## Contention 1: Harms

#### [Chan 18] Private entities are interested in appropriating outer space to expand civilization to other planets

Chan 18 (Min Li Chan, May 3, 2018, Why Do We Love To Hate Jeff Bezos?, <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/minlichan/jeff-bezos-amazon-space-big-tech-elon-musk#.lx8J3l3R8>) SJ

If tech billionaires like Bezos and Musk seem to be completely divorced from the realities on the ground, it’s because their wealth — at net worth $130.2 billion and $19.6 billion respectively — gives them the unfathomable freedom to think at a scale and timeframe that the rest of us cannot afford to. Bezos plans to continue liquidating roughly $1 billion a year of Amazon stock to fund Blue Origin because he predicts that humanity’s great flourishing will be inevitably stymied by an energy crisis in a few hundred years. Bezos predicts our descent into a “civilization of stasis” and believes it can be averted only by moving beyond our home planet. “The solar system can easily support a trillion humans,” reasons Bezos, “and if we had a trillion humans, we would have a thousand Einsteins and a thousand Mozarts and unlimited, for all practical purposes, resources and solar power and so on. That's the world that I want my great-grandchildren's great-grandchildren to live in.” Is there a place for the great-grandchildren’s great-grandchildren of the poor and ordinary in this future universe? To say that tech billionaires like Bezos are apathetic to the problems of common folk because they're too rich, too insular, too selfish, too singularly interested in endeavors that turn a profit, or too eager to cement their personal legacy for human posterity, belies a much more practical calculus: Many, though not all, of the tech industry's elite would rather stay away from directly tackling poverty, or access to education and health care in their work, because these are messy, complex problems that cannot be fundamentally served by techno-utopian solutionism.

#### [Rand 19] Looking to space as the future of humans results in patriarchal views of the role of women

Rand 19 (Dr. Lisa Ruth Rand, a historian of science, technology, and the environment with a PhD in history and sociology of science at UPenn, June 11, 2019, Women, Reproduction, and Patriarchal Views of Space Flight and Colonization in 1960s America, [Brewminate: We're Never Far from Where We Were](https://brewminate.com/), <https://brewminate.com/women-reproduction-and-patriarchal-views-of-space-flight-and-colonization-in-1960s-america/>) SJ

Early space age culture in America highlighted women’s reproductive capacity as a primary, crucial contribution that women could and inevitably would make to the space effort. At a broader glance, the concept of women as essential reproductive payloads on space voyages seems deeply at odds with the high-tech fantasies of those suggesting it. Futurists of the early space age could imagine the entire universe as potential human habitat—they envisioned the terraforming of Mars, enclosed biospheres on the Moon, and space stations with artificial gravity. Whole new civilizations sprang forth from predicted technologies that pushed the limits of the known physical universe. However, the idea of removing childbirth from the human female body crossed a border between natural and unnatural that an agricultural space station did not. The limits of the broad-reaching extraterrestrial utopian imagination of mid-twentieth century America stopped at the biological boundary of human reproduction.[4] Before we shake our heads blithely and chalk this up to 1960s chauvinism, keep in mind that the role of women as interplanetary breeding technology persists in current American scientific and popular culture. Biological studies of the challenges of human reproduction in space have been periodically published in the intervening decades, with one article by NASA researchers on the subject published as recently as 2010. As of April 2014, the Wikipedia page for [“Women in Space”](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_in_space) is roughly half composed of discussions of motherhood in space—whether it is possible to become a mother in outer space, special risks for astronauts who are also mothers, and studies of mammalian reproduction in space science research. Recent and current science fiction franchises that peddle in spectacular intergalactic futurism, including Star Trek and Star Wars, still bank on the reliable ratings draw of dramatic childbirth. We continue to imagine a future in the stars. We are capable of great flights of fancy that strain logic and credibility—except when it comes to imagining gestation and childbirth taking place outside the female body.

#### [Berger 2021] Private space companies like SpaceX foster a culture of sexism

**Berger 2021** [Eric Berger, Senior Space Editor at Ars Technica, “Concerns about sexism in the aerospace industry land at SpaceX,” December 14, 2021, <https://arstechnica.com/science/2021/12/concerns-about-sexism-in-the-aerospace-industry-land-at-spacex/>] //neth

In late September, a former communications executive at Blue Origin and 20 other current and former employees raised concerns about the culture at the company, highlighting issues such as sexism in the workplace. Writing on the Lioness website, Alexandra Abrams and the unnamed employees wrote that Blue Origin "turns a blind eye toward sexism." The essay ignited a wildfire of criticism about the working environment of Blue Origin, even extending to concerns about the safety of the company's vehicles. In the wake of the essay's publication, the Federal Aviation Administration launched an investigation of these safety allegations. Now the conflagration has spread to SpaceX. On Tuesday, Lioness published another essay by Ashley Kosak, a former mission integration engineer at SpaceX. This essay has fewer anonymous co-signers (only two) and is more tightly focused on sexism rather than the company's broader culture. But in regard to harassment, its allegations are no less worrisome. Kosak writes about multiple occasions of feeling sexually harassed and her belief that SpaceX's management did not do enough to intervene. Kosak noted that SpaceX's mission is no less than to settle other worlds, but she muses about whether such a world would be a utopia, given the workplace culture of SpaceX. "These conditions would be disturbing anywhere, but in this particular workplace, we are blazing a trail to settle a new planet," she said. "What will life on Elon's Mars be like? Probably much like life at SpaceX. Elon uses engineers as a resource to be mined rather than a team to be led. The health of Earth is rarely a consideration in the company's projects. Misogyny is rampant." SpaceX declined to comment. I have spoken to more than 100 SpaceX employees over the years as a reporter covering space. In those discussions, the biggest concern about the company's work environment has been its demanding pace and long working hours—a tone clearly set by Musk, who nearly asks the impossible of his employees. And notably, SpaceX President and Chief Operating Officer Gwynne Shotwell has always been described as a defender of women in aerospace. But clearly all is not well, given the concerns expressed by Kosak and other women who have left the company. Shotwell and Musk appear to have taken note. This weekend, in advance of the publication of the Lioness essay, Shotwell sent an internal email to employees announcing an independent audit of the company's human relations procedures. The company, Shotwell wrote, "can always do better." The harsh reality is that the space industry, which grew largely out of military operations in the United States, has been male-dominated since its inception. Figures for the diversity of private companies are not available, but even NASA, which strives for a diverse workforce, had a two-to-one male-to-female ratio of employees in 2020 (see diversity report). At the senior level of management, the ratio was more than four-to-one. Putting up with “unacceptable behavior to achieve success” The mission-driven environment of spaceflight also may help to foster an environment of sexism. Florida Today explored this dynamic in a lengthy report on harassment published earlier this fall. "According to experts and whistleblowers, the idealistic nature of space exploration and sharp focus on 'the mission' adds to a dangerous dynamic in which women, already a minority in the high-tech workplace, might be willing to put up with unacceptable behaviors to achieve success," the publication wrote. "If left unresolved, insiders are concerned this culture could someday extend to astronauts on assignment or deep space colonization efforts." Efforts by whistleblowers in Lioness are helpful in that they shine a light on problems that have existed from the beginning. Such illumination helps to expose bad behaviors. Welcome, too, is the recent creation of organizations to support young women and minorities in the space industry through fellowships—such as the Brooke Owens Fellowship and the Patti Grace Smith Fellowship. These organizations help aerospace students find strong mentors and peers in the space industry. The hope is that students will not feel isolated and will instead be empowered to speak up for their needs and rights. Space should welcome all who are called to its vast potential.

