# 1NC – Round 1 Emory

## NC

### 1

#### Reliance on international governance of space naturalizes Cold War rationalities of sovereignty – appeals to “peace” in space and “preserving” the commons belie the militarization necessary to secure outer space

Craven 19 (Matt Craven – Professor of International Law, SOAS University of London, “‘Other Spaces’: Constructing the Legal Architecture of a Cold War Commons and the Scientific-Technical Imaginary of Outer Space,” The European Journal of International Law 30(2):547-572)

Quite apart from the obvious qualifications that have to be made about the status of the meagrely ratified Moon Treaty, two initial aspects of the code are worth emphasizing. In the first place, it is easy to overlook the undoubtedly radical character of this extraversion of international law into outer space56 – international law was, on this view, suddenly declared to be of unlimited extent, inter-galactic as much as international, an omnipresent order disarticulated from the site of its geographical origin. In the second place, it was more than evident that the code, thus described, was replete with equivocations and silences. It said nothing about the jurisdictional delimitation of outer space, about remote sensing and direct television broadcasting, or about the allocation of rights over the geostationary orbit.57 Still less did it resolve the question as to whether claims to property might be made in relation to resources removed from celestial objects or whether military use of the ‘extra-celestial void’ was legitimate. And, to the extent that these might be attributed to a straightforward failure on the part of the drafters to pay attention to such issues, or perhaps more obviously to an evident lack of ‘political will’, the code may be read as largely transparent – as a literal or manifest representation of the limits of legal regulation in the conflictual circumstances of its production. Yet, as Louis Althusser points out, such a strategy of ‘innocent’ reading will only take us so far.58 It will tell us only what was already palpable to the authors of the code. What it will not do is tell us much about the conditions under which the code appeared, why it assumed the form it did or what pre-suppositions had to be held in place for it to make sense to its authors. For that, a strategy of ‘symptomatic reading’ would seem to be necessary.59 Such a strategy, as Althusser explains, involves not simply looking at a text for the purposes of determining what it seeks to make clear or manifest but, rather, attending also to its constitutive silences – by which he means, not simply what was not said but also what could not be said. The latter strategy, as he points out, involves identifying within a text the ‘problematic’ with which it is engaged – a framework or enquiry or mode of thought that enabled certain things to be ‘thinkable’, ‘visible’ or ‘legible’, and others, by contrast, ‘unthinkable’, ‘invisible’ or ‘illegible’. Symptomatic reading, in these terms, is set to reveal what must be silently repressed, or kept out of sight in order for that which is visible to have meaning. In order to approach the code for space with this strategy of reading in mind, we might want to begin with the observation that the code is structured around a set of oppositions: that outer space is a domain of peace, not of war; a domain of collaborative endeavour, not of competition; a domain of the future, not the past and, finally, a domain entirely beyond the order of sovereignty and the atmospheric conditions that enable it – a commons. Each of these oppositions, however, gives expression to an incipient relationship between the objective in question and its conditions of possibility: between the prohibition of violence and the violence necessary for keeping the peace; between utopian ideas and the dystopian imaginaries that engender them; and between the idea of a commons and the regimes of sovereignty and property from which it derives its content. Taking this formation as my starting point, I want to develop in the ensuing sections of this article the argument that the code for outer space was built upon two forms of illegibility, both of which may be associated with ‘Cold War’ thought. One of these concerns a suppression of the idea of outer space as a site of warfare; the other a suppression of the idea that space might be a site of primitive accumulation. 4 War and Peace in Space There was little doubt to any of the observers of the launch of Sputniks I and II in 1957 that, despite their overtly ‘scientific’ purposes, the arms race had taken a decisive new turn. The exploration of outer space clearly offered a range of potential benefits; alongside the possibility of research into the physics of the atmosphere, it also would facilitate the collection of a host of meteorological, geophysical and cartographic data, enable enhanced capacity for radio communication and television broadcasting, facilitate safe navigation and, finally, open up the possibility of experimental flights to the moon and beyond. No one, however, was blind to the military implications.60 Within the USA, in particular, there was a widespread belief that command over outer space was an imperative that could not be missed: ‘[W]hoever controls outer space’, it was often said, ‘controls the world’.61 In the wilder speculations, thus, it was imagined that a nuclear power might be in a position to launch guided missiles from a space platform to any point on earth with barely any possibility of response, that outer space would be filled with ‘orbiting bombers’ or that the moon would become the site of military rocket installations. ‘Control’ of outer space, thus, was immediately conceived as being vital as a matter of security. Such concerns seemed to place a premium upon ensuring that the ‘use’ of outer space was exclusively peaceful – a view that seemed to be affirmed not merely by the establishment of COPUOS and successive proposals put to the UN by both the USA and Soviet Union. It was also recognized in the US National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, which created a civilian space agency (NASA) and declared, in the process, that ‘it is the policy of the United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind’.62 This theme was carried through into the code for outer space – UN General Assembly Resolution 1962 recognizing ‘the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes’ and the Outer Space Treaty that added in Article 4 that states should not place nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in orbit and that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all states parties ‘exclusively for peaceful purposes’ (military bases and fortifications, in particular, being prohibited). Indeed, President Lyndon B. Johnson described the Outer Space Treaty as ‘the most important arms-control development since the limited test-ban treaty of 1963’.63 In an immediate sense, then, outer space was configured as a space radically distinct from atmospheric space and was placed at once beyond the field of both sovereignty and of war. These, however, were by no means co-terminous. The preferred analogy when discussing the status of outer space was often that of the high seas – like the seas, outer space should be marked by the principle of freedom of access and movement, a res communis incapable of being ‘enclosed’. In fact, this was the analogy used by the USA when defending its use of satellites for reconnaissance purposes; ‘reconnaissance’ from space, it was argued, was the functional equivalent of surveillance from the high seas.64 It is clear, however, that this analogy was problematic precisely because the high seas themselves were not immune from being brought within the field of military conflict.65 And, with that in mind, alternative modes of analysis were often proffered to ensure that the ‘commons’ was not to be equated with a potential field of battle.66 Nevertheless, there was always a certain equivocation running through discussions within the UN and elsewhere as to whether the military/non-military distinction was one that could be effectively held in place. Not only were the Declaration on Outer Space and Outer Space Treaty silent on certain vital matters – on the equipping of satellites, for example, with conventional weaponry or the militarization of the ‘extracelestial void’ – but the inclusion of Article 3, which instructed states to ‘carry on activities’ in accordance with international law and the UN Charter ‘in the interest of maintaining international peace and security’, gave expression to the idea, vaunted at various moments, that outer space may nevertheless be the site of military action in self-defence.67 ‘Peaceful’ use, on such a measure, was not to be calibrated by reference to the equipment or personnel put into space – whether military or civilian – but, rather, by reference to the ends or motivation of the actors in question.68 In the case of the USA, this was to resolve itself in the idea that ‘peaceful use’ should not be equated with ‘non-military use’ but, instead, with ‘non-aggressive’ use. As Senator Albert Gore was to put it, when speaking before the UN First Committee in 1962: [i]t is the view of the United States that outer space should be used only for peaceful – that is, non-aggressive and beneficial – purposes. The question of military activities in space cannot be divorced from the question of military activities on earth. To banish these activities in both environments we must continue our efforts for general and complete disarmament with adequate safeguards. Until this is achieved, the test of any space activities must not be whether it is military or non-military, but whether or not it is consistent with the United Nations Charter and other obligations of law.69 The same general tenor was maintained in the discussion over Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty concerning the demilitarization of the moon and celestial bodies. In this treaty, it was admitted that the use of military personnel ‘for scientific research or other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited’, largely in recognition of the fact that for both space powers it was the military, not civilian agencies, who were responsible for developing rocket and other outer space capabilities. What one might see in this is a straightforward determination, on the part of both space powers, to continue the practice of exploiting outer space for purposes of defence whilst holding on, at the same time, to the general idea that outer space was a space of peaceful endeavour. Defensive militarization, here, was to be conceptualized as the functional equivalent of total demilitarization. Yet ‘defence’ was also an unstable category in circumstances of a bipolar military standoff that depended upon a balance of forces. For not only might an effective defence depend upon first strike capability (as the doctrine of ‘mutually assured destruction’ was to suggest),70 but also, as was later to become evident following the announcement of the US Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983,71 even the construction of an overtly ‘defensive’ system could assume an offensive cast if only one party possessed that capacity.72

