## 1

#### The World Trade Organization ought to be abolished.

#### The following 164 countries listed in the speech doc ought to independently eliminate patent protections for medicines.

Afghanistan Albania Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Bahrain, Kingdom of Bangladesh Barbados Belgium Belize Benin Bolivia, Plurinational State of Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cabo Verde Cambodia Cameroon Canada Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Congo Costa Rica Côte d’Ivoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Democratic Republic of the Congo Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Estonia Eswatini European Union (formerly EC) Fiji Finland France Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hong Kong, China Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Korea, Republic of Kuwait, the State of Kyrgyz Republic Lao People’s Democratic Republic Latvia Lesotho Liberia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macao, China Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Moldova, Republic of Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria North Macedonia Norway Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovak Republic Slovenia Solomon Islands South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Suriname Sweden Switzerland Chinese Taipei Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Uruguay Vanuatu Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of Viet Nam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe

Josh **Hawley 20**. Senator from Missouri, JD @ Yale, “The W.T.O. Should Be Abolished,” New York Times, May 5, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

The coronavirus emergency is not only a public health crisis. With [30 million Americans unemployed](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/us-weekly-jobless-claims.html), it is also an economic crisis. And it has exposed a hard truth about the modern global economy: it weakens American workers and has empowered China’s rise. That must change.

The global economic system as we know it is a relic; it requires reform, top to bottom. We should begin with one of its leading institutions, the World Trade Organization.

We should abolish it.

#### Solves the case---abolition allows free trade and permits nations govern without the pitfalls of the WTO

Josh **Hawley 20**. Senator from Missouri, JD @ Yale, “The W.T.O. Should Be Abolished,” New York Times, May 5, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

Abandoning the W.T.O. is a start. The United States must seek new arrangements and new rules, in concert with other free nations, to restore America’s economic sovereignty and allow this country to practice again the capitalism that made it strong. History can be our guide. For nearly 50 years before the W.T.O.’s founding, the United States and its allies maintained a network of reciprocal trade that protected our national interests and the nation’s workers. We can do it again, for the 21st century. That means returning production to this country, securing our critical supply chains and encouraging domestic innovation and manufacturing. It means striking trade deals that are truly mutual and truly beneficial for America and walking away when they are not. It means building a new network of trusted friends and partners to resist Chinese economic imperialism.

#### Counterplan competes ---

#### 1] Normal means---it’s in their plan text.

#### 2] “Member” is defined as part of a group---the counterplan abolishes the broader group

**Merriam Webster n.d.** “Member,” <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/member>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

**:**one of the individuals composing a group

#### 3] “Member of” means “to be contained in” “to be included in” and “be part of” --- none of those are possible if the broader group is gone.[[1]](#footnote-1)

#### The WTO as an institution is unethical and perpetuates colonialism – solves case

Godrej 20

(Dinyar, Co-editor @ New Internationalist, 4-20, https://newint.org/features/2020/02/10/brief-history-impoverishment)

For countries that were undergoing economic ravishment by structural adjustment, the 1990s brought new torments in the form of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a club dominated by rich nations. In the name of creating a ‘level playing field’, the WTO required poorer countries to sign up to an all-or-nothing, binding set of rules, which removed protections for domestic industries and allowed foreign capital unhindered access. This was strongly prejudicial to the interests of local industries, which were not in a position to withstand foreign competition. Influence within the WTO is weighted by the size of a nation’s economy – thus even if all poorer nations joined forces to demand policy changes they would still not have a chance against wealthy nations. This trade injustice has drawn widespread protests and pressure for the WTO to reform. Meanwhile, wealthy nations are increasingly going down the route of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Usually negotiated in secret, the interests of their corporations are paramount in FTAs and include the ability to sue states for eye-watering sums (should they, for example, want to terminate a contract or nationalize an industry) with no provision for states to do the same. Such instruments are working to create a utopia for transnational corporations, creating a business-friendly climate, which translates as the demolition of labour protection, tax cuts for the wealthiest and a supine regulatory environment. Tax havens operated by the richest countries are home to huge sums of illicit wealth draining out of some of the poorest. Today, due to how the global economy has been engineered, for every dollar of aid sent to poorer countries, they lose 10 times as much in outflows – and that’s before one counts their losses through unfair trade rules and underpaid labour. Foreign investors take nearly $500 billion a year in profits from the Global South, and trade-power imbalances cost poorer nations $700 billion a year in lost export revenue. 7 CONCENTRATION In the 21st century wealth increasingly flows through corporate hands towards a small super-elite. In a trend that began in the 1990s, the lion’s share of equity value is being realized through squeezing workers: the classification ‘working poor’ so familiar in the Global South is now increasingly also being used in the wealthy North, where neoliberal capitalism is leading inevitably to wage erosion and work precarity, coupled with the withdrawal of state support. Inequality is rising dramatically. In 2018 the richest 26 people owned wealth equivalent to the poorest half of the world’s population. And their wealth was increasing at the rate of $2.5 billion a day. Meanwhile 3.4 billion people – nearly half the world – were living on less than $5.50 a day.

#### Allows rampant Chinese tech theft and enrichment

Josh **Hawley 20**. Senator from Missouri, JD @ Yale, “The W.T.O. Should Be Abolished,” New York Times, May 5, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

The reformers wanted all the world to follow the same economic rules, so that capital, products, and people could move easily across national boundaries. Nation-states themselves would become less important in setting economic policy and new, multilateral institutions, like the W.T.O., would take on the role of managing the global economy.

It was a bold vision, and a major departure. The economic system it replaced had been created by America and its allies at the close of the Second World War and pursued more modest aims. The Cold War system sought to build up the free nations’ economies and to contain the Soviet Union. It took the independent nation-state as its basic building block, and encouraged trade and investment between nations as equal sovereigns. This system allowed each country to set its own internal economic policy and control its borders and trade.

But in the early 1990s, with America’s principal adversary gone, Western policymakers were in a messianic frame of mind. President George H.W. Bush [promised](https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-the-45th-session-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-new-york) a “new world order” of “open borders, open trade … and open minds,” a new international system based on liberal values to bring peace to the world. He and other internationalists wanted a new economic system to match.

That new order’s universal peace never quite arrived. Instead, the internationalists embroiled America in one foreign war after another. And their liberal economic order fared little better. It sent American production overseas, compromised American supply chains, and cost American jobs, all while enriching Communist China.

