### Advocacy

#### I defend the resolution as a general principle: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### “Appropriation of outer space” by private entities refers to the exercise of exclusive control of space.

Trapp 13 TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“**Appropriation of outer space**, therefore, **is ‘the exercise of exclusive control** or exclusive use’ **with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access** to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

#### Private entities are non-governmental.

Dunk 11 – Frans G. von der Dunk, 2011, [“The Origins of Authorisation: Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty and International Space Law,” University of Nebraska] Justin

4. Interpreting Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty One main novel feature of Article VI stood out with reference to the role of private enterprise in this context. Contrary to the version of the concept applicable under general international law, where “direct state responsibility” only pertained to acts somehow directly attributable to a state and states could only be addressed for acts by private actors under “indirect,” “due care”/“due diligence” responsibility,18 Article VI made no difference as to whether the activities at issue were the state’s own (“whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies” . . .) or those of private actors (. . . “or by non-governmental entities”). The interests of the Soviet Union in ensuring that, whomever would actually conduct a certain space activity, some state or other could be held responsible for its compliance with applicable rules of space law to that extent had prevailed. However, the general acceptance of Article VI as cornerstone of the Outer Space Treaty unfortunately was far from the end of the story. Partly, this was the consequence of key principles being left undefined.

**Cambridge dictionary defines outer space as:**

Cambridge Dictionary. N.d. “Outer Space”. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/outer-space

outer space noun [ U ] US  /ˈɑʊ·tər ˈspeɪs/ the universe beyond the earth’s atmosphere (= the air surrounding the earth).

### Framing

#### The standard is consistency with conditions of non-alienation.

#### Subjectivity is defined only through volitional relationships. Therefore, subjects and their volition are the basis for ethics. Jaeggi:

[Rahel Jaeggi(August 2014). “Alienation.” Columbia University Press. Translated by Frederick Neuhouser and Alan E. Smith. Edited by Frederick Neuhouser. Rahel Jaeggi is professor of social and political philosophy at the Humboldt University in Berlin. Her research focuses on ethics, social philosophy, political philosophy, philosophical anthropology, social ontology, and critical theory. LHP JW]

The positions of both authors can be reduced to the following common denominator: **roles are less alienating than constitutive for the development of persons and personality**. **They** are constitutive in the sense that they **are directly bound up with a person’s development** and, so, “productive.” At first glance this position might seem to come down on one side of the two alternatives—an unconditional affirmation of roles—but after giving a brief account of the position, I will make use of it to move beyond the two alternatives. Once the “productivity thesis” has been articulated, it will be possible to distinguish between alienating and non-alienating aspects of role behavior. THE HUMAN BEING AS DOPPELGÄNGER Roles are productive. In and through them we first become ourselves. This is the essence of Helmuth Plessner’s conception of the positive significance of roles (which he developed as a direct response to critiques of them as alienating). “**The human being is always** himself only in **‘doubling’ in relation to a role** figure **he can experience**. Also, all that he sees as comprising his authenticity is but the role he plays before himself and others.2**2 Roles** on this view **are not only necessary in order to make social interaction possible**, whether this be a “being together” of individuals or a benign “passing each other by;” **interaction**

**mediated by roles is also constitutive of an individual’s relation to herself**. When Plessner speaks of a “doubling in relation to a role figure,” he means that one depends on roles not only to become a “figure” of experience for others but also in order to become such a figure for oneself. Plessner’s thesis that the human being is a Doppelgänger is grounded in a comprehensive theory of human nature that, beginning from the fundamental concept of “eccentric positionality,” is critical of every idea of immediacy or spontaneity.23 According to Plessner: **The distance that the role creates in family life, as well as in one’s profession**, work, or public offices, **is** **the human** being’s characteristic **detour to his fellow human bein**g; it is the means of his immediacy. Whoever wants to see in this an instance of selfalienation misunderstands the human essence and foists on it a possibility of existence such as animals have on the level of life or angels have on the spiritual level. . . . Only the human being appears as a Doppelgänger, on the outside in the figure of his role and on the inside, privately, as himself. 24 Although at first glance the talk of a Doppelgänger raises the suspicion that Plessner, too, is trapped in a model of doubling that relies on an opposition between authenticity and role behavior—between the inner and the outer—this suspicion turns out to be unwarranted: **the Doppelgänger character of human beings is illusory because there are not two real entities there; our character as a “double” is a construct. There is no**t an **internal division** here to be overcome; **rather, doubling is constitutive of the human self. “**The human being cannot abolish his status as a Doppelgänger without negating his humanity. He cannot complain of this doubling and play it off against the ideal of an original oneness, for I can be one only with something, with someone, even if it is only myself. **The human being gets a hold of himself in others. He encounters these others** on a detour via roles, exactly **as the others encounter him.**”25 If the other “gets a hold of himself” in the other, and if these two can encounter each other only through roles, then **a self that is prior to or outside roles is a fiction**. When Plessner says that “I can be one only with something, with someone, even if it is only myself,”26 he is referring to a constitutive internal division that precedes all possible unity—it points to the fact that **one’s relation to oneself must also be conceived of as a certain kind of relation, namely, one mediated by a relation to the outside or to others. Thus I am not “someone” already at the outset; I can become someone only in relation to others and hence only via the roles in which we reciprocally encounter one another**: “The human being gets a hold of himself in others.” Behind all roles, then, there is nothing or, in any case, there is no “authentic being” there. No matter where we look, behind roles we find nothing we can grab hold of except for more roles that one “plays before oneself and others.” **We could call this an onion conception of the self: there are various layers but no inner core**.

