## **1**

### 1NC – Kritik

#### The Atlantic slave trade marked the birth of modern logistics and racial capitalism that was characterized by endless access and a drive for endless control. Even through this global regime of racialized violence, logistics is vulnerable to logisticality – a glitch amongst those in the grips of total access.

Harney et al. 18 Stefano Harney in conversation with Niccolò Cuppini and Mattia Frapporti, September 2018, “Logistics Genealogies: A Dialogue with Stefano Harney,” Social Text 136 • Vol. 36, No. 3, DOI 10.1215/01642472-6917802 Recut Justin

Modern logistics is a commercial logistics, with all the multiple sources that feed what Cedric Robinson calls racial capitalism. And it’s a capitalist science. Even today’s military logistics is most commonly outsourced to commercial rms, who make huge prfiots off the logistics of contempo- rary permanent war. As a commercial logistics, as a capitalist science, it can be traced directly and emphatically to the Atlantic slave trade. The Atlantic slave trade was the birth of modern logistics, as it was also the birth of a new kind of war on our species being, and the birth of racial cap- italism, which amounts to saying the same thing. This trade entailed the first global movement of mass commodities, voluminous and grotesque. Moreover, these humans were also perishable and volatile commodities that could “go missing” and were hard “to extract,” requiring complex, even diabolical, logistical technologies, supported by finance, insurance, law, and of course state and extrastate violence. Ian Baucom locates the origins of modern insurance in the Atlantic slave trade in his important work Spectres of the Altantic. We know from Sergio Bologna how much contemporary finance and logistics are entwined in today’s overleveraged global shipping industry, but this was true of the Atlantic slave trade too, where speculative finance was already at work. The story of the Zong slave ship is central to Baucom’s account and is also beautifully, unbearably rendered by M. NourbeSe Philip in her book-length poem Zong!, captur- ing what the birth of modern logistics did to any possible project of the human by bringing finance and logistics together in a devilish alliance over the commodity that really “could speak,” the “thing” that talks or is somehow in touch, neither subject nor proper object, a massive, subter- ranean, ethereal, undercommon threat to the individuation of modern “Man” emerging at the same time. But the Atlantic slave trade was also the birth of modern logistics because modern logistics is not just about how to transport large amounts of commodities or information or energy, or even how to move these ef- ficiently, but also about the sociopathic demand for access: topographical, jurisdictional, but as importantly bodily and social access. The nearly complete access that was imposed upon the African enslaved, upon the African continent, and upon the lands and indigenous peoples settled for plantations, this kind of access remains the ambition of logistics today, and it is for this reason that the slave trade remains so contemporary, that abolition as Jared Sexton rightly says is yet to come. And we might add that this abolition requires the abolishment of logistics which in its flows created a people without standing anywhere. We act in abolition not for a ground to stand on but for groundations beyond standing. Modern logistics, with its warehousing and its containers, is as much about controlling the flow as ensuring the flow, as much about the interface of movement of commodities and financialization of commodities as it is about just get- ting goods somewhere. That interface is an opportunity for speculation, and today the line itself, the supply line and the assembly line, their speed, efficiency, and metrics, are a source of massive financial speculation. This is also the horrific legacy of the Atlantic slave trade, the containerization of people, of the sociopathic access demanded to labor and sex, and the storage, in forts, in the hold. And even more murderously, the elimination of goods, of cargo, when the price falls, or considerations of finance as in the incident of the slave ship the Zong, in which 133 enslaved persons were thrown overboard for insurance purposes during a logistical operation. In short, this aggregated access allowed for the most evil calculations about the perishability of goods, the planned obsolescence of products, and the cost of replacement, in a word, financial speculation on the supply line that was in the case of the African enslaved in the Atlantic trade often indis- tinguishable from the assembly line. Marx said the rst thing the worker makes is himself. The slave was worker on the line and at the same time the supply coming off the line and into the line. The same concerns with speculation on the line, the line as a modulation of investment and exploi- tation of labor are still found today at Walmart or Starbucks, not so far from their origins, at least for the most part. As Susan Zieger reminds us in her study of “Box” Brown and logistics — he was the slave who mailed himself in a box to “freedom” from the slave-plantation South to the slave-dependent North in the United States — logistics incorporates loss in its logics. As Fred Moten and I say, logistics tracks us because it assumes fugitivity. Indeed, what is called surveillance might also be called preemptive logistics. It is possible that all we know of surveillance studies, including its most incisive work in black surveillance like Simone Browne’s, could also go under the name preemptive logistics, even predictive logistics, the anticipation not of resistance but of a kind of impenetrability even in the give. In other words, our entangled, indeterminate, undercommon rub- up of curvy lines, kinks, loops, and crooked lines summons logistics. It reacts to our sumptuous tangle. Our entanglement requires them to draw up contingency plans, which are plans to make our indeterminacy mere contingency, to account for what goes missing. Logistics is the science of loss, the science of their lost means, which is to say it will always be the white science and the science of being white. Logistics is the science of their loss, not ours, though we, and those closest to blackness in particu- lar, suffer horrific losses from their loss. However, it was not just modern logistics that was born in this hell-fire. It was also the birth of what Fred and I call logisticality, a social capacity found most intensely amongst those who found themselves, who found each other, under the duress of almost total access but in the grip of each other. As Frank Wilderson writes at the end of Incognegro, his brilliant more-than-memoir: “Something happened to us in the hold.” And not just in the hold. In her heart-breaking but unavoidable book Lose Your Mother, Saidiya Hartman speaks of the fugitivity that the ungoverned and the ungovernable of Africa were forced to invent because of the reach of the Atlantic slave trade. Those captured by the trade either were or became the people Cedric Robinson understands in Africa as living by a principle of “individual” incompleteness. Such peoples existed everywhere, as James Scott asserts in The Art of Not Being Governed. Scott details how highland peoples in Southeast Asia avoided the massive slave trade of the padi states, at trade that dominated precolonial Southeast Asia to the point that slaves became not only the biggest trade but currency itself. In many languages of the padi states these peoples were already known by the name slave before they were enslaved. These peoples refused to form political societies, have leaders, or see land as owned or even shared in ownership. They gathered, and they wandered. No written languages, they sought refuge with each other. But the hold, the middle passage, the ­fire that African peoples went through, those who were captured, and those who became fugitive, created something perhaps unprecedented in its total span across societies and histories. This is what Fred and I call logisticality, the ability to fi­nd each other, to move together, to break the rule of Newtonian time and space, disorder it, and legislate new time and space to disorder, to gather, stranded into refuge together. A people came into existence without origin — anoriginal, as Nahum Chandler would say — who were “in touch,” whose response to the sociopathic demand for access was paradoxically and necessarily a radical opening of being, a practice of touch without surface or border or edge, a practice of hapticality. Fred and I understand hapticality as a kind of touch without surface that undoes, that saps the fever of individuation, in a sometimes violent and profane exorcism. It is not a reassuring touch. It unensures precisely because it’s a loving touch. In a sense, African slaves who came through the ­re could be said to have reversed logistics and overturned it. Now the slaver sought this logisticality, sought but could not fully capture something that had been produced in capture but also preceded it as Robinson and Scott suggest, calling capture into being in all its murderous regulatory force. We can understand this logisticality in two registers, as I’ve suggested: First, in C. L. R. James’s famous contention that slaves ran the plantations in the Caribbean — that it was the slaves who had the capacity and know-how to work across half a dozen African and European languages in this early crucible of world capitalism — it was the slaves who worked the nascent capitalist machinery of the sugar mills and who handled the logistics of transport to the ships, and sometimes on the ships. It was the slaves who worked in exchanges of different currencies, commodities, and calculations of the future, with world prices. The slaves also ran the households, providing the care, nurturing, and attention. Now as James would be quick to point out, all this occurred despite the unbounded inhumanity and cruelty of the owners, as for instance he details in his chapter on owners and on the property in the Black Jacobins. All of this was also going on in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries at a time when, as James notes, most of our families in Italy and across Europe, as we might say, “still only knew the bell tower.” This logisticality — the quantum ­nding, this hapticality, this feel without surface that hurts and loves — could also be understood as a capacity to recreate Robinson’s principle of incompleteness and, indeed, to detect and translate such principles of incompleteness and ungovernability, of the unregulated, the disorderly and the unruled, to feel these things, and feel others feeling you being undone. This hapticality was never going to be fully enslaved, even when American slavery turned to its speci­c Taylorist brutality and slave breeding with the rise of the cotton trade and industrial capitalism at the end of the eighteenth century. But more importantly, it survives as the basis of the black radical tradition, in radical social poesis, as Laura Harris says. It survives in/as blackness. So the shipped, the containerized, the accessed of the Atlantic slave trade gave birth to modern logistics but also conjured something in the break of this massive enclosure of those who lived together by the principle of incompleteness. And despite this, it is fundamentally necessary to place that hapticality against what Christina Sharpe, writing recently about the slave ship and its wake, might call its “weather,” the pervasive antiblack racism that this founding of modern logistics also bequeathed the contemporary world and perpetuates today.

