#### Resolved – The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust

## **1AC – Settler Appropriation**

#### my value for today’s debate is justice.

#### my standard for today’s debate is minimizing structural violence.

#### prioritize slow violence and everyday war against disenfranchised populations – it’s footnoted in favor of sensational impacts, which normalizes everyday violence.

Hunt 18 (Dallas Hunt, PhD Candidate, University of British Columbia, Canada., Chapter 10 “Of course they count, but not right now”: Regulating precarity in Lee Maracle’s Ravensong and Celia’s Song, in Biopolitical Disaster Edited by Jennifer L. Lawrence and Sarah Marie Wiebe, 2018 Routledge, JKS)

“There is a hierarchy to care”: theoretical concerns and applications In Frames of War (an extension and preoccupation with similar issues she outlines in her text Precarious Life), Judith Butler focuses on the ways in which particular, violent perceptions of everyday life are normalized and propagated as legible or granted “intelligibility” (through numbers, statistics, etc.). According to Butler, Frames of War follows on from Precarious Life ... especially its suggestion that specific lives cannot be apprehended as living. If certain lives do not qualify as lives or are, from the start, not conceivable as lives within certain epistemological frames, then these lives are never lived nor lost in the full sense. (2010: 1) For Butler, then, a primary concern is how these intelligibilities allow “a state to wage its wars without instigating a popular revolt” (xvi). Although Butler is writing within the context of the Iraq War and the “War on Terror,” her insights on precarity and modes of state violence exceed their immediate rele- vance. Indeed, as is clear below, the notions of war and settler-colonialism and the biopolitical rationalities they allow are eminently applicable to a local, Canadian context. The frames of war, Butler argues, are not circumscribed to combat zones with the mobilization of weapons. Instead, to Butler, “perceptual weapons” are acting on populations consistently to naturalize violences and enlist citizens to tacitly consent to (and, in some cases, actively participate in) violent forms that authorize dehumanization: “[w]aging war ... begins with the assault on the senses; the senses are the first target of war” (xvi). These perceptual violences resonate with Rob Nixon’s formulation of “slow violence” as well. To Nixon, slow violence is “a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all” (2011: 3). Further, and “[c]rucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded” (4). Conditioning the senses or what is intelligible, then, functions as the way in which state violences are legitimized, as the frames of war dictate the “sensuous parameters of reality itself” (ix). According to Butler, the task at hand is not only to “understand ... these frames, where they come from and what kind of action they perform” (2010: 83), but also to find and articulate “those modes of representation and appearance that allow the claim of life to be made and heard” (81). While Butler is exam- ining conditions of precarity, (in)security, and disposability in the context of “the War on Terror,” and Palestine–Israel, her examination of an imperial/ colonial power exerting force and enacting violence on vulnerable and racialized populations (and in the process producing and reproducing these vulnerable populations) can be fruitfully employed in the Canadian context, though not without some alteration. Although we may not perceive the more mundane, i.e. non-military, violences visited upon Indigenous communities as “war” strictly speaking, Sora Han’s oft-cited phrase that we must think of the United States (and settler-colonial nations more broadly) not “at war” but “as war” is useful here (cited in Simpson 2014: 153, emphasis in original). If we view the biopolitical man- agement of Indigenous populations and Indigenous territories as rationalities rooted in the organizing frame of settler-colonialism, then the states of emer- gency putatively thought to be produced through war are “structural, not eventful” – that is to say, war is the very condition of settler-colonialism and not a by-product of it (154). Indeed, the largest ever domestic deployment of military forces in North America took place within Canada, in the context of the so-called “Oka crisis.” As Audra Simpson writes, the “highest number of troops in the history of Indigenous-settler relations in North America was deployed to Kanehsatà:ke, as this was the most unambiguous form of exceptional relations, that of warfare. There were 2,650 soldiers deployed...” (2014: 152). And, as Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz and others have noted, Western imperial powers still refer to “enemy territories” abroad as “Indian Country” and to “wanted terrorists” as “Geronimo” (2014: 56). I follow the lineages of these Indigenous theorists who view settler-colonialism as a kind of permanent war, drawing parallels between the so-called everyday violences (displacement, sexual violence) inflicted upon Indigenous peoples in the US and Canada and the death-delivering reaches of empire embodied by the West more globally. Or, to echo Mink, the transformer/shapeshifter narrating the events in Mara- cle’s Celia’s Song: “This is war” (2014: 9). For Butler, there are varying tactics for distributing “precarity” differently, or what she describes as “that politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of support,” producing a “maximized precariousness for populations ... who often have no other option than to appeal to the very state from which they need protec- tion” (2010: 26). In the depictions provided in her writing, as well as that of Maracle, violence is deployed not only as “an effort to minimize precarious- ness for some and to maximize it for others,” but also as a mode of shaping the perceptions of citizens in order to make such acts legible, and hence, in a sense justifiable (Butler 2010: 54). Ultimately what Butler is advocating for is a new ethico-political orientation, one with the potential to disrupt the violent regimes of the sensible, as well as the ways in which precarity is currently allocated and distributed. Paraphrasing Jacques Rancière, Jeff Derksen also advocates for political movements that disrupt “regimes of the sensible”: “a politics of the aesthetic could ... redistribute and rethink the possibility of the subject (potentially an isolated figure) within the present and within a com- munity to come” (2009: 73). In sum, Butler’s text illustrates the ways in which State-sanctioned (and induced) precarity “perpetuate[s] a way of dividing lives into those that are worth defending, valuing, and grieving when they are lost, and those that are not quite lives” (2010: 42), as well as the resistive practices that might disrupt the naturalization of “differential distribution[s] of pre- carity” (xxv). The remainder of the chapter considers to what extent Mara- cle’s texts offer such a disruption of the mundane frames of settler-colonial war within the context of an exceptional moment (an epidemic), and asks how her work gestures toward the alternatives that might be offered by Indigenous frames.

