I affirm

I’ll define appropriation as the act of taking or using something (Merriam-Webster)

Offense

Private appropriation uses frontier rhetoric to master nature: by creating fantasy productions of Earth 2.0

**Rahder 19** - “Home and Away The Politics of Life after Earth” by Micha Rahder. Rahder, Micha (2019). Home and Away.

Environment and Society, 10(1), 158–177. doi:10.3167/ares.2019.100110 [https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/] RK

ABSTRACT: This article examines the reinvigoration of outer space imaginaries in the era of global environmental change, and

the impacts of these imaginaries on Earth. Privatized space research mobilizes fears of ecological,

political, or economic catastrophe to garner support for new utopian futures, or the search for Earth 2.0. These imaginaries

rel ect dominant global discourses about environmental and social issues, and enable the flow of earthly resources toward an extraterrestrial frontier. In contrast, eco-centric

visions emerging from Gaia theory or feminist science fiction project post-earthly life in terms that are ecological, engaged in multispecies relations and ethics, and

anti-capitalist. In these imaginaries, rather than centering humans as would-be destroy-ers or saviors of Earth, our species becomes merely instrumental in launching life—a

multispecies process—of the planet, a new development in deep evolutionary time. his article traces these two imaginaries and how they are reshaping material and polit- ical

earthly life. KEYWORDS: anthropology, futures, Gaia theory, NewSpace, outer space, political ecology Outer space imaginaries are booming. Reborn from Cold War projects

into the post-9/11 securitized era, imaginaries of expanding life—human and otherwise—beyond the surface of the planet Earth are proliferating, creating new material impacts

and new politics of expansion, exploration, and exclusion. Motivated by fears of looming environmental or sociopolitical disaster, including the Anthropocene, many

extraterrestrial imaginaries rework earthly fantasies of techno scientific progress

and human mastery over nature. Space programs are increas-ingly privatized, with

tech entrepreneurs leading the way to extraterrestrial futures. I refer to these projects, often framed as a necessary step in human

social and evolutionary history, as in search of Earth 2.0—a new and improved human future enabled by Silicon Valley innovation. Other

narratives about extraterrestrial futures, which I call eco-centric, displace human uniqueness, stretching beyond human timescales to the longer evolutionary history of life on

Earth. These share with Earth 2.0 the assumption that our planet is defined by its living systems, but mark the Anthropocene as only the latest biological revolution to reshape

Earth’s surface. In this frame, humans are not unique in our planetary impact; whether we are unique in our potential to take life beyond Earth’s surface is an open question.

Eco-centric extraterrestrial imaginaries present alternatives based not on mastery, innovation, or human exceptionalism, but on unruly evolutionary ecologies that displace

intention from life’s expansion. eco-centric imaginaries of different understandings of the human, life, time, space, and the relations between these categories.This article traces

these two imaginaries for the future of life after Earth, both of which are flexible and internally varied. thee word “imaginaries” builds on the dei nition of sociotechnical

imaginaries, or ways in which “science and technology become enmeshed in performing and producing diverse visions of the collective good, at expanding scales of

governance from communities to nation-states to the planet” (Jasanof and Kim 2015: 11)—and now beyond. I mobilize “imaginaries” to encompass the range of ef ects and

entanglements between language, cultural production, scientific research, technological innovation, politics, temporal frameworks, and more-than-human evolutionary ecological

trajectories. If (or when) life moves beyond Earth, humans will likely be instrumental, but not necessarily in control. As attention to the political and environmental geographies of

outer space proliferates (Olson 2018), this article instead turns its gaze back “inward” toward Earth, exploring the current and potential terrestrial impacts of extraterrestrial

expansionary megaprojects. ese two directions work together to co-constitute terrestrial presents with these visions range from the widespread ct” proposed by Frank White

(1987). Early space 2004; Lazier 2011). Scientific under-rst century, anticipation: “a moral economy Displacing the Earth “Displacements” describe

how imagined extraterrestrial futures work to rearrange human/life relations in the earthly present. As multiple possible futures materialize in research

programs, policy proposals, social movements, and private investments, they bring displacements of onto-logical, epistemological, and temporal orders into the present—with both oppressive and liberatory

possibilities (Valentine 2017). Displacements describe scalar reconi gurations such that phenomena that might be incomprehensible or beyond human sensorial reach are brought into the scales of human

experience (Messeri 2016). Extraterrestrial displacements workthrough analytical double movement: making extraterrestrial

environments familiar by incorporating them into earthly epistemic and aesthetic

frameworks, and making terrestrial environments strange by way of new perspectives (Markley 2005; Messeri 2017a, 2017b; Olson 2018; Praet and Salazar

2017). The extraterrestrial futures. Rather than a straightforward outward gaze, space expansion imaginaries always involve see-ing Earth from a new perspective (Lepselter

1997). The use of “Spaceship Earth” metaphors in twentieth-century US environmental movements (Fuller 1969), to Carl Sagan’s (1994) “pale blue dot” emphasizing Earth life’s

uniqueness in the uni-verse, to the politically unifying “overview ef programs coproduced the emergence and coherence of the global scale, which has come to dominate

political and environmental ideologies (Jasanoff 2004; lazier 2011) scientific standings of life on Earth are increasingly framed with reference to the

presence or absence of other life in the universe, and how we might recognize it if it is there (Helmreich et al. 2016).Extraterrestrial displacements are temporal

as well as spatial. Imaginaries of futures displace linear time such that their potentialities can be materialized in the present (Denning 2013; Mathews and Barnes 2016). Space expansion imaginaries reinstantiate what many argue

is the dominant temporal framework of the early twenty-in which the future sets the conditions of possibility for action in the present, in which the future is inhabited in the present” (Adams et al. 2009: 249). Critical scholars can be fearful of the “dangers of

prognostication” (Valentine et al. 2012) but increasingly attend to how prognostication i gures as a key political and material practice for creating new worlds. In this case, these new worlds may be brought into existence on or off Earth. Leaving Earth—Fact or

*Fiction?* There is a huge range of extraterrestrial research and development projects around the world, both public and private. In this article, I focus on those that work toward the expansion of life (human and otherwise) beyond Earth in a more or less “permanent” fashion. The boundary drawn for this article mirrors trends in public interest and

political rhetoric that prioritize human expansion over other investigations of the universe (Messeri 2017b; Wright and Oman-Reagan 2017). These projects and imaginaries share significant overlap with others, such as new capitalist resource frontiers (Genovese 2017a; Valentine 2012) or the search for extra- terrestrial intelligence, known as SETI