#### [Griffin 9] The politics of space are profoundly gendered – the discourse of exploration, development, appropriation, and colonization reproduce heteronormative hierarchies and ensure the continuation of patriarchy in space.

Griffin 9 (Penny, Senior Lecturer - Convenor, MA International Relations, ‘The Spaces Between Us: The Gendered Politics of Outer Space’, in Bormann, N. and Sheehan, M. (eds), Securing Outer Space. London and New York: Routledge, pp.59-75.) SJ

This chapter is about sex, but not the sex that people already have clarity about. 'Outer space' as a human, political domain is organized around sex, but a 'sex' that is tacitly located, and rarely spoken, in official discourse. The politics of outer space exploration, militarization and commercialization as they are conceived of and practiced in the US, embody a distinction between public and private (and appropriate behaviours, meanings and identities therein) highly dependent upon heteronormative hierarchies of property and propriety.1 The central aim of this chapter is to show how US outer space discourse, an imperial discourse of technological, military and commercial superiority, configutes and prescribes success and successful behaviour in the politics of outer space in particularly gendered forms. US space discourse is, I argue, predicated on a heteronormative discourse of conquest that reproduces the dominance of heterosexual masculinity(ies), and which hierarchically orders the construction of other (subordinate) gender identities. Reading the politics of outer space as heteronormative suggests that the discourses through which space exists consist of institutions, structures of understanding, practical orientations and regulatory practices organized and privileged around heterosexuality. As a particularly dominant discursive arrangement of outer space politics, US space discourse (re)produces meaning through gendered assumptions of exploration, colonization, economic endeavour and military conquest that are deeply gendered whilst presented as universal and neutral. US space discourse, which dominates the contemporary global politics of outer space, is thus formed from and upon institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that privilege and normalize heterosexualiry as universal. As such, the hegemonic discursive rationalizations of space exploration and conquest ,re)produce both heterosexuality as 'unmarked' (that is, thoroughly normal­ ized) and the heterosexual imperatives that constitute suitable space-able people, practices and behaviours. As the introduction to this volume highlights, the exploration and utilization of outer space can thus far be held up as a mirror of, rather than a challenge to, existent, terrestrially-bound, political patterns, behaviours and impulses. The new possibilities for human progress that the application and development of space technologies dares us to make are grounded only in the strategy­ obsessed (be it commercially, militarily or otherwise) realities of contemporary global politics. Outer space is a conceptual, political and material space, a place for collisions and collusions (literally and metaphorically) between objects, ideas, identities and discourses. Outer space, like international relations, is a global space always socially and locally embedded. There is nothing 'out there' about outer space. It exists because of us, not in spite of us, and it is this that means that it only makes sense in social terms, that is, in relation to our own constructions of identity and social location. In this chapter, outer space is the problematic to which I apply a gender analysis; an arena wherein past, current and future policy-making is embedded in relation to certain performances of power and reconfigurations of identity that are always, and not incidentally, gendered. Effective and appropriate behaviour in the politics of ourer space is configured and prescribed in particularly gendered forms, with heteronormative gender regulations endowing outer space's hierarchies of technologically superior, conquesting performance with theif everyday power. It is through gender that US techno-strategic and astro-political discourse has been able to (re)produce outer space as a heterosexualized, masculinized realm.

## Contention 2: Solvency

#### [Cohn& Ruddick] Feminist epistemology is crucial to displace technostrategic discourse. It privileges lived experience over hypothetical scenario planning

**Cohn and Ruddick, PhDs, 03**

(Carol, founding director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, Sara, winner distinguished female philosopher of the year, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Working Paper No. 104 / 2003)

