### 2

#### The 1AC is nothing more than an expression of jouissance. The affirmative gains morphed pleasure from advocating violence.

#### Hook 17 [Derek Hook; Duquesne University and University of Pretoria; “What Is ‘Enjoyment as a Political Factor’?” *Political Psychology;* 2017; Date Accessed: 27 July 2019.] DG MONT K TEAM

**Jouissance** then **is** an **enjoyment intermingled with suffering**; **it is** a type of painful arousal **poised on** the verge of the **trauma**tic; an enjoyment that stretches the subject beyond the bounds of the pleasurable. In a 1966 lecture, Lacan highlights the relation between pain and enjoyment: “[T]here is jouissance at the level at which pain begins to appear, and we know that it is only at this level of pain that a whole dimension of the organism can be experienced” (Lacan, cited in Braunstein, 2003, p. 103). More bluntly yet: “[J]ouissance is suffering” (Lacan, 1992, p. 184). Pleasure itself—as bound to desire and adhering to the principle of constancy—can be seen as a defense against jouissance, which goes beyond the principle of constancy. Jouissance is thus diametrically opposed both to pleasure and to desire (Braunstein, 2003). Not only does **jouissance** exceed the boundaries of ordinary pleasure, it likewise **exceeds phenomenological registration.** There is something untranslatable in the bodily register of jouissance. It evades the domestication of symbolic capture—it is, for Lacan, the only substance known to psychoanalysis (“the psychoanalytic experience presupposes...the substance of the body,” he says, in Seminar XX [1999, p. 23]). Jouissance presents as a residue, a noxious odor, a smear, or, as it is often described, a stain. In Seminar V, Lacan (2017) evocatively describes the subject in jouissance as in a type of radiation or phosphorescence. Hence—as we will go on to see—the emphasis in Lacanian social theory is on the “thickness,” the sensuality, or liminal nature of certain shared cultural and national activities that are said to maintain a powerful bonding capacity. The sexual dimension to enjoyment—the French term jouissance (orgasm) makes this aspect explicit—is perhaps by now apparent, even if the “erotic” charge here needs be grasped in terms of wider range of bodily stimulations and intensities than might normally be assumed. In his Three Essays on Sexuality, Freud (1905) emphasizes the surplus quality of properly sexual (i.e., libidinal) gratifications that arise from, but far exceed, the basis of physiological sensation: [S]exual excitation arises as a by-product, as it were, of a large number of processes that occur in the organism, as soon as they reach a certain degree of intensity, and most especially of any relatively powerful emotion, even though it is of a distressing nature. (p. 233) In sexual enjoyments then, **we have an unavoidable overlap of** physical **pleasure and pain**—”a feelings of tension necessarily involves unpleasure...sexual excitement is counted as unpleasurable feeling...[but] also undoubtedly as pleasure” (p. 209). Freud goes on to call attention to the intricate connection between sexual gratification and that which is distressing to the subject: [I]ntense affective processes...trench upon sexuality... The sexually exciting effects of many emotions which are in themselves unpleasurable... feelings of apprehension, fright or horror, persist in a great number of people throughout their adult life. (p. 203) Sexual excitation here has more to do with a wide range of intensities of simulation than with the narrow domain of genital sexuality. We stand thus warned: What we “get off” on may surprise us. Indeed, what distresses us, what causes us displeasure—even suffering—can turn us on. The use of such a sexual vocabulary assists in drawing out the libidinal aspect of various enjoyments that may otherwise appear distanced from the sexual realm. An example from Shane Meadows’s (2006) film, This is England, helps makes the point. A group of young skinheads attends a rally for the neo-fascist British National Party. At the crescendo of a hate-filled speech delivered by a fiery orator, they become impassioned, inflamed; they start angrily gesticulating, shouting their support, building to a climax of political fervor. There is something sexual in their reaction, in how they “get off” on their hateful anger. The orgasmic quality to the intensity of their reaction is something perfectly captured by the notion of jouissance. Aggression, as Freud so often stressed, involves an intense erotic excitement: The aggressive drive is erotic in its energy. Jouissance can be thought of as subliminal in the sense that **we are not fully conscious of**—or willing to admit to—**the thrills** (the “surplus enjoyments”) **we get in pursuing those activities that trigger libidinal intensity.