#### The link alone turns the case – faith in bureaucratic restraints on space development like the OST naturalizes the technological rationalities that both ensure circumvention and violent conquest

Craven 19 (Matt Craven – Professor of International Law, SOAS University of London, “‘Other Spaces’: Constructing the Legal Architecture of a Cold War Commons and the Scientific-Technical Imaginary of Outer Space,” The European Journal of International Law 30(2):547-572)

What is worth bringing out here is not the surface-level disagreement as to the relationship between collective and individual modes of extraction or, indeed, the way in which an ‘east–west adversarialism’ appeared to have given way to a dynamic of ‘north–south resource disparity’ but, rather, to the conditions under which the formation of the outer space commons was to appear.121 In the first place, as the Nigerian representative in COPUOS noted, the language of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ had facilitated a subtle shift from a language of exploration to that of exploitation.122 Outer space was no longer simply a site of speculative scientific endeavour or open to projects of exploration and discovery, but it had become a resource or, indeed, as Myres McDougal and others were to explain, a myriad of resources of varying kinds, in which everything from solar radiation, magnetic and gravitational forces, wave lengths, geostationary locations123 through to meteors tracking through the solar system came to be conceptualized in terms of their ultimate ‘value’ or ‘utility’.124 Once again, thus, one sees the presence of a particular technological rationality undergirding the outer space regime, in which the natural and human environments were to be understood to be the objects of an instrumental reasoning that concerned itself with how they might be manipulated, controlled, exploited and, ultimately, commodified, and in which the technology through which those ends were to be both conceived and achieved (space rockets, probes, telescopes, satellites, planetary rovers and so on) would take the form of a passive, neutral, medium – as mere machines and mechanisms or as ways of doing things.125 The embrace of this rationality may, on the face of it, be seen to have been utterly perverse: the ultimate outcome of a desire to avoid a competitive stripping of the resources of the moon and other celestial bodies, resolving itself in the creation of a regime in which that objective, and that way of thinking about our planetary environment, was not just dominant but also subordinate to everything else. The technology through which those projects were to be made thinkable, furthermore, was clearly only ‘neutral’ to the extent that one could separate its existence from the fact of its (largely exclusive) possession and control by two violent, competitive, superpowers.126 As Marcuse observed, however, that same rationality – common to both Western and Soviet state forms127 – cut deeper than this. On the one hand, the technologies of mass communication, surveillance and warfare were to profoundly shape the perception, experience and apprehension of everyday life, creating a ‘technological reality’ of an ‘object world’ conceived ‘as a world of instrumentalities’.128 On the other hand, however, that same rationality would serve to alienate the subject from their life world through their incorporation into the ‘technological community of the administered population’.129 The domination of nature that technology appeared to enable was thus only one side of a formation that had, as its complement, a human domination propagated through the technological ‘administration’ of the subject and the manufacture of human desires, needs and interests.130 To the extent, then, that the Moon Treaty embraced this rationality, it was one that was ultimately pacifying in effect, swallowing up and repulsing all alternatives, bringing all within the sway of the same totalitarian tendency. In the second place, and as an apparently countervailing measure, was the idea that access to, and the use of, outer space resources should be subject to an international regime, the ‘purposes’ of which were set out in Article 11(7). Just as the International Telecommunication Union managed the ‘technical’ distribution of wavelengths and frequencies, allocating slots in the geostationary orbit, and just as the World Meteorological Organization coordinated the collection and dissemination of meteorological data, so also it was envisaged that the resources of the moon should similarly be subject to the oversight of an international regime of rational administration. The anticipated regime, it was explained, would concern itself with the ‘orderly and safe development of the natural resources’, their ‘rational management’, ‘the expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources’ and an ‘equitable sharing of the benefits’. The model of administration imagined here was one clearly designed to displace the possibility of unrestricted pillage or of primitive accumulation, and the language deployed elicited a sense of distance from precisely those ideas. No mention is made of the practices of extraction, commodification or exploitation that might be enabled; rather, it is faintly suggested, the moon might be ‘improved’ through its ‘development’, terraformed perhaps into a site fit for tourism or colonization? Yet, by the same token, the arrangements seemed to be concerned merely with the transfiguration of relations of power into bureaucratic technique and, in doing so, maintained in place the very same conditions that underpinned the practices to which it was opposed. Certainly, it was clearly envisaged that a further agreement would follow, setting out in more detail the administrative arrangements required for the purposes of the ‘equitable sharing of benefits’. Certainly, it was also possible that such arrangements might include the transfer of technology, the sharing of science and the distribution of profits. But no measure of administration could avoid the observation that the regime was to authorize in space precisely the same operations that had been productive of the material inequalities on earth, albeit this time it was ‘colonization’ or ‘conquest’ in the name of humanity (‘mankind’) rather than some small subset of the same.

