#### Ethics must begin with the definition of good and bad, as it is the basis of all ethical decisions and they are ethical binaries. Naturalism falsely assumes objective intrinsicality of what is good and bad which raises infinitely tautological questions. One cannot substitute words in the place of good as for any property we identify with “goodness,” agents can ask “Is that property itself good?”. One can claim that pleasure is the highest intrinsic good, but the question can be asked, “But, is pleasure itself good” The fact that this question makes sense shows that “pleasure” and “goodness” are not identical. Natural terms are externally encountered whereas the non-natural is based internally. Non-naturalism is the only way to escape the naturalistic fallacy, as external/naturalistic explanation of ethical binaries are inherently incoherent and, other frameworks begin at the incorrect assumption of the ethical question at hand. Thus, the meta-ethic is moral non-naturalism.

**Hume 72 explains:** Hume, David. *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1772). Hackett Publ Co. 1993; Chapter on Cause and Effect.

That there are no demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and June? Now whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning a priori.If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience, and make it the standard of our future judgment, these arguments must be probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and real existence according to the division above mentioned. But that there is no argument of this kind, must appear, if our explication of that species of reasoning [can] be admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have said that all argument concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.

#### Correlations exist under non-naturalism because my FW agrees that there is forms of relationship between moral and natural terms. However, reducing terms such as “private entities” or “exploration” to a binary set of external features (good/bad) is what the FW disagrees with. Furthermore, proving correlation justifies our FW because it concedes the authority of no-intrinsicality. It is true pleasure may be “related to” the good, but that doesn’t mean it IS the good. If premise 1 Is that chocolate is sweet and therefore conclude it is “good”, there is a gap between the 2 premises – you can ask “why Is sweetness” good and so on and so forth to infinity. This gap must then be filled with more premises to justify the conclusion, which is tautological.

#### And, since moral properties cannot be defined by natural properties, it becomes impossible to externally distinguish good and bad. Non-naturalism, however, does not deny the ability to internally recognize the good just like distinguishing between natural observations.

**McHugh Writes:** <http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/n/nfallacy.htm>

G.E. Moore presented his ideas that the notion of moral goodness cannot be defined or identified with any property. Moore argues that "goodness" is a foundational and unanalyzable property, similar to the foundational notion of "yellowness," and is not capable of being explained in terms of anything more basic. We intuitively recognize goodness when we see it, as we similarly recognize yellowness when we see it. But the notion of "goodness" itself cannot be defined. We cannot define yellow, but we can point to things that are yellow in order to illustrate our point. It is the same with the idea of Good. You cannot easily define the word, but you can point to things that are thought of as good. Everyone does in fact understand the question "is this good?" When he thinks of it, his state of mind is different from what it would be, were he asked, "Is this pleasant, or desired, or approved?" It has a distinct meaning for him, even though he may not recognize in what respect it is distinct.

#### That means non-naturalism prima facie justifies intuitionism as the only ethical theory that can guide action. Thus, the standard is consistency with a priori moral intuitions.

**McMahan**, Jeff [<http://www.philosophy.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Moral%20Intuition%202nd%20edition.pdf>]

As I will understand the term, a moral intuition is a moral judgment – typically about a particular problem, a particular act, or a particular agent, though possibly also about a moral rule or principle – that is not the result of inferential reasoning. It is not inferred from one’s other beliefs but arises on its own. If I consider the act of torturing the cat, I judge immediately that, in the circumstances, this would be wrong. I do not need to consult my other beliefs in order to arrive at this judgment. This is not to say that a moral intuition is necessarily elicited instantaneously, the way a sense perception is.

#### This means adopting beliefs about the world are insufficient to make decisions consistent with them. Every system is inevitably hijacked or guided by intuitions which makes their faculty fundamentally inescapable.

#### Prefer the standard additionally:

#### First, rule following fails a) We can infinitely question why to follow that rule, as all rules will terminate at the assertion of some principle with no further justification b) Rule are arbitrary since the agent has the ability to formulate a unique understanding of them. It becomes impossible to say someone is violating a rule, since they can always perceive their actions as a non-violation. Intuitions solve since they don’t rely on external normative force.

#### Second, if we have the ability to not follow our intuitions, then that means that morality is non-motivational, and can’t guide action. Intuition is our internal motivation, so if morality can’t guide action then correctness and incorrectness don’t exist.

#### Impact Calc:

#### moral intuitions can be rationally unsound. For example: Intuitions could justify the aff, but also justify util, which negates. In the case of contradictory maxims, err on specificity to the resolution. No general maxim is perfectly intuitive so only direct intuitions to the resolution explain a statement’s properties. Also, this merely proves the aff is a meta-ethical principle to the NC framework which means its offense functions as a hijack because the meta-ethic comes sequentially prior.

### Contention:

#### First, altruism and fairness are a priori intuitive - brain and psychological studies across age ranges prove.

* Ultimatum games prove: 20% offered stake although they could’ve been self-interested

**Lucas**, Margery. “FAIR GAME: THE INTUITIVE ECONOMICS OF RESOURCE EXCHANGE IN FOUR-YEAR OLDS.” Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Behavioral Psychology, **2008**, citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.470.8506&rep=rep1&type=pdf. //Massa