#### Endless access is inextricably tied to the logic of improvement and the Algorithm of work broadly – the demand for the right to strike is subsumed by logistical capitalism.

Moten and Harney 15 [Fred, Professor of Performance Studies for the Tisch School of the Arts at NYU, PhD in English from UC Berkeley, 2020 MacArthur Genius Fellow, Stefano, Professor of Strategic Management for the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University, PhD in Social and Political Sciences from the University of Cambridge, co-founder of Ground Provisions—a curatorial collective, founder of the School for Study—a nomadic study collective, 2015, “Mikey the Rebelator,” Performance Research, 20:4, 141-145, DOI: 10.1080/13528165.2015.1071057] Justin

Paolo Friere thought our incompleteness is what gave us hope.7 It is our incompleteness that inclines us toward one another. For Friere, the more we think of ourselves as complete, finished, whole, individual, the more we cannot love or be loved. Is it too much to put this the other way around? To say, by way of Friere, that love is the undercommon self-defence of being-incomplete? This seems important now when our incompleteness is something we are invited and then compelled to address and improve, when we are told to be impatient with it, and embarrassed by it. We need to be intact. We’re told to raise our buzz because we’re all fucked up. But in our defence we love that we are complete only in a plained incompletion, which they would have undone, finished, owned, and sent on down the line. We do mind working because we do mind dying. THE CONSU LTANT The consultant is not here to provide solutions, innovation or even advice. The consultant exists to demonstrate access in the era of logistical capitalism. The consultant is not an ideologue. Ideology operates here only for the consultant himself. He is demonstrably the only one who believes his bullshit, but fortunately for him this is not the point, not his point. The consultant literalizes access to workplaces, demonstrating their openness by showing up in their midst, like a drone. One day you come to work and there he is sitting next to the boss. Nothing she says or does is as important as this demonstration of access. What the consultant introduces into the imposed, exposed workers’ corp is the algorithm. The consultant bears the algorithm, which violates in the name of completion. When the consultant brings his algorithmic charge, the body of the workers, that undesired and constantly invaded enclosure, is finished. We are rendered complete, made free, by the work, in the work, of the algorithm. We are done, and done in by, the consultant’s forced, aggressive incorporation of an undoing that was of and for itself, of and for ourself, the undoing we keep on making in the face of every sovereign invasion, every violent ascription of words and worth and (the) work. The consultant completes, so that he can access the private loop of a thwarted desire to be intact. It is not the product or even the organization that interests the algorithm of work. It is the production line’s infinite curvature. The algorithm of work is a demonstration within a demonstration. With access comes (the necessity of) improvement, which always takes the form of a demand for more access. As the introduction of the consultant inside the organization demonstrates access, so the introduction of the algorithm demonstrates improvement. The algorithm is the machine of self-improvement; as such, it is the only machine that makes new machines. There is a mirror – marking and instantiating self-envisaging’s shared exclusivity, that scary, silly, Stuart Smalleyish binary solipsism – that stands between it and man, the other only machine that makes new machines and, in so doing, improves itself. The mirror between man, the mirror, and The Man, man’s mirror, is the algorithm. Meanwhile, the inhuman, which is our fleshly inherence and inhabitation in the general mechanics of a general disregard for self-reflection, makes machines because it does not want to improve. Before the algorithm, machines came from strikes, from resistance, from sabotage. Machines made from the algorithm do not wait for the class struggle. The algorithm of work subjects every labour process on the production line to undoing, disassembly and incompletion, in order to demand it be completed better, assembled better, done better. It leaves behind not an improved organization but a metric to ensure the organization will never be satisfied. The metric measures everything against its last instance, ensuring that the last instance never comes. The metric demands more access, more measurement of access, more movement, more assembly, more measure of the last instance, which is given in and as enclosure. The consultant is still talking but it does not matter now what he says. The algorithm of work has arrived, algorithmic surplus has gone viral. If the settler could not be heard over the screams of primitive accumulation, and the citizen could not be heard over the noise of the machines, the consultant cannot be heard over the click of the metrics. Mikey heard this noise and walked the other way, another way, so the algorithm could not pass through, so we could hold him up and pass him along. Nahum Chandler reminds us of a term W. E. B. DuBois invented and employed; ‘democratic despotism’8 . When the consultant cannot demonstrate access, and therefore the algorithm cannot demonstrate improvement, the consultant calls for policy as once (and still) the citizen calls for heteropatriachal nationalism or the settler for racist manifest destiny. Policy is past all that, even though all that’s not past. Policy comes in to diagnose what’s blocking access, and what’s blocking access are ‘those people’. What’s wrong with those people in Detroit who want water, in British Columbia who want land, in Manila who want some place to stay? Policy says there is something wrong with those people that makes it so that the consultant can’t get access. But it is the other way around. The consultant is denied access – those people deny him access – because they embrace the general access-in-antagonism that he denies. And so policy must be called. Selfdefence becomes the disease. Love becomes the problem because love is the problem, the self-defence of the accessible. But, hey, maybe governance can help, which is to say maybe those practising self-defence may be willing to self-diagnose, self-reflect, self-improve! One way or another policy will proscribe, or policy will get posed – as democracy, as democratic despotism, where everyone is given the chance to say there is something wrong with those people. Democratic despotism is the imposition of policy and its violent possibilities and impossibilities on the wrong(ed). Because the thing is, the consultant’s not wrong, the algorithm of work is not malfunctioning, the policy hustler is not misdiagnosing. We’re wrong, which is why we’re wronged. We are incomplete. Moreover, they got the very idea of incompleteness from us! Another word for incompleteness is study, or more precisely, revision. The consultant gets this revision from us, from study, from our sumptuous revisions of one another out of existence, as existence. Study happens and it don’t stop. In study, we are engaged consciously and unconsciously. We revise, and then again. This is not just about distinguishing improvement as capitalist efficiency. That is too easy to dismiss. It is about improvement itself, the time-concept, the moral imperative, the aesthetic judgement, which is to say capitalist improvement founded in and on black flesh, its female informality. Revision has no end and no connection to improvement, never mind efficiency. So the consultant does and undoes institutions but can’t access instituted life, can’t open black life, can’t uncover queer life, can’t expose feminist planning around the ‘kitchen table’ as Barbara and Beverly Smith called it and Tiziana Terranova calls to it again, all noting certain paradoxes of freedom and sequestration in little general intellects of surreal life.9 He can’t access open secrets, can’t incomplete what is already incomplete, can’t deform what is always informal already and yet; they can’t believe and this leads to the state emergency that goes under such names as resilience and preparedness. When democratic despotism fails, simple despotism in the name of democracy must be imposed. Resilience is the name for the violent destruction of things that won’t give, won’t return to form, won’t bend when access is demanded, won’t be flexible and (com)pliant. Stopping when you are told to stop and moving along when you are told to move along demonstrates resilience and composure; but broken, breaking, dissed assembly demonstrates itself openly, secretly, dissembling in captured but inaccessible glance, for us, to us, as incomplete and much more than complete. Its daimonic performance can’t be individuated and won’t be performed. HOL D SHE It’s not about who’s holding you down when you try to jay-walk; it’s about who’s holding you up. This is the question of hapticality. The police can’t hold what’s already held. At the same time, what’s already held is all that we can hold. That’s our haptic institution. Watching mama listen to a song, you’re instituted. Here go that Michael Jackson song she turned up to teach me how to dance. In the photograph, they containerize her but she is uncontained. They bend her because access and logistics strive to be one. The more she is captured by the police, the photographer, the viewer, the more she is shipped. But the more she is shipped, the more she is held, the more she is handed.