** This leads to a qualification that helps address one of the concerns voiced above: **Jouissance is not**—as is sometimes assumed—**unconscious**, certainly not so in the Lacanian sense of “the unconscious structured like a language.” Although not at the foreground of consciousness, and typically unacknowledged by the ego, such libidinal intensities are very much present in the aroused bodily state of the subject. In Seminar XX, Lacan (1999) in fact speaks of the “enjoying substance of the body,” emphasizing that the living body is “something that enjoys itself” (p. 23). A related technical point: Enjoyment is not thus repressed but is instead most typically disavowed. (I mean “repressed” here in the technical Freudian/Lacanian sense of being subject to modes of forgetting, to primary process mechanisms of condensation, symbolization, displacement, to various operations of language (metaphor, metonymy), and so on. Disavowal, by contrast, is a defense mechanism by which something is denied even as it remains conspicuously evident. In making this qualification, I am also affirming the Freudian and Lacanian assertion that what is repressed is not affect but an idea or signifier associated with the affect). In conducting an analysis of social modes of jouissance then, one should focus exclusively on uncovering the unconscious underpinnings of a given ideological formation. One should focus rather on the contrary directions that subjects of ideology finds themselves pulled in, prioritizing rather the discontinuities (the disavowals) between professed symbolic values and modes of enjoyment. The Eroticization of Limits Always composite, never an unalloyed pleasure, jouissance always veers off into excess, be it by virtue of the thrills of transgression, or simply by means of its indulgence in what is “too much,” potentially traumatic, necessarily linked to pain. Simply put, such “negative pleasures” are the result of gratification pursued “beyond the pleasure principle,” beyond the bounds of what is healthy, reasonable, or ordinarily permissible. It is not only by virtue of pain, but also by virtue of transgression that jouissance proves excessive. This transgressive quality of jouissance becomes the predominant facet of the concept in Lacan’s (1992) Seminar VII, where effects of enjoyment are contingent on overstepping existing moral and legal laws. As Lacan (1992) suggests: “[W]ithout a transgression there is no access to jouissance” (p. 177). While this is only one of many Lacanian perspectives on the notion of enjoyment (Miller, 2000), the dimension of transgression will prove crucial as we explore the role of jouissance in supporting given social norms and laws. Here we can introduce the rudiments of argument that will be further developed as we continue: Enjoyment, far from being reductively individual or “intrapsychic” in its locus of functioning, is always linked to the symbolic. How so? Well, by virtue of its relation to socially prescribed limits. Its illicit nature is contingent precisely on the limits it transgresses.

#### AND Our sense of security is a distorted fantasy. We try to answer paradoxical questions in quest for wholeness, which links to more insecurity. The fantasy isn’t the issue; the 1AC’s manipulation is.

#### Eberle 17 (Eberle, Jakub. Institute of International Relations. *Narrative, desire, ontological security, transgression: fantasy as a factor in international politics*, Journal of International Relations and Development, 2017)//MONT K TEAM

**Fantasies** have a narrative form (Z ˇiz ˇek 1997: 10). Glynos deﬁnes fantasy as a story that **confronts subjects with** an ideal (covering over the lack in reaching a whole identity) and an obstacle to it (**separation from the ‘object’ of our desire**). Fantasy is **thus** ‘a narrative structure involving some reference to an idealised scenario **promising an imaginary fullness** or wholeness (the beatiﬁc side of fantasy) **and**, by implication, **a disaster scenario** (the horriﬁc side of fantasy)’ (Glynos 2008: 283). When it comes to narrative, earlier IR works deﬁne it as a story with a plot, which somehow links the past, the present and the future (Barnett 1999: 12; Ringmar 2006). Fantasy certainly qualiﬁes under that deﬁnition, but particularly relevant is the recent contribution of Miskimmon et al.