# 1ac

## Contention 1: Harms

#### [Chan 18] Private entities are interested in appropriating outer space to expand civilization to other planets

**Chan 18** (Min Li Chan, May 3, 2018, Why Do We Love To Hate Jeff Bezos?, <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/minlichan/jeff-bezos-amazon-space-big-tech-elon-musk#.lx8J3l3R8>) SJ

If tech billionaires like Bezos and Musk seem to be completely divorced from the realities on the ground, it’s because their wealth — at net worth $130.2 billion and $19.6 billion respectively — gives them the unfathomable freedom to think at a scale and timeframe that the rest of us cannot afford to. Bezos plans to continue liquidating roughly $1 billion a year of Amazon stock to fund Blue Origin because he predicts that humanity’s great flourishing will be inevitably stymied by an energy crisis in a few hundred years. Bezos predicts our descent into a “civilization of stasis” and believes it can be averted only by moving beyond our home planet. “The solar system can easily support a trillion humans,” reasons Bezos, “and if we had a trillion humans, we would have a thousand Einsteins and a thousand Mozarts and unlimited, for all practical purposes, resources and solar power and so on. That's the world that I want my great-grandchildren's great-grandchildren to live in.” Is there a place for the great-grandchildren’s great-grandchildren of the poor and ordinary in this future universe? To say that tech billionaires like Bezos are apathetic to the problems of common folk because they're too rich, too insular, too selfish, too singularly interested in endeavors that turn a profit, or too eager to cement their personal legacy for human posterity, belies a much more practical calculus: Many, though not all, of the tech industry's elite would rather stay away from directly tackling poverty, or access to education and health care in their work, because these are messy, complex problems that cannot be fundamentally served by techno-utopian solutionism.

#### [Rand 19] Looking to space as the future of humans results in patriarchal views of the role of women

**Rand 19** (Dr. Lisa Ruth Rand, a historian of science, technology, and the environment with a PhD in history and sociology of science at UPenn, June 11, 2019, Women, Reproduction, and Patriarchal Views of Space Flight and Colonization in 1960s America, [Brewminate: We're Never Far from Where We Were](https://brewminate.com/), <https://brewminate.com/women-reproduction-and-patriarchal-views-of-space-flight-and-colonization-in-1960s-america/>) SJ

Early space age culture in America highlighted women’s reproductive capacity as a primary, crucial contribution that women could and inevitably would make to the space effort. At a broader glance, the concept of women as essential reproductive payloads on space voyages seems deeply at odds with the high-tech fantasies of those suggesting it. Futurists of the early space age could imagine the entire universe as potential human habitat—they envisioned the terraforming of Mars, enclosed biospheres on the Moon, and space stations with artificial gravity. Whole new civilizations sprang forth from predicted technologies that pushed the limits of the known physical universe. However, the idea of removing childbirth from the human female body crossed a border between natural and unnatural that an agricultural space station did not. The limits of the broad-reaching extraterrestrial utopian imagination of mid-twentieth century America stopped at the biological boundary of human reproduction.[4] Before we shake our heads blithely and chalk this up to 1960s chauvinism, keep in mind that the role of women as interplanetary breeding technology persists in current American scientific and popular culture. Biological studies of the challenges of human reproduction in space have been periodically published in the intervening decades, with one article by NASA researchers on the subject published as recently as 2010. As of April 2014, the Wikipedia page for [“Women in Space”](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_in_space) is roughly half composed of discussions of motherhood in space—whether it is possible to become a mother in outer space, special risks for astronauts who are also mothers, and studies of mammalian reproduction in space science research. Recent and current science fiction franchises that peddle in spectacular intergalactic futurism, including Star Trek and Star Wars, still bank on the reliable ratings draw of dramatic childbirth. We continue to imagine a future in the stars. We are capable of great flights of fancy that strain logic and credibility—except when it comes to imagining gestation and childbirth taking place outside the female body.

#### [Berger 2021] Private space companies like SpaceX foster a culture of sexism

**Berger 2021** [Eric Berger, Senior Space Editor at Ars Technica, “Concerns about sexism in the aerospace industry land at SpaceX,” December 14, 2021, <https://arstechnica.com/science/2021/12/concerns-about-sexism-in-the-aerospace-industry-land-at-spacex/>] //neth

In late September, a former communications executive at Blue Origin and 20 other current and former employees raised concerns about the culture at the company, highlighting issues such as sexism in the workplace. Writing on the Lioness website, Alexandra Abrams and the unnamed employees wrote that Blue Origin "turns a blind eye toward sexism." The essay ignited a wildfire of criticism about the working environment of Blue Origin, even extending to concerns about the safety of the company's vehicles. In the wake of the essay's publication, the Federal Aviation Administration launched an investigation of these safety allegations. Now the conflagration has spread to SpaceX. On Tuesday, Lioness published another essay by Ashley Kosak, a former mission integration engineer at SpaceX. This essay has fewer anonymous co-signers (only two) and is more tightly focused on sexism rather than the company's broader culture. But in regard to harassment, its allegations are no less worrisome. Kosak writes about multiple occasions of feeling sexually harassed and her belief that SpaceX's management did not do enough to intervene. Kosak noted that SpaceX's mission is no less than to settle other worlds, but she muses about whether such a world would be a utopia, given the workplace culture of SpaceX. "These conditions would be disturbing anywhere, but in this particular workplace, we are blazing a trail to settle a new planet," she said. "What will life on Elon's Mars be like? Probably much like life at SpaceX. Elon uses engineers as a resource to be mined rather than a team to be led. The health of Earth is rarely a consideration in the company's projects. Misogyny is rampant." SpaceX declined to comment. I have spoken to more than 100 SpaceX employees over the years as a reporter covering space. In those discussions, the biggest concern about the company's work environment has been its demanding pace and long working hours—a tone clearly set by Musk, who nearly asks the impossible of his employees. And notably, SpaceX President and Chief Operating Officer Gwynne Shotwell has always been described as a defender of women in aerospace. But clearly all is not well, given the concerns expressed by Kosak and other women who have left the company. Shotwell and Musk appear to have taken note. This weekend, in advance of the publication of the Lioness essay, Shotwell sent an internal email to employees announcing an independent audit of the company's human relations procedures. The company, Shotwell wrote, "can always do better." The harsh reality is that the space industry, which grew largely out of military operations in the United States, has been male-dominated since its inception. Figures for the diversity of private companies are not available, but even NASA, which strives for a diverse workforce, had a two-to-one male-to-female ratio of employees in 2020 (see diversity report). At the senior level of management, the ratio was more than four-to-one. Putting up with “unacceptable behavior to achieve success” The mission-driven environment of spaceflight also may help to foster an environment of sexism. Florida Today explored this dynamic in a lengthy report on harassment published earlier this fall. "According to experts and whistleblowers, the idealistic nature of space exploration and sharp focus on 'the mission' adds to a dangerous dynamic in which women, already a minority in the high-tech workplace, might be willing to put up with unacceptable behaviors to achieve success," the publication wrote. "If left unresolved, insiders are concerned this culture could someday extend to astronauts on assignment or deep space colonization efforts." Efforts by whistleblowers in Lioness are helpful in that they shine a light on problems that have existed from the beginning. Such illumination helps to expose bad behaviors. Welcome, too, is the recent creation of organizations to support young women and minorities in the space industry through fellowships—such as the Brooke Owens Fellowship and the Patti Grace Smith Fellowship. These organizations help aerospace students find strong mentors and peers in the space industry. The hope is that students will not feel isolated and will instead be empowered to speak up for their needs and rights. Space should welcome all who are called to its vast potential.

