# Constructive 1NC

### 1

#### Permissibility Negates –

#### [1] Semantics – [Just](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/just) implies acting or being in conformity with what is morally upright or good, therefore if the resolution is permissible and therefore not unjust it acts according to what is morally upright and flows negative. That applies to presumption as well because [Unjust](https://www.dictionary.com/browse/unjust) means lacking in justice so the affirmative must actively prove that there exists a deficit in Justice.

#### [2] Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the “P” and “~P” are true.

#### [3] Shiftiness – Permissibility ground encourages the aff to load up with triggers and the 1ar controls the direction of the round which means they can moot all my offense, I need permissibility in the 2n to compensate.

#### Moral responsibility necessitates free will

#### van Inwagen [van Inwagen, Peter. “An Essay on Free Will.” Published 1983] //ReNSU SF

The answer to this question is a philosophical commonplace. **If we do not have free will**, then **there is no such thing as moral responsibility**. This proposition, one might think, certainly deserves to be a commonplace. **If someone charges you with, say, lying, and if you can convince him that it was simply not within your power not to lie, then it would seem that you have done all that is necessary to absolve yourself of responsibility for lying**. Your accuser cannot say, "I concede it was not within your power not to lie; none the less you ought not to have lied". Ought, as the saying goes, implies can. (Of course, it is unlikely that anyone would believe you if you said that it was not within your power not to lie, but that is not the point.) Similarly, if someone charges you with not having done something he maintains you ought to have done, he must withdraw his charge if you can convince him that you couldn't have done it. If, for example, he charges you with not having spoken up when a word might have saved Jones's reputation, he must withdraw his charge if you can convince him that you were bound and gagged while Jones was being maligned. (These simple facts are actually a bit too simple. An agent may have been unable to perform a certain act at a certain time, but—owing to his abilities with respect to acts that were or might have been performed at earlier times—he may once have been able so to arrange matters that he would have been able to perform that act at that time. For example, I may have been unable to contribute to a certain charity yesterday because I was locked in a bank vault that can't be opened from the inside. But if it should transpire that I had shut myself into the vault in order to avoid the representatives of the charity, few people would regard my having been locked in the vault as providing me with an adequate excuse for not contributing. The reason is easy to see: though there may be a sense in which it is true that I couldn't have contributed to the charity, there was none the less a time-- before I shut myself in—at which I could so have arranged matters that I should have been able to contribute to it when the time to do so rolled round. In the sequel, I shall ignore the possibility of cases like the "bank vault" case in order to avoid unnecessary detail in the statement of my argument.) It would seem to follow from these considerations that without free will there is no moral responsibility: if moral responsibility exists, then someone is morally responsible for something he has done or for something he has Ieft undone; **to be morally responsible for some act or failure to act is at least to be able to have acted otherwise**, whatever else it may involve; **to be able to have acted otherwise is to have free will. Therefore, if moral responsibility exists, someone has free will. Therefore, if no one has free will, moral responsibility does not exist.**

#### Free will doesn’t exist –

#### [1] Eternalism is true – Events do not solely exist in the present but instead exist with the past and future as one continuous spectrum meaning all our future actions already exist

Ryan Scott Ryan, Doctor of Philosophy in Religion from Baylor University and post doc fellow at Baylor, A Short Argument for Eternalism, 2013, <http://www.scholardarity.com/?page_id=3845> //NSU SF

