# 1NC

## NC

### 1

#### Our interpretation is the aff must defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust

#### ‘Resolved’ before a colon denotes a formal resolution

**AWS ’13** [Army Writing Style; August 24th; Online resource dedicated to all major writing requirements in the Army; Army Writing Style, "Punctuation — The Colon and Semicolon," <https://armywritingstyle.com/punctuation-the-colon-and-semicolon/>]

The colon introduces the following:

a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis.

b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.)

c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it?

d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment.

e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock

g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:". Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### “Appropriation of outer space” means exercise of exclusive control with permanence

Trapp 13 (Timothy Justin Trapp – JD Candidate at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, “Taking up Space by Any Other Means: Coming to Terms with Nonappropriation Article of the Outer Space Treaty,” 2013, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1681) \*Note: Footnote 217 inserted with brackets

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.2 1 4 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to "property interests in outer space."215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*\*FOOTNOTE 217\*\*\* Id. at 236 ("Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is 'the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use' with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations' access to it.") (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*\*END OF FOOTNOTE 217\*\*\*] " The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation. 2 18 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotdi Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different

means. 219

#### Two Impacts

#### 1 – Procedural Fairness – alternative frameworks are unpredictable and make neg research and ground impossible – there are infinite alternative approaches to space appropriation which we cannot adequately prepare – do not burden the neg with rejoinder to affs outside the resolution because it creates an inequitable role for the neg

#### 2 – Clash – its an intrinsic good that is only possible from well-prepared opponents – open topics and models create linear thinking that destroys in-depth engagement

Grossberg 15(2015, Lawrence Grossberg is the Morris Davis Distinguished Professor University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “We All Want to Change the World THE PARADOX OF THE U.S. LEFT A POLEMIC, <http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/ebooks/we_all_want_to_change_the_world.pdf>)

I will, in the following description, focus on the situation in the human sciences (rather than the hard sciences), where the explosion of publication creates an ever-expanding circle in which there is always too much to read—too many positions, too many arguments, too much contradictory evidence—so that scholars have to rely on either the author's stature or theoretical and/or political agreement. It has become almost impossible to read everything one must read, everything necessary to legitimate, at least in traditional terms, the claim of academic expertise or scholarship. In fact, given this situation (and its consequences as I will describe below), the most surprising thing is how much good work continues to be produced. This situation has serious consequences: First, one's expertise becomes defined in increasingly narrow terms, resulting in the proliferation of sub-fields.9 **[insert footnote 9]** For example, one might point to security studies, surveillance studies, transition studies, game studies, code studies, hip-hop studies, horror studies, etc. **[Footnote 9 ends]** And while each of them is valuable for their interdisciplinary efforts around a new empirical field, they all too often act as if the questions (and the realities they interrogate) are new; unfortunately, they rarely say anything new or surprising, anything that has not been said elsewhere. They frequently simply re-discover in their own empirical "pocket" universe what others have said previously in other fields. For example, all sorts of technologically defined sub-fields rediscover the rather old assumption that media audiences are active. This is partly because, within each subfield, one gets the impression of witnessing endless redistributions of a highly circumscribed set of citations and authors, under a series of ever-changing terms to describe their fields or positions. So, academics create ever shrinking circles in which authors cite a few theoretically and politically compatible works, and then follow the footnotes, all of which ultimately lead back to the original authors, creating an endlessly self-referential closed system of citations, a numbingly predictable, circular tissue of references. Second, one is less likely to read work that appears tangential but may nevertheless be absolutely decisive to producing truly interesting and insightful research. Asking significant questions should demand that one makes reference to all sorts of concepts and questions which would lead one to follow other unexpected traditions and lines of research, since any investigation (e.g., around questions of participation, publics, or leadership, to use only a few examples that have irked me recently) is likely to open up to an entire history of problematization, of conversations and debates, but who can afford the time and energy anymore. Third, one tends to read only the most recent work since so much is being published—in various media—so rapidly that there is little time to go back and read. Fourth, one tends to select one's sources according to criteria that have more to do with theoretical and political sympathies than with an understanding of research as a conversation with difference. One reads selectively, finding those ideas that are already in line with what one assumes one already knows, and one establishes a body of near-sacred texts; fifth, one selects topics that are au courant, partly because there is less scaffolding that one has to build upon and partly because one's work is more likely to gain visibility and impact. Sixth, complexity goes out the door as one increasingly "sees the world in a grain of sand." One can no longer be satisfied claiming to have discovered merely a new piece of a complex puzzle or even an interesting redeployment of an older practice or structure, because such claims do not bring fame and glory—either to oneself or the university. Instead, one has to have discovered the leading edge, the new key or essence. One good but relatively small idea is expanded into a metonym for the entire economy, culture or society. Instead of seeking new discursive forms to embody complexity, uncertainty and humility, one goes with elegance, hyperbole and the ever receding new.

#### TVA – ban private companies from doing any actions in space, preventing pharmaceutical companies from testing in antigravity.

#### Fairness is a voter since debate is a competitive activity that intrinsically requires equal footing when participating, to minimize one’s ability to participate in discussion disrespects the other member of the activity.

#### Drop the debater – 1. Deterrence – Prevents reading the abusive practice in the future since it’s not worth risking the loss which is k2 norm setting indefensible practices die out 2. TS – Otherwise you’ll read a bunch of abusive practices for the time trade off 3. Epistemic Skew – The round has already been skewed so it’s impossible to evaluate the rest of the flow 4. Drop the argument is incoherent under norm setting since you’re voting for the best rule, not a punishment of someone else’s wrong-doing 5. DTA treats all arguments in the aff as conditional which moots negative offense since I can’t turn them and read theory.

#### Competing interps – 1. Reasonability encourages a race to the margins of what counts as sufficiently fair which incentivizes as much abuse as possible 2. Norm setting – it encourages the most fair rule through debating competing models 3. Judge intervention – Reasonability begs the question of what the judge thinks is sufficient which takes the round out of the debaters hands.

