#### Settler colonialism is not an event, but a structuring ontological position from a logic of elimination through the imposition of will on the thing which is perceived to lack will.

**Rifkin ‘14** - Mark Rifkin, Ph.D. University of Pennsylvania-2003, M.A. University of Pennsylvania-1999, B.A. Rutgers University-1996 Dr. Rifkin’s research primarily focuses on Native American writing and politics from the eighteenth century onward, exploring the ways that Indigenous peoples have negotiated U.S. racial and imperial formations. His work explores the roles of gender, sexuality, affect, and eroticism in those processes, addressing legal and administrative frameworks, textual representations, and forms of everyday experience. Director of the Women's and Gender Studies Program and Professor of English at the University of North Carolina (‘Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance,’ June 2014 pages 7-8)//Kian

If nineteenth-century American literary studies tends to focus on the ways Indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associations they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on Indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. In Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Patrick Wolfe argues, “Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay—**invasion is a structure not an event**” (2).6 He suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” he observes that “elimination is an **organizing principle of settler-colonial society** rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settlercolonial society” (390). In Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s work, whiteness func - tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of Indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 In “Writing Off Indigenous Sovereignty,” she argues, “As a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and maintain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “Writing Off Treaties,” she suggests, “At an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through **the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will**, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “**possession** . . . **forms** part of **the ontological structure of white subjectivity**” (83–84). For Jodi Byrd, the deployment of Indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of U.S. settler colonialism. She observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). She argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as Indianness, casting place-based political collectivities as (racialized) populations subject to U.S. jurisdiction and management: “the Indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which U.S. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of Indians and Indianness have served as the ontological ground through which U.S. settler colonialism enacts itself ” (xix).

#### Settler colonial sovereignty creates endless violence that scripts Native genocide into the future – makes war, famine, massacre, starvation, disease and slow death inevitable

**Schotten 16** Massachusetts, University PoliSci Associate Professor **2016** C. Heike, “Queering Sovereignty, Decolonizing Desire.” Mills College. Carnegie Hall, Oakland, California. 4 March 2016. Spatializing Sovereignty organized by The Society for Radical Geography, Spatial Theory, and Everyday Life. Conference Presentation. http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/84081898. 8:07 - 19:56 //jazmyn

Okay so in the state of nature, which Hobbes defines as a place where there's no security, there is, in Edelman's terms, no future. This is true not only because we are responsible solely for our own survival, an endeavor we cannot possibly succeed at on our own, but it is also because given this radical insecurity, we are incapable of imagining any other moment or time than now. Hobbes himself acknowledges there is no "accounting of time" in the state of nature, which of course makes sense; in a condition of perpetual war, the future is unimaginable because it is so tenuous. As well, the past becomes effectively irrelevant, hence the institution of sovereignty in Hobbes' version secures our physical preservation and I’m arguing that it does so by bringing temporality itself into existence and producing a future. Okay, so that's the first point. The second point is that, in this act, the sovereign establishes the very meaning and content of life itself. For understood temporally, there is a way in which there is no distinction between life and death in the state of nature, in so far as there is no way to tell present from future. The state of nature's enduring present entails that life there is a kind of limbo-like existence, a suspension of living or perpetual near-death experience wherein we can never be certain of anything. This may be why it is so important to Hobbes to establish the commonwealth in the first place: Not simply to preserve life, as he explicitly suggests, but actually more primarily to definitively demarcate life as life and differentiate it from death. I mean, there's a normative enterprise going on here, right? Indeed, although the sovereign is the beacon of peace, war and death are just as must a byproduct of the institution of sovereignty as life and peace are. So what I take from this is that sovereignty, in short, is the definitive bio-political regime, in so far as it constitutes and determines life as such, distinguishing it from what only becomes subsequently recognizable as death. The third point is that sovereignty institutes this life-death distinction via a moralized logic that relegates life to the domain of civilization and value, and death to the domain of savagery and nihilism. This becomes clear in the conflicted and confusing ways Hobbes characterizes the state of nature as simultaneously a time, a place, and a condition. Now as I just argued that the state of nature is a time — like if it is an era or an epoch — it's a time with no time, a moment that is completely timeless, an era lacking any dynamism or principle of change. If the state of nature is instead a condition, which he also claims, he is clear that it is one of savagery, writing "It may peradventure be thought there never was such a time nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so over all the world, but there are many places where they live so now," and he cites as an example, "the savage people in many places of America." Bolstering the view that the state of nature is a story about humanity's pre-history, Hobbes here rehearses the enlightenment trope of indigenous peoples as European humanity's ancestors and/or pre-modern childhood. Savagery is, therefore, associated with solid temporality, timelessness, and the failure of forward movement or progress. Conclusively, when referencing a geographical location, the state of nature is America, and the 17th-century European notion of the new world, an empty land ripe for exploration and conquest. These specifications of the state of nature in Hobbes make clear that establishment of sovereignty imposes a clear distinction not simply between peace and war, life and death, but also between modernity and backwardness, civilization and savagery. Each of these categorical pairs functions as a surrogate for the others. Taken together, they suggest the deep implications of the categories of life and death with colonization and conquest for European politics and political theory. The fourth point is that the commonwealth, or sovereign or sovereignty, can't actually solve the problem Hobbes says it does. So if there's no state and we're all going to murder each other, the solution is obviously a really big bad, coercive state, right? And that's going to solve the problem? It can't solve the problem, and that's because it can't solve the problem of desire, which has futurism built into its very structure. Hobbes actually gets short shrift as a psychologist. He actually talks quite a bit about desire and affect. So desire, according to Hobbes, is a voluntary motion of the body, whose aim, regardless of object, is attainment — possession, consumption, enjoyment. Yet this attainment poses a dilemma, for as he says, the aim of desire is "not to enjoy once only and for one instant of time, but to assure forever the way of one's future desire." According to Hobbes, in other words, desire seeks perpetuity of enjoyment. It aims at a consumption that can never fully completed. The fifth point — we're almost done — is that Hobbes asserts, therefore, that human beings are perpetual power-seekers, not because we want more and more, but because we want to preserve what we have now forever. His claim is that mere maintenance of the present requires accumulation, undertaking a perpetual reference to an unknown future. Thus, even despite the security from physical violence the sovereign provides, he cannot alleviate the anxiety that runs apace with desire. Everything we do today is undertaken for the sake of a future, which, if we're successful, will be no different from the present. But the sovereign can't guarantee that, right? Sixth then, and finally, this means that Hobbes' colonial story of the emergence of life and death from the state of nature is based on an underlying logic of desire that explains why settler colonial societies transform into expansionist security states. Hobbes' understanding of desire and its dilemmas elaborates George W. Bush's doctrine of preemptive warfare, the logic of Israeli self-defense in the face of so-called "existential threats," and the rationale behind stand-your-ground laws that exonerated the murderer of Trayvon Martin. The fact of this logic's hegemony in economics and political science as rational-choice theory or in international relations as Big R Realism make clear that futurist temporality is the unquestioned philosophical foundation of the U.S. economic and political order, as well as the obviously imperial investments of these economic disciplines. In short, it is the temporalization of desire itself that explains both the settler colonial foundations of survival, life and the value of life, as well as its transformation into an expansionist imperial project. Okay, that was part one. Part two: settlement and the global war on terror. So how does this reading of Hobbes through Edelman help us understand the emergence of empire? Lorenzo Veracini has argued that **settler colonialism is distinct from other types of colonialism in so far as it seeks to erase itself as settler colonialism**. Following Patrick Wolf's argument that settler colonialism pursues a logic of elimination, whereby settlers seek to replace the native and indigenize themselves post-facto, Veracini argues that because it aims at the elimination of the native, settler colonization necessarily aims at its own elimination. The truly successful settler colonial project, then, would therefore efface the native entirely, whether through genocide or assimilation or some other form of disappearance, the politics of recognition as Glen Coulthard has recently argued. Unless and until elimination is accomplished, settler states will engage in all sort of contortions, both political and ideological, to obscure the native in order to naturalize the conquest. Veracini represents this future of settler colonialism as either conceptually embedded its definition or else as a kind of bad faith on settlers' part, potentially implying that a guilty conscience somehow seeks to ward off complicity with conquest. I think that Edelman's understanding of futurism, however, helps explicate just how and why this anxious, reiterative, and reactionary veiling impulse is definitive of bio-political sovereignty. Hobbes' narratization of the drive of the state of nature is, like any other narratization of the drive, an imposition and thus an explicitly ideological move that serves a particular political agenda. It is the specifically futurist character of this imposition that destines it for failure and thus explains its anxious and recursive structure. Edelman regards this narrative movement toward a viable political future as fundamentally fantasmatic, not to mention conservative and ideological. Futurism, in other words – and these are his words — "perpetuates the fantasy of meaning's eventual realization," a realization that is by definition impossible, in so far as it is always only ever to come. Right? That's what the future is: It's beyond our grasp, it's always just out of reach. Built into Hobbes' understanding of desire, in other words, is the failed tautology of futurism, which as Edelman instructs, is fundamentally and futilely political. My contention is that this constitutive failure of futurism can be understood as the dynamic content of conquest in settler societies, as the original civilizationist imposition of temporality, an act that explains their subsequent transmogrification into expansionist security states. So, rather than face the violence that brought peace and life itself into being, Hobbes instead naturalizes this founding act by declaring it to be a "general inclination of all mankind" to engage in what he calls a "perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceases only in death." In other words, he both institutes life and pushes it forward via a futurist narrativization of the drive into an insatiable, cumulative desire. Yet while desire may push us ever forward, ever beyond the initial moment of settlement, it cannot erase that settlement or relieve settlers' sovereignty of conquest. This is neither because of settler colonialist theoretical definition nor because settlers secretly feel guilty, but rather because the impossibility of fulfilling futurism's fantastical promises requires some other way of meeting the needs it manufactures if settler sovereignty is to maintain itself and it polity in tact. **Settler societies resort to any number of destructive forms of managing futurism's failing, from transfer and removal to outright extermination through war, massacre, starvation, and disease**. Yet this anxious reiterative activity is wholly predicable from an Edelmanian perspective and ineliminable from the structure of settler sovereignty because the futurist narrativization of the drive has rendered settlers beholden to an unsustainable temporality that must produce queerness or death in order to continue to produce meaning, survival, and civilization for itself. Settler sovereignty, thus, cannot do without the death native it brings into being. **The native as death must exist in order to purchase life and survival for the settler.** And yet, as Veracini and Wolf argue, the native cannot exist if the settler is to indigenize herself as native to the land she has expropriated, hence the production of new enemies, new queers, new deathly threats to settlement and its civilization and its way of life. The settler colonial foundation of bio-political sovereignty gives way to an expansionist imperial security state that finds new enemies abroad and new obstacles to its endless expansion, thereby solving, albeit only ever partially and temporarily, the problem of futurist failure that constituted settlement to begin with. **purchase life and survival for the settler.** And yet, as Veracini and Wolf argue, the native cannot exist if the settler is to indigenize herself as native to the land she has expropriated, hence the production of new enemies, new queers, new deathly threats to settlement and its civilization and its way of life. The settler colonial foundation of bio-political sovereignty gives way to an expansionist imperial security state that finds new enemies abroad and new obstacles to its endless expansion, thereby solving, albeit only ever partially and temporarily, the problem of futurist failure that constituted settlement to begin with.

