## 1

#### The 1AC is nothing more than an expression of jouissance. The affirmative gains morphed pleasure from advocating violence.

#### Hook 17 [Derek Hook; Duquesne University and University of Pretoria; “What Is ‘Enjoyment as a Political Factor’?” *Political Psychology;* 2017; Date Accessed: 27 July 2019.] DG MONT K TEAM

**Jouissance** then **is** an **enjoyment intermingled with suffering**; **it is** a type of painful arousal **poised on** the verge of the **trauma**tic; an enjoyment that stretches the subject beyond the bounds of the pleasurable. In a 1966 lecture, Lacan highlights the relation between pain and enjoyment: “[T]here is jouissance at the level at which pain begins to appear, and we know that it is only at this level of pain that a whole dimension of the organism can be experienced” (Lacan, cited in Braunstein, 2003, p. 103). More bluntly yet: “[J]ouissance is suffering” (Lacan, 1992, p. 184). Pleasure itself—as bound to desire and adhering to the principle of constancy—can be seen as a defense against jouissance, which goes beyond the principle of constancy. Jouissance is thus diametrically opposed both to pleasure and to desire (Braunstein, 2003). Not only does **jouissance** exceed the boundaries of ordinary pleasure, it likewise **exceeds phenomenological registration.** There is something untranslatable in the bodily register of jouissance. It evades the domestication of symbolic capture—it is, for Lacan, the only substance known to psychoanalysis (“the psychoanalytic experience presupposes...the substance of the body,” he says, in Seminar XX [1999, p. 23]). Jouissance presents as a residue, a noxious odor, a smear, or, as it is often described, a stain. In Seminar V, Lacan (2017) evocatively describes the subject in jouissance as in a type of radiation or phosphorescence. Hence—as we will go on to see—the emphasis in Lacanian social theory is on the “thickness,” the sensuality, or liminal nature of certain shared cultural and national activities that are said to maintain a powerful bonding capacity. The sexual dimension to enjoyment—the French term jouissance (orgasm) makes this aspect explicit—is perhaps by now apparent, even if the “erotic” charge here needs be grasped in terms of wider range of bodily stimulations and intensities than might normally be assumed. In his Three Essays on Sexuality, Freud (1905) emphasizes the surplus quality of properly sexual (i.e., libidinal) gratifications that arise from, but far exceed, the basis of physiological sensation: [S]exual excitation arises as a by-product, as it were, of a large number of processes that occur in the organism, as soon as they reach a certain degree of intensity, and most especially of any relatively powerful emotion, even though it is of a distressing nature. (p. 233) In sexual enjoyments then, **we have an unavoidable overlap of** physical **pleasure and pain**—”a feelings of tension necessarily involves unpleasure...sexual excitement is counted as unpleasurable feeling...[but] also undoubtedly as pleasure” (p. 209). Freud goes on to call attention to the intricate connection between sexual gratification and that which is distressing to the subject: [I]ntense affective processes...trench upon sexuality... The sexually exciting effects of many emotions which are in themselves unpleasurable... feelings of apprehension, fright or horror, persist in a great number of people throughout their adult life. (p. 203) Sexual excitation here has more to do with a wide range of intensities of simulation than with the narrow domain of genital sexuality. We stand thus warned: What we “get off” on may surprise us. Indeed, what distresses us, what causes us displeasure—even suffering—can turn us on. The use of such a sexual vocabulary assists in drawing out the libidinal aspect of various enjoyments that may otherwise appear distanced from the sexual realm. An example from Shane Meadows’s (2006) film, This is