#### [Griffin 9] The politics of space are profoundly gendered – the discourse of exploration, development, appropriation, and colonization reproduce heteronormative hierarchies and ensure the continuation of patriarchy in space.

**Griffin 9** (Penny, Senior Lecturer - Convenor, MA International Relations, ‘The Spaces Between Us: The Gendered Politics of Outer Space’, in Bormann, N. and Sheehan, M. (eds), Securing Outer Space. London and New York: Routledge, pp.59-75.) SJ

This chapter is about sex, but not the sex that people already have clarity about. 'Outer space' as a human, political domain is organized around sex, but a 'sex' that is tacitly located, and rarely spoken, in official discourse. The politics of outer **space exploration**, militarization and commercialization as they are conceived of and practiced in the US, embody a distinction between public and private (and appropriate behaviours, meanings and identities therein) highly dependent upon heteronormative hierarchies of property and propriety.1 The central aim of this chapter is to show how US outer space discourse, an imperial discourse of technological, military and commercial superiority, configutes and prescribes success and successful behaviour in the politics of outer space in particularly gendered forms. US space discourse is, I argue, predicated on a **heteronormative discourse of conquest** that reproduces the dominance of heterosexual masculinity(ies), and which hierarchically orders the construction of other (subordinate) gender identities. Reading the politics of outer space as heteronormative suggests that the discourses through which space exists consist of institutions, structures of understanding, practical orientations and regulatory practices organized and privileged around heterosexuality. As a particularly dominant discursive arrangement of outer space politics, **US space discourse (re)produces meaning through gendered assumptions of exploration, colonization, economic endeavour and military conquest** that are deeply gendered whilst presented as universal and neutral. US space discourse, which dominates the contemporary global politics of outer space, is thus formed from and upon institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that privilege and normalize heterosexualiry as universal. As such, the hegemonic discursive rationalizations of space exploration and conquest ,re)produce both heterosexuality as 'unmarked' (that is, thoroughly normal­ ized) and the heterosexual imperatives that constitute suitable space-able people, practices and behaviours. As the introduction to this volume highlights, the exploration and utilization of outer space can thus far be held up as a mirror of, rather than a challenge to, existent, terrestrially-bound, political patterns, behaviours and impulses. The new possibilities for human progress that the application and development of space technologies dares us to make are grounded only in the strategy­ obsessed (be it commercially, militarily or otherwise) realities of contemporary global politics. Outer space is a conceptual, political and material space, a place for collisions and collusions (literally and metaphorically) between objects, ideas, identities and discourses. Outer space, like international relations, is a global space always socially and locally embedded. There is nothing 'out there' about outer space. It exists because of us, not in spite of us, and it is this that means that it only makes sense in social terms, that is, in relation to our own constructions of identity and social location. In this chapter, outer space is the problematic to which I apply a gender analysis; an arena wherein past, current and **future policy-making** is embedded in relation to certain performances of power and reconfigurations of identity that are always, and not incidentally, gendered. Effective and appropriate behaviour in the politics of ourer space is configured and prescribed in particularly gendered forms, with heteronormative gender regulations endowing outer space's hierarchies of technologically superior, conquesting performance with theif everyday power. It is through gender that US techno-strategic and astro-political discourse has been able to (re)produce outer space as a heterosexualized, masculinized realm.

## Contention 2: Solvency

#### [Cohn& Ruddick] Feminist epistemology is crucial to displace technostrategic discourse. It privileges lived experience over hypothetical scenario planning

**Cohn and Ruddick, PhDs, 03**

(Carol, founding director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, Sara, winner distinguished female philosopher of the year, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Working Paper No. 104 / 2003)

Both in philosophy and in “western” thought more generally, “objective” knowledge is produced by socially autonomous reasoners who have transcended institutional constraints, gender identifications, and emotion. Many feminists propose an “alternative epistemology” which stresses that all thinkers are “situated” within “epistemic communities” which ask some but not other questions, and legitimate some but not other ways of knowing. We are each of us also situated by social identities and personal histories. To take an example at hand: some of us address the volume’s questions as heirs of the “victims” of nuclear weapons, or associate ourselves with them.17 Others are heirs of the attackers. Some address the issue of “proliferation” of nuclear weapons from the situation of a possessor state, others from a situation in which they would find the term “proliferation” inappropriate. None of us speaks from nowhere; there is no phenomenon – including nuclear attack or proliferation – that can be seen independently of the situation of the seers.18 Three tenets of this “alternative epistemology” seem especially relevant to our work. Knowing is never wholly separated from feelings. Indeed, in many kinds of inquiry the capacity to feel and to account for one’s feelings is both a source and a test of knowledge. Secondly, as useful as hypothetical thought experiments and imagined scenarios may be, we begin with and return to concrete open-ended questions about actual people in actual situations. Finally, we measure arguments, and ideals of objectivity, partly in terms of the goods which they yield, the pleasures they make possible and the suffering they prevent. Grounded in this alternative epistemology, anti-war feminists criticize the dominant political/strategic paradigm for thinking about weapons of mass destruction, which we call “technostrategic discourse.”19 In contrast to just war theory, this discourse is explicitly not centered on the ethics of warfare, but on its material and political practicalities. As a tool for thinking about weapons of mass destruction, it essentially restricts the thinker to three issues: the actual use, i.e. the detonation, of these weapons in state warfare or by terrorists; the physical and geo-political effects of this use; the deployment of these weapons to deter attacks involving either conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction. In other words, the concerns of the dominant strategic discourse are limited to the destructive effects of the weapons when, and only when, they are detonated, and to the possible deterrent effects of possessing these weapons. There is scant attention to the potential suffering of targeted societies, and no attempt to evaluate complicated effects on possessor societies of deploying and developing these weapons, nor to grapple with the moral significance of willingly risking such massive, total destruction. When anti-war feminists think about wars, they take into consideration the political, social, economic, psychological and moral consequences of accepting the practice of war. When assessing weapons, they do not single out or isolate weapons’ physical, military and strategic effects from their embeddedness in and impact upon social and political life as a whole, nor from the effects of the discourses which constitute “knowledge” about these weapons. Hence when asked to think about weapons of mass destruction, we strive to consider the totality of the web of social, economic, political, and environmental relationships within which weapons of mass destruction are developed, deployed, used and disposed of – all the while starting from the perspective of women’s lives. It is not possible to do so from within the bounds of “just war” and/or “technostrategic” frameworks – yet those are the very discourses which have shaped the questions we are asked to answer in this volume. Thus, as we respond to the editors’ questions, we find we need to both think inside their frame, and about the frame itself.