#### The AC’s terra nullius conceptions of land ownership are uniquely violent in space – entrenches settler colonialism – affirming indigenous engagement in space is GOOD and key to thwarting settlerism

**Smiles 20** ​​(Deondre Smiles, Ph.D. is a postdoctoral scholar at The Ohio State University. A citizen of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe, his ongoing research agenda is situated at the intersection of critical Indigenous geographies and political ecology, centered in the argument that tribal protection of remains, burial grounds, and more-than-human environments represents an effective form of ‘quotidian’ resistance against the settler colonial state/ “THE SETTLER LOGICS OF OUTERSPACE” / October 26 2020 / SOCIETY AND SPACE / ACCESSED 1-13-21) (<https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/the-settler-logics-of-outer-space>) (SPHS, AL)

In this essay, I position the logics of settler colonialism and the logics of space exploration dominion over both space on earth, and interplanetary space at the expense of Indigenous peoples. I then look to Indigenous conceptions of space as a potential foil to these colonial logics.*“In reaffirming our heritage as a free nation, we must always remember that America has always been a frontier nation. Now we must embrace the next frontier. America’s Manifest Destiny in the stars…The American nation was carved out of the vast frontier by the toughest, strongest, fiercest and most determined men and women ever to walk on the face of the Earth… Our ancestors braved the unknown, tamed the wilderness, settled the Wild West…This is our glorious and magnificent inheritance. We are Americans. We are pioneers. We are the pathfinders. We settled the New World. We built the modern world.” -President Donald J. Trump, 2020 State of the Union address.* To most scholars, and certainly to the virtual majority of Indigenous peoples on Turtle Island, it is no secret that the country we call the United States of America was built upon the brutal subjugation of Indigenous people and Indigenous lands. Fueled by the American settler myths of *terra nullius* (no man’s land) and Manifest Destiny, the American settler state proceeded upon a project of cultural and physical genocide, with lasting effects that endure to the present day. The ‘settler myth’ permeates American culture. Words such as ‘pioneer’, the ‘West’, ‘Manifest Destiny’ grab the imagination as connected to the growth of the country in its early history. America sprang forth from a vast open ‘wilderness’. Of course, for Indigenous people, we know differently—these lands had complex cultural frameworks and political entities long before colonization. Words like ‘pioneer’ and ‘Manifest Destiny’, have deep meanings for us too, as they are indicative of the very real damage dealt against our cultures and nations, damage that we have had to work very hard to undo. Trump’s address raises key insights into the continuing logics of settler colonialism, as well as questions of its future trajectories. Trump’s invocation of ideas such as the ‘frontier’ and ‘taming the wilderness’ draws attention to the brutal violence that accompanied the building of the American state. Scholars such as Greg Grandin (2019) make the case that the frontier is part of what America is—whether it is the ‘Wild West’, or the U.S.-Mexican border, America is always contending with a frontier that must be defined. Language surrounding ‘frontier’ is troubling because it perpetuates the rationale of why the American settler state even exists—it could make better use of the land than Native people would, after all, they lived in wilderness. This myth tells us that what we know as the modern world was built through the hard work of European settlers; Indigenous people had nothing to offer or contribute. For someone like Mr. Trump, whose misgivings and hostility towards Native people have been historically documented, this myth fits well with his narrative as President—he is building a ‘new’ America, one that will return to its place of power and influence. The fact that similar language is being used around the potential of American power being extended to space could reasonably be expected, given the economic and military potential that comes from such a move. Space represents yet another ‘unknown’ to be conquered and bent to America’s will. However, such interplanetary conquest does not exist solely in outer space. I wish to situate the very real colonial legacies and violence associated with the desire to explore space, tracing the ways that they are perpetuated and reified through their destructive engagements with Indigenous peoples. I argue that a scientific venture such as space exploration does not exist in a vacuum, but instead draws from settler colonialism and feeds back into it through the prioritization of ‘science’ over Indigenous epistemologies. I begin by exploring the ways that space exploration by the American settler state is situated within questions of hegemony, imperialism, and terra nullius, including a brief synopsis of the controversy surrounding the planned construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea. I conclude by exploring Indigenous engagement with ‘space’ in both its Earthbound and beyond-earth forms as it relates to outer space, and what implications this might have for the ways we think about our engagement with space as the American settler state begins to turn its gaze skyward once again. I position this essay alongside a growing body of academic work, as well as journalistic endeavors (Haskins, 2020; Koren, 2020) that demands that the American settler colonial state exercise self-reflexivity as to why it engages with outer space, and who is advantaged and disadvantaged here on Earth as a result of this engagement. Settler Colonialism and ‘Space’ A brief exploration of what settler colonialism is, and its engagement with ‘space’ here on Earth is necessary to start. Settler colonialism is commonly understood to be a form of colonialism that is based upon the permanent presence of colonists upon land. This is a distinction from forms of colonialism based upon resource extraction (Wolfe, 2006; Veracini, 2013). What this means is that the settler colony is intimately tied with the space within which it exists—it cannot exist or sustain itself without settler control over land and space. This permanent presence upon land by ‘settlers’ is usually at the expense of the Indigenous, or original people, in a given space or territory. To reiterate: control over space is paramount. As Wolfe states, “Land is life—or at least, land is necessary for life. Thus, contests for land can be—indeed, often are—contests for life” (2006: 387). Without land, the settler state ‘dies’; conversely, deprivation of land from the indigenous population means that in settler logic, indigeneity dies (Povinelli, 2002; Wolfe, 2006.) The ultimate aims of settler colonialism is therefore the occupation and remaking of space. As Wolfe (2006) describes, the settler state seeks to make use of land and resources in order to continue on; whether that is through homesteading/residence, farming and agriculture, mining, or any number of activities that settler colonial logic deems necessary to its own survival. These activities are tied to a racist and hubristic logic that only settler society itself possesses the ability to make proper use of land and space (Wolfe, 2006). This is mated with a viewpoint of landscapes prior to European arrival as *terra nullius*, or empty land that was owned by no one, via European/Western conceptions of land ownership and tenure (Wolfe, 1994). Because of this overarching goal of space, there is an inherent anxiety in settler colonies about space, and how it can be occupied and subsequently rewritten to remove Indigenous presence. In Anglo settler colonies, this often takes place within a lens of conservation. Scholars such as Banivanua Mar (2010), Lannoy (2012), Wright (2014) and Tristan Ahtone (2019) have written extensively on the ways that settler reinscription of space can be extremely damaging to Indigenous people from a lens of ‘conservation’. However, dispossession of Indigenous space in favor of settler uses can also be tied to some of the most destructive forces of our time. For example, Aboriginal land in the Australian Outback was viewed as ‘empty’ land that was turned into weapons ranges where the British military tested nuclear weapons in the 1950s, which directly led to negative health effects upon Aboriginal communities downwind from the testing sites (Vincent, 2010). Indigenous nations in the United States have struggled with environmental damage related to military-industrial exploitation as well. But, what does this all look like in regard to outer space? In order to really understand the potential (settler) colonial logics of space exploration, we must go back and explore the ways in which space exploration became inextricably tied with questions of state hegemony and geopolitics during the Cold War. US and Soviet space programs were born partially out of military utility, and propaganda value—the ability to send a nuclear warhead across a great distance to strike the enemy via a ICBM and the accompanying geopolitical respect that came with such a capability was something that greatly appealed to the superpowers, and when the Soviets took an early lead in the ‘Space Race’ with *Sputnik* and their *Luna* probes, the United States poured money and resources into making up ground (Werth, 2004). The fear of not only falling behind the Soviets militarily as well as a perceived loss of prestige in the court of world opinion spurred the US onto a course of space exploration that led to the *Apollo* moon landings in the late 1960s and the early 70s (Werth, 2004; Cornish, 2019). I argue that this fits neatly into the American settler creation myth referenced by Trump—after ‘conquering’ a continent and bringing it under American dominion, why would the United States stop solely at ‘space’ on Earth? To return to Grandin (2019), space represented yet another frontier to be conquered and known by the settler colonial state; if not explicitly for the possibility of further settlement, then for the preservation of its existing spatial extent on Earth. However, scholars such as Alan Marshall (1995) have cautioned that newer logics of space exploration such as potential resource extraction tie in with existing military logics in a way that creates a new way of thinking about the ‘openness’ of outer space to the logics of empire, in what Marshall calls *res nullius* (1995: 51)[i]. But we cannot forget the concept of *terra nullius* and how our exploration of the stars has real effects on Indigenous landscapes here on Earth. We also cannot forget about forms of space exploration that may not be explicitly tied to military means. Doing so deprives us of another lens through which to view the tensions between settler and Indigenous views of space and to which end is useful. Indeed, even reinscribing of Indigenous space towards ‘peaceful’ settler space exploration have very real consequences for Indigenous sovereignty and Indigenous spaces. Perhaps the most prominent example of the fractures between settler space exploration and Indigenous peoples is the on-going controversy surrounding the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea, on the island of Hawaii. While an extremely detailed description of the processes of construction on the TMT and the opposition presented to it by Native Hawai’ians and their allies is beyond the scope of this essay, and in fact is already expertly done by a number of scholars[ii], the controversy surrounding TMT is a prime example of the logics presented towards ‘space’ in both Earth-bound and beyond-Earth contexts by the settler colonial state as well as the violence that these logics place upon Indigenous spaces, such as Mauna Kea, which in particular already plays host to a number of telescopes and observatories (Witze, 2020). In particular, astronomers such as Chanda Prescod-Weinstein, Lucianne Walkowicz, and others have taken decisive action to push back against the idea that settler scientific advancement via space exploration should take precedence over Indigenous sovereignty in Earth-space. Prescod-Weinstein and Walkowicz, alongside Sarah Tuttle, Brian Nord and Hilding Neilson (2020) make clear that settler scientific pursuits such as building the TMT are simply new footnotes in a long history of colonial disrespect of Indigenous people and Indigenous spaces in the name of science, and that astronomy is not innocent of this disrespect. In fact, Native Hawai’ian scholars such as Iokepa Casumbal-Salazar strike at the heart of the professed neutrality of sciences like astronomy: One scientist told me that astronomy is a “benign science” because it is based on observation, and that it is universally beneficial because it offers “basic human knowledge” that everyone should know “like human anatomy.” Such a statement underscores the cultural bias within conventional notions of what constitutes the “human” and “knowledge.” In the absence of a critical self-reflection on this inherent ethnocentrism, the tacit claim to universal truth reproduces the cultural supremacy of Western science as self-evident. Here, the needs of astronomers for tall peaks in remote locations supplant the needs of Indigenous communities on whose ancestral territories these observatories are built (2017: 8). As Casumbal-Salazar and other scholars who have written about the TMT and the violence that has been done to Native Hawai’ians (such as police actions designed to dislodge blockades that prevented construction) as well as the potential violence to come such as the construction of the telescope have skillfully said, when it comes to the infringement upon Indigenous space by settler scientific endeavors tied to space exploration, there is no neutrality to be had—dispossession and violence are dispossession and violence, no matter the potential ‘good for humanity’ that might come about through these things. Such contestations over outer space and ethical engagement with previously unknown spaces will continue to happen. Outer space is not the first ‘final frontier’ (apologies to Gene Roddenberry) that has been discussed in settler logics and academic spaces. In terms