#### especially because each life improved could solve an existential catastrophe.

Kaczmarek ‘17 (Patrick Kaczmarek, PhD at the University of Glasgow, a Senior Researcher at Effective Giving, Visiting Researcher at the Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford and a Visiting Scholar at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. [How Much is Rule-Consequentialism Really Willing to Give Up to Save the Future of Humanity? Utilitas, 29(2), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/utilitas/article/how-much-is-ruleconsequentialism-really-willing-to-give-up-to-save-the-future-of-humanity/F867301151A79F7DA566A14DF71749B3]//BPS).

Notice, the problem can be cast two different ways. First, the loss associated with humanity's premature extinction is so great that even if the probability of a catastrophic event is very low, an expected value calculation suggests that we should strive to prevent its possible occurrence. And yet, there is something deeply puzzling about ruining the lives of all actual persons for the sake of humanity eking out a longer stay in the universe. Second, you may have realized that the above implication bears close resemblance to the dreaded Repugnant Conclusion. The Repugnant Conclusion states that for any population, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some larger imaginable population whose existence, all else being equal, would be better despite their lives being barely worth living.19The mistake, as countless critics have noted, is that quantity (that is, size of population) should not be able to compensate for a stark reduction to their average quality of life. I'm inclined to agree that this looks worrisome. For some, if this were the end of the story, it would surely act as a reductio ad absurdum of the view. But this is not the full story. AN INDIRECT APPROACH TO LOWERING THE THREAT OF EXTINCTION In setting out our earlier comparison of the two populations it was assumed that only costs go up, never benefits. That is to say, A was fixed and the total sum of goods went up merely because the size of the population grew, despite internalization costs reducing average quality of life. Colouring in the picture, this corresponds to the scenario where, all else being equal, existential threats are directly targeted. To illustrate, this could amount to putting a lot of resources towards asteroid deflection programmes.20 I now wish to argue that we could instead reduce existential risk by indirect means, and in so doing make the world in two ways go better. As noted earlier, we would prolong humanity's place in the cosmos. Furthermore, an indirect approach improves the average welfare of persons, particularly the worse-off in our population. Certainly, it would be a mistake to concentrate exclusively on indirectly lowering the probability of doomsday. Returning to our earlier example, reducing global poverty cannot prevent an Earth-bound asteroid the size of Texas from making impact. Nevertheless, if we were also to adopt an indirect approach, then this would contribute to existential risk reduction by curbing the negative ripple effects of readily preventable illnesses, global hunger, and so forth. Ripple effects are a class of phenomena that affect the far future in significant ways, shaping how our history unfolds over time.21A ripple effect is initiated by a particular event that has some causal influence on the course of events that follow it. These events, in turn, may have their own impact on how further events play out. And so on it goes, reaching wider and wider as time passes. Consider the following example. A doctor is in a position to cure some infant's blindness. Sure, the infant will probably have a better life after the operation. Most of us are quick to hone-in on this feature of the situation. And many other goods go unacknowledged by us as a result. Just a few of the proximate advantages we might reasonably expect to find after curing the infant's blindness include: her parents will be less worried about her, subsequently finding more free time to develop their own personal projects; the government will spend fewer resources on providing her education; this child will grow up with more opportunities, as well as perhaps being inspired to start a grassroots initiative or develop an anti-malarial drug. All of these consequences will have some role in shaping our future due to their own ripple effects. This network of ripple effects might go so far as causing '[her] country's economy to develop very slightly more quickly, or make certain technological or cultural innovations arrive more quickly'.22

#### fantasies of extinction are a logic of settler self-preservation to defer action against settler colonialism

Dalley, 18 [Assistant Professor of English at Daemen College (Hamish, “The deaths of settler colonialism: extinction as a metaphor of decolonization in contemporary settler literature,” Settler Colonial Studies, 8:1, 30-46, dml)]