#### No RVIs – 1. It deters legitimate theory vs good theory debaters because you will lose on a shell even if it’s a good norm 2. Baiting – incentivizes people to be abusive and script counter-interps to win on the RVI which increases the existence of bad norms 3. It forces debaters to argue for bad practices even if they realize their interp is wrong which kills substance debate and norm setting since we have bad theory debates we agree on.

### 2

#### Self-experimentation is neoliberalism par-excellence – their retreat to individualism only strengthens the market

Villadsen and Dean 12 (Kaspar Villadsen – Associate Professor of Sociology at Copenhagen Business School, and Mitchell Dean – Research Professor of Sociology at Newcastle University, Australia, and Professor of Public Governance at Copenhagen Business School, “State-Phobia, Civil Society, and a Certain Vitalism,” Constellations 19(3):401-420, accessed 6-2-16 //Bozzles the Bozz-Dawg Bozz Bozz)

First, there are of course political costs of what is conceived as no longer being possible. They center on the difficulties, to say the least, of referring to the kind of knowledge of society or social structure that has been essential for public policy and provision as remedies against social inequality and as a condition of exercising civil, political, and social freedoms. To reject or displace the importance of such a form of knowledge is to put aside or diminish questions concerning the organization of state institutions, the prioritizing of resources, and the securing of minimum and universal standards. Does not a focus on the identifications that form communities or on aestheticized forms of self-creation through “somatic individuality” and an “ethic of vitalism”86 rule out, or at least undermine, this kind of knowledge and these key political questions? As far as the domains of multiple communities are concerned, we may then demand culturally sensitive services and diversified rights rather than uniform provision and universalism. In this respect, the “birth of community” seems to suffer from the same troubling fit with neoliberal strategies for dismantling welfare services and solidifying social segregation as does the postmodern discourse on cultural diversity and societal differentiation.87 There also are analytical costs, as pointed out by sociologists and geographers.88 It is simply very difficult to move between the local, the unique, the contingent, and the relatively unstructured to analyze extra-local contexts, systems, and institutional frameworks or to discern vectors, logics, and pathways that are embedded in larger-scale kinds of power and regulation. Rose and his colleagues are in danger of making a fetish of the localized and the empirical through a methodological commitment to contingency. A set of valid methodological concerns thus risks becoming an untenable ontological commitment to a particular vision of social and political life as unstructured flux and fluidity.89 As it stands, Rose's ethico-politics is a politics of self-creation that abjures social policy and appears once the social state has been displaced. It is striking, however, that Rose comes very close, as do post-Foucauldians such as William Connolly,90 to a positive conception of civil society. Thus, Rose's concept of politics seems to share the same space as civil society, i.e., it is an extra-state space of innovation, creativity, and critical contestation of state-centered politics and administration. While Rose may share with critical theorists and others a celebration of this realm and its self-creating agents, he brackets the long-lasting, central concern of this tradition to define the conditions of a thriving civil society, including what kind of an active sovereign state power needs to be in place for the potentially lethal conflicts of civil society to be kept in check. By adhering principally to a conception of power as productive and relational, Rose avoids these thorny issues and appears to leave us a fluid and experimental form of post-social politics. In short, there are elements of state-phobia in Rose and a related vitalism in the conclusion of his work on governmentality. These aspects become even more pronounced in his recent work on the multifarious contemporary dimensions of biopolitics from genetics to self-health practices and aesthetic interventions on the body.91 Here, Rose argues that the days of state-administered biopolitics, exemplified by the eugenic drive for biological and moral perfection, are over, and that they have been succeeded by alliances between self-creating consumers and pharmaceutical companies and biomedicine offering products and services for voluntary bodily improvements and risk minimization. Rose is at pains to avoid a purely negative view of this novel somatic ethics and recognizes the expanded possibilities for autonomy and self-formation offered by biotechnology, which “enables us to intervene upon ourselves in new ways.”92 The passage from “the social state” to “advanced liberalism” thus holds the promise of more diversified experimentation and contestation of truth claims about biological normality: “Our somatic individuality has become opened up to choice, prudence, and responsibility, to experimentation, to contestation – and so to a ‘vital politics’.”93 The phrase “art of living” is thus given a more substantive anchorage in the very materiality of the body (“somatic individuality”), and the concept of ethico-politics has been transmuted into etho-politics: By ethopolitics I mean to characterize ways in which the ethos of human existence… have come to provide the “medium” within which the self-government of the autonomous individual can be connected up with the imperatives of good government.… While ethopolitical concerns range from those of lifestyle to those of community, they coalesce around a kind of vitalism… in this highly contested domain, somatic individuals are the key actors.94 None of this escapes Rose's earlier dilemmas. If anything, the aporiae of state-phobia become more acute. If we follow Rose and raise “life itself” to a quasi-universal contemporary political agency, then it is difficult to understand how active choices of self-creation can be available to all without raising the question of the role of the state in ensuring universal access to basic health, promoting innovations in biomedicine, surgery, and the pharmaceutical industries, and securing a set of standards so that life can be lived in this self-governing way. Otherwise etho-politics becomes the preserve of a privileged caste or, at best, unevenly distributed, which then gets played out in the appropriation and allocation struggles that have been at the core of the territorial state's quest for civil peace and the welfare state's concern for universal social rights.

