# R2 NSU SF vs Tampa-Jesuit MH

## NC

### 1

#### I apologize for reading an overly complex position, I’ll go as slow as I can and offer as much explanation as is needed. Due to college apps I had little time to prep so I’m relying on generic args for this tournament.

### 2

#### Permissibility Negates –

#### [1] Semantics – [Just](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/just) implies acting or being in conformity with what is morally upright or good, therefore if the resolution is permissible and therefore not unjust it acts according to what is morally upright and flows negative. That applies to presumption as well because [Unjust](https://www.dictionary.com/browse/unjust) means lacking in justice so the affirmative must actively prove that there exists a deficit in Justice.

#### [2] Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the “P” and “~P” are true.

#### [3] Shiftiness – Permissibility ground encourages the aff to load up with triggers and the 1ar controls the direction of the round which means they can moot all my offense, I need permissibility in the 2n to compensate.

#### Moral responsibility necessitates free will

#### van Inwagen [van Inwagen, Peter. “An Essay on Free Will.” Published 1983] //ReNSU SF

The answer to this question is a philosophical commonplace. **If we do not have free will**, then **there is no such thing as moral responsibility**. This proposition, one might think, certainly deserves to be a commonplace. **If someone charges you with, say, lying, and if you can convince him that it was simply not within your power not to lie, then it would seem that you have done all that is necessary to absolve yourself of responsibility for lying**. Your accuser cannot say, "I concede it was not within your power not to lie; none the less you ought not to have lied". Ought, as the saying goes, implies can. (Of course, it is unlikely that anyone would believe you if you said that it was not within your power not to lie, but that is not the point.) Similarly, if someone charges you with not having done something he maintains you ought to have done, he must withdraw his charge if you can convince him that you couldn't have done it. If, for example, he charges you with not having spoken up when a word might have saved Jones's reputation, he must withdraw his charge if you can convince him that you were bound and gagged while Jones was being maligned. (These simple facts are actually a bit too simple. An agent may have been unable to perform a certain act at a certain time, but—owing to his abilities with respect to acts that were or might have been performed at earlier times—he may once have been able so to arrange matters that he would have been able to perform that act at that time. For example, I may have been unable to contribute to a certain charity yesterday because I was locked in a bank vault that can't be opened from the inside. But if it should transpire that I had shut myself into the vault in order to avoid the representatives of the charity, few people would regard my having been locked in the vault as providing me with an adequate excuse for not contributing. The reason is easy to see: though there may be a sense in which it is true that I couldn't have contributed to the charity, there was none the less a time-- before I shut myself in—at which I could so have arranged matters that I should have been able to contribute to it when the time to do so rolled round. In the sequel, I shall ignore the possibility of cases like the "bank vault" case in order to avoid unnecessary detail in the statement of my argument.) It would seem to follow from these considerations that without free will there is no moral responsibility: if moral responsibility exists, then someone is morally responsible for something he has done or for something he has Ieft undone; **to be morally responsible for some act or failure to act is at least to be able to have acted otherwise**, whatever else it may involve; **to be able to have acted otherwise is to have free will. Therefore, if moral responsibility exists, someone has free will. Therefore, if no one has free will, moral responsibility does not exist.**

#### Free will doesn’t exist –

#### [1] Eternalism is true – Events do not solely exist in the present but instead exist with the past and future as one continuous spectrum meaning all our future actions already exist

Ryan Scott Ryan, Doctor of Philosophy in Religion from Baylor University and post doc fellow at Baylor, A Short Argument for Eternalism, 2013, <http://www.scholardarity.com/?page_id=3845> //NSU SF

Consider two such moments, for example my eating of a peanut butter sandwich for lunch yesterday and my recollection of that experience today. It seems unproblematic to say that the first moment of experience temporally precedes the second. There seems to be a real relation between the two such that the first comes before the second and the second comes after the first. The question for the non-eternalist is whether that temporal relation really obtains. If “before” and “after” are not real relations, relations that in fact obtain between two objectively existing moments of consciousness, then it seems that time is unreal and eternalism follows trivially. But if they do obtain, then the non-eternalist faces a worse difficulty. For if all that is ever real is the present moment, then there is never a time at which both moments of experience exist, and so at least one of the relata always fails to exist. Granting that my eating of the peanut butter sandwich yesterday does not exist now, if there is no sense in which it exists timelessly, then it simply isn’t “there” to be in a relation of “coming before” to the moment of my recollection. If past and present never coexist in any eternal sense whatsoever, then it should be simply meaningless to say that one comes “before” the other; the past simply fails to exist, and therefore can’t be “related” to anything. A non-eternalist might reply to this argument by saying that the past does continue to exist, but only as past—that when the Moving Finger, having writ, moves on, each moment acquires a quality of “pastness” that differentiates it from the present moment without making it fall out of existence altogether. I think this will not do, primarily for the reason Sprigge makes clear in his essay. My experience of eating a peanut butter sandwich has a certain quality of presentness that is simply part and parcel of the experience; without that quality the experience would not be what it is/was, and indeed would arguably not be an “experience” at all. (Sprigge’s own example, which has the advantage of great vividness, is a toothache.) If that moment of experience is not eternally “there” with that very quality of presentness, then it is no longer available as a temporal relatum, and when I say that the experience of eating the sandwich comes “before” my recollection of it, I am referring not to the experience itself (which no longer exists qua experience) but to its ghost. Surely this is not what we mean to say when we say one experience precedes another; the view that began by apparently cleaving to common sense in the end departs from it egregiously. Unless some version of eternalism is true, then, we cannot even meaningfully say that one moment of experience precedes or follows another. That seems to be a pretty big problem for non-eternalists.

