# 1NC

## NC

### 1

#### [1] Permissibility Negates –

#### a) Semantics – [Just](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/just) implies acting or being in conformity with what is morally upright or good, therefore if the resolution is permissible and therefore not unjust it acts according to what is morally upright and flows negative. That applies to presumption as well because [Unjust](https://www.dictionary.com/browse/unjust) means lacking in justice so the affirmative must actively prove that there exists a deficit in Justice.

#### b) Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the “P” and “~P” are true.

#### [2] Presumption Negates – a] There are logically more possibilities of a statement being false than true. For instance, to prove the statement that the pen is red the pen can only be red but the pen being any other color means the statement is false b] We assume statements false, its why we don’t believe in conspiracy theories

#### The standard is consistency with the standpoint of the skeptic.

#### Prefer –

#### 1. Bindingness – The process of debating requires taking a skeptical approach to your opponents’ arguments and attempting to disprove their most basic principles, which means to say skepticial orientation is bad would deny your ability to respond to my arguments.

#### 2. Inherency – All moral frameworks begin from the question of how to resolve skepticism which means it controls the internal link to all other framework education

#### 3. Holding ourselves to a standard of absolute truth is necessary: A) Culpability – Truth is the standard to which we hold people accountable for their actions, absent an understanding of the way the world actually is, people could make up their own understandings which makes it impossible for us to every justify why something someone did was bad, incorrect, etc and tell them to change B) Outcomes – The truth of the world is the ultimate determiner of the success of our actions, for example, if we were to act as though climate change wasn’t real because it is convenient, we would die of climate change must faster C) Resolvability – Debate requires a maintenance of truth – if debaters could make arguments like affirm because 2+2=5 debate as a concept would become incoherent since there’s no metric to determine who is winning based on the truth of their claims.

#### Skepticism is correct –

#### [1] Motivation – Ethical principles must be intrinsically motivational otherwise agents have no commitment to following principles. Absent this ethics can’t guide action as I could agree X is bad yet still imply that I am going to do X regardless. However, no universal motivation exists.

WittgensteinWittgenstein, Ludwig. "A Lecture on Ethics." Heretics Society. Cambridge University. Cambridge University, Cambridge, England. 1 Nov. 1929. Address

I said that so far as facts and propositions are concerned there is only relative value and relative good, right, etc. And let me, before I go on, illustrate this by a rather obvious example. The right road is the road which leads to an arbitrarily predetermined end and it is quite clear to us all that there is no sense in talking about the right road apart from such a predetermined goal. Now let us see what we could possibly mean by the expression, 'the absolutely right road.' I think it would be the road which everybody on seeing it would, with logical necessity, have to go, or be ashamed for not going. And similarly the absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs, would be one which everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about. And I want to say that such a state of affairs is a chimera. No state of affairs has, in itself, what I would like to call the coercive power of an absolute judge.

#### [2] Culpability – Ethics must hold agents culpable as otherwise we cannot be responsible for moral wrongdoings since they occur externally to our wills and will happen regardless of whether we advise against them.

#### [a] Free will is biologically impossible

#### **Coyne 12** Jerry Coyne, [Professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolution at The [University of Chicago](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Organizations/Schools/University+of+Chicago)], “Why You Don’t Really Have Free Will,” *USAToday*, January 1st, 2012 <https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/2013/12/why-you-dont-really-have-free-will.html?m=1>

The first is simple: **we are biological** creatures, **collections of molecules that must obey the laws of physics**. **All the success of science rests on the regularity of those laws, which determine the behavior of every molecule in the universe.** Those molecules, of course, also make up your brain — the organ that does the "choosing." And **the neurons and molecules in your brain are the product of both your genes and your environment,** an environment including the other people we deal with. Memories, for example, are nothing more than structural and chemical changes in your brain cells. Everything that you think, say, or **do, must come down to molecules and physics.** True "**free will**," then, **would require us to somehow step outside of our brain's structure and modify how it works**. Science hasn't shown any way we can do this because "**we" are simply constructs of our brain.** We can't impose a nebulous "will" on the inputs to our brain that can affect its output of decisions and actions, any more than a programmed computer can somehow reach inside itself and change its program.