#### The focus on affective resistance is multicultural neoliberalism at its worst---it replaces structural analysis with psychological self-esteem engineering which are products of neoliberalism’s individualistic focus

Adolph Reed 13, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and a member of the interim national council of the Labor Party. Django Unchained, or, The Help: How “Cultural Politics” Is Worse Than No Politics at All, and Why, http://nonsite.org/feature/django-unchained-or-the-help-how-cultural-politics-is-worse-than-no-politics-at-all-and-why

Defenses of Django Unchained pivot on claims about the social significance of the narrative of a black hero. One node of this argument emphasizes the need to validate a history of autonomous black agency and “resistance” as a politico-existential desideratum. It accommodates a view that stresses the importance of recognition of rebellious or militant individuals and revolts in black American history. Another centers on a notion that exposure to fictional black heroes can inculcate the sense of personal efficacy necessary to overcome the psychological effects of inequality and to facilitate upward mobility and may undermine some whites’ negative stereotypes about black people. In either register assignment of social or political importance to depictions of black heroes rests on presumptions about the nexus of mass cultural representation, social commentary, and racial justice that are more significant politically than the controversy about the film itself.

In both versions, this argument casts political and economic problems in psychological terms. Injustice appears as a matter of disrespect and denial of due recognition, and the remedies proposed—which are all about images projected and the distribution of jobs associated with their projection—look a lot like self-esteem engineering. Moreover, nothing could indicate more strikingly the extent of neoliberal ideological hegemony than the idea that the mass culture industry and its representational practices constitute a meaningful terrain for struggle to advance egalitarian interests. It is possible to entertain that view seriously only by ignoring the fact that the production and consumption of mass culture is thoroughly embedded in capitalist material and ideological imperatives.

That, incidentally, is why I prefer the usage “mass culture” to describe this industry and its products and processes, although I recognize that it may seem archaic to some readers. The mass culture v. popular culture debate dates at least from the 1950s and has continued with occasional crescendos ever since.5 For two decades or more, instructively in line with the retreat of possibilities for concerted left political action outside the academy, the popular culture side of that debate has been dominant, along with its view that the products of this precinct of mass consumption capitalism are somehow capable of transcending or subverting their material identity as commodities, if not avoiding that identity altogether. Despite the dogged commitment of several generations of American Studies and cultural studies graduate students who want to valorize watching television and immersion in hip-hop or other specialty market niches centered on youth recreation and the most ephemeral fads as both intellectually avant-garde and politically “resistive,” it should be time to admit that that earnest disposition is intellectually shallow and an ersatz politics. The idea of “popular” culture posits a spurious autonomy and organicism that actually affirm mass industrial processes by effacing them, especially in the putatively rebel, fringe, or underground market niches that depend on the fiction of the authentic to announce the birth of new product cycles.

The power of the hero is a cathartic trope that connects mainly with the sensibility of adolescent boys—of whatever nominal age. Tarantino has allowed as much, responding to black critics’ complaints about the violence and copious use of “nigger” by proclaiming “Even for the film’s biggest detractors, I think their children will grow up and love this movie. I think it could become a rite of passage for young black males.”6 This response stems no doubt from Tarantino’s arrogance and opportunism, and some critics have denounced it as no better than racially presumptuous. But he is hardly alone in defending the film with an assertion that it gives black youth heroes, is generically inspirational or both. Similarly, in a January 9, 2012 interview on the Daily Show, George Lucas adduced this line to promote his even more execrable race-oriented live-action cartoon, Red Tails, which, incidentally, trivializes segregation in the military by reducing it to a matter of bad or outmoded attitudes. The ironic effect is significant understatement of both the obstacles the Tuskegee airmen faced and their actual accomplishments by rendering them as backdrop for a blackface, slapped-together remake of Top Gun. (Norman Jewison’s 1984 film, A Soldier’s Story, adapted from Charles Fuller’s A Soldier’s Play, is a much more sensitive and thought-provoking rumination on the complexities of race and racism in the Jim Crow U.S. Army—an army mobilized, as my father, a veteran of the Normandy invasion, never tired of remarking sardonically, to fight the racist Nazis.) Lucas characterized his film as “patriotic, even jingoistic” and was explicit that he wanted to create a film that would feature “real heroes” and would be “inspirational for teenage boys.” Much as Django Unchained’s defenders compare it on those terms favorably to Lincoln, Lucas hyped Red Tails as being a genuine hero story unlike “Glory, where you have a lot of white officers running those guys into cannon fodder.”

Of course, the film industry is sharply tilted toward the youth market, as Lucas and Tarantino are acutely aware. But Lucas, unlike Tarantino, was not being defensive in asserting his desire to inspire the young; he offered it more as a boast. As he has said often, he’d wanted for years to make a film about the Tuskegee airmen, and he reports that he always intended telling their story as a feel-good, crossover inspirational tale. Telling it that way also fits in principle (though in this instance not in practice, as Red Tails bombed at the box office) with the commercial imperatives of increasingly degraded mass entertainment.

Dargis observed that the ahistoricism of the recent period films is influenced by market imperatives in a global film industry. The more a film is tied to historically specific contexts, the more difficult it is to sell elsewhere. That logic selects for special effects-driven products as well as standardized, decontextualized and simplistic—“universal”—story lines, preferably set in fantasy worlds of the filmmakers’ design. As Dargis notes, these films find their meaning in shopworn clichés puffed up as timeless verities, including uplifting and inspirational messages for youth. But something else underlies the stress on inspiration in the black-interest films, which shows up in critical discussion of them as well.

All these films—The Help, Red Tails, Django Unchained, even Lincoln and Glory—make a claim to public attention based partly on their social significance beyond entertainment or art, and they do so because they engage with significant moments in the history of the nexus of race and politics in the United States. There would not be so much discussion and debate and no Golden Globe, NAACP Image, or Academy Award nominations for The Help, Red Tails, or Django Unchained if those films weren’t defined partly by thematizing that nexus of race and politics in some way.

The pretensions to social significance that fit these films into their particular market niche don’t conflict with the mass-market film industry’s imperative of infantilization because those pretensions are only part of the show; they are little more than empty bromides, product differentiation in the patter of “seemingly timeless ideals” which the mass entertainment industry constantly recycles. (Andrew O’Hehir observes as much about Django Unchained, which he describes as “a three-hour trailer for a movie that never happens.”7) That comes through in the defense of these films, in the face of evidence of their failings, that, after all, they are “just entertainment.” Their substantive content is ideological; it is their contribution to the naturalization of neoliberalism’s ontology as they propagandize its universalization across spatial, temporal, and social contexts.