#### [2] Molecular neurology proves free will is fictitious

#### Coyne 12 Jerry Coyne, [Professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolution at The [University of Chicago](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Organizations/Schools/University+of+Chicago)], “Why You Don’t Really Have Free Will,” *USAToday*, January 1st, 2012 <https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/2013/12/why-you-dont-really-have-free-will.html?m=1> //NSU SF

The first is simple: **we are biological** creatures, **collections of molecules that must obey the laws of physics**. **All the success of science rests on the regularity of those laws, which determine the behavior of every molecule in the universe.** Those molecules, of course, also make up your brain — the organ that does the "choosing." And **the neurons and molecules in your brain are the product of both your genes and your environment,** an environment including the other people we deal with. Memories, for example, are nothing more than structural and chemical changes in your brain cells. Everything that you think, say, or **do, must come down to molecules and physics.** True "**free will**," then, **would require us to somehow step outside of our brain's structure and modify how it works**. Science hasn't shown any way we can do this because "**we" are simply constructs of our brain.** We can't impose a nebulous "will" on the inputs to our brain that can affect its output of decisions and actions, any more than a programmed computer can somehow reach inside itself and change its program.

#### [3] Time Relativity theory means events are pre-determined

#### Kiekeben 96 ©1996, 2000 Franz Kiekeben Relativistic Determinism <http://www.franzkiekeben.com/relativistic.html> //NSU SF

**The relativity of simultaneity implies that the future is determined** (in a non-causal sense) in **the following way. Let us say that** you at this moment are **event A**. That **is, your present self — what you are doing**,thinking**, [and] observing**, and so on**,** at this moment — is A. **Let's also say that there is an observer traveling in a very fast spaceship, who** at this very moment (**from your frame of reference**) **is event B. Now for** B, that is, for **the spaceship traveler at this moment, there is an event C which, from B's perspective, lies in the past.** The interesting thing is that **it is possible** for C to be an event which, **from A's perspective,** [**that**] is still in the future [and]. That is, **C hasn't happened yet** as far as you're concerned. Nonetheless, **there is someone right now** (again, from your perspective) **who regards C as having already occurred.** And if that is the case, then how can C be avoidable? **If an event which is in your future is in someone else's past**, and that someone else is in your present (or even in your past!), **then it is inevitable that the event will take place.** Event C must come about, no matter what. And this scenario can in principle apply to any future event. **Thus, all** future **events are determined.** The above argument seems to me unquestionably valid. The only way an indeterminist can reject it, I believe, is by rejecting the relativity of simultaneity. **Since special relativity has been experimentally confirmed many times, rejecting it** may seem **[is]** all but **impossible.** But it is not. One must make a distinction between a theory's experimental results and its correct interpretation. It is possible that the observable confirmations of relativity are compatible with a different theory that reintroduces absolute simultaneity. In fact, the basic equations of special relativity were first arrived at while assuming absolute space and time (and thus absolute simultaneity). Given our present knowledge, however, I believe it is more reasonable to accept relativistic determinism than it is to reject it.

#### [4] Even if determinism is false, indeterminism denies freedom

#### McGinn [Colin McGinn. British philosopher. He has held teaching posts and professorships at University College London, the University of Oxford, Rutgers University and the University of Miami, Problems in Philosophy: The Limits of Inquiry. London: Wiley, 1993. P. 80,. BRACKETED FOR CLARITY] //SHS ZS

The argument is exceedingly familiar, and runs as follows. **Either determinism is true or it is not**. **If it is true**, then **all our chosen actions are uniquely necessitated by prior states of the world**., just like every other event. **But then it cannot be the case that we could [not] have acted otherwise**, since this would require a possibility determinism rules out. **Once the initial conditions are set and the laws fixed, causality excludes genuine freedom**. **On the other hand, if indeterminism is true**, then, though things could have happened otherwise, **it is not the case that we could [not] have chosen otherwise**, **since a merely random event is no kind of free choice**. **That some events** occur causelessly, or **are** not **subject to** law, or only to **probabilistic law, is not sufficient for those events to be free choices**. Thus one horn of the dilemma represents choices as predetermined happenings in a predictable causal sequence, while the other construes them as inexplicable lurches to which the universe is randomly prone. **Neither alternative supplies** what **the notion of free will** requires,, and no other alternative suggests itself. **Therefore freedom is not possible in any kind of possible world.** The concept contains the seeds of its own destruction.

