### Dockworkers CP

#### CP: The EU ought to recognize the unconditional right to strike of all workers except dockworkers

#### Global Food prices rising due to supply chain disruptions

Good 10/07 Good, K., 2021. Global Food Prices Highest Since 2011, as Energy Costs Rise and Supply Chain Challenges Persist • Farm Policy News. [online] Farm Policy News. Available at: <https://farmpolicynews.illinois.edu/2021/10/global-food-prices-highest-since-2011-as-energy-costs-rise-and-supply-chain-challenges-persist/> [Accessed 1 November 2021]. Keith Good is the social media manager for the farmdoc project at the University of Illinois. He has previously worked for the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service, and compiled the daily FarmPolicy.com News Summary from 2003-2015. He is a graduate of Purdue University (M.S.- Agricultural Economics), and Southern Illinois University School of Law.

[Bloomberg writer Megan Durisin](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-07/food-inflation-heats-up-as-global-prices-return-to-decade-high?sref=q8seIhDd) reported on Thursday that, “The jump in global food prices to a decade high risks leading to even more expensive grocery bills, and the energy crisis is threatening to make things even worse. “Harvest setbacks, strong demand and supply chain disruptions have sent [a United Nations index of food costs](http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/) up by a third over the past year. The latest leg up last month came as prices for almost all types of foodstuffs gained, adding to inflationary headaches for consumers and central banks.” The Bloomberg article explained that, “[Soaring energy](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-15/what-s-behind-europe-s-skyrocketing-power-prices-quicktake) bills are now adding to the problem, [escalating costs of producing fertilizers](https://farmpolicynews.illinois.edu/2021/09/higher-fertilizer-prices-could-impact-u-s-acreage-allocation-as-power-issues-in-china-impact-feed-costs/) and transporting goods around the world, and making the run-up more reminiscent of the price spikes seen during food crises in 2008 and 2011. The energy rally could also prompt more crops to be diverted from food to making biofuels, the UN warned.” [Reuters News](https://www.reuters.com/business/world-food-prices-hit-10-year-peak-fao-2021-10-07/) reported on Thursday that, “FAO’s food price index, which tracks international prices of the most globally traded food commodities, averaged 130.0 points last month, the highest reading since September 2011, according to the agency’s data.” [@FAO](https://twitter.com/FAO?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw) Food Price Index rises further in Sept led by tightening supply conditions and robust demand for staples such as wheat and palm oil. All-time record cereal output in 2021 still below consumption needs. In a more narrow look at global wheat supply and demand issues, the [AMIS Market Monitor](http://www.amis-outlook.org/fileadmin/user_upload/amis/docs/Market_monitor/AMIS_Market_Monitor_current.pdf) stated on Thursday that, “Poor weather conditions hit wheat crops particularly hard this season in several key producing countries, such as Canada (minus 38 percent below last season’s output), the Russian Federation (minus 13 percent); and the United States (minus 7 percent). Not surprisingly, therefore, global wheat inventories could fall below opening levels in the 2021/22 marketing season. With most of the drawdowns concentrated in major exporting countries, the wheat stocks-to-disappearance ratio could fall to the lowest level in over two decades, which is a worrying sign of supply tightness in world markets, raising the possibility of even further gains in wheat prices this season.” The Market Monitor added that, “The current supply tightness in global wheat markets must also be assessed in light of important and fast changing developments in energy markets and supply chain logistics. Easing COVID-19 restrictions are likely to sustain economic recovery, boosting prices of oil, gas, and, as a result, fertilizer. In addition, port congestions, such as those witnessed recently in China and the US, are also a concern, contributing to supply chain disruptions, which – along with elevated freight rates – might add more volatility to wheat prices and increase import costs, which would be a particular burden for the poorest countries in the world.” Prices for most fertilizers continued their upward trend mainly driven by high [#energy](https://twitter.com/hashtag/energy?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw) and [#shipping](https://twitter.com/hashtag/shipping?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw) costs and supply constraints. <https://t.co/h1cy1iqFpa> [@AMISoutlook](https://twitter.com/AMISoutlook?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw) [pic.twitter.com/kej5th6enc](https://t.co/kej5th6enc) — Farm Policy (@FarmPolicy) [October 7, 2021](https://twitter.com/FarmPolicy/status/1446124302651183108?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw) Meanwhile, [Wall Street Journal writer Jesse Newman](https://www.wsj.com/articles/conagra-expects-higher-inflation-posts-lower-quarterly-profit-11633610545?mod=searchresults_pos1&page=1) reported on Thursday that, Escalating costs and supply-chain challenges are squeezing major U.S. food companies, boosting food costs and hampering the flow of staples to grocery-store shelves. “Makers of french fries, ketchup and potato chips are struggling to staff processing lines and move goods across highways and ports, executives said, while costs for products as diverse as packaging and cooking oil rise. Companies including Conagra Brands Inc., PepsiCo Inc. and Lamb Weston Holdings Inc.are raising prices to keep up, they said, while striving to keep products in stores. “Supply-chain problems are growing for U.S. food makers at a time consumers are spending heavily on food, in supermarkets and restaurants. Consumer spending at grocery stores was 4% higher in August than in the same month a year earlier, according to U.S. Census Bureau data. Restaurant sales have climbed this year as Covid-19 restrictions ease, though [concerns over the Delta variant have eroded some of the rebound](https://www.wsj.com/articles/delta-variant-concerns-temper-dinings-summer-return-as-some-americans-stay-home-11628587801?mod=article_inline) in recent weeks.” Ms. Newman pointed out that, “Other food companies are contending with similar problems. PepsiCo Inc. said earlier this week that it faces higher costs for aluminum cans, plastic bottles, labor and trucking, though [the company boosted its profit expectations for the year](https://www.wsj.com/articles/pepsico-raises-full-year-expectations-while-navigating-supply-chain-environment-11633433216?mod=article_inline) because of rising sales of Mountain Dew, Doritos and other snacks. General Mills Inc. said last month that the Cheerios and Betty Crocker parent is dealing with hundreds of [operational disruptions](https://www.wsj.com/articles/general-mills-posts-higher-sales-amid-inflation-supply-chain-pressures-11632312946?mod=article_inline)—such as more-expensive ingredients and a shortage of truck drivers—that are pushing up costs for supermarket customers.”