There has been a great deal of interest in the study of intuitive knowledge in young children but not much is known about the development of **intuitive** economics - the concepts and abilities that comprise the representations and mechanisms underlying core knowledge of economic value and exchange. Although the acquisition of economic knowledge is usually associated with complex cultural learning, the **ability to engage in fair and reciprocal transactions** involving food and other resources has probably been important throughout human evolutionary history (Dunbar, 1996; Winterhalder, 2001) **suggesting that** fairness, reciprocity, and **altruism in humans may have a biological basis**. If so, these behaviors may be observable even in young children. The field of behavioral economics provides a set of tools for studying adult preferences in resource exchange. **In ultimatum games**, there are two players, a proposer and a responder. **The proposer can offer any amount** of a given stake to the responder. If the amount is accepted, both players receive the amount proposed. If the amount is rejected, neither player receives anything. In the dictator game, the protocol is similar except that responders must accept whatever amount the proposer offers. **The literature on these games reports consistent findings across samples from western cultures** (Camerer, 2003): Proposers in ultimatum games offer, on average, 40% of the stake and responders reject offers of 20% or less about half the time. In college-age populations, the offers are, on average, higher at 40-45% (Henrich et al., 2005). In dictator games, proposers offer 20%, on average, even though they could offer nothing and still keep their stake. These results are problematic for the canonical economic model of rational self-interest according to which proposers should offer the smallest amount possible and responders should accept anything that is offered. Instead, **participants offer more than is necessary and reject offers perceived to be unfair. These** choices **indicate preferences for fairness and altruism** as well as an understanding of the importance of reciprocity. **Failure to meet** social **expectations** regarding reciprocity and fairness have been shown to **elicit strong negative emotions** and punishment in exchange partners (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; de Quervain et al., 2004).

#### That affirms – a) not every private company has the equal resources to explore space b) the strengthening of private space programs gives countries unfair dominant global hegemonic powers over others

#### Second, Increased exploration is not the public’s primary intuition.

Leonard 20, The Harvard Crimson, https://www.thecrimson.com/column/brave-new-worlds/article/2020/5/6/leonard-illogical-case-for-space/

Over the past few months, I’ve written a [half-dozen columns](https://www.thecrimson.com/column/brave-new-worlds/) examining the ethics and rationale behind a variety of space initiatives. But there’s one central question that I have yet to tackle: Why should we care about space exploration in the first place? Some space enthusiasts choose to ignore this question altogether. If you ask them why you ought to care about space, they might look at you like you’re crazy — “Well, why wouldn’t you? Are you, like, against science or something?” But when [billions](https://spacenews.com/nasa-to-receive-22-6-billion-in-fiscal-year-2020-spending-bill/) of taxpayer dollars are going into space-related research every year, and the benefit to the public is not always evident, the “why” question needs to be addressed. Unfortunately, the common arguments in favor of space exploration have glaring holes in their logic. Take a hypothetical space enthusiast. He might begin his defense of space spending by citing all the useful technologies that have been created as a result of space exploration. This point is indisputable — the list of technologies that NASA has produced or refined is [extensive](https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/infographics/infographic.view.php?id=11358), ranging from portable laptops to baby formula. But if our primary desire is the production of useful consumer technologies, a space agency doesn’t seem like the most intuitive place to invest. Plenty of other industries could produce similar technologies if given NASA’s multi-billion dollar budget, and they likely could do so more efficiently, given that the development of these technologies is only one small part of NASA’s overall mission. The space geek might then point out that going after NASA for financial reasons is misguided. After all, NASA’s funding only makes up [0.5 percent](https://www.planetary.org/get-involved/be-a-space-advocate/nasa-budget.html) of the total U.S. budget; if you really wanted to save money, you’d best look elsewhere. But this is where we wade into politically divisive waters — what exactly can we scale back instead of NASA? If you said (as I’m inclined to) that the military is the most deserving of a budget cut, you’d immediately lose the attention of many conservative listeners. A call to slash social spending would be dismissed by the progressive bloc. It would be nigh-impossible to find any element of the U.S. budget that could be slashed with bipartisan support — that is, perhaps, besides NASA itself. At this point, the space fanatic might pull out one last desperate card: Space research is necessary in order to protect the human race. If we never branch out to other planets, then we’re all sitting ducks waiting to be wiped out by the next extinction event. And, indeed, this might be true in the long term. But in the short term, we don’t have the capability to transport humans to another planet en masse, and making a distant planet fully habitable is certainly out of reach. So, for now, it’s more important to keep Earth safe than to start colonizing another planet; fighting existential threats like climate change is actually feasible, and climate research could certainly benefit from an annual budget of $22.6 billion. So, it seems, our space enthusiast has failed to provide a convincing defense of space spending. Now for the dramatic twist — that hypothetical space advocate was actually me, about two days ago, when I sat down to write this final column. At first, I wanted to write a traditional defense of space spending, but I quickly realized that every argument I constructed or encountered online had major holes in its logic. As a result, I was forced to ask myself: Does my deeply-held passion for space exploration actually have no logical basis? And, I realized, the answer is yes. The very act of exploring space — launching humans on giant hunks of metal to go wander around distant space rocks — is a deeply illogical undertaking. Still, millions of humans across the globe are inspired by daring space missions, even if those missions offer no tangible benefit to their own lives. To me, this is because space research — from the search for extraterrestrial life to figuring out how to get humans to Mars — is more of a spiritual pursuit than a pragmatic one. It excites and fascinates us; it satisfies our collective desire to learn more about the unknown — to go where we’ve never been before. Space allows us to explore our deepest questions about the nature of our role in the universe.

#### Third, it’s intuitive for 105 countries to abide by an agreement they agreed to because they already said they would and had the motivational intuition to sign it in the first place – international law proves private companies are in violation of appropriation.

Basulto 15, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2015/11/18/how-property-rights-in-outer-space-may-lead-to-a-scramble-to-exploit-the-moons-resources/

When it comes to outer space, however, there’s the matter of a pesky little document known as the [Outer Space Treaty of 1967](http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html), to which the United States is a signatory. The Outer Space Treaty indirectly suggests that commercial space companies don’t own the rights to any resources they find in outer space. The treaty states that no “celestial body” is subject to “national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”