#### Cold War rationalities ensure endless military interventions – apocalyptic fears are used to colonize political deliberation

Masco 14 (Joseph Masco – Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago, “Engineering the Future as Nuclear Ruin” Imperial Debris: On Ruins and Ruination, pp. 278-281)

Reclaiming the emotional history of the atomic bomb is crucial today, as nuclear fear has been amplified to enable a variety of political projects at precisely the moment American memory of the bomb has become impossibly blurred. In the United States, nuclear fear has recently been used to justify preemptive war and unlimited domestic surveillance, a worldwide system of secret prisons, and the practices of rendition, torture, and assassination. But what today do Americans actually know or remember of the bomb? We live not in the ruins produced by Soviet ICBMs, but rather in the emotional ruins of the Cold War as an intellectual and social project. The half-century-long project to install and articulate the nation through contemplating its violent end has colonized the present. The terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington in 2001 may have produced a political consensus that “the Cold War is over” and a formal declaration of a counterterrorism project.52 But American reactions to those attacks were structured by a multigenerational state project to harness the fear of mass death to divergent political and military industrial agendas. By evoking the image of the mushroom cloud to enable the invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush appealed directly to citizens’ nuclear fear, a cultural product of the very Cold War nuclear stand-off he formally disavowed in inaugurating the new counterterrorist state. The mushroom-cloud imagery, as well as the totalizing immediacy of the threat in his presentation, worked to redeploy a cultural memory of apocalyptic nuclear threat (established during the four decades of the Soviet-American nuclear arms race) as part of the new “war on terror.” The new color-coded terrorist warning system (first proposed by Project East River in 1952 to deal with Soviet bombers) and the Homeland Security Administration’s transformation of shampoo bottles on planes into a totalizing threat are official efforts to install and regulate fear in everyday life.53 In this regard, the “war on terror” has been conducted largely as an emotional-management campaign in the United States, using the tropes and logics developed during the early Cold War to enable a new kind of American geopolitical project. The “war on terror” redirects but also reiterates the American assumptions about mass violence and democracy I have explored in this essay. If the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington felt strangely familiar to many U.S. citizens, it was because American society has been imaginatively rehearsing the destruction of these cities for over three generations: in the Civil Defense campaigns of the early and late Cold War, as well as in the Hollywood blockbusters of the 1990s, which destroyed these cities each summer with increasing nuance and detail. The genealogy of this form of entertainment is traumatic; it goes back to the specific way in which the United States entered the nuclear age with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and to the specific propaganda campaigns informing nuclear threat throughout the Cold War. Indeed, the ease with which the 9/11 attacks were nationalized as part of a nuclear discourse by the second Bush administration has much to do with this legacy.54 Not coincidentally, the two graphic measures of nuclear blast damage most frequently used during the Cold War were the Pentagon and the New York City skyline.55 Figures 8.8 and 8.9, for example, are taken from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (aec) campaign to document the size of the first U.S. hydrogen bomb test from 1952. Fourteen true-to-scale versions of the Pentagon, identified by the aec as the largest building in the world, are placed inside the blast crater (the former Elugelab Island) to document its size, while the New York skyline is used to demonstrate the vast horizontal and vertical scope of the detonation. The events of 9/11 were easily nationalized and transformed into a nuclear discourse precisely because our security culture had imagined and rehearsed attacks on Washington and New York for generations, and because the specific symbols in the attacks—the Pentagon and the tallest building in the New York skyline—were also used by the nuclear state for three generations as part of its emotional-management strategy. The second Bush administration, in other words, mobilized a well-established logic of nuclear attack to pursue its policy objectives, translating discrete, nonnuclear threats into the emotional equivalent of the Cold War nuclear crisis. For a nation that constructs itself via discourses of ruination, it should not be a surprise to see the exportation of ruins on a global scale. As President Musharraf clearly understood, the “with us or against us” logics of the Bush administration in 2001 left no ambiguity about the costs of Pakistan not aligning with the sole global superpower. The threat to reduce Pakistan to a “Stone Age” ruin is the alternative, international deployment of nuclear fear, constituting a U.S. promise to reduce the country to a prenational, pre- technological state. Thus, the United States enters the twenty-first century as a nation both fascinated and traumatized by nuclear ruins. It transforms real and imagined mass death into a nationalized space, and supports a political culture that believes bombing campaigns can produce democracy abroad. It is simultaneously terrorized by nuclear weapons and threatens to use them. The U.S. military both wages preemptive war over nascent “weapons of mass destruction” programs and is preparing to build a new generation of U.S. nuclear weapons.56 American society is today neither “atomic bomb proof” nor capable of engaging nuclear technologies as a global problem of governance. Instead, U.S. citizens live today in the emotional residues of the Cold War nuclear arms race, which can only address them as fearful docile bodies. Thus, even in the twenty-first century, Americans remain caught between terror and fear, trapped in the psychosocial space defined by the once and future promise of nuclear ruins.