#### Work Stoppage at ports would severely harm the economy and drive inflation

Werling 15 Jeffrey Werling 2015. National Impact of a West Coast Port Stoppage. [ebook] National Association of Manufacturers. Available at: <https://www.nam.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/NAM-Port-Closure-Full-Report-2014.pdf> [Accessed 1 November 2021]. Jeff Werling is Executive Director of Inforum, a research unit with in the Department of. Economics at the University of Maryland College Park (UMCP)

Tables 6a and 6b show the annual macroeconomic results for each of the three scenarios. For each indicator, the tables display the baseline levels and the alternative simulation results as both absolute differences and as percentage deviations from the baseline. For GDP and related quantities, the differences in billions of 2013 dollars are shown, and employment deviations are shown in thousands of jobs. Most significant consequences for the economy are confined to 2014. Table 6a shows that compared to the baseline the reduction of GDP for 2014 as a whole is $9.4 billion (-0.05 percent of GDP) for a 5-day scenario, $21.2 billion (-0.12 percent) for a 10-day closure and $49.9 billion (-0.29 percent) for a 20-day disruption. The daily cost of a port disruption would reduce GDP in 2014 by $1.9 billion in a 5-day case, $2.1 billion in a 10-day scenario and $2.5 billion in a 20-day stoppage. The nonlinear damage pattern reflects the presumption that trade losses mount exponentially as a port closure drags out through time. The effects on GDP would continue into 2015. It is small in a 5-day scenario ($1.6 billion), but a 20-day disruption subtracts $7.6 billion from GDP in 2015. By 2016, the economy regains some of the lost output of the previous two years in all cases. However, in a 20-day event, the “clawback” is minimal. In other words, most of the reduction to income occurring in 2014 is lost forever. The costs of a port disruption on economic activity and jobs develop through three main channels. The first is through the loss of exports. In a 20-day port shutdown, exports would be 0.31 percent—or almost $6.9 billion— lower in 2014 and $1.7 billion lower in 2015. These losses directly lessen the output and employment of exporting firms, and they indirectly reduce activity in their supply chains, including transportation, utilities and other sectors. Moreover, lower incomes in export supply chains have knock-on effects on consumer and business investment spending throughout the economy, amplifying the direct export impact by reducing consumer spending and business investment. Second, the interruption, delay and higher cost of imports would also reduce GDP and employment. The import disruption in a 20-day case is $8.3 billion in 2014 and an additional $2.0 billion in 2015. Many imported goods are destined for assembly lines across the manufacturing sector. These lines could be shuttered temporarily due to a lack of capital equipment or key inputs, thereby idling workers. This reduction drives up the cost of production inputs of domestic firms, damages domestic business and harms international competitiveness. Such an interruption would also affect imports of finished consumer goods destined for retail stores. This could mean products for the important back-to-school and holiday shopping seasons could be missed, resulting in immediate markdowns and lost sales opportunities. These effects are best seen in the inflationary impacts of the shocks. One of the direct controls for each alternative simulation is higher import prices for traded commodities. Table 6b provides indicators of how port interruptions would affect annual costs. In 2014, the annualized purchasers’ price of imported goods and services rises by a minimum of 0.08 percent in a 5-day case to 0.47 percent in a 20-day disruption. These increases translate to boosts to personal consumption inflation of 0.03 percent to 0.18 percent. Indeed, because consumers could face higher costs for imports, their overall purchasing power will be reduced. This is the third channel of economic damage. Lower real household expenditures mean lost business and jobs. The net economic impact is summarized most clearly by the loss of consumer purchasing power relative to the baseline. This figure is defined as “real personal income” (nominal household income divided by consumption prices). This indicator combines the change of income with the loss of purchasing power. In a 20-day event, real household income is reduced by 0.31 percent, or $366 per household in 2013 prices. Note that this income loss is more or less permanent. That is, it will not be regained by new economic activity over subsequent years. On the other hand, by 2016, there is little trace of the port disruption remaining. Table 6b also shows that annualized employment is affected significantly as well. In a 5-day scenario, the annualized loss is more than 73,000 jobs, and in a 20-day disruption, it is more than 405,000. The mechanics of the LIFT model specify that employers adjust employment to production losses relatively quickly and completely. However, some employers will preserve labor levels (at least in the earliest stages of any port disruption), thus absorbing some costs of labor idleness. Therefore, while job losses shown here probably overstate what would actually occur, the costs of labor idleness would still be disruptive, especially for an extensive shutdown. Table 7 presents the effects on employment for major industries. For 2014 to 2016, deviations of industry employment levels from the baseline, measured in thousands of jobs, are shown for a 5-, 10- and 20- day disruption scenario. As mentioned, for a 20-day disruption, total employment losses are more than 405,000 in 2014 of which 51,500 are in manufacturing and 83,600 in retail trade. However, reductions are spread across the economy. While lost availability of supplies and equipment directly causes losses in some sectors, additional jobs are lost when consumers lose real income and, thus, reduce spending. Agriculture, mining and manufacturing producers typically have high labor productivity, so they employ relatively few workers, and so absolute job losses are lower compared to construction, trade and services sectors. Total job losses fall to 116,200 in 2015, and employment in 2016 is slightly higher than the baseline as construction and other sectors recover some business.

#### Rising food prices cause instability

Koren and Winecoff 20 Koren, O. and Winecoff, W., 2020. Food Price Spikes and Social Unrest: The Dark Side of the Fed’s Crisis-Fighting. [online] Foreign Policy. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/20/food-price-spikes-and-social-unrest-the-dark-side-of-the-feds-crisis-fighting/> [Accessed 1 November 2021]. Ore Koren is an assistant professor at Indiana University Bloomington. His research focuses on the causes and consequences of political violence, including civil war, violent riots, and mass killing. [W. Kindred Winecoff](https://www.wkwinecoff.info/) is a political scientist at Indiana University Bloomington.