Consider two such moments, for example my eating of a peanut butter sandwich for lunch yesterday and my recollection of that experience today. It seems unproblematic to say that the first moment of experience temporally precedes the second. There seems to be a real relation between the two such that the first comes before the second and the second comes after the first. The question for the non-eternalist is whether that temporal relation really obtains. If “before” and “after” are not real relations, relations that in fact obtain between two objectively existing moments of consciousness, then it seems that time is unreal and eternalism follows trivially. But if they do obtain, then the non-eternalist faces a worse difficulty. For if all that is ever real is the present moment, then there is never a time at which both moments of experience exist, and so at least one of the relata always fails to exist. Granting that my eating of the peanut butter sandwich yesterday does not exist now, if there is no sense in which it exists timelessly, then it simply isn’t “there” to be in a relation of “coming before” to the moment of my recollection. If past and present never coexist in any eternal sense whatsoever, then it should be simply meaningless to say that one comes “before” the other; the past simply fails to exist, and therefore can’t be “related” to anything. A non-eternalist might reply to this argument by saying that the past does continue to exist, but only as past—that when the Moving Finger, having writ, moves on, each moment acquires a quality of “pastness” that differentiates it from the present moment without making it fall out of existence altogether. I think this will not do, primarily for the reason Sprigge makes clear in his essay. My experience of eating a peanut butter sandwich has a certain quality of presentness that is simply part and parcel of the experience; without that quality the experience would not be what it is/was, and indeed would arguably not be an “experience” at all. (Sprigge’s own example, which has the advantage of great vividness, is a toothache.) If that moment of experience is not eternally “there” with that very quality of presentness, then it is no longer available as a temporal relatum, and when I say that the experience of eating the sandwich comes “before” my recollection of it, I am referring not to the experience itself (which no longer exists qua experience) but to its ghost. Surely this is not what we mean to say when we say one experience precedes another; the view that began by apparently cleaving to common sense in the end departs from it egregiously. Unless some version of eternalism is true, then, we cannot even meaningfully say that one moment of experience precedes or follows another. That seems to be a pretty big problem for non-eternalists.

#### [2] Molecular neurology proves free will is fictitious

#### Coyne 12 Jerry Coyne, [Professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolution at The [University of Chicago](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Organizations/Schools/University+of+Chicago)], “Why You Don’t Really Have Free Will,” *USAToday*, January 1st, 2012 <https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/2013/12/why-you-dont-really-have-free-will.html?m=1> //NSU SF

The first is simple: **we are biological** creatures, **collections of molecules that must obey the laws of physics**. **All the success of science rests on the regularity of those laws, which determine the behavior of every molecule in the universe.** Those molecules, of course, also make up your brain — the organ that does the "choosing." And **the neurons and molecules in your brain are the product of both your genes and your environment,** an environment including the other people we deal with. Memories, for example, are nothing more than structural and chemical changes in your brain cells. Everything that you think, say, or **do, must come down to molecules and physics.** True "**free will**," then, **would require us to somehow step outside of our brain's structure and modify how it works**. Science hasn't shown any way we can do this because "**we" are simply constructs of our brain.** We can't impose a nebulous "will" on the inputs to our brain that can affect its output of decisions and actions, any more than a programmed computer can somehow reach inside itself and change its program.

#### [3] Time Relativity theory means events are pre-determined

#### Kiekeben 96 ©1996, 2000 Franz Kiekeben Relativistic Determinism <http://www.franzkiekeben.com/relativistic.html> //NSU SF

**The relativity of simultaneity implies that the future is determined** (in a non-causal sense) in **the following way. Let us say that** you at this moment are **event A**. That **is, your present self — what you are doing**,thinking**, [and] observing**, and so on**,** at this moment — is A. **Let's also say that there is an observer traveling in a very fast spaceship, who** at this very moment (**from your frame of reference**) **is event B. Now for** B, that is, for **the spaceship traveler at this moment, there is an event C which, from B's perspective, lies in the past.** The interesting thing is that **it is possible** for C to be an event which, **from A's perspective,** [**that**] is still in the future [and]. That is, **C hasn't happened yet** as far as you're concerned. Nonetheless, **there is someone right now** (again, from your perspective) **who regards C as having already occurred.** And if that is the case, then how can C be avoidable? **If an event which is in your future is in someone else's past**, and that someone else is in your present (or even in your past!), **then it is inevitable that the event will take place.** Event C must come about, no matter what. And this scenario can in principle apply to any future event. **Thus, all** future **events are determined.** The above argument seems to me unquestionably valid. The only way an indeterminist can reject it, I believe, is by rejecting the relativity of simultaneity. **Since special relativity has been experimentally confirmed many times, rejecting it** may seem **[is]** all but **impossible.** But it is not. One must make a distinction between a theory's experimental results and its correct interpretation. It is possible that the observable confirmations of relativity are compatible with a different theory that reintroduces absolute simultaneity. In fact, the basic equations of special relativity were first arrived at while assuming absolute space and time (and thus absolute simultaneity). Given our present knowledge, however, I believe it is more reasonable to accept relativistic determinism than it is to reject it.