#### Alienation is an intrinsic violation of the subject and their volition. Jaeggi 2:

[Rahel Jaeggi(August 2014). “Alienation.” Columbia University Press. Translated by Frederick Neuhouser and Alan E. Smith. Edited by Frederick Neuhouser. Rahel Jaeggi is professor of social and political philosophy at the Humboldt University in Berlin. Her research focuses on ethics, social philosophy, political philosophy, philosophical anthropology, social ontology, and critical theory. LHP JW]

In “The Ethics of Antiquity and Modernity” Tugendhat raises the problem of whether it is possible to reformulate antiquity’s inquiry into the nature of happiness (or the good life) under modern conditions. **A modern inquiry into the good life must**, on the one hand, do justice to the view that its answer can**not “deny the autonomy** and thus the interpretive sovereignty **of those concerned**,” **and** its method **must** be such that it **avoid**s **committing itself to a** “specific and **unjustifiable picture of the human being**.”3 On the other hand, if modern ethical theory is to recover the interpretive content of ancient ethics, it must be able to identify an objective criterion that allows us to say “whether it is going well or badly for a person independently of their actual perceptions of their present or future well-being.” **What is needed, then, is a criterion that, on the one hand, is not identical with the desires or preferences a person actually has and that, on the other hand, does not call into question the interpretive sovereignty of the person and with it the modern ideal of self-determination.** Tugendhat’s proposed solution is to develop a formal conception of psychological health. **Starting from** (what appears to him to be) an unproblematic definition of physical health in terms of “functional capacity,” he develops for psychological health a conception of **the “functional capacity of willing” and its possible impairment**.4 Tugendhat elaborates his criterion with the example of compulsive behavior: a volition that is compulsive in some sense would count as impaired and hence as being disturbed in its functional capacity**. This provides a standpoint that is immanent to the subject’s will and, at the same time, not subjective in the sense in which contingent** and **unevaluated preferences are**: “In this way we would attain precisely what is sought, a point of view that is independent of the respective subjective goals of our willing but that nevertheless derives its authority from the perspective of willing itself. As willing (freely choosing) beings, we always will to be unlimited in our free choosing.”5 **Wit**h **the standard of the “impairment of the functional capacity of willing,”** which asks whether we have ourselves at our command in what we will, Tugendhat **has achieved a middle ground between subjectivistic and objectivistic positions** of the sort he was looking for. One could call such a positio**n a “qualified subjectivism.”**6 This provides us with a starting point for overcoming the opposition between modern antipaternalism and the paternalism of a more substantial ethical theory: whether something is good for me always depends (antipaternalistically) on my personal view, on whether I in fact want it. This view, however, must be qualified in the sense that the volition it expresses must be a “true volition” and therefore not subject to internal constraints. **I must be free in what I will; I must have my will at my command if it is to count as my own. This criterion is**, in the first place, **formal: it concerns the How, not the What, of willing. That is, I need not will anything in particular**; rather, I must be able to will what I will in a free or self-determined manner. **It is not necessary, then, to identify a “true object of willing,” but only a certain way of relating, in one’s willing, to oneself and to what one wills**. As Tugendhat puts it, “the question of what we truly will concerns not the goals of our willing but the How of willing.” Second**, this criterion is immanent: the criterion is the functional capacity of willing itself**, a claim posited by the act of willing itself. When I say, “I want to be able to do what I will,” I must also mean, “I want to be able—freely—to will.” My account of the problem of **alienation can be linked up with this conception of willing in the following way: instances of alienation can be understood as obstructions of volition and thereby**—formulated more generally—**as obstructions in the relations individuals have to themselves and the world**. With the help of Tugendhat’s conception of having oneself at one’s command, instances of alienation can be reconstructed in terms of disturbed ways of establishing relations to oneself and to the world. In this way the problem of alienation is tied to that of freedom. FREEDOM AND ALIENATION My thesis is that **alienation can be understood as a particular form of the loss of freedom**, as an obstruction of what could be called, following Isaiah Berlin, **positive freedom**. 8 Formulating the notoriously controversial distinction as briefly as possible, freedom in this sense refers not (merely negatively) to the absence of external coercion but (positively) **to the capacity to realize valuable ends**. In the sense described (and criticized) by Berlin, positive freedom has a variety of implications: The “positive” sense of the word “liberty” derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer—deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them. . . . I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes. **I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not.** 9 As unsystematic and indeterminate the various dimensions of positive freedom might be, the important point is that conceptions of positive freedom always depict the free life as not alienated and vice versa.10 As Robert Pippin puts it, only those acts and intentions that I can “link . . . with me such that they count as due to me or count as mine” are “instances of freedom.”11 Being a human being rather than a thing means, according to this view, ascribing to oneself what one wills and does, taking responsibility for it and (therefore) being able to identify with it. Understood in this way, the concept of **alienation concerns itself with the complex conditions of “linking” one’s actions and desires** (or, more generally, one’s life) **with oneself, “counting them as due to” oneself, or making them “one’s own.”** It also concerns itself with the various obstructions and disturbances that can affect these relations. One is not always already “with oneself;” one’s actions and desires are not always one’s own from the start, and one’s relation to the surrounding natural and social world is equally constitutive and threatened. Positively formulated, clarifying the various dimensions of alienation enables us to specify the conditions for being able to understand one’s life as one’s own (and therefore to lead one’s life freely). An unalienated life, according to this view, is not one in which specific substantial values are realized but one that is lived in a specific—unalienated—manner. The belief that everyone should be able to live her own life no longer stands in opposition, then, to the project of alienation critique. Rather, **the absence of alienating impediments and the possibility of appropriating self and**

**world without such impediments is a condition of freedom and self-determination.**

#### Conditions of alienation render the subject a commodity, unable to act on or claim our subjectivity, and hence, volition. Lutz:

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**Alienated** in an imaginary other that presents the appearance of a unified self, the **subject of capitalism** **understands** his or **her existence through the ‘‘empty speech’’ of the commodity**, a me´connaissance that **reproduces** the negative effects of commodity fetishism on human lives. Always found alongside commodity fetishism, indeed, a condition that forms an irreducible aspect of its continued existence, is **profound psychologica**l and physical **impoverishment**. As a subjective process understood within the entire ensemble of social and economic relations constitutive of capitalism, fetishism is underwritten by a libidinal economy of the subject that functions to reproduce psychic impotence, an economy predicated upon the presence of an absence, or better, a fragmentation of subjectivity engendered by the contradictions endemic to the social relations of production and exchange. **Commodities** **operate as objects** of social desire invested with the magical ability to fulfill desires **that**, because they are substitutions for basic human needs derived from economic relations that simultaneously engender and negate those same needs, can **only result in the deprivation of active, creative human satisfactions**. In this sense, fetishism functions as a mechanism of concealment: ‘‘[t]he fetish itself\*/a photograph, a lock of hair, or whatever is chosen\*/becomes invested with presence, and so symbolically ‘stands in’ for absence or loss’’ (Gamman and Makinen 1995, 27). The material presence of the commodity as a fetish points to an absence both in the objective relations between subjects, that is to say, the absence of genuine community, and within the psychic economy of individuals. The hidden but all too real effect of this dialectical relationship between the libidinal economy of subjects and the objective economic process is powerlessness, an existential condition of lack that must be reproduced in order to sustain the consumption of substitutive satisfactions in the form of commodities and money. From the standpoint of a Marxian theory of subjectivity, the compulsion to consume or hoard exchange value derives from the substitution of money and commodities for the kinds of activities that would exist in a society of freely associated producers, a process which, through the internalization of social contradictions as much as the material reality of these contradictions, deprives subjects of the ability to develop themselves. In this way, Marx dramatically illustrates the contradiction between the social process immanent in the commodity, a process that entails the progressive domination of human subject**s**, and the emancipatory promise that all commodities present in their mystified form. To the extent that **capitalism** **requires**, under pain of its own extinction, the quantitative expansion of existing consumption, the creation of new needs by propagating existing ones in the widest possible circle, the production of new needs, and the discovery and creation of new use values (Marx 1973, 408), it sets in motion an irrational process that inverts the natural relationship between human beings and nature, **a relationship where individuals** **would** have the capacity to **realize themselves through their self-objectification in labor, and undermines their capacity** **to engage in self-originating activities that** might genuinely **enrich them** and allow for the creation of an authentic community. To the extent that the commodity continues to serve as an epistemological category, its true character as **a form of domination remains invisible to the subject of capitalism;** however, the double existence of the commodity as a material manifestation of relations of domination and as an idealized representation of autonomy corresponds to the double existence of subjects under capitalism. Marx’s theory of fetishism describes not simply the contradictions immanent in the objective relations of production and exchange, but contradictions played out in the consciousness of subjects, contradictions that must be viewed, in part, as constitutive of subjectivity itself. As Jack Amariglio and Antonio Callari aptly put it, Marx’s theory of ‘‘commodity fetishism depicts the social constitution of the individual as a ‘precondition’ for commodity trade as much as an effect of this trade’’ (1993, 190).

#### Prefer Additionally:

#### 1] Bindingness – volition (or the structure of the will), is the primary source of all our desires, reasons, and beliefs since it generates what counts as motivation to the subject.

#### 2] Prerequisite to ethics -- If we don’t meet the aff framework, all pursuits of morality fail and devolve into nothing because people’s volition will be violated, making it impossible to fulfill moral obligations.

#### 3] Prerequisite to debate -- (A) participating in debate concedes the primacy of the framework because debaters use the faculty of choice facilitated by my criterion (B) the judge’s structural position as the decider of fact requires non-alienation so without my criterion the debate round can’t happen or be resolved

#### 4] The aff controls the internal link to all oppression-based frameworks because the oppressed are those who are alienated. And, the aff framework has unique advantages to an oppression based framework because it attempts to address all of morality and gives a specific response to how to take action against oppression.

#### Impact calc –

#### 1] Don’t evaluate impacts that are justified by chains of consequences, consequentialism fails.

#### A] Infinite consequences – each consequence causes another consequence which goes on infinitely, plus future consequences might significantly affect whether we would deem an action to be good or bad, which makes consequences unusable since calculation would be infinite. Probability doesn’t solve because that assumes you can accurately judge consequences in the first place, which is circular.

#### B] Retroactivity – you can’t determine whether the consequence of an action is good or bad until after the action has happened which means it can’t assign obligations.

#### 2] Offense under my framework comes from rejecting things which are alienating and or violate volition and affirming conditions of non-alienation and therefore volition. You can use induction or deduction to justify things, but you just can’t weigh consequences.

#### 3] You can also compare between impacts by evaluating the magnitude of the impact to alienation, assuming the thing you are weighing is intrinsically alienating or intrinsically resolves alienation and you don’t get there after a string of consequences. To clarify, this doesn’t mean the aff tries to maximize or minimize anything, this mechanism just functions to prevent inability to make moral decisions.

#### 4] Use epistemic confidence – each framework should be a preclusive impact filter, otherwise we have no way of deciding which impacts matter and the debate becomes irresolvable.

### Contention

#### First, the appropriation of space as private property is inherently alienating

**Wright 1** [Will Wright, Sage publications, “The Wild West: The Mythical Cowboy and Social Theory,” pgs. 90-91, 2001]/ lm

All forms of class structure are unjust for Marx, but **the structure of private property is** the most **oppressive and unjust, the most alienating**. Humans are ‘naturally’, essentially productive according to Marx. Humans produce what they need to live, and **individuals can only be fully human when they are not structurally separated from the products they make**. Society can only be just and individuals truly fulfilled when they all have a sense of ownership and control over the products they make. Any structure of **class control, therefore, distorts** **this human essence since the privileged class owns and controls what the working class produces.** In all class structures before capitalism, however, the lower class lived on the land and thus had some degree of direct control over what they produced. As a result, they could build their own homes, grow their own food, cut wood for heat, and make their own clothes. But private property inevitably creates industry, and **in an industrial structure of private property, workers are** completely separated, completely **alienated, from the products they make.** Unlike feudal peasants, industrial workers have no traditional rights, no minimal control, over their own products. They are fully alienated from these products; therefore, for Marx, they are also alienated from their labor, from their own human essence, from all other humans, from all social relations. This is the structure of alienation for Marx, the structure of **capitalist oppression**, and it **arises from** the structure of **private property.** Private property is uniquely oppressive because workers are separated from all productive property – the means of production – and owners can only be self-interested, with no traditional, moral constraints. This means workers become commodities to be bought and sold, and this is another way of saying they are alienated. In another version of this same analysis, Marx argues that private property is a form of theft[!!!] where owners are

stealing from the workers. The idea of alienation is Marx’s social critique of the market, and this idea of theft is his economic critique of the market.

#### Private space appropriation facilitates conditions of alienation – it currently serves as an extension of capitalism.