#### The alternative is to interrogate the affective recruitments of the 1AC – refuse the crisis-laden blackmail of the aff in favor of alternative futures grounded outside of security

Masco 17 (Joseph - Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago, “The Crisis in Crisis,” Current Anthropology 58(15):565-576)

The link between nuclear crisis and climate crisis is human industry: both of these existential dangers have been incrementally built over generations of labor in the pursuit of security. The nuclear complex is explicit in its goals, mobilizing the fear of mass destruction as the basis for US security in a world of competing nation-states. A changing climate is the collective effect of human industrial activity, an accumulation of a vast set of petrochemical practices dispersed across regions that have made the global economy over time. These “crises” are thus infrastructural achievements of an American modernity, modes of endangerment that are not necessary forms but rather effects of modern military and industrial systems. Following Roitman’s (2014:94) suggestion that crisis constitutes a “blind spot” that restricts narrative explanations as well as limits the kind of actions that can be taken, we could interrogate here how crisis states have become lived infrastructures, linking imaginations, affects, and institutions in a kind of total social formation. The crisis in crisis from this point of view is the radical presentism of crisis talk, the focus on stabilizing a present condition rather than engaging the multiple temporalities at stake in a world of interlocking technological, ﬁnancial, military, and ecological systems. As Jean-Luc Nancy (2015:30) argues in After Fukushima, Fukushima is a powerfully exemplary event because it shows the close and brutal connections between a seismic quake, a dense population, and a nuclear installation (under inadequate management). It is also exemplary of a node of complex relationships between public power and private management of the installation, not to mention all the other chains of correlation that extend out from that starting point. Put differently, there are no “natural” disasters any more, as the imbrication of technology, economy, and nature creates ever-emerging conditions for catastrophe, making crisis seem a permanent condition when it is in fact the effect of ﬁnancial, technological, militaristic, and political processes interacting with earth systems. Crisis talk today seeks to stabilize an institution, practice, or reality rather than interrogate the historical conditions of possibility for that endangerment to occur. In our moment, crisis blocks thought by evoking the need for an emergency response to the potential loss of a status quo, emphasizing urgency and restoration over a review of ﬁrst principles and historical ontologies. In an era of complex interlocking systems of ﬁnance, technology, militarism, and ecology, unanticipated effects are inevitable and often cascading processes. In light of a post-welfare-state attitude of crisis management, one that does not protect citizens but rather seeks to restore the conditions from which crisis emerged, there is much attention today to precarity as the very condition for living. Precarity and resilience are the twin logics of a neoliberal order that abandons populations in pursuit of proﬁt and then seeks to naturalize those abandonments as the only possible course of action (see Evans and Reid 2014). Put directly, crisis talk without the commitment to revolution becomes counterrevolutionary. With this in mind, how can we interrogate the “blind spots” informing nuclear crisis and climate crisis today? Despite the end of the Cold War and the widespread politicization of “weapons of mass destruction” under the terms of the War on Terror (Masco 2014), the Department of Energy (DOE) is currently planning to rebuild the US nuclear complex over the next 30 years (US Department of Energy 2013). This plan involves the ﬁrst entirely new weapons designs since the 1980s, part of a strategic effort to create a nuclear arsenal and production complex that can last through the twenty-ﬁrst century. These planned weapon systems will be less complicated mechanically and more robust that the Cold War designs in the current arsenal (which have been painstaking maintained part by part now for over two decades). They will also employ a new generation of weapons scientists through midcentury. These new designs will not have to be detonated, as did all prior weapons systems, before being deployed into US military arsenals thanks to the last 20 years of nuclear weapons research involving component testing, supercomputing, and simulations (see Masco 2006:43–98). The promise of the virtual weapons laboratory now points to a permanent nuclear production capacity in the United States, one that can maintain a nuclear test ban while also introducing new nuclear weapons. As the DOE’s (US Department of Energy 2013:1–6) programmatic report to Congress declares, by 2038, a new generation of weapons designers, code developers, experimentalists, and design and production engineers must demonstrate an understanding of nuclear weapons functionality using more predictive and more precisely calibrated computer-aided design and assessment tools than are possible today. High-ﬁdelity experimental capabilities will produce quantitative data that preclude resumption of underground nuclear testing. This commitment to building new nuclear weapons should place the recent US wars over weapons of mass destruction— both real and imagined—in a new light. White House calls for a nuclear-free world are now linked to a projected $1 trillion investment over the coming decades in a new US nuclear complex (Wolfsthal, Lewis, and Quint 2014), which is being designed for a deep futurity. This makes current US policy a paradoxical program of pursuing global nuclear disarmament through rebuilding a state-of-the-art US nuclear production complex and arsenal. The crisis in crisis here is the automated renewal of an infrastructure that will necessarily encourage current and future nuclear powers to pursue their own nuclear programs and undercut the collective goal of creating a world incapable of nuclear war. This program also reinvigorates nuclear fear as the coordinating logic of American geopolitics. The DOE has turned aging nuclear weapons and experts into a “crisis” requiring immediate action rather than interrogating and building a new collective security for a post–Cold War, post–War on Terror world. Alongside a new generation of nuclear experts and weapons, future nuclear crises are being built into these programs. The governance of a warming planet has also been thoroughly politicized in the United States, a victim of national security politics (see Masco 2010) and petroindustry propaganda (see Oreskes and Conway 2010). Not coincidentally, the George W. Bush administration loosened regulatory rules for domestic shale extraction in 2005 (exempting it from the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act), which, in combination with technological breakthroughs in drilling technology, opened up several large domestic shale formations for immediate exploitation. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill (2010) in the Gulf—alongside Hurricane Katrina (2005), the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown (2011), and superstorm Sandy (2012)—demonstrated the vulnerability of complex natural, technological, and social systems and the near impossibility of environmental remediation. The boom in hydraulic fracturing has allowed the United States to increase its oil production massively even as climate scientists describe in ever-greater detail the collective environmental costs of such extraction for ice caps, atmospheric chemistry, climate, and public health. In its “Saudi America: The Economics of Shale Oil” article, the Economist (2014) reveals that the United States has moved from producing 600,000 barrels of oil a day in 2008 to 3.5 million a day in 2014 because of shale extractions. The Economist focuses on the shifting geopolitics of renewed American oil power but does not mention the consequences for the global environment of abundant, inexpensive oil. If current patterns hold, the United States will become the world’sleading oil producer in 2020—the number one petrostate—at precisely the moment when the damage of such an achievement has been scientiﬁcally documented across the earth sciences. Since 2005, a vast new infrastructure of wells, pipes, and ponds as well as truck and train lines carrying oil and natural gas has been built to exploit shale formations from Texas to North Dakota to Pennsylvania. In addition to greenhouse gas emissions, these infrastructures require vast amounts of water, create waste ponds, and also leak, raising important questions about the environmental safety of these areas over the projected life of each well. New York State recently banned hydraulic fracturing because of the long list of unknown effects on water, air, and public health (New York Department of Public Health 2014), while in Texas and North Dakota there are boom and bust towns devoted entirely to the enterprise and vast landscapes now covered with industrial infrastructures that produce both energy and radically uncertain environmental futures. The deregulation of hydraulic fracturing has made petrochemical energy inexpensive and abundant by historical standards at precisely the moment when it would be most socially and environmentally sound to make it ever more expensive. If the neoliberal logics of market determinism were good at engineering a sustainable collective future, the United States would not be embracing shale with such unrestrained enthusiasm. The ever-shorter proﬁt cycle of corporate review, in other words, is diametrically opposed to the long-term investments in renewable energy, installing the perfect terms for ongoing environmental and health crises for as far into the future as anyone can imagine. Thus, one aspect of the crisis in crisis today is a notion of “proﬁt” that has been so narrowly deﬁned that a loss of the collective environment is easier to imagine than a shift in the nature of petrocapitalism. Instead of reenergizing a collective imaginary that can engage alternative modes of living and apply resources and agency to collective problems, governance today recommits to exactly those existentially dangerous projects that should be formally disavowed for the public good: nuclear weapons and oil. This creates a public feeling of “permanent crisis” as well as increasing vulnerabilities across a range of domestic and global issues. One perverse effect of this twenty-ﬁrst-century circuit is that it encourages social theorists to focus narrowly on the endless modes of precarity that are emerging rather than articulating the alternative futures that are needed, reinforcing a generational gestalt of political gridlock and decline. It is vitally important to understand how cumulative and asymmetrically distributed industrial toxins (from carbon to plastic to nuclear materials) affect communities and individual bodies and to articulate the ways that planetary-scale ﬂows are now remaking local conditions. The age of neoliberal calculation is one that naturalizes the abandonment of populations that are not immediately useful to the quarterly bottom line and renders invisible those many others affected remotely by ﬁnancial, military, or industrial policies (see Lorey 2015). It is also important to interrogate the affective recruitments to existential crisis and the political work such recruitments do in supporting existing political structures (Masco 2014). However, it is equally important to recover the capacity to generate positive futurities—what, following Berlant (2011), we might call the not yet cruel optimisms—that can affectively charge collective action, particularly on those issues (e.g., nuclear danger and climate danger) that have been constructed by generations of human agency and thus are immediately available to reform. At the end of World War II, the United States embraced a new kind of technological utopianism, believing that science would solve the problems of health, welfare, and security. Designing the future for both security and prosperity was the role of the state, allowing signiﬁcant investments in education, welfare-state systems, and the establishment of a variety of environmental protection laws. Indeed, this mid-twentiethcentury period of “crisis” is the moment when many of the key infrastructures—and generational investments in education and environmental protections—were established that inform our world today. Thus, the most dangerous moment in American history was, from this point of view, also one of the most productive, creating important commitments to civil rights, education, and the environment while establishing the precedents for international law and treaties to manage existential dangers. Since the 1980s neoliberal turn in the United States, militarism has remained the project of the state, but the collective future has been assigned to the marketplace, which elevates short-term proﬁtability above all other concerns. What happened to the once vibrant social debate about alternative futures and the commitment to making long-term investments in improving the terms of collective life? The force of global capital has absorbed the power of crisis talk to shock, and thus mobilize, requiring a different call to action. The crisis in crisis today is the inability to both witness the accumulating damage of this system and imagine another politics. A fundamental challenge in our moment is that the key existential dangers of today—nuclear weapons and climate change—operate on different scales, creating friction between the global and the planetary while demanding different kinds of governance (Masco 2015). Because we do not yet have planetary-scale institutions that can govern these collective problems, it is easy to focus on the emerging and amplifying forms of precarity. Instead of a more aggressive media space devoted to detailing the current and projected crises, then, perhaps what our speciﬁc historical moment requires is an explicit commitment—acriticaltheory commitment—to generating the nonutopian but nonetheless positive futurities that can reactivate the world-making powers of society.

