# NC

## Offs

### 1

#### Scenario planning is the violent pre-determination of reality by power, not a neutral technology that we should apply uniformly. It assumes the position of power and tasks itself with protecting it, adopting an inherently reactionary stance that stifles alternative imaginations.

Ossewarde 17. (Dr. Marinus, Associate Professor at the University of Twente, “Unmasking scenario planning: The colonization of the future in the ‘Local Governments of the Future’ program.” Futures, Volume 93 (2017), Pages 80-88, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328716302798)//AD

Scenario planning is meant to be a dialectical quest for open futures, whereby alternative worlds are envisioned and judgement as to the most desirable world is suspended. Such a dialogical process, associated with democratic politics of world making, typically implies the critique, negation and transcendence of the established power constellation, which is by its very nature conservative. Hence, power holders are tempted to believe that their rule is indefinite and that history has ended – since all activities are directed towards the maintenance of the current order. Conversely, action, which ‘has an inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries’ is discouraged (Arendt 1958: 190). Hannah Arendt therefore went so far as claiming that ‘action, seen from the viewpoint of the automatic processes which seem to determine the course of the world, looks like a miracle’ (Arendt 1958: 246). Established power elites may have an interest in scenario planning, but the future with which they are fascinated is the prolongation of their current worlds. In other words, scenario planning is used for colonizing the future. In a colonized ‘scenario planning’, predominant or currently powerful stakeholders do not search for alternative futures, but, instead, enact their own ideological discourses, imaginaries and frames. The current power constellation is left unquestioned, and taken for granted in the scenario planning, as if established power factions will perdure in the future. The negation of well-established biases and prejudices is held in check, in order to safeguard the status quo. Such conservativism is legitimized by referring to current trends that are endowed with the aura of necessity or inevitability (natural and eternal laws). A colonized ‘scenario planning’ therefore masks unequal and often illegitimate power relationships. Historically, it appears that scenario planning has more often than not been a tool for colonization, designed to secure the future rule of the established power complex. In the 1940s, Herman Kahn and the RAND Corporation developed scenario planning to enable US military rulers to forecast the moves of potential opponents and to accordingly develop counteroffensives in the nuclear arms race (Tevis 2010). In the 1970s, Pierre Wack and Royal Dutch/Shell established scenario planning activities as an integral part of strategic management, to secure oil interests in the context of ecological crisis and the oil crisis (Wack 1985; Chermack and Coons 2015). The stimulus for scenario planning in these cases was the perceived rise of uncertainties in a world that had become more unpredictable and potentially apocalyptic. Horror scenarios of nuclear wars and a Third World War had become commonplace in the 1950s. Stories of ecological catastrophe, with a vision of large tracts of the earth rendered uninhabitable, the collapse of global food production, the acidification of the oceans, sea-level rise and storms, and droughts of growing intensity, became common since the publication of the Club of Rome report in 1972 (Wright et al 2013). In the hands of ruling military, governmental and corporate powers, ‘scenario planning’ became a method for ensuring strategic victory in a context of uncertainties and complexities. Since such scenario planning aimed at predictability, ambiguities were undesirable factors that were better eliminated, both in theory and practice (Amer, Daim and Jetter 2013). Computer simulations, game theoretic tools, forecasting methods, trend research, horizon scanning, and visual imageries filtered out all that which could not be mapped (O’Brien 2016). Pierre Wack, who introduced scenario planning at Royal Dutch/Shell, emphasizes that the future is only half closed. He made a plea for the incorporation of both literary and technical methods in scenario planning, to facilitate both the imagination and calculation of probable futures (Chermack and Coons 2015). According to Wack, the future is partly determined by trends that cannot but persist (Van‘t Klooster and Van Asselt 2006). Population growth and ageing are examples of such trends; and the corresponding implications for food demand, transport, housing, and other kinds of infrastructure clearly have to be reckoned with in any scenario planning. At the same time, for Wack, the future cannot be fully outlined based on these data and graphics. The partial openness of the future lies in the unpredictability of future generations’ actions in reaction to these trends. Robotic warfare is one possible future; large-scale euthanasia is another. But it is also imaginable that ecological disasters may wipe off entire populations. These futures are imaginable and yet not simply fictive because the ‘material’ for their ‘creation’ is already available here and now. For instance, it is highly probable that white Americans will no longer be the majority population in the United States by 2050, but the question as to how white Americans will cope with living as a minority in the US invites different answers (Martín Alcoff 2015: 24; 26). Colonization aims at ruling out openness, with the aim of shaping a future (preferably one that seems to be the product of predetermined trends that cannot be altered by human decisions) in which the current status quo is preserved. O’Brien (2016) explains that Royal Dutch/Shell’s interest in scenario planning is motivated by its will to shape a future in which remains a dominant key actor that moulds the world in its own interest: its scenario planning practices and its wish to maintain its hegemony are interconnected. *‘Shell’s scenario plans,’ O’Brien (2016: 334) notes, ‘are credited with the company’s success in outwitting the thugs, and thereby contributing to the larger project of securing Western interests amidst the turmoil of globalization.’* Such a hegemonic project has its prices in terms of human rights abuses, oil pollution and corporate crimes (Holzer 2007; Hennchen 2015). The organized fossil-fuel industry is powerful enough to protect its vested interests and to promote a strategy of inaction (no reduction of fossil-fuel emissions), so that nothing really changes. Michael Mann, a leading climate scientist, explains that to safeguard the current status quo, the fossil-fuel industry, including Royal Dutch/Shell, funds a ‘climate change denial campaign’ to discredit climate science – which advocates radical change now – and prevent dialogues. In this campaign, a significant part of the established power elites, including the Koch Brothers, and influential politicians like John McCain and Joe Lieberman, makes a mockery of climatology, and of particular scientists (Wright and Mann 2013). The pertinent question that ought to be raised, O’Brien (2016: 341) therefore concludes is: ‘whose future is being planned, by whom, for whom and to what ultimate end?’ When scenario planning is a tool for colonization, the future is planned by and for the established power constellation, even if ‘larger’ entities such as national, European or Western interests are invoked. Such scenario planning is legitimized by discrediting ‘doom scenarios’, through discourses on the liberating potential of technology (which should be able to solve the problems that it creates) and (correspondingly) on the inevitable course of history.