#### Statist affirmations allows for endless access by predetermining every interaction.

Bey 20 Marquis Bey, 2020, “Anarcho-Blackness: Notes Toward a Black Anarchism,” AK Press, SJBE

But, ahh, the classics... The anarchist canon, as it were, has had its central tenets—if such an anti-authoritarian, non-doctrinal intellectual praxis like anarchism can be said to have tenets—expressed by many of the aforementioned figures. To summarize, anarchism is the general critique of centralized, hierarchical, and thus oppressively coercive systems of power and authority. State power and capitalism are the culprits responsible for the horrors that surround us, being deemed by anarchists as monopolistic and coercive, and hence illegitimate. The State, for instance, is inextricable from domination, Bakunin arguing that, “If there is a State, there must be domination of one class by another.”1 In theory, anarchism is touted to oppose all kinds of oppression, be it racism, sexism, transanatagonism, classism, colonialism, ageism, etc. While there has been much less explicit meditation on the anarchist stance toward transanatagonism than, say, capitalism, the overarching claim of anarchist ideology is that any kind of coercive, dominative oppression is to be quashed. To be established instead is a society based on direct democratic collaboration, mutual aid, diversity, and equity. “From each according to his [sic] ability, to each according to his [sic] need.” Though there are those who are more strict about incorporating those who preceded the nineteenth-century heyday of people beginning to explicitly call themselves, and rally around a political movement called anarchism, I will not partake in such gatekeeping, for better (where a longer lineage of anarchist thought can be mobilized) or worse (where any form of dissent might be unjustifiably subsumed under anarchism, diluting its specificity and historical situatedness). Like Kropotkin, one might understand the Epicureans and Cynics as anarchists, since they avoided participation in the political sphere, retreated from governmental life, and advocated allegiance to no state or party. They lacked the “desire to belong either to the governing or the governed class.” Kropotkin understands this as a proto-anarchic anti-State and anti- authoritarian disposition. Far from meaning that everyone is left alone and unorganized, anarchism in the classical sense privileges democratic and communal relationality, obviating external rule and control. This is a positive conception of anarchism as voluntary participation predicated on each individual’s autonomy and agreement with communal values. It bears noting, though, that an anarchist society may take different forms: socialist anarchism, which emphasizes developing communal groups that are intended to thrive in the absence of hierarchies and a centralized governmental structure; or individualist anarchism, some of which reject any and all group identities, communal mores of the good, and venerate individual autonomy. Max Stirner represented perhaps the furthest pole of this tendency, with his refusal to obey any law or any state, even if it was collectively arrived at. The self is the only arbiter of one’s life. As well, there is anarcho-syndicalism, which supports workers in a capitalist society gaining control over parts of the economy, and emphasizes solidarity, direct participation, and the self- management of workers. Additionally, anarcho-syndicalism has the aim of abolishing the wage system, seeing it as inextricable from wage slavery. Life under non-anarchist rule conceives of the political arena as a good that exists to protect and serve the people; or better, a system chosen by the people. So much of ancient Greek philosophies, modern liberal philosophies, and political philosophies assert, in various ways, that obedience to the law is a prima facie duty and inarguable good. Anarchism has called this very foundation into question. What arises in the hopeful disintegration of rule by an authoritarian nation-state is a society that cares for one another communally and democratically without the need for a tyrannical force of coercion and sovereignty. Anarchists like Godwin and Proudhon and Bakunin based this anarchist society on beliefs in reason, universal moral law, education, and conscience. With this very brief overview, the task set forth here is slightly different. It parallels yet departs from, as well as stands in contrast to, this anarchist history—an anarchic “shadow history,” if you will, a para-anarchism that anarchizes anarchism. What is not being done here is an attempt to find heads or figures of Black anarchism to give clout to it as a wing of anarchism as a whole. While I will surely cite throughout this chapter, as well as subsequent chapters, the thought of people like Lucy Parsons, the Black Rose Anarchist Federation, Lorenzo Kom’boa Ervin, and Zoé Samudzi, this project is in fact not concerned with simply trotting out a list of anarchist Black people as the meaning of Black anarchism. I am articulating an anarcho- Blackness, first and foremost, as an inhabitable modality of anarchic subjectivity and engagement. This may lead to a discernible Black anarchism. Fine. But the aim is not to arrive at Black anarchism; it is, rather, to engage an anarcho-Blackness that moves toward what might be called a Black anarchism. There are a number of racialized, gendered, and racialized gendered elisions present in classical anarchist theorizations that demand being pointed out. Bakunin: “If there is a State, there must be domination of one class by another and, as a result, slavery; the State without slavery is unthinkable—and this is why we are the enemies of the State.”2 Overlooked here is how the history of the enslavement of peoples of Color, specifically Black people in the Western world, is the haunting specter of his claim. The condition of the slave, which is on one plane the condition of Blackness, is the relationship between a people to the State. Thus, anarchism, in its anti-Statism, must reckon full force with Blackness as Blackness serves as the distinct angle of vision for encountering the effects of State-sanctioned enslavement and oppression. To abolish slavery necessitates the liberation of Blackness, making anarchism an emancipatory project, a project that has as its foundation a grappling with Blackness. On the topic of the State, there has also been the tendency to collapse the relative effects of violence. That is, if it is indeed true that the State bears a hostile relationship to those it controls, there are some who are controlled in different ways and who feel the force of the State in more acute ways. To rest at the nexus of Black and trans, for example, is to feel the brunt of the State in scrutinizing, gender binaristic, and racializing ways, which give one over to the likelihood of poor housing conditions, lack of job access, increased rates of incarceration (which then subjects one to the gendered carcerality of prisons and its pervasive mis-gendering violence), and the like. Examine the lives of Miss Major, Marsha P. Johnson, CeCe McDonald. Anarchic meditation on the terrors of the State begin in the right direction, but they fall short of taking the critique as deeply as it demands. A critique of the State is in order too, though. A traditional focus on the State as the end-all be-all of oppression must be thought of as more than simply a governmental agency or bastion up on high doling out sentences and decrees. The State is, too, a relation, a way of dictating how people are to be interacted with. We encounter one another on the logics of intelligibility that the State demands, and that structures how one can appear to others, circumscribing subjective parts and desires that fall outside of this framework. And this is a violence. We must also note how this relation is not only in the public sphere but characterizes any sphere in which interaction is had. And furthermore, these relations are textured by racial and gender hierarchies. One relates to others on their presumed gender, their presumed race, and disallows them to be otherwise than this fundamentally externally imposed subjectivity. The other has had no opportunity to announce themselves to us on non-State grounds. Any anarchism, then, must recognize this and commit to dismantling their

#### Specifically, regulating the strike into the right to strike allows the state to dictate revolution – that diffuses planning into policy and subverts radicality.