#### [b] Time relativity theory is true and disproves free will

#### Kiekeben 96 ©1996, 2000 Franz Kiekeben Relativistic Determinism <http://www.franzkiekeben.com/relativistic.html> //NSU SF

**The relativity of simultaneity implies that the future is determined** (in a non-causal sense) in **the following way. Let us say that** you at this moment are **event A**. That **is, your present self — what you are doing**,thinking**, [and] observing**, and so on**,** at this moment — is A. **Let's also say that there is an observer traveling in a very fast spaceship, who** at this very moment (**from your frame of reference**) **is event B. Now for** B, that is, for **the spaceship traveler at this moment, there is an event C which, from B's perspective, lies in the past.** The interesting thing is that **it is possible** for C to be an event which, **from A's perspective,** [**that**] is still in the future [and]. That is, **C hasn't happened yet** as far as you're concerned. Nonetheless, **there is someone right now** (again, from your perspective) **who regards C as having already occurred.** And if that is the case, then how can C be avoidable? **If an event which is in your future is in someone else's past**, and that someone else is in your present (or even in your past!), **then it is inevitable that the event will take place.** Event C must come about, no matter what. And this scenario can in principle apply to any future event. **Thus, all** future **events are determined.** The above argument seems to me unquestionably valid. The only way an indeterminist can reject it, I believe, is by rejecting the relativity of simultaneity. **Since special relativity has been experimentally confirmed many times, rejecting it** may seem **[is]** all but **impossible.** But it is not. One must make a distinction between a theory's experimental results and its correct interpretation. It is possible that the observable confirmations of relativity are compatible with a different theory that reintroduces absolute simultaneity. In fact, the basic equations of special relativity were first arrived at while assuming absolute space and time (and thus absolute simultaneity). Given our present knowledge, however, I believe it is more reasonable to accept relativistic determinism than it is to reject it.

#### [3] Objectivity – Ethics must provide absolute accounts of goodness else agents simply act on their own passions and inferences which makes it impossible to evaluate any action as correct or incorrect. However, objectivity is impossible.

#### [A] Argument from relativism

Street 06, Street, Sharon. “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” Philosophical Studies January 2006. Pgs 118-121

Where I think the objection goes wrong, then, is as follows. The objection gains its plausibility by suggesting that rational reflection provides some means of standing apart from our evaluative judgments, sorting through them, and gradually separating out the true ones from the false—as if with the aid of some uncontaminated tool. But this picture cannot be right. For what rational reflection about evaluative matters involves, inescapably, is assessing some evaluative judgments in terms of others. Rational reflection must always proceed from some evaluative standpoint; it must work from some evaluative premises; it must treat some evaluative judgments as fixed, if only for the time being, as the assessment of other evaluative judgments is undertaken. In rational reflection, one does not stand completely apart from one’s starting fund of evaluative judgments: rather, one uses them, reasons in terms of them, holds some of them up for examination in light of others. The widespread consensus that the method of reflective equilibrium, broadly understood, is our sole means of proceeding in ethics is an acknowledgment of this fact: ultimately, we can test our evaluative judgments only by testing their consistency with our other evaluative judgments, combined of course with judgments about the (nonevaluative) facts. Thus, if the fund of evaluative judgments with which human reflection began was thoroughly contaminated with illegitimate influence—and the objector has offered no reason to doubt this part of the argument—then the tools of rational reflection were equally contaminated, for the latter are always just a subset of the former**.** It follows that all our reflection over the ages has really just been a process of assessing evaluative judgments that are mostly off the mark in terms of others that are mostly off the mark. And reflection of this kind isn’t going to get one any closer to evaluative truth, any more than sorting through contaminated materials with contaminated tools is going to get one closer to purity. So long as we assume that there is no relation between evolutionary influences and evaluative truth, the appeal to rational reflection offers no escape from the conclusion that, in the absence of an incredible coincidence, most of our evaluative judgments are likely to be false.