In this way, **these settler-colonial narratives of extinction begin as a contemplation of endings and end as a way for settlers to persist**. As in the classical solution to the settler-colonial paradox of origins, **the native must be invoked and disavowed, and ultimately absorbed into the settler-colonial body** as a means of accessing true belonging and the possibility of an authentic future in place. Veracini’s description of the settler-colonial historical imagination thus applies, in modified but no less appropriate form, to visions of futurity haunted by the possibility of death: Settler colonial themes **include the perception of an impending catastrophe that prompts permanent displacement, the tension between tradition and adaptation and between sedentarism and nomadism, the transformative permanent shift to a new locale, the prospect of a safe ‘new land’, and the familial reproductive unit that moves as one and finally settles an arcadia that is conveniently empty**.67 And yet that parallel means that it is not entirely true to say that settlers cannot contemplate a future without themselves, or that they lack the metaphorical resources to imagine their own demise. It is in fact characteristic of settler consciousness to continually imagine the end. But it does so through a paradox that echoes the ambivalence of Freud’s death drive: **it is a fantasy of extinction that tips over into its opposite and becomes a method of symbolic preservation, a technique for delaying the end, for living on in the contemplation of death**.68 The settler desire for death conceals that wish – the ho**pe that, between the thought of the end and the act, someone will intervene, something will happen to show that it is not really necessary, that the settlers can stay, that they have value and can go on living**. In this way, **they make their own redemption, an extinction that is an act of self-preservation, deferring the hard reckoning we know we lack the courage to face, and avoid making the real changes** – material, political, constitutional, practical – **that might alter our condition of being** and set us on the path to a real home in the world. We dream instead of ends, imagining worlds without us, thinking of what it would be like not to be. But at every moment we know that that the dream is nothing but a dream; we know we will awake and still be here, unchanged, unchanging, living on, forever. **Thus settlers persist even beyond the moment of extinction they thought they wanted to arrive.**

#### thus, i affirm: resolved – the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

### 1AC – contention

#### settler colonialism is the permeating structure of the nation-state which requires the elimination of indigenous life and land via the occupation of settlers – the appropriation of land turns Natives into ghosts and chattel slaves into excess labor.

Tuck and Yang, 12 (Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, JKS)

Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts - though they can overlap - and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place - indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves, whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making a new "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6 The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural. Settlers are not immigrants. Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009). Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire - utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces. Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, seizing imperial wealth is inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated ‘third-world’ wealth). Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context - empire, settlement, and internal colony - make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires7. Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.

#### space appropriation is a ‘re-invocation’ of settler colonialism built on the lens of ‘conservation’ representing yet another ‘unknown’ to be conquered.

Smiles, 20 [Deondre Smiles is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria, in B.C., Canada. Society Space October 26, 2020, SETTLER COLONIAL AND INDIGENOUS GEOGRAPHIES “The Settler Logics of (Outer) Space”] //aaditg