(2013: 5), which elaborates the concept in more detail: **‘A narrative entails an initial situation** or order, **a problem that disrupts that order, and a resolution that reestablishes order** […] Narrative therefore is distinguished by a particular structure through which sense is achieved’. Clearly, **there is a signiﬁcant overlap between narrative and fantasy,** especially in the notions of a problem (obstacle) and the promise of the reestablishment of order (achievement of wholeness). The two positions also share some key assumptions, especially that narratives are an important part of human life, that they are paramount for the construction of identities and that they play a central role in the reproduction and contestation of social orders. Both approaches also do away with the binary between ‘thought’ and ‘language’, thereby rejecting the opposition between the common sense association of narration with ‘talking’ and fantasising with ‘thinking’. As Miskimmon et al. put it, ‘Human beings think in narratives’(ibid.: 176, my emphasis), which sits perfectly with the Lacanian argument that even our innermost thoughts adopt the ultimately social form of language. While the IR work on narratives and Lacanian theory start from different perspectives, the conceptualisation of fantasy as narrative opens a trading zone for mutual enrichment. However, there are also differences, which show us the added value of fantasy for narrative IR. Narrative is a broader concept, whereas fantasy is one particular type of narrative.2 Focusing on what makes fantasy speciﬁc sheds light on aspects of social life which are now largely outside of the lens of the narrative approach. The particular character of **fantasy lies** in its close relation **to desire,** which it produces and arouses through **the promise of the ‘object’ and/or the justiﬁcation of its absence**.3 In a ﬁrst step, fantasy is thus deﬁned as narrative imbued with desire, as narrative + desire. From a Lacanian point of view, **our fundamental desire is to cover the lack and achieve a complete and stable identity in order to overcome the anxiety-inducing self-doubt and feed our ‘hunger for certainty’** (Edkins 2000: 154). In order to relate to this desire, **fantasies are** distinguished from other narratives also by their excessively simpliﬁed and clear-cut, **‘black and white**’ character, which l**eaves little room for ambiguity** or uncertainty. Their affective pull is secured not only by the simple construction of the ‘object’, but also by linking its achievement to dramatically simpliﬁed visions of the future. Typically, in fantasies, there are only two possible versions of the future with no middle ground: either we recapture the ‘object’ and we are safe (the beatiﬁc scenario of securing a complete identity), or we fail and we are doomed (the horriﬁc scenario of losing it). The ‘object’ in fantasies and/or those preventing us from capturing it thus attract desire with a particular force, because our very identity is portrayed as depending on this ‘object’. Thereby, fantasies impose a strong degree of closure on our narration of the world. Therefore, **fantasies present only one** type of **‘resolution’** to the **‘problem’** that is **envisaged** by the deﬁnition of narrative provided by Miskimmon et al., one that is particularly dramatic and plays **on** desires and **anxieties. Fantasies** are those types of narratives, which shelter us from anxiety by **denying** any **ambiguity** or complexity of the given situation. They feed our ‘hunger for certainty’ by **offering us the false safety** of a clear-cut choice between two—and only two—options, which are constructed as excessively beatiﬁc and horriﬁc respectively. To brieﬂy illustrate the point, many narratives can be provided as a ‘resolution’ following a terrorist attack, including those highlighting the impossibility (lack) of absolute security and the need to accept that no matter how tight our security measures are, there may always be more attacks—or maybe not; we simply do not know. Such narratives could remain open to a broad array of possible futures, acknowledge that no certainty is possible, or even blur the line between ‘us’ and ‘terrorists’ and allow for a more ambiguous narration of the world and our own identity within it. Fantasies would be only those narratives that would portray the situation with little room for doubt, as an existential struggle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’.   
