# Neg

## 1

### “Is” Means No Spec Instance of Plan

#### Interpretation—the aff may not defend a subset of appropriation.

#### Appropriation is a generic indefinite singular. Cohen 01

Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf

\*IS generic = Indefinite Singulars

French, then, expresses the two types of reading differently. In English, on¶ the other hand, generic BPs are ambiguous between inductivist and normative¶ readings. But even in English there is one type of generic that can express only¶ one of these readings, and this is the IS generic. While BPs are ambiguous¶ between the inductivist and the rules and regulations readings, ISs are not. In¶ the supermarket scenario discussed above, only (44.b) is true:¶ (44) a. A banana sells for $.49/lb.¶ b. A banana sells for $1.00/lb.¶ The normative force of the generic IS has been noted before. Burton-Roberts¶ (1977) considers the following minimal pair:¶ (45) a. Gentlemen open doors for ladies.¶ b. A gentleman opens doors for ladies.¶ He notes that (45.b), but not (45.a), expresses what he calls “moral necessity.”7¶ Burton-Roberts observes that if Emile does not as a rule open doors for ladies, his mother could utter [(45.b)] and thereby successfully imply that Emile was not, or was¶ not being, a gentleman. Notice that, if she were to utter. . . [(45.a)] she¶ might achieve the same effect (that of getting Emile to open doors for¶ ladies) but would do so by different means. . . For [(45.a)] merely makes a¶ generalisation about gentlemen (p. 188).¶ Sentence (45.b), then, unlike (45.a), does not have a reading where it makes¶ a generalization about gentlemen; it is, rather, a statement about some social¶ norm. It is true just in case this norm is in effect, i.e. it is a member of a set of¶ socially accepted rules and regulations.¶ An IS that, in the null context, cannot be read generically, may receive a¶ generic reading in a context that makes it clear that a rule or a regulation is¶ referred to. For example, Greenberg (1998) notes that, out of the blue, (46.a)¶ and (46.b) do not have a generic reading:¶ (46) a. A Norwegian student whose name ends with ‘s’ or ‘j’ wears green¶ thick socks.¶ b. A tall, left-handed, brown haired neurologist in Hadassa hospital¶ earns more than $50,000 a year.¶ However, Greenberg points out that in the context of (47.a) and (47.b),¶ respectively, the generic readings of the IS subject are quite natural:¶ (47) a. You know, there are very interesting traditions in Norway, concerning the connection between name, profession, and clothing. For¶ example, a Norwegian student. . .¶ b. The new Hadassa manager has some very funny paying criteria. For¶ example, a left-handed. . .¶ Even IS sentences that were claimed above to lack a generic reading, such¶ as (3.b) and (4.b), may, in the appropriate context, receive such a reading:¶ (48) a. Sire, please don’t send her to the axe. Remember, a king is generous!¶ b. How dare you build me such a room? Don’t you know a room is¶ square?

#### Their plan violates. Rules readings are always generalized – specific instances are not consistent. Cohen 01

Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf

In general, as, again, already noted by Aristotle, rules and definitions are not relativized to particular individuals; it is rarely the case that a specific individual¶ forms part of the description of a general rule.¶ Even DPs of the form a certain X or a particular X, which usually receive¶ a wide scope interpretation, cannot, in general, receive such an interpretation in the context of a rule or a definition. This holds of definitions in general, not¶ only of definitions with an IS subject. The following examples from the Cobuild¶ dictionary illustrate this point:¶ (74) a. A fanatic is a person who is very enthusiastic about a particular¶ activity, sport, or way of life.¶ b. Something that is record-breaking is better than the previous¶ record for a particular performance or achievement.¶ c. When a computer outputs something it sorts and produces information as the result of a particular program or operation.¶ d. If something sheers in a particular direction, it suddenly changes¶ direction, for example to avoid hitting something.

#### That outweighs—only our evidence speaks to how indefinite singulars are interpreted in the context of normative statements like the resolution. This means throw out aff counter-interpretations that are purely descriptive

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Precision –any deviation justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### 2] Limits—specifying a type of appropriation offers huge explosion in the topic since space is, quite literally, infinite.

#### Drop the debater to preserve fairness and education – use competing interps –reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### No RVIs—it’s their burden to be topical – shouldn’t get a cookie for being fair

## 2- Debris Advantage CP

#### CP text: Space-faring nations should

#### Establish a unified system of space traffic management modeled after the International Telecommunication Union

#### Collaborate on techniques to track and display the location of objects in real time and AI to automate debris-avoidance maneuvers

#### The United States Federal Government should:

#### Shift responsibility for the Space-Track catalogue to the civilian Department of Commerce, allocating necessary funds

Nature 21 [(Nature Editorial Board, peer-reviewed, comprises experimental scientists and data-standards experts from across different fields of science) “The world must cooperate to avoid a catastrophic space collision,” Nature, 8/11/2021] JL

But there are no traffic cops in space, nor international borders with clearly delineated areas of responsibility. To avoid further damage, it’s crucial that satellite operators have an accurate and up-to-date list of where objects are in space. At present, the main global catalogue of space objects is published at Space-Track.org by the US Space Command, a branch of the military. The catalogue is the most widely used public listing available, but it lacks some satellites that countries — including the United States, China and Russia — have not acknowledged publicly. In part because of this lack of transparency, other nations also track space objects, and some private companies maintain commercially available catalogues.