In early December 2010, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization released a policy brief that noted: “Recent bouts of extreme price volatility in global agricultural markets portend rising and more frequent threats to world food security.” Several days later, on Dec. 17, a Tunisian street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi lit himself on fire after officials seized his fruit cart—depriving him in an instant of his sole livelihood. This act inspired dozens of copycat immolations and motivated large street protests—driven in large part by sharply increasing food prices—that quickly spread through the Middle East and North Africa. This wave of social upheaval became known as the Arab Spring in Western media outlets, but activists in the region described it as the Hunger Revolution, an apt name considering that unrest was hardly limited to the Arab world. Nor were these domestic uprisings contained within their borders. The ensuing civil conflicts in Libya and Syria, in particular, became internationalized, and the 2015 refugee shock from the latter conflict contributed to populist-nationalist political movements, first in Europe and then around the world. The coronavirus crisis has already prompted worry regarding access to affordable food, particularly in developing countries. Earlier this month, President of the U.N. General Assembly Tijjani Muhammad-Bande warned of a pandemic-induced food crisis, while the U.N.’s World Food Program now expects a doubling of acute hunger relative to the pre-crisis baseline. While there have been strong harvests in recent periods, public officials worry about fragility in global supply chains as well as hoarding and food protectionism. As hunger rises, so does the potential for widespread episodes of contentious politics, including protests, mob activity, and both violent and nonviolent mobilizations against governments. Not all of these events generate widespread social disorder, but some of them do, and the consequences can be profound. Protests over affordable food access are a regular feature of political economy. There was a wave of such demonstrations in 2007-2008, even before the Arab Spring began in late 2010. Social movements responding to food shocks have played a powerful role in shaping modern history. More generally, social movements responding to food shocks have played a powerful role in shaping modern history. Sharply rising prices were a major driver of the French Revolution. The 1848 revolutions followed several years of European drought that pushed food prices upward, and food protests not only kick-started the 1917 Russian Revolution from which the Soviet Union was born but also, in a historical irony, contributed to the USSR’s demise. More recently, food crises hastened the 1998 removal of Suharto in Indonesia. Many of these historical episodes involved natural processes, such as drought, that introduced (or exacerbated) Malthusian dynamics—in which the availability of food threatens to be exhausted by the population’s demand for it—particularly when combined with rapid population increases in urban centers. But another factor has had a dramatic impact on global food prices, and thus political stability: changes within the international money system. Food is expansively traded cross-nationally, which generates a world price that is typically indexed in U.S. dollars (still the currency that is most used internationally, by far). Changes to the value of the greenback have the potential to move a wide range of prices around the world, including the price of food. And the value of the U.S. dollar is most influenced by the actions of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve is mandated by the United States government to achieve full employment in the U.S. economy, with low and stable inflation, while maintaining financial stability. The Fed uses a range of policy tools—especially interest rate adjustments and asset purchasing (i.e., “quantitative easing”) programs—to expand (or contract) the supply of dollars in pursuit of these goals. Changes to money supply then have an impact on prices and, because the dollar is the most internationalized currency, these price changes are felt globally. Commodities prices are particularly susceptible to U.S. monetary policy. While other factors—including the stock of inventories, the functioning of distribution networks, and the level of global demand—also play a very important role, expansion of the U.S. dollar supply typically results in commodity price increases, all else equal. And changes to the price of food can have a powerful impact on social stability around the world. This was true during the global financial crisis that began in 2007. As the U.S. economy began slowing, then started crashing, the Federal Reserve slashed interest rates from 5.25 percent to zero in a little over a year. Taking the main policy rate to zero was unprecedented, but it proved insufficient to stabilize the U.S. economy when the financial sector began to collapse. Beginning in the fall of 2008, the Fed embarked on a series of quantitative easing operations, in which they exchanged dollars for other financial assets—mostly government bonds and mortgage-backed securities—to stabilize financial markets and stimulate an economic rebound. From 2008 to 2014, the total assets held by the Fed grew from less than $1 trillion to about $4.5 trillion. This, too, was unprecedented. The cumulative effect of these actions was to increase the dollar money supply by about 50 percent from 2008 to 2014. The extraordinary actions coincided with sharp increases in food prices, as shown in the figure below, which charts monthly percent changes in U.S. dollar supply (using the standard M2 measure, which sums cash along with bank and money market deposits) alongside monthly changes in global food prices (from the U.N.’s Food and Agriculture Organization). Each phase of the 2007-2011 food shocks was preceded by a monetary policy change that impacted dollar supply. Although it would be wrong to blame the crisis solely on Fed policy—other factors such as rising oil prices had an impact (although these are also related to monetary policy changes)—extraordinary monetary policymaking at the core of the international money system produced sharp commodities price movements. Food Shocks and the Dollar Supply The supply of U.S. currency alongside the Food Price Index, which measures the monthly change in global prices of a basket of commodities Food price rises, in turn, had extraordinary political effects: As the figure below shows, the number of food riots globally (based on Marc Bellemare’s data) jumped a whopping 250 percent above their average over the 2005-2011 period in response to these spikes in food prices, and the number of ongoing civil disobedience campaigns (based on Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes 3.0 data) rose from 13 in January 2010 to 28 in December 2011. These mobilization events generated protracted social conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, brought to power a new autocratic regime in Egypt, and contributed to the rise of the Islamic State. We may be living through another such period. The coronavirus pandemic has generated another serious economic crisis, and since mid-March the Federal Reserve has been engaged in expansionary monetary policies that are unique even by its own recent history. After a brief and modest increase beginning in 2016, policy interest rates are back down to zero. More importantly, the Fed’s aggressive asset purchasing is on pace to dwarf the quantitative easing programs of 2008-2014: The central bank’s total assets have increased from $4.2 trillion at the end of February to nearly $7 trillion by the end of April. The 2007-2008 and 2010-2011 protests were closely related to sharp changes in the price of cereals. Some food prices are already on the rise. As the figure above shows, meat prices have already reached their second all-time high, while supply is dwindling. Even more important, however, is the price of cereals (wheat, maize, rice), which constitute the key staple in developing states and are the greatest contributors to caloric intake. The 2007-2008 and 2010-2011 protests were closely related to sharp changes in the price of cereals. The price of rice recently hit a multiyear high, although other cereals have been less volatile (possibly because supplies remain high). Fed policies may have the largest effect on American-grown food products, as the United States is the largest exporter of maize, second-largest exporter of wheat, and second-largest exporter of soybeans. These monetary actions—particularly large-scale asset purchases, which are being called “quantitative easing infinity”—may be economically necessary to stabilize the U.S. (and global) economy against rapidly falling demand. But the potential for even more expansive monetary interventions to destabilize food prices—which had finally normalized over the past four years after a decade of extreme volatility—is high. The political ramifications of these price movements could be even more significant. Moreover, there may be a looming demand shock, as societies begin to reopen from coronavirus lockdowns and people return to restaurants in the coming months, thus contributing to rising prices. Which countries are most likely to be at risk? The heat map below plots the most recent iteration of the Global Food Security Index, which combines food affordability, availability, and quality into a single measure of security. (Higher numbers indicate greater security.) Data is not fully available for all countries, but in general missing data on these dimensions should not be taken as a sign that all is well. What this indicates is that the list of least food-secure countries is similar today to those in the 2000s: countries in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa in particular, but also parts of Central and South Asia, Venezuela, and Central America. This outcome ultimately stems from the fact that arguably the most powerful global economic actor, the Federal Reserve, ultimately possesses a domestic policy mandate while its actions have global effects. Developing countries have long channeled their demands for commodities price stabilization through international institutions, and the same is true today: The United Nations called for a $2.5 trillion financial support fund for developing countries, and the U.N.’s Muhammad-Bande has argued that “International cooperation and coordination are critical to promoting stability in food markets and preventing sudden price shocks.” But these pleas have been met with near-silence by national governments. Internationalism is in short supply today, as the United Stations disdains multilateralism, the European Union continues to dither, and China is unwilling to pay the cost of global public goods provision.Internationalism is in short supply today, as the United Stations disdains multilateralism, the European Union continues to dither, and China is unwilling to pay the cost of global public goods provision. Yet some combination of these efforts—in addition to the mobilization of international financial institutions (the World Bank and IMF) on generous terms—will likely be necessary to prevent the food shocks from creating widespread social upheaval. The Federal Reserve is the actor with the longest global reach and fewest veto points, and its emergency stabilization programs could be used to support bonds issues by the U.S. Treasury that can, in turn, provide finance for international institutions and foreign governments to insulate global markets from sharp food price increases. Of course, this would require the Trump administration to take much more interest in global affairs than it has up to now. The global political economy is interdependent in complex ways. Actions taken at the core of global networks have systemwide impacts. The monetary policies of the U.S. Federal Reserve impact food prices globally, causing sharp increases in the price of key staples. With high food prices come protests and riots, civil disobedience and mass mobilization, and—at least in some contexts—state collapse and civil war. A decade after the most recent wave of food riots, its impacts are still noticeable: Syria remains in conflict, while the economic and political impact of Syrian refugee flows are being felt in Lebanon (where mobilizations are already on the rise), Turkey, Europe, and elsewhere. This, in turn, provides populist-nationalist politicians with an effective item for their propaganda, which they use to consolidate power and reduce democracy. Without an understanding of this complexity, a similar scenario could be repeated in coming days.