#### Thus, agents aren’t morally responsible for their actions. That negates:

#### [1] Private companies are moral agents – if the appropriation of outer space is not the responsibility of any agent and is merely a fact of the universe then it is not ‘unjust’ as no one is responsible for its moral issues. Being unjust requires violating what is morally right but in a deterministic world nothing can be right nor wrong as agents aren’t responsible for their actions

#### [2] Auto-Negate – The appropriation of outter space is already a fact of the world so given determinism the aff cannot change it as it would violate the laws of physics. That means that even if they win that it would be good the aff is impossible.

### 3

#### The role of the ballot is determine the truth or falsity of the resolution.

**[] Constitutive: The ballot asks you to either vote aff or neg based on the given resolution a) Five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means its intrinsic to the nature of the activity b) Anything else is intervention Branse,** David Brasne '15 (), 9-4-2015, "The Role of the Judge By David Branse (Part One)," NSD Update,<http://nsdupdate.com/2015/09/04/the-role-of-the-judge-by-david-branse-part-one> First, bindingness: the practice rules argument I’ve sketched out illustrates this point. **Once a judge commits to a round in accordance with a set of rules**, the reasons within the round are different – **the rules are absolute** and non-optional. When a person signs a contract, **if they come to regard the terms of the contract as problematic, this is not a reason to disregard the contract. It might only be a reason to try to renegotiate it.** A decision about the practicality of the contract cannot, in itself, generate a reason to disobey the terms of the agreement. Second, arbitrariness: A maxim that provides the judge with the authority to vote on their perceived assessment of the activity’s goals seems to only emphasize the arbitrary, subjective elements of debate. There would be something deeply objectionable about the referee deciding to declare the better exerciser winner. **Impositions of practical judgments seem to just be unfair ex post facto rules that step outside the judge’s jurisdiction. This is especially true with debate** – education claims may seem somewhat intuitive, but there is no reason imposing practical judgments ends there. For example, one judge could come to believe that debate is a unique space to construct value judgments, and therefore the best debater is the one who best establishes a philosophy to win the round. Even though debate is a unique space for philosophical argumentation, no debater would feel comfortable for a judge voting on the AC framework when the neg won contention level offense beneath that framework. **Every judge will have different value judgments, and so the role of the judge in each round would oscillate. This emphasizes judge intervention**, and destroys the chance for debaters to predict each other’s arguments and thus engage with them. Very few people are comfortable viewing debate as an activity with oscillating rules where judges cannot be held to any predictable standard.

#### [] Fiat is illusory: Nothing leaves this round other than the result on the ballot which means even if there is a higher purpose, it doesn’t change anything and you should just write whatever is important on the ballot and vote for me. Answering this triggers constitutivism since the win is necessary for your scholarship which means rules inside of the game matter.

#### [] Isomorphism: ROBs that aren’t phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms necessitate that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing solves since it’s solely a question of if something is true or false, there isn’t a closest estimate.

#### [] Bindingness: a) all arguments pre-assume that they are true as judges don’t vote an arguments proven false b) in order to win that your ROB is superior to TT you must prove true the claim that your ROB is better than TT.

#### [] Intrinsicness: Truth Testing is internal to the process of debating

Branse 2, 9-4-2015, "The Role of the Judge By David Branse (Part One)," NSD Update, http://nsdupdate.com/2015/09/04/the-role-of-the-judge-by-david-branse-part-one/ In debate, those rules are testing the truth of a pre-given and pre-prepared topic. Switch-side **debate provides a unique forum where we** A) **don’t have to endorse our arguments as true since we contradict ourselves every round [and],** B) **view the process of warranting as supremely valuable**, and C) can challenge all ethical assumptions we hold. **Truth testing allows debaters to analyze arguments from a wide range of viewpoints, with an emphasis on contesting the warrants of every argument. In my opinion, the value and skills garnered in debate arise from the process of debating, not the content of the arguments or a particular pedagogical viewpoint. Debaters learn to structure logical syllogisms to warrant everything from the outrageous to the intuitive. The process of truth testing teaches debaters how to make decisions in the real world. We learn how to justify our beliefs and become good advocates not by rejecting this paradigm but by embracing it.** Competition to determine the truth of a proposition motivates debaters to engage in the very practices that provide us education. Debaters extensively prep and research unique topical ideas for the sake of winning. Few debaters would have learned as much as they did about the living wage without debate’s competitive incentive.