‍“In reaffirming our heritage as a free nation, we must always remember that America has always been a frontier nation. Now we must embrace the next frontier. America’s Manifest Destiny in the **stars**…The American nation was carved out of the vast frontier by the toughest, strongest, fiercest and most determined men and women ever to walk on the face of the Earth… Our ancestors braved the unknown, tamed the wilderness, settled the Wild West…This is our glorious and magnificent inheritance. We are Americans. We are pioneers. We are the pathfinders. We settled the New World. We built the modern world.” -President Donald J. Trump, 2020 State of the Union address T o most scholars, and certainly to the virtual majority of Indigenous peoples on Turtle Island, it is no secret that the country we call the United States of America was built upon the brutal subjugation of Indigenous people and Indigenous lands. Fueled by the American settler myths of terra nullius (no man’s land) and Manifest Destiny, the American settler state proceeded upon a project of cultural and physical genocide, with lasting effects that endure to the present day. The ‘settler myth’ permeates American culture. Words such as ‘pioneer’, the ‘West’, ‘Manifest Destiny’ grab the imagination as connected to the growth of the country in its early history. America sprang forth from a vast open ‘wilderness’. Of course, for Indigenous people, we know differently—these lands had complex cultural frameworks and political entities long before colonization. Words like ‘pioneer’ and ‘Manifest Destiny’, have deep meanings for us too, as they are indicative of the very real damage dealt against our cultures and nations, damage that we have had to work very hard to undo. Trump’s address raises key insights into the continuing logics of settler colonialism, as well as questions of its future trajectories. Trump’s invocation of ideas such as the ‘frontier’ and ‘taming the wilderness’ draws attention to the brutal violence that accompanied the building of the American state. Scholars such as Greg Grandin (2019) make the case that the frontier is part of what America is—whether it is the ‘Wild West’, or the U.S.-Mexican border, America is always contending with a frontier that must be defined. Language surrounding ‘frontier’ is troubling because it perpetuates the rationale of why the American settler state even exists—it could make better use of the land than Native people would, after all, they lived in wilderness. This myth tells us that what we know as the modern world was built through the hard work of European settlers; Indigenous people had nothing to offer or contribute. For someone like Mr. Trump, whose misgivings and hostility towards Native people have been historically documented, this myth fits well with his narrative as President—he is building a ‘new’ America, one that will return to its place of power and influence. The fact that similar language is being used around the potential of American power being extended to space could reasonably be expected, given the economic and military potential that comes from such a move. Space represents yet another ‘unknown’ to be conquered and bent to America’s will. However, such interplanetary conquest does not exist solely in outer space. I wish to situate the very real colonial legacies and violence associated with the desire to explore space, tracing the ways that they are perpetuated and reified through their destructive engagements with Indigenous peoples. I argue that a scientific venture such as space exploration does not exist in a vacuum, but instead draws from settler colonialism and feeds back into it through the prioritization of ‘science’ over Indigenous epistemologies. I begin by exploring the ways that space exploration by the American settler state is situated within questions of hegemony, imperialism, and terra nullius, including a brief synopsis of the controversy surrounding the planned construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea. I conclude by exploring Indigenous engagement with ‘space’ in both its Earthbound and beyond-earth forms as it relates to outer space, and what implications this might have for the ways we think about our engagement with space as the American settler state begins to turn its gaze skyward once again. I position this essay alongside a growing body of academic work, as well as journalistic endeavors (Haskins, 2020; Koren, 2020) that demands that the American settler colonial state exercise self-reflexivity as to why it engages with outer space, and who is advantaged and disadvantaged here on Earth as a result of this engagement. Settler Colonialism and ‘Space’ A brief exploration of what settler colonialism is, and its engagement with ‘space’ here on Earth is necessary to start. Settler colonialism is commonly understood to be a form of colonialism that is based upon the permanent presence of colonists upon land. This is a distinction from forms of colonialism based upon resource extraction (Wolfe, 2006; Veracini, 2013). What this means is that the settler colony is intimately tied with the space within which it exists—it cannot exist or sustain itself without settler control over land and space. This permanent presence upon land by ‘settlers’ is usually at the expense of the Indigenous, or original people, in a given space or territory. To reiterate: control over space is paramount. As Wolfe states, “Land is life—or at least, land is necessary for life. Thus, contests for land can be—indeed, often are—contests for life” (2006: 387). Without land, the settler state ‘dies’; conversely, deprivation of land from the indigenous population means that in settler logic, indigeneity dies (Povinelli, 2002; Wolfe, 2006.) The ultimate aims of settler colonialism is therefore the occupation and remaking of space. As Wolfe (2006) describes, the settler state seeks to make use of land and resources in order to continue on; whether that is through homesteading/residence, farming and agriculture, mining, or any number of activities that settler colonial logic deems necessary to its own survival. These activities are tied to a racist and hubristic logic that only settler society itself possesses the ability to make proper use of land and space (Wolfe, 2006). This is mated with a viewpoint of landscapes prior to European arrival as terra nullius, or empty land that was owned by no one, via European/Western conceptions of land ownership and tenure (Wolfe, 1994). Because of this overarching goal of space, there is an inherent anxiety in settler colonies about space, and how it can be occupied and subsequently rewritten to remove Indigenous presence. In Anglo settler colonies, this often takes place within a lens of conservation. Scholars such as Banivanua Mar (2010), Lannoy (2012), Wright (2014) and Tristan Ahtone (2019) have written extensively on the ways