Rather than this patchwork of incomplete sources, what the world needs is a unified system of space traffic management. Through this, spacefaring nations and companies could agree to share more of their tracking data and cooperate to make space safer. This might require the creation of a new global regime, such as an international convention, through which rules and technical standards could be organized. One analogy is the International Telecommunication Union, the United Nations agency that coordinates global telecommunications issues such as who can transmit in which parts of the radio spectrum.

It won’t be easy to create such a system for space traffic. For it to succeed, questions of safety (such as avoiding smashing up a satellite) will need to be disentangled from questions of security (such as whether that satellite is spying on another nation) so that countries can be assured that participating in such an effort would not compromise national security. Countries could, for instance, share information about the location of a satellite without sharing details of its capabilities or purpose for being in space.

One near-term move that would help would be for the United States to complete a planned shift of responsibility for the Space-Track.org catalogue from the military to the civilian Department of Commerce. Because this catalogue has historically been the most widely used around the world, shifting it to a civilian agency could start to defuse geopolitical tensions and so improve global efforts to manage space debris. It might one day feed into a global space-traffic agreement between nations; even the nascent space superpower China would have a big incentive to participate, despite rivalries with the United States. The transition was called for in a 2018 US presidential directive that recognizes that companies are taking over from national governments as the dominant players in space, but it has yet to occur, in part because Congress has not allocated the necessary funds.

On 25 August, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space will meet to discuss a range of topics related to international cooperation in space. The UN is the right forum through which spacefaring nations can work together to establish norms for responsible space behaviour, and that should include how the world can track objects to make space safer. It should continue recent work it has been doing emphasizing space as a secure and sustainable environment, which at least brings countries such as the United States and China into the same conversation.

Basic research has a role, too: innovations such as techniques to track and display the locations of orbiting objects in real time, and artificial intelligence to help automate debris-avoidance manoeuvres, could bolster any global effort to monitor and regulate space.

If governments and companies around the world do not take urgent action to work together to make space safer, they will one day face a catastrophic collision that knocks out one or more satellites key to their safety, economic well-being or both. Space is a global commons and a global resource. A global organization responsible for — and capable of — managing the flow of space traffic is long overdue.

## 3

#### Cyber attacks on critical infrastructure are coming now

Underwood 20 [Kimberly Underwood is a reporter on emerging communication technologies, cyberwarfare, the intelligence community, military command operations and weaponry research. “China is Retooling, and Russia Seeks Harm to Critical Infrastructure.” June 24, 2020. https://www.afcea.org/content/china-retooling-and-russia-seeks-harm-critical-infrastructure]