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While this literature does not elaborate on the concept of narrative as much as some of the works cited in the previous section, it provides a more detailed account of the interweaving of linguistic and affective aspects of human existence. Kinnvall (2004) and Steele (2005, 2008) are particularly clear in this respect, outlining the relationship between language and affect/emotion in terms of mutual dependence: anxiety and shame provoke the construction of narratives, while narratives help overcome these unpleasant states. This cycle, where an identity crisis leads to the affective experience of anxiety, which is overcome through a narrative effort, is very similar to what I have described in terms of dealing with the lack in the subject by the construction of particular ‘objects’. **Therefore, in a second step, fantasy can be outlined as narrative + desire + ontological security**. It is a narrative that captures the subjective desire for wholeness and transforms it into a scenario that provides subjects with (the promise of) ontological security. While the overlap of the fantasy framework and ontological security is even closer than the overlap of the approach and the scholarship on narratives, there are indeed also differences, pointing to the speciﬁc contribution that fantasy can make. First, the concept of desire plays at best a secondary role in the ontological security literature. While the abstract desire for ‘wholeness’ is implicitly present in the postulate that subjects need and search for ontological security, the literature does not offer an argument which would explain how exactly this can be tracked in discourse. The **incorporation of fantasy thus offers a better appreciation of the role of desire in the search for ontological security, as well as a way of operationalising desire via the ‘object’ of a fantasy**. Thereby, the fantasy framework develops the ontological security literature by offering conceptual and analytical tools for the examination of the linguistic/affective process of the search for ontological security. Second, the **Lacanian idea that all subjects are lacking and incomplete can clarify the ambiguous relationship of ontological security to closure and provide the literature with a politicised conception of the subject. The political added value of the fantasy approach thus lies in highlighting the problematic, exclusionary and potentially oppressive consequences of the search for ontological security**. As Rossdale (2015) observes, while authors like Kinnvall, Mitzen and Steele are aware of the fragile and potentially pathological nature of ontological security-seeking, they still value the ideal of a secure subject with a stable sense of identity.4 In contrast, from the fantasy perspective, there are no secure subjects or stable identities because of the dependence of the subject on the open and slippery system of language and because of the impossibility of fully expressing the affective and corporeal aspects of subjectivity in the foreign realm of discourse. While ontological security envisages a secure and stable subject (if only as an ideal), the **Lacanian subject is irreducibly unstable and incomplete. Consequently, the Lacanian aim is not to ﬁnd a (necessarily temporary and illusory) harmonious state or a secure self, but rather to learn to accept and live with the constitutive lack** (Z ˇiz ˇek 1989; Edkins 2003). These distinctions translate into a different relationship to fantasy. From the ontological security perspective, the role of fantasies could be viewed as positive, since **fantasies actually do help subjects overcome anxiety and gain an apparently stable sense of self.** What can possibly be wrong about that? As Rossdale (2015) demonstrates, ontological security is a form of closure, since **it erases the ambiguities and contradictions of a subject and forecloses alternative becomings**. Through attachment to a particular identity, subjects contribute to there production of the social order within which this identity is constructed. This presents a fundamental paradox where our apparently benign and decent desires, including that for a stable identity, may contribute to the perpetuation of the oppression and exclusion of others. The identity of a ‘white American Christian patriot’, for example, could have had psychologically stabilising effects in the 1950s. However, such identiﬁcation was com  
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Second, if fantasies and desires have such disturbing consequences, what can we do about them? **The option that is not available is getting rid of fantasies and suspending our desires in favour of rational communicative politic**s, for instance of a Habermasian or Rawlsian nature (see also Mouffe 2000). As I have shown, the emergence of fantasy and desire is correlative with our constitution as subjects, and there is no reality behind and beyond fantasy. We cannot escape fantasies, but what we can do is to look for a different way of relating to them, one that would acknowledge fantasies as fantasies—rather than ‘the way things really are’. Put differently, ‘the ethical challenge […] is to reveal the very contingency which fantasy seeks to hide’ (Hawkins 2015: 143)**. Fantasies will always be there, but the key ethical and political question is whether we afﬁrm and act upon them, or rather confront them and thereby relax the ‘grip’ they exercise over us** (Glynos 2001; Glynos and Howarth 2007). I may not be able to suspend my desires—for a new iPad, sexual partner, ‘security’ or ‘justice’, but I can certainly ‘not give way’ to them (Z ˇiz ˇek 1989; Glynos 2000), that is, not act upon them, or, at the very least, think twice before doing so. The most important thing is to acknowledge that none of these ‘objects’ will help me overcome the fundamental lack that is at the heart of my subjectivity, that my desires are ultimately unfulﬁllable and that they arrest me into a simpliﬁed vision of the world. As long as I keep in mind that **what I call ‘reality’ is much more ambiguous as it is the effect of my only partially conscious desires and that my longing for a stable sense of self can have adverse effects on others, I can achieve a healthier relationship to my fantasy.** Such perpetual struggle with oneself is certainly not easy as it disturbs the comfort zone of ontological security. Nevertheless, it challenges the closure criticised by Rossdale and others and can lead to a more open-ended, democratic and ‘less fantasmatic’ politics based on perpetual self-reﬂection and a constant and radical exercise of doubt (Stavrakakis 1999). In other words, while the ontological security argument is prone to elevating the subjective ontological security at the price of reproducing exclusionary orders, the fantasy approach rejects the (illusory) comfort zone of a stable identity and invites the perpetual exercise of doubt as an ethical imperative.