Both in philosophy and in “western” thought more generally, “objective” knowledge is produced by socially autonomous reasoners who have transcended institutional constraints, gender identifications, and emotion. Many feminists propose an “alternative epistemology” which stresses that all thinkers are “situated” within “epistemic communities” which ask some but not other questions, and legitimate some but not other ways of knowing. We are each of us also situated by social identities and personal histories. To take an example at hand: some of us address the volume’s questions as heirs of the “victims” of nuclear weapons, or associate ourselves with them.17 Others are heirs of the attackers. Some address the issue of “proliferation” of nuclear weapons from the situation of a possessor state, others from a situation in which they would find the term “proliferation” inappropriate. None of us speaks from nowhere; there is no phenomenon – including nuclear attack or proliferation – that can be seen independently of the situation of the seers.18 Three tenets of this “alternative epistemology” seem especially relevant to our work. Knowing is never wholly separated from feelings. Indeed, in many kinds of inquiry the capacity to feel and to account for one’s feelings is both a source and a test of knowledge. Secondly, as useful as hypothetical thought experiments and imagined scenarios may be, we begin with and return to concrete open-ended questions about actual people in actual situations. Finally, we measure arguments, and ideals of objectivity, partly in terms of the goods which they yield, the pleasures they make possible and the suffering they prevent. Grounded in this alternative epistemology, anti-war feminists criticize the dominant political/strategic paradigm for thinking about weapons of mass destruction, which we call “technostrategic discourse.”19 In contrast to just war theory, this discourse is explicitly not centered on the ethics of warfare, but on its material and political practicalities. As a tool for thinking about weapons of mass destruction, it essentially restricts the thinker to three issues: the actual use, i.e. the detonation, of these weapons in state warfare or by terrorists; the physical and geo-political effects of this use; the deployment of these weapons to deter attacks involving either conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction. In other words, the concerns of the dominant strategic discourse are limited to the destructive effects of the weapons when, and only when, they are detonated, and to the possible deterrent effects of possessing these weapons. There is scant attention to the potential suffering of targeted societies, and no attempt to evaluate complicated effects on possessor societies of deploying and developing these weapons, nor to grapple with the moral significance of willingly risking such massive, total destruction. When anti-war feminists think about wars, they take into consideration the political, social, economic, psychological and moral consequences of accepting the practice of war. When assessing weapons, they do not single out or isolate weapons’ physical, military and strategic effects from their embeddedness in and impact upon social and political life as a whole, nor from the effects of the discourses which constitute “knowledge” about these weapons. Hence when asked to think about weapons of mass destruction, we strive to consider the totality of the web of social, economic, political, and environmental relationships within which weapons of mass destruction are developed, deployed, used and disposed of – all the while starting from the perspective of women’s lives. It is not possible to do so from within the bounds of “just war” and/or “technostrategic” frameworks – yet those are the very discourses which have shaped the questions we are asked to answer in this volume. Thus, as we respond to the editors’ questions, we find we need to both think inside their frame, and about the frame itself.

#### [Gorove 69] All signatories of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 should end private appropriation for bioprospecting of outer space by ruling that it violates the non-appropriations clause of the OST

Gorove**1969** [Stephen Gorove, jurist & Professor Emeritus at University of Missisipi, “Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty”, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 349, 1969, <https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1966&context=flr>] //neth