#### Instability leads to nuclear war

Ramberg 16 Ramberg, Bennett. "Nuclear Weapons In Civil War Zones | By Bennett Ramberg - Project Syndicate." Project Syndicate. N.p., 2016. Web. 7 Sept. 2021. Bennett Ramberg, a policy analyst in the US State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs under President George H.W. Bush, is the author of Destruction of Nuclear Energy Facilities in War and [Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for the Enemy](https://www.ucpress.edu/op/9780520049697/nuclear-power-plants-as-weapons-for-the-enemy).

LOS ANGELES – The [recent failed military coup in Turkey](https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/turkey-coup-erosion-of-law-by-dani-rodrik-2016-07) has produced instability, paranoia, and a crackdown on the regime’s perceived opponents, including many journalists. Luckily, it did not end with rebel forces seizing some of the dozens of US nuclear weapons stored at Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base, from which rebel aircraft departed. But what about next time? The world’s nine nuclear powers claim that there is little to worry about. They argue that the combination of physical protection and, in most cases, electronic safeguards (permissive action links, or PALs) means that their arsenals would remain secure, even if countries where they are stored or deployed were engulfed by violence. Robert Peurifoy, a former senior weapons engineer at Sandia National Laboratories, disagrees. He recently [told the Los Angeles Times](http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-na-turkey-nukes-20160721-snap-story.html) that such safeguards – earlier versions of which he helped to design – may only delay terrorists in using seized nuclear weapons. “Either you keep custody or you should expect a mushroom cloud.” Peurifoy’s statements have rightly raised concerns about the security of nuclear weapons stockpiled in [insecure regions](https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/bennett-ramberg-highlights-the-vulnerability-of-nuclear-assets-in-volatile-countries). Consider Pakistan, which has the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal and suffers relentless jihadi terrorism and separatist violence. Attacks have already been carried out on Pakistani military installations reportedly housing nuclear components. The country’s new mobile “battlefield nuclear weapons” – easier to purloin – augment current fears. North Korea, with its volatile and mercurial regime, is another [source of concern](https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/north-korea-kim-collapse-by-kent-harrington-and-bennett-ramberg-2015-01). Suspicious of the military, Kim Jong-un’s government has repeatedly purged senior officers, which has surely stoked opposition that someday could spark serious civil strife. Adding nuclear weapons to that mix would be highly dangerous. While other nuclear powers appear stable, countries like China and Russia, which rely increasingly on authoritarianism, could face their own risks, should political cohesion fray. Of course, there are plenty of examples of security enduring strife. The 1961 revolt of the generals in French Algeria, which placed a nuclear test device in the Sahara at risk, produced no dangerous incidents. In China, the government effectively protected nuclear weapons sites threatened by Revolutionary Guards during the Cultural Revolution. And neither the attempted coup against Mikhail Gorbachev nor the Soviet collapse resulted in a loss of control over the country’s nuclear arsenal. But it is a leap to presume that these precedents mean that nuclear weapons will remain safe, especially in unstable countries like Pakistan and North Korea. Nuclear bombs or materials risk being controlled by rebels, terrorist groups, or even failing and desperate governments. And, in those cases, the international community has few options for mitigating the threat. External powers can, for example, launch a targeted attack, like the one that Israel carried out on suspected reactors under construction in Iraq and Syria. Those strikes would not have succeeded had Israel not been able to identify the targets accurately. Indeed, though the existence of Iraq’s Osirak plant was public knowledge, uncovering Syria’s Al Kibar plant was an intelligence coup. Carrying out such a strike on North Korean or Pakistani nuclear sites in a time of crisis would require a similar breakthrough – one that may be even more difficult to achieve, given extensive concealment efforts. Stealthy movement of bombs or materials amid the unrest would further complicate targeting. Another option – invasion and occupation – avoids the challenge of identifying nuclear sites. The defeat of Nazi Germany permitted the Allies to find and destroy the country’s nascent nuclear program. The 2003 invasion of Iraq granted the US unfettered access to all possible sites where weapons of mass destruction could be stored. But the costs were huge. Likewise, invasion and occupation of either North Korea or Pakistan would require massive armies risking a bitter conventional war and possible use of the weapons against the invaders. A third option is nuclear containment, which relies on several measures. First, in order to prevent nuclear migration, all land, sea, and air routes out of the country in question would have to be controlled, and homeland security near and far would have to be strengthened. While the [Proliferation Security Initiative](http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm) (PSI) is already in place to stop the smuggling of nuclear contraband worldwide, the International Atomic Energy Agency [reports](https://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/security/itdb-fact-sheet.pdf) continued trafficking of small amounts of nuclear material. An increase in monitoring may reduce, but still not eliminate the problem. Containment also requires nuclear custodians be persuaded to risk their lives to defend nuclear sites against terrorists or rebels. And it demands that states neighboring the country in question put ballistic missile defenses on alert. While India, South Korea, and Japan continue to modernize [such systems](https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/thaad-south-korea-nuclear-weapons-by-richard-weitz-2016-08), no missile defense is perfect. In a time of crisis, when the facts on the ground change fast and fear clouds thinking, mitigating the nuclear threat is no easy feat. While concerned governments do have confidential contingency planning in place, such planning has a mixed record when it comes to responding to recent international upsets in the Middle East. And simply hoping that things will go according to plan, and nuclear command and control will stick, remains a gamble. The time has come to discuss new ideas, with the United States – still the global leader in combating proliferation – taking the lead. A public discussion with input from the executive branch, Congress, think tanks, investigative journalists, and scholars should lay a foundation for policy. We cannot allow ourselves to stand on the precipice of catastrophe without a well-considered and broadly supported plan in place. The lesson from Turkey is not that the bombs of Incirlik – not to mention other nuclear weapons in unstable regions – are safe. Rather, it is that our most deadly weapons could be compromised in an instant. It ought to be a wake-up call for all of us.