#### Their view of problems leads to an endless quest for jouissance that causes ressentiment and psychic violence.

#### Hook 17 [Derek Hook; Duquesne University and University of Pretoria; “What Is ‘Enjoyment as a Political Factor’?” *Political Psychology;* 2017; Date Accessed: 27 July 2019.] DG MONT K TEAM

**Jouissance** of the Drive We can now add a further qualification, namely that jouissance and affect should not be equated. It **is** more accurate to understand jouissance as a mode of intensity, **a type of arousa**l—a thrilling twist—**that occurs when affect moves beyond the bounds of what is comfortable, reasonable, or satisfying**. Bearing this in mind prevents us from making the error of thinking jouissance as itself a variety of affect that permits for easy categorization (as in types such as anger, frustration, joy, etc.). **Enjoyment should not be delimited in this way**; it is neither a subcategory of affect nor the preserve of a limited range of affects. We can further refine our understanding of the concept by stressing, as Lacan (1992), that **“jouissance appears** not purely and simply as the satisfaction of a need, but **as the satisfaction of a drive**” (p. 209). Furthermore, **any** drive impulse—be it “blind” **physiological sensation** or a more overly “goal-directed” activity—**can serve as the basis of jouissance.** It helps here to signal the omnipresence of enjoyment in everyday life, to indicate that any drive activity—”drive” understood here as the psychical elaboration of pressing bodily impulses—is linked to the pursuit of **jouissance**. We should evoke here the notion of the death drive; doing so allows us to offer a succinct formulation: [J]ouissance **is a form of enjoyment willing to exceed the parameters of life.** Miller (1992) is once again instructive: To understand the concept of jouissance in Lacan as unique is to understand “that it concerns at the same time libido and death drive, libido and aggression, not as two antagonistic forces external to one another, but as a knot” (pp. 25–26). Lacan (2007) goes so far as to declare that **jouissance is “the path towards death”** (p. 17), a comment **which** calls to mind Freud’s earlier (1924) observation that “even **the subject’s destruction of himself cannot take place without libidinal satisfaction**” (p. 170). This opens a further dimension of the concept, which, as we will go on to see, must be related both to the notions of the law and the superego. Hence, Eagleton’s (2003) description of jouissance as “the lethal pleasure of Freud[’s] primary masochism, in which we reap delight from the way that the law or superego unleashes its demented sadism upon us” (p. 198). **Jouissance**, then, to review the key points made above **is**: (1) diametrically opposed to pleasure and desire; (2) bodily and **subliminal rather than unconscious in nature**; (3) less an affect than an excess of affect, **a** mode of intensity produced by pursuing drive impulses; (4) necessarily “**negative**” (excessive, traumatic) **in the sense that it is inflected with the death drive**; (5) takes the form of contravention (is transgressive) **inasmuch as it pushes the subject painfully** (enjoyably) **beyond the law or socially prescribed limits**. “Negative Dialectics” Our own enjoyment—let alone that of others—is, for the most part, repulsive to us, and needs to be kept at arm’s length. The subject’s stance regards their own enjoyment is thus necessarily conflicted. Jouissance exacerbates the split in **the** subject who at once reviles their enjoyment and yet, periodically,succumbs to it. So, ordinary (neurotic) **subjects** want more jouissance, **feel they deserve more enjoyment than they are receiving, and** yet they are also appalled and repulsed by it, more readily **identify**ing **it in the deplorable enjoyments of others.** **Contrary** then to the tendency **to view enjoyment within the frame of isolated individuality, we need rather approach it in terms of prospective relations to others.