Purportedly in the interest of popular education cum entertainment, Django Unchained and The Help, and Red Tails for that matter, read the sensibilities of the present into the past by divesting the latter of its specific historicity. They reinforce the sense of the past as generic old-timey times distinguishable from the present by superficial inadequacies—outmoded fashion, technology, commodities and ideas—since overcome. In The Help Hilly’s obsession with her pet project marks segregation’s petty apartheid as irrational in part because of the expense rigorously enforcing it would require; the breadwinning husbands express their frustration with it as financially impractical. Hilly is a mean-spirited, narrow-minded person whose rigid and tone-deaf commitment to segregationist consistency not only reflects her limitations of character but also is economically unsound, a fact that further defines her, and the cartoon version of Jim Crow she represents, as irrational.

The deeper message of these films, insofar as they deny the integrity of the past, is that there is no thinkable alternative to the ideological order under which we live. This message is reproduced throughout the mass entertainment industry; it shapes the normative reality even of the fantasy worlds that masquerade as escapism. Even among those who laud the supposedly cathartic effects of Django’s insurgent violence as reflecting a greater truth of abolition than passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, few commentators notice that he and Broomhilda attained their freedom through a market transaction.8 This reflects an ideological hegemony in which students all too commonly wonder why planters would deny slaves or sharecroppers education because education would have made them more productive as workers. And, tellingly, in a glowing rumination in the Daily Kos, Ryan Brooke inadvertently thrusts mass culture’s destruction of historicity into bold relief by declaiming on “the segregated society presented” in Django Unchained and babbling on—with the absurdly ill-informed and pontifical self-righteousness that the blogosphere enables—about our need to take “responsibility for preserving racial divides” if we are “to put segregation in the past and fully fulfill Dr. King’s dream.”9 It’s all an indistinguishable mush of bad stuff about racial injustice in the old-timey days. Decoupled from its moorings in a historically specific political economy, slavery becomes at bottom a problem of race relations, and, as historian Michael R. West argues forcefully, “race relations” emerged as and has remained a discourse that substitutes etiquette for equality.10

This is the context in which we should take account of what “inspiring the young” means as a justification for those films. In part, the claim to inspire is a simple platitude, more filler than substance. It is, as I’ve already noted, both an excuse for films that are cartoons made for an infantilized, generic market and an assertion of a claim to a particular niche within that market. More insidiously, though, the ease with which “inspiration of youth” rolls out in this context resonates with three related and disturbing themes: 1) underclass ideology’s narratives—now all Americans’ common sense—that link poverty and inequality most crucially to (racialized) cultural inadequacy and psychological damage; 2) the belief that racial inequality stems from prejudice, bad ideas and ignorance, and 3) the cognate of both: the neoliberal rendering of social justice as equality of opportunity, with an aspiration of creating “competitive individual minority agents who might stand a better fighting chance in the neoliberal rat race rather than a positive alternative vision of a society that eliminates the need to fight constantly against disruptive market whims in the first place.”11

This politics seeps through in the chatter about Django Unchained in particular. Erin Aubry Kaplan, in the Los Angeles Times article in which Tarantino asserts his appeal to youth, remarks that the “most disturbing detail [about slavery] is the emotional violence and degradation directed at blacks that effectively keeps them at the bottom of the social order, a place they still occupy today.” Writing on the Institute of the Black World blog, one Dr. Kwa David Whitaker, a 1960s-style cultural nationalist, declaims on Django’s testament to the sources of degradation and “unending servitude [that] has rendered [black Americans] almost incapable of making sound evaluations of our current situations or the kind of steps we must take to improve our condition.”12 In its ~~blindness~~[ignorance] to political economy, this notion of black cultural or psychological damage as either a legacy of slavery or of more indirect recent origin—e.g., urban migration, crack epidemic, matriarchy, babies making babies—comports well with the reduction of slavery and Jim Crow to interpersonal dynamics and bad attitudes. It substitutes a “politics of recognition” and a patter of racial uplift for politics and underwrites a conflation of political action and therapy. With respect to the nexus of race and inequality, this discourse supports victim-blaming programs of personal rehabilitation and self-esteem engineering—inspiration—as easily as it does multiculturalist respect for difference, which, by the way, also feeds back to self-esteem engineering and inspiration as nodes within a larger political economy of race relations. Either way, this is a discourse that displaces a politics challenging social structures that reproduce inequality with concern for the feelings and characteristics of individuals and of categories of population statistics reified as singular groups that are equivalent to individuals. This discourse has made it possible (again, but more sanctimoniously this time) to characterize destruction of low-income housing as an uplift strategy for poor people; curtailment of access to public education as “choice”; being cut adrift from essential social wage protections as “empowerment”; and individual material success as socially important role modeling. Neoliberalism’s triumph is affirmed with unselfconscious clarity in the ostensibly leftist defenses of Django Unchained that center on the theme of slaves’ having liberated themselves. Trotskyists, would-be anarchists, and psychobabbling identitarians have their respective sectarian garnishes: Trotskyists see everywhere the bugbear of “bureaucratism” and mystify “self-activity;” anarchists similarly fetishize direct action and voluntarism and oppose large-scale public institutions on principle, and identitarians romanticize essentialist notions of organic, folkish authenticity under constant threat from institutions. However, all are indistinguishable from the nominally libertarian right in their disdain for government and institutionally based political action, which their common reflex is to disparage as inauthentic or corrupt.