Intelligence leader warns of the mounting threats of cyber espionage, digital attacks and influence operations from adversaries. U.S. adversaries are trying to take control of cyberspace as a medium, resulting in implications to our freedom of maneuver and access in cyberspace, says Brig. Gen. Gregory Gagnon, USAF, director of Intelligence (A2), Headquarters Air Combat Command (ACC), Joint Base Langley-Eustis. Increasing cyberspace activity is coming from China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. “We are seeing it not just in volume, but we are seeing an expansion in the ways that they use cyberspace, whether it is to steal information, whether it is to directly influence our citizens or whether it is to disrupt critical infrastructure,” Gen. Gagnon reports. The general spoke at the AFCEA Tidewater chapter’s recent monthly virtual luncheon. China and Russia continue to pose the greatest espionage and cyber attack threats to the United States, but the intelligence leader anticipates that other adversaries and strategic competitors will also build and integrate cyber espionage, cyber attacks and influence operations into how they conduct business. “Our strategic competitors will increasingly use cyber space capabilities including cyber espionage, cyber attack and continued influence operations to seek political, economic and military advantage over the United States, our allies and our partners,” he said. “This is not an ‘if,’ it is a yes. They are doing it and they will continue.” Gen. Gagnon warned that China in particular is using cyber espionage to collect intelligence, target critical infrastructure and steal intellectual property. It is all part of China’s plan to move from being a regional actor to being seen as a global power. The shift also means a greater role for the adversary’s military. The Chinese military is in the process of transitioning from a defensive, inflexible ground-based force charged with domestic and peripheral security to a joint, highly agile, expeditionary and power projecting arm of Chinese foreign policy, he noted. “What is going on in China is a dynamic revectoring of the objectives and goals of the People's Liberation Army,” Gen. Gagnon said. “This is not a small change. This is a major change in course and direction. They're doing it to be a power projection arm of a Chinese foreign policy that engages both in military diplomacy and operations around the globe, but also in predatory economic activity.” Moreover, China’s military spending in 2018 exceeded $200 billion, an increase of about 300% since 2002, the general stated. And while it is not the $750 billion that the United States government spends every year on military defense, the Chinese funding does not reflect the same level of investment in manpower or healthcare. A good portion of their $200 billion directly funds technology and capabilities. “A big chunk of our budget is not buying kit,” Gen. Gagnon explained. “If you're the CCP [Chinese Communist Party], you don't have the same extensive retirement programs that you have to pay for,” he said. “You don't have this extensive healthcare which you have to provide. So, when you think about $200 billion, think about that buying kit and buying operations. That is significant.” To the industry, Gen. Gagnon warned companies that Beijing will authorize Chinese espionage against key U.S technologies. “Many of your corporations hold this technology,” he stressed. “They are trying to undercut your ability to be profitable by developing those same technologies in China. They are competing against us in the international market. I will tell you that China's persistent cyber espionage threat and their growing tech threat to our core military and critical infrastructure will continue to be persistent. China remains the most active strategic competitor responsible for cyber espionage against corporations and allies.” China, like Russia, is also increasing its information warfare against the United States. “They are becoming more adept at using social media to deliver messages directly to the U.S. population that alter the way we think, the way we behave and the way we decide,” the general observed. The improvement of their cyber attack capabilities and ways to alter information online is intended to shape views inside China, shift the mindset of Chinese people around the world, as well as to try to shape the world’s view, not just of China, but also of the United States. “You are seeing that play out in the pandemic, how people view us around the world,” he offered. “We're also concerned about Chinese intelligence and security services,” the A2 continued. “They use Chinese information technology firms as routine and systemic espionage platforms against the United States and against our allies. Many of you are tracking what is in the news about 5G and Huawei, and that's what we're talking about.” As for Russia, their highly capable operations of cyber espionage, influence and cyber attacks continue to target the United States and its allies. In particular, Russia’s form of integrating cyber espionage attacks and influence operations, or information confrontation, is very effective, Gen. Gagnon emphasized. “If you think about it, they’re generally playing with the weaker hand, so they have been rather brilliant on the international stage in achieving their foreign policy objectives,” he said. In addition, Moscow is staging cyberattack assets to disrupt or damage U.S. military or civilian information systems during the COVID-19 pandemic. “There is activity that they undertake on a day-to-day basis to try to gain a decisive military intelligence,” he stated. “Their security services continue to target our systems, both for U.S. information systems and critical infrastructure, as well as the networks of our NATO and Five-Eye partners. They do it for positional advantage in cyberspace to be able to do the five Ds: deceive, deny, disrupt, degrade and destroy our assets, but also to gain intelligence on how systems are established and set up so that they can maintain attack vectors.” Russia also is targeting U.S. critical infrastructure, the general cautioned. “Russia has the ability to execute cyber attacks in the United States that can generate localized temporary disruptive effects on critical infrastructure, such as disrupting electric distribution networks for at least a few hours.” In fact, he warned, Moscow is mapping out critical infrastructure with the long-term goal of being able to cause “substantial damage.”

#### Megaconstellations function as critical infrastructure that increase resiliency and protect against cyberattacks

Hallex and Cottom 20 [Matthew A. Hallex is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Travis S. Cottom is a Research Associate at the Institute for Defense Analyses. “Proliferated Commercial Satellite Constellations: Implications for National Security.” 2020. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-97/jfq-97\_20-29\_Hallex-Cottom.pdf?ver=2020-03-31-130614-940]