## Case

#### The sanctity of life requires free will – if humans aren’t fundamentally free then there is no reason why we care about the value of life to begin with. EG if humans are meat computers with automatic inputs and outputs there is no inherent value to existence

#### Consequences don’t matter under Kantian Ethics – Kant believes that actions are evlauted based on their intrinsic or constitutive features. Eg when I buy a gun it is me excercising my freedom to do so insofar as my buying of a gun doesn’t prevent anyone else from doing so. That is the sanctity of life. Even if I eventually use the gun to kill someone, my buying a gun was still an ethically legitimate action as there is nothing intrinsic about buying a gun that logically necessitates that I kill someone.

#### Life itself isn’t intrinsically motivational so it can’t guide moral action – . Absent this ethics can’t guide action as I could agree X is bad yet still imply that I am going to do X regardless. However, no universal motivation exists.

WittgensteinWittgenstein, Ludwig. "A Lecture on Ethics." Heretics Society. Cambridge University. Cambridge University, Cambridge, England. 1 Nov. 1929. Address

I said that so far as facts and propositions are concerned there is only relative value and relative good, right, etc. And let me, before I go on, illustrate this by a rather obvious example. The right road is the road which leads to an arbitrarily predetermined end and it is quite clear to us all that there is no sense in talking about the right road apart from such a predetermined goal. Now let us see what we could possibly mean by the expression, 'the absolutely right road.' I think it would be the road which everybody on seeing it would, with logical necessity, have to go, or be ashamed for not going. And similarly the absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs, would be one which everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about. And I want to say that such a state of affairs is a chimera. No state of affairs has, in itself, what I would like to call the coercive power of an absolute judge.

#### Biological moral theories terminate in skepticism –Argument from evolution

Machuca 18 Diego E. Machuca “Moral Skepticism: An Introduction and Overview”, 02/27/2018 [https://philarchive.org/archive/EMAMSA] Accessed 3/8/21 AHS//NPR