that settler reinscription of space can be extremely damaging to Indigenous people from a lens of ‘conservation’. However, dispossession of Indigenous space in favor of settler uses can also be tied to some of the most destructive forces of our time. For example, Aboriginal land in the Australian Outback was viewed as ‘empty’ land that was turned into weapons ranges where the British military tested nuclear weapons in the 1950s, which directly led to negative health effects upon Aboriginal communities downwind from the testing sites (Vincent, 2010). Indigenous nations in the United States have struggled with environmental damage related to military-industrial exploitation as well. Saturn V rocket. (Image credit: NASA) But, what does this all look like in regard to outer space? In order to really understand the potential (settler) colonial logics of space exploration, we must go back and explore the ways in which space exploration became inextricably tied with questions of state hegemony and geopolitics during the Cold War. US and Soviet space programs were born partially out of military utility, and propaganda value—the ability to send a nuclear warhead across a great distance to strike the enemy via a ICBM and the accompanying geopolitical respect that came with such a capability was something that greatly appealed to the superpowers, and when the Soviets took an early lead in the ‘Space Race’ with Sputnik and their Luna probes, the United States poured money and resources into making up ground (Werth, 2004). The fear of not only falling behind the Soviets militarily as well as a perceived loss of prestige in the court of world opinion spurred the US onto a course of space exploration that led to the Apollo moon landings in the late 1960s and the early 70s (Werth, 2004; Cornish, 2019). I argue that this fits neatly into the American settler creation myth referenced by Trump—after ‘conquering’ a continent and bringing it under American dominion, why would the United States stop solely at ‘space’ on Earth? To return to Grandin (2019), space represented yet another frontier to be conquered and known by the settler colonial state; if not explicitly for the possibility of further settlement, then for the preservation of its existing spatial extent on Earth. However, scholars such as Alan Marshall (1995) have cautioned that newer logics of space exploration such as potential resource extraction tie in with existing military logics in a way that creates a new way of thinking about the ‘openness’ of outer space to the logics of empire, in what Marshall calls res nullius (1995: 51)[i]. Telescopes on Mauna Kea. (Photo credit: University of Hawaii-Hilo) But we cannot forget the concept of terra nullius and how our exploration of the stars has real effects on Indigenous landscapes here on Earth. We also cannot forget about forms of space exploration that may not be explicitly tied to military means. Doing so deprives us of another lens through which to view the tensions between settler and Indigenous views of space and to which end is useful. Indeed, even reinscribing of Indigenous space towards ‘peaceful’ settler space exploration have very real consequences for Indigenous sovereignty and Indigenous spaces. Perhaps the most prominent example of the fractures between settler space exploration and Indigenous peoples is the on-going controversy surrounding the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea, on the island of Hawaii. While an extremely detailed description of the processes of construction on the TMT and the opposition presented to it by Native Hawai’ians and their allies is beyond the scope of this essay, and in fact is already expertly done by a number of scholars[ii], the controversy surrounding TMT is a prime example of the logics presented towards ‘space’ in both Earth-bound and beyond-Earth contexts by the settler colonial state as well as the violence that these logics place upon Indigenous spaces, such as Mauna Kea, which in particular already plays host to a number of telescopes and observatories (Witze, 2020). In particular, astronomers such as Chanda Prescod-Weinstein, Lucianne Walkowicz, and others have taken decisive action to push back against the idea that settler scientific advancement via space exploration should take precedence over Indigenous sovereignty in Earth-space. Prescod-Weinstein and Walkowicz, alongside Sarah Tuttle, Brian Nord and Hilding Neilson (2020) make clear that settler scientific pursuits such as building the TMT are simply new footnotes in a long history of colonial disrespect of Indigenous people and Indigenous spaces in the name of science, and that astronomy is not innocent of this disrespect. In fact, Native Hawai’ian scholars such as Iokepa Casumbal-Salazar strike at the heart of the professed neutrality of sciences like astronomy: One scientist told me that astronomy is a “benign science” because it is based on observation, and that it is universally beneficial because it offers “basic human knowledge” that everyone should know “like human anatomy.” Such a statement underscores the cultural bias within conventional notions of what constitutes the “human” and “knowledge.” In the absence of a critical self-reflection on this inherent ethnocentrism, the tacit claim to universal truth reproduces the cultural supremacy of Western science as self-evident. Here, the needs of astronomers for tall peaks in remote locations supplant the needs of Indigenous communities on whose ancestral territories these observatories are built (2017: 8). As Casumbal-Salazar and other scholars who have written about the TMT and the violence that has been done to Native Hawai’ians (such as police actions designed to dislodge blockades that prevented construction) as well as the potential violence to come such as the construction of the telescope have skillfully said, when it comes to the infringement upon Indigenous space by settler scientific endeavors tied to space exploration, there is no neutrality to be had—dispossession and violence are dispossession and violence, no matter the potential ‘good for humanity’ that might come about through these things. Such contestations over outer space and ethical engagement with previously unknown spaces will continue to happen. Outer space is not the first ‘final frontier’ (apologies to Gene Roddenberry) that has been discussed in settler logics and academic spaces. In terms of settler colonialism, scholars have written about how Antarctica was initially thought of as the ‘perfect’ settler colony—land that could be had without the messy business of pushing Indigenous people off of it (see Howkins 2010). Of course, we know now that engagement with Antarctica should be constrained by ecological concern—who is to say that these concerns will be heeded in ‘unpopulated’ space? What can be done to push back against these settler logics?