England, helps makes the point. A group of young skinheads attends a rally for the neo-fascist British National Party. At the crescendo of a hate-filled speech delivered by a fiery orator, they become impassioned, inflamed; they start angrily gesticulating, shouting their support, building to a climax of political fervor. There is something sexual in their reaction, in how they “get off” on their hateful anger. The orgasmic quality to the intensity of their reaction is something perfectly captured by the notion of jouissance. Aggression, as Freud so often stressed, involves an intense erotic excitement: The aggressive drive is erotic in its energy. Jouissance can be thought of as subliminal in the sense that **we are not fully conscious of**—or willing to admit to—**the thrills** (the “surplus enjoyments”) **we get in pursuing those activities that trigger libidinal intensity.** This leads to a qualification that helps address one of the concerns voiced above: **Jouissance is not**—as is sometimes assumed—**unconscious**, certainly not so in the Lacanian sense of “the unconscious structured like a language.” Although not at the foreground of consciousness, and typically unacknowledged by the ego, such libidinal intensities are very much present in the aroused bodily state of the subject. In Seminar XX, Lacan (1999) in fact speaks of the “enjoying substance of the body,” emphasizing that the living body is “something that enjoys itself” (p. 23). A related technical point: Enjoyment is not thus repressed but is instead most typically disavowed. (I mean “repressed” here in the technical Freudian/Lacanian sense of being subject to modes of forgetting, to primary process mechanisms of condensation, symbolization, displacement, to various operations of language (metaphor, metonymy), and so on. Disavowal, by contrast, is a defense mechanism by which something is denied even as it remains conspicuously evident. In making this qualification, I am also affirming the Freudian and Lacanian assertion that what is repressed is not affect but an idea or signifier associated with the affect). In conducting an analysis of social modes of jouissance then, one should focus exclusively on uncovering the unconscious underpinnings of a given ideological formation. One should focus rather on the contrary directions that subjects of ideology finds themselves pulled in, prioritizing rather the discontinuities (the disavowals) between professed symbolic values and modes of enjoyment. The Eroticization of Limits Always composite, never an unalloyed pleasure, jouissance always veers off into excess, be it by virtue of the thrills of transgression, or simply by means of its indulgence in what is “too much,” potentially traumatic, necessarily linked to pain. Simply put, such “negative pleasures” are the result of gratification pursued “beyond the pleasure principle,” beyond the bounds of what is healthy, reasonable, or ordinarily permissible. It is not only by virtue of pain, but also by virtue of transgression that jouissance proves excessive. This transgressive quality of jouissance becomes the predominant facet of the concept in Lacan’s (1992) Seminar VII, where effects of enjoyment are contingent on overstepping existing moral and legal laws. As Lacan (1992) suggests: “[W]ithout a transgression there is no access to jouissance” (p. 177). While this is only one of many Lacanian perspectives on the notion of enjoyment (Miller, 2000), the dimension of transgression will prove crucial as we explore the role of jouissance in supporting given social norms and laws. Here we can introduce the rudiments of argument that will be further developed as we continue: Enjoyment, far from being reductively individual or “intrapsychic” in its locus of functioning, is always linked to the symbolic. How so? Well, by virtue of its relation to socially prescribed limits. Its illicit nature is contingent precisely on the limits it transgresses.