Crépon 19 Mark Crépon (French philosopher), translated by Micol Bez “The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin’s ‘Toward the Critique of Violence,’” Critical Times, 2:2, August 2019, DOI 10.1215/26410478-7708331 Recut Justin

If we wish to understand how the question of the right to strike arises for Walter Benjamin in the seventh paragraph of his essay “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” it is impor­ tant to first analyze the previous paragraph, which concerns the state’s monopoly on violence. It is here that Benjamin questions the argument that such a monopoly derives from the impossibility of a system of legal ends to preserve itself as long as the pursuit of natural ends through violent means remains. Benjamin responds to this dogmatic thesis with the following hypothesis, arguably one of his most impor­ tant reflections: “To counter it, one would perhaps have to consider the surprising possibility that law’s interest in monopolizing violence vis­à­vis the individual is explained by the intention not of preserving legal ends, but rather of preserving law itself. [This is the possibility] that violence, when it does not lie in the hands of law, poses a danger to law, not by virtue of the ends that it may pursue but by virtue of its mere existence outside of law.”1 In other words, nothing would endanger the law more than the possibility of its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control. The function of the law would therefore be, first and foremost, to contain violence within its own boundaries. It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis, Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war. Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within class struggle. To begin with, the very idea of such a struggle implies certain forms of violence. The strike could then be understood as one of the recognizable forms that this violence can take. However, this analytical framework is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law in France in 1864. What this recognition engages is, in fact, the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike. Thus, the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best, if not the only, way for the state to circumscribe within (and via) the law the relative violence of class struggles. We might consider this to be the per­ fect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of ques­ tioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider. First, is it legitimate to present the strike as a form of violence? Who has a vested interest in such a representation? In other words, how can we trace a clear and unequivocal demarcation between violence and nonviolence? Are we not always bound to find residues of violence, even in those actions that we would be tempted to consider nonviolent? The second line of questioning is just as important and is rooted in the distinction established by Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, between the “political strike” and the “proletarian general strike,” to which Benja­ min dedicates a set of complementary analyses in §13 of his essay. Here, again, we are faced with a question of limits. What is at stake is the possibility for a certain type of strike (the proletarian general strike) to exceed the limits of the right to strike— turning, in other words, the right to strike against the law itself. The phenomenon is that of an autoimmune process, in which the right to strike that is meant to protect the law against the possible violence of class strugles is transformed into a means for the destruction of the law. The diference between the two types of strikes is nevertheless introduced with a condition: “The validity of this statement, however, is not unrestricted because it is not unconditional,” notes Benjamin in §7. We would be mistaken in believing that the right to strike is granted and guaranteed uncondi­ tionally. Rather, it is structurally subjected to a conflict of interpretations, those of the workers, on the one hand, and of the state on the other. From the point of view of the state, the partial strike cannot under any circumstance be understood as a right to exercise violence, but rather as the right to extract oneself from a preexisting (and verifiable) violence: that of the employer. In this sense, the partial strike should be considered a nonviolent action, what Benjamin named a “pure means.” The interpretations diverge on two main points. The first clearly depends on the alleged “violence of the employer,” a predicate that begs the question: Who might have the authority to recognize such violence? Evidently it is not the employer. The danger is that the state would similarly lack the incentive to make such a judgment call. It is nearly impossible, in fact, to find a single instance of a strike in which this recognition of violence was not subject to considerable controversy. The political game is thus the following: the state legislated the right to strike in order to con­ tain class strugles, with the condition that workers must have “good reason” to strike. However, it is unlikely that a state systematically allied with (and accomplice to) employers will ever recognize reasons as good, and, as a consequence, it will deem any invocation of the right to strike as illegitimate. Workers will therefore be seen as abusing a right granted by the state, and in so doing transforming it into a violent means. On this point, Benjamin’s analyses remain extremely pertinent and profoundly contemporary. They unveil the enduring strategy of governments confronted with a strike (in education, transportation, or healthcare, for example) who, afer claiming to understand the reasons for the protest and the grievances of the workers, deny that the arguments constitute sufcient reason for a strike that will likely paralyze this or that sector of the economy. They deny, in other words, that the conditions denounced by the workers display an intrinsic violence that jus­ tifies the strike. Let us note here a point that Benjamin does not mention, but that is part of Sorel’s reflections: this denial inevitably contaminates the (socialist) lef once it gains power. What might previously have seemed a good reason to strike when it was the opposition is deemed an insufcient one once it is the ruling party. In the face of popular protest, it always invokes a lack of sufcient rationale, allow­ ing it to avoid recognizing the intrinsic violence of a given social or economic situ­ ation, or of a new policy. And it is because it refuses to see this violence and to take responsibility for it that the left regularly loses workers’ support.

#### That continuous improvement paradoxically necessitates racialized genocide and ecological destruction.

**Moten and Harney 21** [Fred Moten, Professor of Performance Studies for the Tisch School of the Arts at NYU, PhD in English from UC Berkeley, 2020 MacArthur Genius Fellow, Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management for the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University, PhD in Social and Political Sciences from the University of Cambridge, co-founder of Ground Provisions—a curatorial collective, founder of the School for Study—a nomadic study collective, 2021, *All Incomplete*, pp 13-18] GZ Recut Justin

