### 1

**Interpretation: the aff may not defend that member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for a medicine or subset of medicines.**

Nebel 19 [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs] “Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution.” Vbriefly. August 12, 2019. https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the- standardized-tests-resolution/?fbclid=IwAR0hUkKdDzHWrNeqEVI7m59pwsnmqLl490n4uRLQTe7bWmWDO\_avWCNzi14

“Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural . I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons. First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “ Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them , but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “ colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural. Second, “ colleges and universities” fails the upward-entailment test for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “ Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals

#### This applies to the resolution – proving “Korea ought to reduce IP rights” doesn’t entail that “the member states of the WTO ought to reduce IP rights” so it’s a generic bare plual incapable of being proven through specific instances.

**Violation: They spec the EU**

**Vote neg for limits and ground – their model allows affs to defend anything from Covid vaccines to HIV drugs to Insulin— there's no universal DA since each has different functions and political implications — that explodes neg prep and leads to random medicine of the week affs which makes cutting stable neg links impossible — limits key to reciprocal engagement since they create a caselist for neg prep and it takes out ground like DAs to certain medicines which are some of the few neg generics when affs spec medicines.**

**TVA solves – you could’ve read your plan as an advantage under a whole res advocacy.**

**Fairness is a voter – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Outweighs because it’s the only intrinsic part of debate – all other rules can be debated over but rely on some conception of fairness to be justified.**

**Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms for debate.**

**Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.**

**No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices**

### 2

#### Permissibility and presumption negate—the aff has the burden of proof to show the normative claim of the resolution is true, so the neg gets anything that denies that.

#### Any moral valuation presupposes the unconditional worth of humanity—that means treating others as ends in themselves. Korsgaard:

Christine Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness” Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, RE

The argument shows how Kant’s idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least**,** if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends(G 45-46/427-28; Doctrine of Virtue 43- 44/384-85). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, “for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth” (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be “humanity” or “rational nature,” which he defines as the capacity to set an end (G 56/437; DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a “subjective principle of human action.” By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since “every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself” (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person’s ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others – the ends that they choose – and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### Impacts:

#### All other frameworks collapse—non-Kantian theories source obligations in extrinsically good objects, but that presupposes the goodness of the rational will which means all other frameworks devolve to skep

#### this requires that maxims be universal: to make an exception for yourself is to value your own humanity above the humanity of others and thus treat them as means.

#### Now negate:

#### 1] Self ownership entails a right to all products of your body and mind, which includes intellectual property.

Attas D. (2008) Lockean Justifications of Intellectual Property. In: Gosseries A., Marciano A., Strowel A. (eds) Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice. Palgrave Macmillan, London. <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-0-230-58239-2_2> JS

On a very simple notion of intellectual creativity, ideas are simply extensions of the self. That is to say, mental products such as ideas, inventions, works of art, and so on, come into being as parts of the mind, in the same way as body products, such as hair or blood, come into being as parts of the body. Since we own our body, we also own its products; if we similarly own our mind, we also own our mind’s products. Were Locke to have given any thought to the idea of intellectual property when he was writing Of Civil Government, he might have said not only that ‘The labour of his body, and the work of his hands’, but also that the ideas of his mind, ‘we may say are properly his’. There is no real need to ‘appropriate’ anything in the genuine sense, since these things come into the world already attached to persons having foundational rights of self-ownership with respect to them.

#### 2] Taking away intellectual property is a contradiction in conception, since if every agent was able to take the intellectual property then a] it would no longer be property and thus would not exist making the initial act incoherent and b] no one would make IP since there’s no incentive to so there’d be no IP to steal.

### 3

#### Reduce means permanent reduction – it’s distinct from “waive” or “suspend.”

**Reynolds 59** (Judge (In the Matter of Doris A. Montesani, Petitioner, v. Arthur Levitt, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al., Respondents [NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department 9 A.D.2d 51; 189 N.Y.S.2d 695; 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7391 August 13, 1959, lexis)

Section 83's counterpart with regard to nondisability pensioners, section 84, prescribes a reduction only if the pensioner should again take a public job. The disability pensioner is penalized if he takes any type of employment. The reason for the difference, of course, is that in one case the only reason pension benefits are available is because the pensioner is considered incapable of gainful employment, while in the other he has fully completed his "tour" and is considered as having earned his reward with almost no strings attached. It would be manifestly unfair to the ordinary retiree to accord the disability retiree the benefits of the System to which they both belong when the latter is otherwise capable of earning a living and had not fulfilled his service obligation. If it were to be held that withholdings under section 83 were payable whenever the pensioner died or stopped his other employment the whole purpose of the provision would be defeated, i.e., the System might just as well have continued payments during the other employment since it must later pay it anyway.  [\*\*\*13] The section says "reduced", does not say that monthly payments shall be temporarily suspended; it says that the pension itself shall be reduced. The plain dictionary meaning of the word is to diminish, lower or degrade. The word "reduce" seems adequately to indicate permanency.