Take the World Trade Organization. Its mandate was to promote free trade, but the organization instead allowed some nations to maintain trade barriers and protectionist workarounds, like China, while preventing others from defending themselves, like the United States. Foreign agriculture won concession after concession, while American farmers struggled to get fair access to markets. Meanwhile, the W.T.O. required American workers to compete against Chinese [forced labor](https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/CECC%20Staff%20Report%20March%202020%20-%20Global%20Supply%20Chains%2C%20Forced%20Labor%2C%20and%20the%20Xinjiang%20Uyghur%20Autonomous%20Region.pdf) but did next to nothing to stop Chinese theft of American intellectual property and products.

Under the W.T.O.’s auspices, capital and goods moved across borders easier than before, no doubt, but so did jobs. And too many jobs left America’s borders for elsewhere. As factories closed, workers suffered, from small towns to the urban core. Inflation adjusted, working wages stagnated and upward mobility flatlined.

Enough is enough. The W.T.O. should be abolished, and along with it, the new model global economy. The quest to turn the world into a liberal order of democracies was always misguided. It always depended on unsustainable American sacrifice and force of arms. And its companion economic order has, in similar vein, succeeded mostly in weakening American workers and industry.

We must face facts. The only sure way to confront the single greatest threat to American security in the 21st century, Chinese imperialism, is to rebuild the U.S. economy and to build up the American worker. And that means reforming the global economic system.

#### Specifically, the WTO permits Chinese tech theft.

Stephen **Ezell 21**. Vice President, Global Innovation Policy, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, “False Promises II: The Continuing Gap Between China’s WTO Commitments and Its Practices,” ITIF, July 26, 2021, <https://itif.org/publications/2021/07/26/false-promises-ii-continuing-gap-between-chinas-wto-commitments-and-its>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

Nearly 20 years after joining the World Trade Organization, China remains woefully short of meeting a broad range of commitments and responsibilities, to the detriment of both its trading partners and the international economic system.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

China’s state-led economic model, driven heavily by innovation-mercantilist practices, stands at odds with the foundational WTO principles of pursuing market-oriented policies while providing non-discrimination, national treatment, and reciprocity.

China has failed to meet numerous WTO commitments on issues such as industrial subsidization, protection of foreign intellectual property, forcing joint ventures and technology transfer, and providing market access to services industries.

China’s behavior toward the WTO and its trading partners is that of a nation that knew what it had to promise to enter the organization, but its subsequent actions have demonstrated it never intended to keep those promises.

Decades of gaming the global trading system and failing to meet WTO commitments have enabled China to accumulate tremendous trade surpluses and foreign currency reserves, which it uses to pursue domestic and foreign policy objectives.

It is time for like-minded nations to join together to forcefully insist that China come into full and immediate compliance with all its WTO commitments and more broadly to contest China’s innovation-mercantilist strategies.

INTRODUCTION

As China nears its 20th year of World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, originally acceding to the organization on December 11, 2001, it has never been further away from faithfully committing to the foundational principles and tenets of the organization and its fundamental obligations and commitments. WTO membership comes with rights to enjoy preferential access to other nations’ markets, but also responsibilities. In particular, it commits nations to support and pursue “open, market-oriented policies” in accordance with the foundational principles of “non-discrimination, market access, reciprocity, and fairness.”1

China has taken full advantage of its WTO rights. It has also largely ignored the responsibilities and commitments through its embrace of state-directed capitalism predicated upon an aggressive innovation mercantilism. This mercantilism denies foreign enterprises access to Chinese markets on reciprocal terms; distorts global markets, including for advanced-technology goods; and deprives nations of the benefits they believed they would receive when granting China accession into the community of trading nations.

In this report, China’s accession to the WTO is recounted along with the trade rules with which it fails to comply. The report also describes the economic benefits China has accrued in part by not complying with its WTO commitments. Lastly, it offers policy recommendations for policymakers from the United States and like-minded nations to address the continuing China trade challenge.

Our initial 2015 Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) report on this topic, on which this report is based, is premised on China’s false promises to the WTO. Even with a full-scale Section 301 investigation initiated by the Trump administration, China has made little progress in fulfilling a wide range of its WTO commitments over the past two decades.2

#### Stopping tech stealing is key to avoid war

Timothy R. **Heath 18**. RAND Senior Defense and International Analyst, “Avoiding “Avoiding U.S.-China Competition Is Futile: Why the Best Option Is to Manage Strategic Rivalry”; Asia Policy; Vol 13 No 2; April 2018, RJP, DebateDrills