#### [4] Even if determinism is false, indeterminism denies freedom

#### McGinn [Colin McGinn. British philosopher. He has held teaching posts and professorships at University College London, the University of Oxford, Rutgers University and the University of Miami, Problems in Philosophy: The Limits of Inquiry. London: Wiley, 1993. P. 80,. BRACKETED FOR CLARITY] //SHS ZS

The argument is exceedingly familiar, and runs as follows. **Either determinism is true or it is not**. **If it is true**, then **all our chosen actions are uniquely necessitated by prior states of the world**., just like every other event. **But then it cannot be the case that we could [not] have acted otherwise**, since this would require a possibility determinism rules out. **Once the initial conditions are set and the laws fixed, causality excludes genuine freedom**. **On the other hand, if indeterminism is true**, then, though things could have happened otherwise, **it is not the case that we could [not] have chosen otherwise**, **since a merely random event is no kind of free choice**. **That some events** occur causelessly, or **are** not **subject to** law, or only to **probabilistic law, is not sufficient for those events to be free choices**. Thus one horn of the dilemma represents choices as predetermined happenings in a predictable causal sequence, while the other construes them as inexplicable lurches to which the universe is randomly prone. **Neither alternative supplies** what **the notion of free will** requires,, and no other alternative suggests itself. **Therefore freedom is not possible in any kind of possible world.** The concept contains the seeds of its own destruction.

#### Thus, agents aren’t morally responsible for their actions. That negates:

#### [1] Private companies are moral agents – if the appropriation of outer space is not the responsibility of any agent and is merely a fact of the universe then it is not ‘unjust’ as no one is responsible for its moral issues. Being unjust requires violating what is morally right but in a deterministic world nothing can be right nor wrong as agents aren’t responsible for their actions

#### [2] Auto-Negate – The appropriation of outter space is already a fact of the world so given determinism the aff cannot change it as it would violate the laws of physics. That means that even if they win that it would be good the aff is impossible.

### 2

#### Interpretation: If the affirmative defends hedonistic consequentialism, they must explicitly delineate which theory of hedonistic pleasure they defend in the text of the AC.

#### B. Violation: They don’t and maximizing expected well-being doesn’t cut it.

IEP No Author, xx-xx-xxxx, "Hedonism," No Publication, https://iep.utm.edu/hedonism/