** Jouissance, insists Macey (1988), “is not...a category of pure subjectivity” (p. 203). Rather, it implies “a dialectic of possession and enjoyment of and by the other” (p. 203). **The revulsion we feel toward our own jouissance is**, as already noted, **all too readily displaced onto others** (as Lacan [1992] laments in Seminar VII: “[W]hat is more of a neighbor to me than this...my jouissance...which I don’t dare go near” [p. 186]). These others, moreover, are always ready to blame for having too much jouissance, for having procured improper or malignant enjoyments that appear to compromise given social or cultural norms or laws. Given neurotic subjects’ presumption that they have surrendered a crucial quantity of enjoyment—an effect of socialization, of the symbolic overwriting the bodily experience of drives—they maintain a preexisting condition of resentment toward such enjoying others. Differently put: This resentment comes before, and thus in a sense determines, what the subject perceives to be the illegitimate or disproportionate enjoyments of others. The perceived existence of **jouissance** thus **implies a social relationship, one that exists before the other upon whom this jouissance will be projected.** So, what even the most elementary experience of jouissance necessitates is a type of hating object-relation, a conflicted mode of intersubjectivity, which is always already there, prior to the racial/cultural/social other who will be assigned a position in this negative interpersonal dialectic. The construction of otherness is thus not merely an effect of social construction. It involves also a libidinal component, a prior attribution of stolen enjoyment, a readymade form of resentment awaiting a blameworthy subject upon whom this crime can be pinned. Enjoyment in the Form of Lack **Jouissance**, certainly once approached as a type of possession, exhibits an odd characteristic: It is never more real than when we have been dispossessed of it. Enjoyment, that is to say, comes most forcefully into being, **is most intensely experienced, when**: (1) I**t is seen to be in the possession of others, or** (2) **when it is** perceived as endangered, **about to be snatched away.** Put differently, ***jouissance*** seems most typically to **exist in an “already stolen” or precarious state;** it only takes form in the shadow of a potential castration. This helps us understand Vighi’s (2010) initially puzzling description. Jouissance, he says, is a type of libidinal excess, most typically experienced as a lack. This experience of surplus, he insists, corresponds to a void: “**[E]very enjoyment is structured around** a lack...**a paradoxical lack of enjoyment**” (p. 25). Furthermore: **We perceive enjoyment not as lack but as fullness, a ubiquitous substance that fills our lives and gives it meaning.** Here we are faced by what we might call the “enjoyment parallax,” with parallax naming the different aspects of the same object viewed from...different lines of sight. Although enjoyment in its deepest connotation is always a lack, we...perceiv[e] it as fullness. (p. 25) **This facet of enjoyment**—**that it oscillates between surplus and absence**, a “too much” and a “not enough”—once again **highlights the intersubjective aspect of the concept.** Moreover, if it is the case, as Vighi (2010) argues, that attributions of enjoyment invariably spring from the experience of lack, then it is unsurprising that this lack should be allocated a cause, and, more importantly yet, a suspect who is responsible for this lack. Jouissance, that is to say, entails an elementary narrative component. **The most rudimentary experience of jouissance implies** already the role—**the fantasy**—of a culprit, **someone who enjoys more than I, or who is poised to steal the little enjoyment that I do possess.** One of the most articulate expressions of this idea is offered by Stavrakakis (1999) who insists that the festivals of **jouissance by means of** which we constitute our “national ways of **enjoyment” are always in some way lacking**: No matter how much we love our national ways of enjoyment, our national real, this real is never enough, it is already castrated... this loss can be attributed to the existence of an alien culture or people: the enjoyment lacking from our national community is being denied to us because “they” stole it.... What is not realised within such a schema is the fact...that we never had at our disposal the surplus enjoyment that we accuse the Other of stealing. (p. 156) The modes of jouissance that we have been discussing cannot be dismissed merely as individual or idiosyncratic quirks (which, of course, is not to say there will not be considerable latitude in terms of how these forms of enjoyment are experienced by individuals). How though is this “structured” quality of enjoyment to be explained? This is a particularly important question given that the notion of jouissance as developed in the clinic is always attuned to the singularity of a subject’s enjoyment.