What does it mean to stand for improvement? Or worse, to stand for what business calls **a ‘commitment to continuous improvement‘?** It **means** to stand for **the brutal speciation of all**. To take a stand for speciation is the beginning of a **diabolical usufruct**. **Improvement comes to us by way of an innovation in land tenure**, where **individuated ownership, derived from increasing the land’s productivity, is given in the perpetual**, and thus arrested, becoming of exception’s miniature. This is to say that from the outset, **the ability to own** – and that ability’s first derivative, **self-possession** – **is entwined with the ability to make more productive**. In order to be improved, to be rendered more productive, **land must be violently reduced to its productivity**, which is the **regulatory diminishment and management of earthly generativity**. Speciation is this general **reduction of the earth to productivity** and **submission of the earth to techniques of domination** that isolate and enforce particular increases in and accelerations of **productivity**. In this regard, (necessarily European) man, in and as the exception, imposes speciation upon himself, in an operation that **extracts and excepts himself from the earth** in order to confirm his supposed **dominion over it**. And just as **the earth must be forcefully speciated to be possessed**, man must **forcefully speciate himself** in order to enact this kind of possession. This is to say that **racialization is present in the very idea of dominion over the earth**; in the very idea and enactment of the exception; **in the very nuts and bolts of possession-by-improvement**. Forms of racialization that both Michel Foucault and, especially and most vividly, Robinson identify in medieval Europe become *usufructed* with modern possession through improvement. Speciated humans are **endlessly improved** through the **endless work** they do on their **endless way to becoming Man**. This is the usufruct of man. In early modern England, establishing title to land by making it more productive meant **eliminating biodiversity** and isolating and breeding a species – barley or rye or pigs. Localized ecosystems were aggressively transformed so that **monocultural productivity smothers anacultural generativity**. **The emergent relation between speciation and racialization is the very conception and conceptualization of the settler**. Maintenance of that relation is his vigil and his eve. For the encloser, possession is established through improvement – this is true for the possession of land and for the possession of self. **The Enlightenment is the universalization/ globalization of the imperative to possess and its corollary, the imperative to improve**. However, this productivity must always confront its contradictory impoverishment: the **destruction of its biosphere** and its **estrangement in, if not from, entanglement**, both of which combine to ensure **the liquidation of the human differential that is already present in the very idea of man, the exception**. To stand for such improvement is to **invoke policy**, which attributes depletion to the difference, which is to say the wealth, **whose simultaneous destruction and accumulation policy is meant to operationalize**. **This attribution of a supposedly essential lack**, an inevitable and supposedly natural diminution, is achieved alongside **the imposition of possession-by-improvement**. **To make policy is to impose speciation upon everybody and everything, to inflict impoverishment in the name of improvement, to invoke the universal law of the usufruct of man**. In this context, continuous improvement, as it emerged with decolonization and particularly with the defeat of national capitalism in the 1970s, is the continuous crisis of speciation in the surround of the general antagonism. This is the contradiction Robinson constantly invoked and analyzed with the kind of profound and solemn optimism that comes from being with, and being of service to, your friends.

#### We affirm Anarcho-Blackness as an undercommon insurgency.

Bey 20 Marquis Bey, 2020, “Anarcho-Blackness: Notes Toward a Black Anarchism,” AK Press, SJBE