of settler colonialism, scholars have written about how Antarctica was initially thought of as the ‘perfect’ settler colony—land that could be had without the messy business of pushing Indigenous people off of it (see Howkins 2010). Of course, we know now that engagement with Antarctica should be constrained by ecological concern—who is to say that these concerns will be heeded in ‘unpopulated’ space? What can be done to push back against these settler logics? Indigenous Engagement with ‘Space’ I want to now turn our attention towards the possibilities that exist regarding Indigenous engagement with outer space. After all, the timing could not be more urgent to do so—we are now at a point where after generations and generations of building the myth that America was built out of nothing, we are now ready to resume the project of extending the reach of American military and economic might in space. To be fair, there are plenty of advances that can be made scientifically with a renewed focus on space exploration. However, history shows us that space exploration has been historically tied to military hegemony, and there is nothing in Mr. Trump’s temperament or attitude towards a re-engagement with space that suggest that his push toward the stars will be anything different. A sustained conversation needs to be had—will this exploration be ethical and beneficial to all Americans? One potential avenue of Indigenous involvement comes through the active involvement of Indigenous peoples and Indigenous perspectives in space exploration, of course. This involvement can be possible through viewing outer space through a ‘decolonial’ lens, for instance. Astronomers such as Prescod-Weinstein and Walkowicz have spoken about the need to avoid replicating colonial frameworks of occupation and use of space when exploring places such as Mars, for example (Mandelbaum, 2018). The rise of logics of resource extraction in outer-space bodies have led to engagements by other academics such as Alice Gorman on the agency and personhood of the Moon. Collaborations between Indigenous people and space agencies such as NASA help provide the Indigenous perspective inside space exploration and the information that is gleaned from it, with implications both in space and on a Earth that is dealing with climate crisis (Bean, 2018; Bartels, 2019). Another potential avenue of engagement with Indigenous methodologies and epistemologies related to space comes with engaging with Indigenous thinkers who are already deeply immersed into explorations of Indigenous ‘space’ here on Earth—the recent works of Indigenous thinkers such as Waziyatawin (2008) Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (2017), Natchee Blu Barnd (2018) and others provide a unique viewpoint into the ways that Indigenous peoples make and remake space—perhaps this can provide another blueprint for how we might engage with space beyond Earth. And that is just the work that exists within the academic canon. Indigenous people have always been engaged with the worlds beyond the Earth, in ways that often stood counter to accepted ‘settler’ conventions of space exploration (Young, 1987). In one example, when asked about the Moon landings, several Inuit said, "We didn't know this was the first time you white people had been to the moon. Our shamans have been going for years. They go all the time...We do go to visit the moon and moon people all the time. The issue is not whether we go to visit our relatives, but how we treat them and their homeland when we go (Young, 1987: 272).” In another example, turning to my own people, the Ojibwe, we have long standing cultural connections to the stars that influence storytelling, governance, and religious tenets (CHIN, 2003). This engagement continues through to the present day, and points to a promising future. A new generation of Indigenous artists, filmmakers, and writers are beginning to create works that place the Indigenous individual themselves into narratives of space travel and futurity, unsettling existing settler notions of what our future in space might look like. As Leo Cornum (2015) writes, “Outer space, perhaps because of its appeal to our sense of endless possibility, has become the imaginative site for re-envisioning how black, indigenous and other oppressed people can relate to each other outside of and despite the colonial gaze.” These previous examples should serve as a reminder that the historical underpinnings of our great national myth are built upon shaky intellectual ground—we need to be honest about this. America did not just spring forth out of nothing; it came from the brutal occupation and control of Native lands. Despite the best efforts of the settler state, Native people are still here, we still exist and make vital contributions to both our tribal communities and science. We cannot expect Donald Trump to turn his back on the national myth of what made the United States the United States—in his mind, this is the glorious history of what made America great in the past. And it should serve as no surprise that Trump and others wish to extend this history into outer space. Even when Trump’s days in the White House are over, the settler colonial logics that underpin our engagement with land on Earth will still loom large over the ways that we may potentially engage with outer space. But for those of us who do work in Indigenous geographies and Indigenous studies, it becomes even more vital that we heed the calls of Indigenous thinkers inside and outside formal academic structures, validate Indigenous histories, and push to deconstruct the American settler myth and to provide a new way of looking at the stars, especially at a crucial moment where the settler state turns its gaze towards the same.

#### The impact is assimilation, genocide, and elimination of the Tribe.

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**The question of genocide is never far from discussions of settler colonialism. Land is life—or, at least, land is necessary for life. Thus contests for land can be—indeed, often are—contests for life.** **Yet this is not to say that settler colonialism is simply a form of genocide.** **In some settler-colonial sites (one thinks, for instance, of Fiji), native society was able to accommodate—though hardly unscathed—the invaders and the transformative socioeconomic system that they introduced.** Even in sites of wholesale expropriation such as Australia or North America, settler colonialism's genocidal outcomes have not manifested evenly across time or space. Native Title in Australia or Indian sovereignty in the US may have deleterious features, but these are hardly equivalent to the impact of frontier homicide. Moreover, there can be genocide in the absence of settler colonialism. The best known of all genocides was internal to Europe, while genocides that have been perpetrated in, for example, Armenia, Cambodia, Rwanda or (one fears) Darfur do not seem to be assignable to settler colonialism. In this article, I shall begin to explore, in comparative fashion, the relationship between genocide and the settler-colonial tendency that I term the logic of elimination.1 I contend that, though the two have converged—which is to say, the settler-colonial logic of elimination has manifested as genocidal—they should be distinguished. **Settler colonialism is inherently eliminatory but not invariably genocidal. As practised by Europeans, both genocide and settler colonialism have typically employed the organizing grammar of race.** **European xenophobic traditions such as anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, or Negrophobia are considerably older than race, which, as many have shown, became discursively consolidated fairly late in the eighteenth century.** 2 But the mere fact that race is a social construct does not of itself tell us very much. **As I have argued, different racial regimes encode and reproduce the unequal relationships into which Europeans coerced the populations concerned.** For instance, Indians and Black people in the US have been racialized in opposing ways that reflect their antithetical roles in the formation of US society. Black people's enslavement produced an inclusive taxonomy that automatically enslaved the offspring of a slave and any other parent. In the wake of slavery, this taxonomy became fully racialized in the “one-drop rule,” whereby any amount of African ancestry, no matter how remote, and regardless of phenotypical appearance, makes a person Black. For Indians, in stark contrast, non-Indian ancestry compromised their indigeneity, producing “half-breeds,” a regime that persists in the form of blood quantum regulations. **As opposed to enslaved people, whose reproduction augmented their owners' wealth, Indigenous people obstructed settlers' access to land, so their increase was counterproductive. In this way, the restrictive racial classification of Indians straightforwardly furthered the logic of elimination. Thus we cannot simply say that settler colonialism or genocide have been targeted at particular races, since a race cannot be taken as given. It is made in the targeting**. 3 **Black people were racialized as slaves; slavery constituted their blackness. Correspondingly, Indigenous North Americans were not killed, driven away, romanticized, assimilated, fenced in, bred White, and otherwise eliminated as the original owners of the land but as Indians.** Roger Smith has missed this point in seeking to distinguish between victims murdered for where they are and victims murdered for who they are.4 **So far as Indigenous people are concerned, where they are is who they are, and not only by their own reckoning. As Deborah Bird Rose has pointed out, to get in the way of settler colonization, all the native has to do is stay at home.** 5 **Whatever settlers may say—and they generally have a lot to say—the primary motive for elimination is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory. Territoriality is settler colonialism's specific, irreducible element. The logic of elimination not only refers to the summary liquidation of Indigenous people, though it includes that.** In common with genocide as Raphaël Lemkin characterized it,6 settler colonialism has both negative and positive dimensions. Negatively, it strives for the dissolution of native societies. Positively, it erects a new colonial society on the expropriated land base—as I put it, settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event.7 In its positive aspect, **elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society** rather than a one-off (and superseded) occurrence. The positive outcomes of the logic of elimination can include officially encouraged miscegenation, the breaking-down of native title into alienable individual freeholds, native citizenship, child abduction, religious conversion, resocialization in total institutions such as missions or boarding schools, and a whole range of cognate biocultural assimilations. All these strategies, including frontier homicide, are characteristic of settler colonialism. Some of them are more controversial in genocide studies than others. **Settler colonialism destroys to replace.** As Theodor Herzl, founding father of Zionism, observed in his allegorical manifesto/novel, “If I wish to substitute a new building for an old one, I must demolish before I construct.”8 In a kind of realization that took place half a century later, one-time deputy-mayor of West Jerusalem Meron Benvenisti recalled, “As a member of a pioneering youth movement, I myself ‘made the desert bloom’ by uprooting the ancient olive trees of al-Bassa to clear the ground for a banana grove, as required by the ‘planned farming’ principles of my kibbutz, Rosh Haniqra.”9 Renaming is central to the cadastral effacement/replacement of the Palestinian Arab presence that Benvenisti poignantly recounts.10 Comparably, though with reference to Australia, Tony Birch has charted the contradictory process whereby White residents sought to frustrate the (re-) renaming of Gariwerd back from the derivative “Grampians” that these hills had become in the wake of their original owners' forcible dispossession in the nineteenth century.11 Ideologically, however, there is a major difference between the Australian and Israeli cases. The prospect of Israeli authorities changing the Hebrew place-names whose invention Benvenisti has described back to their Arabic counterparts is almost unimaginable. In Australia, by contrast (as in many other settler societies), the erasure of indigeneity conflicts with the assertion of settler nationalism. On the one hand, settler society required the practical elimination of the natives in order to establish itself on their territory. On the symbolic level, however, settler society subsequently sought to recuperate indigeneity in order to express its difference—and, accordingly, its independence—from the mother country. Hence it is not surprising that a progressive Australian state government should wish to attach an indigenous aura to a geographical feature that bore the second-hand name of a British mountain range. Australian public buildings and official symbolism, along with the national airlines, film industry, sports teams and the like, are distinguished by the ostentatious borrowing of Aboriginal motifs. For nationalist purposes, it is hard to see an alternative to this contradictory reappropriation of a foundationally disavowed Aboriginality. The ideological justification for the dispossession of Aborigines was that “we” could use the land better than they could, not that we had been on the land primordially and were merely returning home. One cannot imagine the Al-Quds/Jerusalem suburb of Kfar Sha'ul being renamed Deir Yasin. Despite this major ideological difference, however, Zionism still betrays a need to distance itself from its European origins that recalls the settler anxieties that characterize Australian national discourse. Yiddish, for instance, was decisively rejected in favour of Hebrew—a Hebrew inflected, what is more, with the accents of the otherwise derided Yemeni mizrachim. Analogously, as Mark LeVine has noted, though the Zionist modernization of the Arab city of Jaffa was intended to have a certain site specificity, “in fact Jaffa has had to be emptied of its Arab past and Arab inhabitants in order for