# NC

### 1

#### Interpretation: Debaters must meet the disclosure interps that they disclose on their wiki

#### Violation – SS and link to their wiki in the doc, there are multiple

<https://hsld.debatecoaches.org/King/Park%20Aff>

Graphical user interface, text, application

Description automatically generated

Graphical user interface, application, table, Excel

Description automatically generated

#### Extempt is not an analytic summary which your interp requires

#### You don’t disclose case positions after the round in which they were read for any rounds at Lexington (this tournament)

#### You don’t disclose round reports for any rounds at Lexington.

#### Standards –

#### [1] Academic Integrity – You hold other debaters accountable for these norms by virtue of having them on your wiki. Publishing them implies you read them and defend their norms for the activity but you proceeed to violate them. Holding others accountable for things you don’t follow is fundamentally irreciprocal and creates a strat skew since you don’t have to disclose but you can look at everyone else’s wiki to prep

#### [2] Norm Setting – Creates a horrible norm for the activity where debaters can read disclosure interps and then immediately violate them. It turns disclosure into mere strategy and prevents it from seriously impacting the circuit so its disingenuous. Means every reason that disclosure is good negates.

#### Voters –

#### Fairness is a voter since debate is a competitive activity that intrinsically requires equal footing when participating, to minimize one’s ability to participate in discussion disrespects the other member of the activity.

#### Drop the debater – 1. Deterrence – Prevents reading the abusive practice in the future since it’s not worth risking the loss which is k2 norm setting indefensible practices die out 2. TS – Otherwise you’ll read a bunch of abusive practices for the time trade off 3. Epistemic Skew – The round has already been skewed so it’s impossible to evaluate the rest of the flow

#### Competing interps – 1. Reasonability encourages a race to the margins of what counts as sufficiently fair which incentivizes as much abuse as possible 2. Norm setting – it encourages the most fair rule through debating competing models 3. Judge intervention – Reasonability begs the question of what the judge thinks is sufficient which takes the round out of the debaters hands.

#### No RVIs – 1. It deters legitimate theory vs good theory debaters because you will lose on a shell even if it’s a good norm 2. Baiting – incentivizes people to be abusive and script counter-interps to win on the RVI which increases the existence of bad norms 3. It forces debaters to argue for bad practices even if they realize their interp is wrong which kills substance debate and norm setting since we have bad theory debates we agree on.

#### Use a norm setting model – 1. It solves long term abuse whereas IRA only matters one round at a time 2. It’s best for the activity since it encourages deep reflection and debate about what the best world of debate looks like and strives toward it.

### 2

#### The role of the ballot is determine the truth or falsity of the resolution.

**[] Constitutive: The ballot asks you to either vote aff or neg based on the given resolution a) Five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means its intrinsic to the nature of the activity b) Anything else is intervention Branse,** David Brasne '15 (), 9-4-2015, "The Role of the Judge By David Branse (Part One)," NSD Update,<http://nsdupdate.com/2015/09/04/the-role-of-the-judge-by-david-branse-part-one> First, bindingness: the practice rules argument I’ve sketched out illustrates this point. **Once a judge commits to a round in accordance with a set of rules**, the reasons within the round are different – **the rules are absolute** and non-optional. When a person signs a contract, **if they come to regard the terms of the contract as problematic, this is not a reason to disregard the contract. It might only be a reason to try to renegotiate it.** A decision about the practicality of the contract cannot, in itself, generate a reason to disobey the terms of the agreement. Second, arbitrariness: A maxim that provides the judge with the authority to vote on their perceived assessment of the activity’s goals seems to only emphasize the arbitrary, subjective elements of debate. There would be something deeply objectionable about the referee deciding to declare the better exerciser winner. **Impositions of practical judgments seem to just be unfair ex post facto rules that step outside the judge’s jurisdiction. This is especially true with debate** – education claims may seem somewhat intuitive, but there is no reason imposing practical judgments ends there. For example, one judge could come to believe that debate is a unique space to construct value judgments, and therefore the best debater is the one who best establishes a philosophy to win the round. Even though debate is a unique space for philosophical argumentation, no debater would feel comfortable for a judge voting on the AC framework when the neg won contention level offense beneath that framework. **Every judge will have different value judgments, and so the role of the judge in each round would oscillate. This emphasizes judge intervention**, and destroys the chance for debaters to predict each other’s arguments and thus engage with them. Very few people are comfortable viewing debate as an activity with oscillating rules where judges cannot be held to any predictable standard.