#### The AC framework mimics the deliberative model of liberal democracy that must tolerate fascist ideology to prove that it is perfectly tolerant, but they fail to realize that white supremacy cannot be defeated in the marketplace of ideas. Their framework, like most capitalist liberal democracies, tends towards fascism because platforming white supremacist ideology allows it to spread while disrupting anti-racist and anti-capitalist organizing. The alt is to reject the aff for endorsing a deliberative framework that platforms fascist rhetoric.

Shaw 20. (Devin Zane Shaw, Professor of Philosophy at Douglas College, British Columbia, Ph.D. University of Ottawa, “Philosophies of Antifascism: Punching Nazis and Fighting White Supremacy,” Rowman and Littlefield International, 2020.)//catire

Beauvoir maintains that the imperative to reject oppression at any cost justifies the use of emancipatory violence. Her discussion of violence applies her general method of moral inquiry: after identifying an ideal (but impossible) situation, she proceeds to map the moral coordinates of failure—where indeed some failures are better than others. Hence she first identifies the ideal situation: “For a liberating action to be a thoroughly moral action, it would have to be achieved through a conversion of the oppressors: there would then be a reconciliation of all freedoms” (Beauvoir [1947] 1976, 96–97). Presumably this conversion would be achieved through civil discourse, but Beauvoir calls it a utopian reverie. The oppressor “refuses to give up his privileges” (Beauvoir [1947] 1976, 96). Nonetheless, the oppressor provides reasons to justify oppression. Beauvoir, before addressing justifications of violence, analyzes the oppressor’s justifications of oppression through the lens of political conflict. Practically speaking, the oppressor and the oppressed are not merely two sides of a debate, because the oppressor class also sets the terms of the debate (Marcuse 1969). Nonetheless, Beauvoir’s analysis serves a double purpose. First, it shows how these justifications are in bad faith. Second, and more importantly, it tests the political commitments of the reader by identifying the tropes of the oppressor’s discourse so that readers who might otherwise view themselves as committed to political emancipation, but who also feel an investment in these arguments, might be able to reflect upon and have done with them. Thus we must situate the exchange of reasons within a situation of oppression, which divides the world into oppressor and oppressed. I doubt that Beauvoir believes that these reasons are offered to persuade the oppressed, for that would acknowledge an intellectual equality between addressor and addressee denied by the oppressor. Hence these justifications or reasons need only “persuade” others: oppressors and their ideological accomplices, those with privilege, access, or advantage within the situation. Beauvoir situates these reasons as individual moments of a continuous order of justifications. In the first instance, then, justifications for the status quo could be categorized together insofar as they minimize the wrongs committed by oppression. At the most extreme, the oppressor offers reasons as to why either oppression is natural or why the oppressed desires oppression (Beauvoir [1947] 1976, 83–87). If oppression is natural, then it is inevitable and impossible to fight—in this case the oppressed are attempting to overthrow the natural order of things. However, from an existentialist standpoint, where “existence precedes essence,” all situations of oppression are contingent but shaped historically by material conditions—thus no oppression is natural. The second argument is a variation on the first; it maintains that the oppressed desires oppression, with the implication that those who resist have illicit desires. We know that claims of this type were common tropes in the antebellum United States (and after), where the master “interrogates” his slaves about their condition and they express their consent. Of course, this trope is in bad faith. Were it meant otherwise, it would entail the intellectual reciprocity between master and slave that is denied by the master. In a system where they could be killed but not murdered, slaves opt for duplicity; when the moral and material means for revolt are available, the answer is entirely different. The foregoing arguments are illiberal. The remaining arguments are not illiberal. In the first, the oppressor appeals to universal, objective values. These values are then presented as unequivocally good in themselves:[9] “It is not in his own name that he is fighting, but rather in the name of civilization, of institutions, of monuments, of virtues which realize objectively the situation which he intends to maintain” (Beauvoir [1947] 1976, 91). This argument justifies the means (oppression) by appeal to lofty ideals, such as Progress. When appeals to universal, objective values like Progress are raised, Beauvoir contends that such terms cannot be posited as transcendent, existing outside of human projects. We cannot then use these values to determine the meaning of concrete projects or a particular situation; instead, our concrete projects give meaning to our ideals relative to social struggle. When these values are treated as transcendent and absolute, when one treats their societies or institutions as the embodiment of Progress, this legitimates oppression under the guise of paternalism (or worse). The ruling classes identify their institutions with Progress or Enlightenment, and when faced with opposition, they adduce, under “the pretext of ignorance” of the other, “the incompetence of the masses, of women, of the natives in