#### [Gorove 69] All signatories of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 should end private appropriation for bioprospecting of outer space by ruling that it violates the non-appropriations clause of the OST

Gorove **1969** [Stephen Gorove, jurist & Professor Emeritus at University of Missisipi, “Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty”, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 349, 1969, <https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1966&context=flr>] //neth

I. SUBJECT MATTER OF APPROPRIATION With respect to the problem of subject matter, the prohibition of national appropriation relates clearly to "outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies."2 The Treaty is silent on the question of what is outer space, what it encompasses or what its boundaries are in relation to airspace. The only statement contained in the Treaty is that the moon and other celestial bodies are included in outer space. For this reason, the prohibition regarding national appropriation would unquestionably extend to the moon and other celestial bodies. Whether or not the prohibition would extend to outer space in its totality or only to part of it, or would relate to the moon or a celestial body as a whole or only to a part of it, are further significant questions. By common sense interpretation the prohibition could not very well relate to outer space as a whole since no one could at present appropriate outer space as a whole but only a part of it. Insofar as the moon and other celestial bodies are concerned, the prohibition could extend to the whole entity if national appropriation of the whole is indeed possible. But even in relation to the moon and other celestial bodies, it would appear by reasonable interpretation that the prohibition would also cover acquisition of a part of the moon or other celestial body. Any contrary interpretation would seem to make the prohibition of national appropriation largely illusory. In relation to national acquisition of a part of outer space, further questions may be raised. For example, does the prohibition extend to the collection of dust particles or other special elements during flight in outer space? Does the prohibition extend to the appropriation of cosmic rays, gases or the sun's energy, or to the collecting of mineral samples or precious metals on the moon or other celestial bodies? Should the answer depend on the type of resource involved, or on its availability in unlimited (cosmic rays, meteorites, gases) or limited (minerals, metals) quantities or perhaps on its location? In attempting to give answers to these questions, it may be pointed out, first of all, that, in the absence of some special circumstance, little would be gained by insisting on the nonappropriation of resources such as cosmic rays or gases, which are available in inexhaustible quantities. At the same time, the Treaty as it stands seems to make little allowance for national acquisition of exhaustible spatial resources. With respect to location, it could be argued that if any parts of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, were found on the earth, they would not be subject to the prohibition of national appropriation since they would become part and parcel of the earth. Under a strict interpretation it may also be argued that the prohibition extends to the resource irrespective of its location. However, it might be preferable to distinguish between elements of outer space which have reached the earth as a result of natural causes and those which have done so through human intervention. In the first instance national appropriation would not be prohibited, whereas in the second example the prohibition would apply. Thus, a meteorite falling on the earth could be appropriated whereas a precious stone or metal brought to the earth from outer space could not be a subject of national appropriation. Regarding the jurisdictional boundaries of outer space, particularly the dividing line between airspace and outer space, we seem to know a little more now than we knew at the time of the first Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space back in 1958. At that time it did not appear with certainty that nation states would not object to the orbiting of foreign space instrumentalities over and above their territories. Today after more than a decade of spatial experiments, it can be said that an international custom seems to have sprung up which regards the area where space instrumentalities move in durable orbit as outer space. From this we also take for granted that anything above and beyond this area is also regarded as outer space. However, the more precise boundary line between airspace and outer space is still left undetermined. II. NATIONAL APPROPRIATION Turning to the second question which involves the meaning of "national" appropriation, it has been suggested that only the United Nations acting on behalf of the world community as a whole, should be entitled to appropriate.3 While further developments in space law, by international custom or treaty, may eventually prohibit spatial appropriations by an individual or a chartered company or the European communities, the Treaty in its present form appears to contain no prohibition regarding individual appropriation or acquisition by a private association or an international organization, even if other than the United Nations. Thus, at present, an individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or a private association or an international organization could lawfully appropriate any part of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Whether or not an ad hoc international organization could be created for the exclusive purpose of enabling it to appropriate outer space is a delicate question. The answer may have to depend on the good faith of the parties. A further question in relation to "national" appropriation is whether or not political subdivisions of a state, such as the states of a federal state, cities or municipalities may appropriate? Under a strict interpretation, the answers to these questions would likely be in the negative even though an occasional court decision in other areas of the law may support an affirmative position.4 IlL. THE CONCEPT OF APPROPRIATION With respect to the concept of appropriation the basic question is what constitutes "appropriation," as used in the Treaty, especially in contradistinction to casual or temporary use. The term "appropriation" is used most frequently to denote the taking of property for one's own or exclusive use with a sense of permanence. Under such interpretation the establishment of a permanent settlement or the carrying out of commercial activities by nationals of a country on a celestial body may constitute national appropriation if the activities take place under the supreme authority (sovereignty) of the state. Short of this, if the state wields no exclusive authority or jurisdiction in relation to the area in question, the answer would seem to be in the negative, unless, the nationals also use their individual appropriations as cover-ups for their state's activities.5 In this connection, it should be emphasized that the word "appropriation" indicates a taking which involves something more than just a casual use. Thus a temporary occupation of a landing site or other area, just like the temporary or nonexclusive use of property, would not constitute appropriation. By the same token, any use involving consumption or taking with intention of keeping for one's own exclusive use would amount to appropriation. The question may also be asked whether or not the purpose of appropriation, that is whether it takes place in the name of science, for enrichment, or for any other purpose would have a bearing on the question of its lawfulness. Normally, the purpose of appropriation should have little bearing on the prohibition except that to constitute appropriation, the acquisition must be carried out for the purpose of one's own or exclusive use. However, since the Treaty proclaims freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, 6 there seems to be some support for the argument that if the appropriation takes place in the name of science or in the course of a scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, such use would not be prohibited under the Treaty. Nonetheless, if the proclaimed principle is taken literally, the same argument could not be used with equal force in a case where the scientific investigation was carried out on the earth. It is doubtful whether the Treaty intended such effect, but if it did not, it is unfortunate that it fails to make it clear.7 IV. SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY In relation to the question whether or not there is any room for the exercise of some form or degree of superior authority, jurisdiction, use or occupation in outer space, the answer would seem to be in the affirmative, since the Treaty prohibits the exercise of such authority, use or occupation only if it amounts to national appropriation. Under such interpretation, the temporary use of a spatial resource without the latter's transformation or deterioration may be permissible, whereas the consumption or destruction of a resource may not. Furthermore, insofar as the exercise of authority is concerned, the state on whose registry an object launched into space is carried must retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over its personnel, while in outer space or on a celestial body.' The Treaty also makes it clear that the states will be internationally responsible for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, irrespective of whether such activities are carried on by governmental or nongovernmental entities. In fact, the activities of nongovernmental entities require authorization and continuing supervision by the state concerned.9 The fact that some measure of at least temporary exclusive jurisdiction may be exercised over a particular area on the moon or other celestial bodies, such as a space station and its adjacent grounds, is also apparent from Article XII which makes access by representatives of a foreign state contingent on reciprocity. It is not the purpose of the foregoing brief analysis to attempt to resolve the complex problems which may arise in connection with the interpretation of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. The purpose is rather to draw attention to the existence of these problems which will have to be resolved if man's exploration of the cosmos is to be guarded by law and order.