architects to be able to reenvision the region as a ‘typical Middle Eastern city’.”12 In its positive aspect, therefore, settler colonialism does not simply replace native society tout court. Rather, the process of replacement maintains the refractory imprint of the native counter-claim. This phenomenon is not confined to the realm of symbolism. In the Zionist case, for instance, as Gershon Shafir has cogently shown, the core doctrine of the conquest of labour, which produced the kibbutzim and Histadrut, central institutions of the Israeli state, emerged out of the local confrontation with Arab Palestinians in a form fundamentally different from the pristine doctrine of productivization that had originally been coined in Europe. The concept of productivization was developed in response to the self-loathing that discriminatory exclusions from productive industry encouraged in Eastern European Jewry (in this sense, as Shafir acutely observes, Zionism mirrored the persecutors' anti-Semitism13). In its European enunciation, productivization was not designed to disempower anyone else. It was rather designed, autarkically as it were, to inculcate productive self-sufficiency in a Jewish population that had been relegated to urban (principally financial) occupations that were stigmatized as parasitic by the surrounding gentile population—a prejudice that those who sought to build the “new Jew” endorsed insofar as they resisted its internalization. On its importation into Palestine, however, the doctrine evolved into a tool of ethnic conflict, as Jewish industries were actively discouraged from employing non-Jewish labour, even though Arabs worked for lower wages and, in many cases, more efficiently:“Hebrew labor,” or “conquest of labor” … was born of Palestinian circumstances, and advocated a struggle against Palestinian Arab workers. This fundamental difference demonstrates the confusion created by referring “Hebrew labor” back to the productivization movement and anachronistically describing it as evolving in a direct line from Eastern European origins.14 As it developed on the colonial ground, the conquest of labour subordinated economic efficiency to the demands of building a self-sufficient proto-national Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine) at the expense of the surrounding Arab population. This situated struggle produced the new Jew as subject of the labour that it conquered. In the words of Zionist architect Julius Posner, reprising a folk song, “We have come to the homeland to build and be rebuilt in it … the creation of the new Jew … [is also] the creator of that Jew.”15 As such, the conquest of labour was central both to the institutional imagining of a goyim-rein (gentile-free) zone and to the continued stigmatization of Jews who remained unredeemed in the galut (diaspora). The positive force that animated the Jewish nation and its individual new-Jewish subjects issued from the negative process of excluding Palestine's Indigenous owners. In short, elimination refers to more than the summary liquidation of Indigenous people, though it includes that. In its positive aspect, the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler-colonial society. It is both as complex social formation and as continuity through time that I term settler colonization a structure rather than an event, and it is on this basis that I shall consider its relationship to genocide. To start at the top, with the European sovereigns who laid claim to the territories of non-Christian (or, in later secularized versions, uncivilized) inhabitants of the rest of the world: justifications for this claim were derived from a disputatious arena of scholarly controversy that had been prompted by European conquests in the Americas and is misleadingly referred to, in the singular, as the doctrine of discovery.16 Though a thoroughgoing diminution of native entitlement was axiomatic to discovery, the discourse was primarily addressed to relations between European sovereigns rather than to relations between Europeans and natives.17 Competing theoretical formulas were designed to restrain the endless rounds of war-making over claims to colonial territory that European sovereigns were prone to indulge in. The rights accorded to natives tended to reflect the balance between European powers in any given theatre of colonial settlement. In Australia, for instance, where British dominion was effectively unchallenged by other European powers, Aborigines were accorded no rights to their territory, informal variants on the theme of terra nullius being taken for granted in settler culture. In North America, by contrast, treaties between Indian and European nations were premised on a sovereignty that reflected Indians' capacity to permute local alliance networks from among the rival Spanish, British, French, Dutch, Swedish and Russian presences.18 Even where native sovereignty was recognized, however, ultimate dominion over the territory in question was held to inhere in the European sovereign in whose name it had been “discovered.” Through all the diversity among the theorists of discovery, a constant theme is the clear distinction between dominion, which inhered in European sovereigns alone, and natives' right of occupancy, also expressed in terms of possession or usufruct, which entitled natives to pragmatic use (understood as hunting and gathering rather than agriculture)19 of a territory that Europeans had discovered. The distinction between dominion and occupancy illuminates the settler-colonial project's reliance on the elimination of native societies. Through being the first European to visit and properly claim a given territory, a discoverer acquired the right, on behalf of his sovereign and vis-à-vis other Europeans who came after him, to buy land from the natives. This right, known as preemption, gave the discovering power (or, in the US case, its successors) a monopoly over land transactions with the natives, who were prevented from disposing of their land to any other European power. On the face of it, this would seem to pose little threat to people who did not wish to dispose of their land to anyone. Indeed, this semblance of native voluntarism has provided scope for some limited judicial magnanimity in regard to Indian sovereignty.20 In practice, however, the corollary did not apply. Preemption sanctioned European priority but not Indigenous freedom of choice. As Harvey Rosenthal observed of the concept's extension into the US constitutional environment, “The American right to buy always superseded the Indian right not to sell.”21 The mechanisms of this priority are crucial. Why should ostensibly sovereign nations, residing in territory solemnly guaranteed to them by treaties, decide that they are willing, after all, to surrender their ancestral homelands? More often than not (and nearly always up to the wars with the Plains Indians, which did not take place until after the civil war), the agency which reduced Indian peoples to this abjection was not some state instrumentality but irregular, greed-crazed invaders who had no intention of allowing the formalities of federal law to impede their access to the riches available in, under, and on Indian soil.22 If the government notionally held itself aloof from such disreputable proceedings, however, it was never far away. Consider, for instance, the complicity between bayonet-wielding troops and the “lawless rabble” in this account of events immediately preceding the eastern Cherokee's catastrophic “Trail of Tears,” one of many comparable 1830s removals whereby Indians from the South East were displaced west of the Mississippi to make way for the development of the slave-plantation economy in the Deep South: Families at dinner were startled by the sudden gleam of bayonets in the doorway and rose up to be driven with blows and oaths along the weary miles of trail that led to the stockade [where they were held prior to the removal itself.] Men were seized in their fields or going along the road, women were taken from their wheels and children from their play. In many cases, on turning for one last look as they crossed the ridge, they saw their homes in flames, fired by the lawless rabble that followed on the heels of the soldiers to loot and pillage. So keen were these outlaws on the scent that in some instances they were driving off the cattle and other stock of the Indians almost before the soldiers had fairly started their owners in the other direction. Systematic hunts were made by the same men for Indian graves, to rob them of the silver pendants and other valuables deposited with the dead. A Georgia volunteer, afterward a colonel in the Confederate service, said: “I fought through the civil war and have seen men shot to pieces and slaughtered by thousands, but the Cherokee removal was the cruelest work I ever knew.”23 On the basis of this passage alone, the structural complexity of settler colonialism could sustain libraries of elaboration. A global dimension to the frenzy for native land is reflected in the fact that, as economic immigrants, the rabble were generally drawn from the ranks of Europe's landless. The cattle and other stock were not only being driven off Cherokee land; they were being driven into private ownership. Once evacuated, the Red man's land would be mixed with Black labour to produce cotton, the white gold of the Deep South. To this end, the international slave trade and the highest echelons of the formal state apparatus converged across three continents with the disorderly pillaging of a nomadic horde who may or may not have been “lawless” but who were categorically White. Moreover, in their indiscriminate lust for any value that could be extracted from the Cherokee's homeland, these racialized grave-robbers are unlikely to have stopped at the pendants. The burgeoning science of craniology, which provided a distinctively post-eighteenth-century validation for their claim to a racial superiority that entitled them to other people's lands, made Cherokee skulls too marketable a commodity to be overlooked.24 In its endless multidimensionality, there was nothing singular about this one sorry removal, which all of modernity attended. Rather than something separate from or running counter to the colonial state, the murderous activities of the frontier rabble constitute its principal means of expansion. These have occurred “behind the screen of the frontier, in the wake of which, once the dust has settled, the irregular acts that took place have been regularized and the boundaries of White settlement extended. Characteristically, officials express regret at the lawlessness of this process while resigning themselves to its inevitability.”25 In this light, we are in a position to understand the pragmatics of the doctrine of discovery more clearly. Understood as an assertion of Indigenous entitlement, the distinction between dominion and occupancy dissolves into incoherence. Understood processually, however, as a stage in the formation of the settler-colonial state (specifically, the stage linking the theory and the realization of territorial acquisition), the distinction is only too consistent. As observed, preemption provided that natives could transfer their right of occupancy to the discovering sovereign and to no one else. They could not transfer dominion because it was not theirs to transfer; that inhered in the European sovereign and had done so from the moment of discovery. Dominion without conquest constitutes the theoretical (or “inchoate”) stage of territorial sovereignty.26 In US Chief Justice John Marshall's words, it remained to be “consummated by possession.”27 This delicately phrased “consummation” is precisely what the rabble were achieving at Cherokee New Echota in 1838. In other words, the right of occupancy was not an assertion of native rights. Rather, it was a pragmatic acknowledgment of the lethal interlude that would intervene between the conceit of discovery, when navigators proclaimed European dominion over whole continents to trees or deserted beaches, and the practical realization of that conceit in the final securing of European settlement, formally consummated in the extinguishment of native title. Thus it is not surprising that Native Title had hardly been asserted in Australian law than Mr Justice Olney was echoing Marshall's formula, Olney's twenty-first-century version of consummation being the “tide of history” that provided the pretext for his notorious judgment in the Yorta Yorta case.28 As observed, the logic of elimination continues into the present. The tide of history canonizes the fait accompli, harnessing the diplomatic niceties of the law of nations to the maverick rapine of the squatters' posse within a cohesive project that implicates individual and nation-state, official and unofficial alike. Over the Green Line today, Ammana, the settler advance-guard of the fundamentalist Gush Emunim movement, hastens apace with the construction of its facts on the ground. In this regard, the settlers are maintaining a tried and tested Zionist strategy—Israel's 1949 campaign to seize the Negev before the impending armistice was codenamed Uvda, Hebrew for “fact.”29 As Bernard Avishai lamented of the country he had volunteered to defend, “settlements were made in the territories beyond the Green Line so effortlessly after 1967 because the Zionist institutions that built them and the laws that drove them … had all been going full throttle within the Green Line before 1967. To focus merely on West Bank settlers was always to beg the question.”30 In sum, then, settler colonialism is an inclusive, land-centred project that coordinates a comprehensive range of agencies, from the metropolitan centre to the frontier encampment, with a view to eliminating Indigenous societies. Its operations are not dependent on the presence or absence of formal state institutions or functionaries. Accordingly—to begin to move toward the issue of genocide—the occasions on or the extent to which settler colonialism conduces to genocide are not a matter of the presence or absence of the formal apparatus of the state. While it is clearly the case, as Isabel Hull argues, that the pace, scale and intensity of certain forms of modern genocide require the centralized technological, logistical and administrative capacities of the modern state,31 this does