(Battaglia 2006; Denning 2001a, 2011b, 2011c; Vakoch 2013). More than 70 countries have national space programs, including many that train humans for spaceflight, but only the United States, Russia (and the former Soviet Union), and China have successfully launched humans into space. This article has a bias toward US-based projects, both

public and private, as these are most prolific and have generated the most media attention and academic analyses to date. In addition, most national programs, especially in the Global South, focus on satellite systems, launch facilities, and vehicle manufacture, with private com- panies extending these ventures toward resource extraction and potential

tourism. Yet NASA, the European Space Agency, Russia’s Roscosmos, the UAE Space Agency, China’s National Space Administration, and private SpaceX have all declared intentions to send humans to Mars in the next few decades, moving toward expansion. The charisma of expansion imaginaries can displace attention from

the more substantial material investment in other extraterrestrial infrastructures. For example, Ted Cruz, Republi- can Chairman of US Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Space, Science, and Competitiveness, has claimed that NASA is not (and should not be) a

scientific institution but rather one focused on exploration—a strong contrast to the agency’s present and historical activities (Showstack 2017). While the bulk of space programming is not expansion-oriented, expansionist imagi- naries are on the rise as the

international publics of Mars rover adventures, Silicon Valley cultures, and climate catastrophe narratives intersect. As a result of the mismatch between material investments and circulating space narratives, expansionist

imaginaries are political as well as material megaprojects: most humans on Earth doubt or dismiss the possibility of life beyond the planet, so making these narratives salient enough to mobilize resources is a

megaproject in itself, one that works to reshape the relations between humans, other life, and Earth itself.Outer space has long served as a canvas for sociopolitical imaginations, calling up the worlds of science fiction and fantasy long

relegated to the “genre” peripheries of literature and considered irrelevant to “serious” scholarly work (Dickens and Ormrod 2007; Haqq-Misra 2016; Markley 2005). This division is breaking down as the accelerating pace of interconnected technological, geopolitical,

and environmental change leaves many with the sense that they are already living in the sci-fi future (Collins 2003, 2005). The Anthropocene has itself been called an academic science-fiction imaginary (Swanson et al. 2015), and scholars across fields are drawing

attention to how science fiction has long influenced technological and scientific developments, particu- larly in extraterrestrial projects (Cheston 1986; Haraway 1991, 2016; McCurdy 2011; Praet and Salazar 2017). As Peter Redfield notes, “fictions provided space

exploration with a recognizable future, and thus helped engender fantastic practices. These dreams found engineers, eager to materialize them” (2002: 799). Dreams finding engineers (not the reverse) describes how imaginaries

reshape sociotechnical worlds. Whether metaphor becomes material or vice versa, language is central to exchanges between fictional and factual extraterrestrial worlds. It matters whether Mars is to be “settled” or “colonized” (Wright

and Oman-Reagan 2017), whether space is “discovered” or “conquered” by the scientific gaze (Redfield 2002). Language can shape

the materiality of space projects and draw lines of exclusion around who might

participate in them.Reflecting this, I use “humans” instead of “humanity” to retain a sense of multiplicity and difference as opposed to a unified singularity. Similarly, I use “expansion” to

collect diverse extraterrestrial imaginaries that might elsewhere be described under terms like settlement, colonization, or terraformation. While imperfect, these choices follow this article’s concern with the

categories of the human, life, and the relations between the two on Earth. Life, as distinguished from nonlife (rather than death), is a grounding metaphysics of modern colonial ontologies (Povinelli 2016). While

biological and philosophical debates over the definition of the category are as lively as ever (Helmreich et al. 2016), I follow theorizations that define life as more verb than noun: life is an energetic process that

characterizes certain material things on the planet Earth (Margulis and Sagan 1995; Mautner 2009). “Expansion” captures a facet of life’s evolutionary histories that imaginaries of technological progress into space

do not: “Life may not progress, but it expands” (Sagan and Margulis 1997: 235). What this imagined future expansion might mean—at home or away—is being shaped in the earthly present. Following a brief

history of human projects oriented toward life’s expan- sion beyond Earth, I examine Earth 2.0 and eco-centric extraterrestrial imaginaries in detail. I then turn to the implications of both imaginaries for humans and

life on Earth in the present, exploring the social and ecological politics of competing expansionist visions. This focus on the earthly now excludes many works that examine the extension of human environmental

ideas, impacts, and management into space itself (as in rich debates over “space junk” or “planetary protection”). This choice follows the framework of displacements to turn our gaze collectively back inward,

examining space projects as not only shaping possible futures but also as reconfig- uring environmental and political worlds here and now. Space and Environment: From Cold War to

Anthropocene “Things that happen in Silicon Valley and also the Soviet Union: . . . promises of colonizing the solar system while you toil in drudgery day in, day out” —Anton Troynikov (@atroyn), Twitter, 5 July 2018 Narratives projecting human

expansion into space have been present since at least the late nineteenth century but proliferated in response to the military-technological developments of the Cold War (Andrews and Siddiqi 2011; McCurdy

2011). The threat of nuclear warfare was enmeshed with narratives of modernist scientific progress, resulting in the satellite infrastructures we now take for granted for navigation, communication, weather

forecasting, and so on. Twentieth-century extraterrestrial military research and infrastructures developed in close rela- tion with terrestrial sciences and environmental movements, both through collaborations and

oppositions (DeLoughrey 2014; Olson 2018). Terrestrial and extraterrestrial science programs shared funding streams, codeveloped cybernetic systems theories, and led to concepts that have become

fundamental to environmental management on Earth, such as carrying capac- ity, island ecology, or the dominance of engineering approaches to ecological problems (Anker 2005). These “one Earth”

environmental sciences and politics emerged in and from the cultures of colonialism, reinforcing ideologies of militarized surveillance and rational management of more-than-human worlds (DeLoughrey 2014).