Drawing especially on the work of evolutionary biologists, some moral skeptics have argued that the most plausible account of the origin of morality is the one that appeals to evolution: natural selection has forged certain faculties or capacities devoted to moral judgment. In their view, the evolutionary account defeats our first-order moral beliefs because it does not require that morality be true, but only that it be evolutionarily advantageous to believe that it is true. Evolutionary debunking strategies of this sort have been deployed in a systematic way particularly by Richard Joyce (2001: ch. 6; 2006; 2016c) and Sharon Street (2006; 2008). Joyce first appealed to the argument from evolution in his defense of a moral error theory, but later on used it to ground a skepticism about moral justification. Street employed the argument in her attack not merely on moral realism but on value realism in general. Although in the two articles in question she does not develop or defend it, she repeatedly mentions constructivism as the anti-realist view that sidesteps her evolutionary debunking argument against value realism. The defense, interpretation, and criticism of various types of evolutionary arguments for moral skepticism have of late attracted a lot of attention, and in fact the study of ‘the evolution of morality’ constitutes a burgeoning area in metaethics. The thrust of such arguments is that biological evolution is aimed not at moral belief-forming processes that are reliable, but at moral belief-forming processes that are adaptive. In other words, the evolutionary function of those processes is not that of tracking the truth: their general success at matching or accurately representing alleged objective moral facts explains neither their emergence nor their persistence. Humans are therefore disposed to make moral judgments regardless of the evidence to which they are exposed, regardless of whether there are or are not objective moral facts. Someone might object that, in order to be adaptive, such processes must be reliable, i.e., the moral judgments they form are evolutionarily useful—i.e., tend to promote survival and reproduction—because they are in general true. However, given that moral beliefs may well be adaptively useful even if they are not true, if what we know is only that evolution is aimed at moral belief-forming processes that are adaptive, then we do have here a defeater: even if some moral judgments are true, there is no reason for claiming that they are. This is the way in which evolutionary skeptical arguments are in general understood in the literature. Resuming the distinction between rebutting and undercutting defeaters discussed at the outset of the present section, the evolutionary account of the origin of our moral beliefs then provides an undercutting defeater for those beliefs: it does not show that they are false—for there might well be moral facts out there in the world—but rather that they were not formed in a reliable way because their source is not trustworthy, and hence that they are not epistemically justified. The resulting moral skepticism is therefore epistemological. However, as we will see, the evolutionary account has also been understood as providing a rebutting defeater for our moral beliefs: a reason for thinking that objective moral facts do not exist, and hence that such beliefs are false. The resulting moral skepticism is therefore ontological. When appealed to in relation to a moral error theory, evolutionary debunking considerations are normally used as a supplement to arguments that purport to establish the error-theoretic conclusion in order to account, once the conclusion is accepted, for the systematic error we commit in making moral judgments. This seems to be the case of Mackie, who briefly appealed to evolution as an alternative explanation of the origin of our moral sentiments and dispositions (1977: 113–114, 124, 192, 229, 239). Although Mackie (1985: 154) claimed that morality can be seen as an outgrowth from genetically determined retributive tendencies that were favored by evolutionary selection, 14 he did not offer an elaborate evolutionary account of morality in the way Joyce (2001: ch. 6; 2006) has. The latter maintains that the origin of morality is to be found in the development of human cooperation: an individual is more reproductively fit if his sympathetic desires to help his family members are supplemented by a sense of inescapable requirement to favor them that strengthens his motivation to perform helpful actions. This was accomplished by providing people with the belief that such actions have objective moral qualities. Once a cognitive capacity to believe that it is inescapably required to help family members was in place, it was exploited by natural selection to regulate also helpful behavior towards non-kin individuals. It must be remarked that Joyce’s view is not that every particular moral prescription can be evolutionarily explained, or that culture or the environment plays no role in determining moral beliefs. Rather, his view is that the tendency to use general moral categories and the belief that certain types of action bear objective moral properties are innate; that cultural influences can cause some of those actions to stop being regarded as moral or immoral, or cause other types of action to start being so regarded; and that moral dispositions require environmental cues to become manifest. For reasons that will become clear at the end of this subsection, it is important to note that Joyce is at some points cautious regarding the status of his evolutionary account of morality. He presents the hypothesis that natural selection has led us to commit the fundamental moral error as a “plausible speculation” (2001: 135). Also, although he regards the evolutionary hypothesis as plausible, coherent, and testable, and as the best story of the origin of morality we have (2006: 134, 137, 139– 140), and although he therefore answers the question “Is human morality innate?” in the affirmative, he remarks that “this is provisional and to a degree speculative, since the present evidence does not warrant answering the question in either a positive or a negative way with any confidence” (2006: 2). Finally, he observes that his evolutionary debunking argument “is conditional: It relies on an empirical premise concerning the evolution of morality which is yet to be established” (2016b: 9). In his first treatment of the evolutionary account of morality, Joyce not only remarks that it complements the arguments for moral error theory, but he makes the stronger claim that “the fact that moral thinking is a naturally evolved trait has error theoretical implications” (2001: 137) or “provides evidence in favor of the error theory” (2001: 148). In his view, the innateness of moral judgments undermines these judgments being true for the simple reason that if we have evolved to make these judgments irrespective of their being true, then one could not hold that the judgments are justified. And if they are unjustified, then although they could be true, their truth is in doubt. (2001: 159) But the fact that if we accept the evolutionary account, our moral beliefs are utterly unjustified, or we have no reason for thinking that they are true, or it is highly improbable or extremely unlikely that they are true, in no way establishes the ontological conclusion of moral error theory. Of course, the evolutionary account places the burden of proof on the non-minimal moral realist to provide us not only with a reason for believing that our moral beliefs are epistemically justified, but also with a reason for believing that there are objective moral facts or properties in the first place. Oddly enough, Joyce himself recognizes that the evolutionary account alone does not support an ontological conclusion, but rather an attitude of withholding of assent concerning the truth or falsity of moral judgments (2001: 160–168). In any case, in later works he explicitly remarks that one cannot argue for a moral error theory on the basis of evolutionary considerations, the correct skeptical conclusion being instead that all moral judgments are unjustified (Joyce 2006: ch. 6; 2016c; cf. 2016b: 8). Joyce’s later evolutionary debunking stance seems to vacillate between nihilistic and Pyrrhonian epistemological skepticism: sometimes he seems to believe that moral beliefs are intrinsically unjustified or that they have been shown to be so for good, and sometimes to believe that they can be deemed to be unjustified on the basis of the evidence available up to this point. Joyce’s epistemological version of the argument from evolution could be formulated as follows: 1. Our capacity to form first-order moral beliefs is an evolutionary adaptation produced by natural selection. 2. Biological evolution is not aimed at moral belief-forming processes that are reliable, i.e., processes whose function is to track the alleged moral truths. 3. Given 2, our having beliefs that objects possess moral properties is consistent with nothing ever possessing a moral property. Therefore: 4. Our first-order moral beliefs are epistemically unjustified. Street (2006) contends that evolutionary considerations pose a dilemma for realist theories of value (and hence for realist theories of moral value). The fact that the forces of natural selection have greatly shaped the content of our evaluative judgments raises the challenge to explain the relation between such evolutionary influences and the independent evaluative facts posited by the realist. 15 The first horn of the dilemma is the claim that there is no such relation, which results in an implausible skepticism: we would have to conclude that our evaluative judgments are contaminated by a distorting influence and hence that many or most of them are off the track. Although it is possible that “as a matter of sheer chance” our evaluative judgments accord with the allegedly independent evaluative facts, “this would require a fluke of luck that’s not only extremely unlikely . . . but also astoundingly convenient to the realist” (2006: 122). In response, one could appeal to rational reflection as another major influence on the content of our evaluative judgments that corrects the distorting influence of evolutionary pressures on such judgments. Although Street does not discard such an influence, she claims that, since rational reflection must proceed by using evaluative judgments, one would be assessing evolutionarily distorted evaluative judgments by means of other evolutionarily distorted evaluative judgments (2006: 124). The other horn of the dilemma is the claim that natural selection favored those ancestors who were able to grasp the independent evaluative truths, because tracking them was advantageous for survival and reproduction. But this account that presents itself as a scientific explanation is, in Street’s view, inferior on scientific grounds to the one according to which the tendency to make certain kinds of evaluative judgments rather than others contributed to our ancestors’ survival and reproduction because those judgments forged adaptive links between the circumstances in which our ancestors found themselves and their responses to such circumstances. This account is superior in terms of the usual criteria of scientific adequacy, for it is clearer, more parsimonious, and does a better job at illuminating the tendency in question (2006: 129–134). Once again, we see that a crucial premise in an argument against value realism is a best-explanation premise. With a focus on moral realism, Street’s argument could perhaps be formulated thus: 1. The forces of natural selection have had an indirect tremendous influence on the content of our moral judgments. 2. The moral realist owes us an explanation of the relation between such an evolutionary influence and the independent moral facts he posits. 3. He can claim either that (3a) there is no relation or that (3b) there is such a relation. 4. If he claims that (3a), then he is forced either (4a) to embrace a farfetched moral skepticism or (4b) to claim that an incredible coincidence took place. 16 5. If he claims that (3b), then he must propose a tracking account, which is scientifically unacceptable (since the adaptive link account provides the best explanation of why our tendency to make certain kinds of moral judgments rather than others contributed to our ancestors’ reproductive success). Therefore: 6. Moral realism is false, i.e., there are no independent moral facts. It is surprising that Street argues for an ontological conclusion regarding independent or objective moral facts on the basis of an evolutionary debunking argument. For it seems that evolutionary debunking arguments (and genealogical debunking arguments in general) can at most undermine the epistemic credentials of our substantive moral beliefs—i.e., can at most provide us with undercutting defeaters for those beliefs. Street’s own evolutionary debunking argument establishes at most that we have no reason for affirming that our moral beliefs match alleged objective moral facts because the best explanation of our tendency to make certain moral judgments makes no appeal to them. Even though the moral realist then owes us a reason for affirming that such facts exist, the argument does not prove that they do not. Note that such epistemological moral skepticism is different from (4a), the skeptical conclusion that Street regards as implausible or far-fetched.