#### Nature is a hyper object, it doesn’t truly exist – speaking for nature is a superficial attempt to fulfill one’s jouissance. It is necessary to let go of the jouissance within oneself, to have a moment of transubstantiation. We must attempt “Symbolic Suicide” as an attempt to reach in towards that dark void of the unconscious, allowing pleasure, displeasure, and emptiness to emerge. The exploitation of nature is threatening to the relationship of the subject, and thus, nature is able to destroy the subject. Dark ecology is the necessary shift to engage the Hyper Object, and utilizes melancholic ethics and ecopsychoanalysis

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Dark ecology The shift in perspective that climate change has forced us into is dizzying. Now that the seemingly stable neutral background we call `environment' has dissolved into an all too contingent accident, the foreground itself disappears, in Morton's (2010b) view, as foreground cannot exist without background. Global warming . . . has performed a radical shift in the status of the weather . . . Because the world as such, not just a certain idea of world, but world, in its entirety, has evaporated. Or rather, we are realizing that we never had it in the first place . . . **Global warming is a prime example of what I now call a hyper-object, an object that is massively distributed in space-time which radically transforms our ideas of what an object is** . . . It's like suddenly discovering that you've been conducting your business in the expanding sphere of a slow-motion nuclear bomb. You have a few seconds for amazement as the fantasy that you inhabited, a neat seamless little world, melts away. (Morton 2010b) The **solution**, according to Morton, **is** to abandon the comforting fantasy of our Hobbit-like Heideggerian `life-worlds' and **embrace** what he calls a **dark ecology**, based on a `melancholic ethics' (Morton 2007: 186), with interesting potential connections with a Kleinian ecopsychoanalysis shorn of certain of its ontological pretensions (Robbins & Goicoechea 1996), becoming what Steven Brown and Paul Stenner (2009) call a `psychology without foundations'. Morton himself, in his latest book, The Ecological Thought (Morton 2010a), has emphasized the n**on-identitarian, non-substantialist and non-teleological interconnectedness that modern science, and especially ecology, leads us towards**, in ways which we can relate to the discussion of Manuel DeLanda's (2005: 93) concept of `meshworks' and to the perspective of this book in general. For Morton (2010a: 28), `the ecological thought stirs because the mesh appears in our social, psychic, and scientific domains.' Morton's (2010a: 83) **call for a `true materialism' which would consider `matter as self-assembling sets of interrelationships in which information is directly inscribed' has resonances with my own views.** This book argues that the call can best be answered by drawing on the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, and the sciences of complexity and chaos. The working through of these ideas in relation to psychoanalysis and the ecological crisis is the major theoretical task of the remaining chapters of this book.

#### Dark Ecology is necessary to redefine human life.

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ENDING BEFORE THE BEGINNING **The ecological era** we find ourselves in—whether we like it or not and whether we recognize it or not—**makes necessary a searching revaluation of philosophy, politics, and art.** The very idea of being “in” an era is in question. We are “in” the Anthropocene, but that era is also “in” a moment of far longer duration. What is the present? How can it be thought? What is presence? **Ecological awareness forces us to think and feel at multiple scales, scales that disorient normative concepts such as “present,” “life,” “human,” “nature,” “thing,” “thought,” and “logic.”** Dark Ecology shall argue that there are **layers of attunement to ecological reality more accurate than what is habitual in the media, in the academy, and in society at large.** These attunement structures are necessarily weird, a precise term that we shall explore in depth. Weirdness involves the hermeneutical knowingness belonging to the practices that the humanities maintain. The attunement, which I call ecognosis, implies a practical yet highly nonstandard vision of what ecological politics could be. In part, **ecognosis involves realizing that nonhumans are installed at profound levels of the human**—not just biologically and socially but **in** the very **structure of thought and logic.** Coexisting with these nonhumans is ecological thought, art, ethics, and politics. **Dark Ecology traces the ecological crisis to a logistical “program” that has been running unquestioned since the Neolithic. Dark Ecology argues that ecological reality requires an awareness that at first has the characteristics of tragic melancholy and negativity, concerning inextricable coexistence with a host of entities that surround and penetrate us, but which evolves paradoxically into an anarchic, comedic sense of coexistence.