This article argues that the structural drivers of U.S.-China competition are too deep to resolve through cooperative engagement and that policymakers must instead accept the reality of strategic rivalry and aim to manage it at a lower level of intensity. main argument Rising tensions between China and the U.S. have spurred fears that the two countries could end up in conflict or recreate the Cold War. To avoid these outcomes, analysts have proposed ways to defuse competition and promote cooperation. However, because these arguments do not address the structural drivers underpinning U.S.-China competition, such proposals are unlikely to end the rivalry. Conflict is not inevitable, however, and aggressive strategies that unnecessarily aggravate the sources of rivalry are likely to prove dangerously counterproductive. The best option at this point is, paradoxically, for the U.S. to accept the reality of the growing strategic rivalry and manage it at a lower level of intensity. policy implications • Maintaining a technological edge is critical for the U.S. to successfully manage the rivalry with China. Policies should be pursued to ensure that the U.S. continues to attract and nurture the best science and technology talent and retains its status as the global leader in technology. • To compete with China’s narrative about leading regional integration, the U.S. should both put forth a compelling vision for the region that encompasses widely held economic, security, and political values and continue to bolster its diplomatic and military positions in Asia. • To maintain the U.S.-China rivalry at a stable level, policymakers in both countries should prioritize measures that discourage the mobilization of popular sentiment against the other country and encourage cultural exchanges. • U.S.-China competition will likely become increasingly entwined with rivalries between China and U.S. allies and partners such as Japan and India. U.S. policymakers will need to take into account the independent dynamics of those separate rivalries when managing relations with China. The United States and China find themselves increasingly enmeshed in a strategic rivalry, the basic nature of which remains poorly understood in the United States. To be sure, disagreements between the two countries have gained widespread attention. Disputes involving Chinese confrontations with U.S. allies and partners such as Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan have frequently grabbed the headlines. At other times, disagreements over Chinese trade practices and U.S. military activities in the South China Sea have occasioned discord. All these sources of conflict are genuine, but they mask the main drivers of rivalry, which are twofold. First, the United States and China are locked in a contest for primacy—most clearly in Asia and probably globally as well. The United States has been the dominant power, and China seeks to eventually supplant it. By definition, two different states cannot simultaneously share primacy at either the regional or global level. Second, economic, demographic, and military trajectories suggest that China has the potential to contend in a significant way for leadership at the global systemic level. At this level, the most decisive competition will be for technological leadership. Should China supplant the United States as the world’s premier country in terms of technology, its claim to regional and global supremacy will be difficult to deny. And once it has gained that supremacy, China will be well positioned to restructure institutional arrangements to privilege itself and disadvantage the United States. Although this competition is occurring simultaneously at both levels, observers have focused primarily on the struggle for primacy at the regional level and overlooked or downplayed the competition at the global systemic level.1 To counter China’s pursuit of regional primacy, the United States has bolstered its alliances in Asia (albeit inconsistently), expanded diplomatic outreach to China and rising powers in Southeast Asia, and revised its military posture—efforts captured by President Barack Obama’s “rebalance to Asia.” President Donald Trump may have abandoned the rebalance, but many of the related initiatives remain more or less in place.2 China’s challenge at the global systemic level, especially in the field of technology, has received less attention. Confidence in the proven U.S. ability to produce new technologies and facile assumptions about the difficulties China will face in promoting innovation in new industries have led many to dismiss the challenge posed by China. **But the contest for technological leadership is actually even more consequential than that for regional primacy.** Should China succeed in surpassing the United States as the world’s technological leader, U.S. diplomacy and military power will not suffice to hold the line either in Asia or around the globe**.** Under those conditions, countries throughout the world, including U.S. allies in Asia, will be forced to come to terms with the new leading economy. Military power projection could be far less relevant as China moves to consolidate its leading status at both the regional and global levels in such a scenario. Accordingly, although the United States cannot abandon its efforts to bolster its diplomatic and military position in Asia, the country must step up its efforts to strengthen its faltering lead in new technology development. While China clearly grasps the stakes, it is not clear that the United States does. For example, China’s government has promoted R&D into quantum computing. The investment appears to be paying off, as the country has leaped ahead of the United States in developing quantum communications.3 Similarly, the U.S. Congress has proposed to dispense with subsidies for the purchase of electric vehicles, even as China pushes ahead in its plan to become the lead producer of this technology.4 And while the U.S. government seeks to restrict immigration and discourage foreign students from attending U.S. universities (and staying after they receive their advanced training), China has revised its policies to welcome foreigners, prioritizing those with science and technology expertise. Moreover, Chinese investment in basic R&D is rapidly catching up to that of the United States.5 Studies have also noted a shrinking U.S. lead in science and technology as such investment is beginning to bear fruit.6 Similarly, the United States has lost its once-undisputed lead in the per capita number of engineers and scientists.7 Understanding the nature of the U.S.-China rivalry at the regional and global systemic levels, as well as how these two levels interact with one another, is essential if the United States is to successfully manage the challenge posed by China in a manner that avoids war. This study aims to contribute to that understanding. The article is organized into the following sections: u pp. 95–102 provide an overview of the growing rivalry between China and the United States, including a discussion of the meaning and role of strategic rivalry in interstate conflict and a comparison with the U.S.-China rivalry during the Cold War. u pp. 102–4 review the dynamics of the rivalry at the regional systemic level. u pp. 104–10 analyze the dynamics of the rivalry at the global systemic level. u pp. 110–15 examine why proposals to avoid rivalry through cooperation or aggressive competition are unlikely to succeed. u pp. 115–19 discuss the idea of strategic rivalry management and offer recommendations on ways to sustain the rivalry at a lower level of intensity the growing rivalry between the united states and china Strains between China and the United States have deepened in the past few years over a proliferating array of issues. President Trump has stepped up accusations against China of unfair trade practices and inadequate pressure on North Korea. He also provoked controversy early in his term when he floated the idea of increasing official contacts with Taiwan, which Beijing considers a renegade province.8 These disputes add to tensions that had expanded under President Obama, who moved to strengthen U.S. alliances in Asia, promote a regional trade pact, criticize Chinese behavior in the cyber and maritime domains, and shift more military assets to the Asia-Pacific as part of the rebalance to Asia strategy.9 China has in turn dismissed U.S. concerns about the construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, intensified its criticism of U.S. security leadership in Asia, and tightened its grip on disputed maritime territories.10 The baleful state of bilateral relations has spurred plenty of finger-pointing. On the Chinese side, officials denounce the United States’ “Cold War mindset” and warn of conflict if Washington does not adjust its policies.11 A 2015 defense white paper described an “intensifying competition” between the great powers.12 Military officials and many Chinese analysts regard increasing tension between the two countries as unavoidable, although they do not regard war as likely. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deputy chief of staff Qi Jianguo commented that “no conflict and no confrontation does not mean no struggle” between China and the United States.13 According to Chinese official media, polls in China suggest a large majority believes that the United States intends to pursue a containment policy.14 Reflecting this point of view, Niu Xinchun, a scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, argued that the “greatest obstacle to the further integration of emerging countries such as China into the international system comes from the United States.”15 Western officials and commentators tend to blame China for current strains. Senior U.S. leaders have criticized “assertive” Chinese behavior, while some analysts blame Xi Jinping for pushing a more confrontational set of policies.16 Other Western observers worry that a further souring of relations could lead to conflict.17 But even if war remains unlikely, the deepening tensions increase the risks of miscalculation, crises, and potential military clashes involving the world’s two largest powers. Echoing a view widely held among U.S. foreign policy experts and officials, former CIA director General Michael Hayden has warned that mishandling the U.S.-China relationship could be “catastrophic.”18 Rivalry at the Heart of the U.S.-China Relationship This widespread concern reflects a realistic appraisal of the dangers inherent in the U.S.-China relationship. But developing successful policies to manage an increasingly sensitive and complex situation requires an accurate assessment of the phenomenon of interstate rivalry that lies at the heart of that relationship. Rivalry is a concept that, while widely acknowledged, remains poorly understood. To be sure, most experts take for granted the idea that powerful nations compete for status and influence, and they acknowledge the danger posed by a rising power’s challenge to a status quo power. Yet investigation into the phenomenon of rivalry too often stops at these well-trodden findings. Less often discussed are the conclusions regarding the dynamics of rivalry that experts on conflict studies have arrived at within the past few years. Much of this scholarship draws from improvements to the analyses and data regarding interstate crisis and conflict.19 This research has generated useful and interesting insights regarding the start and conclusion of rivalries, crises, and war, although these remain largely unexplored outside academic circles. Analysts have established, for example, that rivalry is perhaps the most important driver of interstate conflict. As defined by political scientists, “rivals” are states that regard each other as “enemies,” sources of real or potential threat, and as competitors. At the root of rivalries thus lie disputes over incompatible goals and perceptions that countries possess both the ability (real or potential) and the intention to harm each other. Wars have historically tended to be fought by pairings of these states and their allies. Rivals have opposed each other in 77% of wars since 1816 and in over 90% of wars since 1945.20 Not only are rivals more likely to fight than non-rivals, but rivals also have a tendency to be recidivists because they are unable to resolve their political differences on the battlefield. Yet that does not always discourage them from trying to do so repeatedly. Rivals that cannot prevail due to parity frequently compete for advantage by building internal strength through arms racing or by leveraging external power through the strengthening of alliances and partnerships. Rivals are also prone to serial militarized crises**.