# NC

## Offs

### 1

**The framing for this debate should be that the AFF should affirm the exportability of their method as net beneficial to the status quo or an alternative and the negative should prove a DA to the method that outweighs the benefits or present a net beneficial and mutually exclusive alternative method.**

**This means you vote negative if by the 2AR the AFF is only good for people in this room or inside debate. It’s impossible to negate the idea that someone might have to do something in a certain context – that turns debate into a space for individualization and therapy rather than collective action.**

**[1] You should collapse the inside/outside distinction for debate – to surrender to blackness in debate, we also need to prioritize black people that are outside of debate and use this space to discuss what can be done to improve their material conditions.**

**[2] Method testing is good – cost-benefit analysis produces both depth and breadth. Solves intellectual myopia where we only look at aspects of experience that we want to look at.**

**[3] Checks aff bias – not being able to negate means the AFF always wins.**

**[4] Academic contestation – the black radical tradition is founded on important disagreements that develop into important historical lessons for revolutionaries – the Black Panther Party’s basement debates prove this activity has some potential for building revolution.**

**There’s a presumption frame here – the solvency threshold isn’t just imagination or survival because people are always going to find interim modes of survivability in violent worlds, but it takes intention to produce worlds where that survival isn’t questioned in the first place.**

### 2

**The only question of this debate is whether the affirmative offers a strategy to challenge racial capitalism. The ontology and semiotics of anti-blackness are locked into place through the alienation of black labor and abstraction through the form of capital – raising antiblackness to an ontological level ignores the contingency of capital risk.**

**Amaro, 18**  (Ramon Amaro, Lecturer in the Department of Visual Cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London; Research Fellow in Digital Culture at Het Nieuwe Instituut in Rotterdam; worked as Assistant Editor for the SAGE open access journal Big Data & Society; 2018, PhD, Philosophy, Centre for Cultural Studies, Goldsmiths; 2013, MA, Sociological Research, University of Essex; 1999, BSe, Mechanical Engineering, University of Michigan; “Machine Learning, Black Labour and Bio-epistemic Resistance,” presented as part of *After Work: Life, Labour and Automation*, a symposium exploring work and resistance through and against technology. Transcription from rvs, finders credit and cutting goes to tris)

Okay, hi. My name is Ramon Amaro. Thank you to the organizers for having me here today. I’m actually going to diverge a second and take the conversation to an ontological and theoretical point that can hopefully emerge to different conversations as we go on later. Namely, what I want to begin with is the idea of bare life of the black female body, an idea that Alessandra Raengo argues must be understood if we are even to critique modern forms of capital, as what we know as **the black form is already subsumed in the monetary form of capital and the fictive substance of race**. What I mean, and what I would like to propose here in following Raengo, is what she calls “the ontological scandal” perpetuated by slavery. This scandal, according to Raengo, is repeated “with each instance of alienated black labor, each time blackness functions as the commodity form, and with each repetition they continue to be reified.” But what’s important is Raengo’s gesture **presupposes** that the production and subsequent **domination** of colonial **nations today** **are predicated on the abstract reification of the black female body as a mode of currency.** **To even begin to address this ontological scandal, we must first think through how the black body is individuated as a currency of exchange within modern financial systems**. For instance, extensive work has been done by Spillers, Hartman, and others to illuminate the important role of the cargo ship on the Middle Passage as a scene of **capital** exchange and racial subjection. However, I want to build on this work to think through **the genesis of the black self as already informed by the logics of innumeration and speculative risk**, where **the pre-individuated state of black being is always already contaminated by the conditions of labor-based capital accumulation**. But this accumulation also informs a dissonance between the real black sense of self and any social agreement that may abstract the black self into, as Denise DeSilva argues**, a formative system of monetary value**. In other words, as Ian BacComb describes, the growth of Anglo-European **financial domination was not merely a cycle of labor and exchange, but a scaled transaction of quantifiable insurance risk associated with the contingency of death and illness aboard slave cargo ships**. BacComb points to the British economy in particular to discuss the granting of a real existence of enslaved bodies inasmuch as the survival and the successful delivery of these bodies can be bought virtually as the hidden substance of insurance contracts and bills of credit. Or in the case of the British slave ship Zong, **the enslaved body is underwritten as the speculative risk of capital, and public outrage.** In this way, the importance of the enslaved body to modes of capital is not predicated to actual material flesh, or even the potential for that body to labor, but was instead articulated as an abstract flow of enumeration and probability. If, under this premise, we are to take W.B. DuBois at face value and consider the double consciousness of the racialized individual, then we are immediately confronted with the fragmentation of black genesis as a tension between what is made visible as blackness or **black non-being**, which Sylvia Wynters argues **is already owned by ontology as a problem of bio-epistemic compliance and the regime of prototypical capital existence, which** I argue **is symptomatic of a larger logic of social quantification**. So I just wanna diverge for a second and return to the issue of **the Zong** for those who aren’t familiar, the issue of the slave body on the British slaver was the start and emergence of the British insurance industry. If anyone knows, there was an illness that broke out on the slave ship, in the middle of the Atlantic, seven crew members died, and I think it was in term of like twenty slaves, and the captain of that ship decided that, actually, it was cheaper to throw all the slaves overboard and claim the insurance than it was to continue the passage. And when he returned back to England, he sued the insurance company, and that **was the start of litigation -- of the body itself as being a virtual point of risk**. And what I’m arguing is that, since that development, obviously we know how pervasive the insurance industry is, how pervasive capital mechanisms are at identifying risk and probability, and what I’m arguing here is, following Raengo, is that what we know today as modern capitalism in the UK is already predicated on the violence of the black female body. So, to continue, as the terms of contemporary capital depart from the derivation of value as the direct engagement with the **body** to the technics of labor practice, so in other words, **it no longer became about the actual slave being delivered to do manual labor – the financial gain was greater from actually deriving insurance risk on the body itself**. So **the body only became a black body once it was subsumed into capital types of risk.** **These engagements emerged as adaptive forms of information exchange that, unlike popular believe, are indifferent to the specificity of the body.** However, it is specific only as much as the racialized body can be extracted into quantifiable forms of data and pre-emption, which continues today to be defined as social value in contemporary techno-capital institutions. What I’m attempting to highlight is that while **the technology of** shipping and **insurance risk**, predicated on violence and the abstraction of the black body, were once the lens through which blackness was made visible, the emergence of new generative types of technology, like machine learning, enact an accelerated form of targeting and visibility that no longer require physicality, but depend on the meta-abstraction of all social phenomenon to locate the body as a measure of correlation and probability. So, in other words, after the Zong, following Raengo here, after the Zong, **the idea of abstracting the body into actual risk**, of course, further objectified the black body, but it also **set a precedent of actual citizenship being viewed as potential financial gain** or potential investment.