not mean that settler-colonial discourse should be regarded as pre- (or less than) modern. Rather, as a range of thinkers—including, in this connection, W. E. B. Dubois, Hannah Arendt and Aimé Césaire—have argued, some of the core features of modernity were pioneered in the colonies.32 It is a commonplace that the Holocaust gathered together the instrumental, technological and bureaucratic constituents of Western modernity. Accordingly, despite the historiographical energy that has already been devoted to the Holocaust, the genealogical field available to its historian remains apparently inexhaustible. Thus we have recently been informed that its historical ingredients included the guillotine and, for the industry-scale processing of human bodies, the techniques of Chicago cattle-yards.33 Yet the image of the dispassionate genocidal technocrat that the Holocaust spawned is by no means the whole story. Rather, as Dieter Pohl, Jürgen Zimmerer and others have pointed out, a substantial number of the Nazis' victims, including Jewish and Gypsy (Sinti and Rom) ones, were not murdered in camps but in deranged shooting sprees that were more reminiscent of sixteenth-century Spanish behaviour in the Americas than of Fordism, while millions of Slav civilians and Soviet soldiers were simply starved to death in circumstances that could well have struck a chord with late-eighteenth-century Bengalis or mid-nineteenth-century Irish people.34 This is not to suggest a partition of the Holocaust into, say, modern and atavistic elements. It is to stress the modernity of colonialism. Settler colonialism was foundational to modernity. Frontier individuals' endless appeals for state protection not only presupposed a commonality between the private and official realms. In most cases (Queensland was a partial exception), it also presupposed a global chain of command linking remote colonial frontiers to the metropolis.35 Behind it all lay the driving engine of international market forces, which linked Australian wool to Yorkshire mills and, complementarily, to cotton produced under different colonial conditions in India, Egypt, and the slave states of the Deep South. As Cole Harris observed in relation to the dispossession of Indians in British Columbia, “Combine capital's interest in uncluttered access to land and settlers' interest in land as livelihood, and the principal momentum of settler colonialism comes into focus.”36 The Industrial Revolution, misleadingly figuring in popular consciousness as an autochthonous metropolitan phenomenon, required colonial land and labour to produce its raw materials just as centrally as it required metropolitan factories and an industrial proletariat to process them, whereupon the colonies were again required as a market. The expropriated Aboriginal, enslaved African American, or indentured Asian is as thoroughly modern as the factory worker, bureaucrat, or flâneur of the metropolitan centre. The fact that the slave may be in chains does not make him or her medieval. By the same token, the fact that the genocidal Hutus of Rwanda often employed agricultural implements to murder their Tutsi neighbours en masse does not license the racist assumption that, because neither Europeans nor the latest technology were involved, this was a primordial (read “savage”) blood-letting. Rwanda and Burundi are colonial creations—not only so far as the obvious factor of their geographical borders is concerned, but, more intimately, in the very racial boundaries that marked and reproduced the Hutu/Tutsi division. As Robert Melson has observed in his sharp secondary synopsis of it, “The Rwandan genocide was the product of a postcolonial state, a racialist ideology, a revolution claiming democratic legitimation, and war—all manifestations of the modern world.”37 The mutual Hutu/Tutsi racialization on which this “post”colonial ideology was based was itself an artifice of colonialism. In classic Foucauldian style, the German and, above all, Belgian overlords who succeeded each other in modern Rwanda had imposed a racial grid on the complex native social order, co-opting the pastoral Tutsi aristocracy as a comprador elite who facilitated their exploitation of the agriculturalist Hutu and lower-order Tutsis. This racial difference was elaborated “by Belgian administrators and anthropologists who argued—in what came to be known as the ‘Hamitic Hypothesis’—that the Tutsi were conquerors who had originated in Ethiopia (closer to Europe!) and that the Hutu were a conquered inferior tribe of local provenance.”38 Shades of the Franks and the Gauls. In their inculcation with racial discourse, Rwandans were integrally modern. Even the notorious hoes with which some Hutus murdered their Tutsi compatriots symbolized the agriculture that not only encapsulated their difference from their victims. As such, these hoes were also the instruments of the Hutus' involvement in the global market. Of itself, however, modernity cannot explain the insatiable dynamic whereby settler colonialism always needs more land. The answer that springs most readily to mind is agriculture, though it is not necessarily the only one. The whole range of primary sectors can motivate the project. In addition to agriculture, therefore, we should think in terms of forestry, fishing, pastoralism and mining (the last straw for the Cherokee was the discovery of gold on their land). With the exception of agriculture, however (and, for some peoples, pastoralism), none of these is sufficient in itself. You cannot eat lumber or gold; fishing for the world market requires canneries. Moreover, sooner or later, miners move on, while forests and fish become exhausted or need to be farmed. Agriculture not only supports the other sectors. It is inherently sedentary and, therefore, permanent. In contrast to extractive industries, which rely on what just happens to be there, agriculture is a rational means/end calculus that is geared to vouchsafing its own reproduction, generating capital that projects into a future where it repeats itself (hence the farmer's dread of being reduced to eating seed stock). Moreover, as John Locke never tired of pointing out, agriculture supports a larger population than non-sedentary modes of production.39 In settler-colonial terms, this enables a population to be expanded by continuing immigration at the expense of native lands and livelihoods. The inequities, contradictions and pogroms of metropolitan society ensure a recurrent supply of fresh immigrants—especially, as noted, from among the landless. In this way, individual motivations dovetail with the global market's imperative for expansion. Through its ceaseless expansion, agriculture (including, for this purpose, commercial pastoralism) progressively eats into Indigenous territory, a primitive accumulation that turns native flora and fauna into a dwindling resource and curtails the reproduction of Indigenous modes of production. In the event, Indigenous people are either rendered dependent on the introduced economy or reduced to the stock-raids that provide the classic pretext for colonial death-squads. None of this means that Indigenous people are by definition non-agricultural. Whether or not they actually do practise agriculture, however (as in the case of the Indians who taught Whites to grow corn and tobacco), natives are typically represented as unsettled, nomadic, rootless, etc., in settler-colonial discourse. In addition to its objective economic centrality to the project, agriculture, with its life-sustaining connectedness to land, is a potent symbol of settler-colonial identity. Accordingly, settler-colonial discourse is resolutely impervious to glaring inconsistencies such as sedentary natives or the fact that the settlers themselves have come from somewhere else. Thus it is significant that the feminized, finance-oriented (or, for that matter, wandering) Jew of European anti-Semitism should assert an aggressively masculine agricultural self-identification in Palestine.40 The new Jew's formative Other was the nomadic Bedouin rather than the fellaheen farmer. The reproach of nomadism renders the native removable. Moreover, if the natives are not already nomadic, then the reproach can be turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy through the burning of corn or the uprooting of fruit trees. But if the natives are already agriculturalists, then why not simply incorporate their productivity into the colonial economy? At this point, we begin to get closer to the question of just who it is (or, more to the point, who they are) that settler colonialism strives to eliminate—and, accordingly, closer to an understanding of the relationship between settler colonialism and genocide. To stay with the Cherokee removal: when it came to it, the factor that most antagonized the Georgia state government (with the at-least-tacit support of Andrew Jackson's federal administration) was not actually the recalcitrant savagery of which Indians were routinely accused, but the Cherokee's unmistakable aptitude for civilization. Indeed, they and their Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw and Seminole neighbours, who were also targeted for removal, figured revealingly as the “Five Civilized Tribes” in Euroamerican parlance. In the Cherokee's case, two dimensions of their civility were particularly salient. They had become successful agriculturalists on the White model, with a number of them owning substantial holdings of Black slaves, and they had introduced a written national constitution that bore more than a passing resemblance to the US one.41 Why should genteel Georgians wish to rid themselves of such cultivated neighbours? The reason why the Cherokee's constitution and their agricultural prowess stood out as such singular provocations to the officials and legislators of the state of Georgia—and this is attested over and over again in their public statements and correspondence—is that the Cherokee's farms, plantations, slaves and written constitution all signified permanence.42 The first thing the rabble did, let us remember, was burn their houses. Brutal and murderous though the removals of the Five Civilized Tribes generally were, they did not affect each member equally. This was not simply a matter of wealth or status. Principal Cherokee chief John Ross, for example, lost not only his plantation after setting off on the Trail of Tears. On that trail, one deathly cold Little Rock, Arkansas day in February 1839, he also lost his wife, Qatie, who died after giving her blanket to a freezing child.43 Ross's fortunes differed sharply from those of the principal Choctaw chief Greenwood LeFlore, who, unlike Ross, signed a removal treaty on behalf of his people, only to stay behind himself, accept US citizenship, and go on to a distinguished career in Mississippi politics.44 But it was not just his chiefly rank that enabled LeFlore to stay behind. Indeed, he was by no means the only one to do so. As Ronald Satz has commented, Andrew Jackson was taken by surprise when “thousands of Choctaws decided to take advantage of the allotment provisions [in the treaty LeFlore had signed] and become homesteaders and American citizens in Mississippi.”45 In addition to being principal chiefs, Ross and LeFlore both had White fathers and light skin. Both were wealthy, educated and well connected in Euroamerican society. Many of the thousands of compatriots who stayed behind with LeFlore lacked any of these qualifications. There was nothing special about the Choctaw to make them particularly congenial to White society—most of them got removed like Ross and the Cherokee. The reason that the remaining Choctaw were acceptable had nothing to do with their being Choctaw. On the contrary, it had to do with their not (or, at least, no longer) being Choctaw. They had become “homesteaders and American citizens.” In a word, they had become individuals. What distinguished Ross and the removing Choctaw from those who stayed behind was collectivity.46 Tribal land was tribally owned—tribes and private property did not mix. Indians were the original communist menace. As homesteaders, by contrast, the Choctaw who stayed became individual proprietors, each to his own, of separately allotted fragments of what had previously been the tribal estate, theirs to sell to White people if they chose to. Without the tribe, though, for all practical purposes they were no longer Indians (this is the citizenship part). Here, in essence, is assimilation's Faustian bargain—have our settler world, but lose your Indigenous soul. Beyond any doubt, this is a kind of death. Assimilationists recognized this very clearly. On the face of it, one might not expect there to be much in common between Captain Richard Pratt, founder of the Carlisle boarding school for Indian youth and leading light of the philanthropic “Friends of the Indian” group, and General Phil Sheridan, scourge of the Plains and author of the deathless maxim, “The only good Indian is a dead Indian.” Given the training in individualism that Pratt provided at his school, however, the tribe could disappear while its members stayed behind, a metaphysical variant on the Choctaw scenario. This would offer a solution to reformers' disquiet over the national discredit attaching to the Vanishing Indian. In a paper for the 1892 Charities and Correction Conference held in Denver, Pratt explicitly endorsed Sheridan's maxim, “but only in this: that all the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill the Indian in him and save the man.”4 But just what kind of death is it that is involved in assimilation? The term “homicide,” for instance, combines the senses of killing and of humanity. So far as I know, when it comes to killing a human individual, there is no alternative to terminating their somatic career. Yet, when Orestes was arraigned before the Furies for the murder of his mother Clytemnestra, whom he had killed to avenge her murder of his father Agamemnon, he was acquitted on the ground that, in a patrilineal society, he belonged to his father rather than to his mother, so the charge of matricide could not stand. Now, without taking this legend too seriously, it nonetheless illustrates (as legends are presumably meant to) an important point. Orestes' beating the charge did not mean that he had not actually killed Clytemnestra. It meant that he