#### [B] Moral facts are impossible due to the is/ought gap

Gray [Bracketed for clarity]Grey, JW. "The Is/Ought Gap: How Do We Get "Ought" from "Is?"" *Ethical Realism*. N.p., 19 July 2011. Web. 28 Oct. 2015. https://ethicalrealism.wordpress.com/2011/07/19/the-isought-gap-how-do-we-get-ought-from-is/

How is the is/ought gap evidence of moral anti-realism? Moral anti-realists think that there are no irreducible [moral facts](https://ethicalrealism.wordpress.com/2011/07/19/2010/11/04/what-are-moral-facts/)—all moral truths can be reduced to our beliefs, desires, commitments, and so on. Anti-realists don’t think that anything is right or wrong apart from something like a social contract—it’s practical to commit ourselves to behaving ethically insofar as we will benefit when everyone else makes the same commitment as well. Three reasons that the is/ought gap is often taken to be evidence for anti-realism is because (a) the anti-realist sees no reason to think that what morally ought to be the case is a “moral fact” beyond our beliefs, desires, and commitments; (b) the anti-realist sees no reason to think that we could ever know such moral facts exist; and (c) the anti-realist solutions to the is/ought gap could be superior to the realist solutions. Is what morally ought to be the case a moral fact? Facts are states of affairs—actual things that exist and relations between things that exist. That a cat is on the mat is a fact. It’s unclear how what morally ought to be the case can be a fact. What morally ought to be is often quite different from the actual state of affairs in the world. A thief steals, a murderer kills, and so on. People aren’t actually doing what they ought to do. How can a[n] state of affairs that ought to exist be said to be a fact when what ought to be the case is often quite different from what actually [is] exists or happens in the world? Anti-realists see no good answers for these questions, but they think anti-realism can solve the problem by avoiding it. If there are no moral facts, then we no longer need to answer these questions. How can we know what morally ought to be the case? Hume was an empiricist, so he thought we could only know about reality through observation. What we observe isn’t necessarily what ought to be. The actual state of affairs in the world can be quite different that what people morally ought to do. We do know what is the case because we can observe it. Looking at what is the case—the actually obtaining nonmoral facts—doesn’t seem to tell us what ought to be the case. So, it’s not obvious how we can know what morally ought to be the case assuming that it’s a moral fact. Anti-realists think that we can avoid this problem entirely by becoming anti-realists and admitting there are no moral facts.

#### [4] Non-arbitrariness – Ethical beliefs cannot rely on arbitrary foundations as it would justify infinite contradictions. For instance, one could easily claim the sky is green without any ability for refutation as it accords with an arbitrary mindset. However, Ethics are arbitrary.

#### [A] Argument from evolution

Machuca 18 Diego E. Machuca “Moral Skepticism: An Introduction and Overview”, 02/27/2018 [https://philarchive.org/archive/EMAMSA] Accessed 3/8/21 AHS//NPR