**Their cessation of revolutionary institution building abdicates the potential for true communual power, reducing revolution to reactive bursts of energy. This debate must be a question of the speed, scope, and scale of revolutionary strategy. Only dual power organizing can build institutions that meet the material needs of community and construct a revolutionary base in the face of compounding crises of climate change, imperialism, and fascism.**

**Escalante, 19** [Alyson, you should totally read her work for non-debate reasons, Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist, "Communism and Climate Change: A Dual Power Approach," *Failing That, Invent*, https://failingthatinvent.home.blog/2019/02/15/communism-and-climate-change-a-dual-power-approach/]//AD

I have previously argued that a crucial advantage to **dual power** **strategy** is that it gives the masses an infrastructure of socialist **institutions** which can directly provide for **material needs** in times of **capitalist crisis.** **Socialist agricultural** and **food distribution programs** can take ground that the **capitalist state** cedes by simultaneously meeting the needs of the masses while proving that socialist **self-management** and **political** **institutions** can function **independently** of capitalism. This approach is not only capable of **literally saving lives** in the case of crisis, but of demonstrating the **possibility of a revolutionary project** which seeks to **destroy rather than reform** capitalism. One of the most pressing of the various crises which humanity faces today is climate change. Capitalist production has devastated the planet, and everyday we discover that the small window of time for avoiding its most disastrous effects is shorter than previously understood. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that we have 12 years to limit (not even prevent) the more catastrophic effects of climate change. The simple, and horrific, fact that we all must face is that climate change has reached a point where many of its effects are **inevitable**, and we are now in a **post-brink world**, where damage control is the primary concern. **The question is not whether we can escape** a future of **climate change, but whether we can survive it**. Socialist strategy must adapt accordingly. In the face of this crisis, the democratic socialists and social democrats in the United States have largely settled on market based reforms. The Green New Deal, championed by Alexandria Ocasio Cortez and the left wing of the Democratic Party, remains a thoroughly capitalist solution to a capitalist problem. The proposal does nothing to challenge capitalism itself, but rather seeks to subsidize market solutions to reorient the US energy infrastructure towards renewable energy production, to develop less energy consuming transportation, and the development of public investment towards these ends. **The plan does nothing to call into question the profit incentives and endless resource consumption of capitalism which led us to this point**. Rather, it seeks to reorient the relentless market forces of capitalism towards slightly less destructive technological developments. While the plan would lead to a massive investment in the manufacturing and deployment of solar energy infrastructure, National Geographic reports that, “Fabricating [solar] panels **requires caustic chemicals** such as sodium hydroxide and hydrofluoric acid, and **the process uses water as well as electricity**, the production of which **emits greenhouse gases**.” Technology alone cannot sufficiently combat this crisis, as the production of such technology through capitalist manufacturing infrastructure **only perpetuates environmental harm**. Furthermore, subsidizing and incentivizing renewable energy stops far short of actually combating the fossil fuel industry driving the current climate crisis. The technocratic market solutions offered in the Green New Deal fail to adequately combat the driving factors of climate change. What is worse, they rely on a violent imperialist global system in order to produce their technological solutions. The development of high-tech energy infrastructure and the development of low or zero emission transportation requires the import of raw material and rare earth minerals which the United States can only access because of the imperial division of the Global South. This imperial division of the world requires constant **militarism** from the imperial core nations, and as Lenin demonstrates in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, facilitates **constant warfare** as imperial states compete for **spheres of influence** in order to facilitate cheap resource extraction. The US military, one of many imperialist forces, is the single largest user of petroleum, and one of its main functions is to ensure oil access for the United States. Without challenging this imperialist division of the world and the role of the United States military in upholding it, the Green New Deal fails even further to challenge the underlying causes of climate change. Even with the failed promises of the Green New Deal itself, it is unlikely that this tepid market proposal will pass at all. Nancy Pelosi and other lead Democrats have largely condemned it and consider it “impractical” and “unfeasible.” This dismissal is crucial because it reveals the total inability of capitalism to resolve this crisis. If the center-left party in the heart of the imperial core sees even milquetoast capitalist reforms as a step too far, we ought to have very little hope that a reformist solution will present itself within the ever shrinking 12 year time frame. There are times for delicacy and there are times for bluntness, and we are in the latter. To put things bluntly: the capitalists are not going to save us, and **if we don’t find a way to save ourselves, the collapse of human civilization is a real possibility.** The pressing question we now face is: **how are we going to save ourselves?** Revolution and Dual Power If capitalism will not be able to resolve the current encroaching climate crisis, we must find a way to organize outside the confines of capitalist institutions, towards the end of overthrowing capitalism. If the Democratic Socialists of America backed candidates cannot offer real anti-capitalist solutions through the capitalist state, we should be skeptical of the possibility for any socialist organization doing so. The DSA is far larger and far more well funded than any of the other socialist organizations in the United States, and they have failed to produce anything more revolutionary than the Green New Deal. We have to abandon the idea that electoral strategy will be sufficient to resolve the underlying causes of this crisis within 12 years. While many radicals call for revolution instead of reform, the reformists often raise the same response: revolution is well and good, but what are you going to do in the mean time? In many ways this question is fair. The socialist left in the United States today is not ready for revolutionary action, and a mass base does not exist to back the various organizations which might undertake such a struggle. Revolutionaries must concede that we have much work to be done before a revolutionary strategy can be enacted. This is a hard truth, but it is true. Much of the left has sought to ignore this truth by embracing adventurism and violent protest theatrics, in the vain hope of sparking revolutionary momentum which does not currently exist. If this is the core strategy of the socialist left, **we will accomplish nothing in the next 12 years**. Such approaches are as useless as the opportunist reforms pushed by the social democrats. Our task in these 12 years is not simply to arm ourselves and hope that magically the masses will wake up prepared for revolution and willing to put their trust in our small ideological cadres. We must instead, build a movement, and with it we must build infrastructure which can survive revolution and provide a framework for socialist development. Dual power is tooled towards this project best. **The Marxist Center** network has done an impressive amount of work developing socialist institutions across the US, largely through **tenants organizing** and **serve the people programs**. The left wing factions within the DSA itself have also begun to develop **mutual aid programs** that could be useful for dual power strategy. At the same time, **mutual aid is not enough**. We cannot simply build these institutions as a reform to make capitalism more survivable. Rather, we must make these institutions part of a **broader revolutionary movement** and they ought to function as a material prefiguration to a socialist society and economy. The institutions we build as dual power outside the capitalist state today ought to be structured towards revolutionary ends, such that they will someday function as the early institutions of a revolutionary socialist society. To accomplish this goal, we cannot simply declare these institutions to be revolutionary. Rather **they have to be linked together through an actual revolutionary movement working towards revolutionary ends**. This means that dual power institutions cannot exist as ends in and of themselves, nor can abstract notions of mutual aid cannot be conceptualized as an end in itself. The explicit purpose of these institutions has to be to **radicalize** the masses through meeting their needs, and providing an infrastructure for a socialist movement to meet **the needs of** its members and the **communities** in which it operates. **Revolutionary institutions** that **can provide food, housing**, and other needs for a revolutionary movement will be crucial for **build**ing **a base** among the masses and for constructing the beginnings of a socialist infrastructure for when we eventually engage in revolutionary struggle.