#### Freedom denies the existence of moral value

#### **Plantigna** An Existentialist's Ethics Author(s): Alvin Plantinga Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Dec., 1958), pp. 235-256

In his choice he [man] defines himself, he defines the other, and he constitutes the world, not by creating it or giving it being, but by giving it whatever limitation, differentiation, form, and meaning that it has. The result of this fearful responsibility is anguish. Man is anguished because he alone must choose, and because he must choose. He is anguished also because he has no guarantee that he will not, at some future date, choose a different essence for himself [in the future] and therefore cease to be as this man. Anguish appears when we realize that there is nothing between us and our lives ; when we realize that we are entirely free and therefore utterly responsible. In The Reprieve Mathieu contemplates the fact that the coming war has completely cut him off from his past. "T am free,' he said suddenly. And his joy changed, on the spot, to a crushing sense of anguish."15 Anguish is the way our freedom reveals itself to consciousness. It is the consciousness that nothing separates me from any possibility whatever (BN 32). We cannot escape anguish. We may try?to try to escape anguish to adopt the atti tude of "bad faith" (BN 43), but such an attempt is doomed to failure, for we are anguish just as we are freedom. Even in bad faith we do not escape anguish, for in order to try to escape it, conceal it from ourselves, we must already know it (BN 45). Such is Sartre's doctrine of the responsibility and anguish following from our absolute freedom. This doctrine seems to take crucial moral notions very seriously. But in the last analysis the doctrine of absolute freedom undercuts the very possibility of morality. Sartre's responsibility and anguish are a delusion. Every choice, he tells us, is unconditioned and completely contingent; there is nothing to which it can appeal, and it is therefore "absurd." "It is absurd in this sense; that the choice is that by which all foundations, all reasons come into being, that by which the very notion of the absurd receives a meaning. It is absurd as being beyond all reasons" (BN 479). Every choice defines both value and rationality. But if that is so, then it is impossible to make a wrong choice. As we have seen, and as Sartre constantly repeats, m[M]y choice defines value; prior to my choice there is no right or wrong. But then m[M]y choice, in defining the right, can never be mistaken. Whatever I choose is right by definition.