I. SUBJECT MATTER OF APPROPRIATION With respect to the problem of subject matter, the prohibition of national appropriation relates clearly to "outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies."2 The Treaty is silent on the question of what is outer space, what it encompasses or what its boundaries are in relation to airspace. The only statement contained in the Treaty is that the moon and other celestial bodies are included in outer space. For this reason, the prohibition regarding national appropriation would unquestionably extend to the moon and other celestial bodies. Whether or not the prohibition would extend to outer space in its totality or only to part of it, or would relate to the moon or a celestial body as a whole or only to a part of it, are further significant questions. By common sense interpretation the prohibition could not very well relate to outer space as a whole since no one could at present appropriate outer space as a whole but only a part of it. Insofar as the moon and other celestial bodies are concerned, the prohibition could extend to the whole entity if national appropriation of the whole is indeed possible. But even in relation to the moon and other celestial bodies, it would appear by reasonable interpretation that the prohibition would also cover acquisition of a part of the moon or other celestial body. Any contrary interpretation would seem to make the prohibition of national appropriation largely illusory. In relation to national acquisition of a part of outer space, further questions may be raised. For example, does the prohibition extend to the collection of dust particles or other special elements during flight in outer space? Does the prohibition extend to the appropriation of cosmic rays, gases or the sun's energy, or to the collecting of mineral samples or precious metals on the moon or other celestial bodies? Should the answer depend on the type of resource involved, or on its availability in unlimited (cosmic rays, meteorites, gases) or limited (minerals, metals) quantities or perhaps on its location? In attempting to give answers to these questions, it may be pointed out, first of all, that, in the absence of some special circumstance, little would be gained by insisting on the nonappropriation of resources such as cosmic rays or gases, which are available in inexhaustible quantities. At the same time, the Treaty as it stands seems to make little allowance for national acquisition of exhaustible spatial resources. With respect to location, it could be argued that if any parts of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, were found on the earth, they would not be subject to the prohibition of national appropriation since they would become part and parcel of the earth. Under a strict interpretation it may also be argued that the prohibition extends to the resource irrespective of its location. However, it might be preferable to distinguish between elements of outer space which have reached the earth as a result of natural causes and those which have done so through human intervention. In the first instance national appropriation would not be prohibited, whereas in the second example the prohibition would apply. Thus, a meteorite falling on the earth could be appropriated whereas a precious stone or metal brought to the earth from outer space could not be a subject of national appropriation. Regarding the jurisdictional boundaries of outer space, particularly the dividing line between airspace and outer space, we seem to know a little more now than we knew at the time of the first Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space back in 1958. At that time it did not appear with certainty that nation states would not object to the orbiting of foreign space instrumentalities over and above their territories. Today after more than a decade of spatial experiments, it can be said that an international custom seems to have sprung up which regards the area where space instrumentalities move in durable orbit as outer space. From this we also take for granted that anything above and beyond this area is also regarded as outer space. However, the more precise boundary line between airspace and outer space is still left undetermined. II. NATIONAL APPROPRIATION Turning to the second question which involves the meaning of "national" appropriation, it has been suggested that only the United Nations acting on behalf of the world community as a whole, should be entitled to appropriate.3 While further developments in space law, by international custom or treaty, may eventually prohibit spatial appropriations by an individual or a chartered company or the European communities, the Treaty in its present form appears to contain no prohibition regarding individual appropriation or acquisition by a private association or an international organization, even if other than the United Nations. Thus, at present, an individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or a private association or an international organization could lawfully appropriate any part of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Whether or not an ad hoc international organization could be created for the exclusive purpose of enabling it to appropriate outer space is a delicate question. The answer may have to depend on the good faith of the parties. A further question in relation to "national" appropriation is whether or not political subdivisions of a state, such as the states of a federal state, cities or municipalities may appropriate? Under a strict interpretation, the answers to these questions would likely be in the negative even though an occasional court decision in other areas of the law may support an affirmative position.4 IlL. THE CONCEPT OF APPROPRIATION With respect to the concept of appropriation the basic question is what constitutes "appropriation," as used in the Treaty, especially in contradistinction to casual or temporary use. The term "appropriation" is used most frequently to denote the taking of property for one's own or exclusive use with a sense of permanence. Under such interpretation the establishment of a permanent settlement or the carrying out of commercial activities by nationals of a country on a celestial body may constitute national appropriation if the activities take place under the supreme authority (sovereignty) of the state. Short of this, if the state wields no exclusive authority or jurisdiction in relation to the area in question, the answer would seem to be in the negative, unless, the nationals also use their individual appropriations as cover-ups for their state's activities.5 In this connection, it should be emphasized that the word "appropriation" indicates a taking which involves something more than just a casual use. Thus a temporary occupation of a landing site or other area, just like the temporary or nonexclusive use of property, would not constitute appropriation. By the same token, any use involving consumption or taking with intention of keeping for one's own exclusive use would amount to appropriation. The question may also be asked whether or not the purpose of appropriation, that is whether it takes place in the name of science, for enrichment, or for any other purpose would have a bearing on the question of its lawfulness. Normally, the purpose of appropriation should have little bearing on the prohibition except that to constitute appropriation, the acquisition must be carried out for the purpose of one's own or exclusive use. However, since the Treaty proclaims freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, 6 there seems to be some support for the argument that if the appropriation takes place in the name of science or in the course of a scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, such use would not be prohibited under the Treaty. Nonetheless, if the proclaimed principle is taken literally, the same argument could not be used with equal force in a case where the scientific investigation was carried out on the earth. It is doubtful whether the Treaty intended such effect, but if it did not, it is unfortunate that it fails to make it clear.7 IV. SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY In relation to the question whether or not there is any room for the exercise of some form or degree of superior authority, jurisdiction, use or occupation in outer space, the answer would seem to be in the affirmative, since the Treaty prohibits the exercise of such authority, use or occupation only if it amounts to national appropriation. Under such interpretation, the temporary use of a spatial resource without the latter's transformation or deterioration may be permissible, whereas the consumption or destruction of a resource may not. Furthermore, insofar as the exercise of authority is concerned, the state on whose registry an object launched into space is carried must retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over its personnel, while in outer space or on a celestial body.' The Treaty also makes it clear that the states will be internationally responsible for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, irrespective of whether such activities are carried on by governmental or nongovernmental entities. In fact, the activities of nongovernmental entities require authorization and continuing supervision by the state concerned.9 The fact that some measure of at least temporary exclusive jurisdiction may be exercised over a particular area on the moon or other celestial bodies, such as a space station and its adjacent grounds, is also apparent from Article XII which makes access by representatives of a foreign state contingent on reciprocity. It is not the purpose of the foregoing brief analysis to attempt to resolve the complex problems which may arise in connection with the interpretation of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. The purpose is rather to draw attention to the existence of these problems which will have to be resolved if man's exploration of the cosmos is to be guarded by law and order.

#### [Marx 20] The aff is key to global cooperation and scientific exploration

Marx 20 (Paris Marx is a freelance writer, host of left-wing tech podcast Tech Won't Save Us, and editor of Radical Urbanist, June 8, 2020, Yes to Space Exploration. No to Space Capitalism, <https://jacobinmag.com/2020/06/spacex-elon-musk-jeff-bezos-capitalism>) SJ