Drawing especially on the work of evolutionary biologists, some moral skeptics have argued that the most plausible account of the origin of morality is the one that appeals to evolution: natural selection has forged certain faculties or capacities devoted to moral judgment. In their view, the evolutionary account defeats our first-order moral beliefs because it does not require that morality be true, but only that it be evolutionarily advantageous to believe that it is true. Evolutionary debunking strategies of this sort have been deployed in a systematic way particularly by Richard Joyce (2001: ch. 6; 2006; 2016c) and Sharon Street (2006; 2008). Joyce first appealed to the argument from evolution in his defense of a moral error theory, but later on used it to ground a skepticism about moral justification. Street employed the argument in her attack not merely on moral realism but on value realism in general. Although in the two articles in question she does not develop or defend it, she repeatedly mentions constructivism as the anti-realist view that sidesteps her evolutionary debunking argument against value realism. The defense, interpretation, and criticism of various types of evolutionary arguments for moral skepticism have of late attracted a lot of attention, and in fact the study of ‘the evolution of morality’ constitutes a burgeoning area in metaethics. The thrust of such arguments is that biological evolution is aimed not at moral belief-forming processes that are reliable, but at moral belief-forming processes that are adaptive. In other words, the evolutionary function of those processes is not that of tracking the truth: their general success at matching or accurately representing alleged objective moral facts explains neither their emergence nor their persistence. Humans are therefore disposed to make moral judgments regardless of the evidence to which they are exposed, regardless of whether there are or are not objective moral facts. Someone might object that, in order to be adaptive, such processes must be reliable, i.e., the moral judgments they form are evolutionarily useful—i.e., tend to promote survival and reproduction—because they are in general true. However, given that moral beliefs may well be adaptively useful even if they are not true, if what we know is only that evolution is aimed at moral belief-forming processes that are adaptive, then we do have here a defeater: even if some moral judgments are true, there is no reason for claiming that they are. This is the way in which evolutionary skeptical arguments are in general understood in the literature. Resuming the distinction between rebutting and undercutting defeaters discussed at the outset of the present section, the evolutionary account of the origin of our moral beliefs then provides an undercutting defeater for those beliefs: it does not show that they are false—for there might well be moral facts out there in the world—but rather that they were not formed in a reliable way because their source is not trustworthy, and hence that they are not epistemically justified. The resulting moral skepticism is therefore epistemological. However, as we will see, the evolutionary account has also been understood as providing a rebutting defeater for our moral beliefs: a reason for thinking that objective moral facts do not exist, and hence that such beliefs are false. The resulting moral skepticism is therefore ontological. When appealed to in relation to a moral error theory, evolutionary debunking considerations are normally used as a supplement to arguments that purport to establish the error-theoretic conclusion in order to account, once the conclusion is accepted, for the systematic error we commit in making moral judgments. This seems to be the case of Mackie, who briefly appealed to evolution as an alternative explanation of the origin of our moral sentiments and dispositions (1977: 113–114, 124, 192, 229, 239). Although Mackie (1985: 154) claimed that morality can be seen as an outgrowth from genetically determined retributive tendencies that were favored by evolutionary selection, 14 he did not offer an elaborate evolutionary account of morality in the way Joyce (2001: ch. 6; 2006) has. The latter maintains that the origin of morality is to be found in the development of human cooperation: an individual is more reproductively fit if his sympathetic desires to help his family members are supplemented by a sense of inescapable requirement to favor them that strengthens his motivation to perform helpful actions. This was accomplished by providing people with the belief that such actions have objective moral qualities. Once a cognitive capacity to believe that it is inescapably required to help family members was in place, it was exploited by natural selection to regulate also helpful behavior towards non-kin individuals. It must be remarked that Joyce’s view is not that every particular moral prescription can be evolutionarily explained, or that culture or the environment plays no role in determining moral beliefs. Rather, his view is that the tendency to use general moral categories and the belief that certain types of action bear objective moral properties are innate; that cultural influences can cause some of those actions to stop being regarded as moral or immoral, or cause other types of action to start being so regarded; and that moral dispositions require environmental cues to become manifest. For reasons that will become clear at the end of this subsection, it is important to note that Joyce is at some points cautious regarding the status of his evolutionary account of morality. He presents the hypothesis that natural selection has led us to commit the fundamental moral error as a “plausible speculation” (2001: 135). Also, although he regards the evolutionary hypothesis as plausible, coherent, and testable, and as the best story of the origin of morality we have (2006: 134, 137, 139– 140), and although he therefore answers the question “Is human morality innate?” in the affirmative, he remarks that “this is provisional and to a degree speculative, since the present evidence does not warrant answering the question in either a positive or a negative way with any confidence” (2006: 2). Finally, he observes that his evolutionary debunking argument “is conditional: It relies on an empirical premise concerning the evolution of morality which is yet to be established” (2016b: 9). In his first treatment of the evolutionary account of morality, Joyce not only remarks that it complements the arguments for moral error theory, but he makes the stronger claim that “the fact that moral thinking is a naturally evolved trait has error theoretical implications” (2001: 137) or “provides evidence in