**Shammas and Holen 19**

[Victor L. Shammas Oslo Metropolitan University, Work Research Institute (AFI), Oslo, Norway, Tomas B. Holen Independent scholar, Oslo, Norway, nature, Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, “One giant leap for capitalistkind: private enterprise in outer space,” January 29 2019, [https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9]/lm](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9%5d/lm)

But how are we to understand NewSpace? In some ways, NewSpace signals the emergence of capitalism in space. The production of carrier rockets, placement of satellites into orbit around Earth, and the exploration, exploitation, or colonization of outer space (including planets, asteroids, and other celestial objects), will not be the work of humankind as such, a pure species-being (Gattungswesen), but of particular capitalist entrepreneurs who stand in for and represent humanity. Crucially, they will do so in ways modulated by the exigencies of capital accumulation. These enterprising capitalists are forging a new political-economic regime in space, a post-Fordism in space aimed at profit maximization and the apparent minimization of government interference. A new breed of charismatic, starry-eyed entrepreneurs, including Musk’s SpaceX, Richard Branson’s Virgin Galactic, and Amazon billionaire Jeff Bezos’s Blue Origin, to name but a selection, aim at becoming ‘capitalists in space' (Parker, [2009](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9)) or space capitalists. Neil Armstrong’s famous statement will have to be reformulated: space will not be the site of ‘one giant leap for mankind', but rather one giant leap for capitalistkind.[Footnote5](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9) With the ascendancy of NewSpace, humanity’s future in space will not be ‘ours', benefiting humanity tout court, but will rather be the result of particular capitalists, or capitalistkind,[Footnote6](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9) toiling to recuperate space and bring its vast domain into the fold of capital accumulation: **NewSpace sees outer space as the domain of private enterprise, set to become the ‘first-trillion dollar industry'**, according to some estimates, **and likely to produce the world’s first trillionaires** (see, e.g., Honan, [2018](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9))—as opposed to Old Space, a derisive moniker coined by enthusiastic proponents of capitalism-in-space, widely seen to have been the sole preserve of the state and a handful of giant aerospace corporations, including Boeing and Lockheed Martin, in Cold War-era Space Age.

No longer terra nullius, space is now the new terra firma of capitalistkind: its naturalized terroir, its next necessary terrain**. The logic of capitalism dictates that capital should seek to expand outwards into the vastness of space**, a point recognized by a recent ethnography of NewSpace actors (Valentine, [2016](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9), p. 1050). The operations of capitalistkind serve to resolve a series of (potential) crises of capitalism, revolving around the slow, steady decline of spatial fixes (see e.g., Harvey, [1985](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9), p. 51–66) as they come crashing up against the quickly vanishing blank spaces remaining on earthly maps and declining (terrestrial) opportunities for profitable investment of surplus capital (Dickens **and Ormrod,** [**2007a**](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9)**, p. 49–78).**

**A ‘spatial fix' involves the geographic modulation of capital accumulation, consisting in the outward expansion of capital onto new geographic terrains, or into new spaces, with the aim of filling a gap in the home terrains of capital**. Jessop ([2006](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9), p. 149) notes that spatial fixes may involve a number of strategies, including the creation of new markets within the capitalist world, engaging in trade with non-capitalist economies, and exporting surplus capital to undeveloped or underdeveloped regions. The first two address the problem of insufficient demand and the latter option creates a productive (or valorizing) outlet for excess capital. Capitalism must regularly discover, develop, and appropriate such new spaces because of its inherent tendency to generate surplus capital, i.e., capital bereft of profitable purpose. In Harvey’s ([2006](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9), p. xviii) terms, a spatial fix revolves around ‘geographical expansions and restructuring…as a temporary solution to crises understood…in terms of the overaccumulation of capital'. **It is a temporary** solution **because** these newly **appropriated spaces** will in turn **become exhausted** of profitable potential and are likely to produce their own stocks of surplus capital; while ‘capital surpluses that otherwise stood to be devalued, could be absorbed through geographical expansions and spatio-temporal displacements' (Harvey, [2006](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9), p. xviii), **this** outwards **drive** of capitalism **is inherently limitless**: there is no end point or final destination for capitalism. Instead, capitalism must continuously propel

itself onwards in search of pristine sites of renewed capital accumulation. In this way, Harvey writes, society constantly ‘creates fresh productive powers elsewhere to absorb its overaccumulated capital' (Harvey, [1981](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9), p. 8).

Historically, **spatial fixes have played an important role in conserving the capitalist system.** As Jessop ([2006](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9), p. 149) points out, ‘The export of surplus money capital, surplus commodities, and/or surplus labour-power outside the space(s) where they originate enabled capital to avoid, at least for a period, the threat of devaluation'. But these new spaces for capital are not necessarily limited to physical terrains, as with colonial expansion in the nineteenth century; as Greene and Joseph ([2015](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9)) note, various digital spaces, such as the Internet, can also be considered as spatial fixes: the Web absorbs overaccumulated capital, heightens consumption of virtual and physical goods, and makes inexpensive, flexible sources of labor available to employers. Greene and Joseph offer the example of online high-speed frequency trading as a digital spatial fix that furthers the ‘annihilation of space by time' first noted by Marx in his Grundrisse (see Marx, [1973](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9), p. 524).

In short, outer space serves as a spatial fix. It swallows up surplus capital, promising to deliver valuable resources, technological innovations, and communication services to capitalists back on Earth. This places outer space on the same level as traditional colonization, analyzed in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, which Hegel thought of as a product of the ‘inner dialectic of civil society', which drives the market to ‘push beyond its own limits and seek markets, and so its necessary means of subsistence, in other lands which are either deficient in the goods it has overproduced, or else generally backward in creative industry, etc.' (Hegel, [2008](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9), p. 222). In this regard, SpaceX and related ventures are not so very different from maritime colonialists and the trader-exploiters of the British East India Company. But there is something new at stake. As the Silicon Valley entrepreneur Peter Diamandis has gleefully noted: ‘There are twenty-trillion-dollar checks up there, waiting to be cashed!' (Seaney and Glendenning, [2016](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9)). **Capitalistkind consists in the naturalization of capitalist consciousness and practice,** the (false) universalization of a particular mode of political economy **as inherent to the human condition, followed by the projection of this naturalized universality into space**—capitalist humanity as a Fukuyamite ‘end of history', the end-point of (earthly) historical unfolding, but the starting point of humanity’s first serious advances in space.

