# NC

## Offs

### 1

#### Permissibility Negates –

#### 1. Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation[[1]](#footnote-1) which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two. Semantics o/w – a) it’s key to predictability since we prep based on the wording of the res and b) it’s constitutive to the rules of debate since the judge is obligated to vote on the resolutional text.

#### 2. Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.

#### 3. Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the “P” and “~P” are true.

#### Volition, or the structure of the will, is a pre-condition for ethics and has intrinsic value – A) Proceduralism – the will is the mechanism by which every agent engages in any activity, which means regardless of the content of any ethical theory, the ability to will that theory is an intrinsic good B) Motivation – the structure of the will is the primary source of all our desires, reasons, and beliefs since it generates what counts as motivational to the subject C) Identity – the nature of the will is most constitutive to the creation of the subject since it determines what each subject considers intrinsic to its identity and what exists externally as an façade.

**Ethical theories to evaluate the will face a dilemma – they are either paternally objectivist to the extent they restrict the will, or they are weakened by subjectivism to the extent that it’s impossible to make true moral claims. Jaeggi 14,** Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation///Scopa. From the perspective of liberal theory one aspect of the critique of alienation appears problematic above all others: **theories of alienation appear to appeal to objective criteria that lie beyond the “sovereignty” of individuals to interpret for themselves what the good life consists in**. Herbert Marcuse exemplifies this tendency of many theories of alienation in One Dimensional Man—a book that provided a crucial impulse for the New Left’s critique of alienation in the 1960s and 1970s— when, unconcerned with the liberal objection, he defends the validity of diagnoses of alienation with respect to the increased integration and identification with social relations that characterize the members of affluent industrial societies: “I have just suggested that the concept of alienation seems to become questionable when the individuals identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have in it their own development and satisfaction. This identification is not illusion, but reality. However, the reality constitutes a more progressive stage of alienation. The latter has become entirely objective; the subject which is alienated is swallowed up by its alienated existence.”10 The subjective satisfaction of those who are integrated into objectively alienated relations is, according to Marcuse, “a false consciousness which is immune against its falsehood.”11 Here, however, the theory of alienation appears to have made itself immune to refutation. It would seem, then, that the concept of alienation belongs to **a perfectionist ethical theory that presupposes, broadly speaking, that it is possible to determine what is objectively good for humans by identifying a set of properties or a set of functions inherent in human nature—a “purpose”—that ought to be realized. But** if the foundation of modern morality and the fundamental conviction of liberal conceptions of society is the idea “that **it should be left to each individual how he lives his own life**” 12—that **individuals are sovereign with respect to interpreting their own lives—then a theory of alienation that relies on objective perfectionist ideals appears to reject this idea in favor of a paternalist perspective that claims to “know better.”** For the latter (and as seems to be the case for Marcuse), it is possible for something to count as objectively good for someone without him subjectively valuing it as such. By the same token, it is possible to criticize a form of life as alienated or false without there being any subjective perception of suffering. But can someone be alienated from herself in the sense outlined here if she herself fails to perceive it? Can we claim of someone that she is alienated from her own desires or driven by false (alienated) needs or that she pursues an alienated way of life if she claims to be living precisely the life she wants to lead? In diagnoses of alienation the question arises, then, whether there can be objective evidence of pathology that contradicts individuals’ subjective assessments or preferences. This is a dilemma that is difficult to resolve. On the one hand, the concept of **alienation (this is what distinguishes it from weaker forms of critique) claims to be able to bring to individuals’ prima facie evaluations and preferences a deeper dimension of critique—a critical authority—that functions as a corrective to their own assertions**. On the other hand, it is not easy to justify the position of such a critical corrective. What could the objective criteria that overrule the assessments and preferences of individuals be in this case? 13 The arguments from human nature frequently appealed to in this context demonstrate, even in their most methodologically sophisticated, “thin” variants, the problems that plague attempts to derive normative standards from some conception of human nature. 14 **Even if there is**—in a banal sense—**something humans share on the basis of their natural, biological constitution, and even if**—in a banal sense—**certain functional needs can be derived from these basic presuppositions of human life** (all humans need nourishment or certain climatic conditions in order to survive), **these basic conditions imply very little when it comes to evaluating how humans, in relation to issues beyond mere survival, lead their lives**. On the other hand, the more human nature is given a specific content such that it becomes relevant to (culturally specific) forms of life, the more controversial and contestable the claims become. How are we to define human nature when its extraordinary variability and malleability appear to be part of human nature itself?15 And how are we to pick out among diverse forms of human life those that really correspond to human nature, given that even forms of life criticized as alienated have been in some way developed, advanced, and lived by human beings?

beings?