Several contemporary varieties of hedonism have been defended, although usually by just a handful of philosophers or less at any one time. Other varieties of hedonism are also theoretically available but have received little or no discussion. Contemporary varieties of Prudential Hedonism can be grouped based on how they define pleasure and pain, as is done below. In addition to providing different notions of what pleasure and pain are, contemporary varieties of Prudential Hedonism also disagree about what aspect or aspects of pleasure are valuable for well-being (and the opposite for pain). The most well-known disagreement about what aspects of pleasure are valuable occurs between Quantitative and Qualitative Hedonists. Quantitative Hedonists argue that how valuable pleasure is for well-being depends on only the amount of pleasure, and so they are only concerned with dimensions of pleasure such as duration and intensity. Quantitative Hedonism is often accused of over-valuing animalistic, simple, and debauched pleasures. Qualitative Hedonists argue that, in addition to the dimensions related to the amount of pleasure, one or more dimensions of quality can have an impact on how pleasure affects well-being. The quality dimensions might be based on how cognitive or bodily the pleasure is (as it was for Mill), the moral status of the source of the pleasure, or some other non-amount-related dimension. Qualitative Hedonism is criticised by some for smuggling values other than pleasure into well-being by misleadingly labelling them as dimensions of pleasure. How these qualities are chosen for inclusion is also criticised for being arbitrary or ad hoc by some because inclusion of these dimensions of pleasure is often in direct response to objections that Quantitative Hedonism cannot easily deal with. That is to say, the inclusion of these dimensions is often accused of being an exercise in plastering over holes, rather than deducing corollary conclusions from existing theoretical premises. Others have argued that any dimensions of quality can be better explained in terms of dimensions of quantity. For example, they might claim that moral pleasures are no higher in quality than immoral pleasures, but that moral pleasures are instrumentally more valuable because they are likely to lead to more moments of pleasure or less moments of pain in the future. Hedonists also have differing views about how the value of pleasure compares with the value of pain. This is not a practical disagreement about how best to measure pleasure and pain, but rather a theoretical disagreement about comparative value, such as whether pain is worse for us than an equivalent amount of pleasure is good for us. The default position is that one unit of pleasure (sometimes referred to as a Hedon) is equivalent but opposite in value to one unit of pain (sometimes referred to as a Dolor). Several Hedonistic Utilitarians have argued that reduction of pain should be seen as more important than increasing pleasure, sometimes for the Epicurean reason that pain seems worse for us than an equivalent amount of pleasure is good for us. Imagine that a magical genie offered for you to play a game with him. The game consists of you flipping a fair coin. If the coin lands on heads, then you immediately feel a burst of very intense pleasure and if it lands on tails, then you immediately feel a burst of very intense pain. Is it in your best interests to play the game? Another area of disagreement between some Hedonists is whether pleasure is entirely internal to a person or if it includes external elements. Internalism about pleasure is the thesis that, whatever pleasure is, it is always and only inside a person. Externalism about pleasure, on the other hand, is the thesis that, pleasure is more than just a state of an individual (that is, that a necessary component of pleasure lies outside of the individual). Externalists about pleasure might, for example, describe pleasure as a function that mediates between our minds and the environment, such that every instance of pleasure has one or more integral environmental components. The vast majority of historic and contemporary versions of Prudential Hedonism consider pleasure to be an internal mental state. Perhaps the least known disagreement about what aspects of pleasure make it valuable is the debate about whether we have to be conscious of pleasure for it to be valuable. The standard position is that pleasure is a conscious mental state, or at least that any pleasure a person is not conscious of does not intrinsically improve their well-being.

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Shiftiness – They can shift out of my turns based on whatever theory of the good they operate under due to the nature of a vague standard. Especially true because the warrants for their standard could justify different versions of hedonism as coming first and I wouldn’t know until the 1ar which gives them access to multiple contingent standards.

#### 2. Strat – I lose 6 minutes of time during the AC to generate a strategy because I don't know what turns or strategy I can go for during the 1N absent which proves CX doesn’t check since it would occur after the skew.

#### 3. Resolvability – Makes the round irresolvable since we can’t weigh different mechanisms for the good – Sentimentalism hijacks would make more sense under a motivational theory of hedonism – weighing ground is key since it ensures we can compare arguments that clash to access the ballot.

#### No infinite spec – Reading a syllogism solves.

#### Fairness is a voter since debate is a competitive activity that intrinsically requires equal footing when participating, to minimize one’s ability to participate in discussion disrespects the other member of the activity.

#### Drop the debater – 1. Deterrence – Prevents reading the abusive practice in the future since it’s not worth risking the loss which is k2 norm setting indefensible practices die out 2. TS – Otherwise you’ll read a bunch of abusive practices for the time trade off 3. Epistemic Skew – The round has already been skewed so it’s impossible to evaluate the rest of the flow

#### Competing interps – 1. Reasonability encourages a race to the margins of what counts as sufficiently fair which incentivizes as much abuse as possible 2. Norm setting – it encourages the most fair rule through debating competing models 3. Judge intervention – Reasonability begs the question of what the judge thinks is sufficient which takes the round out of the debaters hands.

#### No RVIs – 1. It deters legitimate theory vs good theory debaters because you will lose on a shell even if it’s a good norm 2. Baiting – incentivizes people to be abusive and script counter-interps to win on the RVI which increases the existence of bad norms 3. It forces debaters to argue for bad practices even if they realize their interp is wrong which kills substance debate and norm setting since we have bad theory debates we agree on.

#### Use a norm setting model – 1. It solves long term abuse whereas IRA only matters one round at a time 2. It’s best for the activity since it encourages deep reflection and debate about what the best world of debate looks like and strives toward it.