Through linked terrestrial and extraterrestrial technosciences, “one Earth” imaginaries grew deeper entrenched even as the projects of colonialism and development were

unraveling into irrevocably damaged socioenvironmental orders. Despite space’s centrality to the ecological sciences, mainstream environmental movements in the

United States and Europe have often been opposed to space expansion programs. Opponents argue that resources would be better spent attending to Earth’s problems rather

than imagining others we might one day escape to (Cockell 2006). Narratives of new capitalist frontiers led many environmentalists to

view space exploration as a “jingoistic boondoggle,” fearing it will lead to ideologies of a disposable planet (Hartmann 1986). Yet

expansion imaginaries took on new significance in the 1970s and 1980s in relation to globalized debates about the human population limit of Earth (Dickens and Ormrod 2007). Space has alternately figured as a solution or distraction from earthly environmental

problems, a shared point of reference for a global humanity. The end of the Cold War brought a short lull in expansionist space imaginaries, with extra- terrestrial colonization set aside in favor of earthly applications of satellite technology. But while government

funding of space programs has declined since the early 1990s, entrepreneurial cap- italists—or NewSpace—have now stepped in to fill this gap, collectively investing billions of dollars into extraterrestrial technologies, projects, and futures. Anton Troynikov, a writer

and robotics researcher, noted the displacement of this techno-fantasy in his humorous series of tweets from 2018 comparing life in Silicon Valley to the Soviet Union. NewSpace extends far beyond Central California, however: the growing accessibility of computing

and other technologies has led to space programs beyond the former superpowers or colonial centers (these are mostly satellite focused, though Nigeria plans to launch humans into space by 2030). Public interest in space expansion is on the rise again, most often

articulated in connection to global environmental change. Before his death in 2018, Steven Hawking projected that the human species will last no more than one hundred years unless we expand into space. In the NewSpace era, the push for expansion beyond

Earth is no longer defined by compet- ing capitalist and communist superpowers but by the divisions (and collaborations) between public and private entities. A sense of impending apocalypse remains, though this has shifted from sudden nuclear annihilation to the

slow violence of a warming atmosphere, rising seas, and other environmental devastation (Ahmann 2018; Nixon 2011). Though understood as new or different, Cold War space science was instrumental in transforming the “threat” of nuclear annihilation into that of

climate crisis (DeLoughrey 2014; Masco 2010, 2012). Space infrastruc- tures enabled not only new futures but also the possibility that there might be an “end of ends” negating futurities altogether (Masco 2012). These contradictory possibilities are co-constituted

such that the end of Earth becomes the inevitability of extraterrestrial expansion, and vice versa. As Anthropocene discourses mix with NewSpace futures, human ecological relations with other living matter are entering extraterrestrial imaginaries in a new way.

These sometimes amplify urgency and reinscribe humans as “saviors” of Earth, and other times challenge conventional thinking about managerial control. This contradictory Anthropocene sets the stage for the emergence of Earth 2.0 and eco-centric imaginaries for

life after Earth. Earth 2.0 Dominating current efforts to expand human life beyond Earth are public-private partner- ships, mostly based in the United States, Europe, and the United Arab Emirates. Participants in NewSpace worlds are dominated by older white men

from the United States, though are still surprisingly diverse in political and demographic makeup (Valentine 2012). With names like the Lifeboat Foundation, the Space Frontier Foundation, or the Alliance to Rescue Civilization, motivations for these projects range

from imperialist nationalisms to profits to new utopian social orders, often mixed together in unexpected configurations. Yet these Earth 2.0 visions are resolutely united by one thing: the centering of the human species as the ontological basis and scale for

extraterrestrial futures. In the United States, amid the inflammatory rhetoric of his presidency, Donald Trump’s proc- lamations on outer space as the “next great American frontier” have largely been met with derision or relative disregard. He signed executive orders

in 2017 and 2018 to reformulate US space policy, including new directives to build public-private partnerships to return to the moon, followed by a Mars mission. In early 2019, he established new extraterrestrial branch of the US military known as the Space Force.

Despite relative inattention to these policies in contrast to other executive actions, the 45th president has done much to enliven public attention to space futures in the country, causing what seem to many observers to be uncomfortable or strate- gic alliances with his

bombastic rhetoric (e.g., gleeful circulation of Buzz Aldrin’s pained facial expressions in memes after a joint press conference with the president). While easily dismissed in the face of his violently right-wing proclamations and policy decisions, Trump’s space dreams

reinforce the power of his America First doctrine. Although figures like Aldrin proclaim more universalist narratives of international cooperation in space, they continue to line up in support of Trump’s space programming. Rather than an exception in globalist visions

of unified human- ity, Trump’s (and Trump-like) racisms have been at the heart of liberal democratic projects all along—preelection events like viral video footage of police shootings of African Americans or Native American protests against the Dakota Access

Pipeline reveal how liberal sovereignty rests on the violent exclusion of racialized others (Rosa and Bonilla 2017).Military and nationalist narratives are easily

imported into privatized realms. The tech entre- preneur Elon Musk is a prominent figure in NewSpace, alternately characterized in the press as

a techno-futurist hero or a supervillain. Musk’s SpaceX holds launch contracts with NASA and other national space programs and is a leader in the development of space

tourism. Musk’s visions for settling Mars are immensely popular and filled with superlative exaggeration, such as referring to his planned technology as the BFR (big fucking

rocket) (Pope 2018). Musk (2018) plans to send the first cargo missions to Mars in 2022, with crew missions following two years later, establishing a base from which humans

can become a multi-planetary species. Robert Zubrin (2002, 2012, 2019) is another popular leader who has published numerous books advo- cating for human expansion to

Mars. The founder of the Mars Society, Zubrin is a former Lock- heed Martin engineer, and a vocal proponent of privatized space futures. Many private space

organizations replicate the worst aspects of late capitalism: securitized property regimes, essentialized identities, and competitive extraction (Genovese 2017a). Lan- guage describing space as a “frontier” is common,

particularly American “manifest destiny” and Mars as the new US American West (Grinspoon 2004; Wright and Oman-Reagan 2017). Indeed, space has become a resource

frontier in the sense defined by Anna Tsing (2003): neither place nor process, but a capitalist imaginary that shapes both. Frontier imaginaries transform the ontological

status of extraterrestrial materials into “resources,” whether for capitalist or scientific exploitation. The existence of extraterrestrial resources is then used as justification for expansion: they are

out there; therefore, we should use them (e.g., Cockell 2006). Peter Dickens and James Ormrod (2007) thus extend David Harvey’s analysis of capitalism’s expansionist frontiers as a “spatial fix” to an “outer

spatial fix,” though endless extraction is rarely the goal in itself. Instead, through utopias or through the protection of distance, space expansion is widely framed in Earth 2.0 imaginaries as a kind of pressure

release for Earth-bound human problems. Among NewSpace proponents, even within the most profit-motivated arenas, most people express unexpected or contradictory utopian visions of new social and political

relations enabled by extraterrestrial futures. NewSpace representatives like Musk celebrate an extreme version of neoliberal entrepreneurialism and libertarian socioeconomic ethics, projecting these as necessary steps in the directed evolutionary

development of the human species. Rather than short-term profit motivations leading to unpredictable long-term futures, as most critiques of NewSpace would have it, short-term R&D projects are more commonly motivated by long- term visions of extraterrestrial