#### War and extinction is the affirmative’s drug. The 1AC was 6 minutes of the same jouissance that functions within the libidinal economy of the state.

#### Hook 2nd [Derek Hook; Duquesne University and University of Pretoria; “What Is ‘Enjoyment as a Political Factor’?” *Political Psychology;* 2017; Date Accessed: 27 July 2019.] DG MONT K TEAM

Untoward Enjoyments Kathryn Bigelow’s award-winning (2008) war film The Hurt Locker begins with a quote: “**The rush of battle is a potent and often lethal addiction, for war is a drug.**” This perceptive remark, according to which heightened distressing affects often become forms of passion that are not easily sacrificed or moderated, points us in the direction of the Lacanian concept of jouissance. The remark provides an example of how ideologies attach themselves to—as Jodi Dean (2006) puts it—a traumatic element, a kernel of intensity. This is what Zizek (1994) has in mind with his notion of enjoyment as a political factor, the idea that ideology works upon us not simply as a system of representation or a mode of discourse, but via the currency of enjoyment. There is, Dean insists, an “irrational nugget involved in accepting authority...[in] responding to an ideological hail... [this irrationality] is manifest in actions and practices in which the subject does apart from what the subject claims to know” (2006, p. 190). Ideology then is more than a question of social structure and discursive values. Moreover, the libidinal component of ideology—that which is most enjoyed in an ideology—occurs in spite of what the subject claims to know or believe, in ways that contradict what he or she would ordinarily assert as a rational or morally defensive position. I have tried elsewhere—drawing on authors working in political studies (such as Glynos, 2001; Stavrakakis, 2007; Zi zek, 1992, 1994)—to make the argument that the concept of jouissance/enjoyment is of vital importance for political psychology, particularly in the study of racism. In what follows, I explore and develop this crucial tenet of Lacanian social theory: that forms of libidinal enjoyment play an indispensable part in the domain of the political. We fail to grasp something essential about the interplay of power and subjectivity if we do not attend to the libidinal rewards and investments that bind subjects to particular ideologies. My overarching aim in this article is expository: to introduce and explore the usefulness of the idea of enjoyment in the domain of political psychology. A second and related objective—more critical in nature—is to identify a series of prospective limitations that arise in attempts to utilize this concept analytically. Indeed, a series of pragmatic methodological questions follow on from this assertion of the importance of the notion of jouissance. What exactly is meant, first, by the concept of enjoyment as political? Second, how might it best be utilized as a viable instrument of critique and analysis? Third, what associated concepts need to be introduced in any analysis of enjoyment as a social form? The Vagaries of Jouissance In this first section of the article, I focus on qualifying what is meant by the term “enjoyment” (jouissance), a concept frequently employed but seldom adequately defined in Lacanian literature (for exceptions to this rule, see Braunstein, 2003; Evans, 1999; Miller, 2000; Stavrakakis, 2007). Evans (1999) is correct when he notes: “[T]he term jouissance does not retain a stable meaning...its resonances and articulations shift dramatically over the course of Lacan’s teaching” (p. 2). This situation has not been helped by the varying interpretations of the term in the secondary literature, where the only real constant is an apparent lack of consistency in how the term is applied. There is a complicating issue to consider here: Lacan’s own dismissive attitude to explanations based on attributions of affect. Lacan (1988) maintained—following the structuralist lead of his colleague Claude Levi-Strauss—that **one should