#### [Marx 20] The aff is key to global cooperation and scientific exploration

**Marx 20** (Paris Marx is a freelance writer, host of left-wing tech podcast Tech Won't Save Us, and editor of Radical Urbanist, June 8, 2020, Yes to Space Exploration. No to Space Capitalism, <https://jacobinmag.com/2020/06/spacex-elon-musk-jeff-bezos-capitalism>) SJ

Musk and Bezos are the leading drivers of the modern push to privatize and colonize space through their respective companies, SpaceX and Blue Origin. Their visions differ slightly, with Musk preferring to colonize Mars, while Bezos has more interest in building space colonies in orbit. In 2016, Musk claimed he would [begin sending rockets to Mars in 2018](https://observer.com/2016/06/elon-musk-charts-path-to-colonizing-mars-within-a-decade/). That never happened, but it hasn’t ended his obsession. Musk is determined to make humans a multi-planetary species, framing our choice as either space colonization or the risk of extinction. Bezos says that Earth is the best planet in our solar system, but if we don’t colonize space we doom ourselves to “[stasis and rationing](https://jacobinmag.com/2019/07/space-colonies-jeff-bezos-blue-origin).” These framings serve the interests of these billionaires, and make it seem like colonizing space is an obvious and necessary choice when it isn’t. It ignores their personal culpability and the role of the capitalist system they seek to reproduce in causing the problems they say we need to flee in the first place. Billionaires have a [much greater carbon footprint](https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/12/1/16718844/green-consumers-climate-change) than ordinary people, with Musk [flying his private jet](https://arstechnica.com/cars/2019/01/elon-musk-private-jet-flew-150000-miles-in-2018-washington-post-reports/) all around the world as he claims to be an environmental champion. Amazon, meanwhile, is [courting oil and gas companies](https://gizmodo.com/amazon-is-aggressively-pursuing-big-oil-as-it-stalls-ou-1833875828) with cloud services to make their business more efficient, and Tesla is selling [a false vision of sustainability](https://jacobinmag.com/2020/01/elon-musk-climate-apocalypse-tesla-spacex) that purposely serves people like Musk, all while capitalism continues to drive the climate system toward the cliff edge. Colonizing space will not save us from billionaire-fueled climate dystopia. But these billionaires do not hide who would be served by their futures. Musk has given many figures for the cost of a ticket to Mars, but they’re never cheap. He told Vance the tickets would cost $500,000 to $1 million, a price at which he thinks “it’s highly likely that there will be a self-sustaining Martian colony.” However, the workers for such a colony clearly won’t be able to buy their own way. Rather, Musk tweeted a plan for [Martian indentured servitude](https://gizmodo.com/elon-musk-a-new-life-awaits-you-on-the-off-world-colon-1841071257) where workers would take on loans to pay for their tickets and pay them off later because “There will be a lot of jobs on Mars!” Bezos is even more open about how the workforce will have to expand to serve his vision, but has little to say about what they’ll be doing. His plan to maintain economic “growth and dynamism” requires the human population to [grow to a trillion people](https://jacobinmag.com/2019/07/space-colonies-jeff-bezos-blue-origin). He claims this would create “a thousand Mozarts and a thousand Einsteins” who would live in space colonies that are supposed to house a million people each, with the surface of Earth being mainly for tourism. Meanwhile, industrial and mining work would move into orbit so as not to pollute the planet, and while he doesn’t explicitly acknowledge it, it’s likely [that’s where you’ll find many of those trillion workers](https://jacobinmag.com/2019/12/jeff-bezos-the-expanse-space-fantasy-sci-fi-syfy/) toiling for their space overlord and his descendants. Space Shouldn’t Serve Capitalists In 1978, Murray Bookchin [skewered a certain brand of futurism](http://unevenearth.org/2019/10/bookchin_doing_the_impossible/) that sought to “extend the present into the future” and desired “multinational corporations to become multi-cosmic corporations.” Much of this future thinking obsesses about possible changes to technology, but seeks to preserve the existing social and economic relations — “the present as it exists today, projected, one hundred years from now,” as Bookchin put it. That’s at the core of the space billionaires’ vision for the future. Space has been used by past US presidents to bolster American power and influence, but it was largely accepted that capitalism ended at the edge of the atmosphere. That’s no longer the case, and just as past capitalist expansions have come at the expense of poor and working people to enrich a small elite, so too will this one. Bezos and Trump may have a public feud, but that doesn’t mean that their mutual interest isn’t served by a renewed US push into space that funnels massive public funds into private pockets and seeks to open celestial bodies to capitalist resource extraction. This is not to say that we need to halt space exploration. The collective interest of humanity is served by learning more about the solar system and the universe beyond, but the goal of such missions must be driven by gaining scientific knowledge and enhancing global cooperation, not nationalism and profit-making.Yet that’s exactly what the space billionaires and American authoritarians have found common cause in, with Trump declaring that “[a new age of American ambition has now begun](https://twitter.com/TeamTrump/status/1266846741787074560?s=20)” at a NASA press briefing just hours before cities across the country were placed under curfew last week. Before space can be explored in a way that benefits all of humankind, existing social relations must be transformed, not extended into the stars as part of a new colonial project.

## Contention 3: Framing

#### [Morris 2020] The role of the judge is to center intersectional feminist pedagogy

**Morris 2020** [Charlotte Morris, teaching fellow at University of Sussex (UK); holds a doctorate in gender studies, “TEACHING TO TRANSFORM: REIMAGINING FEMINIST PEDAGOGIES IN CONTEMPORARY HIGHER EDUCATION,” January 27, 2020, <https://maifeminism.com/teaching-to-transform-reimagining-feminist-pedagogies-in-contemporary-higher-education/>] //neth