#### intertwined with colonial logic, private entities urge to colonize space, resulting in the inevitable exploitation of indigenous people.

**Utrarta, 21** (Alina Utrata, Alina Utrata is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge, and a Gates-Cambridge and Marshall, 7-14-2021, "Lost in Space," Boston Review, https://bostonreview.net/articles/lost-in-space/ //aw)

For two entrepreneurs whose businesses have been lauded as exceptionally visionary, their celestial utopias stand out for their lack of political creativity and awareness. **Bezos’s notion that imperial expansion is the only way to support an ever-growing population is an old colonialist appeal**, now **repackaged for the stars**. The infinite need for resources, as well as the “poverty and pollution” that Bezos dismisses as short-term problems, are deeply enmeshed in capitalism’s cycles of extraction and are currently causing Earth’s climate crisis. Given the green-orientation of his enterprises, Musk is presumably aware of the climate crisis—or at least the opportunities it presents for government funding. Yet he has not explicitly named climate change as one of the potential “extinction events” that a Mars colony might protect against. Putting aside the question of whether terraforming Mars is actually feasible—for the record, a Nature Astronomy article suggests it is not—settling space won’t be cost-free to Earth. As science writer Shannon Stirone pointed out in The Atlantic, “Mars has a very thin atmosphere; it has no magnetic field to help protect its surface from radiation from the sun or galactic cosmic rays; it has no breathable air and the average surface temperature is a deadly 80 degrees below zero . . . . For humans to live there in any capacity they would need to build tunnels and live underground.” The environmental and human destruction necessary to make space habitable would dwarf any technological or political response needed to stop the climate crisis now. And—like capitalism and climate change—the impacts of **colonizing space will be far worse for some rather than others**, particularly in the Global South. For example, when Indonesian president Joko Widodo offered SpaceX the island of Biak in Papua, home to an ongoing secessionist campaign, **local communities protested that the building of the launch station would cause vast ecological damage and community displacement**. They had reason to worry. This is precisely what happened in Boca Chica, a small town on the southern tip of Texas where SpaceX had built a previous launch site. After SpaceX moved into town, residents of the Texas community were pushed out from their homes as the area became unsafe due to rocket activity, which has since damaged a wildlife refuge in the area. SpaceX has offered to purchase residents’ homes, but below the price many think is fair. An email from SpaceX to Boca Chica holdouts stated, “As the scale and frequency of spaceflight activities at the site continue to accelerate, your property will frequently fall within established hazard zones in which no civilians will be permitted to remain, in order to comply with all federal and other public safety regulations.” SpaceX’s impact on the area demonstrated little concern for its displacement and damage of the local community. **While we all may use, explore, or research space, no state can claim to own it**—though this does not mean states will not try. Musk and Bezos rely on the notion that colonizing space somehow differs from colonizing Earth. Implicit in their **arguments** is the belief **that it was not the systems of colonial-capitalism, but rather the context surrounding their implementation**, that wreaked havoc in the past. On this view, although previous colonization attempts often unleashed genocidal violence, that history cannot be repeated in space. After all, no one lives there. This perspective **ignores the fact that colonial destruction was justified by a specific ideology that made a certain view of the world, and humanity’s role in it, appear natural and inevitable.** The idea that space is open for the taking simply because “no one is there” finds root in the exact colonial logics that have justified settler genocide for centuries: that only certain people, using resources in certain ways, have a claim to land and ownership. Imperialist conceptions of ownership thus transform space into an “empty frontier” where certain individuals can project their political dreams, whether they be extractive manufacturing industries or settler colonies. In his recent book Theft is Property! (2019), Robert Nichols interrogates the recursive logic of colonial dispossession, which relies on the simultaneous processes of transformation and theft. As he puts it: Colonization entails the large-scale transfer of land that simultaneously recodes the object of exchange in question such that it appears retrospectively to be a form of theft in the ordinary sense. . **. ‘dispossession’ may be coherently reconstructed to refer to a process in which new proprietary relations are generated but under structural conditions that demand their simultaneous negation**. In one move, **land is both transformed into property, and taken away.** The same logic allows Musk and Bezos to claim that space is both “empty” and free for the taking. Of course, that we do not use space is a lie, even if no one owns or occupies a plot of land on the moon. Just as we all use waterways and air, “ownership” cannot determined by whose territory these resources reside in. For example, the increased light pollution (or “light graffiti”) caused by the thousands of orbiting satellites has affected many communities on Earth, from astronomers and their scientific research to **indigenous communities who rely on celestial navigation for cultural practices and survival.** But because these communities aren’t “properly” using or appropriating space’s resources, they aren’t considered its rightful owners—and therefore have no claim to space. But these communities have no less of a claim to the skies than Musk and Bezos, according to international law. The Outer Space Treaty states that the “exploration and use of outer space . . . shall be the province of all mankind.” While we all may use, explore, or research space, no state can claim to own it—though this does not mean states will not try. For example, in 2015 President Barack Obama signed the SPACE Act. The law allowed private U.S. citizens to claim ownership of resources extracted from space and defend their property rights in U.S. courts. International legal experts have pointed out that the SPACE Act may theoretically violate the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits states from claiming sovereignty over any celestial body. The law, however, specifically notes that the United States is not claiming sovereignty over any extraterrestrial territory, only ownership of resources. Critics dismiss this defense; states cannot claim ownership unless they first claim sovereignty over territory. Territoriality, after all, makes states. Even in the stars, it is difficult to imagine any other principle as a basis for governing. Yet territorial borders have never acted as a hard limit to the exercise of power. **The United States frequently exerts power over people and property outside of its own(ed) territory.