had been brought before the wrong court (the Furies dealt with intra-family matters that could not be resolved by the mechanism of feud). Thus Orestes may not have been guilty of matricide, but that did not mean he was innocent. It meant that he might be guilty of some other form of illegal killing—one that could be dealt with by the blood-feud or other appropriate sanction (where his plea of obligatory revenge may or may not have succeeded). As in those languages where a verb is inflected by its object, the nature of a justiciable killing depends on its victim. There are seemingly absolute differences between, say, suicide, insecticide, and infanticide. The etymology of “genocide” combines the senses of killing and of grouphood. “Group” is more than a purely numerical designation. Genos refers to a denominate group with a membership that persists through time (Raphaël Lemkin translated it as “tribe”). It is not simply a random collectivity (such as, say, the passengers on a bus). Accordingly, with respect to Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan (concerning both the subtitle of their excellent collection and their reference, in this context, to 9/11), the strike on the World Trade Center is an example of mass murder but not, in my view, of genocide. Certainly, the bulk of the victims were US citizens. On the scale of the whole, however, not only was it an infinitesimal part of the group “Americans” (which, strictly, is not a consideration), but it was a one-off event.48 This does not mean that the perpetrators of 9/11 are not guilty. It means that a genocide tribunal is the wrong court to bring them before. Mass murders are not the same thing as genocide, though the one action can be both. Thus genocide has been achieved by means of summary mass murder (to cite examples already used) in the frontier massacring of Indigenous peoples, in the Holocaust, and in Rwanda. But there can be summary mass murder without genocide, as in the case of 9/11, and there can be genocide without summary mass murder, as in the case of the continuing post-frontier destruction, in whole and in part, of Indigenous genoi. Lemkin knew what he was doing when he used the word “tribe.”49 Richard Pratt and Phillip Sheridan were both practitioners of genocide. The question of degree is not the definitional issue. Vital though it is, definitional discussion can seem insensitively abstract. In the preceding paragraph, part of what I have had in mind has, obviously, been the term (which Lemkin favoured) “cultural genocide.” My reason for not favouring the term is that it confuses definition with degree. Moreover, though this objection holds in its own right (or so I think), the practical hazards that can ensue once an abstract concept like “cultural genocide” falls into the wrong hands are legion. In particular, in an elementary category error, “either/or” can be substituted for “both/and,” from which genocide emerges as either biological (read “the real thing”) or cultural—and thus, it follows, not real. **In practice, it should go without saying that the imposition on a people of the procedures and techniques that are generally glossed as “cultural genocide” is certainly going to have a direct impact on that people's capacity to stay alive (even apart from their qualitative immiseration while they do so). At the height of the Dawes-era assimilation programme, for instance, in the decade after Richard Pratt penned his Denver paper, Indian numbers hit the lowest level they would ever register.50 Even in contemporary, post-Native Title Australia, Aboriginal life expectancy clings to a level some 25% below that enjoyed by mainstream society, with infant mortality rates that are even worse**.51 What species of sophistry does it take to separate a quarter “part” of the life of a group from the history of their elimination? Clearly, we are not talking about an isolated event here. Thus we can shift from settler colonialism's structural complexity to its positivity as a structuring principle of settler-colonial society across time. The Cherokee Trail of Tears, which took place over the winter of 1838–1839, presupposed the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, when Thomas Jefferson had bought approximately one-third of the present-day continental United States at a knockdown price from Napoleon.52 The greatest real estate deal in history provided the territory west of the Mississippi that successive US governments would exchange for the homelands of the eastern tribes whom they were bent on removing. For various reasons, these removals, which turned eastern tribes into proxy invaders of Indian territory across the Mississippi, were a crude and unsatisfactory form of elimination. In particular, they were temporary, it being only a matter of time before the frontier rabble caught up with them.53 When that happened, as Annie Abel resignedly observed in concluding her classic account of the removals, “Titles given in the West proved less substantial than those in the East, for they had no foundation in antiquity.”54 Repeat removals, excisions from reservations, grants of the same land to different tribes, all conducted against a background of endless pressure for new or revised treaties, were the symptoms of removal's temporariness, which kept time with the westward march of the nation. In the end, though, the western frontier met the one moving back in from the Pacific, and there was simply no space left for removal. The frontier had become coterminal with reservation boundaries. At this point, when the crude technique of removal declined in favour of a range of strategies for assimilating Indian people now that they had been contained within Euroamerican society, we can more clearly see the logic of elimination's positivity as a continuing feature of Euroamerican settler society. With the demise of the frontier, elimination turned inwards, seeking to penetrate through the tribal surface to the individual Indian below, who was to be co-opted out of the tribe, which would be depleted accordingly, and into White society. The Greenwood LeFlore situation was to be generalized to all Indians. The first major expression of this shift was the discontinuation of treaty-making, which came about in 1871.55 **Over the following three decades, an avalanche of assimilationist legislation, accompanied by draconian Supreme Court judgments which notionally dismantled tribal sovereignty and provided for the abrogation of existing treaties,56 relentlessly sought the breakdown of the tribe and the absorption into White society of individual Indians and their tribal land, only separately. John Wunder has termed this policy framework “the New Colonialism,” a discursive formation based on reservations and boarding schools that “attacked every aspect of Native American life—religion, speech, political freedoms, economic liberty, and cultural diversity.”57 The centrepiece of this campaign was the allotment programme, first generalized as Indian policy in the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887 and subsequently intensified and extended, whereby tribal land was to be broken down into individual allotments whose proprietors could eventually sell them to White people.58 Ostensibly, this programme provided for a cultural transformation whereby the magic of private property ownership would propel Indians from the collective inertia of tribal membership into the progressive individualism of the American dream.** In practice, not only did Indian numbers rapidly hit the lowest level they would ever record, but this cultural procedure turned out to yield a faster method of land transference than the US Cavalry had previously provided. In the half-century from 1881, the total acreage held by Indians in the United States fell by two thirds, from just over 155 million acres to just over 52 million.59 **Needless to say, the coincidence between the demographic statistics and the land-ownership ones was no coincidence. Throughout this process, reformers' justifications for it (saving the Indian from the tribe, giving him the same opportunities as the White man, etc.) repeatedly included the express intention to destroy the tribe in whole.60 With their land base thus attenuated, US citizenship was extended to all Indians in 1924. In 1934, under the New Deal Indian Reform Act, allotment was abandoned in favour of a policy of admitting the tribe itself into the US polity, only on condition that its constitution be rewritten into structural harmony with its US civic environment. A distinctive feature of the model constitutions that the Secretary of the Interior approved for tribes that registered under the 1934 Act was blood quantum requirements, originally introduced by Dawes Act commissioners to determine which tribal members would be eligible for what kind of allotments.61 Under the blood quantum regime, one's Indianness progressively declines in accordance with a “biological” calculus that is a construct of Euroamerican culture.62 Juaneño/Jaqi scholar Annette Jaimes has termed this procedure “statistical extermination.”**63 In sum, the containment of Indian groups within Euroamerican society that culminated in the end of the frontier produced a range of ongoing complementary strategies whose common intention was the destruction of heterodox forms of Indian grouphood. In the post-World War II climate of civil rights, these strategies were reinforced by the policies of termination and relocation, held out as liberating individual Indians from the thralldom of the tribe, whose compound effects rivalled the disasters of allotment.64 A major difference between this and the generality of non-colonial genocides is its sustained duration. For comparative purposes, it is significant that the full radicalization of assimilation policies in both the US and Australia coincided with the closure of the frontier, which forestalled spatial stop-gaps such as removal. In infra-continental societies like those of mainland Europe, the frontier designates a national boundary as opposed to a mobile index of expansion. Israel's borders partake of both qualities. Despite Zionism's chronic addiction to territorial expansion, Israel's borders do not preclude the option of removal (in this connection, it is hardly surprising that a nation that has driven so many of its original inhabitants into the sand should express an abiding fear of itself being driven into the sea). As the logic of elimination has taken on a variety of forms in other settler-colonial situations, so, in Israel, the continuing tendency to Palestinian expulsion has not been limited to the unelaborated exercise of force. As Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal have observed, for instance, Israeli officials have only permitted family unions “in one direction—out of Israel.”65 The Law of Return commits the Jewish state to numerically unlimited but ethnically exclusive immigration, a factor that, formalities of citizenship notwithstanding, militates against the assimilation of gentile natives. Thus assimilation should not be seen as an invariable concomitant of settler colonialism. Rather, assimilation is one of a range of strategies of elimination that become favoured in particular historical circumstances. Moreover, assimilation itself can take on a variety of forms. In the Australian context, for instance, various scholars have recognized that “the genetic and cultural codes recapitulated each other.”66 Though “softer” than the recourse to simple violence, however, these strategies are not necessarily less eliminatory. To take an example from genocide's definitional core, Article II (d) of the UN Convention on Genocide, which seems to have been relatively overlooked in Australian discussions, includes among the acts that constitute genocide (assuming they are committed with intent to destroy a target group in whole or in part) the imposition of “measures intended to prevent births within the group.” Given that the Australian practice of abducting Aboriginal children, assuming its “success,” would bring about a situation in which second-generation offspring were born into a group that was different from the one from which the child/parent had originally been abducted, there is abundant evidence of genocide being practised in post-war Australia on the basis of Article II (d) alone. It is impossible to draw simple either/or lines between culture and biology in cases such as these. Though a child was physically abducted, the eventual outcome is as much a matter of a social classification as it is of a body count. Nonetheless, the intentional contribution to the demographic destruction of the “relinquishing” group is unequivocal. Why, then, logic of elimination rather than genocide? As stated at the outset, settler colonialism is a specific social formation and it is desirable to retain that specificity. So far as I can tell, an understanding of settler colonialism would not be particularly helpful for understanding the mass killings of, say, witches in medieval Europe, Tutsis in Rwanda, enemies of the people in Cambodia, or Jews in the Nazi fatherland (the Lebensraum is, of course, another matter). By the same token, with the possible exception of the witches (whose murders appear to have been built into a great social transition), these mass killings would seem to have little to tell us about the long-run structural consistency of settler colonizers' attempts to eliminate native societies. In contrast to the Holocaust, which was endemic to Nazism rather than to Germany (which was by no means the only—or even, historically, the most—anti-Semitic society in Europe), settler colonialism is relatively impervious to regime change. The genocide of American Indians or of Aboriginal people in Australia has not been subject to election results. So why not a special kind of genocide?