### Death Criticisms

#### The unconditional affirmation of human life is a violent form of oppression which denies the possibility of value to death and reifies a master-slave dichotomy

Baudrillard 02 (Jean, “The Spirit of Terrorism: Hypotheses on Terrorism”

All the same, we should try to get beyond the moral imperative of unconditional respect for human life, and conceive that one might respect, both in the other and in oneself, something other than, and more than, life (existence isn’t everything, it is even the least of things): a destiny, a cause, a form of pride or of sacrifice. There are symbolic stakes which far exceed existence and freedom - which we find it unbearable to lose, because we have made them the fetishistic values of a universal humanist order. So we cannot imagine a terrorist act committed with entire autonomy and ‘freedom of conscience’. Now, choice in terms of symbolic obligations is sometimes profoundly mysterious - as in the case of Romand, the man with the double life, who murdered his whole family, not for fear of being unmasked, but for fear of inflicting on them the profound disappointment of discovering his deception. Committing suicide would not have expunged the crime from the record; he would merely have passed the shame off on to the others. Where is the courage, where the cowardice? The question of freedom, one’s own or that of others, no longer poses itself in terms of moral consciousness, and a higher freedom must allow us to dispose of it to the point of abusing or sacrificing it. Omar Khayyam: ‘Rather one freeman bind with chains of love than set a thousand prisoned captives free.’ Seen in that light, this is almost an overturning of the dialectic of domination, a paradoxical inversion of the master-slave relationship. In the past, the master was the one who was exposed to death, and could gamble with it. The slave was the one deprived of death and destiny, the one doomed to survival and labour. How do things stand today? We, the powerful, sheltered now from death and overprotected on all sides, occupy exactly the position of the slave; whereas those whose deaths are at their own disposal, and who do not have survival as their exclusive aim, are the ones who today symbolically occupy the position of master.

#### Our culture exists to escape death to the ultimate extreme – The most bloodthirsty form of capitalism is legitimized as we survive instead of live

Baudrillard 76 (Jean, dead philosopher, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage Publications.)

From this point on the obsession with death and the will to abolish death through accumulation become the fundamental motor of the rationality of political economy Value, in particular time as value, is accumulated in the phantasm of death deferred, pending the term of a linear infinity of value. Even those who no longer believe in a personal eternity believe in the infinity of time as they do in a species-capital of double-compound interests. The infinity of capital passes into the infinity of time, the eternity of a productive system no longer familiar with the reversibility of gift exchange , but instead with the irreversibility of quantitative growth. The accumulation of time imposes the idea of progress, as the accumulation of science imposes the idea of truth: in each case , what is accumulated is no longer symbolically exchanged , but becomes an objective dimension . Ultimately, the total objectivity of time, like total accumulation , is the total impossibility of symbolic exchange, that is, death . Hence the absolute impasse of political economy, which intends to eliminate death through accumulation : the time of accumulation is the time of death itself. We cannot hope for a dialectical revolution at the end of this process of spiralling hoarding. We already know that the economic rationalisation of exchange (the market) is the social form which produces scarcity (Marshall Sahlins, 'The original affluent society' , in Stone Age Economics [Chicago: Aldine and Atherton, 1972] ) . Similarly, the infinite accumulation of time as value under the sign of general equivalence entails the absoLute scarcity of time that is death . A contradiction in capitalism? No, communism in this instance is in solidarity with political economy, since, in accordance with the same fantastic schema of an eternal accumulation of productive forces, communism too aims for the abolition of death . Only its total ignorance of death (save perhaps as a hostile horizon to be conquered by science and technics) has protected it up to now from the worst contradictions. For nothing can will the abolition of the law of value if you want to abolish death, that is, to preserve life as absolute value, at the same time . Life itself must leave the law of value and achieve a successful exchange against death. The materialists, with their idealistic life expurgated of death, a life 'free' at last of all ambivalence , hardly trouble themselves with this ? ' Our whole culture is just one huge effort to dissociate life and death, to ward off the ambivalence of death in the interests of life as value, and time as the general equivalent . The elimination of death is our phantasm , and ramifies in every direction : for religion , the afterlife and immortality; for science, truth; and for economics, productivity and accumulation . No other culture had this distinctive opposition of life and death in the interests of life as positivity: life as accumulation, death as due payment. No other culture had this impasse : as soon as the ambivaLence of life and death and the symbolic reversibility of death comes to an end, we enter into a process of accumulation of life as value; but by the same token, we also enter the field of the equivaLent production of death. So life-becomevalue is constantly perverted by the equivalent death. Death, at the same instant , becomes the object of a perverse desire. Desire invests the very separation of life and death. This is the only way that we can speak of a death-drive. This is the only way we can speak of the unconscious, for the unconscious is onLy the accumuLation of equivalent death , the death that is no longer exchanged and can only be cashed out in the phantasm. The symbolic is the inverse dream of an end of accumulation and a possible reversibility of death in exchange. Symbolic death, which has not undergone the imaginary disjunction of life and death which is at the origin of the reality of death, is exchanged in a social ritual of feasting. Imaginary-real death (our own ) can only be redeemed through the individual work of mourning, which the subject carries out over the death of others and over himself from the start of his own life. This work of mourning has fuelled Western metaphysics of death since Christianity, even in the metaphysical concept of the death drive .