Musk and Bezos are the leading drivers of the modern push to privatize and colonize space through their respective companies, SpaceX and Blue Origin. Their visions differ slightly, with Musk preferring to colonize Mars, while Bezos has more interest in building space colonies in orbit. In 2016, Musk claimed he would [begin sending rockets to Mars in 2018](https://observer.com/2016/06/elon-musk-charts-path-to-colonizing-mars-within-a-decade/). That never happened, but it hasn’t ended his obsession. Musk is determined to make humans a multi-planetary species, framing our choice as either space colonization or the risk of extinction. Bezos says that Earth is the best planet in our solar system, but if we don’t colonize space we doom ourselves to “[stasis and rationing](https://jacobinmag.com/2019/07/space-colonies-jeff-bezos-blue-origin).” These framings serve the interests of these billionaires, and make it seem like colonizing space is an obvious and necessary choice when it isn’t. It ignores their personal culpability and the role of the capitalist system they seek to reproduce in causing the problems they say we need to flee in the first place. Billionaires have a [much greater carbon footprint](https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/12/1/16718844/green-consumers-climate-change) than ordinary people, with Musk [flying his private jet](https://arstechnica.com/cars/2019/01/elon-musk-private-jet-flew-150000-miles-in-2018-washington-post-reports/) all around the world as he claims to be an environmental champion. Amazon, meanwhile, is [courting oil and gas companies](https://gizmodo.com/amazon-is-aggressively-pursuing-big-oil-as-it-stalls-ou-1833875828) with cloud services to make their business more efficient, and Tesla is selling [a false vision of sustainability](https://jacobinmag.com/2020/01/elon-musk-climate-apocalypse-tesla-spacex) that purposely serves people like Musk, all while capitalism continues to drive the climate system toward the cliff edge. Colonizing space will not save us from billionaire-fueled climate dystopia. But these billionaires do not hide who would be served by their futures. Musk has given many figures for the cost of a ticket to Mars, but they’re never cheap. He told Vance the tickets would cost $500,000 to $1 million, a price at which he thinks “it’s highly likely that there will be a self-sustaining Martian colony.” However, the workers for such a colony clearly won’t be able to buy their own way. Rather, Musk tweeted a plan for [Martian indentured servitude](https://gizmodo.com/elon-musk-a-new-life-awaits-you-on-the-off-world-colon-1841071257) where workers would take on loans to pay for their tickets and pay them off later because “There will be a lot of jobs on Mars!” Bezos is even more open about how the workforce will have to expand to serve his vision, but has little to say about what they’ll be doing. His plan to maintain economic “growth and dynamism” requires the human population to [grow to a trillion people](https://jacobinmag.com/2019/07/space-colonies-jeff-bezos-blue-origin). He claims this would create “a thousand Mozarts and a thousand Einsteins” who would live in space colonies that are supposed to house a million people each, with the surface of Earth being mainly for tourism. Meanwhile, industrial and mining work would move into orbit so as not to pollute the planet, and while he doesn’t explicitly acknowledge it, it’s likely [that’s where you’ll find many of those trillion workers](https://jacobinmag.com/2019/12/jeff-bezos-the-expanse-space-fantasy-sci-fi-syfy/) toiling for their space overlord and his descendants. Space Shouldn’t Serve Capitalists In 1978, Murray Bookchin [skewered a certain brand of futurism](http://unevenearth.org/2019/10/bookchin_doing_the_impossible/) that sought to “extend the present into the future” and desired “multinational corporations to become multi-cosmic corporations.” Much of this future thinking obsesses about possible changes to technology, but seeks to preserve the existing social and economic relations — “the present as it exists today, projected, one hundred years from now,” as Bookchin put it. That’s at the core of the space billionaires’ vision for the future. Space has been used by past US presidents to bolster American power and influence, but it was largely accepted that capitalism ended at the edge of the atmosphere. That’s no longer the case, and just as past capitalist expansions have come at the expense of poor and working people to enrich a small elite, so too will this one. Bezos and Trump may have a public feud, but that doesn’t mean that their mutual interest isn’t served by a renewed US push into space that funnels massive public funds into private pockets and seeks to open celestial bodies to capitalist resource extraction. This is not to say that we need to halt space exploration. The collective interest of humanity is served by learning more about the solar system and the universe beyond, but the goal of such missions must be driven by gaining scientific knowledge and enhancing global cooperation, not nationalism and profit-making.Yet that’s exactly what the space billionaires and American authoritarians have found common cause in, with Trump declaring that “[a new age of American ambition has now begun](https://twitter.com/TeamTrump/status/1266846741787074560?s=20)” at a NASA press briefing just hours before cities across the country were placed under curfew last week. Before space can be explored in a way that benefits all of humankind, existing social relations must be transformed, not extended into the stars as part of a new colonial project.

## Contention 3: Framing

#### [ROJ & Mehta] Creating solidarity is good and this starts with including more women in the space. A rejection of the patriarchal form of debate is key and this is the place to resist it. Thus, the role of the judge is to be an anti-patriarchal educator.

**Mehta 2019** (Damini Mehta, Feminism In India, Feminisminindia.com, February 4, 2019, “Does Patriarchy Divide Women: The Importance Of Solidarity”, <https://feminisminindia.com/2019/02/04/patriarchy-divide-women-solidarity/>) // Hill NL

Patriarchy and the way it has manifested, and has continued to, has long been a matter of analytical concern and still continues to be one. A very subtle yet explicit way that it manifests out of the many other renditions of its existence, is one where it thrives by being a divisive force under the garb of competition, or by creating a comparative – which results in being exclusionary in so far as it creates an illusion of how there can be only ‘one suitable woman’ for whatever category or space it seeks to compare women in. Therefore, it ends up being very reductive in the way that it views women as a community and a collective. While patriarchy has always thrived on not letting women ever be equals, the way it’s shaped itself within the popular narrative to still continue to thrive with changing climates is by morphing into more subtle forms. A very significant manifestation of this is how patriarchy internalises as well as pits women against each other. In an atmosphere where the feminist movement and how it engages with patriarchy becomes extremely relevant, it becomes very pertinent to analyse the consequences of how it pans out. It creates a narrative where women cannot thrive; but even if they somehow manage to, the way it then restricts them is by creating a narrative of “only a select few of you can actually access resources and prestige, and that has to be done at the cost of the others.” How this is achieved is by patriarchy pitting women against another in a manner where women start negatively viewing their female counterparts – and seeing themselves as the one successful woman. As a consequence of this, women are given a climate where they are implicitly or explicitly encouraged to pull each other down and to do whatever it takes to be the one woman who’s better out of all women in that position. As a consequence, a very strong sense of animosity festers between women, who are already minorities within very male dominated workspaces. This sense of animosity is encouraged in these environments and workspaces under the garb of ‘healthy competition’ and ‘achievement’, but they often end up further dividing women and making their interactions with each other more toxic. This sort of a mudslinging competition sponsored by patriarchy further divides women – for what threatens patriarchy is women and other gendered minorities banding together against a common oppressor. If they’re too busy fighting amongst themselves, they won’t be able to figure out that this sort of division is being sponsored by a common oppressor. This illusion of achievement which is propagated not only creates divide between women, it also restricts access to resources to women – because now structures don’t have to make more inclusive spaces for have more seats at the table for women, they just have to pit them against one another to see which one comes out on top. This creation of division and toxic competition is also a very problematic cause which contributes to a systematic exclusion of women from systems and institutions. As a consequence, institutions don’t have any incentive to create spaces for women beyond the tokenistic ‘inclusive’ spaces they have to create – a very half-hearted effort at the bare minimum to bridge the gender gap. This is very visible if we take a comparative – out of all Fortune 500 company CEOs, only 5% are women. This is the representation of the creamiest layer of the work industry – representation only grows thinner from here onwards, as we go to the lower rungs of corporations, and within the corporate ladder, the lower rungs of the business company ecosystem. However, in this climate, what has been a very prominent development is women recognising this systemic problem and taking active steps to address it. Women have created a community that is slowly but surely becoming immune to the divisive forces that patriarchy creates. Prominent examples of this are Lilly Singh, and India origin Canadian Youtuber and her campaign #GirlLove, and closer home, women like Rega Jha, an Instagram Influencer. Even the Indian beauty community which is flourishing is seeing a very inclusive and positive space for women to share and grow together. This sense of community which comes out of shared lived experiences and other overlapping diaspora within which people function, is very important for it not only helps in the creation and sustenance of a bond but also an unsaid implicit contract which manifests in the form of being able to celebrate each other’s’ successes because they realise that an individual success is also success on a larger level, a collective success which creates space for more recognition and more merit. This ecosystem of solidarity and collectivisation based on being able to help each other in creating more success not only helps the individual, but also stands in direct contrast to the toxic ecosystem of patriarchy – and challenges it. But solidarity isn’t only limited to this – it is also a sense of community where women allow each other space for their own unique expression. This is an expression that comes out of not encroaching on each others’ spaces. Women of upper castes and upper classes don’t take up space meant for and deserved by women who may not be from that same privilege, women don’t take up spaces meant for trans people and other gendered minorities; just creating a more inclusive space meant for celebrating and building each other up – to challenge[s] the contours of patriarchy and [helps us] thrive despite its oppression.