—Raymond Evans' and Bill Thorpe's etymologically deft “indigenocide,” for instance,67 or one of the hyphenated genocides (“cultural genocide,” “ethnocide,” “politicide,” etc.)68 that have variously been proposed? The apparently insurmountable problem with the qualified genocides is that, in their very defensiveness, they threaten to undo themselves. They are never quite the real thing, just as patronizingly hyphenated ethnics are not fully Australian or fully American. Apart from this categorical problem, there is a historical basis to the relative diminution of the qualified genocides. This basis is, of course, the Holocaust, the non-paradigmatic paradigm that, being the indispensable example, can never merely exemplify. Keeping one eye on the Holocaust, which is always the unqualified referent of the qualified genocides, can only disadvantage Indigenous people because it discursively reinforces the figure of lack at the heart of the non-Western. Moreover, whereas the Holocaust exonerates anti-Semitic Western nations who were on the side opposing the Nazis, those same nations have nothing to gain from their liability for colonial genocides. On historical as well as categorical grounds, therefore, the hyphenated genocides devalue Indigenous attrition. No such problem bedevils analysis of the logic of elimination, which, in its specificity to settler colonialism, is premised on the securing—the obtaining and the maintaining—of territory.69 This logic certainly requires the elimination of the owners of that territory, but not in any particular way. To this extent, it is a larger category than genocide. For instance, the style of romantic stereotyping that I have termed “repressive authenticity,” which is a feature of settler-colonial discourse in many countries, is not genocidal in itself, though it eliminates large numbers of empirical natives from official reckonings and, as such, is often concomitant with genocidal practice.70 Indeed, depending on the historical conjuncture, assimilation can be a more effective mode of elimination than conventional forms of killing, since it does not involve such a disruptive affront to the rule of law that is ideologically central to the cohesion of settler society. When invasion is recognized as a structure rather than an event, its history does not stop—or, more to the point, become relatively trivial—when it moves on from the era of frontier homicide. Rather, narrating that history involves charting the continuities, discontinuities, adjustments, and departures whereby a logic that initially informed frontier killing transmutes into different modalities, discourses and institutional formations as it undergirds the historical development and complexification of settler society. This is not a hierarchical procedure. **How, then, when elimination manifests as genocide, are we to retain the specificity of settler colonialism without downplaying its impact by resorting to a qualified genocide? I suggest that the term “structural genocide” avoids the questions of degree—and, therefore, of hierarchy among victims—that are entailed in qualified genocides, while retaining settler colonialism's structural induration (it also lets in the witches—whose destruction, as Charles Zika has shown, was closely linked to the coeval transatlantic destruction of Native Americans71). Given a historical perspective on structural genocide, we can recognize its being in abeyance (as, mercifully, it seems to be in contemporary Australia) rather than being a thing of the past—which is to say, we should guard against the recurrence of what Dirk Moses terms “genocidal moments” (social workers continue to take Aboriginal children in disproportionate numbers, for example.72) Focusing on structural genocide also enables us to appreciate some of the concrete empirical relationships between spatial removal, mass killings and biocultural assimilation**. For instance, where there is no space left for removal (as occurred on the closure of the frontier in the US and Australia, or on the Soviet victory on Nazi Germany's eastern front), mass killings or assimilation become the only eliminatory options available. Under these circumstances, the resort to mass killings can reflect the proclaimed inassimilability of the victim group, as in the case of Jews in relation to the “Aryan” blood stock.73 Correspondingly, assimilation programmes can reflect the ideological requirements of settler-colonial societies, which characteristically cite native advancement to establish their egalitarian credentials to potentially fractious groups of immigrants.74 How, then, might any of this help to predict and prevent genocide? In the first place, it shows us that settler colonialism is an indicator. Unpalatable though it is (to speak as a member of a settler society), this conclusion has a positive aspect, which is a corollary to settler colonialism's temporal dimension. Since settler colonialism persists over extended periods of time, structural genocide should be easier to interrupt than short-term genocides. For instance, it seems reasonable to credit the belated UN/Australian intervention in East Timor with warding off the likelihood of a continued or renewed genocidal programme. Realpolitik is a factor, however. Thus the Timorese miracle would not seem to hold out a great deal of hope for, say, Tibet. Since settler colonialism is an indicator, it follows that we should monitor situations in which settler colonialism intensifies or in which societies that are not yet, or not fully, settler-colonial take on more of its characteristics. Israel's progressive dispensing with its reliance on Palestinian labour would seem to present an ominous case in point.75 Colin Tatz has argued, conclusively in my view, that, while Turkish behaviour in Armenia, Nazi behaviour in Europe, and Australian behaviour towards Aborigines (among other examples) constitute genocide, the apartheid regime in South Africa does not. His basic reason is that African labour was indispensable to apartheid South Africa, so it would have been counterproductive to destroy it. The same can be said of African American slavery. In both cases, the genocide tribunal is the wrong court. The US parallel is significant because, unlike the South African case, the formal apparatus of oppression (slavery) was overcome but Whites remained in power.76 On emancipation, Blacks became surplus to some requirements and, to that extent, more like Indians. Thus it is highly significant that the barbarities of lynching and the Jim Crow reign of terror should be a post-emancipation phenomenon.77 As valuable commodities, slaves had only been destroyed in extremis. Even after slavery, Black people continued to have value as a source of super-cheap labour (providing an incitement to poor Whites), so their dispensability was tempered.78 Today in the US, the blatant racial zoning of large cities and the penal system suggests that, once colonized people outlive their utility, settler societies can fall back on the repertoire of strategies (in this case, spatial sequestration) whereby they have also dealt with the native surplus. There could hardly be a more concrete expression of spatial sequestration than the West Bank barrier. There again, apartheid also relied on sequestration. Perhaps Colin Tatz, who insists that Israel is not genocidal,79 finds it politic to allow an association between the Zionist and apartheid regimes as the price of preempting the charge of genocide. It is hard to imagine that a scholar of his perspicacity can have failed to recognize the Palestinian resonances of his statement, made in relation to Biko youth, that: “They threw rocks and died for their efforts.”80 Nonetheless, as Palestinians become more and more dispensable, Gaza and the West Bank become less and less like Bantustans and more and more like reservations (or, for that matter, like the Warsaw Ghetto). Porous borders do not offer a way out.

#### Native understandings of space offer different perspectives — Indigenous space exploration resists common space appropriation narratives informed by colonialism – solves back

**Young 87** ("Pity the Indians of Outer Space": Native American Views of the Space Program Author(s): M. Jane Young - american studies and folklore educator at U of A. Source: Western Folklore , Oct., 1987, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Oct., 1987), pp. 269-279 Published by: Western States Folklore Society) (<https://www.jstor.org/stable/1499889>) (SPHS, AL)

In the 1960s, because of crises in their social and cultural life, many "mainstream" Americans' began to re-examine their goals, calling into question values that they had hitherto taken for granted. Some accompanied this raising of consciousness with a search for their tra ditional "roots" and a renewed interest in recovering the fundamen tals of human life, turning to non-Western religions and philosophies. Many of these people who were searching for an alternative to the mainstream ethos came to regard Native Americans, whose religion and worldview stress respect for nature and harmony with the cosmos, as the proper guides to this "rediscovery." Dissatisfied with social val ues that were shaped by excessive materialism and individualism, non-Native Americans began to become aware of the significant con tribution Native Americans could make to the attempt to restore humanity's ties with the universe and re-establish a sense of identity. Al though the moon walks of the 1970s took place against this background-the search for an alternative reality-the regressive, conservative view of the 1980s is a backlash against the liberalism and questioning mode of the 1960s and 1970s. Still, some Americans today are actively "considering" the Native American alternative-an alter native that, I suggest, would add depth and scope to the narrow vision of the current "me-centered" generation. Because Native Americans have a different perspective of the world, they can offer us alternative ways of seeing ourselves in relationship to the natural world and help us answer the question of what constitutes appropriate behavior-in outer space, as well as on earth. Furthermore, some non-Native Americans realize that, as they look to the traditions of the Native Americans, they see their own heritage with increased clarity. Although this appreciation of Native Ameri cans comes too late in America's history and could be construed as ap propriating their ideas as we did their land, a significant number of Native Americans are receptive to the potential that now exists for a dialogue between traditions, both non-Native and Native American, perhaps because they are experiencing a parallel concern, a need to come to terms with their own emerging identity. Both groups have begun to realize that it is only through such a dialogue that the mistakes of the past can be avoided in the future. For non-Native Ameri cans the justification for this inquiry is that through an analysis of the difference between the two understandings of space-Anglo and Na tive American-we can better "see" the ideological dimensions of our own, taken-for-granted mythology that legitimizes space exploration. Native American attitudes towards "outer space" often conflict with the attitudes of the proponents of the U.S. space program. Rather than applying the metaphor of the "new frontier" or even the term "outer" to this aspect of the cosmos, many Native Americans regard it as encompassed in "Father Sky," part of their network of symbolic associations that integrates all elements of the cosmos. A recent com mercial called "Earth Pictures," produced by TRW, a firm that special izes in "aerial views" of portions of the earth's globe from outer space, aptly illustrates these differing attitudes. In this commercial, TRW representatives give members of the Navajo tribe a guided tour of the TRW laboratories and conclude by showing them a satellite picture (Landsat) of the Navajo reservation from outer space. With evident humor, the Navajos respond by holding up a picture of outer space from their reservation-a dry painting of Father Sky who contains within his body the sun, moon, and constellations. The commercial thus serves to illustrate Navajo beliefs about "outer space." According to Navajo worldview, which emphasizes harmonious relations with all elements of the cosmos-a sacred kinship among all aspects of experience, natural and supernatural-Father Sky is a living being, intimately related to humans who should, therefore, treat him with appreciation and respect. This example from the Navajo is representative of the cosmology of most Native American groups, a cosmology that is shaped by a belief in the unity and sacred nature of all life, the above and the below. As Joseph Epes Brown suggests, the Native American quality of seeing is based on "a polysynthetic me taphysic of nature, immediately experienced rather than dangerously abstracted." He describes this vision as a "message of the sacred nat ure of the land, of place."5 Place in this sense extends, of course, to outer space, or Father Sky, as well as to Mother Earth. This perspec tive contrasts sharply with that of enthusiasts of space exploration who regard space as something "out there," beyond everyday experience, through which we should travel to reach planets and other objects that we will investigate, and, if possible, use to meet our own needs. I have taken the title of this essay from the transcript of a convoca tion of Native American scholars that took place in 1970. The state ment, "pity the Indians and the buffalo of outer space," refers to the Euro-American concept of the American frontier, based on the erroneous notion that the "New World" was unoccupied, hence available for exploration and exploitation. Consequently, many indigenous Americans view the use of the metaphor of the frontier in the argu ment for the expanded exploration and settlement of outer space as parallel to the historic "settlement" of America in which homesteaders extended the notion of "unoccupied" land through time as they pushed the "frontier" steadily westward. The Native Americans had no encouraging vision of the frontier for, as a conquered people, they found their traditional domain constricted by the expansion of Euro pean cultures into the New World. They have no hopeful vision of the so-called "new frontier" of outer space, either: "pity the Indians of outer space" whose territory is regarded as unoccupied land to which powerful governments can lay claim. Native Americans fear that the motives of expansion and exploitation that, in part, drive the space program will bring disorder into the cosmos. In contrast, according to the Native American view, one should strive to bring oneself into harmony with the order perceived in the heavens, rather than to challenge that order. Thus, many elements of