#### The focus on self-transformation and collective affect produces a fragmented model of local resistance that exhausts political energies but cannot meaningfully challenge state repression or material need.

Dean, 19 (Jodi, communist organizer associated with the Party for Socialism and Liberation, professor in the Political Science department at Hobart and William Smith Colleges; “From Allies to Comrades,“ *Comrade: An Essay on Political Belonging,* Verso Books, 2019)

How do we imagine political work? Under conditions where political change seems completely out of reach, we might imagine political work as self-transformation. At the very least, we can work on ourselves. In the intensely mediated networks of communicative capitalism, we might see our social media engagements as a kind of activism where Twitter and Facebook function as important sites of struggle. Perhaps we understand writing as important political work and hammer out opinion pieces, letters to the editors, and manifestoes. When we imagine political work, we often take electoral politics as our frame of reference, focusing on voting, lawn signs, bumper stickers, and campaign buttons. Or we think of activists as those who arrange phone banks, canvass door-to-door, and set up rallies. In yet another political imaginary, we might envision political work as study, whether done alone or with others. We might imagine political work as cultural production, the building of new communities, spaces, and ways of seeing. Our imaginary might have a militant, or even militarist, inflection: political work is carried out through marches, occupations, strikes, and blockades; through civil disobedience, direct action, and covert operations. Even with the recognition of the wide array of political activities, the ways people use them to respond to specific situations and capacities, and how they combine to enhance each other, we might still imagine radical political work as punching a Nazi in the face Throughout these various actions and activities, how are the relations among those fighting on the same side imagined? How do the activists and organizers, militants and revolutionaries relate to one another? During the weeks and months when the Occupy movement was at its peak, relations with others were often infused with a joyous sense of being together, with an enthusiasm for the collective co-creation of new patterns of action and ways of living.11 But the feeling didn’t last. The pressures of organizing diverse people and politics under conditions of police repression and real material need wore down even the most committed activists. Since then, on social media and across the broader left, relations among the politically engaged have again become tense and conflicted, often along lines of race and gender. Dispersed and disorganized, we’re uncertain of whom to trust and what to expect. We encounter contradictory injunctions to self-care and call out. Suspicion undermines support. Exhaustion displaces enthusiasm. Attention to comradeship, to the ways that shared expectations make political work not just possible but also gratifying, may help redirect our energies back to our common struggle. As former CPUSA member David Ross explained to Gornick: I knew that I could never feel passionately about the new movements as I had about the old, I realized that the CP has provided me with a sense of comradeship I would never have again, and that without that comradeship I could never be political. 12 For Ross, the Communist Party is what made Marxism. The party gave Marxism life, political purpose. This life-giving capacity came from comradeship. Ross continues: “The idea of politics as simply a diffused consciousness linked only to personal integrity was—is—anathema to me.” His description of politics as “a diffused consciousness linked only to personal integrity” fits today’s left milieus. Perhaps, then, his remedy— comradeship—will as well. Various people have told me their stories of feeling a rush of warmth when they were first welcomed into their party as a comrade. I’ve had this feeling myself. In his memoir Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid, the theorist Frank Wilderson, a former member of uMkhonto weSizwe, or MK, the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC), describes his first meeting with Chris Hani, the leader of the South African Communist Party and the chief of staff of MK. Wilderson writes, “I beamed like a schoolboy when he called me ‘comrade.’” 13 Wilderson chides himself for what he calls a “childish need for recognition.”14 Perhaps because he still puts Hani on a pedestal, he feels exposed in his enjoyment of the egalitarian disruption of comradeship. Wilderson hasn’t yet internalized the idea that he and Hani are political equals. “Comrade” holds out an equalizing promise, and when that promise is fulfilled, we confront our own continuing yet unwanted attachments to hierarchy, prestige, inadequacy. Accepting equality takes courage. Wilderson’s joy in hearing Hani call him “comrade” contrasts sharply with another instance Wilderson recounts where comrade was the term of address. In 1994, shortly before Wilderson was forced to leave South Africa, he encountered Nelson Mandela at an event hosted by Tribute magazine. After Mandela’s public remarks, Wilderson asked a question in which he addressed Mandela as “comrade.” “Not Mr. Mandela. Not sir, like the fawning advertising mogul who asked the first question. Comrade Mandela. It stitched him back into the militant garb he’d shed since the day he left prison.”15 Wilderson’s recollection shows how comrade’s equalizing insistence can be aggressive, an imposition of discipline. This is part of its power. Addressing another as “comrade” reminds them that something is expected of them Discipline and joy are two sides of the same coin, two aspects of comradeship as a mode of political belonging. As a form of address, figure of political relation, and carrier of expectations, comrade disrupts capitalist society’s hierarchical identifications of sex, race, and class. It insists on the equalizing sameness of those on the same side of a political struggle and renders that equalizing sameness productive of new modes of work and belonging. In this respect, comrade is a carrier of utopian longings in the sense theorized by Kathi Weeks. Weeks presents the utopian form as carrying out two functions: “One function is to alter our connection to the present, while the other is to shift our relationship to the future; one is productive of estrangement, the other of hope.”16 The first function mobilizes the negativity of disidentification and disinvestment. Present relations become strange, less binding on our sense of possibility. The second function redirects “our attention and energies toward an open future … providing a vision or glimmer of a better world.”17 The power of comrade is in how it negates old relations and promises new ones—the promise itself ushers them in, welcoming the new comrade into relations irreducible to their broader setting.

**Their cessation of revolutionary institution building abdicates the potential for true communual power, reducing revolution to reactive bursts of energy. Only dual power organizing can build institutions that meet the material needs of community and construct a revolutionary base in the face of compounding crises of climate change, imperialism, and fascism.**

**Escalante, 19** [Alyson, you should totally read her work for non-debate reasons, Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist, "Communism and Climate Change: A Dual Power Approach," *Failing That, Invent*, https://failingthatinvent.home.blog/2019/02/15/communism-and-climate-change-a-dual-power-approach/]//AD