** Mutual perceptions of each other as hostile enemies and the inconclusive outcome of previous militarized disputes typically fuel a pattern of recurrent crises characterized by deepening resentment, distrust, and growing willingness to risk escalation. Studies have also established that the risk of conflict increases sharply after three episodes of militarized crises.21 Rivalries do not progress in a linear direction, however. Their intensity can wax and wane in response to shocks and other important developments. Periods of relative stability can alternate with turbulent periods of tension and conflict. Similarly, cooperative activities can be interspersed with periods of acute tension and hostility. Nevertheless, the link between rivalry, crises, and interstate conflict is pervasive. Drawing from these sources, one can describe the Sino-U.S. relationship as a rivalry characterized as a competition between two major powers over incompatible goals regarding their status, leadership, and influence over a particular region—in this case principally the Asia-Pacific. The dynamics of this type of strategic rivalry differ in significant ways from the far more numerous rivalries over territory that have characterized conflict between so many countries, especially weaker and poorer ones. In contrast with rivalries over territories, strategic rivals do not necessarily share borders, although allies of one power may be engaged in a territorial dispute with the other major power. Strategic rivalries among major powers tend to be especially long-lived, with the average enduring for about 55 years.22 Strategic rivalries are incredibly complex phenomena that include overlapping and often reinforcing layers of disputes over leadership, status, and territory between the principal rivals and their allies. Such rivalries are almost always multilateral affairs that also involve allies and partners, some of which have their own rivalries with the other side. Competition in the economic, political, and military domains can serve as expressions as well as drivers of rivalry, as can sports and cultural competition. Strategic rivalries can be confined to one region, with the basic conflict reducible in some respects to which rival will occupy the top rung of the regional hierarchy. In other cases, however, a rivalry can span regional and global domains either sequentially or simultaneously. The U.S.-China rivalry, for instance, is already both a regional and, to a lesser extent, a global rivalry, but there is still considerable room for competition to expand. The complex and overlapping nature of the disputes makes strategic rivalries extremely crisis- and conflict-prone. Strategic rivalries come in a grim package deal that includes strained and hostile relations, serial crises, and in some cases wars. The comprehensive and multifaceted nature of the disputes also explains why such rivalries have proved so durable and why their wars have been so devastating. Conflict between strategic rivals has historically occasioned the most destructive wars, of which World Wars I and II are the most recent examples. The fact that experts at the time of each historic episode of systemic conflict consistently underestimated the duration or extent of war offers cold comfort to analysts today who seek to predict the trajectory of any conflict that might involve China and the United States. Comparisons of the Current Environment with the U.S.-China Rivalry during the Cold War How did the two countries arrive at this position? The most widely accepted narrative argues that China’s rapid economic growth has provided the resources with which it can press demands on long unresolved issues such as unification with Taiwan. China and the United States may have enjoyed stable relations in the 1980s when they cooperated on a limited basis against the Soviet Union, but that foundation of cooperation eroded considerably once the Soviet bloc dissolved in the early 1990s. Moreover, China’s rapid growth in economic power has given the country fresh resources to press its own demands on the United States and U.S. allies. By 2010, China’s economy had outpaced that of Japan to become the second-largest in the world.23 The persistence of long-standing sources of antagonism, such as the U.S. security partnership with Taiwan, has both reflected and aggravated a broader competition for leadership. For its own reasons, Washington has resisted Beijing’s demands, and the result has been growing fear and distrust.24 The intensifying rivalry between the rising power and the status quo leader is as old as antiquity itself. Indeed, Graham Allison coined the term “Thucydides trap” to describe such a situation, a term that he subsequently applied to the current U.S.-China situation.25 The popular narrative is not entirely incorrect, yet in some ways it remains incomplete. A closer look at history reminds us that antagonism between China and the United States is not unprecedented. In the 1950s and 1960s, the two countries engaged in an intense strategic competition for status and influence in Asia, one that occasionally burned hot, as it did when they clashed on the Korean Peninsula or more indirectly in Vietnam. This Cold War–era rivalry saw a complex network of competing alliances and partnerships, principally in Asia. The United States supported Taiwan and South Korea in bitter disputes with China and its allies, North Korea and the Soviet Union. This rivalry terminated in the 1970s primarily due to Beijing’s decision to counter a growing Soviet menace and the United States’ decision to pursue China as a potential partner for its own rivalry with the Soviet Union. But the existence of a period of intense U.S.-Chinese tension and competition provides a helpful baseline of comparison. What requires explanation is not the fact that the United States and China are engaged in a rivalry but the difference between today’s rivalry and that of the Cold War. What distinguishes the rivalry today from that of the earlier period is both the closer parity in relative power—albeit still more potential than real—between the two countries and the comprehensiveness, complexity, and systemic nature of the disputes between them. Paradoxically, these features make the current rivalry potentially far more threatening to the United States, despite the fact that so far U.S.-China relations have remained peaceful, and even though the U.S. and Chinese militaries fought each other in the Korean War. The dangerous potential of the current rivalry ultimately owes to the risk that China could rise to the position of global system leader and subordinate the United States accordingly. As has happened in previous power transitions, China as a system leader could exploit existing arrangements to its benefit and to the detriment of the outgoing leader, the United States. Due to the enormous rewards that accrue to a systemic leader and the high costs for the state that loses this position**,** struggles for global leadership have historically proved to be especially destructive. The possibility that China and the United States could find themselves in a similar struggle, while unlikely at this point, cannot be ruled out given the reality of the relative decline in U.S. power and the concomitant increase in Chinese comprehensive national power. At the most basic level, this fact may be measured superficially by the U.S. share of world GDP, which eroded from 40% in 1950 to 16% in 2014, adjusted for purchasing power parity. Over the same period, China’s share expanded from around 5% to 17%.26 An important consequence of the narrowing of the gap in comprehensive power has been an intensifying competition for leadership in the international economic and political order. In this way, the popular discussion of the Thucydides trap correctly recognizes the dangers of the U.S.-China competition. This feature contrasts sharply with the previous episode of rivalry. In the 1950s and 1960s, the asymmetry in power meant that the United States and China competed for influence and even clashed militarily in countries along China’s borders, but rarely elsewhere. As a largely rural, impoverished country, China had little stake in the system of global trade promoted by the industrialized West. Excluded from the United Nations, Maoist China also lacked the institutional ability to influence geopolitics and project power much beyond its immediate environs—and even that capability was sorely handicapped. Outside Asia, the United States faced minimal competition from China and generally regarded the Soviet Union as a more pressing threat. By contrast, the current competition features a China fully enmeshed in a political and economic order led by the United States. While generally supportive of this order, China is also seeking to revise aspects of the regional and international order that it regards as obstacles to the country’s revitalization as a great power. The main theater of this competition for influence and leadership is the Asia-Pacific, as it was in the Cold War, but U.S.-China rivalry increasingly is expanding globally. Moreover, unlike the largely military, regional, and ideological Cold War competition, the current contest is far more multifaceted and comprehensive in nature; it includes military, economic, technological, and political dimensions. The following two sections review the state of the competition at both the regional and the global systemic levels. the u.s.-china rivalry at the regional level At the regional level, U.S.-China competition spans the political, economic, and military realms. Politically, the two countries have feuded over the role of liberal values and ideals, a dispute that widened after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. However, the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis elevated the potential threat of conflict between the two countries and may therefore be regarded as the starting point of the current rivalry. Coinciding with impressive gains in China’s economic and military power following two decades of market reforms, the standoff saw Washington and Beijing deploy military assets to back up their respective positions regarding Taiwan’s right to hold a presidential election, elevating the risk of a clash. Since then, the competition for political influence and leadership has intensified. In 2011, the United States announced its rebalance to Asia, which was aimed in part at shoring up U.S. alliances, partnerships, and influence.27 Although on the surface Washington has abandoned the effort, the Trump administration has reintroduced a vision for Asia’s economic and security order premised on values favorable to U.S. interests.28 The 2017 National Security Strategy stated, for example, that the United States upholds a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”29 Beijing, by contrast, has increased its efforts to advance a vision for a regional order premised on Chinese leadership. In recent years, China has promoted major economic and geostrategic initiatives to deepen Asia’s economic integration through the Belt and Road Initiative, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and other initiatives.30 In 2017, China for the first time issued a white paper that outlined the government’s vision for Asia-Pacific security. The paper stated that China takes the advancement of regional prosperity and stability “as its own responsibility.”31 These policies build on directives issued by Xi Jinping in 2013, when he called for policies to bolster China’s attractiveness as a regional leader.32 Economically, the two countries are competing over the evolution of Asia’s economic future—a region anticipated to drive global growth in coming decades. Both countries are also competing to shape the terms of trade. President Trump may have abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but his advisers have advocated other measures to shape favorable trade terms.33 Meanwhile, China has stepped up advocacy of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a proposed free trade agreement for the region that excludes the United States.34 China also has promoted the AIIB, while the United States and Japan continue to instead support the Asian Development Bank.35 Militarily, the growing arms race and the establishment of rival security institutions stand among the most obvious manifestations of an increasing competition in this domain. China and the United States have designed an array of military capabilities and doctrines partly aimed at each other. The PLA has developed weapons systems to counter potential U.S. intervention in any contingency along China’s periphery, which the United States has in turn sought to counter with its own innovations, such as the Joint Operational Access Concept.36 U.S. secretaries of defense Chuck Hagel and Ashton Carter outlined a “third offset” strategy to compete with China and Russia in military technology.37 To promote regional security, the United States has strengthened its military alliances and partnerships, while China has strengthened ties with Russia and argued that regional security is best protected through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, and other Chinese-led institutions. In 2014, Xi indirectly rebuked the United States for seeking to bolster its security leadership in the region, stating that “it is for the people of Asia to uphold the security of Asia.”38