#### Only a functional understanding of the will solves – it ensures the very nature of the will is taken care of through appropriate willing capacities, without over-limiting it to a strict set of substantive rules. This functional capacity of willing is mediated by social roles – as the authentic self is inexplicably linked to the self that engages in social communities with others through duplication. Understanding the functionality of the will is impossible in a vacuum. Jaeggi 2, Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation///Scopa. The positions of both authors can be reduced to the following common denominator: roles are less alienating than constitutive for the development of persons and personality. They are constitutive in the sense that they are directly bound up with a person’s development and, so, “productive.” At first glance this position might seem to come down on one side of the two alternatives—an unconditional affirmation of roles—but after giving a brief account of the position, I will make use of it to move beyond the two alternatives. Once the “productivity thesis” has been articulated, it will be possible to distinguish between alienating and non-alienating aspects of role behavior. THE HUMAN BEING AS DOPPELGÄNGER Roles are productive. In and through them we first become ourselves. This is the essence of Helmuth Plessner’s conception of the positive significance of roles (which he developed as a direct response to critiques of them as alienating). “The human being is always himself only in ‘doubling’ in relation to a role figure he can experience. Also, all that he sees as comprising his authenticity is but the role he plays before himself and others.22 Roles on this view are not only necessary in order to make social interaction possible, whether this be a “being together” of individuals or a benign “passing each other by;” interaction mediated by roles is also constitutive of an individual’s relation to herself.

#### This culminates in the act of appropriation – the ability to view yourself as a practical agent capable of taking up a project that actively changes your own subject and the role itself. Jaeggi 3, Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation///Scopa. What does it mean to appropriate something?12 If the concept of appropriation refers to a specific relation between self and world, between individuals and objects (whether spiritual or material), what precisely does this relation look like, what are its particular character and its specific structure? Various aspects come together here, and together they account for the concept’s appeal and potential. As opposed to the mere learning of certain contents, talk of appropriation emphasizes that something is not merely passively taken up but actively worked through and independently assimilated. In contrast to merely theoretical insight into some issue, appropriation—comparable to the psychoanalytic process of “working through”—means that one can “deal with” what one knows, that it stands at one’s disposal as knowledge and that one really and practically has command over it. And appropriating a role means more than being able to fill it: one is, we could say, identified with it. Something that we appropriate does not remain external to ourselves. In making something our own, it becomes a part of ourselves in a certain respect. This suggests a kind of introjection and a mixing of oneself with the objects of appropriation. It also evokes the idea of productively and formatively interacting with what one makes one’s own. Appropriation does not leave what is appropriated unchanged. This is why the appropriation of public spaces, for example, means more than that one uses them. We make them our own by making a mark on them through what we do in and with them, by transforming them through appropriative use such that they first acquire a specific form through this use (though not necessarily in a material sense). Although it has one of its roots in an account of property relations, the concept of appropriation, in contrast to mere possession, emphasizes the particular quality of a process that first constitutes a real act of taking possession of something. Accordingly, appropriation is a particular mode of seizing possession.13 Someone who appropriates something puts her individual mark on it, inserts her own ends and qualities into it. This means that sometimes we must still make something that we already possess our own. Relations of appropriation, then, are characterized by several features: appropriation is a form of praxis, a way of relating practically to the world. It refers to a relation of penetration, assimilation, and internalization in which what is appropriated is at the same time altered, structured, and formed. The crucial point of this model (also of great importance for Marx) is a consequence of this structure of penetration and assimilation: appropriation always means a transformation of both poles of the relation. In a process of appropriation both what is appropriated and the appropriator are transformed.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with non-alienated relations.

#### Prefer –

#### 1. Performativity – Every exercise you engage in is an instance of using your volition to establish some relation to the world and only non-alienation can establish that relationship as normatively legitimate.

#### 2. Action theory – Only viewing an agent as an active body capable of generating intentions can hold agents culpable and decipher the difference between actions and wishes. That’s a necessary feature of ethics since we must be able to warrant a coherent conception of what motivates our actions in order to provide a method to actually implement ethical principles.

#### 3. Epistemology – Only an understanding of appropriation can unify the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge. Theoretical abstract concepts like 2+2=4 are true and necessary, but can only becomes useful once explained in context of how they actualize in the world through our intentions. That means absent an explanation of how that knowledge mixes with the world around us, it becomes useless.

### Contention

#### I contend that member nations of the WTO ought not reduce intellectual property protections for medicine.

#### [1] Intellectual property is a self-expression of the subject. When it’s used in a way that doesn’t reflect the framer’s intent, it is alienating.