#### [] Fiat is illusory: Nothing leaves this round other than the result on the ballot which means even if there is a higher purpose, it doesn’t change anything and you should just write whatever is important on the ballot and vote for me. Answering this triggers constitutivism since the win is necessary for your scholarship which means rules inside of the game matter.

#### [] Isomorphism: ROBs that aren’t phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms necessitate that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing solves since it’s solely a question of if something is true or false, there isn’t a closest estimate.

#### [] Inclusion: a) other ROBs open the door for personal lives of debaters to factor into decisions and compare who is more oppressed which causes violence in a space where some people go to escape. b) Anything can function under truth testing insofar as it proves the resolution either true or false. Specific role of the ballots exclude all offense besides those that follow from their framework which shuts out people without the technical skill or resources to prep for it.

#### [] Normativity: Truth testing is the only ROB that encourages moral action guiding in every situation through an ethical fwk. Other ROBs pinpoint a problem, yet fail to apply in other ethical circumstances besides the one at hand. Proves that other ROBs trigger permissibility since they don’t condemn things that fall outside the scope of discussion.

#### [] Bindingness: a) all arguments pre-assume that they are true as judges don’t vote an arguments proven false b) in order to win that your ROB is superior to TT you must prove true the claim that your ROB is better than TT.

#### [] Intrinsicness: Truth Testing is internal to the process of debating

Branse 2, 9-4-2015, "The Role of the Judge By David Branse (Part One)," NSD Update, http://nsdupdate.com/2015/09/04/the-role-of-the-judge-by-david-branse-part-one/ In debate, those rules are testing the truth of a pre-given and pre-prepared topic. Switch-side **debate provides a unique forum where we** A) **don’t have to endorse our arguments as true since we contradict ourselves every round [and],** B) **view the process of warranting as supremely valuable**, and C) can challenge all ethical assumptions we hold. **Truth testing allows debaters to analyze arguments from a wide range of viewpoints, with an emphasis on contesting the warrants of every argument. In my opinion, the value and skills garnered in debate arise from the process of debating, not the content of the arguments or a particular pedagogical viewpoint. Debaters learn to structure logical syllogisms to warrant everything from the outrageous to the intuitive. The process of truth testing teaches debaters how to make decisions in the real world. We learn how to justify our beliefs and become good advocates not by rejecting this paradigm but by embracing it.** Competition to determine the truth of a proposition motivates debaters to engage in the very practices that provide us education. Debaters extensively prep and research unique topical ideas for the sake of winning. Few debaters would have learned as much as they did about the living wage without debate’s competitive incentive.