## 2

#### Economy’s recovering now – Delta and inflation are challenges but surmountable

Sully 8/19 - Evan Sully, 8/19/21, Reuters, U.S. leading indicator points to further economic recovery in July, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-leading-indicator-points-further-economic-recovery-july-2021-08-19/ WJ

(Reuters) -A gauge of future U.S. economic activity increased in July, suggesting the economy continued to expand from the recession caused by the coronavirus pandemic even in the face of a resurgence in cases fueled by the Delta variant.

The Conference Board on Thursday said its index of leading economic indicators (LEI) rose 0.9% last month to 116.0. Economists polled by Reuters had expected an increase of 0.8%.

Even though the U.S. economy is forecast to grow this year at its fastest pace since the 1980s, there are signs the recovery could be cooling off. Supply-chain bottlenecks continue to slow manufacturing growth, and consumer sentiment plummeted in early August to a decade-low as Americans gave faltering outlooks on everything from personal finances to inflation and employment.

Meanwhile, consumer price increases slowed in July, the Labor Department said last week, but inflation overall remained at a historically high level amid supply-chain disruptions as well as stronger demand for travel-related services.

"The U.S. LEI registered another large gain in July, with all components contributing positively," said Ataman Ozyildirim, the Conference Board's senior director of economic research. "While the Delta variant and/or rising inflation fears could create headwinds for the U.S. economy in the near term, we expect real GDP (gross domestic product) growth for 2021 to reach 6.0% year-over-year, before easing to a still robust 4.0% growth rate for 2022."

The LEI's coincident index, a measure of current economic conditions, rose 0.6% in July after increasing 0.4% in June.

But the lagging index increased 0.6% last month after being unchanged in June and increasing 0.8% in May.

"Even with more moderate growth in the second half of the year, the economy’s momentum remains encouraging with constraints on labor supply easing, a trove of excess savings still waiting to be drawn down, and strong vaccine numbers that will insulate the economy from the worsening health situation more so than prior waves," said Mahir Rasheed, U.S. economist at Oxford Economics.

#### Pharma collapses without strong IP protections

Buckland 17 - Danny Buckland (award-winning journalist who writes about health, general features and news, shortlisted for the prestigious Mind Media Awards for his work covering mental health issues), April 26, 2017, “Patents are lifeblood of pharmas”, https://www.raconteur.net/legal/intellectual-property/patents-are-lifeblood-of-pharmas/ WJ

Pharmaceutical companies are staffed by ranks of attorneys, and the intellectual property (IP) specialist is now a pivotal position in the research and development (R&D) cycle that keeps a company profitable and new drugs flowing to patients.

Tighter regulatory frameworks and even tighter purse strings controlled by healthcare systems are putting the squeeze on pharma returns and limiting R&D budgets. Figures from analysts Deloitte in 2016 reported projected return on investment was at a six-year low while development costs had risen by almost a third.

The litany of market changes is vexing for the industry. The generation of blockbuster drugs, with massive returns, has ended, national healthcare budgets are receding, traditional management methods are being challenged and new players, such as electronics and software companies, are entering the arena.