I have previously argued that a crucial advantage to **dual power** **strategy** is that it gives the masses an infrastructure of socialist **institutions** which can directly provide for **material needs** in times of **capitalist crisis.** **Socialist agricultural** and **food distribution programs** can take ground that the **capitalist state** cedes by simultaneously meeting the needs of the masses while proving that socialist **self-management** and **political** **institutions** can function **independently** of capitalism. This approach is not only capable of **literally saving lives** in the case of crisis, but of demonstrating the **possibility of a revolutionary project** which seeks to **destroy rather than reform** capitalism. One of the most pressing of the various crises which humanity faces today is climate change. Capitalist production has devastated the planet, and everyday we discover that the small window of time for avoiding its most disastrous effects is shorter than previously understood. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that we have 12 years to limit (not even prevent) the more catastrophic effects of climate change. The simple, and horrific, fact that we all must face is that climate change has reached a point where many of its effects are **inevitable**, and we are now in a **post-brink world**, where damage control is the primary concern. **The question is not whether we can escape** a future of **climate change, but whether we can survive it**. Socialist strategy must adapt accordingly. In the face of this crisis, the democratic socialists and social democrats in the United States have largely settled on market based reforms. The Green New Deal, championed by Alexandria Ocasio Cortez and the left wing of the Democratic Party, remains a thoroughly capitalist solution to a capitalist problem. The proposal does nothing to challenge capitalism itself, but rather seeks to subsidize market solutions to reorient the US energy infrastructure towards renewable energy production, to develop less energy consuming transportation, and the development of public investment towards these ends. **The plan does nothing to call into question the profit incentives and endless resource consumption of capitalism which led us to this point**. Rather, it seeks to reorient the relentless market forces of capitalism towards slightly less destructive technological developments. While the plan would lead to a massive investment in the manufacturing and deployment of solar energy infrastructure, National Geographic reports that, “Fabricating [solar] panels **requires caustic chemicals** such as sodium hydroxide and hydrofluoric acid, and **the process uses water as well as electricity**, the production of which **emits greenhouse gases**.” Technology alone cannot sufficiently combat this crisis, as the production of such technology through capitalist manufacturing infrastructure **only perpetuates environmental harm**. Furthermore, subsidizing and incentivizing renewable energy stops far short of actually combating the fossil fuel industry driving the current climate crisis. The technocratic market solutions offered in the Green New Deal fail to adequately combat the driving factors of climate change. What is worse, they rely on a violent imperialist global system in order to produce their technological solutions. The development of high-tech energy infrastructure and the development of low or zero emission transportation requires the import of raw material and rare earth minerals which the United States can only access because of the imperial division of the Global South. This imperial division of the world requires constant **militarism** from the imperial core nations, and as Lenin demonstrates in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, facilitates **constant warfare** as imperial states compete for **spheres of influence** in order to facilitate cheap resource extraction. The US military, one of many imperialist forces, is the single largest user of petroleum, and one of its main functions is to ensure oil access for the United States. Without challenging this imperialist division of the world and the role of the United States military in upholding it, the Green New Deal fails even further to challenge the underlying causes of climate change. Even with the failed promises of the Green New Deal itself, it is unlikely that this tepid market proposal will pass at all. Nancy Pelosi and other lead Democrats have largely condemned it and consider it “impractical” and “unfeasible.” This dismissal is crucial because it reveals the total inability of capitalism to resolve this crisis. If the center-left party in the heart of the imperial core sees even milquetoast capitalist reforms as a step too far, we ought to have very little hope that a reformist solution will present itself within the ever shrinking 12 year time frame. There are times for delicacy and there are times for bluntness, and we are in the latter. To put things bluntly: the capitalists are not going to save us, and **if we don’t find a way to save ourselves, the collapse of human civilization is a real possibility.** The pressing question we now face is: **how are we going to save ourselves?** Revolution and Dual Power If capitalism will not be able to resolve the current encroaching climate crisis, we must find a way to organize outside the confines of capitalist institutions, towards the end of overthrowing capitalism. If the Democratic Socialists of America backed candidates cannot offer real anti-capitalist solutions through the capitalist state, we should be skeptical of the possibility for any socialist organization doing so. The DSA is far larger and far more well funded than any of the other socialist organizations in the United States, and they have failed to produce anything more revolutionary than the Green New Deal. We have to abandon the idea that electoral strategy will be sufficient to resolve the underlying causes of this crisis within 12 years. While many radicals call for revolution instead of reform, the reformists often raise the same response: revolution is well and good, but what are you going to do in the mean time? In many ways this question is fair. The socialist left in the United States today is not ready for revolutionary action, and a mass base does not exist to back the various organizations which might undertake such a struggle. Revolutionaries must concede that we have much work to be done before a revolutionary strategy can be enacted. This is a hard truth, but it is true. Much of the left has sought to ignore this truth by embracing adventurism and violent protest theatrics, in the vain hope of sparking revolutionary momentum which does not currently exist. If this is the core strategy of the socialist left, **we will accomplish nothing in the next 12 years**. Such approaches are as useless as the opportunist reforms pushed by the social democrats. Our task in these 12 years is not simply to arm ourselves and hope that magically the masses will wake up prepared for revolution and willing to put their trust in our small ideological cadres. We must instead, build a movement, and with it we must build infrastructure which can survive revolution and provide a framework for socialist development. Dual power is tooled towards this project best. **The Marxist Center** network has done an impressive amount of work developing socialist institutions across the US, largely through **tenants organizing** and **serve the people programs**. The left wing factions within the DSA itself have also begun to develop **mutual aid programs** that could be useful for dual power strategy. At the same time, **mutual aid is not enough**. We cannot simply build these institutions as a reform to make capitalism more survivable. Rather, we must make these institutions part of a **broader revolutionary movement** and they ought to function as a material prefiguration to a socialist society and economy. The institutions we build as dual power outside the capitalist state today ought to be structured towards revolutionary ends, such that they will someday function as the early institutions of a revolutionary socialist society. To accomplish this goal, we cannot simply declare these institutions to be revolutionary. Rather **they have to be linked together through an actual revolutionary movement working towards revolutionary ends**. This means that dual power institutions cannot exist as ends in and of themselves, nor can abstract notions of mutual aid cannot be conceptualized as an end in itself. The explicit purpose of these institutions has to be to **radicalize** the masses through meeting their needs, and providing an infrastructure for a socialist movement to meet **the needs of** its members and the **communities** in which it operates. **Revolutionary institutions** that **can provide food, housing**, and other needs for a revolutionary movement will be crucial for **build**ing **a base** among the masses and for constructing the beginnings of a socialist infrastructure for when we eventually engage in revolutionary struggle.

#### The alternative is to embrace the comradeship of the party – a partisan discipline and mutual accountability that enables a shared commitment to an international communist horizon.