Here, I draw on foundational feminist pedagogical principles, which can be applied across course content and are not gender specific. While it is not possible to fully summarise the diversity of feminist teaching here, feminist pedagogies build on epistemologies which question white, western, male-centred, heteronormative forms of knowing (Harding 2003) and values of disembodied objectivity, rationality and neutrality as sole ways of being and knowing. Rather they recognise caring, embodied, emotional domains of life (Motta 2012); understand knowledge as ‘situated’—context-bound, partial and contingent (Haraway 1988)—and disrupt power relationships by foregrounding previously marginalised voices and knowledges. bell hooks’ work (1994) comprises a useful touchstone in elucidating meanings and purposes of feminist pedagogies, drawing on feminist, critical and de-colonial approaches in paving the way for intersectional teaching. hooks (1994) draws on Freire’s critical pedagogy (1970) in disrupting what is defined as the banking system whereby students are positioned as passive recipients of deposits of knowledge, as opposed to active participants. Instead, the classroom can be a safe space in which students can raise critical questions and where teachers attend to their wellbeing. Within this current milieu where sexism, racism, classism and ‘anti-social justice’ attitudes are emboldened, it is not always possible to promise every student a safe space; indeed the very premise of safer spaces in universities is frequently derided within popular media. However, such discourses can be challenged; creating learning environments where open and meaningful discussions can take place without causing harm can be a shared endeavour wherein students take responsibility and co-create rules of engagement. Within feminist pedagogical frameworks, teachers might not expect immediate gratification in student feedback as there may be an initial discomfort in relation to different ways of learning and thinking and students may not realise the benefits until years later. (hooks 1994) With students positioned as consumers (Brule 2004) there are now additional challenges to enacting such discomforting practices. National Student Surveys and Teaching Excellence Frameworks focus on immediate gratification, positioning students as passive recipients as opposed to co-creators of knowledge (Rohrer 2018) who undergo complex and uneven learning journeys. (Gale & Parker 2014) Current challenges inherent in approaching education as a ‘practice of freedom’, as hooks (1994) advocates, are invoked by recent commentators, including Toni Wright (2016), who suggests that feminist university teaching is in crisis: Following cuts to women’s and gender studies courses, gender content is frequently treated as an optional ‘add-on’. (Hinton-Smith et al. 2019) Others highlight a longstanding backlash against feminism and lack of time-space for developing feminist curricula. (Moss & Richter 2011) While this may be the case, perhaps the current moment of reactionary politics and neoliberalisation can be simultaneously viewed as an opportunity to rejuvenate and reimagine possibilities and potentialities of feminist teaching—to rebuild capacities, communities and solidarities. Background to Study and Methodology Feminist pedagogical strategies are particularly relevant in this case study wherein I teach social justice content on an interdisciplinary course for social sciences, business, arts and humanities foundation students from diverse backgrounds within a cohort of approximately 80 students. Foundation courses are geared towards non-traditional learners and in this cohort, 26.9% are from Black and Minority Ethnic backgrounds and 20.6% disclose disabilities, above the sector average. [1] This course, entitled ‘Cradle to the Grave’, explores themes of welfare, wellbeing and their interconnections, investigating how policy contexts shape life chances and experiences while taking different social locations into account. Inevitably, content interlinks with issues of equity and social justice. Ethics approval was granted by the University of Sussex and permission was sought from students to draw on reflections as data with reassurance that no sensitive data would be used, all data would be anonymised and identifying features would be removed. All 80 students undertaking the course submitted regular short reflections on their learning through the course of the year (2018-2019). Many of the extracts analysed here were drawn from both formative and summative work gathered towards the end of this year at a point when the majority were now confident with the process of reflection; approximately 200 pieces of data were analysed in total. A thematic analysis of data was then undertaken with a focus on processes and shifts in learning. This is complemented by ongoing reflections on my own teaching practice. Before proceeding to an exploration of identified themes, I should acknowledge my privileged standpoint of being a white cis-woman and British citizen working in a UK university, a western context developed through histories of exclusion, coloniality and violence. Being a Feminist Teacher: Attending to Transparency Attending to teacher-student power dynamics has long been a concern of feminist practitioners (hooks 1994) and enabling students to hold more power in the classroom is potentially liberating. Yet, it is vital firstly to recognise the relative privilege students might hold and secondly, in a climate where precariously employed women teachers hold relatively little power there are continual anxieties about repercussions. Furthermore, gender-related content and feminism can be perceived alternately as threatening and not to be taken seriously in contexts where students are exposed to misogynistic, anti-feminist viewpoints and universities are positioned as full of politically correct feminist ‘lefties’. (Burke & Carolissen 2018; Read 2018) This situation is exacerbated by the consumer model whereby teaching is judged in accordance with student satisfaction (Rohrer 2018), further complicating teacher-student power dynamics. Navigating a route between setting expectations of professionalism and respect from students while maintaining a commitment to feminist practices can be fraught, so building trust and reciprocity over time and encouraging students to take ownership of their learning is crucial. Positive pedagogical relationships can begin with transparency around our purposes, practices, politics, language and positionalities. This entails carefully referencing and critiquing contemporary discourses which seek to undermine social justice aims, meaningful discussions (Kouloris 2017) and scholarly critiques. Students may start university with (media-fuelled) concerns around academics fostering particular agendas; some may have been exposed to far-right propaganda circulating on many university campuses suggesting that education is increasingly founded on left-wing ‘dogma’; [2] indeed some students may identify as ‘alt-right’. Early conversations in teaching sessions about what we are and are not trying to do can help to build trust and provide a framework for quality discussions. I explain to my students that we will inevitably be touching on a range of political issues but, rather than supporting particular political parties or viewpoints, our purpose is to develop meaningful knowledge and understanding, building on high quality evidence and analysis beyond uninformed opinions and popular, common-sense reactions. Students are reassured that we welcome a range of perspectives—challenge, contestation and debate form an important part of our sessions. Despite unhelpful stereotypes of feminist university teachers, being open about our own positions and conveying a willingness to be vulnerable can be empowering for students who identify as feminists or may consider doing so, those who are marginalised and those who are working out their own positions while navigating complex environments. While some may push back against such openness to begin with, tired media tropes about feminists trying to ‘brainwash’ students impose particular theories or disempower male students soon dissipate. Feminism makes an early appearance on the curriculum and forms an opportunity to address what it is (a wide-ranging global movement addressing sexism) and what it is not, i.e. ‘man-hating’; we stress that there is not a ‘single story’ of feminism. Students from all genders and backgrounds appreciate definitions, theoretical and historical underpinnings to inform their emergent understandings in the light of much misinformation. This moment provides an opportunity to introduce my own personal take on feminism, being transparent about my positionality, theoretically scaffolding this by introducing the concept of intersectionality at an early stage. Stereotypes about feminist academics can be addressed directly; for example, when the class discuss ground-rules to create a ‘safer space’ for discussion, I explicitly reference wider language used in popular press of ‘snowflake students’ and feminist academics ‘policing’ language, explaining that we have this initial discussion not in order to shut down conversations but to enable them to take place. It is much easier to share responses and perspectives if everyone in the room feels valued, equal, safe and respected. Resulting discussions are more likely to be more open, thoughtful and engaged without resorting to ‘common-sense’ assumptions or prejudices and causing those from less privileged locations to be silenced. Language is always politically charged and arguably never more so than now. Tropes of ‘political correctness’ are explored and I tend to posit that, despite the unfortunate terminology, to be ‘politically correct’ refers simply to an awareness of the history behind words and the impact language can have on others. There are usually a variety of understandings and viewpoints on this, creating opportunities for debate and exploration. The notion of ‘free speech’ has increasingly been weaponised (Phipps 2017), conflated with a ‘right to offend’ as justification for sexism, racism, transphobia, homophobia and other forms of hate. Discussing ‘free speech’, ‘hate speech’ and ways in which the latter can potentially impinge on the freedom of others is another valid discussion to have early on to scaffold discussions and set expectations. Likewise, it is imperative to carefully define and work with concepts such as ‘diversity’, always a ‘slippery’ term (Ahmed 2012), which has recently been invoked by the far-right as a way of shutting down conversation around race. [3] Similarly, ‘social justice’, my students report, is frequently being used as a term of abuse in social media; students can be important informants as to current uses and misuses of language and discussions around it can foster criticality. Setting boundaries, encouraging thoughtful, open and professional approaches to communication and developing the kind of environment which will best enable meaningful learning sets the tone for learning. A ‘calling in’ rather than ‘calling out’ model can help in this: ‘Calling out’ means to adopt a blaming or judgemental stance if someone inadvertently uses language which may offend others, for example. Students may make mistakes or, due to social and previous educational contexts or media exposure, not realise what is socially acceptable or that certain language choices might be offensive. It is not necessarily helpful to castigate but rather to ‘call in’ what the impacts may be, raising and addressing any concerns in a sensitive manner. Dynamics of openness do not always make for ‘comfortable’ classrooms but ensuring everyone understands the ‘terms of engagement’ fosters respectful and meaningful exchanges, not possible in all settings. Often students draw on their own knowledge and experiences in contesting reductive and reactionary positions. However, in some cases, vulnerable and marginalised students may not necessarily have a level of confidence and articulation needed to challenge harmful, discriminatory comments. If this were to occur I [the teacher] would need to take responsibility, speak up and support these students. (Phipps 2017) Thinking cannot move forwards unless it is opened up to challenges and there needs to be a supported environment for this to happen. Due to the sensitive, often controversial, nature of many issues discussed in my classes (including gender-based violence, gender and sexual identities, attitudes to welfare claimants, migrants and other marginalised groups), it is imperative that students feel it is acceptable to make mistakes, take risks, question, speak out and share experiences so that they can undergo meaningful learning. I make a well-timed statement to students about it being ‘OK to be political’: In my first year of teaching this group, I received several pieces of work decrying a particular author for not being politically ‘neutral’ in their left-aligned perspectives, echoing far-right sentiments. There were also several feedback comments indicating that the course itself was biased or not politically neutral. In epistemological terms, feminist thought has sought to challenge dominant constructions of knowledge which value objectivity, distance and neutrality (Stanley & Wise 1983) above intuitive, engaged, embodied, creative, situated knowledges. (Haraway 1988; Motta 2012) At the risk of undermining previous learning based on positivistic assumptions, academic positions are introduced which contest restrictive notion of knowledge and assert that it is considered important for good quality ethical research to be open about our positionalities and standpoints. (Harstock 1998) Above all, in academic writing it is important to take up a position and clear line of argument. I reassure students that no-one is going to be penalised for holding views which do not correspond to my own; as good academic practice work should be well thought through, evidenced by credible academic sources and rigorous analysis, clearly explaining how conclusions are reached. A high degree of reflexivity is needed to reflect on my own political prejudices throughout the teaching and marking process, ensuring that I am listening and taking alternative perspectives into account; while challenging at times, I have found giving time to debating points of contention with Conservative students, for example, lifts the quality of discussions and creates opportunities for critique; [4] such debates may even shift positions in some cases. I reinforce to students that ‘party politics’ are not the object of our studies—I am not seeking to influence opinions but due to course foci, we inevitably discuss inequalities in relation to many contemporary social issues, necessitating critical rather than neutral stances. Part of our role in universities, I contend, is to scrutinise and critique dominant positionings and modes of governance. Following on from this, students are reminded that this is a learning journey we are undergoing that will involve questioning, uncertainty and sometimes vulnerability. Students are encouraged to bring their knowledges and experiences into the classroom and it is important that we as teachers, in a reciprocal relationship, are willing to do the same (hooks 1994), to open up about how we are affected by difficult issues and reflexively share our own uncertainties, experiences and learning where relevant. It entails acknowledging the limitations of our own knowledge, positioning ourselves as learners who may not know everything and who are open to different perspectives. While there is a risk initially of undermining our authority, this makes it more possible for students to ask questions and be open to complexities, uncertainties, not-knowing.