## AT Case

### OV

#### The aff has to prove that there should be a right to strike in all cases. If they cannot prove why an unconditional right to strike is UNIQUELY needed for the solvency of the aff, vote neg on presumption.

### General

#### Turn – strikes spark backlash and fragmentation

Grant and Wallace 91 [Don Sherman Grant; Ohio State University; Michael Wallace; Indiana University; “Why Do Strikes Turn Violent?” University of Chicago Press; March 1991; <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2781338.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aca3144a9ae9e4ac65e285f2c67451ffb>]

\*\*RM = Resource-Mobilization, or Strikes

3. Violent tactics.-Violent tactics are viewed by RM theorists exclu- sively as purposeful strategies by challengers for inciting social change with little recognition of how countermobilization strategies of elites also create violence. The role of elite counterstrategies has been virtually ig- nored in research on collective violence. Of course, history is replete with examples of elites' inflicting violence on challenging groups with the full sanction of the state. Typically, elite-sponsored violence occurs when the power resources and legal apparatus are so one-sidedly in the elites' favor that the outcome is never in doubt. In conflicts with weak insiders, elites may not act so openly unless weak insiders flaunt the law. Typically, elite strategies do not overtly promote violence but rather provoke violence by the other side in hopes of eliciting public condemnation or more vigorous state repression of challenger initiatives. This is a critical dynamic in struggles involving weak insiders such as unions. In these cases, worker violence, even when it appears justified, erodes public support for the workers' cause and damages the union's insider status. 4. Homogeneity and similarity.-Many RM theorists incorrectly as- sume that members of aggrieved groups are homogeneous in their inter- ests and share similar positions in the social structure. This (assumed) homogeneity of interests is rare for members of outsider groups and even more suspect for members of weak-insider groups. Indeed, groups are rarely uniform and often include relatively advantaged persons who have other, more peaceful channels in which to pursue their goals. Internal stratification processes mean that different persons have varying invest- ments in current structural arrangements, in addition to their collective interest in affecting social change. Again, these forces are especially prev- alent for weak insiders: even the group's lowest-status members are likely to have a marginal stake in the system; high-status members are likely to have a larger stake and, therefore, less commitment to dramatic change in the status quo. Internal differences may lead to fragmentation of interests and lack of consensus about tactics, especially tactics suggesting violent confronta- tion. While group members share common grievances, individual mem- bers may be differentially aggrieved by the current state of affairs or differentially exposed to elite repression. White's (1989) research on the violent tactics of the Irish Republican Army shows that working-class members and student activists, when compared with middle-class partici- pants, are more vulnerable to state-sponsored repression, more likely to be available for protest activities, and reap more benefits from political violence. When we apply them to our study of strike violence, we find that differences in skill levels are known to coincide with major intraclass Strikes divisions in material interests (Form 1985) and are likely to coincide with the tendency for violent action. For instance, skilled-craft workers, who are more socially and politically conservative than unskilled workers, are less likely to view relations with employers as inherently antagonistic and are prone to separate themselves from unskilled workers, factors that should decrease their participation in violence.

### AT Democracy

#### Turn: Public employees striking anti-democratic and hurt other government programs like welfare

Sherk, J., 2014. F.D.R. Warned Us About Public Sector Unions - NYTimes.com. [online] Nytimes.com. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/02/18/the-first-blow-against-public-employees/fdr-warned-us-about-public-sector-unions> [Accessed 15 July 2021].

It is impossible to bargain collectively with the government.” That wasn’t Newt Gingrich, or Ron Paul, or Ronald Reagan talking. That was George Meany -- the former president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O -- in 1955. Government unions are unremarkable today, but the labor movement once thought the idea absurd. Public sector unions insist on laws that serve their interests -- at the expense of the common good. The founders of the labor movement viewed unions as a vehicle to get workers more of the profits they help create. Government workers, however, don’t generate profits. They merely negotiate for more tax money. When government unions strike, they strike against taxpayers. F.D.R. considered this “unthinkable and intolerable.” Government collective bargaining means voters do not have the final say on public policy. Instead their elected representatives must negotiate spending and policy decisions with unions. That is not exactly democratic – a fact that unions once recognized. George Meany was not alone. Up through the 1950s, unions widely agreed that collective bargaining had no place in government. But starting with Wisconsin in 1959, states began to allow collective bargaining in government. The influx of dues and members quickly changed the union movement’s tune, and collective bargaining in government is now widespread. As a result unions can now insist on laws that serve their interests – at the expense of the common good. Union contracts make it next to impossible to reward excellent teachers or fire failing ones. Union contracts give government employees gold-plated benefits – at the cost of higher taxes and less spending on other priorities. The alternative to Walker's budget was kicking 200,000 children off Medicaid. Governor Walker’s plan reasserts voter control over government policy. Voters’ elected representatives should decide how the government spends their taxes. More states should heed the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Executive Council’s 1959 advice: “In terms of accepted collective bargaining procedures, government workers have no right beyond the authority to petition Congress — a right available to every citizen.”

### AT: Populism

#### Populism on the decline in Europe

Henley and Duncan 20 Henley, J. and Duncan, P., 2020. European support for populist beliefs falls, YouGov survey suggests. [online] the Guardian. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/26/european-support-for-populist-beliefs-falls-yougov-survey-suggests> [Accessed 6 November 2021].

