students know French/hate Bob. (generic) Stage level predicates appear to give rise to the existential reading of bare plurals, while individual level ones give rise to generic readings. Carlson also took the distinction to underwrite the difference between existential and generic readings of the indefinite singular:

#### It applies to “workers” – 1] upward entailment test – “governments ought to recognize the right of workers to strike” doesn’t entail that governments ought to recognize the right of everybody to strike since it doesn’t make sense for unemployed people to strike, 2] adverb test – adding “usually” to the res doesn’t change the meaning because “unconditionally" means no matter what

**B] Violation –**

#### C] Vote neg—

#### 1] Semantics outweigh --

#### A] Topicality is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden, they agreed to debate the topic when they came to the tournament

#### B] It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it.

#### 2] Limits: **You can spec in any sector like climate, tech, manufacturing, healthcare almost every sector has experienced strikes. There’s no universal DA since if you spec a hyper specific sector it won’t have any impact on the economy. That explodes neg prep burdens and kills engagement – even if generics solve, it’s a horrible model that leads to the same stale debates.**

#### D] Paradigm Issues –

#### 1] T is DTD – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start

#### 2] Comes before 1AR theory -- A] If we had to be abusive it’s because it was impossible to engage their aff B] T outweighs on scope because their abuse affected every speech that came after the 1AC C] Topic norms outweigh on urgency – we only have a few months to set them

#### 3] Use competing interps on T – A] topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical B] reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### 4] No RVIs – A] Forcing the 1NC to go all in on the shell kills substance education and neg strat B] discourages checking real abuse C] Encourages baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quickly

### T

#### Interpretation: the affirmative must defend a right to strike for workers who earn money.

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/worker> JS

#### a person who does a particular job to earn money

#### standards:

#### 1] limits – you can defend any group of people who aren’t workers like students, black people, minorities, etc which moots core neg disads

### Case

#### 1] We hijack your framework – critique cannot be divorced from Kantian thinking. A priori reason is necessary to identify oppressive beliefs.

Wood, Allen, 2007 Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University. *Kantian Ethics*, Cambridge University Press, pg. 11-12,. 11/21/17 MB PZ

Against those theories that want to ground ethics on natural feelings, inclinations, or passions (such as sympathy), Kant has two main objections. One is that feelings and inclinations do not suffice to ground clear and determinate principles for action. But the deeper objection is that in human beings, no feelings, empirical desires, or passions are merely “natural” – that is, good or innocent. All are at the same time social (and socially corrupted), so that the most we can expect from them is a correspondence to what is morally good that is contingent and at best precarious. Ethical theories grounded on them therefore might give the right results for a different species of rational creatures, a species that was asocial or whose sociability was not, like ours, infected with self-conceited ambition and a passionate need to dominate our fellows. When applied to us, such theories are either too naïve or too complacent, especially in the context of our more developed or “civilized” societies. In other words, Kantian ethics is fundamentally committed to a radical critique of human social life, especially of social life in its “civilized” form. This critical tendency is not a mere ancillary feature or contingent concomitant of Kantian ethics. It conditions the fundamental conception of Kantian ethical theory. For it is Kant’s view that our only resource in combating the radical evil of our social condition is the faculty of reason, whose development accompanies that of our propensity to evil, and which alone enables us to recognize evil for what it is. This is why moral principles for Kant must be a priori rather than empirical in origin, and why we cannot trust our natural feelings, inclinations, or passions to provide us with moral distinctions, judgments, and motives

#### Kant solves oppression – we recognize the agency and rationality of the oppressed and argue that they ought to have freedom of will and judgement. Independent voters about how rationality is exclusionary presuppose that certain minority groups aren’t capable of reasoning which itself is racist and turns them.

#### 2] Only Kantianism can create binding reasons to actually not be oppressive, as any other system of ethics allows for individuals to continually asking why they ought to be moral – that’s regress argument.

#### Frame the round through ideal theory – nonideal and ideal theory are compatible but ideal theory’s a prerequisite.

**Shelby 13** [Tommie Shelby, “Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Charles Mills,” *Critical Philosophy of Race*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2013), pp. 145-162] AG