sociality not yet in existence (Valentine 2012).NewSpace utopian visions resonate with, but cannot be explained away by, expansionary profit seeking. The coexistence of these contradictory

visions was established in US cultural narratives through early Apollo mission photographs, which were rooted in the mastering gaze of US military imperialism yet projected an

environmentally and politically united Earth (Cosgrove 2003). The unification of a divided humanity is often figured as the result of shared intrinsic val- ues that define the

species: curiosity, innovation, and exploration. Zubrin’s Mars Society (1998) argues that space expansion will not just reduce conflict but replace it as a driving force behind

innovation: Civilizations, like people, thrive on challenge and decay without it. The time is past for human societies to use war as a driving stress for technological progress. As the world moves towards unity, we

must join together, not in mutual passivity, but in common enterprise, facing out- ward to embrace a greater and nobler challenge than that which we previously posed to each other. Pioneering Mars will provide

such a challenge. A collective leap into space is seen as fulfilling the broken promises of capitalist modernity: equality, liberty, and progress.

**These extraterrestrial fantasies are Utopias Messeri, Lisa. 2017**a.

“Gestures of Cosmic Relation and the Search for Another Earth.” *Environmental Humanities* 9 (2): 325–40. 332-333 RK

**The search for a habitable exoplanet is the search for** Earth as we have never known it. Scientists searching for another Earth are looking for ideal indicators of

habitability.20Under what stable conditions, they ask, would terrestrial life be most likely to flourish? Though in the current climate crisis the present habitability of Earth would still be detectable, it perhaps won’t be

too much longer (on a cosmic timescale) before an alien observer of Earth might find the conditions undesirable. In explaining to her children, “that world has air that creatures like us can breathe,” the astronomer

in the myth rep- resents how the community is lookingfor markers of a pristine Earth as opposed to a human-altered Earth. The models that predict the “biomarkers” they seek to detect are based on ideal

ecosystems, not those that include byproducts of the industrial complex humans have built on Earth.This is a nostalgic quest for an Earth at its best; an Edenic Earth. Historian Carolyn Merchant writes of the

deep-seated and long-lasting Western desire to recover **Eden**. Merchant finds elements of both progress and decline depending on who is spinning the story and when it is being told.

“For many Americans, humanity’s loss of the perfect Garden of Eden is among the most powerful of all stories. . . . We search for ways to re- claim our loss.”21 The habitable

exoplanet is Edenic in that it is a planet of stability, par ticularly desirable in the age of the Anthropocene when planetary change on Earth is newly image-able.22**The**

**prospect of repairing our own planet is daunting, prompting dreams of extending humanity’s presence**

**beyond Earth.** Through the myth and associ- ated scientific imaginations of human life on exoplanets, we catch glimpses of the cul- tural traces

that are already extending beyond Earth, mingling with cosmic natures. **The** figure of the mother astronomer and the perpetuation of the

**colonizing mind-set offer,** following Merchant, **opportunities** to read both progress and stagnation, if not decline, **into the cosmic**

**gestures that direct us beyond Earth.** It is striking that the figure of the mother is a constant character in this story of cosmic connection.

Read pragmatically, it recasts the gender of the stereotypical scien- tist, painting a progressive picture of the future of exoplanet astronomy. At the

same time, that this woman is a mother who connects Earth with an other through her point- ing extends the myth of woman’s closeness to nature into

the cosmos. Drawing to- gether the progressive and conservative imageries surrounding the mother astronomer suggests that as technology facilitates

our view further into the universe, being close to this cosmic nature requires also being close to the high-tech culture that produces it.

**The status-quo represses the death drive to create a politics of utopia sustained by the genocide of communities that do not fall into the boundaries of their harmonious world.**

**Stavrakakis 99** (Yannis Stavrakakis has PhD degrees from the ‘Ideology and Discourse Analysis’ programme at the University of Essex, “Lacan and the Political”, 10/3/99) AqN