** Akin to Benedict Anderson’s logo map, territoriality operates as an imagined associational identity: it legitimates state power, but it does not really create or limit it. Tech entrepreneurs often envision ways to cede from the state, both territorially and politically. Still, utopian visions of political communities—as Philip Steinberg, Elizabeth Nyman and Mauro Caraccioli pointed out—from Plato’s solitary city-state to Martian colonies, often fail to imagine any method beyond territorial sovereignty as a way to escape the state and start afresh. For example, the Seasteading Institute is a “sister project” of Bezos’s and Musk’s space colonization projects, spearheaded by another tech billionaire Peter Thiel. Thiel, Musk’s co-founder at Paypal, and Patri Friedman, a former Google engineer (and Milton Friedman’s grandson), established the Seasteading Institute in order to “further the establishment and growth of permanent, autonomous ocean communities, enabling innovations with new political and social systems” through floating ocean platforms. Like the space colonizers, seasteaders imagine that human engineering will be able to create new, virgin territories—in the sea or stars—which will provide the “space” to solve political problems. “If we can solve the engineering challenges of seasteading, two-thirds of the Earth’s surface becomes open for these political start-ups,” Friedman explained. Thiel has referred to these floating island nations as using a “space colonies model”—but, closer to Earth, the technology to build them is more feasible. For some Silicon Valley elites, the point of these “start-up nations” is that states will not be able to control them. Tech entrepreneurs often envision ways to cede from the state, both territorially and politically. For example, venture capitalist Balaji Srinivasan briefly achieved notoriety for his manifesto “Silicon Valley’s Ultimate Exit” in which he advocated the region cede from the United States to become its own corporate city-state. Moreover, Mark Zuckerberg was asked at a staff meeting during the start of the pandemic whether Facebook could buy a COVID-free island to shelter its employees. Silicon Valley executives are also notorious offshore doomsday preppers, with figures such as Thiel and Y Combinator’s Sam Altman buying and building extravagant apocalypse shelters in New Zealand. But these visions of state secession are not ideologically unmoored. While techno-utopian predictions about the demise of the territorial state are often associated with John Perry Barlow’s Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996), another political manifesto predicting the end of sovereign nations is also highly influential among Silicon Valley elites—The Sovereign Individual (1997), co-authored by William Rees-Mogg and James Dale Davidson. Despite his reputation for failed political predictions in the United Kingdom, Rees-Mogg has dedicated tech entrepreneur fans, including Thiel, Srinivasan, and venture capitalist Marc Andreessen. It is easy to see why the book appeals to Silicon Valley types; it predicted the rise of cryptocurrency, as well as the death of the nation-state due to technological innovation. But the demise of the state is no cause for concern, Rees-Mogg contends, as it will “liberate individuals as never before.” He states that **the new Sovereign Individual “will operate like the gods of myth in the same physical environment as the ordinary, subject citizen, but in a separate realm politically.”** As Bezos and Musk extol the virtues of using public money to move humanity into the stars, we should ask: Who are these colonies for? Not everyone on Earth will become a Sovereign Individual, however, according to Rees-Mogg. **Only the “cognitive elite . . . persons of superior skills and intelligence” will be so fortunate.** On this view, as modern states decline due to dwindling tax revenues, these superior individuals will cede from states entirely to form their own micro-enclaves, causing “a radical restructuring of the nature of sovereignty.” Most ominously, Rees-Mogg notes, “The lower classes will be walled out. The move to gated communities is all but inevitable.” As Bezos and Musk extol the virtues of using public money to move humanity into the stars, we should ask: Who are these colonies for? The ideals guiding billionaires’ race to space are not new. Lofty **utopian visions have often obscured violent processes that prioritize abstract visions of “human civilization” over some human lives.** For his part, Bezos looks at this as a utilitarian calculation, a numbers game. If humanity expands into space, he urges, “trillions of humans” can prosper, “which means thousands of Einsteins or Mozarts.” He fails to acknowledge that the genius of those future Einsteins and Mozarts exists now, on Earth, but unrealized and unrecognized in the very cycles of poverty Bezos dismisses as a short-term problem. Furthermore, and more importantly, **the value of human life should not be based on some arbitrary utilitarian calculation of humans’** intellectual contribution to “civilization” or their **ability to replicate the legacies of two white men.** Lofty utopian visions have often obscured violent processes that prioritize abstract visions of “human civilization” over some human lives. Musk is more explicit about his willingness to sacrifice human life. Mars is “not for the faint of heart,” he has pronounced. There’s a “good chance you’ll die. And it’s going to be tough, tough going. But it’ll be pretty glorious if it works out.” In fact, his belief in the necessity of human sacrifice for this glorious future was openly celebrated in his Saturday Night Live skit “Chad on Mars” in which a Martian settler embarks on a suicide mission after a technical malfunction in the colony’s oxygen distribution systems. In the clip Musk remains safely in command back on Earth, thanking the doomed settler on behalf of humanity as his demise is broadcast live worldwide. When the settler perishes at the end of the skit, Musk shrugs his shoulders and walks away, nonchalantly reminding his team, “Well, I did say people were going to die.” While Bezos and Musk are right that colonizing space will not result in the genocide of nonexistent extraterrestrial populations, **the colonial destruction of indigenous communities was but one component in a global regime of racial violence.** Indeed, the labor needed to support the system of colonial-capitalism in the United States fueled the atrocities of the Atlantic slave trade. In pursuit of America’s “manifest destiny” along the Western frontier, white railroad company owners brutally exploited Asian migrants. One in ten Chinese laborers died building the transcontinental railroad. It is no coincidence that **casual discussions of colonization are happening in an industry that is still dominated by white men**. Bezos has said that he first became obsessed with space when he was five years old, watching the Apollo moon landing on television exactly fifty-two years before his plans to launch himself into space. Listening to Bezos and Musk speak about their childhood obsession with rocket ships to adoring crowds, one perceives another reason why two of the richest men on Earth are spending billions in public money to get to space: they think it’s cool. One wonders what the five-year-old Bezos would have thought upon learning that Wernher von Braun, whose work was foundational to the Apollo program, was a former Nazi, or that he used slaves to build his rockets in wartime Germany—20,000 of whom died in his factory. Utopian dreams, even in space, always have a human cost. Utopian dreams, even in space, always have a human cost. Remember that the labor needed to support colonial-capitalism in the United States fueled the atrocities of the Atlantic slave trade. Bezos and Musk’s technological visions of becoming an “interplanetary species” do not answer the political question of what kind of future awaits us (whoever “us” is) in space. Will we find, like the British East India Company, that SpaceX and Blue Origin’s space colonies are ultimately incorporated into an arm of the state, inadvertently transforming the United States into an intergalactic empire? Will space corporations, following the Virginia or Massachusetts Bay Companies, break free of their home states (and planets) and become independent governing entities on the moon or Mars? Or will Bezos and Musk, in the image of King Leopold’s horrifically violent Belgian Congo, wrangle their way into becoming personal kings of princely celestial estates? And will states be able to stop them? **The language of inevitability that proponents of space colonization deploy obscures another, better option: that we do not colonize space at all.**