#### [ROB & Cohn] Technostrategic discourse sets the confines of debates which rigs the game in favor of hegemonic solutions and deterrence. Thus the role of the ballot is to endorse the debater who creates the best impacts under a feminist view of international relations.

**Cohn, PhD, et al., 05**

( Carol,FELICITY HILL AND SARA RUDDICK, The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction <http://www.iansa-women.org/sites/default/files/newsviews/en-wmdc-paper38-2005.pdf>)

Why did he feel that way? First, he was transgressing a code of professional conduct. Expressing concern about human bodies is not the way you talk within the terms of the **strategic expert discourse**, which is, after all, a discourse about **weapons** and their relation to each other, not to human bodies. But even worse than that, he evinced some of the characteristics on the “female” side of the dichotomies – in his “blurting” he was being impulsive, uncontrolled, emotional, concrete, upset and attentive to fragile human bodies. Thus, the hegemonic discourse of gender positioned him as feminine, which he found doubly threatening. It was not only a threat to his own sense of self as masculine, his gender identity; it also positioned him in the devalued or subordinate position in the discourse. Thus, both his statement, “I felt like a woman,” and his subsequent silence in that and other settings, are completely understandable. To find the strength of character and courage to transgress the strictures of both professional and gender codes and to associate yourself with a lower status is very difficult. This story is not simply about one individual, his feelings and actions; it illustrates the role and meaning of gender discourse in the defence community. The impact of gender discourse in that room (and countless others like it) is that some things are **excluded** and get left out from **professional deliberations.** Certain ideas, concerns, interests, information, feelings and meanings are marked in national security discourse as feminine, and devalued. They are therefore very difficult to speak, as exemplified by the physicist who blurted them out and wished he hadn’t. And if they manage to be said, they are also very difficult to hear, to take in and work with seriously. For the others in the room, the way in which the physicist’s comments were marked as feminine and devalued served to delegitimate them; it also made it very unlikely that any of his colleagues would find the courage to agree with him. This example should not be dismissed as just the product of the idiosyncratic personal composition of that particular room; **it is replicated many times and in many places.** Women, in professional and military settings, have related experiences of realising that something terribly important is being left out but feeling constrained, as if there is almost a physical barrier preventing them from pushing their transgressive truths out into the open. What is it that cannot be spoken? First, any expression of an emotional awareness of the desperate human reality behind the **sanitised abstractions of death** and destruction in strategic deliberations. Similarly, weapons’ effects may only be spoken of in the most clinical and abstract terms, and usually only by those deemed to have the appropriate **professional qualifications** and expertise. What gets left out, then, is the emotional, the concrete, the particular, human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity – all of which are marked as feminine in the binary dichotomies of gender discourse. In other words, gender discourse informs and shapes **nuclear and national security discourse**, and in so doing creates silences and absences. It keeps things out of the room, unsaid, and keeps them ignored if they manage to get in. As such, it **degrades our ability to think well** and fully about nuclear weapons and national security, and so shapes and limits the **possible outcomes of our deliberations.** With this understanding, it becomes obvious that defence intellectuals’ standards of what constitutes “good thinking” about weapons and security have not simply **evolved out of trial and error**; it is not that the history of nuclear discourse has been filled with exploration of other ideas, concerns, interests, information, questions, feelings, meanings and stances which were then found to create distorted or poor thought. On the contrary, serious consideration of a whole range of ideas and options has been **preempted by their gender coding,** and by the feelings evoked by living up to or transgressing normative gender ideals. To borrow a strategists’ term, we can say that gender coding serves as a “**preemptive deterrent” to certain kinds of thought** about the effects and consequences of strategic plans and WMD.vi