the colonies,” in order to maintain their rule, the status quo of oppression, capital accumulation, and resource extraction (Beauvoir [1947] 1976, 138–39). Proponents of “Western civilization,” for example, have for centuries exploited native populations in the colonized world in the name of historical Progress. The final trope frames oppression as merely one kind of interest in competition with other interests. As we have seen, oppression is a social structure that divides society into two, producing social conflict. To frame oppression as interest reduces political conflict to what Rancière has called parapolitics: all political claims are merely expressions of conflicting interests (see “3.1. Demarcating Egalitarianism”). This trope appeals broadly to abstract right: when the oppressed confronts the oppressor and seeks to correct a wrong, the oppressor objects that “under the pretext of freedom, there you go oppressing me in turn; you deprive me of my freedom” (Beauvoir [1947] 1976, 90). Though Beauvoir quickly dismisses this argument, it demands further analysis. In one variant of the argument, these freedoms are also framed in zero-sum terms: “Respect for freedom is never without difficulty, and perhaps he may assert that one can never respect all freedoms at the same time” (Beauvoir [1947] 1976, 96). In other words, granting rights to marginalized groups comes at the cost of those who already have rights. These arguments sometimes gain traction in well-meaning liberal discourses because they are framed in terms of a liberal understanding of rights. Sometimes these claims are specific: when we no-platform nazis, they often complain that their rights have been violated. Sometimes, these claims are broad: white nationalists and white supremacists, for example, present their views as if they represent white interests against other competing interests; that is, “It’s not ‘white supremacy,’ it’s a European-Canadian majority in a nation with European roots, which includes our history, our customs, our laws, our languages, our monuments, our faith, and our people.”[10] In general, these claims frame white supremacy as merely the expression of one ethnic group among others while asserting that other ethnic groups are permitted a degree of social cohesion and social mobility now denied to whites. These claims, however, are made in bad faith. Leading figureheads of the alt-right and Far Right, such as Richard Spencer, have readily admitted that they appeal to rights such as free speech only in order to advance their agenda (Ami du Radical 2018). As Matthew Lyons points out, the European New Right has long rehearsed the rhetorical devices of—and provided an intellectual veneer to—the ethnonationalism and separatism to which these groups often appeal: they “championed ‘biocultural diversity’ against the homogenization supposedly brought by liberalism and globalization. They argued that true antiracism requires separating racial and ethnic groups to protect their unique cultures” (Lyons 2018, 58). These claims do not have to make a positive or convincing case; they must merely be effective in shifting the frame of the debate away from the idea that oppression is a social structure; they must merely undermine the legitimate political claims of the oppressed. Here Sartre’s analysis of the rhetorical strategies of anti-Semites is apropos: They know that their remarks are frivolous, open to challenge. But they are amusing themselves, for it is their adversary who is obliged to use words responsibly, since he believes in words. The anti-Semites have the right to play. They even like to play with discourse for, by giving ridiculous reasons, they discredit the seriousness of their interlocutors. They delight in acting in bad faith, since they seek not to persuade by sound argument but to intimidate and disconcert. . . . They fear only to appear ridiculous or to prejudice by their embarrassment their hope of winning over some third person to their side. (Sartre [1946a] 1995, 20) In my view, when Sartre says anti-Semite, he means fascist. His book Anti-Semite and Jew was published after the defeat of fascism in Europe, and I believe that the terminological choice reflects this defeat: analyzing anti-Semitism points to forms of oppression that remain present in postwar Europe, whereas his readers might have dismissed his argument had he discussed the continued existence of fascist attitudes after the war. Thus, in contemporary parlance, Sartre contends that debating fascists either normalizes their views as worthy of debate or discredits the seriousness of their interlocutor. When the Far Right frames its agenda in terms of rights, this strategy aims to normalize their racist agenda, but it also treats all demands of political conflict as if they were merely competing interests. This parapolitical strategy appeals to those invested in the status quo because it presents all grievances in general as merely competing interests—occluding the possibility that political oppression is imbricated in the status quo itself. For Beauvoir, as for Sartre or Rancière, political and social conflict is not about competing interests that can be settled in the established terms of rights within a given institutional framework. Political struggle puts the very concept of freedom into question. Liberal democratic systems of consensus rest on some variation of a concept of freedom based on the harm principle.[11] By contrast, Beauvoir defines freedom as having the moral and material ability “to surpass the given toward an open future” (Beauvoir [1947] 1976, 91). In Rancière’s terms, Beauvoir’s analysis of discourse shows how the demands of the oppressed are a demonstration of disagreement.