#### [ROB & Cohn] Technostrategic discourse sets the confines of debates which rigs the game in favor of hegemonic solutions and deterrence. Thus the role of the ballot is to endorse the debater who creates the best impacts under a feminist view of international relations.

**Cohn, PhD, et al., 05**

( Carol,FELICITY HILL AND SARA RUDDICK, The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction <http://www.iansa-women.org/sites/default/files/newsviews/en-wmdc-paper38-2005.pdf>)

Why did he feel that way? First, he was transgressing a code of professional conduct. Expressing concern about human bodies is not the way you talk within the terms of the **strategic expert discourse**, which is, after all, a discourse about **weapons** and their relation to each other, not to human bodies. But even worse than that, he evinced some of the characteristics on the “female” side of the dichotomies – in his “blurting” he was being impulsive, uncontrolled, emotional, concrete, upset and attentive to fragile human bodies. Thus, the hegemonic discourse of gender positioned him as feminine, which he found doubly threatening. It was not only a threat to his own sense of self as masculine, his gender identity; it also positioned him in the devalued or subordinate position in the discourse. Thus, both his statement, “I felt like a woman,” and his subsequent silence in that and other settings, are completely understandable. To find the strength of character and courage to transgress the strictures of both professional and gender codes and to associate yourself with a lower status is very difficult. This story is not simply about one individual, his feelings and actions; it illustrates the role and meaning of gender discourse in the defence community. The impact of gender discourse in that room (and countless others like it) is that some things are**excluded** and get left out from **professional deliberations.** Certain ideas, concerns, interests, information, feelings and meanings are marked in national security discourse as feminine, and devalued. They are therefore very difficult to speak, as exemplified by the physicist who blurted them out and wished he hadn’t. And if they manage to be said, they are also very difficult to hear, to take in and work with seriously. For the others in the room, the way in which the physicist’s comments were marked as feminine and devalued served to delegitimate them; it also made it very unlikely that any of his colleagues would find the courage to agree with him. This example should not be dismissed as just the product of the idiosyncratic personal composition of that particular room; **it is replicated many times and in many places.**Women, in professional and military settings, have related experiences of realising that something terribly important is being left out but feeling constrained, as if there is almost a physical barrier preventing them from pushing their transgressive truths out into the open. What is it that cannot be spoken? First, any expression of an emotional awareness of the desperate human reality behind the **sanitised abstractions of death** and destruction in strategic deliberations. Similarly, weapons’ effects may only be spoken of in the most clinical and abstract terms, and usually only by those deemed to have the appropriate **professional qualifications** and expertise. What gets left out, then, is the emotional, the concrete, the particular, human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity – all of which are marked as feminine in the binary dichotomies of gender discourse. In other words, gender discourse informs and shapes **nuclear and national security discourse**, and in so doing creates silences and absences. It keeps things out of the room, unsaid, and keeps them ignored if they manage to get in. As such, it **degrades our ability to think well** and fully about nuclear weapons and national security, and so shapes and limits the **possible outcomes of our deliberations.**With this understanding, it becomes obvious that defence intellectuals’ standards of what constitutes “good thinking” about weapons and security have not simply **evolved out of trial and error**; it is not that the history of nuclear discourse has been filled with exploration of other ideas, concerns, interests, information, questions, feelings, meanings and stances which were then found to create distorted or poor thought. On the contrary, serious consideration of a whole range of ideas and options has been **preempted by their gender coding,** and by the feelings evoked by living up to or transgressing normative gender ideals. To borrow a strategists’ term, we can say that gender coding serves as a “**preemptive deterrent” to certain kinds of thought**about the effects and consequences of strategic plans and WMD.vi

#### [Petersen] The panic over potential threats to the nation is a form of masculine futurity which allows reproductive bodies to be regulated. Claims of utilitarianism justify the endless sacrifice of reproductive freedom in the name of the “greatest good.”