#### Scenario Planning breeds positive feedback loops and replicates the threat of nuclear war and violence.

Ossewarde, 17 [Marinus, yes he’s back I’m sorry this article was just too good: “Unmasking scenario planning: The colonization of the future in the ‘Local Governments of the Future’ program.” Futures, Volume 93 (2017), Pages 80-88, [http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328716302798]//AD](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328716302798%5d//AD)

\*italic emphasis added

Scenario planning is meant to be a dialectical quest for open futures, whereby alternative worlds are envisioned and judgement as to the most desirable world is suspended. Such a dialogical process, associated with democratic politics of world making, typically implies the critique, negation and transcendence of the established power constellation, which is by its very nature conservative. Hence, power holders are tempted to believe that their rule is indefinite and that history has ended – since all activities are directed towards the maintenance of the current order. Conversely, action, which ‘has an inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries’ is discouraged (Arendt 1958: 190). Hannah Arendt therefore went so far as claiming that ‘action, seen from the viewpoint of the automatic processes which seem to determine the course of the world, looks like a miracle’ (Arendt 1958: 246). Established power elites may have an interest in scenario planning, but the future with which they are fascinated is the prolongation of their current worlds. In other words, scenario planning is used for colonizing the future. In a colonized ‘scenario planning’, predominant or currently powerful stakeholders do not search for alternative futures, but, instead, enact their own ideological discourses, imaginaries and frames. The current power constellation is left unquestioned, and taken for granted in the scenario planning, as if established power factions will perdure in the future. The negation of well-established biases and prejudices is held in check, in order to safeguard the status quo. Such conservativism is legitimized by referring to current trends that are endowed with the aura of necessity or inevitability (natural and eternal laws). A colonized ‘scenario planning’ therefore masks unequal and often illegitimate power relationships. Historically, it appears that scenario planning has more often than not been a tool for colonization, designed to secure the future rule of the established power complex. In the 1940s, Herman Kahn and the RAND Corporation developed scenario planning to enable US military rulers to forecast the moves of potential opponents and to accordingly develop counteroffensives in the nuclear arms race (Tevis 2010). In the 1970s, Pierre Wack and Royal Dutch/Shell established scenario planning activities as an integral part of strategic management, to secure oil interests in the context of ecological crisis and the oil crisis (Wack 1985; Chermack and Coons 2015). The stimulus for scenario planning in these cases was the perceived rise of uncertainties in a world that had become more unpredictable and potentially apocalyptic. Horror scenarios of nuclear wars and a Third World War had become commonplace in the 1950s. Stories of ecological catastrophe, with a vision of large tracts of the earth rendered uninhabitable, the collapse of global food production, the acidification of the oceans, sea-level rise and storms, and droughts of growing intensity, became common since the publication of the Club of Rome report in 1972 (Wright et al 2013). In the hands of ruling military, governmental and corporate powers, ‘scenario planning’ became a method for ensuring strategic victory in a context of uncertainties and complexities. Since such scenario planning aimed at predictability, ambiguities were undesirable factors that were better eliminated, both in theory and practice (Amer, Daim and Jetter 2013). Computer simulations, game theoretic tools, forecasting methods, trend research, horizon scanning, and visual imageries filtered out all that which could not be mapped (O’Brien 2016). Pierre Wack, who introduced scenario planning at Royal Dutch/Shell, emphasizes that the future is only half closed. He made a plea for the incorporation of both literary and technical methods in scenario planning, to facilitate both the imagination and calculation of probable futures (Chermack and Coons 2015). According to Wack, the future is partly determined by trends that cannot but persist (Van‘t Klooster and Van Asselt 2006). Population growth and ageing are examples of such trends; and the corresponding implications for food demand, transport, housing, and other kinds of infrastructure clearly have to be reckoned with in any scenario planning. At the same time, for Wack, the future cannot be fully outlined based on these data and graphics. The partial openness of the future lies in the unpredictability of future generations’ actions in reaction to these trends. Robotic warfare is one possible future; large-scale euthanasia is another. But it is also imaginable that ecological disasters may wipe off entire populations. These futures are imaginable and yet not simply fictive because the ‘material’ for their ‘creation’ is already available here and now. For instance, it is highly probable that white Americans will no longer be the majority population in the United States by 2050, but the question as to how white Americans will cope with living as a minority in the US invites different answers (Martín Alcoff 2015: 24; 26). Colonization aims at ruling out openness, with the aim of shaping a future (preferably one that seems to be the product of predetermined trends that cannot be altered by human decisions) in which the current status quo is preserved. O’Brien (2016) explains that Royal Dutch/Shell’s interest in scenario planning is motivated by its will to shape a future in which remains a dominant key actor that moulds the world in its own interest: its scenario planning practices and its wish to maintain its hegemony are interconnected. *‘Shell’s scenario plans,’* O’Brien (2016: 334) notes, *‘are credited with the company’s success in outwitting the thugs, and thereby contributing to the larger project of securing Western interests amidst the turmoil of globalization*

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)