#### Violation – the plan waives intellectual property protections in certain instances – there are no fewer patents on the books post-aff, just changes when they get enforced.

#### Vote neg for limits and neg ground – re-instatement or waiving under any infinite number of conditions doubles aff ground – every plan becomes either temporary or permanent – you cherry-pick the best criteria and I must prep every aff while they avoid core topic discussions like reduction-based DAs which decks generics like Pharma Innovation and Bio-Tech.

**Independently, Precision is a voter – the counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.**

### 1NC – Disease

#### No extinction from diseases

Farquhar et al. 17 – \*director of the Global Priorities Project, M.A in Physics and Philosophy from the University of Oxford, \*\*Global Priorities Project, \*\*\*Research Associate in the FHI at the University of Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at St. Hugh’s College, \*\*\*\*PhD in philosophy, Researcher at the Centre for Effective Altruism, \*\*\*\*\*Academic Project Manager, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, \*\*\*\*\*\*Director of Research at FHI [Sebastian Farquhar\*, John Halstead\*\*, Owen Cotton-Barratt\*\*\*, Stefan Schubert\*\*\*\*, Haydn Belfield\*\*\*\*\*, Andrew Snyder-Beattie\*\*\*\*\*\*, 2017, Global Priorities Project 2017, “Existential Risk Diplomacy and Governance”, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>] AMarb

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

#### No disease extinction---empirics and isolated populations

Nick Beckstead 14, Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, citing Peter Doherty, recipient of the 1996 Nobel Prize for Medicine, PhD in Immunology from the University of Edinburgh, Michael F. Tamer Chair of Biomedical Research at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, “How much could refuges help us recover from a global catastrophe?” in Futures, published online 18 Nov 2014, Science Direct

That leaves pandemics and cobalt bombs, which will get a longer discussion. While there is little published work on human extinction risk from pandemics, it seems that it would be extremely challenging for any pandemic—whether natural or manmade—to leave the people in a specially constructed refuge as the sole survivors. In his introductory book on pandemics (Doherty, 2013, p. 197) argues:¶ “No pandemic is likely to wipe out the human species. Even without the protection provided by modern science, we survived smallpox, TB, and the plagues of recorded history. Way back when human numbers were very small, infections may have been responsible for some of the genetic bottlenecks inferred from evolutionary analysis, but there is no formal proof of this.”¶ Though some authors have vividly described worst-case scenarios for engineered pandemics (e.g. Rees, 2003 and Posner, 2004; and Myhrvold, 2013), it would take a special effort to infect people in highly isolated locations, especially the 100+ “largely uncontacted” peoples who prefer to be left alone. This is not to say it would be impossible. A madman intent on annihilating all human life could use cropduster-style delivery systems, flying over isolated peoples and infecting them. Or perhaps a pandemic could be engineered to be delivered through animal or environmental vectors that would reach all of these people.

### 1NC – Econ

#### Recessions don’t uniquely cause wars

* War can occur at any stage of expansion, crisis, recession, and recovery
* Doesn’t happen at one particular stage, despite recessions being quick
* Decision to go to war based on military gains – not germane to recession
* Econ explanation for war is downward pressure – happens during prosperity because of unfounded worry for recessions

Liao 19 [Jianan Liao, Shenzhen Nanshan Foreign Language School, China. Business Cycle and War: A Literature Review and Evaluation. Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, volume 68. Copyright 2019]

First, war can occur at any stage of expansion, crisis, recession, recovery, so it is unrealistic to assume that wars occur at any particular stage of the business cycle. On the one hand, although the domestic economic problems in the crisis/recession/depression period break out and become prominent in a short time, in fact, such challenge exists at all stages of the business cycle. When countries cannot manage to solve these problems through conventional approaches, including fiscal and monetary policies, they may resort to military expansion to achieve their goals, a theory known as Lateral Pressure. [13] Under such circumstances, even countries in the period of economic expansion are facing downward pressure on the economy and may try to solve the problem through expansion. On the other hand, although the resources required for foreign wars are huge for countries in economic depression, the decision to wage wars depends largely on the consideration of the gain and loss of wars. Even during depression, governments can raise funding for war by issuing bonds. Argentina, for example, was mired in economic stagflation before the war on the Malvinas islands (also known as the Falkland islands in the UK). In fact, many governments would dramatically increase their expenditure to stimulate the economy during the recession, and economically war is the same as these policies, so the claim that a depressed economy cannot support a war is unfounded. In addition, during the crisis period of the business cycle, which is the early stage of the economic downturn, despite the economic crisis and potential depression, the country still retains the ability to start wars based on its economic and military power. Based on the above understanding, war has the conditions and reasons for its outbreak in all stages of the business cycle.