IT IS MISGUIDED TO PRESUME THAT AN ANARCHIC WORLD, A WORLD IN which, for classical anarchists, the State is eliminated—or a world in which, for Black queer feminist anarchists, racial capitalism and cisheteronormative patriarchy is overturned —is the “end” of anarchist pursuits. Anarcho-Blackness, with its disruptive disorderly conduct—its mode of conducting itself as, in other words, disorderly—advances a critical praxis that answers the fundamental political question, “What is to be done?” Kind of. The question “What is to be done?” demands an answer, not that the texture, tenor, or terms of that answer can be readily discerned. Nor does admitting this exculpate us from needing to, nevertheless, provide an answer. So again: what is to be done? Indeed, accosted by right-wing populism, virulent white supremacy, transantagonism, heteronormative patriarchy, and the litany of other violent regimes in our midst, we so earnestly want them to cease. We demand that it all end, now, and for justifiable reasons. I, though, animated by anarchism’s critical praxis—its practice of a criticality—do not place my crosshairs on a moment beyond now, when things might come to a close. This is not motivated by a nihilistic pessimism about the fate of the current political moment, where I cannot fathom cessation or even mitigation of various violences; this is not motivated by a perverse infatuation with the bounding persistence of hegemonic terrors. It is motivated by a kind of zeal, in fact, one where refusing an end allows for a perpetual openness that enables, always, the possibility of another beginning. Black anarchism’s emphasis on the constitutivity of the concepts of critical and praxis is fundamental here, as it itself is constituted through an indebtedness to Black queer and trans feminisms. This project is deeply theoretical, but also practical and material, because there is nothing more theoretically practical than trying to figure out how to fundamentally change the very system by which we live; indeed, to quote Zoé Samudzi, “What does it mean to create community that is safe for Black women, for Black trans women? That’s an incredibly theoretical exercise because that requires that we have all of these conversations and start to create material politics around misogynoir and trans misogynoir.”1 So the critical praxis and its theoretical heft is a ruthless interrogation of the established and institutionalized—in the vein of Marx’s 1843 call for die rücksichtlose Kritik alles Bestehenden (the ruthless criticism of all that exists); and if praxis is a doing, an agential enactment that bears on sociality, then a critical praxis marks an interrogative social enactment. What kind of politics might this lead to? What kind of world might this engender, and who might show up to this promiscuous gathering? The space cultivated by this critical praxis is where a Black anarchic politics and those subjectivated by an anarcho-Blackness, its attendant Black queer feminist electrical circuitry, show up. Those maroons, subversive intellectuals, fugitives, queers, feminists, anarchists, and rebellious workers meet to conspire together in the undercommons: a non-place where everyone is Black, queer, anarchic, because they are changed by the undercommons, which is not a place you enter but a groove that enters you. Critical praxis becomes a radical invitation to not only do but to be done by the undercommon insurgency that makes its own demands. And such an interrogation must suspend the presumption of an end goal. We know from Moten and Harney, and Jack Halberstam, that what we think we want before the crisis that precipitates our insurgency will necessarily shift after we’ve attained the limits of what our coalitional knowledge could compile. It is not because we are insufficient, as if insufficiency is a deficiency rather than a willingness to risk getting at the outer limits of what we dared to think; it is because we cannot, and must not, assume that the logics and rubrics we have when moving within the maelstrom of the hegemonic—radically altered as they may be—can operate to our benefit when we’ve unseated the hegemon. We will need new rubrics and metrics, unrubrics and unmetrics, because a radically other-world requires radically other means to love it, to caress it, to be all the way in it. So why is there no “end”? To assert this might seem to sidestep what Foucault claims in the Preface of Anti- Oedipus: to be “less concerned with why this or that than with how to proceed.” Refusing to bank on the “end” is, at least in part, how to proceed. “An abdication of political responsibility?” Moten and Harney write, anticipating the accusation. “OK. Whatever. We’re just anti-politically romantic about actually existing social life.”2 I submit that one’s concern must be an ethical one that—to supplement an oversight in Moten and Harney—not only sets its sights on social life that “actually” (I shiver at the hubris of this word) exists but, more substantively, fertilizes the conditions of possibility for otherwise and unsung and unknown emergence. There is no “end” because to know the end is to think one knows the totality of the landscape, a line of thinking that cannot account for that which falls outside the dictates of legibility. There might always be something else just outside, and we cannot close the discussion when we think it is over. Fugitive planning plans for what it cannot plan for by refusing to plan for it. So there is no end in sight because sight is not the only sense available to us. (But there is also no end in touch, smell, feel, or taste—or any other “sense.”) There is no end in sight because our end may only be someone else’s beginning or middle. Thus, our critical praxis, our interrogative social enactment, does something precisely when it commits to a political endeavor proliferating life where no life is said to be found. And the “where” of “life where no life is said to be found” is the place brought about by abolition. Abolition is fundamentally anarchic, as will be discussed at greater length in the final chapter. It is the eradication “of a society that could have prisons, that could have slavery, that could have the wage, and therefore not abolition as the elimination of anything but abolition as the founding of a new society.”3 This entails, to put it simply, the eradication of society inasmuch as “Society” is predicated on, constituted