While potentially threatening the sustainability of safe orbital operations, new proliferated constellations also offer opportunities for the United States to increase the resilience of its national security space architectures. Increasing the resilience of U.S. national security space architectures has strategic implications beyond the space domain. Adversaries such as China and Russia see U.S. dependence on space as a key vulnerability to exploit during a conflict. Resilient, proliferated satellite constellations support deterrence by denying adversaries the space superiority they believe is necessary to initiate and win a war against the United States.28 Should deterrence fail, these constellations could provide assured space support to U.S. forces in the face of adversary counterspace threats while imposing costs on competitors by rendering their investments in counterspace systems irrelevant. Proliferated constellations can support these goals in four main ways. First, the extreme degree of disaggregation inherent in government and commercial proliferated constellations could make them more resilient to attacks by many adversary counterspace systems. A constellation composed of hundreds or thousands of satellites could withstand losing a relatively large number of them before losing significant capability. Conducting such an attack with kinetic antisatellite weapons—like those China and Russia are developing—would require hundreds of costly weapons to destroy satellites that would be relatively inexpensive to replace. Second, proliferated constellations would be more resilient to adversary electronic warfare. Satellites in LEO can emit signals 1,280 times more powerful than signals from satellites in GEO.29 They JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Hallex and Cottom 25 also are faster in the sky than satellites in more distant orbits, which, combined with the planned use of small spot beams for communications proliferated constellations, would shrink the geographic area in which an adversary ground-based jammer could effectively operate, making jammers less effective and easier to geolocate and eliminate.30 Third, even if the United States chooses not to deploy national security proliferated constellations during peacetime, industrial capacity for mass-producing proliferated constellation satellites could be repurposed during a conflict. Just as Ford production lines shifted from automobiles to tanks and aircraft during World War II, one can easily imagine commercial satellite factories building military reconnaissance or communications satellites during a conflict. Fourth, deploying and maintaining constellations of hundreds or thousands of satellites will drive the development of low-cost launches to a much higher rate than is available today. Inexpensive, high-cadence space launch could provide a commercial solution to operationally responsive launch needs of the U.S. Government. In a future where space launches occur weekly or less, the launch capacity needed to augment national security space systems during a crisis or to replace systems lost during a conflict in space would be readily available.31

#### Cyberattacks cause extinction---false warnings, stealing nukes, and introducing vulnerability

Ernest J. Moniz et al. 18, Ernest J. Moniz is the CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, served as the thirteenth United States Secretary of Energy from 2013 to January 2017. Sam Nunn, and Des Browne, September 2018, “Nuclear Weapons in the New Cyber Age,” https://media.nti.org/documents/Cyber\_report\_finalsmall.pdf

The Cyber Threat to Nuclear Weapons and Related Systems

Cyber-based threats target all sectors of society—from the financial sector to the entertainment industry, from department stores to insurance companies. Governments face an even more critical challenge when it comes to cyberattacks on their most critical systems. Attacks on critical infrastructure could have extraordinary consequences, but a successful cyberattack3 on a nuclear weapon or related system—a nuclear weapon, a delivery system, or the related Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) systems—could have existential consequences. Cyberattacks could lead to false warnings of attack, interrupt critical communications or access to information, compromise nuclear planning or delivery systems, or even allow an adversary to take control of a nuclear weapon.

Given the level of digitization of U.S. systems and the pace of the evolving cyber threat, one cannot assume that systems with digital components—including nuclear weapons systems—are not or will not be compromised. Among the reasons: nuclear weapons and delivery systems are periodically upgraded, which may include the incorporation of new digital systems or components. Malware could be introduced into digital systems during fabrication, much of which is not performed in secure foundries. In addition, there are a range of external dependencies, such as connections to the electric grid, that are outside the control of defense officials but directly affect nuclear systems. Finally, the possibility always exists that an insider, either purposefully or accidentally, could enable a cybersecurity lapse by introducing malware into a critical system.

Increased use of digital systems may also adversely affect the survivability of nuclear systems. New technologies can enhance reliability and performance, but they can also lead to new vulnerabilities in traditionally survivable systems, such as submarines or mobile missile launchers.4

# Case

## AT the plan

#### Private business actions are k2 develop CIL in space – squo solves for debris we don’t need the detriments of the aff– attribution lends it legitimacy

Durkee 19 Melissa J**.** Durkee 19, University of Georgia School of Law's associate dean for international programs and director of the Dean Rusk International Law Center, Interstitial Space Law, 97 Wash. U. L. Rev. 423 (2019). <https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol97/iss2/7>