Second, the economic origin for the outbreak of war is downward pressure on the economy rather than optimism or competition for monopoly capital, which may exist during economic recession or economic prosperity. This is due to a fact that during economic prosperity, people are also worried about a potential economic recession. Blainey pointed out that wars often occur in the economic upturn, which is caused by the optimism in people's mind [14], that is, the confidence to prevail. This interpretation linking optimism and war ignores the strength contrast between the warring parties. Not all wars are equally comprehensive, and there have always been wars of unequal strength. In such a war, one of the parties tends to have an absolute advantage, so the expectation of the outcome of the war is not directly related to the economic situation of the country. Optimism is not a major factor leading to war, but may somewhat serve as stimulation. In addition, Lenin attributed the war to competition between monopoly capital. This theory may seem plausible, but its scope of application is obviously too narrow. Lenin's theory of imperialism is only applicable to developed capitalist countries in the late stage of the development capitalism, but in reality, many wars take place among developing countries whose economies are still at their beginning stages. Therefore, the theory centered on competition among monopoly capital cannot explain most foreign wars. Moreover, even wars that occur during periods of economic expansion are likely to result from the potential expectation of economic recession, the "limits of growth" [15] faced during prosperity — a potential deficiency of market demand. So the downward pressure on the economy is the cause of war.

#### Collapse of industrial society is inevitable---forcing a transition is key to avoid a total collapse that ends civilization

Nafeez M. Ahmed 17, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development, *Failing States, Collapsing Systems: BioPhysical Triggers of Political Violence*, 2017, pp. 11-13

Today, human civilization under late capitalism maintains its increasing distance from thermodynamic equilibrium via the throughput of vast quantities of increasingly depleted fossil fuel reserves, along with other finite and increasingly scarce resources such as metal ores, radionucleotides, rare earth elements, phosphate fertilizer, arable land, and fresh water (Nekola et al. 2013). One indicator of the system’s growing complexity today is the measure of material throughput, or economic growth—Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Under capitalist social-property relations, GDP must continuously increase through the maximization of private sector profits, simply for businesses to survive in the competitive marketplace and for the economy to maintain its ability to meet the consumption requirements of a growing population. However, as the complexity of human civilization has advanced, the continual growth in material throughput is correlated with an escalating rate of depletion of energy and raw materials, as well as an acceleration in the dissipation of energy through intensifying greenhouse gas emissions. Robust scientific assessments now demonstrate that the continuation of those biophysical processes of environmental degradation in a business-as-usual scenario will, before the end of the twenty-first century, fundamentally undermine the biophysical basis of human civilization in its current mode of material organization and structural complexity. Further, the uncontrolled energy releases generated by these biophysical processes are manifested in climate change, extreme weather events, and natural disasters (Earth System Disruption); and drives geopolitical competition, social unrest, and violent conflict (Human System Destabilization). These manifestations of dissipative energy release can be seen as distinctive feedback processes resulting from human civilization’s accelerating exploitation of fossil fuel energy sources within the context of the biophysical limits of the environment. In turn, these two strands of systemic feedbacks—Earth System Disruption (ESD) and Human System Destabilization (HSD)—are occurring within a single, overarching human-environment system, and thus are already inherently interconnected, therefore feeding back into each other. This mutual feedback process creates an amplifying global systemic feedback in which: (1) ESD drives HSD, which in turn generates ‘security’ issues perceived through the lens of ‘threat’ and ‘risk’ analysis; (2) this invites traditional securitized human responses that focus on the expansion of existing military, political and economic power to stabilize existing structures of authority and advance prevailing mechanisms of energy extraction and mobilization; (3) the entrenchment and expansion of existing structures undermines human civilization’s capacity to pursue structural modifications to ameliorate, mitigate or prevent ESD, thus intensifying ESD; (4) the feedback process continues as ESD drives further HSD. The trajectory of this amplifying global systemic feedback, carried to its logical conclusion and assuming no intervening shift, is simply the protracted, cascading collapse of human civilization in its current form toward increasingly less complex, and therefore less resource-intensive configurations, corresponding to available resources and constrained within the environmental limits imposed by accelerating climate change (Tainter 1990). Within this amplifying global systemic feedback, one fundamental obstacle to the systemic restructuring required to avert this outcome is knowledge access, distribution, and processing. In much the same way that an integral factor in an organism’s capacity to adapt to changing environmental conditions is its genetic ability to absorb environmental information and process it through genetic modification that can result in new adaptive biological configurations, human civilization must be capable of absorbing and processing accurate information about the human-environment system, and converting this into actionable knowledge, in order to be empowered to enact the key structural modifications capable of effecting a phase-shift to a more stable adaptive configuration in relation to the Earth System. The difference here, of course, is that while evolutionary biological genetic modifi cation is a question of random mutations, human civilization consists of a collection of conscious agents who can make deliberative decisions on the basis of the information available to them, which must be integrated into knowledge that is capable of informing adaptive behaviors. This raises the question of a pivotal system- wide structural defi ciency in the knowledge processing capacity of human civilization. In short, inaccurate, misleading or partial knowledge bears a particularly central role in cognitive failures pertaining to the most powerful prevailing human political, economic and cultural structures, which is inhibiting the adaptive structural transformation urgently required to avert collapse. The most obvious locus of this global systemic information defi cit is, of course, the global media system— or perhaps more accurately, the Global Media-Industrial Complex (GMIC), and related organs of communication and transnational information dissemination. The GMIC, in effect, currently operates as the information-knowledge architecture of human civilization. The implications of this analysis are stark: scientific data demonstrates that the rapid convergence of multiple global crisis in coming years and decades is pushing a vast array of interconnected sub-systems toward a threshold of simultaneous tipping points. From a complex adaptive systems perspective, this feedback threshold signifies a global system that is on the brink, if not in the midst, of a fundamental phase-shift to a new structural configuration. However, the evolutionary context of this process suggests that the nature and outcome of this global civilizational phase-shift will determine the ultimate fate of civilization. Rapidly changing environmental conditions and the escalating breach of biophysical limits are compelling human civilization to either adapt through fundamental