Justin Hughes 98, "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property," 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 330-350 (1988) [https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html] AHS//MAK recut emi Accessed 8/10/21

"On the Hegelian perspective, payments from intellectual property users to the property creator are acts of recognition." 3. Intellectual Property Under Hegel. For Hegel, intellectual property need not be justified by analogy to physical property. In fact, the analogy to physical property may distort the status Hegel ascribes to personality and mental traits in relation to the will. Hegel writes: Mental aptitudes, erudition, artistic skill, even things ecclesiastical (like sermons, masses, prayers, consecration of votive objects), inventions, and so forth, become subjects of a contract, brought on to a parity, through being bought and sold, with things recognized as things. It may be asked whether the artist, scholar, &c., is from the legal point of view in possession of his art, erudition, ability to preach a sermon, sing a mass, &c., that is, whether such attainments are "things." We may hesitate to call such abilities, attainments, aptitudes, &c., "things," for while possession of these may be the subject of business dealings and contracts, as if they were things, there is also something inward and mental about it, and for this reason the Understanding may be in perplexity about how to describe such possession in legal terms. . . . n205**.** Intellectual property provides a way out of this problem, by "materializing" these personal traits.Hegel goes on to say that "[a]ttainments, eruditions, talents, and so forth, are, of course, owned by free mind and are something internal and not external to it, but even so, by expressing them it may embody [\*338] them in something external and alienate them." n206.Hegel takes the position that one cannot alienate or surrender any universal element of one's self. Hence slavery is not permissible because by "alienating the whole of my time, as crystallized in my work, I would be making into another's property the substance of my being, my universal activity and actuality, my personality." n207 Similarly, there is no right to sacrifice one's life because that is the surrender of the "comprehensive sum of external activity." n208 This doctrine supplies at least a framework to answer the question of intellectual property that most concerns Hegel. It is a question we ignore today, but one that is not easy to answer: what justifies the author in alienating copies of his work while retaining the exclusive right to reproduce further copies of that work. A sculptor or painter physically embodies his will in the medium and produces one piece of art.When another artist copies this piece Hegel thinks that the hand-made copy "is essentially a product of the copyist's own mental and technical ability" and does not infringe upon the original artist's property. n209 The **problem arises when a creator of intellectual property does not embody** his **will in an object** in **the** same **way the artist does**. The writer physically manifests his will only "in a series of abstract symbols" which can be rendered into "things" by mechanical processes not requiring any talent. n210 The dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that "the purpose of a product of mind is that people other than its author should understand it and make it the possession of their ideas, memory, thinking, &c." n211 This concern for the common of ideas is familiar. In resolving this dilemma, Hegel says that the alienation of a single copy of a work need not entail the right to produce facsimiles because such reproduction is one of the "universal ways and means of expression . . . which belong to [the author]." n212 Just as he does not sell himself into slavery, the author keeps the universal aspect of expression as his own. The copy sold is for the buyer's own consumption; its only purpose is to allow the buyer to incorporate these ideas into his "self." Hegel also identifies the instrumentalist-labor justification as a consideration against granting full rights of reproduction to buyers of individual copies [\*339] of a work. Hegel admits that protecting intellectual property is "[t]he purely negative, though the primary, means of advancing the sciences and arts." n213 Beyond this, Hegel says little. He declares that intellectual property is a "capital asset" and explicitly links this label to a later section in which he defines a "capital asset." n214 There is considerable literature on how Hegel did not develop the idea of "capital" to its logical conclusions, n215 but here "capital asset" can be understood as property which has a greater tendency to permanence and a greater ability than other property to give its own economic security

#### [2] IP is key to recognizing agents through the personality in their work. Recognition is necessary for agents to be non-alienated bc we need to establish relations with the world.

**Hughes 2 -** "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property," 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 330-350 (1988) by Justin Hughes [https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html] // ahs emi