The Article uses the space law debate as a test case for a theory of international lawmaking I call "attributed lawmaking." The theory asserts that private conduct can contribute to the formation of uncodified international law-customary international law and treaty practice-when that private conduct is attributed or imputed to the state.9 The theory exposes the relevance of new facts that could (for better or for worse) resolve the space law debate. Yet its implications reach far beyond this debate. It uncovers the potentially disquieting consequence that private business entities can have a legally sanctioned role to play in creating law in a variety of areas when the state fails so to do. Conventionally, customary international law is the product of acts and assertions of nations that aggregate over time like precedents in a common law system." When a sufficient number of nations have converged upon a legal rule through their actions or reactions, the rule becomes binding law, 12 and can be invoked in national and international courts, as well as in diplomatic contexts.' Customary international law was once the predominant form of international law, and its importance persists. Indeed, in an era of nationalist retraction, where major multilateral treaty regimes are facing existential threats, 14 international custom may be experiencing a resurgence.1 The conventional account of how customary international law is created is, however, incomplete.' 6 It does not account for the acts and assertions of private business entities, which take on lawmaking significance in certain circumstances.' 7 In particular, the theory of attributed lawmaking asserts that when the conduct of a private actor becomes attributed or imputed to the state under existing international legal doctrines, this conduct counts among the behavioral building blocks that contribute to the formation of customary international law. That is, because the private conduct is attributed to the state, it contributes to the formation of a customary legal rule. The challenge is to determine when private conduct becomes attributed to the state. For example, a private business entity can be an "organ" or "agent" of the state,' 8 or nations can take responsibility for certain business activity through treaties.19 These principles are not new. What the attributed lawmaking theory contributes is the observation that attribution for the purposes of state responsibility also has significant and underappreciated lawmaking implications. Space law offers a case study. In the space law arena, it is possible to argue that private companies are themselves developing the international law of outer space. They can do this by advancing the legal principles of their choice-to legislators, investors, and the popular press, and with their actual rocket launches.20 Under this argument, the behavior of these companies is itself the "subsequent practice" that determines how the Outer Space Treaty should be interpreted. 2 ' Because private missions are defined by the Outer Space treaty as "national" missions, which are attributed to the home nation and for which home nations are responsible,2 2 these private acts can also be attributed to those nations for the purposes of customary law formation and treaty interpretation. This is because when a corporation whose activity is attributed to the state publicly asserts a legal rule and acts on it, and a nation does nothing, that nation implicitly accepts the corporate rule.23 In the absence of direct evidence of a nation's acts and assertions in support of a customary rule, the actions of private space companies-which are attributed to the nation-become the best evidence of a nation's embrace of a particular interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty. The result, the Article shows, is that private companies may be forcing development of an international legal rule that is permissive to appropriation of space resources. The Article stops short of concluding that attributed lawmaking offers a final resolution to the debate.2 4 Rather, it identifies a potential legal argument that attributed treaty practice on this topic exists and bolsters arguments that the Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit commercial appropriation.

### AT: Debris

No link no impacts

**1] the aff doesn’t solve existing debris and Kessler is inevitable – current situation proves collisions don’t cascade but we need solutions**

**David 21**, Leonard David, 4-14-2021, "Space Junk Removal Is Not Going Smoothly," Scientific American, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/space-junk-removal-is-not-going-smoothly/ //wr tanya

Consider the February 2009 run-in between a dead Russian Cosmos satellite and a commercial Iridium spacecraft, which produced an enormous amount of debris. **Finding ways to remove** at least **some of all that space junk should be a top global priority**, says Donald Kessler, a retired NASA senior scientist for orbital debris research. In the late 1970s he foretold the possibility of a scenario that has been dubbed the Kessler syndrome: as the density of space rubbish increases, a cascading, self-sustaining runaway cycle of debris-generating collisions can arise that might ultimately make low-Earth orbit too hazardous to support most space activities. “There is now agreement within the community that the **debris** environment **has reached a ‘tipping point’ where debris would continue to increase even if all launches were stopped**,” Kessler says. “It takes an Iridium-Cosmos-type collision to get everyone’s attention. That’s what it boils down to.... And we’re overdue for something like that to happen.” As for the Kessler syndrome, “it **has already started**,” the debris expert says. “**There are collisions taking place all the time**—less dramatic and not at the large size scale,” Kessler adds. A new entrant in grappling with this worrisome state of affairs is the just launched End-of-Life Services by Astroscale Demonstration (ELSA-d) mission. ELSA-d is a two-satellite mission developed by Astroscale, a Japan-based satellite services company: it consists of a “servicer” satellite designed to safely remove debris from orbit and a “client” one that doubles as an object of interest. The project aims to showcase a magnetic system that can capture stable and even tumbling objects, whether for disposal or servicing in orbit. Following a multiphase test agenda, the servicer and client will then deorbit together, disintegrating during their fiery plunge into Earth’s atmosphere. ELSA-d is now circling in Earth orbit. The mission was lofted on March 22 via a Russian Soyuz rocket that tossed scads of other hitchhiking satellites into space. Following the liftoff, Astroscale’s founder and CEO Nobu Okada said ELSA-d will prove out debris-removal capabilities and “propel regulatory developments and advance the business case for end-of-life and active debris removal services.” The launch is a step toward realizing “safe and sustainable development of space for the benefit of future generations,” he said. The most serious risks, she says, come from debris particles between one and 10 centimeters in size. “There’s far more of them than whole defunct spacecraft, and there is a far greater probability of collision,” Gorman says. “While debris this size might not cause a catastrophic breakup, **collision** with it can **certainly damage working satellites and create new debris particles.**” Turning her attention to satellite mega constellations, Gorman worries about their effects in a low-Earth orbital environment that is already congested. “We also know that **orbital dynamics can be unpredictable**,” she says. “I want to see some of these mega constellation operators releasing their long-term modeling for collisions as more and more satellites are launched.”