Dean, 19 (Jodi, communist organizer associated with the Party for Socialism and Liberation, professor in the Political Science department at Hobart and William Smith Colleges; “From Allies to Comrades,“ *Comrade: An Essay on Political Belonging,* Verso Books, 2019)

As comrades, our actions are voluntary, but they are not always of our own choosing. Comrades have to be able to count on each other even when we don’t like each other and even when we disagree. We do what needs to be done because we owe it to our comrades. In The Romance of American Communism, Vivian Gornick reports the words of a former member of the Communist Party USA, or CPUSA, who hated the daily grind of selling papers and canvassing expected of party cadre, but nevertheless, according to her, “I did it. I did it because if I didn’t do it, I couldn’t face my comrades the next day. And we all did it for the same reason: we were accountable to each other.”6 Put in psychoanalytic terms, the comrade functions as an ego ideal: the point from which party members assess themselves as doing important, meaningful work.7 Being accountable to another entails seeing your actions through their eyes. Are you letting them down or are you doing work that they respect and admire? In Crowds and Party, I present the good comrade as an ideal ego, that is to say, as how party members imagine themselves. 8 They may imagine themselves as thrilling orators, brilliant polemicists, skilled organizers, or courageous militants. In contrast with my discussion there, in the current book, I draw out how the comrade also functions as an ego ideal, the perspective that party members—and often fellow travelers—take toward themselves. This perspective is the effect of belonging on the same side as it works back on those who have committed themselves to common struggle. The comrade is a symbolic as well as an imaginary figure and it is the symbolic dimension of ego ideal I focus on here. My thinking about the comrade as a generic figure for those on the same side flows out of my work on communism as the horizon of left politics and my work on the party as the political form necessary for this politics. 9 To see our political horizon as communist is to highlight the emancipatory egalitarian struggle of the proletarianized against capitalist exploitation—that is, against the determination of life by market forces; by value; by the division of labor (on the basis of sex and race); by imperialism (theorized by Lenin in terms of the dominance of monopoly and finance capital); and by neocolonialism (theorized by Nkrumah as the last stage of imperialism). Today we see this horizon in struggles such as those led by women of color against police violence, white supremacy, and the murder and incarceration of black, brown, and working-class people. We see it in the infrastructure battles around pipelines, climate justice, and barely habitable cities with undrinkable water and contaminated soil. We see it in the array of social reproduction struggles against debt, foreclosure, and privatization, and for free, quality public housing, childcare, education, transportation, healthcare, and other basic services. We see it in the ongoing fight of LGBTQ people against harassment, discrimination, and oppression. It is readily apparent today that the communist horizon is the horizon of political struggle not for the nation but for the world; it is an international horizon. This is evident in the antagonism between the rights of immigrants and refugees and intensified nationalisms; in the necessity of a global response to planetary warming; and in anti-imperialist, decolonization, and peace movements. In these examples, communism is a force of negativity, the negation of the global capitalist present. Communism is also the name for the positive alternative to capitalism’s permanent and expanding exploitation, crisis, and immiseration, the name of a system of production based on meeting social needs—from each according to ability to each according to need, to paraphrase Marx’s famous slogan—in a way that is collectively determined and carried out by the producers. This positive dimension of communism attends to social relations, to how people treat each other, animals, things, and the world around them. Building communism entails more than resistance and riot. It requires the emancipated egalitarian organization of collective life. With respect to the party, intellectuals on the contemporary left tend to extract the party from the aspirations and accomplishments it enabled. Communist philosophers who disagree on a slew of theoretical questions, such as Antonio Negri and Alain Badiou, converge on the organizational question—no party! The party has been rejected as authoritarian, as outmoded, as ill-fitting a society of networks. Every other mode of political association may be revised, renewed, rethought, or reimagined except for the party of communists. This rejection of the party as a form for left politics is a mistake. It ignores the effects of association on those engaged in common struggle. It fails to learn from the everyday experiences of generations of activists, organizers, and revolutionaries. It relies on a narrow, fantasied notion of the party as a totalitarian machine. It neglects the courage, enthusiasm, and achievements of millions of party members for over a century. Rejection of the party form has been left dogmatism for the last thirty years and has gotten us nowhere. Fortunately, the movements of the squares in Greece and Spain, as well as lessons from the successes and limits of the Occupy movement, have pushed against this left dogmatism. They have reenergized interest in the party as a political form that can scale; a form that is flexible, adaptive, and expansive enough to endure beyond the joyous and disruptive moments of crowds in the streets. A theory of the comrade contributes to this renewal by drawing out the ways that shared commitment to a common struggle generates new strengths and new capacities. Over and against the reduction of party relations to the relations between the leaders and the led, comrade attends to the effects of political belonging on those on the same side of a political struggle. As we fight together for a world free of exploitation, oppression, and bigotry, we have to be able to trust and count on each other. Comrade names this relation. The comrade relation remakes the place from which one sees, what it is possible to see, and what possibilities can appear. It enables the revaluation of work and time, what one does, and for whom one does it. Is one’s work done for the people or for the bosses? Is it voluntary or done because one has to work? Does one work for personal provisions or for a collective good? We should recall Marx’s lyrical description of communism in which work becomes “life’s prime want.” We get a glimpse of that in comradeship: one wants to do political work. You don’t want to let down your comrades; you see the value of your work through their eyes, your new collective eyes. Work, determined not by markets but by shared commitments, becomes fulfilling. French communist philosopher and militant Bernard Aspe discusses the problem of contemporary capitalism as a loss of “common time”; that is, the loss of an experience of time generated and enjoyed through our collective being-together. 10 From holidays, to meals, to breaks, whatever common time we have is synchronized and enclosed in forms for capitalist appropriation. Communicative capitalism’s apps and trackers amplify this process such that the time of consumption can be measured in much the same way that Taylorism measured the time of production: How long did a viewer spend on a particular web page? Did a person watch a whole ad or click off of it after five seconds? In contrast, the common action that is the actuality of communist movement induces a collective change in capacities. Breaking from capitalism’s 24-7 injunctions to produce and consume for the bosses and owners, the discipline of common struggle expands possibilities for action and intensifies the sense of its necessity. The comrade is a figure for the relation through which this transformation of work and time occurs.

## Case

### Ontology

#### Anti-blackness is not totalizing – [“social death” / “political death” / insert their uniqueness frame] is an incomplete racial project that requires social and political responses – denying relationality and agency is empty moralism that entrenches domination

Gordon 21 (Lewis R. Gordon – Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut at Storrs; Honorary President of the Global Center for Advanced Studies; Honorary Professor in the Unit for the Humanities at Rhodes University, South Africa; Chairperson of the American Philosophical Association Committee on Public Philosophy; and Chairperson of the Awards Committee and Global Collaborations for the Caribbean Philosophical Association, *Freedom, Justice, and Decolonization*, p73-82)

The first is that “an antiblack world” is not identical with “the world is antiblack.” The latter is an antiblack racist project. It is not the historical achievement of such. Its limitations emerge from a basic fact. Black people and other opponents of such an enterprise fought, and continue to fight, against it. The same argument applies to the argument about social death. Such an achievement would have rendered even those authors’ and the reflections I am offering here stillborn. The basic premises of the antiblack world and social death arguments are, then, locked in performative contradictions. They fail at the moment they are articulated. Yet, they have rhetorical force. This is evident through the continued growth of its proponents, literature, and forums devoted to it, in which all lay claim to stillborn status.

In Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism, I argued that there are forms of antiblack racism that are also offered under the guise of love. I was writing about whites who exoticize blacks while offering themselves as white sources of black salvation. It was a response to those who regard racism exclusively as acts of demonization. There are also racist forms of valorization. Analyzed in terms of bad faith, where one lies to oneself in an attempt to flee displeasing truths for pleasing falsehoods, exoticists romanticize blacks while affirming white normativity and themselves as principals of reality. These ironic, performative contradictions are features of all forms of racism, where one group is elevated to a godlike status and another is pushed below or outside that of human despite both claiming to be human.

Antiblack racism offers whites self–other relations (necessary for ethics) with each other but not so for groups forced in a “zone of nonbeing” below or outside them. Although to be outside is not necessarily to be below, it is so in a system of hierarchy in which above is also interpreted as being within. There is asymmetry where whites and any designated racially superior groups stand as others who look downward to those who are not their others or their analogs. Antiblack racism is, thus, not a problem of blacks being “others.” It is a problem of their not-being-analogical-selves-and-not-even-being-others.

Fanon, in Black Skin, White Masks, reminds us that Blacks among each other live in a world of selves and others. It is in attempted relations with whites under circumstances where whites control the conditions that these problems of dehumanization and subordination occur. Reason in such contexts, as he observes, has a bad habit of walking out when Blacks enter. What are Blacks to do? As reason cannot be forced to recognize Blacks because that would be “violence,” they must ironically reason reasonably with such forms of unreasonable reason. Contradictions loom. Racism is, given these arguments, a project of imposing nonrelations as the model of dealing with people designated “black.”12

12In The Damned of the Earth, Fanon goes further and argues that colonialism is an attempt to impose a Manichean structure of contraries instead of a dialectical one of ongoing, human negotiations of contradictions. The former segregates the groups; the latter is produced from interaction. The police, he observes, is the primary mediator between the two models, as their role is the use of force/violence to maintain the contraries instead of the human, discursive one of politics and civility requiring the elimination of separation through the interactive, and ultimately intimate, dynamics of communication. Such societies draw legitimacy from Black nonexistence or invisibility. Black appearance, in other words, would be a violation of those systems. Think of the continued blight of police, extra-judicial killings of blacks and Blacks in those countries.13 The ongoing model of fascist white rule as the daily condition of blacks is to prevent the emergence of Blacks.

An immediate observation of many postcolonies is that antiblack attitudes, practices, and institutions are not exclusively white. Black antiblack dispositions make this clear. In addition to black antiblackness taking the form of white hatred of black people, there is also the adoption of black exoticism. Where this exists, blacks simultaneously receive avowed black love alongside black rejection of agency. Many problems follow. The absence of agency bars maturation, which would reinforce the racial logic of blacks as in effect wards of whites. Without agency, ethics, liberation, maturation, politics, and responsibility could not be possible. This is because blacks would not actually be able to do anything outside of the sphere of white approbation and commands.

Afropessimism endorses the previous set of observations, but this agreement is supported by a hidden premise of white agency versus black and Black incapacity. They make much of Fanon’s remark that “the Black has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white.”14 Fanon’s rhetorical flare led many unfortunate souls to misread this remark. As he had already argued that racism is a socially produced phenomenon, his point was that those who produced it take it to be ontological. In other words, such people—in this case whites—do not take seriously that blacks have any ontological resistance to white points of view. Fanon was not arguing that blacks are ontologically beings, or even nonbeings, of that kind. If this were so, he would not have pointed out, in numerous sections of that book, black and Black experiences with each other. The whole point of the chapter in which that remark is made, “The Lived-Experience of the Black,” is to explore blacks’ and Blacks’ points of view. This is a patent rejection of an ontological status while pointing to the presumed ontological status of a skewed perspective.

Proponents of Afropessimism might respond that their position on white agency and black incapacity comes from Fanon’s famous remark that though whites created le Nègre—the French term for, depending on the context, “negro,” “nigger,” and “black”—it was les Nègres who created Négritude.15 Whites clearly did not create Afropessimism, which Black liberationists should, in agreement, celebrate. We should avoid the fallacy of confusing the source with the outcome. History is not short of bad ideas from good or well-intentioned people. If intrinsically good, each person of African descent would become ethically and epistemologically a switching of the Manichean contraries, which means in effect only changing the players instead of the racist game. We come, then, to the crux of the matter. If the goal of Afropessimism is Afropessimism, its achievement would be attitudinal and, in the language of old, stoic—in short, a symptom of antiblack society.

At this point, there are several observations that follow. The first is a diagnosis of the implications of Afropessimism as a symptom. The second pertains to the epistemological implications of Afropessimism. The third is whether a disposition counts as a political act and, if so, is it sufficient for its avowed aims. There are more, but for the sake of brevity, I will simply focus on these.16

#### Pessimism devolves to nihilism – appeals to “ontology” are empty moralism that ignore the historical reality of resistance and naturalize domination

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An ironic dimension of pessimism is that it is the other side of optimism. Oddly enough, both are connected to nihilism, which is, as Nietzsche showed, a decline of values during periods of social decay.17 It emerges when people no longer want to be responsible for their actions. The same problem surfaces in movements. When one such as the Black Liberation movement is suffering from decay, nihilism is symptomatic. Familiar tropes follow. Optimists expect intervention from beyond. Pessimists declare that relief is not forthcoming. Neither takes responsibility for what is valued. The valuing is what leads to the second, epistemic point. The presumption that what is at stake is what can be known to determine what can be done is the problem. If such knowledge were possible, the debate would be about who is reading the evidence correctly. Such judgment would be a priori—that is, prior to events actually occurring. The future, unlike transcendental conditions such as language, signs, and reality, is ex post facto; it is yet to come. Facing the future, the question is not what will be or how do we know what will be but instead the realization that whatever is done will be that on which the future will depend. Rejecting optimism and pessimism, there is a supervening alternative, as we have seen throughout the reflections offered throughout this book—namely, political commitment.