** In the First Thread of this book, I argue that ecological awareness takes the form of a loop. In this loop we become aware of ourselves as a species—a task far more difficult than it superficially appears. We also grow familiar with a logistics of human social, psychic, and philosophical space, a twelve-thousand-year set of procedures that resulted in the very global warming it was designed to fend off. The Second Thread shows that the logistics represses a paradoxical realm of human-nonhuman relations. The realm contains tricksterlike beings that have a loop form, which is why ecological phenomena and awareness have a loop form. The growing familiarity with this state of affairs is a manifestation of dark ecology. Dark ecology begins in darkness as depression. It traverses darkness as ontological mystery. It ends as dark sweetness. The Third Thread maps these stages, while outlining the ethics and politics that emerge from dark ecology. The Arctic Russian town of Nikel looks horrifying at first, like something out of Tarkovsky’s Stalker, only on bad acid. A forest devastated by an iron-smelting factory. Soviet buildings stark and bleak. Mounds of garbage sitting on hills of slag. A final tree, last of the pines destroyed by the sulfur dioxide. We were Sonic Acts, a small group of musicians, artists, and writers. We had traveled there in later 2014 to start a four-year art and research project called Dark Ecology. Then Nikel becomes rather sad and melancholic. A collection of broken things. Past things. Garages repurposed as homes. Broken metal structures in which people are living. Holding on to things for no reason. Sometimes the smelting plant is closed because the price of iron plummets. Then all lose their jobs. Then it restarts. The Norwegians pay the plant to direct its smoke elsewhere than across the very border, ever so close. That means the factory directs the smoke over Russians. Peeling paint, telling stories of decisions and indecisions and nondecisions. And then for some strange reason it becomes warm. There is a Palace of the Future, full of wonderful kitschy communist art, Terry Gilliam sculpturelike lampshades, hauntingly luminous pale blues, pinks, and yellows, the building grooving as hard as a Tibetan stupa. And on the outskirts the reality of death is so explicit. It’s a charnel ground almost identical to the one on Mount Kailash, another very friendly place where offerings (or are they huge piles of garbage?) litter the space at the top and nuns meditate in a land strewn with bits of corpse like an emergency room. People are dying, or are they going to live, or are they already dead? There is a lot of blood, severing and severed limbs. A lot of care. It’s even a little bit funny. A drag queen poses for a photographer outside a metallic building. Some kind of joy is here. The demons and ghosts aren’t demons or ghosts. They are faeries and sprites. The arche-lithic. **Dark ecology thinks the truth of death, a massive cognitive relief that if integrated into social form would embody nonviolence.** It makes you wonder, maybe we should store plutonium neither deep underground with militarized warnings nor in knives and forks without any warning whatsoever (this was actually suggested in the late 1990s). Let’s get small pieces of plutonium, store them in a way that we can monitor them, and encase them in a substance that will not leak radiation, aboveground, so you can maintain the structure and so that you can take responsibility for it. You, the human, made the plutonium, or you the human can understand what it is—therefore you are responsible. Let’s put these structures in the middle of every town square in the land. One day there will be pilgrimages to them and circumambulations. A whole spirituality of care will arise around them. Horror and depression will give way to sadness and joy. We bristle plutoniumly. Or we feel suicidal plutoniumly. Or we cry plutoniumly. Or we even dance plutoniumly. The arche-lithic. There is always already a relationship to a nonhuman. In anticipation of this future, let’s make metal personnel covers and plant them in the town square. On the covers will be stamped the following sentence: FUTURE PEOPLE WILL MAINTAIN PLUTONIUM HERE. Or let’s team up with some physicists and get hold of a plutonium battery. Let’s encase it in a safe storage chamber. Then let’s put it in MoMA. That might be a good start. Jae Rhim Lee’s Mushroom Burial Suit is infused with familiar mushroom mycelia. With hairs and skin flakes and tweezers and petri dishes, you can train these mushrooms to recognize and enjoy eating your flesh. Then, when you die, you can be placed in your suit in one of her flat-pack slotted cardboard coffins, and the mushrooms digest you in two days. It’s even better than being left for the vultures, because the mushrooms metabolize the mercury. Or you could act like an Egyptian seed and be cryogenically suspended for several hundred years—when the future people open the chamber, they will be so pleased to see you. How did they manage without you? They will regard the fact that the chamber ate even more energy than regular living you as a minor inconvenience. Decomponaut or cryonaut: it depends on whether you are OK with widening your view, taking your eyes out of the telescopic sight of Life, putting down the agrilogistic tube, and resting in the charnel ground.1 Let’s pour the oil of death on the troubled water of agrilogistics.