**2] private companies are key to debris solutions. Voting neg is the best way to solve the aff’s problems**

**Katz 21**, Miranda Katz, 10-31-2021, "Space Debris: Another Frontier in the Commercialization of Space — Columbia Journal of Transnational Law," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/space-debris-another-frontier-in-the-commercialization-of-space //wr tanya

Space “Junk” is a threat to any spacefaring operator, be they a sovereign or private actor. The current legal framework does not directly address space debris, leaving the door open for **private companies** to not only solve the technical problems of clean up, but also craft the policy that supports their involvement. In the Summer of 2021, we got a glimpse of what some hope will be commonplace in the future: space tourism.  While it might be billionaires and their associates for now, if this technology is to follow the arc of many other advancements previously reserved for the rich (cell phones and air travel, for example), eventually there may come a time in the future where space tourism is a realistic financial goal for those of more restricted means.  As humanity broaches this great commercial frontier, it will have to clear the great and neglected hurdle of “space junk,” and **current trends appear to indicate that industry will shape not only the technology designed to solve the problem, but the policy as well.** Outside the realms of fictional space-thrillers, even the smallest pieces of space junk can present real danger.  In 2016, a tiny piece of space junk, believed 0to be a paint chip or a piece of metal no more than a few thousandths of a millimeter across, cracked the window of the International Space Station.  In May 2021, a piece of space debris punctured the robotic arm of the International Space Station.  This is seriously concerning, as, according to the European Space Agency, **there are 670,000 pieces of space debris larger than 1cm and 170,000,000 between 1mm and 1cm** in width. Unfortunately8, **public action and policy struggles to keep up with these risks.**  International law affords little clarity on the problem, as its control is a novel, emerging field with many technical tracking and removal challenges.  **None of the existing space treaties directly tackle the** issue, rendering responsibility for it **ambiguous**.  Absent such responsibility, **legal incentives are non-existent**.  Guidelines are occasionally issued by international governing bodies, but provide little legal significance and are more targeted at the practicalities of tracking and removal. The nation best positioned to notify space actors of collision risks is the United States, and the burden of that task currently falls on the Department of Defense.  However, the Trump administration issued a directive in 2018, shifting the responsibility from the DoD to the Department of Commerce, and **the transition has yet to** materialize, leaving DoD struggling to keep pace with increasing commercial activity.  In the face of public paralysis, **addressing the problem through industry looks more and more attractive**. This has led some to call for a new legal order that still leaves room for government, but reframes who the rules exist to serve.  Rather than our current, rudimentary treaty regime designed to prevent international conflict, commentators have called for an additional regime resembling maritime law that preserves the interests of a more diverse set of stakeholders, including those in the future that can bring technology and interests to space that may not yet exist.  These commentators shun the common conception that space regulation should resemble air-traffic control, which is suited to a narrower set of uses (transport).  Under such a “maritime” regime, the light touch of central regulatory bodies, and perhaps their non-existence, is preferred, just as it has been on the seas.  This way, individual nations have a degree of flexibility in instituting controls they see fit while leaving room for industry to address problems and introduce new uses for space. Furthermore, **governments seem ready and willing to construct the legal and incentive framework in concert with such private action**.  In a joint statement this summer, G7 members expressed openness to resolving the technical aspects of the debris problem with private institutions, and there is some promising progress.  **Apple co-founder Steve Wozniak** signaled his plans to address the problem through a new company with a telling name: Privateer Space.  **Astroscale, a UK-based company, successfully launched a pair of satellites** in the Spring of 2021 **that will remove** certain **space debris from orbit.**  Astroscale also stated their desire to work with governments and international governing bodies to craft policy with private efforts to control the problem top of mind.   In light of public policy’s silence on space debris, **the initiative of actors** like Astroscale involving themselves in policy may be advised, as it **could promote further private investment in technology for space debris removal.**  A popular policy recommendation among experts is **the establishment of public-private partnerships**, and Astroscale has entered several such agreements including with Japan and the European Space Agency.  Other **actors include ClearSpace, OneWeb, and D-Orbit**.