favor of the error theory” (2001: 148). In his view, the innateness of moral judgments undermines these judgments being true for the simple reason that if we have evolved to make these judgments irrespective of their being true, then one could not hold that the judgments are justified. And if they are unjustified, then although they could be true, their truth is in doubt. (2001: 159) But the fact that if we accept the evolutionary account, our moral beliefs are utterly unjustified, or we have no reason for thinking that they are true, or it is highly improbable or extremely unlikely that they are true, in no way establishes the ontological conclusion of moral error theory. Of course, the evolutionary account places the burden of proof on the non-minimal moral realist to provide us not only with a reason for believing that our moral beliefs are epistemically justified, but also with a reason for believing that there are objective moral facts or properties in the first place. Oddly enough, Joyce himself recognizes that the evolutionary account alone does not support an ontological conclusion, but rather an attitude of withholding of assent concerning the truth or falsity of moral judgments (2001: 160–168). In any case, in later works he explicitly remarks that one cannot argue for a moral error theory on the basis of evolutionary considerations, the correct skeptical conclusion being instead that all moral judgments are unjustified (Joyce 2006: ch. 6; 2016c; cf. 2016b: 8). Joyce’s later evolutionary debunking stance seems to vacillate between nihilistic and Pyrrhonian epistemological skepticism: sometimes he seems to believe that moral beliefs are intrinsically unjustified or that they have been shown to be so for good, and sometimes to believe that they can be deemed to be unjustified on the basis of the evidence available up to this point. Joyce’s epistemological version of the argument from evolution could be formulated as follows: 1. Our capacity to form first-order moral beliefs is an evolutionary adaptation produced by natural selection. 2. Biological evolution is not aimed at moral belief-forming processes that are reliable, i.e., processes whose function is to track the alleged moral truths. 3. Given 2, our having beliefs that objects possess moral properties is consistent with nothing ever possessing a moral property. Therefore: 4. Our first-order moral beliefs are epistemically unjustified. Street (2006) contends that evolutionary considerations pose a dilemma for realist theories of value (and hence for realist theories of moral value). The fact that the forces of natural selection have greatly shaped the content of our evaluative judgments raises the challenge to explain the relation between such evolutionary influences and the independent evaluative facts posited by the realist. 15 The first horn of the dilemma is the claim that there is no such relation, which results in an implausible skepticism: we would have to conclude that our evaluative judgments are contaminated by a distorting influence and hence that many or most of them are off the track. Although it is possible that “as a matter of sheer chance” our evaluative judgments accord with the allegedly independent evaluative facts, “this would require a fluke of luck that’s not only extremely unlikely . . . but also astoundingly convenient to the realist” (2006: 122). In response, one could appeal to rational reflection as another major influence on the content of our evaluative judgments that corrects the distorting influence of evolutionary pressures on such judgments. Although Street does not discard such an influence, she claims that, since rational reflection must proceed by using evaluative judgments, one would be assessing evolutionarily distorted evaluative judgments by means of other evolutionarily distorted evaluative judgments (2006: 124). The other horn of the dilemma is the claim that natural selection favored those ancestors who were able to grasp the independent evaluative truths, because tracking them was advantageous for survival and reproduction. But this account that presents itself as a scientific explanation is, in Street’s view, inferior on scientific grounds to the one according to which the tendency to make certain kinds of evaluative judgments rather than others contributed to our ancestors’ survival and reproduction because those judgments forged adaptive links between the circumstances in which our ancestors found themselves and their responses to such circumstances. This account is superior in terms of the usual criteria of scientific adequacy, for it is clearer, more parsimonious, and does a better job at illuminating the tendency in question (2006: 129–134). Once again, we see that a crucial premise in an argument against value realism is a best-explanation premise. With a focus on moral realism, Street’s argument could perhaps be formulated thus: 1. The forces of natural selection have had an indirect tremendous influence on the content of our moral judgments. 2. The moral realist owes us an explanation of the relation between such an evolutionary influence and the independent moral facts he posits. 3. He can claim either that (3a) there is no relation or that (3b) there is such a relation. 4. If he claims that (3a), then he is forced either (4a) to embrace a farfetched moral skepticism or (4b) to claim that an incredible coincidence took place. 16 5. If he claims that (3b), then he must propose a tracking account, which is scientifically unacceptable (since the adaptive link account provides the best explanation of why our tendency to make certain kinds of moral judgments rather than others contributed to our ancestors’ reproductive success). Therefore: 6. Moral realism is false, i.e., there are no independent moral facts. It is surprising that Street argues for an ontological conclusion regarding independent or objective moral facts on the basis of an evolutionary debunking argument. For it seems that evolutionary debunking arguments (and genealogical debunking arguments in general) can at most undermine the epistemic credentials of our substantive moral beliefs—i.e., can at most provide us with undercutting defeaters for those beliefs. Street’s own evolutionary debunking argument establishes at most that we have no reason for affirming that our moral beliefs match alleged objective moral facts because the best explanation of our tendency to make certain moral judgments makes no appeal to them. Even though the moral realist then owes us a reason for affirming that such facts exist, the argument does not prove that they do not. Note that such epistemological moral skepticism is different from (4a), the skeptical conclusion that Street regards as implausible or far-fetched.