by, the existence of these things. Anarchism is the ground on which we assert the destitution of the terrain, a destitution that marks, according to the Invisible Committee, “a rupture in the fatality that condemns revolutions to reproduce what they have driven out, shattering the iron cage of counter-revolution.”4 Following this line of thinking, we might also say that destitution is another name for the position of Blackness, that “irreparable disturbance.”5 Destituting the world-as-is, the Blackening of the world, shifts what counts as the “real” terrain of politics. To be ungoverned is a quotidian practice (a way of life), and the space in which that practice is lived is a space of anarchy—not nihilism or chaos but life by other means. Anarcho-life. What Black anarchists seek to do is to found a new society, not necessarily by bringing about the destruction of myriad edifices of terror, violence, circumscription, and normativity but by cultivating the spaces and places that, by dint of their existence, instantiate the impossibility of the normative bastions that now surround us. We might call this justice, might call this a non-utopic utopia, a sanctuary. We might call it the undercommons. How, then, to do this? Upon a re-reading of The Undercommons, I was drawn, obsessively, to one phrase, one that struck me at first as dangerously wrongheaded. But, then, the revolutionary will always be dangerous. The revolutionary call that Moten and Harney require and that I’ve been obsessed with is this: they insist that our radical politics, our anarchic world-building must be “unconditional—the door swings open for refuge even though it may let in police agents and destruction.”6 As my grandmother might quip, what kind of foolishness is this? But it is not foolishness precisely because the only ethical call that could bring about the radical revolutionary overturning we seek is one that does not discriminate or develop criteria for inclusion and, consequently, exclusion. If the door swings open without a bouncer checking names, it means that whoever shows up will be let in, unconditionally, without conditions. The ethical demand here is to be monstrously inclusive, a lesson learned in the Black Radical Tradition, Black feminisms, and trans activism. Yes, the Law might send agents to infiltrate our conspiratorial sessions. Or, even worse, as has happened, our enemy might show up and sit with us in prayer before gunning us down. But, at the same time, a salvational figure might show up or, better yet, a fugitive might show up, asking us to provide her refuge and a safe harbor. And we must let her in—this is what is to be done—we must feed and shelter her, because this fugitive, any fugitive, might be the one we didn’t know we were doing all this insurgent conspiratorial work for. Answering “What is to be done?” carries a deeply ethical valence. The manner by which things get done and the result of the doing inflects to whom we owe allegiances, who is or is not on our minds, and most fundamentally for whom we wish to see the world changed. The doing we seek is committed to making a world for people we don’t yet know, people who might need a drastically different world, while understanding that even our idea of “worldness” might be predicated on the logics of normative regimes that limit our horizons. It is imperative, then, to commit to the work without presuming to know who the work is for, only committing to the work because it might allow for those we did not know existed to finally live. When we volunteer at the soup kitchen we must turn no one away, even and especially when they look like they just ate a hearty bowl of soup; when we are faced with imminent violence we must refuse to proliferate violence, because we’ve come into being via a violation and this bestows upon us the ethical commitment to mitigate that violence; when we hear a knock at the door and someone asking for help because they are being chased we must let them in. Again, “the door swings open...” Each entity that crosses the threshold is another possible signatory on our missives for “the antipolitics of dissent.”7 To take praxis seriously, a praxis that has as its never-‐ ending end the proliferation of nonnormative life and the livelihood of the unemerged, is to risk what we ultimately come to. We cannot be afraid of what we find in our critical praxis precisely because, if it commits to the aforementioned, it will indeed be scary and impossible to prepare for. That is the work of the monstrous—a liberatory, unanticipated salvation, that troubling interrogation of gender Susan Stryker finds in the trans; that divine portent that Derrida would argue is unannounceable, which is to say untamable, unable to be absorbed into existing logics; that claimable thingliness that Hortense Spillers says might “rewrite after all a radically different text.”8 Critical praxis in the undercommons—insurgent work being done by folks who were let in without paperwork and without vouchers because they, despite where they came from, got down to work for the revolution—is work for monsters, monstrous work. In the end, what I am asking for is assemblic work for those who are impoverished in spirit, who come together, an intimate proximity reached because we are doing the work not because of an ontologized accident. What I am asking for is a willingness to move toward becoming subjectivated by an analytical queerness, a radical transitivity, an anoriginal Blackness, where Blackness names a sociopoetic force of subversive irregularity and, as Moten expressed to me in an email exchange, “must be claimed by any and every body” who seeks to do anarchic work. What is being asked for, what is to be done, is a Blackening that inducts all those who live and be in the undercommons, stealing life so it can steal more life, pilfering resources and asking no permission, taking no responsibility, because the ones who need this stuff might not know they need it, and neither do we. But if we must hack into government security systems and disseminate the firewalled information, that is what is to be done; if we must lie about the destination of funding we are given, allocating it to unauthorized and unadvised and undisclosed locations, that is what is to be done; if we must sully ourselves by hanging around a bad crowd that is bad only because the good’s violent optics and ethics deem it so, then that is what is to be done.