Our age is clearly an age of social fragmentation, political disenchantment and open cynicism characterised by the decline of the political mutations of modern universalism that, by replacing God with Reason, reoccupied the ground of a pre-modern aspiration to fully represent and master the essence and the totality of the real. On the political level this universalist fantasy took the form of a series of utopian constructions of a reconciled future society. The fragmentation of our present social terrain and cultural milieu entails the collapse of such grandiose fantasies. 1 Today, talk about utopia is usually characterised by a certain ambiguity. For some, of course, utopian constructions are still seen as positive results of human creativity in the socio-political sphere: utopia is the expression of a desire for a better way of being (Levitas, 1990:8). Other, more suspicious views, such as the one expressed in Marie Berneriís book Journey through Utopia, warn of taking into account experiences like the Second World War of the dangers entailed in trusting the idea of a perfect, ordered and regimented world. For some, instead of being how can we realise our utopias? í, the crucial question has become how can we prevent their final realisation?Ö. [How can] we return to a non-utopian society, less perfect and more free (Berdiaev in Berneri, 1971:309). 2 It is particularly the political experience of these last decades that led to the dislocation of utopian sensibilities and brought to the fore a novel appreciation of human finitude, together with a growing suspicion of all grandiose political projects and the meta-narratives traditionally associated with them (Whitebook, 1995:75). All these developments, that is to say the crisis of the utopian imaginary, seem however to leave politics without its prime motivating force: the politics of today is a politics of aporia. In our current political terrain, hope seems to be replaced by pessimism or even resignation. This is a result of the crisis in the dominant modality of our political imagination (meaning utopianism in its various forms) and of our inability to resolve this crisis in a productive way. 3 In this chapter, I will try to show that Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket. Letís start our exploration with the most elementary of questions: what is the meaning of the current crisis of utopia? And is this crisis a development to be regretted or cherished? In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking. First of all it seems that the need for utopian meaning arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality. Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field. As Tillich has put it ‘all utopias strive to negate the negative…in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience. Furthermore, from the time of More’s Utopia (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? Utopias are images of future human communities in which these antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’. As Marin has put it, utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise. What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis.4 Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. Put another way, the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat. The naivety—and also the danger—of utopian structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by extermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s dictum that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?—VII:131).5 The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modern anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this utopian operation—here the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on The Formations of the Unconscious, Lacan identified the utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area (seminar of 18 June 1958). In order to realise the problematic character of the utopian operation it is necessary to articulate a genealogy of this way of representing and making sense of the world. The work of Norman Cohn seems especially designed to serve this purpose. What is most important is that in Cohn’s schema we can encounter the three basic characteristics of utopian fantasies that we have already singled out: first, their link to instances of disorder, to the element of negativity. Since human experience is acontinuous battle with the unexpected there is always a need to represent and master this unexpected, to transform disorder to order. Second, this representation is usually articulated as a total and universal representation, a promise of absolute mastery of the totality of the real, a vision of the end of history. A future utopian state is envisaged in which disorder will be totally eliminated. Third, this symbolisation produces its own remainder; there is always a certain particularity remaining outside the universal schema. It is to the existence of this evil agent, which can be easily localised, that all persisting disorder is attributed. The elimination of disorder depends then on the elimination of this group. The result is always horrible: persecution, massacres, holocausts. Needless to say, no utopian fantasy is ever realised as a result of all these ‘crimes’—as mentioned in Chapter 2, the purpose of fantasy is not to satisfy an (impossible) desire but to constitute it as such. What is of great interest for our approach is the way in which Cohn himself articulates a genealogy of the pair utopia/demonisation in his books The Pursuit of the Millennium and Europe’s Inner Demons (Cohn, 1993b, 1993c). The same applies to his book Warrant for Genocide (Cohn, 1996) which will also be implicated at a certain stage in our analysis. These books are concerned with the same social phenomenon, the idea of purifying humanity through the extermination of some category of human beings which are conceived as agents of corruption, disorder and evil. The contexts are, of course, different, but the urge remains the same (Cohn, 1993b:xi). All these works then, at least according to my reading, are concerned with the production of an archenemy which goes together with the utopian mentality. It could be argued that the roots of both demonisation and utopian thinking can be traced back to the shift from a cyclical to a unilinear representation of history (Cohn, 1993a:227).6 However, we will start our reading of Cohn’s work by going back to Roman civilisation. As Cohn claims, a profound demonising tendency is discernible in Ancient Rome: within the imperium, the Romans accused the Christians of cannibalism and the Jews were accused by Greeks of ritual murder and cannibalism. Yet in the ancient Roman world, although Judaism was regarded as a bizarre religion, it was nevertheless a religio licita, a religion that was officially recognised. Things were different with the newly formed Christian sect. In fact the Christian Eucharist could easily be interpreted as cannibalistic (Cohn, 1993b:8). In almost all their ways Christians ignored or even negated the fundamental convictions by which the pagan Graeco-Roman world lived. It is not at all surprising then that to the Romans they looked like a bunch of conspirators plotting to destroy society. Towards the end of the second century, according to Tertullian, it was taken as a given that the Christians are the cause of every public catastrophe, every disaster that hits the populace. If the Tiber floods or the Nile fails to, if there is a drought or an earthquake, a famine or a plague, the cry goes up at once: ‘Throw the Christians to the Lions!’