While some elements of the astrosociological community, such as the Astrosociology Research Institute (ARI),[Footnote14](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9) insist on elucidating the “human dimension” in outer space, Dickens and Ormrod recognize that this humanization-through**-capitalism really involves the ‘commodification of the universe'** ([2007b](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9), p. 2). While Dickens and Ormrod develop similar arguments to those sketched here—from their concept of an ‘outer spatial fix' to their argument about **outer space becoming woven into circuits of capital accumulation**—they were writing at a time when their remarks necessarily remained speculative: the commercialization of space was still in its infancy. In an inversion of Hegel’s owl of Minerva, reality has since largely confirmed their ideas and caught up with theory. Above all, when considering the various ventures ongoing in space today, it is not so much the universalizing human dimension as the specifically capitalist dimension that is striking. With the advent of NewSpace, outer space is becoming not the domain of a common humanity but of private capital.

The very centrality of these maneuvers has initiated a new phase in the history of capitalist relations, that of ‘charismatic accumulation'—certainly not in the sense of any ‘objective' or inherent charismatic authority, but with a form of illusio, to speak with Bourdieu, vested in the members of capitalistkind by their uncanny ability to spin mythologizing self-narratives. This has always been part of the capitalist game, from Henry Ford and onwards, but the charismatic mission gains a special potency in the grandiose designs of NewSpace’s entrepreneurs. Every SpaceX launch is a quasi-religious spectacle, observed by millions capable of producing a real sense of wonder in a condition of (legitimizing) collective effervescence.

We have already noted that it is not humanity, conceived as species-being, a Gattungswesen, that makes its way into space. The term Gattungswesen, of course, has a long intellectual pedigree, harking back to Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, and others. The term can ‘be naturally applied both to the individual human being and to the common nature or essence which resides in every individual man and woman', Allan Wood ([2004](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9), p. 17) writes, as well as ‘to the entire human race, referring to humanity as a single collective entity or else to the essential property which characterizes this entity and makes it a single distinctive thing in its own right'. Significantly, the adherents of NewSpace often resort to the idea of humanity in its broad universality (e.g.,Musk, [2017](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9)), but this denies and distorts the modulation of humanity by its imbrication with the project of global (and post-global, i.e., space-bound) capitalism. It is precisely the sort of false universality implied in the humanism of the supporters of NewSpace that Marx subjected to a scathing critique in the sixth of his Theses on Feuerbach. Here Marx noted that the human essence is not made up of some ‘abstraction inherent in each single individual' ([1998](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9), p. 570). Instead, humans are defined by the ‘ensemble of social relations' in which they are enmeshed. Under NewSpace, it is not humanity, plain and simple, that ventures forth, but a specific set of capitalist entrepreneurs, carrying a particular ideological payload, alongside their satellites, instruments, and supplies, a point noted by other sociologists of outer space, or ‘astrosociologists' (Dickens and Ormrod, [2007a](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9), [2007b](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9)).

#### Second, private appropriation of outer space causes alienation from the earth – 2 warrants

Arroyo 19 Arroyo, Sam, (Bard College, Sociology) "Earth Alienation and Space Exploration: Uncharted Territory for Sociology" (2019). <Https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=senproj_s2019> [bracketed for sexism]

In this project, I see space initiatives, be it the creation of habitable satellites placed at the Moon or Earth’s orbit, or the extension of human life to Mars, as technological developments that extend the mapping of our universe, in effect reducing the meaning of distance in our solar system and by extension shrinking the solar system. Arendt explains that to map and chart an area not only shrinks it but also has the effect of removing a person from their surroundings, she writes, “The greater the distance between himself and his surroundings, world or earth, the more he will be able to survey and to measure and the less will worldly, earth-bound space be left to him”. Arendt uses the example of the airplane to show that, “any decrease of terrestrial distance can be won only at the price of putting decisive distance between man [people] and earth, of alienating man [them] from his [their] immediate earthly surroundings”. If Arendt is right, the continuation and advancement of human travel within our solar system will not only have the effect of shrinking our solar system in the same way that the airplane shrunk the earth, but it will also have the effect of drastically alienating humans from the Earth.

My concern with outer space and the idea of Earth alienation is not only that humanity is tied to the Earth which in Arendt's view, “The Earth is the very quintessence of the human condition… a habitat in which they can move and breathe without effort and without artifice”.10 But also, that extending human travel deeper into our solar system can further alienate humans from Earth resulting in a relationship between humanity and Earth which negatively affects the planet and its living organisms. To further human’s alienation from Earth raises questions concerning the future of our planet and the future of humanity. Exploring this idea from a perspective of environmental sociology, I engage with the question: what do developments of technology and science for the exploration and exploitation of outer space mean for the future of humanity and planet Earth?

In this paper, I make two arguments: the first argument is that we are in a new space age, in which the idea of outer space being the province of all mankind is changing to outer space being a new frontier offering economic opportunity subject to the exploitation of private entities. The second argument I make is that technological and scientific developments in the field of aerospace are advancing at a speed which requires reflection on what extending human life and artificial creations into outer space means for the future of humanity, Earth, and other living organisms.

### Method

#### Focusing our politics around human survival against extinction primes us to understand the world through a terminally unsustainable framework.