## AC

### Framework

#### Overview –

#### [1] Util can’t justify intrinsic wrongness – We can’t know whether our action was good until we’ve evaluated the states of affairs they’ve produced since it’s based on the outcome of the action. For Example if asked the question “is murder okay?” a utilitarian would not be able to say no because there are situations in which it would be morally obligatory to do so if it maximized pleasure

#### [2] Util triggers determinism – if all actions have consequences and those consequences have consequences and so on then all actions are a part of a causal chain that determines the universe. Your confidence that the advantage is correct is proof of a deterministic theory of metaphysics.

#### AT Moen –

#### [1] Moen is self-justifying – The card gives no warrant for why pleasure is good other than ‘we like it’ but that can’t explain phenomena like sadomasochism or why people experience pleasure in entirely different ways and as a response to different actions. Even if pleasure is good it begs the question of who’s and which.

#### [2] Friendship, love, knowledge etc. are valuable regardless – its why you still want to know more even when learning things only makes you sad.

#### At Weighibility –

#### [1] Determinism is the most resolvable, its answer is based on the way moral error theory would flow which is fundamentally binary and thus clear

#### [2] There’s no reason in philosophy why explaining degree of wrongness is necessary

#### [3] There are plenty of things that are intuitive but wrong – Eg the Monty Hall problem, we should follow evidence not intuition

#### AT I/F –

#### 1] Multiple people can foresee the same consequence with different intents IE going home to see family vs to avoid work. Proves your framework fails as judgements are not objectively based on the situation but subjectively decided with present knowledge

#### [2] No objective way to hold agents responsible for foreseen events since each person foresees varying levels and types of consequences

#### AT Actor Spec –

#### [1] Is/ought fallacy – The fact that Governments use a framework doesn’t mean that they should, the fact that US policy is bad and they use util means util fails to guide action

#### [2] Governments use side constraint theories like the constitution and countries like Germany literally have political systems based on the categorical imperative

#### [3] There is a difference between actions and omissions – otherwise governments would need to give away all their money to help those in need because omitting that action is morally wrong.

#### At Papineu –

#### [1] Naturalistic Fallacy – that’s Moore; util provides examples of things that are good, but things we perceive can never translate into the ultimate good since good is an indefinable property – for instance, chocolate is good but not everything good is chocolate so chocolate doesn’t encompass the property of being good. Means natural properties like pain and pleasure aren’t the ultimate good

#### [2] Is/Ought Fallacy – There’s no reason why following biological inclinations is good. If we acted purely on instinct we would acted egotistically since we only know our own pain and pleasure, proves naturalism means egoism not util

#### [3] Devil Problem – We cannot confirm empirical reality except through empirical reality. Everything around us could be deception or false perception, we can only confirm non-natural properties like reason and math since they’re universal

#### AT Ext First –

#### [1] If I win my framework its deductively true, your being unsure doesn’t mean you should actually be unsure so there’s a 0% risk extinction outweighs

#### [2] Reduction of Agency comes first under any ethical framework – a) absent agency we don’t care about extinction because we can’t find value in the existence of rational actors b) Reduction of agency justifies the worst atrocities like extinction because we have no moral starting point from which to condemn actions.

#### [3] If we come to uncertainty there’s an equal likelihood that extinction is an absolute good as it is an absolute wrong.

#### AT Lexical Pre-Requisite –

#### [1] Fallacy of Origin – I need oxygen to engage in ethics but that doesn’t mean the standard is maximizing oxygen.

#### [2] Empirically Disproven – We act morally in the face of danger constantly. For instance, Congress debates health care policy while wars are happening.

#### [3] We are always in threat of random events like spontenaous combustion or diseases, this means we never act so vote neg on presumption

#### AT Ext First –

#### [1] If I win my framework its deductively true, your being unsure doesn’t mean you should actually be unsure so there’s a 0% risk extinction outweighs

#### [2] doesn’t affect determinism – its not an ethical theory but a metaphysical one.

#### [3] If we come to uncertainty there’s an equal likelihood that extinction is an absolute good as it is an absolute wrong.