**Petersen 15**

(Kristin Petersen B.A., University of Southern California 2003 M.A. New York University 2008, A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, The Logic of Futurity: Reproduction, Cultural Eugenics, and Contingencies of Women’s Citizenship in the Contemporary United States, Proquest, JKS)

Cultural theorist Ruth McElroy suggests, “Women’s belonging to nations is indissoluble from their reproductive biology” (325). For all that motherhood may be conceived as a private choice occurring in the supposedly private sphere, reproduction and motherhood are nonetheless public and political as well, and thoroughly entangled with women’s status as members of their nation. By virtue of their reproduction (or even lack thereof!), women can be constructed in cultural narratives and political scripts as contributors to society or threats to the national good, caretakers of the future who merit protection and support or wayward parents who must be disciplined back into the national fold, national maternal ideals or outsiders within. The state’s identification of and response to women as reproducers reflects the continuous processes of the politics of belonging, which “involve not only the maintenance and reproduction of the boundaries of the community of belonging by the hegemonic political powers...but also by their contestation, challenge and resistance by other political agents” (Yuval-Davis 20). We see these politics of belonging manifested not only discursively, but also in the policies and laws that protect or privilege some mothers and not others, some children, but not all. When anthropologists Faye Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp ask, “who defines the body of the nation into which the next generation is recruited? Who is considered to be in that national body, who is out of it?” (3), therefore, there is no one answer; rather, this is the question perpetually being asked and answered by political discourse and practice infused with the logic of futurity. The hopes and fears of the present political moment and the imaginative desires for the future are thus continually projected upon the bodies of women and their procreative capacities. Futurity, I suggest in this project, as a possibly inevitable perspective or worldview, allows for the state to focus on women as reproductive beings in a way that it does not for men. Following from Foucault’s explication of biopower, the modern state takes an interest in the workings and ostensible health of its populations, creating new knowledges and indices for the normal as it counts up the characteristics of its citizenry and sets goals for demographic management. While Foucault tends not to focus on the reproductive elements of the state’s biopolitical interest—for instance, the setting of ideal rates of fertility, health expectations for women and children, creation of access to the medical, economic, and social resources needed for reproduction—these are, I would argue, operations of the state that have potential for tremendous impacts upon women particularly. The other biopolitical interests of the state—appropriate number of workers, manageable immigration rates, proper ratio of elderly to young, and so on—are also all implicated in the procreative behaviors of women, which would seem to intensify the state’s interest in them. Brought into the broader framework of women’s political status and national belonging, reproduction in this context seems poised to function as an axis upon which the dispensation of women’s citizenship can pivot, with particular regard to her racial, economic, and social demographic and the state’s assessment of her (and her children’s) value to the national future. Penelope Deutscher suggests that through the emergence of biopower: Women would later assume a status as a reproductive threshold of the future and health of nations, populations and peoples. But the condition for this role for women and maternal reproductivity was the very possibility of reproduction being associated with a shifting field of possible substances, telos, outcomes and obligations: the overall good, the general happiness, the future of the nation, the health of the nation, the competitiveness of the nation, the future of the people, individual flourishing or freedom, individual rights, domestic happiness, the family unit as building block of the nation, the transmission of the bloodline, the family name, transmission of property or family or genealogical transmission, reproduction of the labour force, etc. That reproduction be plausibly thought of in such terms at all was a precondition of it becoming associated with women’s role as threshold of futurity. (Deutscher 129) The state’s biopolitical management of women’s reproduction may thus allow it to approach women primarily as reproductive beings, an essentalist or even utilitarian collapse that may make it easier to intervene upon their bodies and perhaps reflects a deeply ingrained discomfort with the notion that women have tremendous potential power to impact the composition of the future. In this project, I am proposing a framework of futurity that is in operation, characterized by discursive and eugenic aspects, that uses women as the vehicle for future world-building and nation-making. This futurity aims to enact particular visions of the future via changes in the present, particularly through the management of women’s reproduction in the present such that the future population comports with present desires. When this futurity framework is picked up by the state in its various capacities, I suggest there are significant consequences for women’s citizenship as women because they are so intrinsically linked in the cultural and political imaginary with reproduction. In the process of grappling with these concepts, this project asks how the logic of futurity functions to organize the terms of women’s social or political belonging in reproductive terms. How does the state pick up and extend this logic to women, and how might that impact the meaningfulness of women’s citizenship or national belonging? Does the logic of futurity, the constant pressure of the forward vision combined with the imaginative limitations of the present, insist upon women’s citizenship being or becoming something fundamentally different from men’s by virtue of reproductive capacity and association? Exploring these questions brings this project into several disciplinary contexts, including feminist theory and philosophy, political theory, disability theory (eugenics), and even the sphere of economics. In connecting these concepts to ongoing conversations about women and citizenship in the contemporary United States, this project is ultimately working to tie together disparate fields and illuminate how they interact with respect to a model of futurity that I theorize as containing discursive and eugenic aspects. It may be that state-based discourses and practices related to women’s reproduction and citizenship are not so much causes as they are effects of the logic of futurity.

#### [Delgado 09] Rejecting positive material change in favor of academic theorization is unethical and paternalistic— case outweighs.

**Delgado 9** – Chair of Law at the University of Alabama Law School, J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, his books have won eight national book prizes, including six Gustavus Myers awards for outstanding book on human rights in North America, the American Library Association’s Outstanding Academic Book, and a Pulitzer Prize nomination.  Professor Delgado’s teaching and writing focus on race, the legal profession, and social change, 2009, “Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want, Arguing about Law”, p. 588-590

The CLS critique of piecemeal reform Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal reform. Incremental change, they argue, merely postpones the wholesale reformation that must occur to create a decent society. Even worse, an unfair social system survives by using piecemeal reform to disguise and legitimize oppression. Those who control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to, or periodic court victory of, a black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair and just. In fact, Crits believe that teaching the common law or using the case method in law school is a disguised means of preaching incrementalism and thereby maintaining the current power structure” To avoid this, CLS scholars urge law professors to abandon the case method, give up the effort to ﬁnd rationality and order in the case law, and teach in an unabashedly political fashion. The CLS critique of piecemeal reform is familiar, imperialistic and wrong. Minorities know from bitter experience that occasional court victories do not mean the Promised Land is at hand. The critique is imperialistic in that it tells minorities and other oppressed peoples how they should interpret events affecting them. A court order directing a housing authority to disburse funds for heating in subsidized housing may postpone the revolution, or it may not. In the meantime, the order keeps a number of poor families warm. This may mean more to them than it does to a comfortable academic working in a warm office. It smacks of paternalism to assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs the certainty of heat now, unless there is evidence for that possibility. The Crits do not offer such evidence. Indeed, some incremental changes may bring revolutionary changes closer, not push them further away. Not all small reforms induce complacency; some may whet the appetite for further combat. The welfare family may hold a tenants’ union meeting in their heated living room. CLS scholars’ critique of piecemeal reform often misses these possibilities, and neglects the question of whether total change, when it comes, will be what we want.