#### [] Critical pedagogy forces the judge into the role of coercer. Rickert,

(Thomas, “"Hands Up, You're Free": Composition in a Post-Oedipal World”, JacOnline Journal, wbem) **An example of the connection between violence and pedagogy is implicit in** the notion of being "schooled" as it has been conceptualized **by Giroux [is]** and Peter Mcl.aren. They explain, **"Fundamental to** the principles that inform **critical pedagogy is the conviction that schooling for self- and social empowerment** is ethically prior to questions of epistemology or to a mastery oftechnical or social skills that are primarily tied to the logic of the marketplace" (153-54). **A presumption here is that it is the teacher who knows (best)**, and **this** orientation gives the concept of schooling a particular bite: though it presents itself as oppositional to the state and the dominant forms of pedagogy that serve the state and its capitalist interests, it nevertheless **reinscribes an authoritarian model that is congruent with any number of oedipalizing pedagogies that "school" the student in proper behavior.** As Diane Davis notes, radical, feminist, and **liberatory pedagogies** "often **camouflage pedagogical violence in their move from one mode of 'normalization' to another" and "function within a disciplinary matrix of power**, a covert carceral system, **that aims to create useful subjects for particular political agendas" (212).** Such oedipalizing pedagogies are less effective in practice than what the claims for them assert; indeed, the attempt to "school" students in the manner called for by Giroux and McLaren is complicitous with the malaise of postmodern cynicism.Students will dutifully go through their liberatory motions, producing the proper assignments, but it remains an open question whether they carry an oppositional politics with them. The "critical distance" supposedly created with liberatory pedagogy also opens up a cynical distance toward the writing produced in class

#### [] Truth testing is the only democratically agreed upon framing. All others assume individual interpretations are correct but that collapses to egoism. Mouffe

[Mouffe, Chantal. The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso, 2000. Print. // LHP AA]

In coming to terms with pluralism, **what** **is** really **at stake is power** and antagonism and their ineradicable character. **This** **can** only **be grasped from a perspective that puts into** **question the objectivism** and essentialism **which are dominant** in democratic theory. In Hegemony and Socialist strategy, we delineated an approach that asserts that any social objectivity is constituted through acts of power. This means that **any social objectivity is** ultimately **political and has** **to show the** traces of the **acts of exclusion which govern** **its** **constitution**; what, following Derrida, can be referred to as its 'constitutive outside'. This point is decisive. It is because **every object has inscribed in its** **very being something other than itself and** **that as a result**, **everything is constructed as** **difference**. that its being cannot be conceived as pure 'presence' or 'objectivity'. **Since the** **constitutive outside** **is present within** **the inside as** **its always** real **possibility every identity** **becomes** purely **contingent**. This implies that **we should not conceptualize power as an** external **relation taking place between two** pre-constituted **identities**, but **rather as** **constituting** **the identities themselves**. This point of confluence between objectivity and power is what we have called 'hegemony'. When we envisage democratic politics from such an antiessentialist perspective, we can begin to understand that, for democracy to exist, **no social agent should be able to claim** any **mastery of the foundation of society.** This signifies that **the relation between social agents becomes more democratic only as far as they accept the particularity and the limitation of their claims; that is**, only in so far as **they** **recognize their mutual relation as one from which power is ineradicable**. The **democratic society cannot be conceived** any **more as a society that would have realized the dream of a perfect harmony in social relations.** Its **democratic** **character can only be given by the fact that no limited social actor can attribute to herself or himself the representation of the totality. The** main **question** of democratic politics **becomes** then not how to eliminate power, but **how to constitute forms of power which are compatible with democratic values. To acknowledge** the existence of **relations of power and the need to transform them**, while renouncing the illusion that we could free ourselves completely from power - this is what is specific to the project that we have called 'radical and plural democracy'. **Such** a project **recognizes** that the specificity of modern **pluralist democracy** - even a well-ordered one - **does not reside in the absence of domination** and of violence **but** [resides] in **the establishment of a set of institutions through which they** [domination and violence] **can be** limited and **contested. To negate** the ineradicable character of **antagonism and** to **aim at** a **universal** rational **consensus** - this **is the real threat** to democracy. Indeed, this can lead to violence being unrecognized and hidden behind appeals to . rationality', as is often the case in liberal thinking which disguises the necessary frontiers and forms of exclusion behind pretenses of 'neutrality'.

### 3

#### Permissibility Negates –

#### [1] Semantics – [Just](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/just) implies acting or being in conformity with what is morally upright or good, therefore if the resolution is permissible and therefore not unjust it acts according to what is morally upright and flows negative. That applies to presumption as well because [Unjust](https://www.dictionary.com/browse/unjust) means lacking in justice so the affirmative must actively prove that there exists a deficit in Justice.