On the Rawlsian view, **injustices are** conceptualized as **deviations from the ideal principles of justice, in much the same way that fallacious reasoning is conceived as a deviation from the rules of logical inference**. An injustice is a failure on the part of individuals or social arrangements to satisfy what the ideal principles of justice demand. Thus, **charges of injustice presuppose ideals of justice, which particular individuals and institutions can and often do depart from**. Such deviations can be small or great, minor or serious, and **depending on the** size and nature of **the gap between ideals and practice** (and also on whether these deviations are avoidable or blameworthy), **different remedies will be required. Nonideal theory specifies and justifies the principles that should guide our responses to such deviations from ideal justice**.17 Within nonideal theory (and here I focus on domestic rather than global justice), we should distinguish at least four sets of principles: 1. Principles of reform and revolution: the principles that should guide efforts to bring an unjust institutional arrangement more in line with justice such that the society’s members have a more just (though not necessarily perfectly just) society within which to live. 2. Principles of rectification: the principles that should guide the steps a society takes to remedy or make amends for the injuries and losses the oppressed have suffered as a result of past injustice. 3. Penal principles: the principles that should guide the policies a society relies on when responding to individual noncompliance with what justice requires (e.g., principles for punishment, detention, and deportation). 4. Political ethics: the duties and permissions individuals have under unjust social conditions, that is, the principles that should guide their response to injustice. Rawls’s theory provides some direction for (1) and (4), and some limited guidance for (3). But he provides almost no help with (2). And it is (2)—principles of rectification—that is Mills’s chief concern and the main concern of many black radicals. Most of my work has focused on principles of reform and revolution and political ethics (particularly the political ethics of the oppressed), and on the relationship between the two. Yet I certainly see value in work defending principles of rectification Indeed, we can view the principles of reform and revolution and the principles of rectification as jointly constituting a theory of corrective justice. Principles of type (1) have to do with altering the basic structure of a society so that it better approximates a well-ordered society. Type (2) principles address the need to make amends to those burdened and harmed by unjust basic structures. Type (1) principles are forward looking, oriented toward establishing a just society. Type (2) principles are backward looking, oriented toward settling unpaid moral debts. To see that (1) and (2) are distinct it is enough to observe that one could fully pay reparations to the victims of past racial injustice and yet their society remain unjust, including racially unjust. Rawls is concerned with corrective justice, but he thinks of it as encompassing more than laying down principles for making amends to the victims of past injustice. He conceives of it as also including the philosophical arm of reform or revolutionary efforts to establish a society regulated by a mutual commitment to justice, a well-ordered society. When the principles of justice function as a goal of reform or revolution, what the reformers and revolutionaries are ultimately aiming at is this: a society in which the principles are fully realized in its institutions and citizens support and comply with institutional rules because these are in accord with their shared conception of justice. It is in this way that ideal theory serves as a guide for nonideal theory. Mills might accept this more expansive conception of corrective justice and even concede that Rawls’s ideal theory can aid us in its development. But I suspect he would still have doubts about ideal theory’s helpfulness in developing the rectificatory dimension of nonideal theory. After all, Rawls’s two principles are supposed to provide a basis for citizens to judge the validity of their claims of justice on their social system. One kind of claim citizens may make (on their own behalf or on behalf of others) is that they or others are due reparations for harms they have incurred as a result of serious injustice. Does Rawls provide any guidance for judging the validity of such claims? Mills is skeptical. He asserts, “Surely forty years is long enough—especially in a society to whose creation racism has been central—for there to be a significant body of work by now showing how one derives principles of rectificatory racial justice (a “pressing and urgent matter” [Rawls, Theory, 9] if ever there was one) from the idealtheory principles!” (23, note 6) In reply I would note that serving as a guide for nonideal theory is not the same as serving as a set of axioms from which theorems of rectification can be directly deduced. I doubt that ideal theory could play this latter justificatory role. And it should not surprise us if auxiliary precepts of justice were required for a fully adequate theory of compensatory justice. (The same would presumably be true of penal principles. After all, one cannot strictly derive a principle of proportionality in punishment from the two principles of justice either.)18 What ideal theory can provide, however, are evaluative standards for judging when such rectification is prima facie called for—namely, when culpable violations of the principles of justice have caused serious and identifiable harm. The ideal principles (particularly the equal liberty principle) help to explain what was wrong with, say, Jim Crow and Apartheid and why the damage they did to their victims warrants various corrective measures, perhaps including reparations. The trouble with **Mills**’s view is that he **regards nonideal theory as independent of ideal theory**, indeed as an alternative to it. **But nonideal theory—the study of the principles that should guide our responses to injustice—cannot succeed without knowing what the standards of justice are** (**and** perhaps also **what justifies these standards**). It is not clear how we are to develop a philosophically adequate and complete theory of how to respond to social injustice without first knowing what makes a social scheme unjust. **When dealing with gross injustices, such as slavery, we may** of course be able to **judge correctly that a social arrangement is unjust** simply **by observing it** or having it described to us, **relying exclusively on our pre-theoretic moral convictions**. We don’t need a theory for that. **But with less manifest injustices, or when our political values seem to conflict, or when we’re uncertain about what justice requires, or when there is great but honest disagreement about whether a practice is unjust, we won’t know which aspects of a society should be altered in the absence of a more systematic conception of justice**. Without a set of principles that enables us to identify the injustice-making features of a social system, we could not be confident in the direction social change should take, at least not if our aim is to realize a fully just society.