### 2

#### Counter Plan – The United States federal government should decarbonize, democratize, and decommodify energy sources in the United States including penalties on carbon emissions, regulations to promote a transition to renewable energy, and distributing ownership and decision-making over utilities.

#### CP solves the aff but avoids every DA to appropriating space

Shaw et al. 18 (Robert Shaw, Thea Riofrancos, and Will Speck – Jacobin, “Eco-Socialism or Bust,” 4-20-18, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/04/fossil-fuels-renewable-energy-eco-socialism)

In this terrain, there are several points of entry for eco-socialist politics. Broadly, our energy vision should center on the three D’s: decarbonize, democratize, and decommodify. Decarbonizing energy sources requires massive political confrontation with the fossil-fuel industry — a movement currently being led by the frontline communities most impacted by fossil-fuel extraction and its transformation — combined with federal and state-level policies that punish carbon emissions and a regulatory framework that encourages transition to renewable sources. Meanwhile, democratization and decommodification — the collective control of energy distribution that treats energy access as a human right rather than an opportunity for profit — are another point of entry. To achieve these ends, socialists must politicize the grid, and propose alternative visions of ownership and decision-making. In the United States, over two-thirds of electricity users are served by for-profit utilities. These private monopolies are often overseen by state-level energy commissions that are ripe for regulatory capture by Big Energy and the fossil-fuel industry. Even where utilities are publicly owned, technocratic governance structures provide limited fora for public input, let alone real democratic control. Building a bridge toward a socialist energy future requires a vision of a system that removes the profit motive from the delivery of utilities services and establishes energy as a universal human right alongside other basic human needs.