#### [Mccluskey] Disregarding foreseeable harm reifies structures of domination

**McCluskey 12** – JSD @ Columbia, Professor of Law @ SUNY-Buffalo

(Martha, “How the "Unintended Consequences" Story Promotes Unjust Intent and Impact,” Berkeley La Raza, doi: dx.doi.org/doi:10.15779/Z381664)

By similarly making structures of inequality appear beyond the reach of law reform, the "unintended consequences" message helps update and reinforce the narrowing of protections against intentional racial harm.   Justice is centrally a question of whose interests and whose harms should count, in what context and in what form and to whom. Power is centrally about being able to act without having to take harm to others into account. This power to gain by harming others is strongest when it operates through systems and structures that make disregarding that harm appear routine, rational, and beneficial or at least acceptable or perhaps inevitable. By portraying law's unequal harms as the "side effects" of systems and structures with unquestionable "main effects," the "unintended consequences" story helps affirm the resulting harm even as it seems to offer sympathy and technical assistance. In considering solutions to the financial market problems, the policy puzzle is not that struggling homeowners' interests are overwhelmingly complex or uncertain. Instead, the bigger problem is that overwhelmingly powerful interests and ideologies are actively resisting systemic changes that would make those interests count. The failure to criminally prosecute or otherwise severely penalize high-level financial industry fraud is not primarily the result of uncertainty about the harmful effects of that fraudulent behavior, but because the political and justice systems are skewed to protect the gains and unaccountability of wealthy executives despite the clear harms to hosts of others. The unequal effects of the prevailing policy response to the crisis are foreseeable and obvious, not accidental or surprising. It would not take advanced knowledge of economics to readily predict that modest-income homeowners would tend to be far worse off than bank executives by a policy approach that failed to provide substantial mortgage forgiveness and foreclosure protections for modest-income homeowners but instead provided massive subsidized credit and other protections for Wall Street. Many policy actions likely to alleviate the unequal harm of the crisis similarly are impeded not because consumer advocates, low-income homeowners, or racial justice advocates hesitate to risk major changes in existing systems, or are divided about the technical design of alternative programs or more effective mechanisms for enforcing laws against fraud and racial discrimination. Instead, the problem is that these voices pressing for effective change are often excluded, drowned out or distorted in Congress and in federal agencies such as the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve, or in the media, in the mainstream economics profession, and to a large extent in legal scholarship about financial markets. More generally, those diverse voices from the bottom have been largely absent or marginalized in the dominant theoretical framework that constructs widespread and severe inequality as unforeseeable and largely inevitable, or even beneficial. Moreover, justice requires careful attention to both harmful intent and to complex harmful effects. But the concept of "unintended consequences" inverts justice by suggesting that the best way to care for those at the bottom is to not care to make law more attentive to the bottom. "Unintended consequences" arguments promote a simplistic moral message in the guise of sophisticated intellectual critique-the message that those who lack power should not seek it because the desire for more power is what hurts most. Further, like Ayn Rand's overt philosophy of selfishness, that message promotes the theme that those who have power to ignore their harmful effects on others need not-indeed should not-be induced by law to care about this harm, because this caring is what is harmful. One right-wing think tank has recently made this moral message more explicit with an economic values campaign suggesting that the intentional pursuit of economic equality is a problem of the immoral envy of those whose economic success proves they are more deserving.169 Legal scholars and advocates who intend to put intellectual rigor and justice ahead of service to financial elites should reject stories of "unintended consequences" and instead scrutinize the power and laws that have so effectively achieved the intention of making devastating losses to so many of us seem natural, inevitable, and beneficial.

#### [Kirker] Discourse matters – especially in educational spaces

**Kirker 2017** (Jessica Kirker, “Professional Friction: Racialized Discourse and the Practice of Teaching Art,” Copyright 2017 by The Journal of Social Theory in Art Education / Volume 37, <https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1502&context=jstae>) //neth

Language is crucial in situating our selves and others. Discursive patterns create alliances or factions, establish hierarchies, and subjugate individuals or groups. In this autoethnographic study, I consider how I, as a White woman teaching art, participate in, maneuver, and manipulate spoken and unspoken racialized discourses within the context of a high school with a diverse population of students. Through the data collection process of journaling over one school year, I recorded reflections on conversations, speeches, and written communication with, between, and regarding teachers, students, parents, and school administrators. I employed discourse analysis on these texts and draw upon Critical Race Theory and Whiteness Studies to examine the discourses that govern the school and inform its social conventions as manifested in my professional identity as it intersects with various collegial spaces. I also show the value in performing an autoethnography as a way to evolve as a social justice educator and scholar as well as a means to give voice to teachers’ stories so that we can render visible the way radicalized discourses and discords they create can shape the daily practice of teaching art. Discussions of racial discrimination often only exist as history lessons, but the lessons taught throughout U.S. schools about racial identity are deeply embedded within the daily practices of all members of a school community. Racial identities are established on a daily basis through (seemingly) casual interactions and microagressions between teachers, students, parents, and administrators. The discourses that position and subjugate individuals can be as simple as an informal email or a casual hallway conversation to more public approaches like disciplinary hearings or faculty meetings. These messages establish relationships of sameness or difference, power or subordination, and allegiance or contention. Beyond the interactions of daily personal relationships, there are normalizing school practices; ways of doing things, guiding principles, and procedures, that define and shape parties in relationship to each other as well as ascertaining a dominant value system over the school context. Rules as well as social norms are communicated through highly visible social etiquette conventions as well as formalized policies and legislation (Hodge & Kress, 1988). The discourses that define these rules are often structured to ensure dominant parties remain unchallenged (Hodge & Kress, 1988). In the context of U.S. schools, censorship of speech or imagery, management tactics, and disciplinary policies are often designed to fit the interests and desires of dominant White educational leaders.