reject any explanatory recourse to emotions to the murky realm of “the field of affectivity”** (p. 57). And this for good reason: Reference to a posited affect can “explain” virtually any form of social behavior. This concern provides us with the first of a series of provisional critiques that can be directed at the concept: Is the notion of jouissance just “Lacan-speak” for affect? If not, then **what distinguishes enjoyment from affect, and what underlies the analytical specificity of the concept as distinct from explanations of affect**? Second, if **jouissance** is in part unconscious—as the secondary literature seems so often to imply—then **does** this **not consign the concept to a merely speculative use**, pertaining as it does to something that cannot be verified or ascertained? Third: How does the concept avoid falling prey to psychological reductionism? Explanations by way of jouissance seem to possess a markedly depoliticizing potential: The notion of **jouissance** surely **runs the risk of transforming properly social and political events into merely psychological phenomena**. Fourth: The concept emerges in the clinical realm, where it points to the **infinitely varied, idiosyncratic—even “solipsistic”—ways in which subjects attain libidinal arousal.** This would seem to **suggest that there is no viable way to extrapolate the concept to the generality of a group, a society, or even**—as is sometimes the case in the secondary literature—**an entire nation.** In other words, then, is it even possible to speak of group modalities of jouissance? Fifth, there appears to be no necessary connection between jouissance as the intense libidinal gratifications experienced by the individual and the broader social or symbolic field. This problem is only exacerbated when we are routinely told that jouissance is “real,” that is, “extradiscursive,” outside the domain of the symbolic. What then, if anything, holds enjoyment in a relationship to the symbolic realm, to the dimension of social structure and power? **Enjoying in the Margins It helps, by way of introducing the concept, to make reference to several everyday expressions**. We may speak of someone flying into a rage or of a person wallowing in despair. The verb in each case, “to fly,” “to wallow,” indexes the factor of jouissance. The **enjoyment involved here is to be distinguished from the everyday** (banal, pleasurable) **sense of enjoying**; it refers, instead, to more illicit gains, to “getting off” in ways one would not readily admit to. Hence the **frequent characterization of the “obscene” or “perverse” quality of enjoyment that seems invariably to run counter to the prevailing norms according to what is acceptable, permissible**. After all, this is not something typically acknowledged in how we represent negative affects to ourselves, that is, the possibility that once I have flown into a rage I find myself greatly excited, exhilarated by this; that in the midst of wallowing in despair I find myself painfully gratified by own misery. If the dimension of pained stimulation is not yet clear enough in these examples, consider the following extract from Tony Blair’s (2010) autobiography A Journey, where he describes Prime Minister’s Questions, a weekly session where opposing MPs would have the opportunity to grill the PM: PMQs was the most nerve-racking, discombobulating, nail-biting, bowel-moving, terrorinspiring, courage-draining experience in my prime ministerial life, without question...I hated it... [T]he whole thing is a giant joust, a sort of modern, non-physical dual.... It’s a blood sport and the prime minister is the quarry. (p. 109) When Blair described the experience to Americans who had watched him negotiate the perilous weekly sessions, they would often retort, to his exasperation: “‘Oh, but you always seemed to enjoy it so much’” (p. 109). It seems then, upon reflection, that while Blair himself may not have grasped the Lacanian concept of jouissance, his American observers, apparently, had.