### 3

#### Private space mining is coming now because of global recognition of property rights

Gilbert 21 (Alex Gilbert – complex systems researcher and a PhD student in space resources at the Colorado School of Mines, “Mining in Space Is Coming,” 4-26-21, https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/mining-in-space-is-coming)

Space exploration is back. After decades of disappointment, a combination of better technology, falling costs and a rush of competitive energy from the private sector has put space travel front and center. indeed, many analysts (even some with their feet on the ground) believe that commercial developments in the space industry may be on the cusp of starting the largest resource rush in history: mining on the Moon, Mars and asteroids. While this may sound fantastical, some baby steps toward the goal have already been taken. Last year, NASA awarded contracts to four companies to extract small amounts of lunar regolith by 2024, effectively beginning the era of commercial space mining. Whether this proves to be the dawn of a gigantic adjunct to mining on earth — and more immediately, a key to unlocking cost-effective space travel — will turn on the answers to a host of questions ranging from what resources can be efficiently. As every fan of science fiction knows, the resources of the solar system appear virtually unlimited compared to those on Earth. There are whole other planets, dozens of moons, thousands of massive asteroids and millions of small ones that doubtless contain humungous quantities of materials that are scarce and very valuable (back on Earth). Visionaries including Jeff Bezos imagine heavy industry moving to space and Earth becoming a residential area. However, as entrepreneurs look to harness the riches beyond the atmosphere, access to space resources remains tangled in the realities of economics and governance. Start with the fact that space belongs to no country, complicating traditional methods of resource allocation, property rights and trade. With limited demand for materials in space itself and the need for huge amounts of energy to return materials to Earth, creating a viable industry will turn on major advances in technology, finance and business models. That said, there’s no grass growing under potential pioneers’ feet. Potential economic, scientific and even security benefits underlie an emerging geopolitical competition to pursue space mining. The United States is rapidly emerging as a front-runner, in part due to its ambitious Artemis Program to lead a multinational consortium back to the Moon. But it is also a leader in creating a legal infrastructure for mineral exploitation. The United States has adopted the world’s first space resources law, recognizing the property rights of private companies and individuals to materials gathered in space. However, the United States is hardly alone. Luxembourg and the United Arab Emirates (you read those right) are racing to codify space-resources laws of their own, hoping to attract investment to their entrepot nations with business-friendly legal frameworks. China reportedly views space-resource development as a national priority, part of a strategy to challenge U.S. economic and security primacy in space. Meanwhile, Russia, Japan, India and the European Space Agency all harbor space-mining ambitions of their own. Governing these emerging interests is an outdated treaty framework from the Cold War. Sooner rather than later, we’ll need new agreements to facilitate private investment and ensure international cooperation. What’s Out There Back up for a moment. For the record, space is already being heavily exploited, because space resources include non-material assets such as orbital locations and abundant sunlight that enable satellites to provide services to Earth. Indeed, satellite-based telecommunications and global positioning systems have become indispensable infrastructure underpinning the modern economy. Mining space for materials, of course, is another matter. In the past several decades, planetary science has confirmed what has long been suspected: celestial bodies are potential sources for dozens of natural materials that, in the right time and place, are incredibly valuable. Of these, water may be the most attractive in the near-term, because — with assistance from solar energy or nuclear fission — H2O can be split into hydrogen and oxygen to make rocket propellant, facilitating in-space refueling. So-called “rare earth” metals are also potential targets of asteroid miners intending to service Earth markets. Consisting of 17 elements, including lanthanum, neodymium, and yttrium, these critical materials (most of which are today mined in China at great environmental cost) are required for electronics. And they loom as bottlenecks in making the transition from fossil fuels to renewables backed up by battery storage. The Moon is a prime space mining target. Boosted by NASA’s mining solicitation, it is likely the first location for commercial mining. The Moon has several advantages. It is relatively close, requiring a journey of only several days by rocket and creating communication lags of only a couple seconds — a delay small enough to allow remote operation of robots from Earth. Its low gravity implies that relatively little energy expenditure will be needed to deliver mined resources to Earth orbit. Science Photo Library/Alamy Stock Photo The Moon may look parched — and by comparison to Earth, it is. But recent probes have confirmed substantial amounts of water ice lurking in permanently shadowed craters at the lunar poles. Further, it seems that solar winds have implanted significant deposits of helium-3 (a light stable isotope of helium) across the equatorial regions of the Moon. Helium-3 is a potential fuel source for secondand third-generation fusion reactors that one hopes will be in service later in the century. The isotope is packed with energy (admittedly hard to unleash in a controlled manner) that might augment sunlight as a source of clean, safe energy on Earth or to power fast spaceships in this century. Between its water and helium-3 deposits, the Moon could be the resource stepping-stone for further solar system exploration. Asteroids are another near-term mining target. There are all sorts of space rocks hurtling through the solar system, with varying amounts of water, rare earth metals and other materials on board. The asteroid belt between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter contains most of them, many of which are greater than a kilometer in diameter. Although the potential water and mineral wealth of the asteroid belt is vast, the long distance from Earth and requisite travel times and energy consumption rule them out as targets in the near term. Even the surface of celestial bodies pose a challenge to mining machinery since they consist of unconsolidated rocky materials called regolith instead of more familiar soil. Wannabe asteroid miners will thus be looking at smaller near-Earth asteroids. While they are much further away than the Moon, many of them could be reached using less energy — and some are even small enough to make it technically possible to tow them to Earth orbit for mining. Space mining may be essential to crewed exploration missions to Mars. Given the distance and relatively high gravity of Mars (twice that of the Moon), extraction and export of minerals to Earth seems highly unlikely. Rather, most resource extraction on Mars will focus on providing materials to supply exploration missions, refuel spacecraft and enable settlement. Technology Is the Difference The prospects for space mining are being driven by technological advances across the space industry. The rise of reusable rocket components and the now-widespread use of off-the-shelf parts are lowering both launch and operations costs. Once limited to government contract missions and the delivery of telecom satellites to orbit, private firms are now emerging as leaders in developing “NewSpace” activities — a catch-all term for endeavors including orbital tourism, orbital manufacturing and mini-satellites providing specialized services. The space sector, with a market capitalization of $400 billion, could grow to as much as $1 trillion by 2040 as private investment soars.

#### Space mining is key to sustainable mining, especially rare earth metals – mining is disastrous for poor countries and the environment.