### Contention

#### “Extinction” operates as a narrative trope that disavows settler colonialism – rational appeals to geopolitical conflict inscribes social death through appeals to white vulnerability

Dalley 16 – Assistant Professor of English at Daemen College

(Hamish, “The deaths of settler colonialism: extinction as a metaphor of decolonization in contemporary settler literature,” Settler Colonial Studies, accessed 11-15-16 //Bosley)

Settlers love to contemplate the possibility of their own extinction; to read many contemporary literary representations of settler colonialism is to find settlers strangely satisfied in dreaming of ends that never come. This tendency is widely prevalent in English-language representations of settler colonialism produced since the 1980s: the possibility of an ending–the likelihood that the settler race will one day die out–is a common theme in literary and pop culture considerations of colonialism’s future. Yet it has barely been remarked how surprising it is that this theme is so present. For settlers, of all people, to obsessively ruminate on their own finitude is counterintuitive, for few modern social formations have been more resistant to change than settler colonialism. With a few exceptions (French Algeria being the largest), the settler societies established in the last 300 years in the Americas, Australasia, and Southern Africa have all retained the basic features that define them as settler states–namely, the structural privileging of settlers at the expense of indigenous peoples, and the normalization of whiteness as the marker of political agency and rights–and they have done so notwithstanding the sustained resistance that has been mounted whenever such an order has been built. Settlers think all the time that they might one day end, even though (perhaps because) that ending seems unlikely ever to happen. The significance of this paradox for settler-colonial literature is the subject of this article. Considering the problem of futurity offers a useful foil to traditional analyses of settler-colonial narrative, which typically examine settlers’ attitudes towards history in order to highlight a constitutive anxiety about the past–about origins. Settler colonialism, the argument goes, has a problem with historical narration that arises from a contradiction in its founding mythology. In Stephen Turner’s formulation, the settler subject is by definition one who comes from elsewhere but who strives to make this place home. The settlement narrative must explain how this gap–which is at once geographical, historical, and existential–has been bridged, and the settler transformed from outsider into indigene. Yet the transformation must remain constitutively incomplete, because the desire to be at home necessarily invokes the spectre of the native, whose existence (which cannot be disavowed completely because it is needed to define the settler’s difference, superiority, and hence claim to the land) inscribes the settler’s foreignness, thus reinstating the gap between settler and colony that the narrative was meant to efface.1 Settler-colonial narrative is thus shaped around its need to erase and evoke the native, to make the indigene both invisible and present in a contradictory pattern that prevents settlers from evermoving on from the moment of colonization.2As evidence of this constitutive contradiction, critics have identified in settler-colonial discourse symptoms of psychic distress such as disavowal, inversion, and repression.3Indeed, the frozen temporality of settler-colonial narrative, fixated on the moment of the frontier, recalls nothing so much as Freud’s description of the ‘repetition compulsion’ attending trauma.4As Lorenzo Veracini puts it, because: ‘settler society’ can thus be seen as a fantasy where a perception of a constant struggle is juxtaposed against an ideal of ‘peace’ that can never be reached, settler projects embrace and reject violence at the same time. The settler colonial situation is thus a circumstance where the tension between contradictory impulses produces long-lasting psychic conflicts and a number of associated psychopathologies. Current scholarship has thus focused primarily on settler-colonial narrative’s view of the past, asking how such a contradictory and troubled relationship to history might affect present-day ideological formations. Critics have rarely considered what such narratological tensions might produce when the settler gaze is turned to the future. Few social formations are more stubbornly resistant to change than settlement, suggesting that a future beyond settler colonialism might be simply unthinkable. Veracini, indeed, suggests that settler-colonial narrative can never contemplate an ending: that settler decolonization is inconceivable because settlers lack the metaphorical tools to imagine their own demise.6This article outlines why I partly disagree with that view. I argue that the narratological paradox that defines settler-colonial narrative does make the future a problematic object of contemplation. But that does not make settler decolonization unthinkable per se; as I will show, settlers do often try to imagine their demise–but they do so in a way that reasserts the paradoxes of their founding ideology, with the result that the radical potentiality of decolonization is undone even as it is invoked. I argue that, notwithstanding Veracini’s analysis, there is a metaphor via which the end of settler colonialism unspools–the