. (Tertullian in Cohn, 1993b:14) This defamation of Christians that led to their exclusion from the boundaries of humanity and to their relentless persecution is a pattern that was repeated many times in later centuries, when both the persecutors and the persecuted were Christians (Cohn, 1993b:15). Bogomiles, Waldensians, the Fraticelli movement and the Cathars—all the groups appearing in Umberto Eco’s fascinating books, especially in The Name of the Rose—were later on persecuted within a similar discursive context. The same happened with the demonisation of Christians, the fantasy that led to the great witch-hunt. Again, the conditions of possibility for this demonisation can be accurately defined. First, some kind of misfortune or catastrophe had to occur, and second, there had to be someone who could be singled out as the cause of this misfortune (Cohn, 1993b:226). In Cohn’s view then, social dislocation and unrest, on the one hand, and millenarian exaltation, on the other, do overlap. When segments of the poor population were mesmerised by a prophet, their understandable desire to improve their living conditions became transfused with fantasies of a future community reborn into innocence through a final, apocalyptic massacre. The evil ones—variously identified with the Jews, the clergy or the rich—were to be exterminated; after which the Saints—i.e. the poor in question—would set up their kingdom, a realm without suffering or sin. (Cohn, 1993c:14–15) It was at times of acute dislocation and disorientation that this demonising tendency was more present. When people were faced with a situation totally alien to their experience of normality, when they were faced with unfamiliar hazards dislocating their constructions of reality—when they encountered the real—the collective flight into the world of demonology could occur more easily (ibid.: 87). The same applies to the emergence of millenarian fantasies. The vast majority of revolutionary millenarian outbreaks takes place against a background of disaster. Cohn refers to the plagues that generated the first Crusade and the flagellant movements of 1260, 1348–9, 1391 and 1400, the famines that preluded the first and second Crusade, the pseudo-Baldwin movement and other millenarian outbreaks and, of course, the Black Death that precipitated a whole wave of millenarian excitement (ibid.: 282).7 It is perhaps striking that all the characteristics we have encountered up to now are also marking modern phenomena such as Nazi anti-Semitic utopianism. In fact, in the modern anti-Semitic fantasy the remnants of past demonological terrors are blended with anxieties and resentments emerging for the first time with modernity (Cohn, 1996:27). In structural terms the situation remains pretty much the same. The first condition of possibility for its emergence is the dislocation of traditional forms of organising and making sense of society, a dislocation inflicted by the increased hegemony of secularism, liberalism, socialism, industrialisation, etc. Faced with such disorientating developments, people can very easily resort to a promise for the re-establishment of a lost harmony. Within such a context Hitler proved successful in persuading the Germans that he was their only hope. Heartfield’s genius collages exposing the dark kernel of National Socialism didn’t prove very effective against Nazi propaganda. It was mass unemployment, misery and anxiety (especially of the middle classes) that led to Hitler’s hegemony, to the hegemony of the Nazi utopian promise. At the very time when German society was turning into one of the great industrial powers of Europe, a land of factories and cities, technology and bureaucracy, many Germans were dreaming of an archaic world of Germanic peasants, organically linked by bonds of blood in a ‘natural’ community. Yet, as Cohn very successfully points out, ‘such a view of the world requires an anti-figure, and this was supplied partly by the liberal West but also, and more effectively, by the Jews’ (Cohn, 1996:188). The emergence of the Jew as a modern antichrist follows directly from this structural necessity for an anti-figure. Rosenberg, Goebbels and other (virtually all) Nazi ideologues used the phantom of the Jewish race as a lynch-pin binding the fears of the past and prospective victims of modernisation, which they articulated, and the ideal volkish society of the future which they proposed to create in order to forestall further advances of modernity. (Bauman, 1989:61) No doubt the idea of a Jewish world conspiracy is a revival, in a secularised form, of certain apocalyptic beliefs. There is clearly a connection between the famous forgery known as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the antichrist prophecy (Cohn, 1996:48). The Protocols were first published by Nilus as part of his book The Great in the Small: Antichrist Considered as an Imminent Political Possibility and were published in 1917 with the title He is Near, At the Door…Here comes Antichrist and the Reign of the Devil on Earth. As the famous Nazi propagandist Rosenberg points out ‘One of the advance signs of the coming struggle for the new organisation of the world is this understanding of the very nature of the demon which has caused our present downfall. Then the way will be open for a new age’ (Rosenberg in Cohn, 1996:217). Within this schema the elimination of the antichrist, that is the Jews, is considered as the remedy for all dislocations, the key to a new harmonious world. Jews were seen as deserving death (and resented for that reason) because they stood between this one imperfect and tension-ridden reality and the hoped-for world of tranquil happiness…the disappearance of the Jews was instrumental in bringing about the world of perfection. (Bauman, 1989:76) As Sartre claims, for the anti-Semite the Good itself is reduced to the destruction of Evil. Underneath the bitterness of the anti-Semite one can only reveal the optimistic belief that harmony will be reconstituted of itself, once Evil is destroyed. When the mission of the anti-Semite as holy destroyer is fulfilled, the lost paradise will be re-established (Sartre, 1995:43–5).8 In Adorno’s words, ‘charging the Jews with all existing evils seems to penetrate the darkness of reality like a searchlight and to allow for quick and all-comprising orientation…. It is the great Panacea…the key to everything’ (Adorno, 1993:311, my emphasis). Simply put, the elimination of the Jew is posited as the only thing that can transform the Nazi dream to reality, the only thing that can realise utopia.9 As it is pointed out by an American Nazi propagandist, ‘our problem is very simple. Get rid of the Jews and we’d be on the way to Utopia tomorrow. The Jews are the root of all our trouble’ (True in Cohn, 1996:264, my emphasis). The same is, of course, true of Stalinism. Zygmunt Bauman brings the two cases together: Hitler’s and Stalin’s victims were not killed in order to capture and colonise the territory they occupied…. They were killed because they did not fit, for one reason or another, the scheme of a perfect society. Their killing was not the work of destruction but creation. They were eliminated, so that an objectively better human world—more efficient, more moral, more beautiful—could be established. A Communist world. Or a racially pure, Aryan world. In both cases, a harmonious world, conflict free, docile in the hands of their rulers, orderly, controlled. (Bauman, 1989:93) In any case, one should not forget that the fact that the anti-figure in Nazi ideology came to be the Jew is not an essential but a contingent development. In principle, it could have been anyone. Any of us can be a substitute for the Jew. And this is not a mere theoretical possibility. In their classical study of the authoritarian personality Theodor Adorno and his colleagues point out that ‘subjects in our sample find numerous other substitutes for the Jew, such as the Mexicans and the Greeks’ (Adorno, 1993:303). Although the need for the structural position of the anti-figure remains constant the identity of the ‘subject’ occupying that position is never given a priori. This does not mean that within a certain historical configuration with a particular social sedimentation and hegemonic structure all the possibilities are open to the same extent; it means though that in principle nobody is excluded from being stigmatised. Of course, the decision on who will eventually be stigmatised depends largely on the availability within a particular social configuration of groups that can perform this role in social fantasy, and this availability is socially constructed out of the existing materials. As Lacan points out in Anxiety, although a lack or a void can be filled in several ways (in principle), experience—and, in fact, analytic experience—shows that it is never actually filled in 99 different ways (seminar of 21 November 1962). What we have here is basically **a** play of incarnation. This play of incarnation is marking both the pole of the utopian fantasies and the pole of the evil powers that stand between us and them. As Cohn concludes, Middle Ages prophecies had a deep effect on the political attitudes of the times. For people in the Middle Ages, the drama of the Last Days was not a distant and hazy but an infallible prophecy which at any given moment was felt to be on the point of fulfilment: In even the most unlikely reigns chroniclers tried to perceive that harmony among Christians, that triumph over misbelievers, that unparalleled plenty and prosperity which were going to be the marks of the new Golden Age. When each time experience brought the inevitable disillusionment people merely imagined the glorious consummation postponed to the next reign. (Cohn, 1993c:35) But this fantasy cannot be separated by the coming of the antichrist which was even more tensely awaited. Generation after generation of medieval people lived in continuous expectation of signs of the antichrist, and since these signs, as presented in the prophecies, included comets, plague, bad rulers, famine, etc. a similar play of incarnation was played out in terms of determining the true face of the antichrist (ibid.).