Support for populist beliefs in Europe has fallen markedly over the past year, a major YouGov survey suggests, with significantly fewer people across a range of countries likely to agree with key statements designed to measure it. The YouGov-Cambridge Globalism Project, a survey of about 26,000 people in 25 countries designed with the Guardian, showed a more or less steep decline in populist tendencies in 2020 in all eight of the European countries also surveyed last year. Political scientists expressed surprise at the size of the fall but said since the main reasons for it were most likely related to the coronavirus pandemic, support for populist beliefs could recover as the focus of the crisis becomes more economic. “You could think of the virus like a volcano,” said Matthijs Rooduijn, a political sociologist at the University of Amsterdam and expert on populism. “It has hit populism hard, but it will leave behind fertile ground for the future.” populism Populism, which frames politics as a battle between ordinary people and corrupt elites, has grown rapidly as a political force, with support for populist parties in national elections across Europe surging from 7% to more than 25% in 20 years. Populist leaders mainly on the far right – Italy’s Matteo Salvini, France’s Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán in Hungary or Sweden’s Jimmie Åkesson – have surged and populist parties have entered government in nearly a dozen European countries. The survey, carried out in July and August, found that across Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden – and in Australia, Canada and the US as well – fewer people agreed with the statement that “the power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress”. In some countries the fall was substantial: from 33% to 22% in Denmark, a fall of 11 percentage points, with falls of 9 points in Great Britain, 9 points in Germany, 8 in France, 6 in Italy and 4 in Poland. The survey showed similar marked declines in support for other statements designed to measure support for populist beliefs – including falls of 20 percentage points in Denmark and 15 in Germany for the view that “a lot of important information is deliberately concealed from the public out of self-interest”. Significant drop-offs were also seen in support for the view that “my country is divided by ordinary people and the corrupt elites who exploit them”: 11 points in Denmark, 9 points in Germany, 7 in Italy and 5 points in France. The survey found a smaller decline in support for the statement “the will of the people should be the highest principle of this country’s politics”– down by 3points in Germany, 2 in Italy and 8 in Poland. But levels of support for this and other populist views nonetheless remain high in several countries: in seven of the eight European countries surveyed, between 60% and 74% of respondents said they agreed that the “will of the people” should prevail. Sizeable differences also remain between individual countries. Fifty-six per cent of respondents in France and 66% in Spain, for example, agreed their country was split between ordinary people and a corrupt elite, against 34% and 18% in Sweden and Denmark. Rooduijn said the survey’s results mirrored opinion polling on support for populist radical right parties over the past few months. He saw several main reasons for the fall in support for populist ideas, all tied to the coronavirus pandemic. “There is evidence of greater trust in science, politicians and experts – an impression that only they can help us,” he said. “A perception, maybe, that a global health crisis is not a situation where we necessarily want to give power back to the people.” Populist parties in many countries have also suffered from a “rally round the flag” effect that has boosted support for governments, he said, while their popularity has been dented by their inability to maintain a consistent line on how to handle the virus, flip-flopping on issues like border closures and lockdowns. This is a moment of truth for rightwing populists – but don't celebrate yet | Andy Beckett Read more Finally, Rooduijn said, the scale of the crisis had meant that populist parties and their ideas simply got far less attention, particularly in the early stages of the crisis. He warned, however, that this was likely only to be a temporary lull. “Things are already changing quite rapidly with the second wave,” Rooduijn said. “Conspiracy theories are rising; populations are becoming increasingly polarised over the measures governments are taking. “That’s an opportunity for populists. Several populist radical right parties already seem to be recovering in the polls.” The survey showed significantly less movement among respondents in the US, where the declines ranged from 2 percentage points to 4 , with only one question (“The people I disagree with politically are just misinformed”) eliciting more agreement this year at 38%, up five points on 2019. immigration The survey found that while people had generally moved away from the belief that the costs of immigration outweigh the benefits, attitudes to immigration – a key policy question for all European far-right populist parties – had hardened over the past year. Across the US, Canada, Australia and five EU countries, the proportion of people agreeing that “the costs of immigration outweigh the benefits” for their country fell in 2020 compared with last year – by seven percentage points in France and Italy, and five in Germany. However, asked about future immigration into their respective countries, larger proportions of respondents in seven of the eight European countries surveyed said immigration numbers should be cut: in France, 51% of respondents said immigration should be reduced in future, compared with 36% in 2019. Anti-immigration sentiment remained most consistently strong in Sweden, where 65% of respondents said fewer immigrants should be allowed into the country in future, up from 58% last year. The figures were similar in Italy, where 64% of those surveyed agreed immigration should be cut, against 53% last year. The country with by far the strongest anti-immigration feelings was Greece, included in the survey for the first time in 2020. Nearly four out of every five respondents wanted immigration reduced, with 62% saying it should be reduced by “a lot”. Among the European countries surveyed, only Poland bucked this trend with 32% of people saying immigration should be reduced in future compared with 37% in 2019. Rooduijn said he suspected there could have been a “Covidisation” of immigration attitudes too, prompted by people’s lockdown experiences and their fears about the consequences of future immigration on public health risks and systems.

### AT Economy

#### Unconditional right to strike doesn’t improve economy – South Africa proves

Francis and Webster 19 Francis, David & Webster, Edward. (2019). Poverty and inequality in South Africa: critical reflections. Development Southern Africa. 36. 1-15. 10.1080/0376835X.2019.1666703.

The study of inequality in South Africa presents something of a paradox. Post-apartheid South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world in terms of income and wealth. The richest 10 percent of the population earns 60 percent of national income and owns 95 percent of all wealth (Webster, Valodia, & Francis, 2017). These high levels of inequality have been sustained, and in some cases have deepened in the post-apartheid era: at the start of the 1990s, South Africa was the most unequal country, in terms of income, of the 57 countries for which there were data at the time (Wilson & Ramphele, 1994). In 2017, the World Bank found South Africa to be the most unequal country in the world, with the Gini coefficient of income remaining at 0.66 (Victor & Zikhali, 2018). At this aggregated level, then, South Africa has made no progress in addressing inequality in the post-apartheid era. Rising inequality has accompanied, more recently, by a deepening of poverty; by 2015, more than half of all South African’s were living below a poverty line of R992 per person per month. This reverses a trend of declining poverty up until 2011(STATS SA, 2017). On the other hand, the country has one of the most progressive constitutions in the world, which is underpinned by a radical Bill of Rights that foregrounds expanded socio-economic rights. Furthermore, the Constitutional dispensation is supported by a raft of progressive labour-related legislation. The parallel existence of these contradictory phenomena is what we call the South African inequality paradox. We are not the first to point to the deepening of inequality in post apartheid South Africa. In their important study Seekings and Nattrass demonstrate how income inequalities have deepened since the end of apartheid , arguing that the primary determinant of inequality has shifted from race to class ( Seekings and Nattrass, 2005) [[1]](#footnote-1) They focus their study on what they argue is “the entrenchment of inequality between a stable , permanent urban working class and a set of marginal classes, some precariously employed, most unemployed “( Ibid, 33).[[2]](#footnote-2)The authors make an important contribution to the study of inequality by approaching inequality through a class analysis, but by focussing on intra working class cleavages and presenting their approach as a choice between class and race, they produce an incomplete picture of inequality in South Africa. ( Ibid:41) Firstly, as Goran Therborn suggests, racism persists as a form of existential inequality – like sexism – that affects the individual by denying their personhood ( Therborn, 2018). [[3]](#footnote-3) Secondly, the most robust class formation taking place in contemporary South Africa is, as Karl Von Holdt argues , the emergence of a new capitalist class through Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), employment equity, land redistribution, and the dispossession of communal land. ( Von Holdt, 2019).[[4]](#footnote-4) Our focus in this paper is on the heightened inequality in the workplace and the failure of the instruments introduced by the post-apartheid government to reduce inequality. To do this we have divided the paper into two parts; first, we turn to three innovations of the new labour regime – the extension of collective bargaining; the introduction of stakeholder participation; and regulation for equal pay – and show how high levels of income inequality persist in the labour market despite very progressive legislation and policy instruments in these three areas. Secondly, we provide some suggestions for why this might be the case. In the first instance, we argue that a dependence on Black Economic Empowerment as the ANC government’s single most important attempt to date to transform the racial disparities of the past through the targeted redistribution of asset wealth and productive opportunity has resulted in the capital relations which produce and reproduce inequality remaining largely intact. Secondly, we argue that there has been a preoccupation with horizontal equity at the expense of vertical equity. Thirdly, we argue that power as a concept to understand the allocation of the resources in the workplace has not been used strategically by the social partners. We conclude by discussing the challenges globalisation poses to any nation-states’ agenda to reduce inequality in the workplace. We reject the fatalistic argument