#### [B] Argument from relativity

Mackie 90, J.L. Mackie, famous error theorist “Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong”, Penguin Books, ISBN 10: 0140135588, 1990 [https://b-ok.cc/book/2532967/9b3856] Accessed 3/2/21 AHS//NPR

The argument from relativity has as its premises the well-known variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community. Such variation is in itself merely a truth of descriptive morality, a fact of anthropology which entails neither first order nor second order ethical views. Yet it may indirectly support second order subjectivism: radical differences between first order moral judgements make it difficult to treat those judgements as apprehensions of objective truths. But it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tells against the objectivity of values. Disagreement on questions in history or biology or cosmology does not show that there are no objective issues in these fields for investigators to disagree about. But such scientific disagreement results from speculative inference or explanatory hypotheses based on inadequate evidence, and it is hardly plausible to interpret moral disagreement in the same way. Disagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people’s adherence to and participation in different ways of life. The causal connection seems to be mainly that way round: it is that people approve of monogamy because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy. Of course, the standards may be an idealization of the way of life from which they arise: the monogamy in which people participate may be less complete, less rigid. than that of which it leads them to approve. This is not to say that moral judgements are purely conventional. Of course, there have been and are moral heretics and moral reformers, people who have turned against the established rules and practices of their own communities for moral reasons, and often for moral reasons that we would endorse. But this can usually be understood as the extension, in ways which, though new and unconventional, seemed to them to be required for consistency, of rules to which they already adhered as arising out of an existing way of life. In short,' the argument from relativity has some force simply because the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values. But there is a well-known counter to this argument from relativity, namely to say that the items for which objective validity is in the first place to be claimed are not specific moral rules or codes but very general basic principles which are recognized at least implicitly to some extent in all society - such principles as provide the foundations of what Sidgwick has caused different methods of ethics: the principle of universalizability, perhaps, or the rule that one ought to conform to the specific rules of any way of life in which one takes part, from which one profits, and on which one relies, or some utilitarian principle of doing what tends, or seems likely, to promote the general happiness It is easy to show that such general principles, married with differing concrete circumstances. different existing social patterns or different preferences, will beget different specific moral rules; and there is some plausibility in the claim that the specific rules -thus generated will vary from community to community or from group to group in close agreement with the actual variations in accepted codes. The argument from relativity can be only partly countered in this way. To take this line the moral objectivist has to say that it is only in these principles that the objective moral character attaches immediately to its descriptively specified ground or subject: other moral judgements are objectively valid or true. but only derivatively and contingently - if things had been otherwise, quite different sorts of actions would have been right. And despite the prominence in recent philosophical ethics of universalization, utilitarian principles, and the like, these are very far from constituting the whole of what is actually affirmed as basic in ordinary moral thought. Much of this is concerned rather with what Hare calls ‘ideals’ or, less kindly, 'fanaticism\*. That is, people judge that some things are good or right and others are bad or wrong, not because - or at any rate not only because - they exemplify some general principle for which widespread implicit acceptance could be claimed, but because something about those things arouses certain responses immediately in them, though they would arouse radically and irresolvably different responses in others. ‘Moral sense’ or ‘intuition’ is an initially more plausible description of what supplies many of our basic moral judgements than ‘reason’. With regard to a l these starting points of moral thinking the argument from relativity remains in full force.