Native American folklore and worldview outline principles of behavior that stand in opposition to those of the proponents of the U.S. space program. Behavior is a key word here, for the opposition is directed not so much to the simple goals of the space program as to the attitudes those who are actively involved in the space program have about the beings who reside in this part of the cosmos, and the disastrous actions that will ensue from these mis guided notions. The following anecdotes from recent Native Ameri can oral tradition exemplify this different perspective." An anthropologist working with Inuit peoples in Alaska told them of the first moon shot, and of astronauts walking on the moon. The Inuits began laughing, and when the anthropologist inquired why, they replied: "We didn't know this was the first time you white people had been to the moon. Our shamans have been going for years. They go all the time." The woman who told this story added, "We do go to visit the moon and moon people all the time. The issue is not whether we go to visit our relatives, but how we treat them and their homeland when we go." An example from the Navajo illustrates their concern that the "moon people" will receive the same treatment from "Western" soci ety as the American Indians did. During the first years of outer space exploration, NASA leased some Navajo land for test sites. One site in particular was to be used to test the mechanized moon walker. At one point during the testing, NASA invited the Navajo tribal chairman, Peter MacDonald, out to the site as an observer. MacDonald brought a Navajo singer, or medicine man, with him. When told that these men he saw in strange suits would be going to the moon, the singer asked if he could send a message to the moon people. So a tape recorder was brought to him and he recorded a message in the Navajo language. When he finished speaking, the NASA people asked MacDonald to translate the message. "Okay," MacDonald said, "he's telling the moon people to watch you guys carefully, because you might screw things up on the moon the way you have on Earth." Some of the Navajo regard explorations in outer space, specifically moon landings, as responsible for disasters here on earth. When a particularly dry spell of weather hit the eastern area of the Navajo res ervation and many sheep and goats died, tribal members there attrib uted the drought to witchcraft. This was the same drought period that Navajos in the Chuska Valley interpreted as having been caused by the United States moon landings." In this particular case, the Navajo view space exploration and witchcraft as similarly destructive of the har monious existence that they strive for through the vehicle of ceremo nial activity. Exploring the relationship between what has been called "main stream experiences" and Native American stories, Simon Ortiz, an Acoma poet and short story writer, describes the reactions of a tradi tional Acoma man to modern technology in the story "Men on the Moon." As various relatives point out the benefits of modern technol ogy, the old man's perplexed responses indicate that his traditional view of the world is incompatible with these so-called benefits and the system of values that they imply. His daughter brings him a television set which, in itself, is somewhat incomprehensible to him, and the family watches the Apollo moon landing. When his son-in-law tells him that scientists want to find out what is on the moon because they are looking for knowledge, the old man wonders if men "have run out of places to look for knowledge on the earth." When he is told that the scientists believe this knowledge from the moon will help them learn more about the universe, find out "where everything began and how everything was made," the old man suggests, first, that his son-in-law is teasing him. When assured that this is not the case, he asks, "Do they say why they need to know where everything began? Hasn't anyone ever told them?" The old man's questions here reveal his understand ing that the sacred calls for a different sort of knowledge than that de manded by science and its products. His comments throughout the story suggest, in fact, that research done in the name of science alone cannot provide a holistic understanding of experience. Similarly, some non-Native Americans have begun to question whether scien tists can carry out purely objective research; whether they are capable of, or even ought to attempt, the de-mystification of the moon. 10 The story continues and that night the old man dreams that Flintwing Boy and Coyote are watching a monster with metal legs that crushes trees, grass and flowers; as they watch they realize that, alone, they are powerless to stop the monster. So they face East, pray, his ar breathe on some sacred pollen, take in the breath of all the directions and give cornfood to the earth. Flintwing Boy then prepares rows and sends Coyote to the village to warn the people and to tell them "to talk among themselves and decide what it is about and what they will do." Ortiz illustrates here the relevance and immediacy of traditional narrative for this old man; it becomes for him a way of tak ing the dream-vision to heart in order to begin to take the appropriate action; it is a means by which he comes to terms with such potential dangers as a metal monster that lands on the moon and crushes the life out of things in nature. In contrast to the view of outer space as consisting of inanimate ob jects in motion, many Native American groups see themselves as intimately related, in a literal as well as a ceremonial manner, to the sun, moon, and stars. The Skidi Pawnee, for instance, believe that the people on earth were conceived by the stars; thus, for them, the sky is populated with beings who have a kinship relationship to those on earth.¹¹ The sun, moon, and stars are the fathers, mothers, aunts, and uncles of the people on earth and ought to be treated with respect. Similarly, Zuni cosmology is shaped by a belief in the essential connectedness of all life, the sky and the earth, and all else that exists. The Zunis speak of the Sun Father, Earth Mother, and others who reside in these realms as living beings; furthermore, the zenith (above) and nadir (below) are integral to their conceptual model of directionality, extending the two-dimensional scheme (based on the four semi-cardinal directions) into three-dimensional space. The Zunis, like the Pawnee, see themselves as intimately related to the sun, moon, and stars. It is not surprising, then, that they perceive the actions of non-Native Americans towards these cosmological beings as not only disrespectful, but highly dangerous. The Zuni attitude toward the "persons" who inhabit the sky world, as well as their perceptions of space and time more generally, are aptly illustrated by stories several Zunis told me about certain clown per formances that occurred at the time of the first U.S. moon shots. One man described a memorable summer rain dance during which the clowns mimicked the behavior of the first astronauts to walk on the moon.12 According to this account, the clowns in the plaza gave a good rendition of the particular walk that the astronauts in their cumber some space suits exhibited. Then the clowits climbed to the rooftops and walked on top of one of the sacred kivas. The purpose of these actions, my Zuni consultant said, was to object to the behavior of the astronauts who heedlessly walked on the body of the Moon Mother and pierced her with metal instruments in order to bring back samples. for study. 13 This performance was not only a critique of the moon shots, however, but an enactment of Zuni cosmological principles that the clowns equated the moon with sacred space in this instance was not arbitrary. This coupling suggests a merging of space and time in a ritual context such that the kiva, a ceremonial chamber, some times located underground and symbolically associated with the emergence from the underworld, becomes equivalent to the moon, one of the Zuni deities who travels across the sky. 14 Outer and inner space thus occupy the same place at the same time. Zuni "clowns" who portrayed the astronauts not only provide comic relief, easing tension through laughter, but also embody disorder through ritual reversals. In addition, their performances often be come vehicles for criticizing the actions of both Zunis and non-Zunis alike. The Zunis regard these clowns as extremely powerful, poten tially dangerous beings who play a central role in their ceremonies. Between "sets" of the sacred rain dances, they mimic the stately ka chinas, make sexual overtures to the highly respected matrons of the tribe, and even walk on the moon; yet none of these activities consti tutes appropriate behavior in day-to-day life. The disorderly behavior of the clowns, enacted in a ceremonial context, contrasts with and, therefore, emphasizes the order by which people should govern their lives. Significantly, Zuni and Hopi clowns include impersonations of anthropologists and government bureaucrats, as well as astronauts, in their repertoire-perhaps an indication that these roles are character ized by the exploitative nature of the Anglo-American. 15 Similarly, the Cherokee carry out a special ritual dance, called the Booger Dance, that portrays "the European invader as awkward, ridiculous, lewd, and menacing, a dramatic perpetuation of the tradition of hostility and disdain."16 This dance functions to lessen the harmful powers of the aliens who, in the form of living beings or ghosts, are responsible for sickness and misfortune. The Booger Dance is frequently recom mended by a medicine man to form part of a cure for a sick person. Interestingly, one Zuni man who described the clowns' perform ance of the first moon walk mentioned it within the context of a discus sion about the ability of the clowns to predict, and hence, control, fu ture events. His description of the event tallied with the others I had heard, with one striking difference: he said the event took place a year before astronauts first walked on the moon. Certainly, this example un derscores the perceived power of the clowns, but it also serves to link this event with other ominous events foreseen in the future. This man associated the story of the moon walk with one the grandfathers used to tell long ago, predicting that a time would come when their children would begin to drink dark liquid and quarrel and eventually the world would end in a shower of hot rain. 17 Finally, just as the clowns' equa tion of the moon and the kiva constituted a collapsing of inner and outer space in ritual activity, so does this particular instance of ability to predict the future reveal a similar collapsing of time: present and fu ture coalesce as the clowns ritually enact an event that has not yet oc curred. These examples illustrate a traditional Native American ethos in which time as well as space can be described as "inner-" rather than "outer-" directed. According to Western Puebloan mythology, which the Puebloans themselves regard as history, the people back in the time of the beginning lived in the fourth underworld, below the sur face of the earth. 18 This "time of the beginning" had no beginning; simply was, before the time of the emergence. Similarly, Puebloans be lieve that existence after death is not situated in the sky, but rather, inside mother earth, back in the time of the beginning. In the Zuni origin myth, as the people search for the Center after they have em erged from the underworld, they undertake geographical travels that steadily spiral inward until they reach their destination. Their search for knowledge is, in a sense, synonymous with their search for the Center. The Center represents the physical existence of Zuni, the middle of any place, the time of the winter solstice, a person's heart, and that person's essence as the Center when ritually observing the six directions or offering sacred prayer meal. 19 The vehicle for attaining this knowledge, for finding the Center, for reaching the moon, is ceremonial activity, not travel in a space ship. Also apparent in these examples is the Native American emphasis on process rather than product; on the unity of all beings in the act of harmonious existence. For the Puebloans, the moon, like the sun, is not an object to be walked on or traveled to, but a living being whose light is drawn through the kiva hatchway during certain rituals. 20 They draw the sun, too, into the kiva at certain times and often con struct buildings so that rays of sunlight will enter a window or porthole and strike a specific niche at ceremonially and calendrically important times of the year.21 The interplay of light and shadow at such sites seems to be a celebration of the event-an "inviting in" of the sun or the shadows it casts-an incorporation of the sacred into the structure itself. 22 This perception of the sun and moon as living beings who en ter the sacred space of the kiva at ritually significant times of the year is a phenomenon similar to that described earlier: the behavior of the clowns during a Zuni rain dance that served to equate the kiva with the moon for a circumscribed period of time. Both instances are part of a sequence of ritual activities in which a condensation and intensifica tion of experience occur-a collapsing of "inner" and "outer" into one entity. Thus, the Puebloans in particular, and Native Americans in general, do not view space and the beings who reside there as external to ceremonial life, nor do they regard them as material objects that they can own, control, or overcome. According to this perspective, there are no rigid boundaries between the spiritual and physical; or, if such boundaries exist at all, they are fluid and permeable. The cosmos is one entity; the beings within it operate according to the principles of continuity and similarity-principles evident in the unification of inner and outer space in the context of ritual activity. For most Native American groups, this continuity applies to time as well as to space. Although they may introduce a myth as having occurred "a long time ago" or "in the beginning," they do not envision the events of the myth as over and done with, situated at a single point in a linear flow of time; instead, they perceive them as ever-present, informing the here and now.25