“For pharmaceutical companies, the patent system is its lifeblood and it simply wouldn’t survive without it,” says Simon Wright, a patent attorney with J A Kemp and chairman of the Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys’ life sciences committee. “The cost of getting a product to market is high and there is a high failure rate, so you are not going to get investment unless you can protect your product and innovation. Quite frankly, it would all collapse without good IP.”

#### Bipoharma collapse causes economic meltdown – it’s far worse than previous recessions

Howrigon 17 -- Ron Howrigon “(President and Founder of Fulcrum Strategies. He earned a Bachelor's degree in Business Administration from Western Michigan University and a Master's in Economics from North Carolina State University, focusing in the area of Health Economics) http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2017/01/health-care-crash-u-s-economy.html, January 19 2017, WJ

In recent history, the U.S. economy has experienced the near catastrophic failure of two major market segments. The first was the auto industry and the second was the housing industry. While each of these reached their breaking point for different reasons, they both required a significant government bailout to keep them from completely melting down. What is also true about both of those market failures is that, looking back, it’s easy to see the warning signs. What happens if health care is the next industry to suffer a major failure and collapse? It’s safe to say that a health care meltdown would make both the automotive and housing industries’ experiences seem minor in comparison. While that may be hard to believe, it becomes clear if you look at the numbers. The auto industry contributes around 3.5 percent of this country’s GDP and employs 1.7 million people. This industry was deemed “too big to fail” which is the rationale the U.S. government used to finance its bail out. From 2009 through 2014, the federal government invested around $80 billion in the U.S. auto industry to keep it from collapsing. Health care is five times larger than the auto industry in terms of its percentage of GDP, and is ten times larger than the auto industry in terms of the number of people it employs. The construction industry (which includes all construction, not just housing) contributes about 6 percent of our country’s GDP and employs 6.1 million people. Again, the health care market dwarfs this industry. It’s three times larger in terms of GDP production and, with 18 million people employed in the health care sector, it’s three times larger than construction in this area, too. These comparisons give you an idea of just how significant a portion health care comprises of the U.S. economy. It also begins to help us understand the impact it would have on the economy if health care melted down like the auto and housing industries did. So, let’s continue the comparison and use our experience with the auto and housing industries to suggest to what order of magnitude the impact a failure in the health care market would cause our economy. The bailout in the auto industry cost the federal government $80 billion over five years. Imagine a similar failure in health care that prompted the federal government to propose a similar bailout program. Let’s imagine the government felt the need to inject cash into hospital systems and doctors’ offices to keep them afloat like they did with General Motors. Since health care is five times the size of the auto industry, a similar bailout could easily cost in excess of $400 billion. That’s about the same amount of money the federal government spends on welfare programs. To pay for a bailout of the health care industry, we’d have to eliminate all welfare programs in this country. Can you imagine the impact it would have on the economy if there were suddenly none of the assistance programs so many have come to rely upon? When the housing market crashed, it caused the loss of about 3 million jobs from its peak employment level of 7.4 million in 1996. Again, if we transfer that experience to the health care market, we come up with a truly frightening scenario. If health care lost 40 percent of its jobs like housing did, it would mean 7.2 million jobs lost. That’s more than four times the number of people who are employed by the entire auto industry — an industry that was considered too big to be allowed to fail. The loss of 7.2 million jobs would increase the unemployment rate by 5 percent. That means we could easily top the all-time high unemployment rate for our country. OK, now it’s time to take a deep breath. I’m not convinced that health care is fated to unavoidable failure and economic catastrophe. That’s a worst-case scenario. The problem is that at even a fraction the severity of the auto or housing industry crises we’ve already faced, a health care collapse would still be devastating. Health care can’t be allowed to continue its current inflationary trending. I believe we are on the verge of some major changes in health care, and that how they’re implemented will determine their impact on the overall economic picture in this country and around the world. Continued failure to recognize the truth about health care will only cause the resulting market corrections to be worse than they need to be. I don’t want to diminish the pain and anguish that many people caught up in the housing crash experienced. I think an argument can be made, though, that if the health care market crashes and millions of people end up with no health care, the resulting fallout could be could be much worse than even the housing crisis.

#### Extinction

Tønnesson 15 Stein Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

## 3

#### Existential threats outweigh – all life has infinite value and extinction eliminates the possibility for future generations – err neg, because of innate cognitive biases

GPP 17 (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>,

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

#### Math --- prioritize avoiding existential risk

Bostrom 11

Nick Bostrom, Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, Director of the Future of Humanity Institute, and Director of the Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology at the University of Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Eugene R. Gannon Award for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the London School of Economics, 2011 (“Existential Risk: The most important task for all humanity” Draft of a Paper published on ExistentialRisk.com, <http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.html>)AS

But even this reflection fails to bring out the seriousness of existential risk. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is not that they would show up robustly on a plot like the one in figure 3, causing a precipitous drop in world population or average quality of life. Instead, their significance lies primarily in the fact that they would destroy the future. The philosopher Derek Parfit made a similar point with the following thought experiment: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be *much* worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) **Peace.** (2) **A nuclear** **war that kills 99%** of the world’s existing population. (3) **A nuclear war that kills 100%.** (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). **I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is *very much* greater.** … The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second. (10: 453-454) To calculate the loss associated with an existential catastrophe, we must consider how much value would come to exist in its absence. **It turns out that the ultimate potential for Earth-originating intelligent life is literally astronomical**. One gets a large number even if one confines one’s consideration to the potential for biological human beings living on Earth. If we suppose with Parfit that our planet will remain habitable for at least another billion years, and we assume that at least one billion people could live on it sustainably, then the potential exist for at least 1018 human lives. These lives could also be considerably better than the average contemporary human life, which is so often marred by disease, poverty, injustice, and various biological limitations that could be partly overcome through continuing technological and moral progress. However, the relevant figure is not how many people could live on Earth but how many descendants we could have in total. One lower bound of the number of biological human life-years in the future accessible universe (based on current cosmological estimates) is 1034 years.[[7]](http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.html#_ftn7) Another estimate, which assumes that future minds will be mainly implemented in computational hardware instead of biological neuronal wetware, produces a lower bound of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1071 basic computational operations).(4)[[8]](http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.html#_ftn8) If we make the less conservative assumption that future civilizations could eventually press close to the absolute bounds of known physics (using some as yet unimagined technology), we get radically higher estimates of the amount of computation and memory storage that is achievable and thus of the number of years of subjective experience that could be realized.[[9]](http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.html#_ftn9) Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 1018 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere *one millionth of one percentage point* is at least ten times the value of a billion human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1052 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. **Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere *one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point* is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives**. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any “ordinary” good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the *indirect* effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential risk—positive or negative—is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.[[10]](http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.html#_ftn10)