**3] No debris cascades —This evidence answers all aff warrants – even in the neg world, space ventures will continue**

**Fange 17** (Daniel Von Fange, Web Application Engineer, Founder and Owner of LeanCoder, Full Stack, Polyglot Web Developer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped”, 5/21/2017, http://braino.org/essays/kessler\_syndrome\_is\_over\_hyped/)

Kessler Syndrome is **overhyped**. A **chorus of online commenters** great any news of upcoming low earth orbit satellites with worry that humanity will to lose access to space. I now think they are **wrong**. What is Kessler Syndrome? Here’s the popular view on Kessler Syndrome. Every once in a while, a piece of junk in space hits a satellite. This single impact destroys the satellite, and breaks off several thousand additional pieces. These new pieces now fly around space looking for other satellites to hit, and so exponentially multiply themselves over time, like a nuclear reaction, until a sphere of man-made debris surrounds the earth, and humanity no longer has access to space nor the benefits of satellites. It is a dark picture. Is Kessler Syndrome likely to happen? I had to stop everything and spend an afternoon doing back-of-the-napkin math to know how big the threat is. To estimate, we need to know where the stuff in space is, how much mass is there, and how long it would take to deorbit. The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. **Low LEO** - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO **doesn’t matter** for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over. **High LEO** - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue. **Mid Orbit** - **GPS** satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The **volume of space is so huge**, and the **number of satellites so few**, that we **don’t need to worry** about Kessler **here**. **GEO** - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about **one satellite per 1000km** of the ring. Kessler is **not a problem** here. How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be?Let’s imagine a **worst case** scenario. An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space? I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s **839,985,870 1cm cubes**. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are **tiny - less than 1 in 10,000**. So **even in the worst case, we don’t lose access to space**. Now though you can travel through the debris, you couldn’t keep a satellite alive for long in this orbit of death. Kessler Syndrome at its worst just prevents us from putting satellites in **certain orbits**. In **real life**, there’s a **lot of factors** that make Kessler syndrome **even less of a problem** than our worst case though experiment. Debris would be **spread** over a **volume** of space, not a **single orbital surface**, making collisions **orders of magnitudes less likely**.Most impact debris will have a **slower orbital velocity** than either of its original pieces - this makes it deorbit **much sooner**.Any collision will create large and small objects. Small objects are much more affected by atmospheric drag and deorbit faster, even in a **few months** from high LEO. Larger objects can be **tracked** by earth based radar and **avoided**. The planned big new constellations are **not in High LEO**, but in **Low LEO** for faster communications with the earth. They **aren’t an issue** for Kessler. Most importantly, all new satellite launches since the 19**90’s** are required to include a plan to get rid of the satellite at the end of its useful life (usually by deorbiting) So the realistic worst case is that **insurance premiums on satellites go up a bit**. Given the **current trend** toward **much smaller, cheaper micro satellites**, this wouldn’t even have a huge effect. I’m removing Kessler Syndrome from my list of things to worry about.

#### 4] Robust tracking systems ensure there is no risk

**Mosher 19** [Dave; September 3rd; Journalist with more than a decade of experience reporting and writing stories about space, science, and technology; Business Insider, “Satellite collisions may trigger a space-junk disaster that could end human access to orbit. Here’s How,” <https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/Space_and_Defense_2_3.pdf>; GR]

The Kessler syndrome plays center-stage in the movie "Gravity," in which an accidental space collision endangers a crew aboard a large space station. But Gossner said that type of a runaway space-junk catastrophe is unlikely. "Right now I don't think we're close to that," he said. "I'm not saying we couldn't get there, and I'm not saying we don't need to be smart and manage the problem. But I don't see it ever becoming, anytime soon, an unmanageable problem." There is no current system to remove old satellites or sweep up bits of debris in order to prevent a Kessler event. Instead, space debris is monitored from Earth, and new rules require satellites in low-Earth orbit be deorbited after 25 years so they don't wind up adding more space junk. "Our current plan is to manage the problem and not let it get that far," Gossner said. "I don't think that we're even close to needing to actively remove stuff. There's lots of research being done on that, and maybe some day that will happen, but I think that — at this point, and in my humble opinion — an unnecessary expense." A major part of the effort to prevent a Kessler event is the Space Surveillance Network (SSN). The project, led by the US military, uses 30 different systems around the world to identify, track, and share information about objects in space. Many objects are tracked day and night via a networkof radar observatories around the globe. Optical telescopes on the ground also keep an eye out, but they aren't always run by the government. "The commercial sector is actually putting up lots and lots of telescopes," Gossner said. The government pays for their debris-tracking services. Gossner said one major debris-tracking company is called Exoanalytic. It uses about 150 small telescopes set up around the globe to detect, track, and report space debris to the SSN. Telescopes in space track debris, too. Far less is known about them because they're likely top-secret military satellites. Objects detected by the government and companies get added to a catalog of space debris and checked against the orbits of other known bits of space junk. New orbits are calculated with supercomputers to see if there's a chance of any collisions. Diana McKissock, a flight lead with the US Air Force's 18th Space Control Squadron, helps track space debris for the SSN. She said the surveillance network issues warnings to NASA, satellite companies, and other groups with spacecraft, based on two levels of emergency: basic and advanced. The SSN issues a basic emergency report to the public three days ahead of a 1-in-10,000 chance of a collision. It then provides multiple updates per day until the risk of a collision passes. To qualify for such reporting, a rogue object must come within a certain distance of another object. In low-Earth orbit, that distance must be less than 1 kilometer (0.62 mile); farther out in deep space, where the precision of orbits is less reliable, the distance is less than 5 kilometers (3.1 miles). Advanced emergency reports help satellite providers see possible collisions much more than three days ahead. "In 2017, we provided data for 308,984 events, of which only 655 were emergency-reportable," McKissock told Business Insider in an email. Of those, 579 events were in low-Earth orbit (where it's relatively crowded with satellites).