### 2

#### 1. Util justifies atrocities since it justifies allowing us to harm some for the benefit of others – even if they spew some pain quantifiability argument that doesn’t solve since there are still instances some get great benefit from others harm.

#### 2. Util can’t justify intrinsic wrongness – We can’t know whether our action was good until we’ve evaluated the states of affairs they’ve produced since it’s based on the outcome of the action. For Example if asked the question “is rape okay?” a utilitarian would not be able to say yes because there are situations in which it would be morally obligatory to do so if it maximized pleasure. Probability doesn’t solve because that just allows for moral error and freezes action while attempting to calculate the perfect decision.

#### Two Impacts:

#### [1] It triggers permissibility since they can’t generate a correct moral obligation that justifies affirming. That negates: A) Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation[[1]](#footnote-1) which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two and B) Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.

#### [2] They read morally repugnant arguments. Thus the alternative is to drop the debater, to ensure that debate remains a space safe for all – the judge has a proximal obligation to ensure inaccessible practices don’t proliferate. Accessibility is a voting issue since all aff arguments presuppose that people feel safe in this space to respond to them.

### 3

#### Interpretation: If the affirmative defends a consequentialist framework, they must explicitly delineate which theory of the good they defend in the form of a text in the 1ac.

#### Each nuance of the ethic entails different obligations and would exclude different offense – there are 7 different versions.

**Mastin,** [Luke Mastin, Consequentialism, The basics of philosophy <http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_consequentialism.html>]

Some **consequentialist theories include**: Utilitarianism, which holds that an action is right if it leads to the most happiness for the greatest number of people ("happiness" here is defined as the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain). **Hedonism**, **which** is the philosophy **[holds] that pleasure** **is** the **most important** pursuit of mankind, **and** that **individuals** **should** strive to **maximise** **their own total** **pleasure** (net of any pain or suffering). **Epicureanism** is a more moderate approach (which still seeks to maximize happiness, but which **defines happiness** more **as a** **state of tranquillity** than pleasure). **Egoism, which holds that an action is right if it maximizes good for the self.** Thus, Egoism may license actions which are good for an individual even if detrimental to the general welfare. **Asceticism**, in some ways, **the opposite of Egoism in that it describes a life characterized by abstinence from egoistic pleasures** especially **to achieve a spiritual goal. Altruism**, which **prescribes that an individual take actions that have the best consequences for everyone except for himself**, according to Auguste Comte's dictum, "Live for others". Thus, individuals have a moral obligation to help, serve or benefit others, if necessary at the sacrifice of self-interest. **Rule Consequentialism**, which is a theory (sometimes seen as an attempt to reconcile Consequentialism and Deontology), **[holds] that moral behaviour involves following certain rules**, but that those rules should be **chosen** based **on** the **consequences that** the selection of **those rules have**. Some theorists holds that a certain set of minimal rules are necessary to ensure appropriate actions, while some hold that the rules are not absolute and may be violated if strict adherence to the rule would lead to much more undesirable consequences. **Negative Consequentialism**, which **focuses on minimizing bad consequences rather than promoting good consequences**. This may actually require active intervention (to prevent harm from being done), or may only require passive avoidance of bad outcomes.