Audra Mitchell Balsillie School of International Affairs, Wilfrid Laurier University ’17 “Is IR going extinct?” European Journal of International Relations 23 (1) p. 16-23

However, I want to argue that the problem is not only one of cognitive capability: extinction is also made ‘unthinkable’ in IR as a result of normative taboos. These taboos secure the existing ontological and ethical bases of IR — the survival of ‘humanity’ — by prohibiting thinking about (human) extinction, even as it is increasingly recognized as a real possibility. Indeed, according to Claire Colebrook (2014a: 186):

now that life appears to be in danger of disappearance, diminution or mutation beyond recognition, living humans indulge both in greater and greater insistence on the sanctity of life, and seem incapable of directly confronting the intensifying threats that menace the present. What Colebrook presents as a paradox, in fact, seems rational in the context of IR: the sanctity and centrality of human life as the basis of all being, action and ethics creates strong prohibitions against thinking its negation. As Colebrook (2014a: 142) puts it: ‘humanity has been fabricated as the proper ground of all life — so much so that threats to all life on Earth are being dealt with today by focusing on how man may adapt, mitigate and survive’ (Colebrook, 2014a: 142). Security discourses, in particular, convert questions of whether humans (or other life forms) can continue to exist into questions of who gets to live and die, and how. In order to function as mobilizing and governing logics, they must portray security as possible, but not guaranteed. As a result, even though human life is treated as contingent, ‘humanity’ as a life form is taken for granted, both as a practical possibility and as an unquestioned good.

For Colebrook, this produces a serious failure of thought: it leaves unquestioned the insistence on dominant modes of existence. In this context, survival is a powerful dogma, to the extent that simply questioning prevailing conceptions of survival is interpreted as an attempt to undermine survival as such. As a result of the unwillingness to question survival, political action will **continue to** be channelled towards sustaining **the** ‘survival mechanisms that have brought **the** human species and its milieu to the brink of destruction’ (Colebrook, 2014a: 13). In other words, the unwillingness to question the dominant concept of survival as the continuation of life-as-it-is condemns humans and other life forms to cling tenuously to it. For Colebrook, only questioning the dogma of survival can enable us to critique this condition, and possibly (although not necessarily) to transcend it. In the context of IR and other anthropocentric forms of thought, this is a radical premise. Critics of this approach may object that Colebrook’s perspective is not only antihumanist, but also anti-human, that is, that its manner of contemplating extinction amounts to a misanthropic desire for it. This is far too simplistic a reading. For Colebrook, the point of thinking about the possibilities of extinction — that is, not only its probability, but also the new modes of being that might emerge from it — is to challenge dogmatic assumptions about the value of particular forms of life. She suggests that the ‘scandal’ of anthropocentric thought is:

not that humans have placed their own survival as more valuable than other lives, but that at the heart of moral philosophy is an assumption that nothing is more valuable or definitive of value than human life’s capacity to maintain and define itself. (Colebrook, 2014a: 203)

In other words, such frameworks elide human existence with the attempt to secure currently existing forms of life, however bare they might become. This, in turn, precludes critical engagement with ‘what the actual death of man might enable, whether “we” ought to live on, and just what or who this saved “we” approaching finality might be’ (Colebrook, 2014a: 13). This argument is post-humanist: it questions the foundations of a belief system in which humans are the sole centre and purpose of being. However, it need not be anti-human: it is possible to reject a particular, normative account of ‘humanity’ while maintaining a benevolent attitude towards humans. Moreover, questioning the survival of dominant conceptions of ‘humanity’ does not equate to suggesting that human life per se — that is, in all of its possible forms and permutations — has no value. Instead, it challenges the belief that there is only one valuable mode of human survival. As I shall argue shortly, this argument may open up new possibilities of survival, of being human — and of being-otherwise. This helps to undercut one of the most powerful taboos against confronting extinction: that it amounts to an extinction-wish, and that it is therefore necessary to preclude serious thought and discussion about it.

This discussion has suggested that extinction is not ‘unthinkable’ in itself. It is possible at least to glimpse the inhuman, and the facticity of subjective existence. Moreover, by breaking taboos around the discussion of extinction, it is possible to critique the core assumptions and foundations of IR. With all of this in mind, what would IR look like if it took extinction seriously? Would it survive, and, if so, in what forms?

Is IR going extinct?

So far, I have argued that IR does not engage rigorously with extinction either as a core concept or as a boundary condition; indeed, it renders extinction unthinkable in order to secure its foundational assumptions. I have also argued that it is possible to think extinction in this context by challenging anthropocentric norms and engaging with the inhuman. Doing so would involve transforming IR profoundly, not only in terms of its subject matter, but also with regards to its most basic ontological and metaphysical assumptions. Is such a turn desirable? Earlier, I made this argument from the perspective of necessity: IR must engage seriously with extinction if it is to respond to evidence of a global extinction crisis and the possibility of existential threats, that is, IR must change beyond recognition if it is to avoid going extinct. However, what, if any, are the positive possibilities of such a turn?

In order to explore these questions, it is important to outline the nature and scope of the changes that IR would need to undergo in order to respond to the challenges raised by (mass) extinction. The argument so far suggests several profound transformations. First, it is crucial that IR develops a robust conceptual basis for engaging with (mass) extinction as one of its central concepts and as the fundamental boundary condition of survival. This, in turn, requires moving beyond anthropocentric conceptions of IR to acknowledge the nonhuman and the inhuman. For instance, confronting ancestrality and the potential of a future without subjectivity requires extending the temporal horizons of IR backwards and forwards beyond the scope of human history. Moreover, taking contingency (or Meillassoux’s ‘facticity’) seriously would require a shift in register from an ontic concern with managing and sustaining existing life and death processes to a (weak) ontological concern with the open-ended be(com)ing of life forms. This, in turn, would demand the understanding that survival — as the perpetuation of currently existing life processes — may not be a practicable possibility of instrumental human action in the long term.

Perhaps most profoundly, taking extinction seriously would involve relinquishing the fetishism of survival as it relates to dominant conceptions of the human rather than simply adapting these conceptions to new sources and registers of threat.6 In other words, it would be necessary to dispense with the imperative to ensure at all costs the survival of currently existing norms and modes of human life. However, why should emancipation from this imperative be desirable? Simply put, the imperative to preserve dominant, existing modes of human life monopolizes human energy, dominates frameworks of value and imposes stasis on extant life forms. This imperative imposes a kind of death (in the Heideggerian sense) on life forms: it prevents them from unfolding into their indeterminate, virtual possibilities, entrapping them in the mode of rigid metaphysical categories. The severing of possibilities of becoming can already be intuited within the biopolitical discourses of extinction discussed earlier. These discourses simultaneously frame the survival of ‘humanity-as-it-is’ as the dominant principle of being and highest value, while presenting it as imminently and irreversibly threatened (see Evans and Reid, 2014). Within this stark opposition, the political possibilities of becoming are precluded by the imperative to survive ‘as we are’ at all costs.