#### The alternative is to embrace the comradeship of the party – a partisan discipline and mutual accountability that enables a shared commitment to an international communist horizon. The party is not an authoritarian form, but a flexible organization structure capable of scaling beyond moments of disruption to meet the needs of the masses and negate the material and social relations of capitalist exploitation.

Dean, 19 (Jodi, communist organizer associated with the Party for Socialism and Liberation, professor in the Political Science department at Hobart and William Smith Colleges; “From Allies to Comrades,“ *Comrade: An Essay on Political Belonging,* Verso Books, 2019)

As comrades, our actions are voluntary, but they are not always of our own choosing. Comrades have to be able to count on each other even when we don’t like each other and even when we disagree. We do what needs to be done because we owe it to our comrades. In The Romance of American Communism, Vivian Gornick reports the words of a former member of the Communist Party USA, or CPUSA, who hated the daily grind of selling papers and canvassing expected of party cadre, but nevertheless, according to her, “I did it. I did it because if I didn’t do it, I couldn’t face my comrades the next day. And we all did it for the same reason: we were accountable to each other.”6 Put in psychoanalytic terms, the comrade functions as an ego ideal: the point from which party members assess themselves as doing important, meaningful work.7 Being accountable to another entails seeing your actions through their eyes. Are you letting them down or are you doing work that they respect and admire? In Crowds and Party, I present the good comrade as an ideal ego, that is to say, as how party members imagine themselves. 8 They may imagine themselves as thrilling orators, brilliant polemicists, skilled organizers, or courageous militants. In contrast with my discussion there, in the current book, I draw out how the comrade also functions as an ego ideal, the perspective that party members—and often fellow travelers—take toward themselves. This perspective is the effect of belonging on the same side as it works back on those who have committed themselves to common struggle. The comrade is a symbolic as well as an imaginary figure and it is the symbolic dimension of ego ideal I focus on here. My thinking about the comrade as a generic figure for those on the same side flows out of my work on communism as the horizon of left politics and my work on the party as the political form necessary for this politics. 9 To see our political horizon as communist is to highlight the emancipatory egalitarian struggle of the proletarianized against capitalist exploitation—that is, against the determination of life by market forces; by value; by the division of labor (on the basis of sex and race); by imperialism (theorized by Lenin in terms of the dominance of monopoly and finance capital); and by neocolonialism (theorized by Nkrumah as the last stage of imperialism). Today we see this horizon in struggles such as those led by women of color against police violence, white supremacy, and the murder and incarceration of black, brown, and working-class people. We see it in the infrastructure battles around pipelines, climate justice, and barely habitable cities with undrinkable water and contaminated soil. We see it in the array of social reproduction struggles against debt, foreclosure, and privatization, and for free, quality public housing, childcare, education, transportation, healthcare, and other basic services. We see it in the ongoing fight of LGBTQ people against harassment, discrimination, and oppression. It is readily apparent today that the communist horizon is the horizon of political struggle not for the nation but for the world; it is an international horizon. This is evident in the antagonism between the rights of immigrants and refugees and intensified nationalisms; in the necessity of a global response to planetary warming; and in anti-imperialist, decolonization, and peace movements. In these examples, communism is a force of negativity, the negation of the global capitalist present. Communism is also the name for the positive alternative to capitalism’s permanent and expanding exploitation, crisis, and immiseration, the name of a system of production based on meeting social needs—from each according to ability to each according to need, to paraphrase Marx’s famous slogan—in a way that is collectively determined and carried out by the producers. This positive dimension of communism attends to social relations, to how people treat each other, animals, things, and the world around them. Building communism entails more than resistance and riot. It requires the emancipated egalitarian organization of collective life. With respect to the party, intellectuals on the contemporary left tend to extract the party from the aspirations and accomplishments it enabled. Communist philosophers who disagree on a slew of theoretical questions, such as Antonio Negri and Alain Badiou, converge on the organizational question—no party! The party has been rejected as authoritarian, as outmoded, as ill-fitting a society of networks. Every other mode of political association may be revised, renewed, rethought, or reimagined except for the party of communists. This rejection of the party as a form for left politics is a mistake. It ignores the effects of association on those engaged in common struggle. It fails to learn from the everyday experiences of generations of activists, organizers, and revolutionaries. It relies on a narrow, fantasied notion of the party as a totalitarian machine. It neglects the courage, enthusiasm, and achievements of millions of party members for over a century. Rejection of the party form has been left dogmatism for the last thirty years and has gotten us nowhere. Fortunately, the movements of the squares in Greece and Spain, as well as lessons from the successes and limits of the Occupy movement, have pushed against this left dogmatism. They have reenergized interest in the party as a political form that can scale; a form that is flexible, adaptive, and expansive enough to endure beyond the joyous and disruptive moments of crowds in the streets. A theory of the comrade contributes to this renewal by drawing out the ways that shared commitment to a common struggle generates new strengths and new capacities. Over and against the reduction of party relations to the relations between the leaders and the led, comrade attends to the effects of political belonging on those on the same side of a political struggle. As we fight together for a world free of exploitation, oppression, and bigotry, we have to be able to trust and count on each other. Comrade names this relation. The comrade relation remakes the place from which one sees, what it is possible to see, and what possibilities can appear. It enables the revaluation of work and time, what one does, and for whom one does it. Is one’s work done for the people or for the bosses? Is it voluntary or done because one has to work? Does one work for personal provisions or for a collective good? We should recall Marx’s lyrical description of communism in which work becomes “life’s prime want.” We get a glimpse of that in comradeship: one wants to do political work. You don’t want to let down your comrades; you see the value of your work through their eyes, your new collective eyes. Work, determined not by markets but by shared commitments, becomes fulfilling. French communist philosopher and militant Bernard Aspe discusses the problem of contemporary capitalism as a loss of “common time”; that is, the loss of an experience of time generated and enjoyed through our collective being-together. 10 From holidays, to meals, to breaks, whatever common time we have is synchronized and enclosed in forms for capitalist appropriation. Communicative capitalism’s apps and trackers amplify this process such that the time of consumption can be measured in much the same way that Taylorism measured the time of production: How long did a viewer spend on a particular web page? Did a person watch a whole ad or click off of it after five seconds? In contrast, the common action that is the actuality of communist movement induces a collective change in capacities. Breaking from capitalism’s 24-7 injunctions to produce and consume for the bosses and owners, the discipline of common struggle expands possibilities for action and intensifies the sense of its necessity. The comrade is a figure for the relation through which this transformation of work and time occurs.