The appeal to political commitment is not only in stream with what French existentialists call l’intellectuel engagé (the committed intellectual) but also in what reaches back through the history and existential situation of enslaved, racialized ancestors. Many were, in truth, an existential paradox of commitment to action without guarantees. The slave revolts, micro and macro acts of resistance, escapes, and returns to help others do the same, the cultivated instability of plantations and other forms of enslavement, and countless other actions, were waged against a gauntlet of forces designed to eliminate any hope of success. The claim of colonialists and enslavers was that the future belonged to them, not to the enslaved and the indigenous. Such people were, in colonial eyes, incapable of ontological resistance. A result of more than 500 years of “conquest” and 300 years of enslavement was also a (white) rewriting of history in which African and First Nations’ agency was, at least at the level of scholarship, practically erased. Yet there was resistance even in that realm, as Africana and First Nation intellectual history and scholarship attest; what, after all, are Africana, Black, and Indigenous Studies? What, after all, are those many sites of intellectual production and activism outside of hegemonic academies? Such actions set the course for different kinds of struggle today.

Such reflections occasion meditations on the concept of failure. Afropessimism, the existential critique suggests, suffers from a failure in their analysis of failure. Consider Fanon’s notion of constructive failure, where what does not initially work transforms conditions for something new to emerge. To understand this argument, one must rethink the philosophical anthropology at the heart of a specific line of Euromodern thought on what it means to be human. Atomistic and individual-substance-based, this model, articulated by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and many others, is of a nonrelational being that thinks, acts, and moves along a course in which continued movement depends on not colliding with others. Under that model, the human being is a thing that enters into a system that facilitates or obstructs its movement. Under this model, the human being is actually a being. An alternative model, shared by many groups across southern Africa, Asia, South America, and even parts of Continental Europe, is a relational version of the human being as part of a larger system of meaning. Actions, from that perspective, are not about whether “I” succeed but instead about “our” unending story across time. Under this model, no human being is a being simpliciter or being-in-her-or-himself-or-themselves. As relational, it means that each human being is a constant negotiation of ongoing efforts to build relationships with others, which means no one actually enters a situation without establishing new situations of action and meaning. Instead of entering a game, their participation requires a different kind of project—especially where the “game” was premised on their exclusion. Thus, where the system or game repels initial participation, such repulsion is a shift in the grammar of how the system functions, especially its dependence on obsequious subjects. Shifted and shifting energy afford alternatives. Kinds cannot be known before the actions that birthed them. Participation, understood in these terms, is never in games but acts of changing them.

Abstract as this sounds, it has much historical support. For example, Evelyn Simien, in her insightful political study Historic Firsts, examines the new set of relations established in the United States by Shirley Chisholm’s and Jesse Jackson’s U.S. presidential campaigns.18 There would have been no President Barack Obama without such important predecessors affecting the demographics of voter participation. Simien intentionally focused on the most mainstream example of political life to illustrate this point. Though no exemplar of radicalism or revolution, Obama’s “success” came from Chisholm and Jackson’s (and many others’) so-called “failure.” Despite the appalling reactionary response of a right-wing majority in the 114th Congress during the second term of Obama’s presidency and the election of Donald Trump, whose obsession with erasing Obama’s legacy exemplified a form of psychoanalytical little man’s trauma, the historic fact remains that Obama took the helm of a mismanaged executive branch and gave it a level of dignity and intelligence matched by few of its white exemplars. His successors claim for a restored greatness only reveals the joke that is, in fact, any project on which the term “supremacy” is built: the naked racism and mediocrity that followed—there is an amusing photograph of a Klansman holding up a sign declaring his race’s “superior jeans!”—reveal the folly and terror of white megalomania. Beyond presidential electoral politics, there are numerous examples of how prior, radical so-called “failures” transformed relationships that facilitated other kinds of outcome. The trail goes back to the Haitian Revolution, which offered a vision of Black sovereignty that garnered the full force of Euromodern colonial and racist alliances to stall, and back to every act of resistance from Nat Turner’s Rebellion in the USA, Sharpe’s in Jamaica, or Tula’s in Curaçao, and so many other efforts for social transformation to come.19

In existential terms, then, many ancestors of the African diaspora embodied what Kierkegaard calls an existential paradox. All the evidence around them suggested failure and the futility of hope. They first had to make a movement of infinite resignation—that is, resigning themselves to their situation. Yet they must simultaneously act against that resignation. Kierkegaard, as we have seen, called this seemingly contradictory phenomenon “faith,” but that concept relates more to a relationship with a transcendent, absolute being, which could only be established by a “leap,” as there are no mediations or bridge to the Absolute whose distant is, as Kierkegaard put it, absolutely absolute. Ironically, if Afropessimism appeals to transcendent intervention, it would collapse into faith. If the Afropessimist’s argument rejects transcendent intervention and focuses on committed political action, of taking responsibility for a future that offers no guarantees, then the movement from infinite resignation becomes existential political action.

#### Prefer worldly engagement that recognizes Black sociality – their frame of nonrelationality only strengthens both material and metaphysical incarceration

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At this point, the crucial meditation would be on politics and political action. An attitude of infinite resignation to the world without the leap of committed action would simply be pessimistic or nihilistic. Similarly, an attitude of hope or optimism about the future would lack infinite resignation. We see here the underlying failure of the two approaches. Yet ironically, there is a form of failure at failing in the pessimistic turn versus the optimistic one, since if focused exclusively on resignation as the goal, then the “act” of resignation would have been achieved, which, paradoxically, would be a success; it would be a successful failing of failure. For politics to emerge, there are two missing elements in inward pessimistic resignation to consider.

The first is that politics is a social phenomenon, which means it requires the expanding options of a social world. It must transcend the self. Turning away from the social world, though a statement about politics, is not in and of itself political. As we have seen, the ancients from whom much Western political theory or philosophy claimed affinity had a disparaging term for an individual resigned from political life—namely, idiōtēs, a private person, one not concerned with public affairs, in English: an idiot. I mention “Western political theory” because that is the hegemonic intellectual context of Afropessimism; I have not come across Afropessimistic writings on thought outside of that framework. We do not have to end our etymological journey in ancient Greek. Recall that extending our linguistic archaeology back a few thousand years we could examine the Middle Kingdom (2000 BCE–1700 BCE) of Kmt’s Mdw Ntr word idi (deaf). The presumption, later taken on by the ancient Athenians and other Greek-speaking peoples, was that a lack of hearing entailed isolation, at least in terms of audio speech. The contemporary inward resignation of seeking a form of purity from the loathsome historical reality of racial oppression, in this reading, retreats ultimately into a form of moralism (private, normative satisfaction) instead of public responsibility born of and borne by action. The nonbeing to which Afropessimists refer is also a form of inaudibility.