Framing/method

**Thus  I advocate a reading of the resolution centered on traversing the fantasy to find that the Appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.**

**Traversing the fantasy is key. We must understand that our desires have no object that can fill our lack. Rather, lack is intrinsic to our location within the symbolic.**

**Sharpe**, University of Melbourne, ‘5 [Matthew, “Jacques Lacan (1901—1981)”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/lacweb/, RSR]

It is for this reason that Slavoj Zizek has recently drawn a parallel between it and Kant's unity of apperception in The Critique of Pure Reason. Lacan himself, in his seminar on the logic of fantasy, strove to articulate his meaning by a revision of Descartes' famous cogito ergo sum: "I am not where I think." The key to this formulation is the opposition between thinking and being. Lacan is saying that, at the point of my thought and speech (the subject of enunciation), there I have no substantial being that could be known. Equally, "I am not where I think" draws out the necessary misapprehension of the nature of the subject in what s/he enunciates. If Lacan's subject thus seems a direct psychoanalytic restatement of Sartre/Kojeve's position, however, it needs to be read in conjunction with his doctrines concerning the "master signifier" and the "fundamental fantasy." Lacan says that master signifiers "represent the subject for other signifiers." Given his identification of the subject with a lack of being, a first register of this remark becomes clear. The master signifiers, as examined above, have no particular enunciated content or signified, according to Lacan.But the Lacanian position is precisely that this lack of enunciated content is **correlative to the subject**. In this way, his theorisation of the subject depends not only on a phenomenological analysis, as (for example) Sartre's does in Being and Nothingness. If the subject is the subject "of the lack of the signifier," Lacan means not only that it cannot be objectified at the point of its thinking, as I examined above. The subject is---directly---something that emerges at the point of- and **because of- a lack in the field of signification**, on his reckoning. This was already intimated above, in the section on the "logics of the fantasy," which recounted Lacan's position concerning how it is that subjects develop regimes of fantasy concerning what Others are supposed to know in order to ground their own belief in, and identification with, the master signifiers. The point to be emphasised now is that these master signifiers, if they are to function, cannot do without this subjective investment of fantasy. Lacan's famous claim there is no metalanguage is meant to imply only this: that there is no field of sense that can be "quilted," and attain to a semblance of consistency, unless subjects have invested their partial, **biased perspective** upon that field. This is even the final and most difficult register to what Lacan aimed to express in the matheme: $ a. As we saw in Part 3, ii., the subject is correlative to the fantasmatically posed lost object/referent of the master signifiers. We can now state a further level of what Lacan implied in this matheme, though. This is that in fantasy what subjects misrecognize is not simply the non-existence of the incestuous-maternal Thing. What subjects primordially repress is the necessity of subjects' implication in the play of signification that has **over-determined** the symbolic coordinates of their lives. The archetypal neurotic subject-position, Lacan notes, is one of victimization. It is the Others who have sinned, and not the subject. S/he has only suffered. What is of course occluded by these considerations (which may be right or wrong from a moral or legal perspective) is how the subject has invested him/herself in the events of his/her life. Firstly, there is the fantasmatic investment of the subject in the "Others supposed to enjoy," who are supposed not to have been made to undergo the castrating losses that s/he [they] has [have] undergone. As Lacan reads Freud's later postulation of the superego, this psychical agency is constructed around residual fantasies of the Oedipal father supposed to have access to the sovereign jouissance of the mother's body denied to the child. Secondly, what is occluded is what Freud already theorised when he spoke of subjects' adaption to and "gain" from their illness, as a way of organising their access to jouissance in defiance of the demands of the big Other. Even if the subject has undergone the most frightful trauma, Lacan argues, what matters is how this trauma has come to be signified subsequently and retrospectively by the subject around the fundamental fantasy. S/he must be made to avow that the subject-position they have taken up towards their life is something that they have subjectified, and have an ongoing stake in. This is why, in Seminar II, Lacan quips that the injunction of psychoanalysis is mange ton dasein!- eat your existence! He means that at the close of the analysis, the subject should come to internalise and so surpass the way that it has so far organised your life and relations to Others. It is this point, accordingly, that the ethics of Lacanian psychoanalysis is announced. **Lacan's name for what occurs at the end of the cure is traversing the fantasy**. But since what the fantasy does, for Lacan, is veil from the subject his/her own implication in and responsibility for how s/he experiences the world, to traverse the fantasy is to **reavow subjective responsibility**. To traverse the fantasy, Lacan theorizes, is to cease positing that the Other has taken the "lost" object of desire. It is to accept that this object is something posited by oneself as a means to compensate for the experienced trauma of castration. One comes to accept that castration is not an event with a winner (the father) and a loser (the subject), but a structurally necessary factum for human-beings as such, to which all speaking subjects have been subjected. What equally follows is the giving up of the resentful and acquisitive project of trying to reclaim the objet petit a from the Other, and "settling the scores." This gives way to an identification with the place of this object that is at once within the fabric of the world, and yet which stands out from it. (Note that this is one Lacanian reading of "where It was, there I shall be"). The subject who has traversed the fantasy, for Lacan, is the subject who has not ceded on its desire. This desire is no longer fixed by the coordinates of the fundamental fantasy. S/he is able to accept that the fully satisfying sexual object, that which would fulfil the sovereign desire of the mother, does not exist. S/he is [They are] thus equally open to accepting that the big Other, and/or any concrete Other supposed by the subject to be its authoritive representative(s), does not have what s/he has [they have] "lost." Lacan puts this by saying that **what the subject can now avow is that the Other does not Exist**: that **it, too, lacks**, and what it does and wants depends upon the interventions of the subject. The subject is, finally, able to thereby accept that what it took to be its place in the order of the Other is not a finally fixed thing. It can now avow without reserve that it is a lacking subject, or, as Lacan will also say, a subject of desire, but that the metonymic sliding of this desire has no final term. Rather than being ceaselessly caught in the lure of the object-cause of desire, this desire is now free to circle around on itself, as it were, and desire only itself, in what is a point of strange final proximity between Lacan and the Nietzcheanism he scarcely ever mentioned in his works.

**ROTB is to vote for the team who embraces this lack**

**Ruti 10** *Winnicott with Lacan: Living Creatively in a Postmodern World. American Imago, 67(3), 353–374.[*doi:10.1353/aim.20 [sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016](https://sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016)]

While the internalization of the signifier brings the subject into existence as a creature of desire (thereby giving it access to a fully “human” existence), it simultaneously reveals that **the** surrounding **world is much larger and more powerful than any individual subject could ever be—that the self is always merely a minor participant in a system of signification that operates quite independently of its “private” passions and preoccupations**. In this manner, the signifier shatters the fantasies of omnipotence and wholeness that characterize the emerging ego of the mirror stage. One could, then, say that, in the Lacanian scenario, we purchase our social subjectivity at the price of narcissistic injury in the sense that we become culturally intelligible beings only insofar as we learn to love ourselves a bit less. It is worth noting right away that one of the things that drives a wedge between Lacan and Winnicott is that while Winnicott regards the ego as what allows the subject to enter into an increasingly complex relationship to the world, Lacan associates it primarily with narcissistic and overconfident fan- tasies that lend an illusory consistency to the subject’s psychic life. Lacan explains that **the subject’s realization that it is not synonymous with the world**, but rather a frail and faltering creature that needs continuously to negotiate its position in the world, **introduces an apprehensive state of want and restlessness that it finds difficult to tolerate and that it consequently endeavors to cover over by fantasy formations**. In other words, **because lack is devastating to admit to**—because the subject experiences it as a debilitating wound—**it is disposed to seek solace in fantasies that allow it to mask and ignore the reality of this lack.** Such fantasies alleviate anxiety and fend off the threat of fragmentation because they enable the subject to consider itself as more unified and complete than it actually is; by concealing the traumatic split, tear, or rift within the subject’s psychic life, they render its identity (seemingly) reli- able and immediately readable. As a result, they all too easily lead the subject to believe that it can come to know itself in a definitive fashion, thereby preventing it from recognizing that “knowing” one version of itself may well function as a defense against other, perhaps less reassuring, versions.One consequence of the subject’s dependence on such ego- gratifying fantasies is that they mislead it to seek self-fulfillment through the famous *objet petit a*—the object cause of desire that the subject believes will return to it the precious sense of whole- ness that it imagines having lost.2 In this scenario, the subject searches for meaning outside of itself, in an object of desire that seems to contain the enigmatic *objet a*. Lacan’s goal, in this context, is to enable the subject to perceive that **this fantasmatic quest** for secure foundations **is a waste** of its psychic energies. His aim is to convince the subject that the *objet a* will never give it the meaning of its existence, but will, instead, lead it down an ever-widening spiral of existential deadends. How, then, does the Lacanian subject find meaning in its life? Lacan’s answer is that it is **only by accepting lack as a precondition of its existence**—by welcoming and embracing the primordial wound inflicted by the signifier—**that the subject can begin to weave the threads of its life into an existentially evocative tapestry**. It is, in other words, **only by exchanging its ego for language**, its narcissistic fantasies for the meaning making capacities of the signifier,that **the subject can begin to ask constructive questions about its life.**3 For Lacan, there are of course no definitive answers to these questions. But this does not lessen the value of being able to ask them. The fact that there is no stable truth of being does not prevent the subject from actively and imaginatively participating in the production of meaning.Lacan implies that it is precisely because the subject can never attain the truth of its  being—because it can never achieve a state of transparent wholeness—that it is driven to look for substitutes that might compensate for its sense of lack; it is motivated to invent figures of meaning that can, momentarily at least, ease and contain the discomfort of alienation. In this paradoxical sense, **rather than robbing the subject of its inner richness, lack is the underpinning of everything that is potentially innovative about human life**.