At first blush, this economic rationale seems far removed from the concerns of personality theory, [n244](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n244) yet it can be recast into the framework of the personality theory. From the Hegelian perspective, payments from intellectual property users to the property creator are acts of recognition. These payments acknowledge the individual's claim over the property, and it is through such acknowledgement that an individual is recognized by others as a person. [n245](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n245) "Recognition" involves more than lip service. If I say "this forest is your property" and then proceed to flagrantly trespass, cut your timber, and hunt your deer, I have not recognized your property rights. Similarly, verbal recognition of an intellectual property claim is not equal to the recognition implicit in a payment. Purchasers of a copyrighted work or licensees of a patent form a circle of people recognizing the creator as a person. Furthermore, this generation of income complements the personality theory in as much as income facilitates further expression. When royalties from an invention allow the inventor to buy a grand piano he has always wanted, the transaction helps maximize personality. But this argument tends to be too broad. First, much income is used for basic necessities, leading to the vacuous position that life-sustenance is "personally maximizing" because it allows the personality to continue. Second, this approach could justify property rights for after-the-fact development of personality interests without requiring [\*350] such interests in the property at the time the property rights are granted. The personality theory provides a better, more direct justification for the alienation of intellectual property, especially copies. The alienation of copies is perhaps the most rational way to gain exposure for one's ideas. This is a non-economic, and perhaps higher, form of the idea of recognition: respect, honor, and admiration. Even for starving artists recognition of this sort may be far more valuable than economic rewards. Two conditions appear essential, however, to this justification of alienation: first, the creator of the work must receive public identification, and, second, the work must receive protection against any changes unintended or unapproved by the creator.VARA Hegel's prohibition of "complete" alienation of intellectual property appears to result from his recognition of the necessity for these two conditions. While he would permit alienation of copies, and even the rights to further reproduction, [n246](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n246) he disapproves alienation of "those goods, or rather substantive characteristics, which constitute . . . private personality and the universal essence of . . . self-consciousness." [n247](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n247) Such alienation necessarily occurs if the recognition of the connection between a creator and his expression is destroyed or distorted. When the first condition is violated, this recognition is destroyed; when the second condition is violated, it is distorted.

#### 3. Objectification - Absent intellectual property, agents feel like objects since they aren’t recognized for their exercise of agency. They lack incentive to innovate bc they’re detached from their goods.

### 2

#### Interpretation: If the affirmative defends a consequentialist framework, they must explicitly delineate which theory of the good they defend in the form of a text in the 1ac.

#### Each nuance of the ethic entails different obligations and would exclude different offense – there are 7 different versions.

**Mastin,** [Luke Mastin, Consequentialism, The basics of philosophy <http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_consequentialism.html>]

Some **consequentialist theories include**: Utilitarianism, which holds that an action is right if it leads to the most happiness for the greatest number of people ("happiness" here is defined as the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain). **Hedonism**, **which** is the philosophy **[holds] that pleasure** **is** the **most important** pursuit of mankind, **and** that **individuals** **should** strive to **maximise** **their own total** **pleasure** (net of any pain or suffering). **Epicureanism** is a more moderate approach (which still seeks to maximize happiness, but which **defines happiness** more **as a** **state of tranquillity** than pleasure). **Egoism, which holds that an action is right if it maximizes good for the self.** Thus, Egoism may license actions which are good for an individual even if detrimental to the general welfare. **Asceticism**, in some ways, **the opposite of Egoism in that it describes a life characterized by abstinence from egoistic pleasures** especially **to achieve a spiritual goal. Altruism**, which **prescribes that an individual take actions that have the best consequences for everyone except for himself**, according to Auguste Comte's dictum, "Live for others". Thus, individuals have a moral obligation to help, serve or benefit others, if necessary at the sacrifice of self-interest. **Rule Consequentialism**, which is a theory (sometimes seen as an attempt to reconcile Consequentialism and Deontology), **[holds] that moral behaviour involves following certain rules**, but that those rules should be **chosen** based **on** the **consequences that** the selection of **those rules have**. Some theorists holds that a certain set of minimal rules are necessary to ensure appropriate actions, while some hold that the rules are not absolute and may be violated if strict adherence to the rule would lead to much more undesirable consequences. **Negative Consequentialism**, which **focuses on minimizing bad consequences rather than promoting good consequences**. This may actually require active intervention (to prevent harm from being done), or may only require passive avoidance of bad outcomes.

#### B. Violation: They don’t and maximizing expected well-being doesn’t cut it.

**Crisp**, Roger, "Well-Being", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(Fall **2017** Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/well-being/>.

Well-being is most commonly used in philosophy to describe what is non-instrumentally or ultimately good *for* a person. **The question of what well-being consists in is of independent interest**, but it is of great importance in moral philosophy, especially **in the case of utilitarianism**, according to which the only moral requirement is that well-being be maximized. Significant challenges to the very notion have been mounted, in particular by G.E. Moore and T.M. Scanlon. **It has become standard to distinguish theories of well-being as either hedonist theories, desire theories, or objective list theories**. According to the view known as welfarism, well-being is the only value. Also important in ethics is the question of how a person’s moral character and actions relate to their well-being.

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Shiftiness – They can shift out of my turns based on whatever theory of the good they operate under due to the nature of a vague standard. Especially true because the warrants for their standard could justify different versions of consequentialism as coming first and I wouldn’t know until the 1ar which gives them access to multiple contingent standards.