#### Moral responsibility necessitates free will

#### van Inwagen [van Inwagen, Peter. “An Essay on Free Will.” Published 1983] //ReNSU SF

The answer to this question is a philosophical commonplace. **If we do not have free will**, then **there is no such thing as moral responsibility**. This proposition, one might think, certainly deserves to be a commonplace. **If someone charges you with, say, lying, and if you can convince him that it was simply not within your power not to lie, then it would seem that you have done all that is necessary to absolve yourself of responsibility for lying**. Your accuser cannot say, "I concede it was not within your power not to lie; none the less you ought not to have lied". Ought, as the saying goes, implies can. (Of course, it is unlikely that anyone would believe you if you said that it was not within your power not to lie, but that is not the point.) Similarly, if someone charges you with not having done something he maintains you ought to have done, he must withdraw his charge if you can convince him that you couldn't have done it. If, for example, he charges you with not having spoken up when a word might have saved Jones's reputation, he must withdraw his charge if you can convince him that you were bound and gagged while Jones was being maligned. (These simple facts are actually a bit too simple. An agent may have been unable to perform a certain act at a certain time, but—owing to his abilities with respect to acts that were or might have been performed at earlier times—he may once have been able so to arrange matters that he would have been able to perform that act at that time. For example, I may have been unable to contribute to a certain charity yesterday because I was locked in a bank vault that can't be opened from the inside. But if it should transpire that I had shut myself into the vault in order to avoid the representatives of the charity, few people would regard my having been locked in the vault as providing me with an adequate excuse for not contributing. The reason is easy to see: though there may be a sense in which it is true that I couldn't have contributed to the charity, there was none the less a time-- before I shut myself in—at which I could so have arranged matters that I should have been able to contribute to it when the time to do so rolled round. In the sequel, I shall ignore the possibility of cases like the "bank vault" case in order to avoid unnecessary detail in the statement of my argument.) It would seem to follow from these considerations that without free will there is no moral responsibility: if moral responsibility exists, then someone is morally responsible for something he has done or for something he has Ieft undone; **to be morally responsible for some act or failure to act is at least to be able to have acted otherwise**, whatever else it may involve; **to be able to have acted otherwise is to have free will. Therefore, if moral responsibility exists, someone has free will. Therefore, if no one has free will, moral responsibility does not exist.**

#### Free will doesn’t exist –

#### Molecular neurology proves free will is fictitious

#### Coyne 12 Jerry Coyne, [Professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolution at The [University of Chicago](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Organizations/Schools/University+of+Chicago)], “Why You Don’t Really Have Free Will,” *USAToday*, January 1st, 2012 <https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/2013/12/why-you-dont-really-have-free-will.html?m=1> //NSU SF

The first is simple: **we are biological** creatures, **collections of molecules that must obey the laws of physics**. **All the success of science rests on the regularity of those laws, which determine the behavior of every molecule in the universe.** Those molecules, of course, also make up your brain — the organ that does the "choosing." And **the neurons and molecules in your brain are the product of both your genes and your environment,** an environment including the other people we deal with. Memories, for example, are nothing more than structural and chemical changes in your brain cells. Everything that you think, say, or **do, must come down to molecules and physics.** True "**free will**," then, **would require us to somehow step outside of our brain's structure and modify how it works**. Science hasn't shown any way we can do this because "**we" are simply constructs of our brain.** We can't impose a nebulous "will" on the inputs to our brain that can affect its output of decisions and actions, any more than a programmed computer can somehow reach inside itself and change its program.

#### Thus, agents aren’t morally responsible for their actions. That negates:

#### [1] Private companies are moral agents – if the appropriation of outer space is not the responsibility of any agent and is merely a fact of the universe then it is not ‘unjust’ as no one is responsible for its moral issues.

### 4

# Case

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)