What if, instead, it were possible to refuse the demand to survive — without embracing an extinction-wish or desiring the elimination of any species? In the context of IR, this would entail resisting the powerful discourses of biopolitical discipline, catastrophism, resilience and mitigation discussed earlier and becoming open to the possibilities of extinction, in two senses: in the sense that extinction may occur; and in the sense of the new modes of ethico-political action and forms of life it might enable. Being open to the possibility of extinction does not involve relinquishing all claims to continued existence or the desire to pursue them. Instead, by removing the imperative to secure the indefinite survival of dominant forms of life at all costs, it might free these energies to develop modes of being-otherwise. As Colebrook (2014a: 58) puts it:

As long as we calculate the future as one of sustaining, maintaining, adapting and rendering ourselves viable … there would be no future for us other than an eventual, barely lived petering out. If, however, we entertained the erasure of the human … then there might be a future. (Colebrook, 2014a: 58)

What visions, logics and inputs might IR contribute to this new future, and how might it be transformed as a result?

Cosmopolitics and the possibilities of extinction

Extinction is not only about endings; it can also be understood as a force that engenders ethico-political creativity in and with the conditions of finitude (Mitchell, 2016). Viewing (mass) extinction in this way consists of ‘a confrontation with perishing, finitude, and fragility but one that fills us with at least as much wonder as dread, more political energy than resignation, and takes seriously that apocalypses are not ends but irreversible transitions’ (Grove, 2015). This, in turn, involves reframing nihilism not as an apolitical collapse into apathy and submission to visions of the inevitable, but rather as a ‘speculative opportunity’ that opens up new futures (Brassier, 2007: xi). In other words, rather than promoting (only) a ‘will to nothingness’, let alone a malevolent extinction-wish, engaging with the possibilities of non-being can make it possible to embrace the indeterminacy of the universe and its creative forces. I shall now argue that it demands and enables a politics attuned to the biological, geological and cosmological forces of the universe: a cosmopolitics.

According to Isabelle Stengers (2005), ‘cosmopolitics’ is politics rooted in the acknowledgement of the multiple, diverse and constantly transforming beings that constitute the cosmos. It hinges on the belief that all beings make interventions that shape, disrupt and transform political processes. Importantly, participation in these processes does not require representation in terms of human interests or even the ability to act or speak in a human-oriented sense. Indeed, Stengers (2005: 996) asserts that ‘the political arena is peopled with shadows of that which does not have, cannot have or does not want to have a political voice’. A range of beings — whether they are considered human and nonhuman, living and non-living, organic and inorganic — can intervene in politics by ‘forcing thought’ through their effects, properties, presence or absence. For instance, water can make its force felt politically by destroying human habitations and ecosystems in the form of floods, by withdrawing and creating droughts, or by sustaining and nurturing multiple life forms. For Stengers, these issues are not made political by humans: to the extent that they have an effect in the world, they are always-already political. According to Stengers, the interventions of multiple beings help to slow down processes of universalization central to traditional modes of cosmopolitanism. Indeed, the presence of other beings with conflicting interests and needs makes universalization, and political decisionmaking, ‘as difficult as possible’ (Stengers, 2005: 1003). Cosmopolitics is conflictual and agonistic: the insurgence of awkward subjects and the obstructions, disruptions and disjunctures they create can nurture pluralism and generate creative politics. Crucially, cosmopolitics is not simply an intensification or variant of cosmopolitanism. Whereas cosmopolitanism stresses the suffix -politan, cosmopolitics shifts emphasis to the prefix cosmo-, that is, it takes the cosmos, rather than human communities, as the basis and locus of political action. Cosmopolitanism, as Colebrook contends, is based on the extrapolation and expansion of a polity that, while it may be expanded to include other beings, is centrifugal to the figure of humanity. In other words, the cosmos of cosmopolitanism ‘is always an extension of the composed polity, an abstraction or idealization of man englobed in his world of human others’ (Colebrook, 2014a: 110). Even the most radical contemporary reframings of cosmopolitanism, in contrast, involve stretching the scope of the human-dominated polity to include all humans and (certain) nonhumans (see Linklater, 2011). Anthony Burke (2013, 2015) has attempted to radically rethink cosmopolitanism in terms of the intermeshing of complex processes, material conditions and (human and nonhuman) actors across planetary space-time. However, I want to argue that this project is better understood in the context of cosmopolitics, insofar as it seeks to render the cosmos the ontological basis of politics.

I want to argue that a modified form of cosmopolitics — one attuned to the inhuman — is demanded by, and can ground meaningful responses to, (mass) extinction. Specifically, Stengers’s cosmopolitics acknowledges the role of the weak, marginalized and ‘shadowy’ subjects; it focuses largely on presence, that is, on the positive beings that interrupt human activities. In order to respond to mass extinction, cosmopolitics must place more focus on absence, negation and non-being. Colebrook hints at this in her call to ‘destroy cosmopolitanism for the sake of the cosmos’ (Colebrook, 2014a: 96) She claims that arguing that: if the crises of the twenty-first century were to prompt us to think at all it may be in a cosmic and inhuman mode, asking … what the elements of this earth are, what force they bear, how we are composed in relation to those forces. (Colebrook, 2014a: 114)

If we consider (mass) extinction as one of these forces, a different kind of cosmopolitics emerges — one that responds to extinction and considerably adds to the conceptual mass of IR. This mode of cosmopolitics makes it possible to generate new forms of solidarity based not on the fear of collective annihilation, but rather on a sense of shared vulnerability that is the condition of earthly coexistence. For Rosi Braidotti (2013), such solidarities emerge from the defamiliarization of dominant norms of ‘humanity’, which, she argues, is best achieved by thinking as if ‘humanity’ were already extinct. This, she contends, compels humans to ‘think critically about who we are and what we are actually in the process of becoming’ (Braidotti, 2013: 49–50). From this perspective, attention to the inhuman, and to the possible extinction of humans, can produce an ‘enlarged sense of inter-connection between self and others, including the non-human or “earth” others’ (Braidotti, 2013: 49–50). The same processes of defamiliarization, Colebrook (2014a: 58) suggests, would make possible a radical new form of feminism that, in embracing ‘a thought of life beyond the human’, would place neither man nor woman at its centre (Colebrook, 2014b: 16). By unsettling the foundations of ‘humanity’ itself, she contends, thinking the inhuman makes it possible to transcend boundaries such as gender and race that essentialize characteristics as ‘essentially’ human. This would have profound importance for feminist, queer and decolonial international politics: it would undercut the metaphysical foundations of sources of exclusion and oppression against which they struggle. In short, contemplating the extinction of ‘the human’ makes it possible to imagine alternative, future life forms that bear resemblances to, but are not restricted by, existing norms of ‘humanity’.