#### Also turns racism

Thompson 18 [Nicole Akoukou. Chicago-based creative writer. 4-6-2018. "Why I will not allow the fear of a nuclear attack to be white-washed." RaceBaitR. http://racebaitr.com/2018/04/06/2087/#]

I couldn’t spare empathy for a white woman whose biggest fear was something that hadn’t happened yet and might not. Meanwhile, my most significant fears were in motion: women and men dying in cells after being wrongly imprisoned, choked out for peddling cigarettes, or shot to death during ‘routine’ traffic stops. I twitch when my partner is late, worried that a cantankerous cop has brutalized or shot him because he wouldn’t prostrate himself. As a woman of color, I am aware of the multiple types of violence that threaten me currently—not theoretically. Street harassment, excessively affecting me as a Black woman, has blindsided me since I was eleven. A premature body meant being catcalled before I’d discussed the birds and the bees. It meant being followed, whistled at, or groped. As an adult, while navigating through neighborhoods with extinguished street lights, I noticed the correlation between women’s safety and street lighting—as well as the fact that Black and brown neighborhoods were never as brightly lit as those with a more significant white population. I move quickly through those unlit spaces, never comforted by the inevitable whirl of red and blue sirens. In fact, it’s always been the contrary. Ever so often, cops approach me in their vehicle’s encouraging me to “Hurry along,” “Stay on the sidewalk,” or “Have a good night.” My spine stiffening, I never believed they endorsed my safety. Instead, I worried that I’d be accused of an unnamed accusation, corned by a cop who preys on Black women, or worse. A majority of my 50-minute bus ride from the southside of Chicago to the north to join these women for the birthday celebration was spent reading articles about citywide shootings. I began with a Chicago Tribute piece titled “33 people shot, seven fatally, in 13 hours,” then toppled into a barrage of RIP posts on Facebook and ended with angry posts about police brutality on Tumblr. You might guess, by the time I arrived to dinner I wasn’t in the mood for the “I can’t believe we’re all going to die because Trump is an idiot” shit. I shook my head, willing the meal to be over, and was grateful when the check arrived just as someone was asking me about my hair. My thinking wasn’t all too different from Michael Harriot’s ‘Why Black America Isn’t Worried About the Upcoming Nuclear Holocaust.” While the meal was partly pleasant, I departed thinking, “fear of nuclear demolition is just some white shit.” Sadly, that thought would not last long. I still vibe with Harriot’s statement, “Black people have lived under the specter of having our existence erased on a white man’s whim since we stepped onto the shore at Jamestown Landing.” However, a friend—a Black friend—ignited my nuclear paranoia by sharing theories about when it might happen and who faced the greatest threat. In an attempt to ease my friend’s fear, I leaned in to listen but accidentally toppled down the rabbit hole too. I forked through curated news feeds. I sifted through “fake news,” “actual news,” and foreign news sources. Suddenly, an idea took root: nuclear strike would disproportionately impact Black people, brown people, and low-income individuals. North Korea won’t target the plain sight racists of Portland, Oregon, the violently microaggressive liberals of the rural Northwest, or the white-hooded klansmen of Diamondhead, Mississippi. No, under the instruction of the supreme leader Kim Jong-un, North Korea will likely strike densely populated urban areas, such as Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington D.C., and New York City. These locations stand-out as targets for a nuclear strike because they are densely populated U.S. population centers. Attacking the heart of the nation or populous cities would translate to more casualties. With that in mind, it’s not lost on me that the most populous cities in the United States boast sizeable diverse populations, or more plainly put: Black populations. This shit stresses me out! There’s a creeping chill that follows me, a silent alarm that rings each time my Google alert chimes letting me know that Donald Trump has yet again provoked Kim Jong-Un, a man who allegedly killed his very own uncle. I’ve grown so pressed by the idea of nuclear holocaust that my partner and I started gathering non-perishables, candlesticks, a hand-crank radio, and other must-buy items that can be banked in a shopping cart. The practice of preparing for a nuclear holocaust sometimes feels comical, particularly when acknowledging that there has long been a war on Black people in this country. Blackness is bittersweet in flavor. We are blessed with the melanized skin, the MacGyver-like inventiveness of our foremothers, and our blinding brightness—but the anti-blackness that we experience is also blinding as well as stifling. We are stuck by rigged systems, punished with the prison industrial complex, housing discrimination, pay discrimination, and worse. We get side-eyes from strangers when we’re “loitering,” and the police will pull us over for driving “too fast” in a residential neighborhood. We get murdered for holding cell phones while standing in our grandmother’s backyard. The racism that strung up our ancestors, kept them sequestered to the back of the bus and kept them in separate and unequal schools still lives. It lives, and it’s more palpable than dormant. To me, this means one thing: Trump’s America isn’t an unfortunate circumstance, it’s a homecoming event that’s hundreds of years in the making, no matter how many times my white friends’ say, “He’s not my president.” In light of this homecoming, we now flirt with a new, larger fear of a Black genocide. America has always worked towards Black eradication through a steady stream of life-threatening inequality, but nuclear war on American soil would be swift. And for this reason I’ve grown tired of whiteness being at the center of the nuclear conversation. The race-neutral approach to the dialogue, and a tendency to continue to promote the idea that missiles will land in suburban and rural backyards, instead of inner-city playgrounds, is false. “The Day After,” the iconic, highest-rated television film in history, aired November 20, 1983. More than 100 million people tuned in to watch a film postulating a war between the Soviet Union and the United States. The film, which would go on to affect President Ronald Reagan and policymakers’ nuclear intentions, shows the “true effects of nuclear war on average American citizens.” The Soviet-targeted areas featured in the film include Higginsville, Kansas City, Sedalia, Missouri, as well as El Dorado Springs, Missouri. They depict the destruction of the central United States, and viewers watch as full-scale nuclear war transforms middle America into a burned wasteland. Yet unsurprisingly, the devastation from the attack is completely white-washed, leaving out the more likely victims which are the more densely populated (Black) areas. Death tolls would be high for white populations, yes, but large-scale losses of Black and brown folks would outpace that number, due to placement and poverty. That number would be pushed higher by limited access to premium health care, wealth, and resources. The effects of radiation sickness, burns, compounded injuries, and malnutrition would throttle Black and brown communities and would mark us for generations. It’s for that reason that we have to do more to foster disaster preparedness among Black people where we can. Black people deserve the space to explore nuclear unease, even if we have competing threats, anxieties, and worries. Jacqui Patterson, Director of the Environmental and Climate Justice Initiative, once stated: African American communities are disproportionately vulnerable to and impacted by natural (and unnatural) catastrophes. Our socio-economic vulnerability is based on multiple factors including our lack of wealth to cushion us, our disproportionate representation in lower quality housing stock, and our relative lack of mobility, etc.