quasi-biological concept of extinction, which, when deployed as a narrative trope, offers settlers a chance to consider and disavow their demise, just as they consider and then disavow the violence of their origins. This article traces the importance of the trope of extinction for contemporary settler-colonial literature, with a focus on South Africa, Canada, and Australia. It explores variations in how the death of settler colonialism is conceptualized, drawing a distinction between historio-civilizational narratives of the rise and fall of empires, and a species-oriented notion of extinction that draws force from public anxiety about climate change–an invocation that adds another level of ambivalence by drawing on ‘rational’ fears for the future (because climate change may well render the planet uninhabitable to humans) in order to narrativize a form of social death that, strictly speaking, belongs to a different order of knowledge altogether. As such, my analysis is intended to draw the attention of settler-colonial studies toward futurity and the ambivalence of settler paranoia, while highlighting a potential point of cross-fertilization between settler-colonial and eco-critical approaches to contemporary literature. That ‘extinction’ should be a key word in the settler-colonial lexicon is no surprise. In Patrick Wolfe’s phrase,7 settler colonialism is predicated on a ‘logic of elimination’ that tends towards the extermination – by one means or another – of indigenous peoples.8 This logic is apparent in archetypal settler narratives like James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans (1826), a historical novel whose very title blends the melancholia and triumph that demarcate settlers’ affective responses to the supposed inevitability of indigenous extinction. Concepts like ‘stadial development’–by which societies progress through stages, progressively eliminating earlier social forms–and ‘fatal impact’–which names the biological inevitability of strong peoples supplanting weak–all contribute to the notion that settler colonialism is a kind of ‘ecological process’9 that necessitates the extinction of inferior races. What is surprising, though, is how often the trope of extinctional so appears with reference to settlers themselves; it makes sense for settlers to narrate how their presence entails others’ destruction, but it is less clear why their attempts to imagine futures should presume extinction to be their own logical end as well. The idea appears repeatedly in English-language literary treatments of settler colonial-ism. Consider, for instance, the following rumination on the future of South African settler society, from Olive Schreiner’s 1883Story of an African Farm: It was one of them, one of those wild old Bushmen, that painted those pictures there. He did not know why he painted but he wanted to make something, so he made these. [...] Now the Boers have shot them all, so that we never see a yellow face peeping out among the stones.[...] And the wild bucks have gone, and those days, and we are here. But we will be gone soon, and only the stones will lie on, looking at everything like they look now.10 In this example, the narrating settler character, Waldo, recognizes prior indigenous inhabitation but his knowledge comes freighted with an expected sense of biological superiority, made apparent by his description of the ‘Bushman’s’ ‘yellow face’, and lack of mental self-awareness. What is not clear is why Waldo’s contemplation of colonial genocide should turn immediately to the assumption that a similar fate awaits his people as well. A similar presumption of racial vulnerability permeates other late nineteenth-century novels from the imperial metropole, such as Dracula and War of the Worlds which are plotted around the prospect of invasions that would see the extinction of British imperialism, and, in the process, the human species. Such anxieties draw energy from a pattern of settler defensiveness that can be observed across numerous settler-colonial contexts. Marilyn Lake’s and Henry Reynold’s account of the emergence of transnational ‘whiteness’ highlights the paradoxical fact that while white male settlers have been arguably the most privileged class in history, they have routinely perceived themselves to be ‘under siege’, threatened with destruction to the extent that their very identity of ‘whiteness was born in the apprehension of imminent loss’.11 The fear of looming annihilation serves a powerful ideological function in settler communities, working to foster racial solidarity, suppress dissent, and legitimate violence against indigenous populations who, by any objective measure, are far more at risk of extermination than the settlers who fear them. Ann Curthoys and Dirk Moseshave traced this pattern in Australia and Israel-Palestine, respectively.12 This scholarship suggests that narratives of settler extinction are acts of ideological mystification, obscuring the brutal inequalities of the frontier behind a mask of white vulnerability–an argument with which I sympathize. However, this article shows how there is more to settler-colonial extinction narratives than bad faith. I argue that we need a more nuanced understanding of how they encode a specifically settler-colonial framework for imagining the future, one that has implications for how we understand contemporary literatures from settler societies, and which allows us to see extinction as a genuine, if flawed, attempt to envisage social change.