#### Their view of problems leads to an endless quest for jouissance that causes ressentiment and psychic violence.

#### Hook 3rd [Derek Hook; Duquesne University and University of Pretoria; “What Is ‘Enjoyment as a Political Factor’?” *Political Psychology;* 2017; Date Accessed: 27 July 2019.] DG MONT K TEAM

**Jouissance** of the Drive We can now add a further qualification, namely that jouissance and affect should not be equated. It **is** more accurate to understand jouissance as a mode of intensity, **a type of arousa**l—a thrilling twist—**that occurs when affect moves beyond the bounds of what is comfortable, reasonable, or satisfying**. Bearing this in mind prevents us from making the error of thinking jouissance as itself a variety of affect that permits for easy categorization (as in types such as anger, frustration, joy, etc.). **Enjoyment should not be delimited in this way**; it is neither a subcategory of affect nor the preserve of a limited range of affects. We can further refine our understanding of the concept by stressing, as Lacan (1992), that **“jouissance appears** not purely and simply as the satisfaction of a need, but **as the satisfaction of a drive**” (p. 209). Furthermore, **any** drive impulse—be it “blind” **physiological sensation** or a more overly “goal-directed” activity—**can serve as the basis of jouissance.** It helps here to signal the omnipresence of enjoyment in everyday life, to indicate that any drive activity—”drive” understood here as the psychical elaboration of pressing bodily impulses—is linked to the pursuit of **jouissance**. We should evoke here the notion of the death drive; doing so allows us to offer a succinct formulation: [J]ouissance **is a form of enjoyment willing to exceed the parameters of life.** Miller (1992) is once again instructive: To understand the concept of jouissance in Lacan as unique is to understand “that it concerns at the same time libido and death drive, libido and aggression, not as two antagonistic forces external to one another, but as a knot” (pp. 25–26). Lacan (2007) goes so far as to declare that **jouissance is “the path towards death”** (p. 17), a comment **which** calls to mind Freud’s earlier (1924) observation that “even **the subject’s destruction of himself cannot take place without libidinal satisfaction**” (p. 170). This opens a further dimension of the concept, which, as we will go on to see, must be related both to the notions of the law and the superego. Hence, Eagleton’s (2003) description of jouissance as “the lethal pleasure of Freud[’s] primary masochism, in which we reap delight from the way that the law or superego unleashes its demented sadism upon us” (p. 198). **Jouissance**, then, to review the key points made above **is**: (1) diametrically opposed to pleasure and desire; (2) bodily and **subliminal rather than unconscious in nature**; (3) less an affect than an excess of affect, **a** mode of intensity produced by pursuing drive impulses; (4) necessarily “**negative**” (excessive, traumatic) **in the sense that it is inflected with the death drive**; (5) takes the form of contravention (is transgressive) **inasmuch as it pushes the subject painfully** (enjoyably) **beyond the law or socially prescribed limits**. “Negative Dialectics” Our own enjoyment—let alone that of others—is, for the most part, repulsive to us, and needs to be kept at arm’s length. The subject’s stance regards their own enjoyment is thus necessarily conflicted. Jouissance exacerbates the split in **the** subject who at once reviles their enjoyment and yet, periodically,succumbs to it. So, ordinary (neurotic) **subjects** want more jouissance, **feel they deserve more enjoyment than they are receiving, and** yet they are also appalled and repulsed by it, more readily **identify**ing **it in the deplorable enjoyments of others.** **Contrary** then to the tendency **to view enjoyment within the frame of isolated individuality, we need rather approach it in terms of prospective relations to others.