The second is the importance of power. Politics makes no sense without it. As we have seen throughout our earlier reflections on power, Eurocentric etymology points to the Latin word potis as its source, from which came the word “potent” as in an omnipotent god. If we again look back farther, we will notice the Middle Kingdom Mdw Ntr word pHty, which refers to godlike strength. Yet for those ancient Northeast Africans, even the gods’ abilities came from a source. In the Coffin Texts, HqAw or heka activates the ka (sometimes, as we have seen, translated as soul, spirit, womb, or “magic”), which makes reality.20 All this amounts to a straightforward thesis on power as the ability with the means to make things happen.

There is an alchemical quality of power. The human world, premised on symbolic communication, brings many forms of meaning into being, and those new meanings afford relationships that build institutions through a world of culture, a phenomenon that Freud, we should recall, rightly described as “a prosthetic god.” It is godlike because it addresses what humanity historically sought from the gods—protection from the elements, physical maledictions, and social forms of misery. Such power clearly can be abused. It is where those enabling capacities (empowerment) are pushed to the wayside in the hording of social resources into propping up some people as gods that the legitimating practices of cultural cum political institutions decline and stimulate pessimism and nihilism. The institutions in Abya Yala and in Northern countries, such as the United States and Canada, very rarely attempt to establish positive relations to blacks, and Blacks the subtext of Afropessimism and this entire meditation.

The discussion points to a demand for political commitment. Politics is manifested under different names throughout the history of our species, but the one occasioning the word “politics” is, as we have seen, from the Greek pólis, which refers to ancient Hellenic city-states. It identifies specific kinds of activities conducted inside the city-state, where order necessitated the resolution of conflicts through rules of discourse the violation of which could lead to (civil) war, a breaking down of relations into those appropriate for “outsiders.” Returning to the Fanonian observation of selves and others, it is clear that imposed limitations on certain groups amount to impeding or blocking the option and activities of politics. Yet, as a problem occurring within the polity, the problem short of war becomes a political one.

Returning to Afropessimistic challenges, the question becomes this. If the problem of antiblack racism is conceded as political—where antiblack institutions of power have, as their project, the impeding of Black power, which in effect requires barring Black access to political institutions—then antiblack societies are ultimately threats also to politics defined as the human negotiation of the expansion of human capabilities or, more to the point, appearance, speech, and freedom.

Antipolitics is one of the reasons why societies in which antiblack racism is hegemonic are also those in which racial moralizing dominates; moralizing stops at individuals at the expense of addressing institutions the transformation of which would make immoral individuals irrelevant. As a political problem, it demands a political solution. It is not accidental that blacks continue to be the continued exemplars of unrealized freedom and against whom violence is waged against appearance and speech. As so many from Ida B. Wells-Barnett to Angela Y. Davis, Michelle Alexander, Angela J. Davis, Noël Cazenave have shown the expansion of privatization and incarceration is squarely placed in a structure of states and civil societies premised on the limitations of freedom (Blacks)—ironically, as seen in countries such as South Africa and the United States, in the name of freedom.21

That power is a facilitating or enabling phenomenon, a functional element of the human world, a viable response must be the establishment of relations that reach beyond the singularity of the body. I bring this up because proponents of Afropessimism might object to this analysis because of its appeal to a human world. If that world is abrogated, the site of struggle becomes that which is patently not human. It is not accidental that popular race discourse refers today to “black bodies” instead of “black people,” for instance. As the human world is discursive, social, and relational, this abandonment amounts to an appeal to the nonrelational, the incommunicability of radicalized singularity, and appeals to the body and its very limited reach, if not isolation. At that point, it is perhaps the psychologist, psychiatrist, or psychoanalyst who would be helpful, as turning radically inward offers the promise of despair, narcissistic delusions of divine power, and, as Fanon also observed, madness.22 Even if that slippery slope were rejected, the performative contradiction of attempting to communicate such singularity or absence thereof requires, at least for consistency, the appropriate course of action: silence.

### Hope

#### Political hope isn’t anti-black idolatry but meliorism – [method] drains energy and ensures authoritarianism

Stitzlein 18. Sarah M. Professor, University of Cincinnati School of Education. "Hoping and Democracy." Contemporary Pragmatism 15: 228-250. Emory Libraries.

What ought I hope for? This question guides our pursuit of the good life and its answer is often shaped by our social, political, and educational experiences. We aren’t born with ready-made hopes; rather, we shape them through our interactions with others, our growing sense of what is possible as we learn about our environment, and our experiments with the world to see what we can do within it and to change it. Other people play an important role in this process, especially through institutions like schools, social arrangements like families, and political practices like democracy. They shape the traditions and expectations we inherit, as well as the ways in which we test, challenge, and revise what has been passed on to us.

Despite this, hope is too often described in individualist terms that fail to encapsulate the full process of hoping and its potential impact on shared living. Many theologians link hope with an individual’s faith in a deity who will act on his or her behalf, 1 some philosophers employ a narrow understanding of hope as an individual’s desire for an outcome in the face of uncertainty, 2 while many more psychologists describe hope as an individual’s use of willpower and “waypower” to achieve clear goals. 3 Instead, I will offer a pragmatist account of hope, which is firmly rooted in the experiences of individuals and grows out of real life circumstances, yet cannot be disconnected from social and political life. 4 I extend my account to show how a pragmatist view of hope is necessarily connected to other people and can be used to enrich our experiences in communities. Moreover, such hope can help us to better face current political struggles and social problems, all the while building a democratic identity together. 5

In this article, I will explain how pragmatism offers an enhanced understanding of hope and its role in our lives together. To examine the ways in which shared hoping and the shared content of our hopes shape our identity and our work together in democracy, I consider both how and what we hope. Unlike other accounts of hope that are largely divorced from life’s circumstances, such as theological accounts that direct our attention to deities and psychological accounts that tell us we must hope for our goals regardless of real world constraints, pragmatist hope is noteworthy because it is firmly rooted in reality. 6 Moreover, a pragmatist account addresses some of the current obstacles we face in American democracy and is capable of transforming or improving them. Perhaps more importantly, such hope can be directly and indirectly cultivated within citizens, thereby offering a feasible way that democratic life can be strengthened.

1 Present Context

Before looking at hope in detail, let’s briefly first take stock of current conditions that relate to hopelessness in personal and political life. In pragmatist spirit, the account I offer here must attend to real conditions. Unfortunately, these are conditions where hope is struggling, where democracy may be in jeopardy, and where the dominant form of hope that we do see is largely privatized.