#### [Petersen] The panic over potential threats to the nation is a form of masculine futurity which allows reproductive bodies to be regulated. Claims of utilitarianism justify the endless sacrifice of reproductive freedom in the name of the “greatest good.”

**Petersen 15**

(Kristin Petersen B.A., University of Southern California 2003 M.A. New York University 2008, A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, The Logic of Futurity: Reproduction, Cultural Eugenics, and Contingencies of Women’s Citizenship in the Contemporary United States, Proquest, JKS)

Cultural theorist Ruth McElroy suggests, “Women’s belonging to nations is indissoluble from their reproductive biology” (325). For all that motherhood may be conceived as a private choice occurring in the supposedly private sphere, reproduction and motherhood are nonetheless public and political as well, and thoroughly entangled with women’s status as members of their nation. By virtue of their reproduction (or even lack thereof!), women can be constructed in cultural narratives and political scripts as contributors to society or threats to the national good, caretakers of the future who merit protection and support or wayward parents who must be disciplined back into the national fold, national maternal ideals or outsiders within. The state’s identification of and response to women as reproducers reflects the continuous processes of the politics of belonging, which “involve not only the maintenance and reproduction of the boundaries of the community of belonging by the hegemonic political powers...but also by their contestation, challenge and resistance by other political agents” (Yuval-Davis 20). We see these politics of belonging manifested not only discursively, but also in the policies and laws that protect or privilege some mothers and not others, some children, but not all. When anthropologists Faye Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp ask, “who defines the body of the nation into which the next generation is recruited? Who is considered to be in that national body, who is out of it?” (3), therefore, there is no one answer; rather, this is the question perpetually being asked and answered by political discourse and practice infused with the logic of futurity. The hopes and fears of the present political moment and the imaginative desires for the future are thus continually projected upon the bodies of women and their procreative capacities. Futurity, I suggest in this project, as a possibly inevitable perspective or worldview, allows for the state to focus on women as reproductive beings in a way that it does not for men. Following from Foucault’s explication of biopower, the modern state takes an interest in the workings and ostensible health of its populations, creating new knowledges and indices for the normal as it counts up the characteristics of its citizenry and sets goals for demographic management. While Foucault tends not to focus on the reproductive elements of the state’s biopolitical interest—for instance, the setting of ideal rates of fertility, health expectations for women and children, creation of access to the medical, economic, and social resources needed for reproduction—these are, I would argue, operations of the state that have potential for tremendous impacts upon women particularly. The other biopolitical interests of the state—appropriate number of workers, manageable immigration rates, proper ratio of elderly to young, and so on—are also all implicated in the procreative behaviors of women, which would seem to intensify the state’s interest in them. Brought into the broader framework of women’s political status and national belonging, reproduction in this context seems poised to function as an axis upon which the dispensation of women’s citizenship can pivot, with particular regard to her racial, economic, and social demographic and the state’s assessment of her (and her children’s) value to the national future. Penelope Deutscher suggests that through the emergence of biopower: Women would later assume a status as a reproductive threshold of the future and health of nations, populations and peoples. But the condition for this role for women and maternal reproductivity was the very possibility of reproduction being associated with a shifting field of possible substances, telos, outcomes and obligations: the overall good, the general happiness, the future of the nation, the health of the nation, the competitiveness of the nation, the future of the people, individual flourishing or freedom, individual rights, domestic happiness, the family unit as building block of the nation, the transmission of the bloodline, the family name, transmission of property or family or genealogical transmission, reproduction of the labour force, etc. That reproduction be plausibly thought of in such terms at all was a precondition of it becoming associated with women’s role as threshold of futurity. (Deutscher 129) The state’s biopolitical management of women’s reproduction may thus allow it to approach women primarily as reproductive beings, an essentalist or even utilitarian collapse that may make it easier to intervene upon their bodies and perhaps reflects a deeply ingrained discomfort with the notion that women have tremendous potential power to impact the composition of the future. In this project, I am proposing a framework of futurity that is in operation, characterized by discursive and eugenic aspects, that uses women as the vehicle for future world-building and nation-making. This futurity aims to enact particular visions of the future via changes in the present, particularly through the management of women’s reproduction in the present such that the future population comports with present desires. When this futurity framework is picked up by the state in its various capacities, I suggest there are significant consequences for women’s citizenship as women because they are so intrinsically linked in the cultural and political imaginary with reproduction. In the process of grappling with these concepts, this project asks how the logic of futurity functions to organize the terms of women’s social or political belonging in reproductive terms. How does the state pick up and extend this logic to women, and how might that impact the meaningfulness of women’s citizenship or national belonging? Does the logic of futurity, the constant pressure of the forward vision combined with the imaginative limitations of the present, insist upon women’s citizenship being or becoming something fundamentally different from men’s by virtue of reproductive capacity and association? Exploring these questions brings this project into several disciplinary contexts, including feminist theory and philosophy, political theory, disability theory (eugenics), and even the sphere of economics. In connecting these concepts to ongoing conversations about women and citizenship in the contemporary United States, this project is ultimately working to tie together disparate fields and illuminate how they interact with respect to a model of futurity that I theorize as containing discursive and eugenic aspects. It may be that state-based discourses and practices related to women’s reproduction and citizenship are not so much causes as they are effects of the logic of futurity.