** Jouissance, insists Macey (1988), “is not...a category of pure subjectivity” (p. 203). Rather, it implies “a dialectic of possession and enjoyment of and by the other” (p. 203). **The revulsion we feel toward our own jouissance is**, as already noted, **all too readily displaced onto others** (as Lacan [1992] laments in Seminar VII: “[W]hat is more of a neighbor to me than this...my jouissance...which I don’t dare go near” [p. 186]). These others, moreover, are always ready to blame for having too much jouissance, for having procured improper or malignant enjoyments that appear to compromise given social or cultural norms or laws. Given neurotic subjects’ presumption that they have surrendered a crucial quantity of enjoyment—an effect of socialization, of the symbolic overwriting the bodily experience of drives—they maintain a preexisting condition of resentment toward such enjoying others. Differently put: This resentment comes before, and thus in a sense determines, what the subject perceives to be the illegitimate or disproportionate enjoyments of others. The perceived existence of **jouissance** thus **implies a social relationship, one that exists before the other upon whom this jouissance will be projected.** So, what even the most elementary experience of jouissance necessitates is a type of hating object-relation, a conflicted mode of intersubjectivity, which is always already there, prior to the racial/cultural/social other who will be assigned a position in this negative interpersonal dialectic. The construction of otherness is thus not merely an effect of social construction. It involves also a libidinal component, a prior attribution of stolen enjoyment, a readymade form of resentment awaiting a blameworthy subject upon whom this crime can be pinned. Enjoyment in the Form of Lack **Jouissance**, certainly once approached as a type of possession, exhibits an odd characteristic: It is never more real than when we have been dispossessed of it. Enjoyment, that is to say, comes most forcefully into being, **is most intensely experienced, when**: (1) I**t is seen to be in the possession of others, or** (2) **when it is** perceived as endangered, **about to be snatched away.** Put differently, ***jouissance*** seems most typically to **exist in an “already stolen” or precarious state;** it only takes form in the shadow of a potential castration. This helps us understand Vighi’s (2010) initially puzzling description. Jouissance, he says, is a type of libidinal excess, most typically experienced as a lack. This experience of surplus, he insists, corresponds to a void: “**[E]very enjoyment is structured around** a lack...**a paradoxical lack of enjoyment**” (p. 25). Furthermore: **We perceive enjoyment not as lack but as fullness, a ubiquitous substance that fills our lives and gives it meaning.** Here we are faced by what we might call the “enjoyment parallax,” with parallax naming the different aspects of the same object viewed from...different lines of sight. Although enjoyment in its deepest connotation is always a lack, we...perceiv[e] it as fullness. (p. 25) **This facet of enjoyment**—**that it oscillates between surplus and absence**, a “too much” and a “not enough”—once again **highlights the intersubjective aspect of the concept.** Moreover, if it is the case, as Vighi (2010) argues, that attributions of enjoyment invariably spring from the experience of lack, then it is unsurprising that this lack should be allocated a cause, and, more importantly yet, a suspect who is responsible for this lack. Jouissance, that is to say, entails an elementary narrative component. **The most rudimentary experience of jouissance implies** already the role—**the fantasy**—of a culprit, **someone who enjoys more than I, or who is poised to steal the little enjoyment that I do possess.** One of the most articulate expressions of this idea is offered by Stavrakakis (1999) who insists that the festivals of **jouissance by means of** which we constitute our “national ways of **enjoyment” are always in some way lacking**: No matter how much we love our national ways of enjoyment, our national real, this real is never enough, it is already castrated... this loss can be attributed to the existence of an alien culture or people: the enjoyment lacking from our national community is being denied to us because “they” stole it.... What is not realised within such a schema is the fact...that we never had at our disposal the surplus enjoyment that we accuse the Other of stealing. (p. 156) The modes of jouissance that we have been discussing cannot be dismissed merely as individual or idiosyncratic quirks (which, of course, is not to say there will not be considerable latitude in terms of how these forms of enjoyment are experienced by individuals). How though is this “structured” quality of enjoyment to be explained? This is a particularly important question given that the notion of jouissance as developed in the clinic is always attuned to the singularity of a subject’s enjoyment.