**[5] Empirics – the competition between competing ethics has been going for centuries.**

Leiter 2Leiter, Brian. Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement: Developing an Argument from Nietzsche. March 25, 2010.

With respect to very particularized moral disagreements — e.g., about questions of economic or social policy — which often trade on obvious factual ignorance or disagreement about complicated empirical questions, this seems a plausible retort. But **for** over **two hundred years, Kantians and utilitarians have [developed]** been developing increasingly systematic **versions of their** respective **positions.** The Aristotelian tradition in moral philosophy has an even longer history. Utilitarians **[**They] have become particularly adept at explaining how they can accommodate [others] Kantian and Aristotelian intuitions about particular cases and issues, though in ways that are usually found to be systematically unpersuasive to the competing traditions and which, in any case, do nothing to dissolve the disagreement about the underlying moral criteria and categories. **Philosophers in each tradition increasingly talk only to each other, without even trying to convince** those in **the other traditions.** And **while there may** well **be ‘progress’ within traditions** — e.g., most utilitarians regard Mill as an improvement on Bentham—**there does not appear to be any progress [towards]** in moral theory, in the sense of **a consensus that particular** fundamental **theories** of right action and the good life **are** deemed **better** than their predecessors. What we find now are simply **the competing traditions** — Kantian, Humean, Millian, Aristotelian, Thomist, perhaps now even Nietzschean — who often **view** their **competitors as** unintelligible or morally **obtuse, but** don’t have any actual arguments against the foundational principles of their competitors. **There is**, in short, **no sign** — I can think of none — **that we are heading towards any epistemic rapprochement between these competing** moral **traditions.** Are we really to believe that hyper-rational and **reflective moral philosophers**, whose lives, in most cases, are devoted to systematic reflection on philosophical questions, many of whom (historically) were independently wealthy (or indifferent to material success) and so immune to crass considerations of livelihood and material self-interest,and **most of whom**, in the modern era, **spend professional careers refining their positions**, and have been doing so as a professional class in university settings for well over a century — are we really supposed to believe that they **have reached no substantial agreement** on any foundational moral principle because of ignorance, irrationality, or partiality

#### Thus, I contend the skeptic would negate the resolution.

#### 1. The skeptical conclusion being true denies the existence of justice prima facie. It proves that nothing can be just nor unjust as ethics itself is an imaginary construct. That means the aff is incapable of proving the truth of the resolution.

#### 2. Skep linguistically negates because sentences derive meaning from their linguistic properties corresponding to facts about reality. For example, a claim like “my dog has four legs” requires you to have a dog and for that dog to actually have four legs. If unjust means immoral and wrongfulness doesn’t exist, the statement is false.