MacWhorter 16 (Kevin McWhorter – JD Candidate at William and Mary, “Sustainable Mining: Incentivizing Asteroid Mining in the Name of

Environmentalism,” February 2016, 40 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 645, https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol40/iss2/11/)

In the next sixty years, scientists predict that certain elements crucial to modern industry such as platinum, zinc, copper, phosphorous, lead, gold, and indium could be exhausted on Earth. 12 Many of these have no synthetic alternative, unlike chemical elements such as oil or diamonds.13 Liquid-crystal display (LCD) televisions, cellphones, and laptops are among the various consumer technologies that use precious metals.14Further, green technologies including wind turbines, solar panels, and catalytic converters require these rare elements. 15 As demand rises for both types of technologies, and as reserves of rare metals fall, prices skyrocket.16 Demand for nonrenewable resources creates conflict, and consumerism in rich countries results in harsh labor treatment for poorer countries.17 In general, the mining industry is extremely destructive to Earth’s environment.18 In fact, depending on the method employed, mining can destroy entire ecosystems by polluting water sources and contributing to deforestation.19 It is by its nature an unsustainable practice, because it involves the extraction of a finite and non-renewable resource.20 Moreover, by extracting tiny amounts of metals from relatively large quantities of ore, the mining industry contributes the largest portion of solid wastes in the world.21 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) describes the industry as the source of more toxic and hazardous waste than any other industrial sector [in the United States], costing billions of dollars to address the public health and environmental threats to communities. 22 Poor regulations and oxymoronic corporate definitions of sustainability, however, make it unclear as to just how much waste the industry actually produces.23 Platinum provides an excellent case study of the issue, because it is an extremely rare and expensive metal—an ore expected to exist in vast quantities in asteroids.24 Further, production of platinum has increased sharply in the past sixty years in order to keep up with growing demand for use in new technologies.25 In fact, despite their high costs, platinum group metals are so useful that [one] of [four] industrial goods on Earth require them in production. 26 Scholars do not expect demand to slow any time soon.27 Among other technologies, industries use platinum in products such as catalytic converters, jewelry production, various catalysts for chemical processing, and hydrogen fuel cells.28 While there is no consensus on how far the Earth’s reserves of platinum will take humanity, many scientists agree that platinum ore reserves will deplete in a relatively short amount of time.29 With the rate of mining at an all-time high,30 it is increasingly clear that historical patterns of mineral resources and development cannot simply be assumed to continue unaltered into the future. 31 The platinum mining industry, however, has a strong incentive to increase its rate of extraction as profits grow with the rate of demand. Without any alternative, this destructive practice will continue into the future.32 So-called platinum-group metal (PGM) ores are mined through underground or open cut techniques.33 Due to these practices, all but a very small fraction of the mined platinum ore is disposed of as solid waste.34 The environmental consequences of platinum production are thus quite significant, but like the mining industry in general, the amount of waste is typically under-reported.35 While this is due to high production levels at the moment, those levels will only increase given the estimated future demand of platinum.36 In spite of the negative consequences, mining continues unabated because it is economically important to many areas.37 The future environmental costs provide a major challenge in creating a sustainable system. Relegating at least some mining companies to near-Earth asteroids would reduce the negative effects of future mining levels on Earth. The economic benefits of mining need not be sacrificed for the sake of the environment.38

## Case

### Overview

#### The 1AC is not space socialism but a liberalist lie resulting in an eco-fascist state of nationalized space industry. The aff can’t fiat a utopian socialist state, they only provide a fascist one with the power to unilaterally determine space activities. Nationalization is complicit with the capitalist command economy that your own evidence would call dooms-day. Nationalizing space only ramps up militarism and violence, the US quickly squirms to weaponize its satellites and overtake all space operations for national purposes. Even If they win temporary peace, eventually the world police inevitably steps in to ‘preserve the peace’

#### Insufficiency – The aff has to prove that their mechanism spills up to radical change. Space is an important market but not a site of labor organizing, the aff can never overthrow capitalism without a more overarching institutional overthrow with Marxist platformng which proves your impacts are inevitable. At best you delay them but in doing so you delay the end of capitalism itself.

#### Obfuscation – The Aff obfuscates the true labor struggle by refocusing movements on frontiers beyond capitalisms core. Markets are adaptable and cutting off their heads only breeds more avenues of profit. The AC can never mobilize a sufficient movement to solve their impacts.

#### Agitation – The AC removes a reason for movements to exist, all their reasons why space appropriation is bad are reasons for movements to exist and fight but the aff removes it which kills mobilization and movement-building.

#### Neoliberalism is inevitable – broad support and elite cooption shut down opposition

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(Vamsi, “Why Does Neoliberalism Persist Even After the Global Crisis?,” 12-20-12, http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2012/12/why-does-neoliberalism-persist-even-after-the-global-crisis.html)