## Case

### Overview

#### 1. Vote neg on presumption

#### A – Zero internal link between the ballot and solvency – voting aff doesn’t increase queer worldmaking, doesn’t change the ability of the aff or any individual to engage in self-experimentation, nor do anything in interrupt the flow of pharmacopornographic capitalism – competitive incentives mean there is zero spillover between wins, losses, and personal politics

#### B – Inherency – this aff has been read for nearly 7 topics, and every uniqueness arg they make shows that there is queer resistance now – zero reason this Zoom debate is key to ongoing efforts

#### C – Individual experimentation is apolitical and trades off with meaningful collective resistance

Chandler 10 – Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster

(David, 'No Communicating Left' (review article), Radical Philosophy, No. 160 (March/April 2010), pp.53-55. ISSN 0300 211X)

Dean pulls few punches in her devastating critique of the American left for its complacency, its limited capacity, and even its lack of awareness of the need to offer a stand of political resistance to power. This is how she concludes her book: The eight years of the Bush administration were a diversion. Intoxicated with a sense of purpose, we could oppose war, torture, indefinite detention, warrantless wiretapping, a seemingly endless series of real crimes… such opposition keeps us feeling like we matter… We have an ethical sense. But we lack a coherent politics. (p.175) Dean highlights clearly the disintegration of the collective left and its simulacra in the individuated life-style politics of today’s depoliticized radicalism, where it appears that particular individual demands and identities are to be respected but there is no possibility of universalising them into a collective challenge to the system: no possibility of a left which stands for something beyond itself. She argues that, rather than confront this problem, the left take refuge in the fantasy that technology will overcome their inability to engage and that the circulation of ideas and information on the internet will construct the collectivities and communities of interest, which are lacking in reality. For Dean, this ‘technology fetishism’ marks the left’s failure: its ‘abandonment of workers and the poor; its retreat from the state and repudiation of collective action; and its acceptance of the neoliberal economy as the “only game in town”’ (p.33). In fact, she uncovers the gaping hole at the heart of the left, highlighting that radicalism appears to be based less on changing the world than on the articulation of an alternative oppositionalist identity: a non-strategic, non-instrumental, articulation of a protest against power. In a nutshell, the left are too busy providing alternative voices, spaces and forums to think about engaging with mass society in an organised, collective, attempt to achieve societal transformation. For Dean, this is fake or hollow political activity, pursued more for its own sake than for future political ends. This is a politics of ethical distancing, of self-flattery and narcissism, which excuses or even celebrates the self-marginalization of the left: as either the result of the overwhelming capacity of neoliberal power to act, to control, and to regulate; or as the result of the apathy, stupidity, or laziness of the masses - or the ‘sheeple’ (p.171) - for their failure to join the radical cause. Dean suggests that the left needs to rethink its values and approaches and her book is intended to be a wake-up call to abandon narcissistic complacency. In doing this, she highlights a range of problems connected around the thematic of the left’s defence of democracy in an age of communicative capitalism. She argues that the left’s focus on extending or defending democracy by asserting their role in giving voice and creating spaces merely reproduces the domination of communicative capitalism, where there is no shared space of debate and disagreement but the proliferation of mediums and messages without the responsibility to develop and defend positions or to engage and no external measure of accountability. Communicative capitalism is held to thrive on this fragmented, atomizing, and individuated, framework of communication, which gives the impression of a shared discourse, community, or movement but leaves reality just as it is, with neoliberal frameworks of domination, inequality, and destruction continuing unopposed (pp.162-75).