## Case

Top level is that their solvency is specific to COVID—the Vanni card specifies COVID vaccines to other nations

#### Patents have already been reduced and nothing has changed

**Drezner 5/10** – Drezner, Daniel W., 10 May 2021. “The end of intellectual property protections?” The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/05/10/end-intellectual-property-protections/>. Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Prior to Fletcher, he taught at the University of Chicago and the University of Colorado at Boulder. He has previously held positions with Civic Education Project, the RAND Corporation and the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and received fellowships from the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Council on Foreign Relations, and Harvard University. (Harker KB) //recut EG

This leads us to the libertarian position — that this was a short-term exercise in symbolic politics at the expense of long-term innovation. Libertarians argue, correctly, that this will change very little in terms of vaccine dissemination, because patents have not been the binding constraint. In October, Moderna [announced](https://investors.modernatx.com/news-releases/news-release-details/statement-moderna-intellectual-property-matters-during-covid-19) that it would not enforce its coronavirus-related patents during the pandemic. That did not trigger a tsunami of vaccine generics. As [the Financial Times’s Alan Beattie notes](https://www.ft.com/content/b3c2ae3c-4688-4ea9-a1ed-9e72bc01eedb), “India has all the IP and know-how it needs and yet still can’t produce enough for itself, let alone supply the world.” In addition to patents, a lot of tacit knowledge is required to manufacture mRNA vaccines.

#### IP waiver fails to address main issues—neg on presumption

Nick Bassil 21 (Nick Bassil, Partner of Life Sciences and Chemistry Team for Killburn and Strode, Involved in Patent Applications and IP rights of research institutions) Why a waiver won’t work 6-15-2021 No Publication https://www.kilburnstrode.com/knowledge/european-ip/covid19-vaccine-ip-protection-waiver //DebateDrills TJ

Nick Bassil, Partner in the life science and chemistry team at Kilburn & Strode, believes that the waiver proposal is unlikely to address the desired aim of increasing vaccinations: “The IP issues only scratch the surface of the problem. The bigger issues are knowledge transfer, the availability of raw materials and the education and training of staff.” COVID-19 vaccines are complex and require raw materials and manufacturing equipment that are not easily available, and there are no short cuts: every dose must be safe and effective. This requires skilled scientists and rigorous processes. (Some of the promising leads for vaccines, as well as treatments and diagnostics, were discussed in our previous article “The worldwide pharma response to coronavirus”.)

#### A waiver can’t solve for supply shortages – the squo sufficiently solves vaccine production but a waiver will disrupt supply chains.

Zarocostas 21, Zarocostas, J., 2021. What next for a COVID-19 intellectual property waiver?. *The Lancet*, *397*(10288), pp.1871-1872., <https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(21)01151-X/fulltext?utm_campaign=WR&utm_content=167900285&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&hss_channel=tw-27013292>, Debatedrills AS

Intellectual property industry consultants and health diplomats say the waiver will not solve the immediate problem of the huge shortfall in vaccine production aggravated by vaccine nationalism, hoarding of supplies, and poor sharing or donation of COVID-19 vaccines.

“Even if a waiver is approved, there may still be bottlenecks related to production capacity, distribution, and the production of raw materials and equipment used to manufacture package and transport vaccines”, said Appleton. “Of course, just the threat of a waiver may help drive down the cost of vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostic tools, and result in increased access in the developing world. The threat may also lead to voluntary licensing agreements on terms favourable to developing countries.”

Thomas Cueni, director-general of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations, told *The Lancet*that “The waiver would also put into question the framework that gives companies the trust to sign contracts with other manufacturers they voluntarily collaborate with. The **waiver** is at best a distraction, at worst it will disrupt the supply chain and divert scarce resources.”

No coercion was needed, Cueni noted, to encourage the setting up of more than 280 partnerships and collaborations among vaccine manufacturers worldwide. “As a result COVID-19 vaccine production capacity has been scaled up in a matter of months from zero to 1·7 billion in April, and it is anticipated that 11·6 billion COVID-19 vaccine doses will be produced by the end of 2021.”

For technologies, such as medicines, 't Hoen has noted, an intellectual property waiver would be sufficient to allow generic production. However, for vaccines, in addition to the intellectual property “you need additional technology transfer or access to materials such as cell lines. Some of those may be in the public domain. But if not the original company or research institute would have to provide this”.

#### Waiving IP misses the point of solving for vaccine inequity.

Rachel Silverman (Rachel Silverman, leads policy-oriented research on global health financing and incentive structures, Master’s of Philosophy in public health University of Cambridge) Would Exempting COVID-19 Vaccines from Intellectual Property Rights Improve Global Access and Equity? Center For Global Development https://www.cgdev.org/debate/would-exempting-covid-19-vaccines-intellectual-property-rights-improve-global-access //DebateDrills TJ

With thanks to our contributors and commentators, I think this debate has generated greater clarity and nuance—if not necessarily consensus—about whether IP poses a meaningful barrier to COVID-19 vaccine access. We largely agree that knowledge-sharing and tech transfer are the crux of the IP issue—not patents and legal strictures per se. Moderna, for example, has waived IP enforcement for COVID-19 vaccines but has not widely shared its know-how; without the latter, the former action has not generated any generic production.

We are left, in that case, with two broad areas of disagreement and/or uncertainty.

First, is an IP waiver important as a first step and/or symbolic gesture, even if it will have limited impact without broader knowledge sharing? Some have argued “yes”—that it provides legal clarity to protect generic manufacturers against retribution and signals a shared commitment to human life and health over company profits and wealthy-country interests. From my perspective, I continue to feel largely agnostic on this point. I recognize the symbolic value and I’m not opposed to the waiver per se¸ but given its relatively low impact I continue to think it’s an inefficient use of limited global advocacy/political capital for vaccine access.

Second, if originators were to freely share all know-how, would additional generic companies start manufacturing? We spent less time discussing this, so I don’t want to mischaracterize anyone’s views. I think we (mostly) agree that there are generic manufacturers with the capacity to produce at least some of the vaccines (Oxford/AZ, J&J, and Novavax) in the medium-term. But in the absence of public subsidy—and given considerable medium-term commercial risk vis-à-vis total demand and performance against emerging variants—I’m still unsure that they would actually invest up-front to repurpose manufacturing lines. Given that there’s already substantial competition between originators, my instinct is that we should continue to actively engage originators in scale-up, creating the right incentives for voluntary licensing and tech transfer.

1. https://www.thesaurus.com/browse/be%20a%20member%20of [↑](#footnote-ref-1)