#### Strikes threaten recessions and hurt more people than they help

McElroy 19 John McElroy 10-25-2019 "Strikes Hurt Everybody" <https://www.wardsauto.com/ideaxchange/strikes-hurt-everybody> (MPA at McCombs school of Business)

This creates a poisonous relationship between the company and its workforce. Many GM hourly workers don’t identify as GM employees. They identify as UAW members. And they see the union as the source of their jobs, not the company. It’s an unhealthy dynamic that puts GM at a disadvantage to non-union automakers in the U.S. like Honda and Toyota, where workers take pride in the company they work for and the products they make. Attacking the company in the media also drives away customers. Who wants to buy a shiny new car from a company that’s accused of underpaying its workers and treating them unfairly? Data from the Center for Automotive Research (CAR) in Ann Arbor, MI, show that GM loses market share during strikes and never gets it back. GM lost two percentage points during the 1998 strike, which in today’s market would represent a loss of 340,000 sales. Because GM reports sales on a quarterly basis we’ll only find out at the end of December if it lost market share from this strike. UAW members say one of their greatest concerns is job security. But causing a company to lose market share is a sure-fire path to more plant closings and layoffs. Even so, unions are incredibly important for boosting wages and benefits for working-class people. GM’s UAW-represented workers earn considerably more than their non-union counterparts, about $26,000 more per worker, per year, in total compensation. Without a union they never would have achieved that. Strikes are a powerful weapon for unions. They usually are the only way they can get management to accede to their demands. If not for the power of collective bargaining and the threat of a strike, management would largely ignore union demands. If you took away that threat, management would pay its workers peanuts. Just ask the Mexican line workers who are paid $1.50 an hour to make $50,000 BMWs. But strikes don’t just hurt the people walking the picket lines or the company they’re striking against. They hurt suppliers, car dealers and the communities located near the plants. The Anderson Economic Group estimates that 75,000 workers at supplier companies were temporarily laid off because of the GM strike. Unlike UAW picketers, those supplier workers won’t get any strike pay or an $11,000 contract signing bonus. No, most of them lost close to a month’s worth of wages, which must be financially devastating for them. GM’s suppliers also lost a lot of money. So now they’re cutting budgets and delaying capital investments to make up for the lost revenue, which is a further drag on the economy. According to CAR, the communities and states where GM’s plants are located collectively lost a couple of hundred million dollars in payroll and tax revenue. Some economists warn that if the strike were prolonged it could knock the state of Michigan – home to GM and the UAW – into a recession. That prompted the governor of Michigan, Gretchen Whitmer, to call GM CEO Mary Barra and UAW leaders and urge them to settle as fast as possible. So, while the UAW managed to get a nice raise for its members, the strike left a path of destruction in its wake. That’s not fair to the innocent bystanders who will never regain what they lost. John McElroyI’m not sure how this will ever be resolved. I understand the need for collective bargaining and the threat of a strike. But there’s got to be a better way to get workers a raise without torching the countryside.

#### Strikes create a stigmatization effect over labor and consumption that devastates the economy

Tenza 20, Mlungisi. "The effects of violent strikes on the economy of a developing country: a case of South Africa." Obiter 41.3 (2020): 519-537. (Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-Natal)