### AT: Preciado

#### Preciado replicates casual misogyny, reject the team – their uniqueness claim is totalizing – the alt gives energy to aristocratic pharmacomaniacs who and focus on transgressing the self leaves no basis for collective politics against pharma-pornographic control

Hansen 16—Assistant Professor of Philosophy at California State University, Northridge [Sarah, “Testo Junkie: Sex, Drugs, and Biopolitics in the Pharmacopornographic Era by Paul B. Preciado (review),” philoSophia 6(1): 166-170, Emory Libraries]

[BP refers to Preciado as the first person narrator]

It is not clear. There are moments where BP seems quite entangled in normalizing programs of gender. “They are still my little girls, my bitches,” BP says while describing experiences at Catholic boarding school and years spent fucking across several continents. “All girls, the most beautiful, the most heterosexual, the ones waiting for a Prince Charming full of natural [End Page 168] testosterone, are actually destined without knowing it to become bitches that my dildos penetrate” (91). Far from countering dominant trends of pornpower, comments like these amount to casual misogyny. They are complicit with the reduction of orgasmic force to sexual capital, reminding readers that potential spaces of political agency are also effects of the process of subjection and control. Given that Testo Junkie revels in breaking down the distinctions between personal and philosophical, gender experimentation and conceptual invention, we might wonder whether BP’s casual misogyny extends into the analysis of pharmacopower and pornpower. Do BP’s concepts marginalize some stories or perspectives? The chapter on the birth control pill de-centers BP’s white, Western, cosmopolitan body, describing the emergence of pharmacopower vis-à-vis racist medical testing in Puerto Rico. However, the chapter on pornpower is more abstract and less attentive to different histories. There, BP offers eleven theses on the “pornographic imperative,” riffs on Paris Hilton’s persona, and positions the notion of pornpower in relationship to anti-capitalist theories by Paulo Virno, Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, and Angela Davis. Aside from broad gestures to racialized and pauperized bodies, there is no sustained discussion of different histories of pornpower, histories that might point to other political laboratories, alternative drugs, and lines of counterattack. Does the pornofication of labor—and its resistance—unfold in different ways for differently positioned subjects? Can an estrogen junkie similarly subvert pornpower’s tendency to commodify bodies and pleasures? Questions like these receive surprisingly little attention from BP, too rapt by “bitches” and “testomania” to deeply explore other modes of “artistocratic pharmacomania.”

Ultimately, the self-obsessed dimensions of Testo Junkie are a central part of BP’s experiment in auto-theory, a method that can always participate in pharmacopower and pornpower as much as it can resist it. In the final chapter, BP reminds us of the messy, fraught, personal inspiration for this experiment: avenging the death of GD. Standing at GD’s grave with VD (who may or may not be carrying a Luger), BP promises to return to “rub our our bodies against your grave. [. . .] to leave traces of fluids on the slab” like a “pack of mutating wolves” (427). Like a wolf, BP and VD will honor GD’s “gonastic legacy” with sexual experimentation and reveling, using their bodies and pleasures as a laboratory for theory and resistance. The legacy of Testo Junkie lies in this call for subversive, naughty auto-theory. However, the book is also a performance of the limits and dangers of this strategy. From mutating wolves to hotel hookups to Jimi Hendrix dildos, there is a lot of dirty theory-talk in Testo Junkies. It shocks and excites, but it can also become part of the very mechanisms that it seeks to resist. As Lynne Huffer argues, talking dirty “might feel transgressive” and edgy, “especially in an academic space bent on erasing pleasure, but that rebellious feeling hardly undoes the ironic knot of sexuality’s disciplinary power” (76). The same concern applies to pharmacopower and pornpower. If [End Page 169] BP is an experiment in auto-decapitation and Testo Junkie is a “trace left by the cut,” then the separating from the program of gender is not a masterful, final event. A trace remains. Indeed, the concepts of pharmacopower and pornopower promise to sharpen and update feminist and queer research, but they are also, as Foucault would say, dangerous.

#### Can’t achieve immanence thru artificial chemicals

Noys 13—Professor of Critical Theory at the University of Chichester [Benjamin, “Intoxication and Acceleration,” presented at the University of London Institute in Paris’ Postgraduate Conference, 28 June, Retrieved from Academia.edu]

Of course we could and probably should note that this discourse risks returning to the extrinsic moralism Deleuze and Guattari has claimed to avoid. Accusing drug users or addicts of being locked-in anti-social identities and chains of dependency is not so far from the discourse of the police. Of course Deleuze and Guattari would insist that their aim is to suggest the drug addict returns themselves to social orders of control, rather than pursuing a true or real construction that might rupture with the normative forms of territorialisation. This is part of their rejection of fantasy, and their insistence that the collapse of the drug user is one that results in falling into ‘hallucinations, delusions, false perceptions, phantasies, or paranoid outbursts’ (285). What is wrong with these experiences is that they are not ‘rich or full’, they are not ‘passages of intensities’, but result in ‘a vitrified or emptied body’ (285). The problem with this use of drugs is that it is not immanent enough – ‘Drug addicts continually fall back on what they wanted to escape: a segmentarity all the more rigid for being marginal, a territorialisation all the more artificial for being based on chemical substances, hallucinatory forms, and phantasy subjectifications.’ (285)

Rather than disappearance or immersion, the emphasis now falls on construction. This is an ‘art of dosages, since overdose is a danger’ (160). It is not a matter of blazing a path. Instead it is even a matter of absence of abstinence: getting drunk, but on pure water’, or ‘getting high, but by abstention’. This is a critique of drug use based upon a discourse of immanence: ‘Drugs do not guarantee immanence; rather the immanence of drugs allows one to forgo them.’ (286) While I think this is not particularly satisfactory as a mode of critique, it indicates the priority Deleuze and Guattari give to a ‘molecular’ becoming that folds-in to immanence. Constantly warding off any trace of the negative results in its occulted return, which tries to specify and delimit what molecules we can connect with. This selection, unsurprisingly, in the name of a ‘vital assemblage’ (286). To use the ironic sample of Emperion’s classic track ‘Narcotic Influence’: ‘Giving them drugs, taking their lives away’… Deleuze and Guattari conclude, in seeming contradiction, that drugs don’t lead to the plane of immanence, but ‘in fact the plane must distill its own drugs, remaining master of speeds and proximities.’