To begin, a recent study using the World Values Survey and other polling sources finds that democratic citizens have “become more cynical about the value of democracy as a political system, less hopeful that anything they do might influence public policy, and more willing to express support for authoritarian alternatives.” 7 Those citizens have increasingly withdrawn from democratic participation, whether that be through formal institutions or alternatives in the public or civic spheres, such as joining in movements or protests. There has been a dramatic shift in how the wealthy view democracy, with 16 percent of them now believing that military rule is a better way of living and an astounding 35 percent of rich young Americans holding such a view. 8

There are likely many factors impacting this current state of affairs and I will touch on a few here. 9 First, in terms of hope most overtly, Alan Mittleman rightly notes that “the legitimacy of politics is damaged in proportion to its failure to fulfil the hopes it has engendered.” 10 Indeed, several recent American candidates ran on messages of hope and yet the visions evoked have often failed to be fulfilled in reality, crushing the heightened expectations of citizens. Politicians often use the rhetoric of hope, but they tend to distort what hope really is and what it requires of citizens, as I will explain later. Instead, they make reference to the supposed destiny of the nation with God as its backer. Or, as in the cases of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, some citizens place their hope in the leader himself, invoking a messianic figure. These forms of hope entail no more citizen action than, perhaps, donating to a campaign or wearing an iconic t-shirt proclaiming “hope.” Instead, I will argue that, rather than passively relying on the hope promised by politicians, citizens must participate in shaping and fulfilling hope, making such hope more genuine and robust.

Second, structural violence and inequality, common amongst poor and racial minority communities in America, has wreaked havoc on hope. In some cases, it has eroded hope. 11 In others it has rendered hope exhausting, 12 \*\*\*footnote 12 begins\*\*\* Calvin Warren, “Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope,” cr: The New Centennial Review, 15 (2015), pp. 215–248. Shannon Sullivan, “Setting aside hope: A pragmatist approach to racial justice,” in Pragmatism and Justice, ed. by Susan Dielman, David Rondel, and Christopher Voparil (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).\*\*\*footnote 12 ends\*\*\* with marginalized citizens told that they must never give up hope and that they must keep trying to earn a better life for themselves, in part through improving their own character regardless of the stagnant harmful practices of others. Many of those citizens are left either nihilistically without hope or perpetually chasing a vision of justice that is (perhaps sometimes intentionally kept) out of reach. 13 \*\*\*footnote 13 begins\*\*\* Calvin Warren, “Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope,” cr: The New Centennial Review, 15 (2015): 215–248. \*\*\*footnote 13 ends\*\*\* I intend to describe a form of hope that is more sustainable and more attuned to the real conditions of life that we can control and others where we have limited control.

Third, citizenship in America has increasingly become centered on individuals, personal responsibility, entrepreneurship, and private success. Historical accounts of rugged individualism have now joined forces with calls to educate children in grit and expectations that one will fight to earn one’s position and goods in a competitive marketplace. 14 This environment lacks trust in others and discourages collaborative effort. Often those who have not been successful in the past, or do not see viable avenues for being so in the future, fatalistically accept these conditions and become passive about countering or changing them. While others who have enough resources and power to be comfortable with the present conditions, indulge in the privilege of being cynical or apathetic. Some spread these states of hopelessness or jaded negativity through memes and messages on social media, especially about the role and effectiveness of government, rendering cynicism a collective practice. 15 Cynics, left believing that their political efforts are useless or ineffective and perhaps that everyone acts on self-interest, are left to look out merely for themselves, without a sense of responsibility to act on behalf of themselves and others. Indeed, cynics may mock others who do not hold such views as naïve and out of touch with reality. Cynicism functions as a distancing maneuver, separating citizens from each other, from formal democratic institutions, and from civic organizations, where visions of an improved world and action to achieve it tend to occur. My notion of hope aims to span those divides.

Finally, what is left of hope has become privatized. 16 This is exacerbated as neoliberalism continues to assert Margaret Thatcher’s claims, “There is no such thing as society, only individuals and families,” and “there is no alternative to the market.” Hope is reduced to a mere drive to achieve one’s own limited dreams, or those of one’s children, typically only through financial terms and material goods. When citizens are rendered isolated competitors, they lose the ability to detect social problems and the motivation to ameliorate them, especially if the effects on one’s self or family are not immediate. Economist Tyler Cowen describes these citizens as the new “complacent class,” who are content with the way things are as long as they are not directly harmed and as long as they can stay surrounded by people and things that confirm their experience of the world. In their complacency, the members of the complacent class are unable to “inspire an electorate with any kind of strong positive visions, other than some marginal adjustments.” 17 I aim to show how hope is better understand as a social and political endeavor that brings us into contact with others as we craft visions of the future.

In sum, these changes in citizens’ lives and views debilitate individual citizens and democracy as a whole. They keep us from recognizing and solving collective problems and from leading better lives together. Citizens sit around waiting for reasons to hope, sometimes becoming swept up in campaign rhetoric when election cycles come around, rather than acknowledging that hope is generated through action as subjects working together, as I will argue. I will turn now to depict a pragmatist account of hope that can be formally cultivated in schools and informally in our lives together—a way of hoping together that may better support democratic life in these challenging times.

2 Pragmatist Hope

I offer here a pragmatist account of hope, largely based in the philosophy of John Dewey. Notably, Dewey himself does not provide such an account, even though hope underlies much of his work and was evident in his own personal life as he encountered considerable despair at the loss of two of his children and his wife, while also facing two world wars. I construct a view of hope from Dewey’s well-articulated elements of inquiry, growth, truth, meliorism, and habits. Pragmatism begins with the real and complicated conditions of our world. It brings together intelligent reflection with inquiry, habits, and action so that we can understand and change our environments to better align with our needs and desires. Hope plays an important role in that process.

Inquiry, Growth, and Truth

For Dewey, hope often arises within the midst of despair, when we have lost our way and are struggling to move forward. Dewey describes these moments as “indeterminate situations.” He turns to the process of inquiry via the empirical method to help us explore those situations, consider possible courses of action, and test out various solutions. It is inquiry that helps us to understand, act upon, and reconstruct our environments and our experiences so that we are able to move forward out of the indeterminate situation. In a richly cognitive and often social practice, inquiry invokes curiosity and problem solving to move us out of ruts. Indeed, this method combats the stagnation of fatalism by urging us to formulate and try out solutions.

Wilderson proves cap --- the origin of slavery comes from the reduction of blackness to an object of labor, their claims might prove that there was a psychological economy created surrounding blackness but they don't prove that redutionism is a one and done event. Its constantly repeated which is justified by your gratuitious violence claim and proves comradery in class warfare solves since it can challenge the repeition of violence