#### the settler system is in terminal crisis – assuaging its anxieties results in ongoing extinction scenarios inevitable.

Mitchell, 17 [(Audra Mitchell, CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics, Balsillie School of International Affairs, and Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, former Senior Lecturer in International Relations, department of Politics, University of York, Ph.D. Queen’s University of Belfast, “Decolonizing against extinction part I: extinction is violence,” Worldly, 7-28-2017, <https://worldlyir.wordpress.com/2017/07/28/decolonizing-against-extinction-part-i-extinction-is-violence/>)KMM]

**Western scientists are proclaiming the start of a ‘sixth mass extinction event’ that may involve the destruction of more than three quarters of earth’s currently-existing life forms**. In their attempts to explain this phenomenon, most scientists have converged around four major, interlinked drivers: **climate change, habitat destruction, species exchange, and the direct killing of plants and animals**. In most cases, these drivers are understood as the unintended consequences of generic ‘human’ activity, and as a **result of desirable trends** such as development or urbanization (Wilson 2002; Barnosky 2014; Ceballos 2016). **A crucial driver is missing** from this list: **transversal structural violence against Indigenous peoples and their relations, and colonial violence in particular**. ‘Structural violence’ involves systemic forms of harm, exclusion and discrimination that disproportionately affect particular groups, and which can take many forms (physical, psychological, economic, gendered and others). They are embedded in and expressed through political, cultural, economic and social structures (Farmer 2009) that can persist across large spans of time and space. I use the term ‘transversal’ to refer to forms of structural violence that extend across multiple boundaries – not only those of nation-states, but also other kinds of nations (human and otherwise), communities or kinship groups, and temporalities. Prime examples of transversal structural violence include: **settler colonialism, colonial genocides** (Woolford et al 2014); **environmental racism or ‘slow violence’, including toxification and pollution; and complexes of sexual, physical, communal, spiritual and land-based violence associated with the extractive industries**. Each of these forms of violence **is ecologically devastating, and their convergence in European projects of colonisation is even more so**. Many formations of transversal structural violence are **significant causes of** the so-called ‘four horsemen’ of **extinction** mentioned above. For instance, ‘direct killing’ is carried out to clear land for settlement, and it occurs as a result of ecological damage caused by resource extraction. **Settler colonialism**, carbon-based economies and regimes of environmental racism also **support forms of socio-economic organization** (for instance, carbon and energy-intensive urbanized societies) **that intensify climate change and increase habitat destruction**. Meanwhile, colonization has played a significant role in the ongoing transfer of life forms across the planet – whether unintentionally (e.g. the transfer of fish in the bilge water of ships); as an instrument of agricultural settlement (e.g. cattle ranching), or as a deliberate strategy of violence (e.g. smallpox). However, **transversal structural violence is a driver of extinction in itself, with its own distinct manifestations**. First, it **involves the disruption or severance of relations and kinship structures between human communities and other life forms, and the dissolution of Indigenous systems of governance, laws and protocols that have co-created and sustained plural worlds over millennia** (Borrows 2010; Atleo 2012; Kimmerer 2013). Second, **the destruction of Indigenous knowledges through policies of assimilation, expropriation, cultural appropriation and other strategies undermines these forms of order and the relationships they nurture**. Third, **the displacement of and/or restricted access to land by Indigenous peoples interferes with practices of caring for land or Country that are necessary for the survival of humans and other life forms** (Bawaka Country 2015). **Colonial genocides embody all of these forms of destruction by killing or displacing Indigenous communities, undermining Indigenous modes of governance and kinship systems, systematically destroying relationships between life forms and erasing knowledge**. All of these modes of violence weaken co-constitutive relationships between Indigenous communities, other life forms and ecosystems that have enabled their collaborative survival. This results in disruptions to ecosystems – and climate – that Potawatomi scholar Kyle Powys Whyte (2016) has recently argued would have been considered a dystopia by his Ancestors. In other words, transversal structural violence, and colonial violence in particular, are fundamental drivers of global patterns of extinction. It stands to reason, then, that **responses to extinction that focus on managing endangered species or populations, or ‘backing up’ genetic material, are insufficient: they leave the structures of violence intact and may add to their power.** Instead, **efforts to address extinction need to focus on identifying, confronting and dismantling these formations of violence, and on restoring or strengthening the relations they sever**. Yet responses to global patterns of extinction are overwhelmingly rooted in Western scientific concepts of conservation – a paradigm that emerged within 20th century European colonial government structures (Adams 2004). Contemporary conservation approaches – from the creation of land and marine parks to the archiving of genetic materials – may exacerbate the destruction of relations between Indigenous peoples and their relations. For instance, conservation strategies often involve displacing Indigenous peoples from the land that they care for (Jago 2017, Brockington and Igoe 2006), or curtailing of processes such as subsistence hunting, fishing or burning that have enabled the co-survival of Indigenous groups, plants, animals and land for millennia. Meanwhile, ex situ and genetic forms of conservation (including zoos and gene banks) may violate these relationships by instrumentalizing or commodifying kinship relations. Increasingly popular conservation approaches based on Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) approaches claim to center Indigenous communities and knowledges. However, they ultimately instrumentalize fragments of Indigenous knowledge systems (for instance, data on climatic change) to test or support Western approaches. As such, they leave the structures of colonization and other forms of transversal structural violence untouched, and may even exacerbate them. **All of this suggests that confronting global patterns of extinction calls for decolonization and other ethos that work to eliminate transversal structural violence** – and I don’t mean this metaphorically. Enabling the restoration of relations that can enable the ongoing flourishing of life on earth will require the transfer of land and power back into plural Indigenous peoples and their distinct modes of sovereignty, law and governance (Tuck and Yang 2012). These relationships and forms of order have enabled plural Indigenous peoples and their multitude of relations to co-flourish for millennia, including through periods of rapid climate change, and they are needed to ensure the continuation of this co-flourishing. **This means that decolonization is not simply related to global patterns of extinction: it is necessary to ensuring the ongoingness of plural life forms on earth.**