#### Try or die means the transition’s worth it – our evidence does the impact calculus

Alexander 15—Lecturer and research fellow at the University of Melbourne, co-director of the Simplicity Institute, and a PhD [Samuel, *Sufficiency Economy: Enough for Everyone, Forever*, italics in original]

While Tainter’s theory of social complexity has much to commend it, in this chapter I wish to examine and ultimately challenge Tainter’s conclusion that voluntary simplification is not a viable path to sustainability. In fact, I will argue that it is by far our best bet, even if the odds do not provide grounds for much optimism. Part of the disagreement here turns on differing notions of ‘sustainability’. Whereas Tainter seems to use sustainability to mean *sustaining the existing civilisation*, I use sustainability to mean *changing the form of civilisation* through voluntary simplification, insofar as that is required for humanity to operate within the carrying capacity of the planet (Vale and Vale, 2013). Given that Tainter (1988) seems to accept, as we will see, that his own conception of sustainability will eventually lead to collapse, I feel he is wrong to be so dismissive of voluntary simplification as a strategy for potentially avoiding collapse. It is, I argue, our only alternative to collapse, and if that is so, voluntary simplification ought to be given our most rigorous attention and commitment, even if the chances of success do not seem high. I feel Tainter is flippant about our best hope, and given what is at stake, his dismissal of voluntary simplification should be given close critical attention. Furthermore, even if attempting to sustain the existing civilisation through ever-increasing complexity continues to be humanity’s dominant approach to solving societal problems, I maintain the alternative path of voluntary simplification remains the most effective means of building ‘resilience’ (i.e., the ability of an individual or community to withstand societal or ecological shocks). This is significant because it justifies the practice and promotion of voluntary simplification, *irrespective of the likelihood of it ever being broadly accepted*. Directed toward the highly developed regions of the world, I argue that environmental sustainability requires voluntary simplification; but if that strategy is not widely embraced, I maintain we should still embrace the strategy *as far as possible*, in order to build resilience in preparation for forthcoming civilisational deterioration or collapse. The aim is not to achieve some passive socio-ecological stasis, but to move toward a way of life that achieves some form of dynamic equilibrium within ecologically sustainable limits.

While I accept that problem solving generally implies an increase in social complexity, the thesis I present below is that there comes a point when complexity itself becomes a problem, at which point voluntary simplification, not further complexity, is the most appropriate response. Not only does industrial civilisation seem to be at such a point today (Homer-Dixon, 2006; Slaughter, 2010), or well beyond it (Gilding, 2011), I hope to show, albeit in a preliminary way, that voluntary simplification presents a viable and desirable option for responding to today’s converging social, economic, and ecological problems. This goes directly against Tainter’s conception of sustainability, while accepting much of his background theoretical framework.