#### The alternative is to recognize the partiality of enjoyment—it allows us to recognize the impossibility fulfilling our desires, allowing us to move forward as effective political actors

#### McGowan 4 (Todd, Todd McGowan—professor of English @ University of Vermont English Department, THE END¶ OF DISSATISFACTION?, pp.194-196)

Today, after enjoyment has become a social duty, **the embrace of partial enjoyment—rather than the pursuit of an illusory total enjoyment—*emerges as a unique political possibility.***Partial enjoyment is uncertain and insecure. One never knows whether one has it or not, and at the moment one seems to secure it, this form of enjoyment slips away. **It is**, first and foremost, the enjoyment of the other—**an enjoyment that the subject can never wholly possess for¶ itself**. But *partial enjoyment has a political content to it precisely because of its connection to the other*. **The subject of partial enjoyment is** a subject **committed** not only **to its own enjoyment, but also to the enjoyment of the other.** Such a subject recognizes that one cannot differentiate between the two; **one cannot** choose **enjoy**ment **for oneself while refusing the enjoyment of the other.** To embrace **the partiality of one’s own enjoyment is at the same time** to embrace **the enjoyment of the other**.¶ Each of the symptoms that the previous chapters have explored repre- sents a form of retreat from the partiality of enjoyment. In chapter 2, we saw how the anal father commands us to enjoy ourselves fully, without any lack. Chapter 3 showed the increasing power of the image and the illusion of total enjoyment that it provides. Chapter 4 revealed the contemporary elimination of distance as a strategy for filling in all the gaps in our enjoyment. Chapter 5 linked the failure of interpretation to the reluctance to accept the enjoyment of the Other. In chapter 6, we saw the cynic’s refusal to allow for any pocket of unknown enjoyment. Chapter 7 explored the apathy that results from a monolithic concern with total enjoyment. Chapter 8 detailed the retreat into private enjoyment and its effect on the public world. And in chapter 9, we saw how incivility and aggressivity result from the contemporary subject’s com- mitment to an enjoyment without any lack. The ideal of total enjoyment represents the fundamental barrier that the subject in the society of enjoyment must navigate.¶ This ideal haunts the contemporary subject because partial enjoyment is such a precarious endeavor, whereas total enjoyment holds out the promise of a sense of security and wholeness. The subject of partial enjoyment remains constantly aware of her/his own tortured relationship to this enjoyment. Such a subject does not feel secure in the possession of this enjoyment. ***Partial enjoyment involves enjoying one’s lack—what one doesn’t have, not what one does have*.** In fact, the enjoyment possesses the subject; **the subject does not possess the enjoyment. Partial enjoyment** thus **involves** **the subject’s accep- tance that it cannot escape some originary damage that constitutes it as a subject.** To be **a subject is** to be **incomplete and lacking**, **but** one can, **through tak- ing up the very partiality of enjoyment**, come to **view this incompletion as *originary rather than as a state of loss***.¶ The advantage of partial enjoyment lies in its connection to the Real. Unlike **total enjoyment,** which **is always imaginary, partial enjoyment is Real**. It involves an experience of the Real, specifically the way in which the Real throws the symbolic order out of balance. In the experience of partial enjoy- ment, the subject enjoys its own lack without feeling this lack as a deprivation. This experience frees the subject by breaking its link to the symbolic Law: the Law no longer seems to hold within itself the secret that eludes the subject; the secret exists in the subject itself. Such a transformation offers the subject¶ 196 The End of Dissatisfaction?¶ the freedom that has continued to elude it within the society of prohibition. Thus, partial enjoyment eludes the limits of the symbolic order. **Even though it is partial, it is also an unlimited, infinite enjoyment**.¶ The turn from the prohibition of enjoyment to the command to enjoy has fundamentally transformed the experience of the subject while leaving the subject in an unchanged situation. In both structures, the subject remains deprived of—and haunted by—the idea of complete enjoyment. In this sense, *nothing substantive changes for the contemporary subject despite all of the phenomenological transformations we have explored.* However, the emer- gence of the society of enjoyment produces a window of opportunity: we might obey the command to enjoy in a way that frees us from its superegoic compulsion and opens enjoyment as such. We can only do so if we reject the image of completion—and of complete enjoyment—that this command prof- fers. **As long as we pursue and defend an image of total enjoyment, we remain within the domain of the superego. Accepting the partiality of enjoyment is the path to freedom that the contemporary world offers us.**

#### Recognizing one’s investment in society is key to moving outside of the social order—it’s the most “radical” course of action

#### McGowan 4 (Todd, Todd McGowan—professor of English @ University of Vermont English Department, THE END¶ OF DISSATISFACTION?, pp.193-194)

The **society of enjoyment works to convince subjects that they exist outside** this **society**, in independent isolation. It thus becomes increasingly diffi- cult to grasp oneself within the universal. **One** feels and **lives like an outsider**. But this in no way hampers the functioning of the universal.It works through us all the more effectively insofar as we fail to recognize it. In the society of enjoyment, **the most difficult task becomes recognizing our** own **role as** an integral **part of** this **society**—what keeps it going. **The great temptation** today **lies in** proclamations of one’s radicality, **expressions of a refusal to conform to the social order.** But any subversive display today plays in the prevailing demand for enjoyment. **The key to transcending the society of enjoyment**— and the global capitalism with which it works hand-in-hand—**lies in reconciling ourselves to this society,** in *grasping our fundamental investment in it.¶* 194 The End of Dissatisfaction?¶ **When we recognize ourselves as the subjects of the society of enjoyment** and the subjects of global capitalism rather than as subjects existing in marginal- ity or in isolation, **we take a leap beyond this society.** The limits of the society of enjoyment are daunting limits precisely because we cannot recognize them as such. In recognizing these limits—**in recognizing the extent of our obedi- ence—we find a way out of this obedience.** As Hegel puts it in the Encyclope- dic Logic, “No one knows, or even feels, that anything is a limit or defect, until he is at the same time above and beyond it.”4 **The act of recognition is**, at the same time, **the act of transcendence.** **To recognize one’s failure to enjoy is already to begin to enjoy.**