#### 2. Strat – I lose 6 minutes of time during the AC to generate a strategy because I don't know what turns or strategy I can go for during the 1N absent which proves CX doesn’t check since it would occur after the skew.

#### 3. Resolvability – Makes the round irresolvable since we can’t weigh different mechanisms for the good – Benatar would probably link harder under a hedonistic conception of util – weighing ground is key since it ensures we can compare arguments that clash to access the ballot.

#### Voters –

#### DD – a) deter abuse b) I spent time reading theory c) The round has already been skewed

#### CI – a) Reasonability is arbitrary since idk your BS meter b) It fosters the best norms through encouraging the fairest rule c) Reasonability collapses by debating the brightline

#### No RVI – a) It’s illogical to vote for you for being fair b) Rounds without theory would be irresolvable c) It incentivizes you to bait theory and win off a scripted CI

## Case

### Underview

#### Aff theory doesn’t come first –

#### [1] Evaluate theory based on abuse and weighing – a) Encourages good skills of comparing arguments b) establishes equity between sides on the theory flow, sectioning off paradigm issues for one side encourages a race to the bottom on theory

#### [2] 1AR theory is already harder to answer because I only have one speech, a minute less time, and half to split my 2N but you can go all in in the 2AR. You get advantages too which compensates for time tradeoff

#### [3] Aff theory should be a commitment, its brought up late in the debate, but that doesn’t justify an advantage.

### Framework

#### [1] Consequences empirically impossible to predict. Menand 05, Louis Menand (the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University) “Everybody’s An Expert” The New Yorker 2005 <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert//> FSU SS “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, [e.g.] economic growth), or less of something (repression, [e.g.] recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

#### [2] Util evaluates end states, not the way to achieve those ends states. But if the way we obtain an end is through an action and util ignores the action taken, it ignores the actions taken and cares only about the end states so technically any action is permissible under util because it wouldn’t condemn the action it would condemn the end that the action entails.

#### [3] Induction fails because we can’t evaluate an action until after his consequences have played out so we’re always uncertain as to whether or not the aff will be a good idea.

#### [4] This framework is impact justified – There is no syollogism that explains why it’s a good account of morality which is an independent reason to reject it for a) Destroying any and all phil education that could be gained from clashing justification and b) allows infinite shift because theirs no cohesive story to hold your arguments to.

#### On Actor Spec – a) Just because states use util doesn’t mean they should, that’s an is/ought b)

#### A] On aggregation

#### B] On Act-omission

#### [1] Means there’s infinite obligations since every inaction is a moral wrong.

#### [2] Proves the aff is performatively bad since you aren’t doing it right now.

#### C] On Intent-Foresight:

#### [1] There’s no objective way to hold people responsible for certain foreseen events since each person foresees varying levels and types of consequences.

#### [2] Empirically denied: Multiple people can foresee the same consequence with different intents IE going home to see family vs to avoid work.

#### On Lexical Prerequisite –

#### [1] Just proves life is instrumentally valuable, not intrinsically valuable which proves my fwk o/w.

#### [2] Self-defeating: You justify always trying to stop the smallest risks of harms which trades off with actual ethical calculus.

#### [3] Doesn’t prove value – we have to breath to do anything else but that doesn’t mean we max oxygen.

#### On degree of wrongness –

#### [1] No reason this needs to be explained.

#### [2] Intent can explain this - A contradiction in conception is worse than a contradiction of wills under Kant.

#### [3] If an act is wrong it shouldn’t be taken regardless of how bad.

#### On Phenomenal introspection –

#### [1] Not normative: Introspection just points out that I feel X and other could too, not that I have an obligation to do it.

#### [2] Phenomenal introspection is unreliable: We can never view ourselves outside of ourselves so all conclusions are influenced by subjective biases.

#### [3] Doesn’t prove util: Different people like masochists derive pleasure and pain from different sensations, this proves that its impossible to find one particular definition of the good to aggregate.

#### [4] Its impossible for us to verify if other’s feel pain which means introspection causes egoism not util

#### On Epistemic modesty –

#### Use confidence – a) Impossible to determine probability of framework and offense being true as truth isn’t scalar b) Modesty assumes outside knowledge or judge biases on whether certain arguments are true which trades off with competitive equity c) we have to be confident in the paradigm of modesty which defaults back to confidence

#### On Maximizig probability – That’s not how states worth, truth is scalar not decile based so by spreading it out you increase the likelihood that you are entirely wrong. You can’t have a half obligation or be half true meaning putting all our eggs in one rigorously justifies solution is best

1. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)