**Prefer**

* **Prefiat-an: aff ballot upholds the educational capacity of examining our ontological positions and the ROTB forces us to distance ourselves from harmful debate practices such as improbable nuke impacts.**
* Aff embraces ideas of not reading utopias, counters squo’s discourse
* Letting go of elements of desire that shape the space race (shift in mindset)
* Aff isn't a post-fiat implication,
* Embracing the lack requires a shift in mindset and discourse. The mindset shift requires accepting that there is a lack, and that we don't have to fill it just to fill it This prevents us from seeking out utopias that perpetually cause harm
* Essentially: no amount of going up to space in a giant phallus will soothe Jeff Bezos’s man feelings. He's always going to want more and moreAnd that means he will launch attacks against people who disagree like climate activists, possible government officials and destroy environments of other planets bc he just doesn't care
* Not just better debater: they hit theory of power even if they speak will

UNDERVIEW

**Allow 1AR Theory**

**1] It checks against infinite abuse in the neg. 1AR theory is drop the debater, and competing interps.**

**2] It’s also key to deterring abusive NC’s from spreading out the 1AR on paradigm issues**

**3]Fairness is a voter because debaters must be on an equitable level before engaging in substantive education.**

**Reject Extinction First Weighing,**

**1) Extinction based politics pulls us away from thinking about the right and moral responses to the world around us and interrogating our own desires.**

**2) Everything technically could cause extinction – spraying hairspray could put a hole in the ozone layer - it’s infinitely regressive**

**3) Probability comes before Magnitude, otherwise we would constantly focus on non-applicable things**

**4] Extinction impacts are viewed from a white patriarchal lens, any possible neg da’s disregard ongoing extinction of minorities such as idenigious people for low probability events**

**Falsifiability is a bad standard and aff meets anyways**

**1. They can’t falsify their case---**

**2. Falsifiability is a bad standard and doesn’t apply to psychoanalysis --- this also turns their framework impact because it’s an excuse to avoid psychological investigation**

**Castellano ‘12** (Daniel, The Insufficiency of Empiricism, <http://www.arcaneknowledge.org/philtheo/empiricism2.htm>)

The successful use of controlled experiments in science to corroborate or falsify hypotheses has led many to consider this testing process as the defining characteristic of scientific inquiry. Sir Karl Popper articulated this criterion when trying to find a way to distinguish apparent pseudosciences such as Freudianism and Marxism from genuine science. Popper asserted that a truly scientific theory must be “falsifiable,” that is to say, it can be subjected to a controlled experiment that could conceivably contradict it. Conversely, any theory that does not admit the possibility of empirical falsification is regarded as pseudoscience. The falsifiability standard has attained widespread acceptance among scientists, though philosophers of science have pointed out several problems with such a definition of scientific method. First, the falsifiability standard was chosen by Popper deliberately to exclude theories he intuitively judged unscientific, so it possibly contains more cultural bias than an objective theory of knowledge should. Second, it is not clear that this standard includes or excludes the theories that Popper intended. Some Marxists and Freudians are quite amenable to refutation by experiment, while some mathematical theories of physics deal with particle interactions that are fundamentally unobservable. Moreover, Popper’s definition might be interpreted to exclude mathematics and many of the social sciences, particularly those studying the unrepeatable past. Falsifiability might be a good standard for empirical natural science, but not science in the broader, classical sense of the term. So-called pseudosciences such as Freudianism, Marxism, and astrology do not meet the falsifiability standard, to the extent that their defenders resort to special pleading to explain away failed predictions, rather than admit a failure of their theory. This seems to make the scientific or pseudoscientific status of a theory depend more on the behavior of its adherents than on any intrinsic characteristic of the theory as such. Tautological knowledge, which may be deduced by philosophers and mathematicians, would seem to be inherently unfalsifiable. This exclusion reminds us that a theory of empirical science can never serve as a general theory of knowledge, as there are other possible paths to knowledge. Thus pseudosciences that do not meet the falsifiability standard are not thereby discredited in the least. All that is proven is that they are not empirical sciences of nature, but neither are mathematics and philosophy, and that is not to their discredit. The falsifiability standard counterintuitively suggests that the credibility of a scientific theory is derived from the possibility of it being wrong. It is more accurate to assert that a scientific theory gains credibility from its verifiability, by successfully passing tests where it might have been proven wrong. What is paramount is that a theory is consistent with observation, and this has been the hallmark of physical science for the last three centuries, without explicit reference to a falsifiability standard. As long as a theory is confirmed by controlled experiment, the hypothetical possibility of a negative result is of secondary importance. Equally counterintuitive is the implication that a theory lacking falsifiability loses credibility. Intuitively, if a proposition is absolutely not falsifiable, it is certainly true, though it may be merely a tautology. Regarding pseudosciences as non-falsifiable gives them too much credit, when in fact their excuses for failed predictions can be refuted by evidence and argument. All too often the falsifiability standard is used as an excuse to refuse to engage a theory, maintaining that its exponents will not accept any refutation.

**Finally, reject Util**

**[1] Consequences empirically impossible to predict. Menand 05,  Louis Menand (the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University) “Everybody’s An Expert” The New Yorker 2005** [**http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert//**](http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert/) **FSU SS “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism.//AHS EM**

 Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, [e.g.] economic growth), or less of something (repression, [e.g.] recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.