#### [Kirker] Discourse matters – especially in educational spaces

**Kirker 2017** (Jessica Kirker, “Professional Friction: Racialized Discourse and the Practice of Teaching Art,” Copyright 2017 by The Journal of Social Theory in Art Education / Volume 37, <https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1502&context=jstae>) //neth

Language is crucial in situating our selves and others. Discursive patterns create alliances or factions, establish hierarchies, and subjugate individuals or groups. In this autoethnographic study, I consider how I, as a White woman teaching art, participate in, maneuver, and manipulate spoken and unspoken racialized discourses within the context of a high school with a diverse population of students. Through the data collection process of journaling over one school year, I recorded reflections on conversations, speeches, and written communication with, between, and regarding teachers, students, parents, and school administrators. I employed discourse analysis on these texts and draw upon Critical Race Theory and Whiteness Studies to examine the discourses that govern the school and inform its social conventions as manifested in my professional identity as it intersects with various collegial spaces. I also show the value in performing an autoethnography as a way to evolve as a social justice educator and scholar as well as a means to give voice to teachers’ stories so that we can render visible the way radicalized discourses and discords they create can shape the daily practice of teaching art. Discussions of racial discrimination often only exist as history lessons, but the lessons taught throughout U.S. schools about racial identity are deeply embedded within the daily practices of all members of a school community. Racial identities are established on a daily basis through (seemingly) casual interactions and microagressions between teachers, students, parents, and administrators. The discourses that position and subjugate individuals can be as simple as an informal email or a casual hallway conversation to more public approaches like disciplinary hearings or faculty meetings. These messages establish relationships of sameness or difference, power or subordination, and allegiance or contention. Beyond the interactions of daily personal relationships, there are normalizing school practices; ways of doing things, guiding principles, and procedures, that define and shape parties in relationship to each other as well as ascertaining a dominant value system over the school context. Rules as well as social norms are communicated through highly visible social etiquette conventions as well as formalized policies and legislation (Hodge & Kress, 1988). The discourses that define these rules are often structured to ensure dominant parties remain unchallenged (Hodge & Kress, 1988). In the context of U.S. schools, censorship of speech or imagery, management tactics, and disciplinary policies are often designed to fit the interests and desires of dominant White educational leaders.

#### [Lal & Graham 2021] Feminist foreign policy maximizes the well-being of all of society and avoids a laundry list of big stick impacts

**Lal & Graham 2021** [Rollie Lal, Associate Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University, and Shirley Graham, Director, Gender Equality Initiative in International Affairs and Associate Professor of Practice, Elliott School, George Washington University, “How a ‘feminist’ foreign policy would change the world,” March 9, 2021, The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/how-a-feminist-foreign-policy-would-change-the-world-152868>] //neth

The Biden administration has a woman, Vice President Kamala Harris, in its second-highest position, and 61% of White House appointees are women. Now, it has declared its intention to “protect and empower women around the world.” Gender equity and a gender agenda are two ingredients of a “feminist foreign policy” – an international agenda that aims to dismantle the male-dominated systems of foreign aid, trade, defense, immigration and diplomacy that sideline women and other minority groups worldwide. A feminist foreign policy reenvisions a country’s national interests, moving them away from military security and global dominance to position equality as the basis of a healthy, peaceful world. This is in keeping with Hillary Clinton’s groundbreaking 1995 statement at the United Nations, “Women’s rights are human rights.” The world could change in some positive ways if more countries, especially a power like the United States, made a concerted effort to improve women’s rights abroad, our scholarship on gender and security suggests. Research shows that countries with more gender equality are less likely than other countries to experience civil war. Gender equality is also linked with good governance: Countries that exploit women are far more unstable. Women aren’t yet any country’s top foreign policy priority. But ever more countries are starting to at least write them into the agenda. Women at the bottom In 2017, Canada launched a “feminist international assistance policy” aimed at supporting women, children and adolescent health worldwide. Putting money behind its promises, it pledged Canadian $1.4 billion annually by 2023 to both governments and international organizations to strengthen access to nutrition, health services and education among women in the developing world. Some $700 million of this money will go to promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights and eradicating gender-based violence. Some $10 million over four years will go to UNICEF to reduce female genital mutilation. In January 2020, Mexico became the first country in Latin America to adopt a feminist foreign policy. Its strategy seeks to advance gender equality internationally; combat gender violence worldwide; and confront inequalities in all social and environmental justice program areas. Mexico must also increase its own foreign ministry’s staff to be at least 50% women by 2024, and ensure it is a workplace free of violence. Neither Canada nor Mexico has achieved its lofty new goals. Critics say Canada’s lack of focus on men and boys leaves the traditions and customs supporting gender inequality not fully addressed. And in Mexico, which has among the world’s highest rates of gender violence – men murder 11 women there every day – it’s hard to see how a government that cannot protect women at home can credibly promote feminism abroad. But both countries are at least taking women’s needs explicitly into account. Feminist foreign policy The U.S., too, has taken steps toward a more feminist foreign policy. In summer of 2020, under the Trump administration, the departments of Defense, State and Homeland Security, along with the U.S. Agency for International Development, each published a plan putting women’s empowerment in their agendas. These documents – passed in accordance with a 2000 United Nations Security Council resolution on women, peace and security – promote women’s participation in decision-making in conflict zones, advance women’s rights and ensure their access to humanitarian assistance. They also include provisions encouraging American partners abroad to similarly encourage women’s participation in peace and security processes. These are the components of a feminist foreign policy. But the plans are still operating in silos. A truly feminist foreign policy would be coherent across aid, trade, defense, diplomacy and immigration – and consistently prioritize equality for women. One of Biden’s early moves in office, in January, was to rescind the “global gag rule,” a Republican policy prohibiting health providers in foreign countries that receive any U.S. aid from providing abortion-related services – even if they use their own money. Studies show the funding restriction reduces women’s access to all kinds of health care, exposing them to disease and forcing women to seek unsafe abortions. Reallocating financial resources in ways that level the playing field for women is another critical aspect of a feminist foreign policy. But again, it needs to be a policy that’s consistent and across the board, not a one-off decision. Afghanistan, women and peace The U.S., long a leading world power, is unlikely to replace its international military security strategy with a purely “feminist” foreign policy. But it doesn’t have to. As the evidence grows that women’s well-being is central to everyone’s well-being, the connection between gender equality and global security can be naturally incorporated into updated global strategies focusing on traditional American goals like international security and human rights. Afghanistan shows the necessity of – and opportunities for – a feminist U.S. foreign policy. Afghan women were brutally discriminated against under the Taliban, with girls banned from education and women barred from leadership in politics, security and business. Now, under the Afghan government of President Ashraf Ghani, 28% of Afghan parliamentarians are women and 3.5 million girls are in school. Women worry that their freedoms could be compromised in any power-sharing agreement with the Taliban. Yet American officials distinctly, and controversially, did not incorporate gender into negotiations with the Taliban militant group to end the war in Afghanistan. Only one U.S. negotiator is a woman – poor representation for a country that says it is committed to conserving Afghan women’s rights. The Taliban delegation has no women, and just four women sit on the Afghanistan government’s 21-member delegation. With the United States’ help, an Afghanistan accord could secure the gains women have made since the United States toppled the Taliban in 2001 – or it could sacrifice them for “peace.”