#### B. Violation: They don’t and maximizing expected well-being doesn’t cut it.

**Crisp**, Roger, "Well-Being", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(Fall **2017** Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/well-being/>.

Well-being is most commonly used in philosophy to describe what is non-instrumentally or ultimately good *for* a person. **The question of what well-being consists in is of independent interest**, but it is of great importance in moral philosophy, especially **in the case of utilitarianism**, according to which the only moral requirement is that well-being be maximized. Significant challenges to the very notion have been mounted, in particular by G.E. Moore and T.M. Scanlon. **It has become standard to distinguish theories of well-being as either hedonist theories, desire theories, or objective list theories**. According to the view known as welfarism, well-being is the only value. Also important in ethics is the question of how a person’s moral character and actions relate to their well-being.

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Shiftiness – They can shift out of my turns based on whatever theory of the good they operate under due to the nature of a vague standard. Especially true because the warrants for their standard could justify different versions of consequentialism as coming first and I wouldn’t know until the 1ar which gives them access to multiple contingent standards.

#### 2. Strat – I lose 6 minutes of time during the AC to generate a strategy because I don't know what turns or strategy I can go for during the 1N absent which proves CX doesn’t check since it would occur after the skew.

#### 3. Resolvability – Makes the round irresolvable since we can’t weigh different mechanisms for the good – Benatar would probably link harder under a hedonistic conception of util – weighing ground is key since it ensures we can compare arguments that clash to access the ballot.

#### Voters –

#### DD – a) deter abuse b) I spent time reading theory c) The round has already been skewed

#### CI – a) Reasonability is arbitrary since idk your BS meter b) It fosters the best norms through encouraging the fairest rule c) Reasonability collapses by debating the brightline

#### No RVI – a) It’s illogical to vote for you for being fair b) Rounds without theory would be irresolvable c) It incentivizes you to bait theory and win off a scripted CI

## Case

### Util

#### Consequences empirically impossible to predict. Menand 05, Louis Menand (the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University) “Everybody’s An Expert” The New Yorker 2005 <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert//> FSU SS “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, [e.g.] economic growth), or less of something (repression, [e.g.] recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

#### AT – Lexical Pre-req

#### [1] Fallacy of Origin – I need oxygen to engage in ethics but that doesn’t mean the standard is maximizing oxygen.

#### [2] Empirically Disproven – We act morally in the face of danger constantly. For instance, Congress debates health care policy while wars are happening.

#### [3] This is a form of de-radicalization – It lets policymakers constantly shift out of responsibilities by saying there are greater threats. It encourages leftists and anti-fascists to drop their militant causes in favor of softening to the cris about nuclear war that spew out of the government every week. This is an independent link to the gish gallop because this line of thinking encourages policymakers and fascists to spew as many scenarios as they can until one sticks and works to deradicalize opposition.

#### AT Ext First –

#### [1] Extinction doesn’t really happen – Its merely an impact in the round but it doesn’t affect us as individuals so its secondary to impacts that affect debate as a communicative activity

#### [2] This rhetoric is the same as what’s used to silence minority communities – people of color and the global south face extinction at the hands of the US empire literally everyday, extinction through militarism, police violence, and poverty are constant issues that are ignored for “more important problems,” refuse their paving over of individual experience

#### [3] Extinction is fundamentally non-unique – Every debate topic teams come up with a new extinction scenario but we never actually see them occur. Reject their constant gishing of securitization rhetoric and embrace militant anti-fascism.

AT No Calc indites –

[1] They’re inevitable k

### Advantage

#### No pandemic impact

Barratt, DPhil, 17 (Owen-Cotton Barratt, John Halstead, Stefan Schubert, Haydn Belfield, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, Global Priorities Project 2017, 1/23/2017, accessed 2-8-2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf) dlb

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic.

One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

1. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)