Moreover, a cosmopolitics attuned to the inhuman could profoundly transform global ethics by grounding it not in a politics of ressentiment, but rather one of gratitude. The geographer Nigel Clark (2011) argues that humans should embrace the finite, deeply contingent and potentially meaningless (in a transcendent, metaphysical sense) existence furnished by an indifferent Earth. Specifically, he claims that human existence is contingent upon conditions created by previous (largely extinct) life forms and by inhuman forces, both contemporary and temporally distant. From this perspective, existence is a gift given to humans (among others) but it is not given-for-us in the correlationist sense. Instead, humans are indebted to a chain of interlocking forces that are ultimately indifferent to their existence. Clark argues that humans should embrace this gift with the knowledge that it can, and eventually will, be withdrawn. This means accepting and honouring it without treating it as an entitlement or devaluing it on account of its finitude. His account contrasts sharply with the discourses of catastrophe, resilience and biopolitics discussed earlier, which devalue any mode of life that cannot be indefinitely sustained through human intervention. Clark finds an ethico-political alternative to these logics in an ethos of gratitude and reciprocation. For Clark, the latter is epitomized by the actions of the government of Kiribati — the small island state perhaps most imminently threatened by rising sea levels — in creating one of the world’s largest marine parks in 2006 (the Phoenix Islands Protected Area). In so doing, Clark contends, this community expressed unconditional gratitude for the gift of existence rather than resentment of its endangerment. Moreover, by seeking to protect and preserve the watery medium that threatens to destroy it, Kiribatians embodied a mode of meaningful response to disaster that was not constrained to sustaining survival-as-we-know-it.

Moreover, a cosmopolitics attuned to extinction and to the inhuman would foster a new mode of future-oriented politics based not on the continuity of the present, but rather on the creative possibilities of discontinuity and unpredictable difference. For Evans and Reid (2014: 164), biopolitical responses to extinction reflect a ‘cult of mourning’ for the coming death of existing species life that ‘manages to turn the wondrous phenomenon of the emergence of new forms of life … into a problematic of security and threat’. Indeed, in popular literature on extinction, there is a marked tone of mourning and fear about what might ‘replace’ humans as Earth’s dominant species, and the readers’ focus is trained on monstrous figures such as robots, microbes or giant rats (see Zalasiewicz, 2008). In contrast, cosmopolitics attuned to extinction and the inhuman would be open to the new forms of being that might emerge from, or even in place of, humans. For instance, it might involve overcoming fear and revulsion of the hybrid or mutant creatures that are emerging, at least in part from human scientific interventions, treating them with love and care instead of abjection (see Haraway, 2011; Latour, 2012). Crucially, it would also involve embracing the defamiliarized modalities of currently existing humanity discussed earlier. This includes beings so transformed through technological and evolutionary change as to be almost unrecognizable to ‘us’ (currently existing humans), and the ‘defamiliarized’ beings no longer essentialized in terms of race, sex or gender. The cosmopolitics I am outlining here would embrace these beings-to-come instead of fearing and resenting them. This amounts to a kind of futural gratitude that mirrors the Kiribatian marine park — an ethics of comportment towards the unknowable other that might displace ‘us’. However, how can currently existing humans adopt such an ethics? Emmanuel Levinas (1998: 50) terms this mode of ethics ‘being-forbeyond- my-death’, that is, being ‘for a time that would be without me … in order to be for that which is after me’. Although Levinas is referring to human individuals and their comportment towards future generations of humans, this principle can be translated across species boundaries and to a collective register. It profoundly shifts the emphasis of human action — instead of attempting to secure existing conditions, it encourages ‘action for a world to come’, and responsiveness to the ethical demands of the (remote, unknowable) Other (Levinas, 1998: 51). Clark, writing in a Levinasian vein, agrees that embracing future life forms is not passive. Instead, it requires the ability to see ‘the intolerability of the world as it is presently imagined and demands the seemingly impossible; the creation of a new one’ (Clark, 2011: 195).

Crucially, this ethos is not a replacement for security or the pursuit of indefinite survival, but rather a qualitatively different kind of politics. It cannot guarantee the survival of humanity-as-it-is — the goal to which all existing strategies and responses to extinction are oriented. It entails an ‘eschatology without hope for oneself’ (Levinas, 1998: 51): welcoming new worlds makes, and demands, no promises. While this ethos engenders cautious hope for undetermined futures, it cannot be made conditional on the survival of existing forms of life. Instead, it must be pursued ‘for the hell of it and for love of the world’ (Braidotti, 2010: 17). This shifts the logic of responsiveness to extinction from one of mastery and control to one of gratitude and hopeful, creative experimentation. As Clark (2011: 217, paraphrasing Allan Stoekl) puts it:

we might have a better chance of prising the planet out of its downward ecological spiral accidentally, not as the goal of a grand, visionary project but as the unintended consequence of more joyous and generous living right here and now.

In other words, adopting an attitude of hospitality and generosity towards other beings might help to open up a future of long-term flourishing for humans and other beings. However, as Clark argues, this kind of action needs to have the character of Derridean hospitality, that is, it needs to be undertaken without conditionality, or, in this case, the demand for security. Adopting this ethico-political orientation does not involve capitulation to extinction, and even less an extinction-wish. Instead, it widens the range of human responsiveness far beyond the spectrum of pre-emptive trauma, loss and tragedy, and a future of rapidly diminishing life lived in survival mode.