The 2007-9 crisis in global capitalism brought a new energy and focus to the heterodox economists, and more broadly to the critics of neoliberalism from different arenas of society. It seemed clear at that time that neoliberalism had run its course when it met its structural contradiction – with the burst of the US housing bubble and the concomitant financial crises across the world, it looked like the avenues through which demand was being generated were closed and the system was poised for structural change. Three years later, Southern Europe is witnessing an intense so-called sovereign debt crisis with the working people bearing the brunt of it, and real economies in the developed world are continuing to witness slow growth. The US seems to be under the threat of the so-called fiscal cliff (which seems more like a political event rather than an economic one). The economies that grew quickly during the neo-liberal period, like China and India, have slowed down considerably. Across the globe, we seem to be going through a period of uncertainty without a clear path ahead. Yet, neoliberalism persists. Why? There are multiple explanations for this. Bailout packages of various governments were directed at rescuing financial capital, and this has pitted the interests of financial capital against the interests of the majority. The global left has not been strong enough to take advantage of the crisis to better represent the interests of the majority. Governments across the world, after a brief gap, have returned to their neoliberal posture of supporting financial capital and so forth. There is truth in all these explanations. However, we need to broaden the array of explanations both to take into account the spatial diversity of neoliberalism, as well as to deepen our analytical understanding of this persistence. I offer one such explanation from field explorations in India to add to the existing explanations. This addition is not simply academic, but it shows the need for deeper political engagement to bring about systemic change, given that our explanations of the structural contradictions of neoliberalism are on the mark. In two recent field visits that we (a group of local researchers) undertook to understand the persistence of neoliberalism at the concrete level, we found some interesting phenomena. Both these visits were in the state of Andhra Pradesh in South India. The first visit was in the region of Telangana, which is highly politicized right now, as the people of the region are fighting for a separate state within the Indian nation-state. The second visit was to a tribal habitat in the northeastern region of the same state, where communist struggles have been active for a while. In both these areas, there are continued appropriations of common lands, common resources and minerals, such as Granite and Bauxite by local and foreign capitalist elites aided by the State. In the process, these elites are destroying the local livelihoods without creating credible alternative. Both these are classic cases of primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession, a process that has centrally defined neoliberalism over the last thirty-five years across the globe. Accumulation by dispossession operates in our times through the following modes of appropriation. First, it operates through the acquisition of lands from small producers such as peasants, tribal people, artisans and the urban poor in the name of Special Economic Zones and the like. Some of the lands acquired thus, have became open to speculative enterprises of real estate dealers. Second, there has been a large-scale privatization drive in most countries that has made public sector enterprises alienate their properties at throwaway prices to private players. Third, and these are the cases that we have focused on – commons have been appropriated with ease either because the laws governing them are weak or because common properties are often meddled with by the State. What we found in these two regions is that the particular modes of appropriation that have come into being with great force during the neoliberal period have persisted even after the crisis. Why is this the case? One explanation that ties in with the explanations above is that resistance has not been strong enough or effective from the people and their social movements or from the larger left movements. The other explanation that we offered is that neoliberalism has been able to create structures of populism that are deeply entrenched. The local elites have pursued a three-fold strategy for the continued appropriation of the commons. First, they (with the support of the State) have put in place various populist policy imperatives that have temporarily addressed the consumption needs of the majority without altering the deeper neoliberal structural forces that have inhibited employment growth and wage growth over the last thirty years. For example, there are schemes such as housing or subsidized food for the poor even as their productive resources such as land are acquired by the elites/states. These have tended to perpetuate themselves after the global crisis, even with the loud demands for austerity. Second, the elites have continued to appropriate common and public resources to keep their own accumulation levels above an acceptable minimum in a time of slowdown of accumulation opportunities through regular economic growth. Resistance is sought to be controlled through populism of the kind discussed above. Even in regions that are highly politicized, such as Telangana, the leadership of the movement has been hand-in-glove with the local elites who gain consistently through the perpetuation of these appropriation practices.Third, professionals and middle classes have been the beneficiaries of a system that has thrived on the creation of enclave economies where there is a sharing of rents among the elites and these professional groups. These professional classes have taken up key positions in the government, media, corporate executive roles, and as intermediaries between the elites and the working people who use the commons. The broad support of these classes for the local elites has played a key role in the perpetuation of neoliberalism. As long as these processes persist, neoliberalism will be strong on the ground, with the elites and non-elites bound together in the larger neoliberal system through the different, yet entangled processes of appropriation, rent sharing and populism. Of course, this cannot go on, since the logic of austerity is bound to create contradictions in the path of populism. However, this contradiction may unfold very differently across space and time, as not all governments are going to react identically to the demands of austerity. The 1% in the US (that the Occupy movement has targeted) or the top decile of the population (in countries like China and India) continue to benefit from the perpetuation of the neoliberal configuration while they are pitted against their large majorities. As long as the political groups on the ground do not make their voices heard loudly enough against the top 1% or the top 10%, and as long as there are continued benefits for the elites from the perpetuation of neoliberalism, the system will persist.

#### Cap is sustainable – adaptation overcomes systemic contradictions

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(Razmig, “Not even climate change will kill off capitalism,” 3-6-14, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/06/not-even-climate-change-will-kill-off-capitalism>, accessed 5-27-16 //Bozzles the Bozz-Dawg Bozz Bozz)

Arguably the single most important mistake the revolutionary movements of the 60s and 70s made was to overlook the resilience of capitalism. The idea – catastrophism, as it is often called – that the system was going to crumble under the pressure of its own contradictions, that the bourgeoisie produces its own "gravediggers" (as Marx and Engels put it in the Communist Manifesto) has been disproved. When the rate of profit started showing signs of decline in the first half of the 70s, the redistributive policies implemented after the second world war were terminated and the neoliberal revolution was launched. This resilience of capitalism has little to do with the dominant classes being particularly clever or far-sighted. In fact, they can keep on making mistakes – yet capitalism still thrives. Why? Capitalism has created a world of great complexity since its birth. Yet at its core, it is based on a set of simple mechanisms that can easily adapt to adversity. This is a kind of "generative grammar" in Noam Chomsky's sense: a finite set of rules can generate an infinity of outcomes. The context today is very different from that of the 60s and 70s. The global left, however, is in danger of committing the same error of underestimating capitalism all over again. Catastrophism, this time, takes the form of investing faith in a new object: climate change, and more generally the ecological crisis. There is a worryingly widespread belief in leftwing circles that capitalism will not survive the environmental crisis. The system, so the story goes, has reached its absolute limits: without natural resources – oil among them – it can't function, and these resources are fast depleting; the growing number of ecological disasters will increase the cost of maintaining infrastructures to unsustainable levels; and the impact of a changing climate on food prices will induce riots that will make societies ungovernable. The beauty of catastrophism, today as in the past, is that if the system is to crumble under the weight of its own contradictions, the weakness of the left ceases to be a problem. The end of capitalism takes the form of suicide rather than murder. So the absence of a murderer – that is, an organised revolutionary movement – doesn't really matter any more. But the left would be better off learning from its past mistakes. Capitalism might well be capable not only of adapting to climate change but of profiting from it. One hears that the capitalist system is confronted with a double crisis: an economic one that started in 2008, and an ecological one, rendering the situation doubly perilous. But one crisis can sometimes serve to solve another. Capitalism is responding to the challenge of the ecological crisis with two of its favourite weapons: financialisation and militarisation. In times of crisis, for instance, markets will require simultaneously that wages be cut and that people keep consuming. Opening the flow of credit allows the reconciliation of these two contradictory injunctions – at least until the next financial crisis. As Costas Lapavitsas has recently shown, finance has penetrated every nook and cranny of our everyday lives: housing, health, education, even nature. Carbon markets, weather or biodiversity derivatives, catastrophe bonds, among others, belong to a new variety of "environmental finance" products. Each one has its own specific way of functioning, but their overall purpose is to alleviate or spread the rising costs of climate change and the super-exploitation of the environment.