## Case

### Hijack – Emotivism

#### Open question justifies non-cognitivism and that proves emotivism

#### Miller, Miller, Alexander. “Rejection of Non-Naturalism.” *Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics.* Oxford: Polity, 2003.explains: Ayer denies that moral judgments express beliefs: rather, moral judgments express emotions, or sentiments, of approval and disapproval. Since these emotions and sentiments are unlike beliefs in that they do not even purport to represent how the world is, the judgments which express them are not truth-apt. Compare your belief that there are children in the street, which purports to represent how the world is, with your horror at the fact that the children are torturing a cat. The belief has a representative function: it purports to represent how the world is, and it is true if and only if the world actually is as it represents it. The emotion of horror, on the other hand, has no such representative function: it is not the sort of thing that can even be assessed for truth or falsity. In short, moral judgments are neither true nor false: they do not state anything, but rather express our emotions and feelings. As Ayer puts it in a famous passage: “If I say to someone, ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money’, I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, ‘You stole that money’. In adding that this action is wrong, I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval about [stealing] it. It is as if I had said, ‘You stole that money’, in a peculiar tone of horror, or written with the addition of some special exclamation marks. The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker*.*”(Ayer [1936] 1946: 107; emphases added) It follows that: “If I now generalize my previous statement and say, ‘Stealing money is wrong,’ I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning – that is, expresses no proposition that can be either true or false.” ([1936] 1946: 107)

Negates –

#### [1] Unjust cannot unilaterally be true because every individual has different reactions and emotional responses to the resolution.

#### [2] prohibitive ethics are inconsistent with emotivism, especially when it denies private control

**Cain,**Cain, George. "Needs, Desires, Fears, and Freedom." The Downtown Review. Vol. 1. Iss. 1 (2015). Available at: http://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/tdr/vol1/iss1/7  Now, thus far we have discussed how **humans are connected by common** needs, **desires**, and fears. **What people want most of all is the ability to have control of their persons**, their lives, and their circumstances **in order to** satisfy their needs, **fulfill their desires**, and eliminate their fears if possible. **In order to have such control, people need the freedom to do so. This freedom is** commonly known as**autonomy**. Although what constitutes true autonomy is entirely subjective and varies from person to person, the most general definition of the term is the freedom of the individual to do whatever he wants to do without any hindrances.

### Hijack – Rodl

#### First-person ethical conclusions cannot derive from general statements regarding states of affairs – either the aff defends the resolution and thus cannot justify a coherent ethical account or they defend a non-topical position.

#### RÖDL Sebastian Rödl In Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. Oxford University Press 138--160 (2010)

However, the fact that it would be good if p were the case need not speak in favor of thinking it good to bring it about. Even if it would be good if p, it may be that I must not bring it about. Perhaps it is someone else’s office, or duty, or privilege to bring it about, or perhaps its goodness depends on its not being brought about by anyone. This may seem to show that we must include in the outcome not only what in a strict sense is the result of the act, but furthermore the fact that I am producing or have produced it. The thought from which I derive an act of the will is not “It would be good if p,” but “It would be good if . . . [I, see to it that p ] . . . .” However, I cannot reason from this premise to “It is good to see to it that p ” or “I should see to it that p .” For while “It would be good if . . . [I see to it that p” is not originally a first-person thought, “It is good to see to it that p ” is. And without further premises, an originally first-person thought cannot be derived from a thought that is not originally first personal. 19 Adapting an example from Anselm W. Müller, 20 we can bring this out by turning to the second person. “You must drink this glass of water” addresses a demand to you**:** In virtue of its form, it presents itself as capable of determining your will. By contrast, “It must be the case that you drink this glass of water” refers to you and to the glass in the same manner; it no more addresses a demand to you than it does so to the glass. There is no way to derive a demand from it without relying on a demand already in place. An act of the will in virtue of its form is productive and therefore first personal. The alleged thought that it would be good if p were the case is not. This remains so no matter what is plucked into the content of “ p .” Hence, this alleged thought never provides a self-standing basis for a thought about what is good to do. 21 This shows that there is no self-standing use of good in application to states of affairs. An illusion of intelligibility arises when we unwittingly give the relevant phrase a sense that we do understand: relating a state of affairs to a given end. It is easy to fall prey to this illusion. It is well-nigh impossible not to fall prey to it when one does not even notice the difference between the use of good or ought as indicating a form of predication (which is productive and therefore first personal) and as a sentential operator.

#### Negates – the resolution is a question of states of affairs because its non-agential, states of affairs don’t have the moral capacity to be self-standingly good or bad

### Overviewe

#### Internalism proves skepticism –

[1] Non-bindngness

[2] V