#### 5] It’s not going to happen - timeframe is decades and intervening actors solve.

Burns Interviewing Kessler 13 Corrinne Burns, interviewing Donald Kessler, who made up the concept. [Space junk apocalypse: just like Gravity? 11-15-2013, https://www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2013/nov/15/space-junk-apocalypse-gravity]//BPS

Now? Are we in trouble? Not yet. Kessler syndrome isn't an acute phenomenon, as depicted in the movie – it's a slow, decades-long process. "It'll happen throughout the next 100 years – we have time to deal with it," Kessler says. "The time between collisions will become shorter – it's around 10 years at the moment. In 20 years' time, the time between collisions could be reduced to five years." Fortunately, communications satellites are, in the main, situated high up in geosynchronous orbit (GEO), whereas the risk of collisions lies mainly in the much lower, and more crowded, low Earth orbit (LEO). But that doesn't mean we can relax. "We've got to get a handle on it – we need to prevent the cascade process from speeding up." And the only way to do that is, he says, to begin actively removing junk from space. Charlotte Bewick agrees. She's a mission concepts engineer with the German space technology company OHB System, with special expertise in space junk – specifically, how we can capture it and bring it back to Earth. While agreeing with Kessler that the movie scenario is exaggerated, she remains concerned. "Fragments of junk can naturally re-enter the atmosphere [and so be removed from orbit]. But we're at the stage where the rate of creation of new debris fragments is higher than the rate of natural removal. The orbits most at risk harbour important space assets – satellites for weather forecasting, oil spill and bush fire detection, and polar ice monitoring." Bewick highlights the case of Envisat, a defunct 8,000kg spacecraft circling Earth in an orbit that is very popular with space agencies and, hence, pretty crowded. "If Envisat collides with a piece of debris or a micrometeorite, the fragments could render the whole orbital region unusable." So can we get the junk down, I asked Massimiliano Vasile, part of the Mechanical & Aerospace Department at the University of Strathclyde and co-ordinator of the Stardust network. He told me defunct satellites in the high GEO region have, for some time, been shifted to higher "graveyard orbits" to keep them out of the way. But that's not an option for items in low Earth orbit. For this, he tells me, researchers are looking seriously into active debris removal – in-orbit capture techniques like harpooning, netting and tethering, the use of contactless systems like ion-beams or lasers, and even onboard robotics to position the junk away from high-risk orbital regions. As for middle Earth orbit – well, ideas are welcome, he says. We're in no immediate danger from Kessler syndrome – but it's not a problem that's going away. Despite Gravity's artistic license, Donald Kessler is pleased to see the phenomenon represented on the big screen. "It is very improbable that events would play out as they did in the film," he says. "But if it raises awareness, then that's great."

### AT: Debris miscalc

#### The Aff has no link - there is no miscalc from satellite disruptions or space dust -- empirically denied

Dr. Eric J. Zarybnisky 18, MA in National Security Studies from the Naval War College, PhD in Operations Research from the MIT Sloan School of Management, Lt Col, USAF, “Celestial Deterrence: Deterring Aggression in the Global Commons of Space”, 3/28/2018, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1062004.pdf

PREVENTING AGGRESSION IN SPACE

While deterrence and the Cold War are strongly linked in the public’s mind through the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, the fundamentals of deterrence date back millennia and deterrence remains relevant. Thucydides alludes to the concept of deterrence in his telling of the Peloponnesian War when he describes rivals seeking advantages, such as recruiting allies, to dissuade an adversary from starting or expanding a conflict.6F6 Aggression in space was successfully avoided during the Cold War because both sides viewed an attack on military satellites as highly escalatory, and such an action would likely result in general nuclear war.7F7 In today’s more nuanced world, attacking satellites, including military satellites, does not necessarily result in nuclear war. For instance, foreign countries have used high-powered lasers against American intelligence-gathering satellites8F8 and the United States has been reluctant to respond, let alone retaliate with nuclear weapons. This shift in policy is a result of the broader use of gray zone operations, to which countries struggle to respond while limiting escalation. Beginning with the fundamentals of deterrence illuminates how it applies to prevention of aggression in space.

They say satellites like agriculture and missile warning are good but under the aff’s claims these also have the ability to generate debris - this is a contradiction – we take down all sats including ag and missile with aff