When South Africa obtained democracy in 1994, there was a dream of a better country with a new vision for industrial relations.5 However, the number of violent strikes that have bedevilled this country in recent years seems to have shattered-down the aspirations of a better South Africa. South Africa recorded 114 strikes in 2013 and 88 strikes in 2014, which cost the country about R6.1 billion according to the Department of Labour.6 The impact of these strikes has been hugely felt by the mining sector, particularly the platinum industry. The biggest strike took place in the platinum sector where about 70 000 mineworkers’ downed tools for better wages. Three major platinum producers (Impala, Anglo American and Lonmin Platinum Mines) were affected. The strike started on 23 January 2014 and ended on 25 June 2014. Business Day reported that “the five-month-long strike in the platinum sector pushed the economy to the brink of recession”. 7 This strike was closely followed by a four-week strike in the metal and engineering sector. All these strikes (and those not mentioned here) were characterised with violence accompanied by damage to property, intimidation, assault and sometimes the killing of people. Statistics from the metal and engineering sector showed that about 246 cases of intimidation were reported, 50 violent incidents occurred, and 85 cases of vandalism were recorded.8 Large-scale unemployment, soaring poverty levels and the dramatic income inequality that characterise the South African labour market provide a broad explanation for strike violence.9 While participating in a strike, workers’ stress levels leave them feeling frustrated at their seeming powerlessness, which in turn provokes further violent behaviour.10 These strikes are not only violent but take long to resolve. Generally, a lengthy strike has a negative effect on employment, reduces business confidence and increases the risk of economic stagflation. In addition, such strikes have a major setback on the growth of the economy and investment opportunities. It is common knowledge that consumer spending is directly linked to economic growth. At the same time, if the economy is not showing signs of growth, employment opportunities are shed, and poverty becomes the end result. The economy of South Africa is in need of rapid growth to enable it to deal with the high levels of unemployment and resultant poverty. One of the measures that may boost the country’s economic growth is by attracting potential investors to invest in the country. However, this might be difficult as investors would want to invest in a country where there is a likelihood of getting returns for their investments. The wish of getting returns for investment may not materialise if the labour environment is not fertile for such investments as a result of, for example, unstable labour relations. Therefore, investors may be reluctant to invest where there is an unstable or fragile labour relations environment. 3 THE COMMISSION OF VIOLENCE DURING A STRIKE AND CONSEQUENCES The Constitution guarantees every worker the right to join a trade union, participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union, and to strike. 11 The Constitution grants these rights to a “worker” as an individual.12 However, the right to strike and any other conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike such as a picket13 can only be exercised by workers acting collectively.14 The right to strike and participation in the activities of a trade union were given more effect through the enactment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 199515 (LRA). The main purpose of the LRA is to “advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace”. 16 The advancement of social justice means that the exercise of the right to strike must advance the interests of workers and at the same time workers must refrain from any conduct that can affect those who are not on strike as well members of society. Even though the right to strike and the right to participate in the activities of a trade union that often flow from a strike17 are guaranteed in the Constitution and specifically regulated by the LRA, it sometimes happens that the right to strike is exercised for purposes not intended by the Constitution and the LRA, generally. 18 For example, it was not the intention of the Constitutional Assembly and the legislature that violence should be used during strikes or pickets. As the Constitution provides, pickets are meant to be peaceful. 19 Contrary to section 17 of the Constitution, the conduct of workers participating in a strike or picket has changed in recent years with workers trying to emphasise their grievances by causing disharmony and chaos in public. A media report by the South African Institute of Race Relations pointed out that between the years 1999 and 2012 there were 181 strike-related deaths, 313 injuries and 3,058 people were arrested for public violence associated with strikes.20 The question is whether employers succumb easily to workers’ demands if a strike is accompanied by violence? In response to this question, one worker remarked as follows: “[T]here is no sweet strike, there is no Christian strike … A strike is a strike. [Y]ou want to get back what belongs to you ... you won’t win a strike with a Bible. You do not wear high heels and carry an umbrella and say ‘1992 was under apartheid, 2007 is under ANC’. You won’t win a strike like that.” 21 The use of violence during industrial action affects not only the strikers or picketers, the employer and his or her business but it also affects innocent members of the public, non-striking employees, the environment and the economy at large. In addition, striking workers visit non-striking workers’ homes, often at night, threaten them and in some cases, assault or even murder workers who are acting as replacement labour. 22 This points to the fact that for many workers and their families’ living conditions remain unsafe and vulnerable to damage due to violence. In Security Services Employers Organisation v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union (SATAWU),23 it was reported that about 20 people were thrown out of moving trains in the Gauteng province; most of them were security guards who were not on strike and who were believed to be targeted by their striking colleagues. Two of them died, while others were admitted to hospitals with serious injuries.24 In SA Chemical Catering & Allied Workers Union v Check One (Pty) Ltd,25 striking employees were carrying various weapons ranging from sticks, pipes, planks and bottles. One of the strikers Mr Nqoko was alleged to have threatened to cut the throats of those employees who had been brought from other branches of the employer’s business to help in the branch where employees were on strike. Such conduct was held not to be in line with good conduct of striking.26 These examples from case law show that South Africa is facing a problem that is affecting not only the industrial relations’ sector but also the economy at large. For example, in 2012, during a strike by workers employed by Lonmin in Marikana, the then-new union Association of Mine & Construction Workers Union (AMCU) wanted to exert its presence after it appeared that many workers were not happy with the way the majority union, National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), handled negotiations with the employer (Lonmin Mine). AMCU went on an unprotected strike which was violent and resulted in the loss of lives, damage to property and negative economic consequences including a weakened currency, reduced global investment, declining productivity, and increase unemployment in the affected sectors.27 Further, the unreasonably long time it takes for strikes to get resolved in the Republic has a negative effect on the business of the employer, the economy and employment. 3 1 Effects of violent and long strikes on the economy Generally, South Africa’s economy is on a downward scale. First, it fails to create employment opportunities for its people. The recent statistics on unemployment levels indicate that unemployment has increased from 26.5% to 27.2%. 28 The most prominent strike which nearly brought the platinum industries to its knees was the strike convened by AMCU in 2014. The strike started on 23 January 2014 and ended on 24 June 2014. It affected the three big platinum producers in the Republic, which are the Anglo American Platinum, Lonmin Plc and Impala Platinum. It was the longest strike since the dawn of democracy in 1994. As a result of this strike, the platinum industries lost billions of rands.29 According to the report by Economic Research Southern Africa, the platinum group metals industry is South Africa’s second-largest export earner behind gold and contributes just over 2% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).30 The overall metal ores in the mining industry which include platinum sells about 70% of its output to the export market while sales to local manufacturers of basic metals, fabricated metal products and various other metal equipment and machinery make up to 20%. 31 The research indicates that the overall impact of the strike in 2014 was driven by a reduction in productive capital in the mining sector, accompanied by a decrease in labour available to the economy. This resulted in a sharp increase in the price of the output by 5.8% with a GDP declined by 0.72 and 0.78%.32

#### Err Negative – over-estimate the effect on Strikes on the economy since traditional economic measures underestimate the damage.

Babb No Date Katrina Babb "Chapter 11: The Economic Impact of Unions" <http://isu.indstate.edu/conant/ecn351/ch11/chapter11.htm> (Professor of Economic at Indiana State)

Strikes ­ Simple statistics on strike activity suggest that strikes are relatively rare and the associated aggregate economic losses are relatively minimal. Table 11-3 provides data on major work stoppages, defined as those involving 1000 or more workers and lasting at least one full day or one work shift. But these data **can be misleading** **as a measure of the costliness of a strike.** On the one hand, employers in the struck industry may have anticipated the strike and worked their labor force overtime to accumulate inventories to supply customers during the strike period, so that the work lost data overstates the actual loss. On the other hand, the amount lost **can be understated** by the data if production in associated industries ( those that buy inputs from the struck industry or sell products to it) **is disrupted**. As a broad generalization, the adverse effects of a strike on nonstriking firms and customers are likely to be greater **when services are involved** and less when products are involved. Remember, that strikes are the result of the failure of both parties to the negotiation, so it is inaccurate to attribute all of the costs associated with a strike to labor alone.

1. The first to demonstrate through statistical data the increasing importance of class rather race was Owen Crankshaw (1997) in his study of African occupational advancement under apartheid [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This implies a conflict of interest between between the employed and the unemployed. Indeed they have argued that trade unions’ demands have contributed to job loss in the textiles and clothing industries (Nattrass and Seekings 2014) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Therborn distinguishes between three quite different kinds of inequality. The first is inequality of [health](http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/books-and-journals/2009/en_GB/JHE_18_S1_APR09/) and death, what might be called vital inequality.

   The second is existential inequality, which hits the individual as a person.

   The third is material or resource inequality, which means that human actors have very different resources to draw upon. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. It could be argued that there are two distinct classes emerging; a dependent black capitalist class benefitting from BEE, and a black middle class benefitting from employment equity particularly in the public sector. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)