#### The Role of the Ballot is to affirm planning as opposed to policy.

Greer 18 [GH; 2018; Concordia University, Art Education Department, Graduate Student; "Who Needs the Undercommons? Refuge and Resistance in Public High Schools," Brock Education: A Journal of Educational Research and Practice 28.1: 5-18.] Recut Justin

Planning While study in the undercommons is a sociality that provides refuge, joy, and resilience, planning is the ongoing process of resistance which protects study. In the terms of complexity theory, planning creates the conditions for study to emerge. Planning defends study, for example, by attending to methods, when economic forces are oriented toward outcomes. In such a case, study thrives in the fascination required to build a car from scratch but is extinguished by a production line. Planning may then take the form of activism against the process of de-skilling workers. Generally, study is in trouble where labour is detached from purpose, discovery, and agency; and planning poses resistance to such divisions. Resistance may take a passive form like absenteeism or an active form like student strikes; it is an ongoing social experiment. The subjects of difference who inhabit the undercommons initiate planning in support of further difference: “planning in the undercommons is not an activity, not fishing or dancing or teaching or loving, but the ceaseless experiment with the future presence of the forms of life that make such activities possible” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 74). Importantly, “[p]lanning is self-sufficiency at the social level, and it reproduces in its experiment not just what it needs, life, but what it wants, life in difference…” (p. 76). Planning resists the austerity of conformity. Difference may bring the concept of diversity to mind for social justice educators. There are a number of distinctions between the difference that propels planning in the undercommons and diversity as it is understood in the field of education. Social justice education organized around diversity involves “eliminating the injustice created when differences are sorted and ranked in a hierarchy that unequally confers power…” (Adams, Bell, Goodman, & Joshi, 2016, p. 3, emphasis in original). In this sense, equitable diversity is an end goal that is, significantly, often supported by the implementation of policy. Planning, on the other hand, is a process, rather than an outcome, that resists policy, as explained below. Planning appears distorted, if at all, from the commons where the rules are made: “Because from the perspective of policy it is too dark in there, in the black heart of the undercommons, to see” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 79). Planning may become invisible or appear criminal in the light. Historical examples of such distortions are plentiful. The Freedom Riders were planning in 1961, boarding buses into their own brutalization to desegregate the southern United States; in the light of curricular history, Freedom Riders disappear and are replaced by parliamentary motions. There was planning at the Stonewall Riots in June of 1969 when homeless queer kids led by trans women of colour revolted against police brutality; the political necessity of Stonewall disappears in the parade lights of Pride every year on its own anniversary. Planning made visible but distorted is apparent in current events in the criminalization of self-preservation: from immigration (Ackerman & Furman, 2013), to activism (Matthews & Cyril, 2017; Alonso, Barcena, & Gorostidi, 2013), to panhandling (Chesnay, 2013). Educators who wish to see the planning of the undercommons, or to make it visible to students, must research to discover the exclusions of curriculum. When we include stories like the Stonewall Riots or the Freedom Riders in our teaching, we offer a connection to students who see their lives reflected therein. Stories of resistance to injustice, particular to local contexts, are important educational resources. In addition to these, pedagogical models which support the development and scholastic direction, of planning skills among students include: problem-based learning (Walker, Leary, Hmelo-Silver, & Ertmer, 2015), choice-based art education (Douglas, & Jaquith, 2009), critical media literacy (Funk, Kellner, & Share, 2016), and anti-oppressive education (Kumashiro, 2000). Policy From the perspective of the undercommons, policy inevitably conflicts with the forms of study and planning described above. Policy is the instrument of efficiency; it seeks measurable, predictable outcomes. The immeasurable social experiments and emerging differences of planning and study cannot be reconciled with administrative control as exercised through policy. Policy from the perspective of the undercommons operates under three rules. First, it diagnoses planners as problematic and prescribes itself as the solution; “This is the first rule of policy. It fixes others” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 78). Second, policy requires the participation of planners in the fixing of themselves; “Participating in change is the second rule of policy.” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 80). In this way, participants implicate themselves in order to fulfill the third rule of policy: that “wrong participation” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 81) provokes all manner of crises. If there is no crisis then the participant is fixed and may be deputised in order to fix others. More commonly, any crisis at all proves that policy was right about the planners all along; and of course, they were bound to fail. The circular logic of policy as viewed from the undercommons reflects what Spade (2015) calls administrative violence. Spade (2015) details a story which I relate here to clarify the operations of policy. Bianca, a trans girl, was sent home from her high school in 1999 for wearing clothing that affirmed her gender. She was not allowed to return to her classes. Bianca’s parents called the school and received no response. Spade met Bianca in 2002 when she was homeless, unemployed, and attempting to leave an abusive relationship. Bianca had enrolled in a welfare work program but was outed as a trans woman by her male identification (ID). She was subsequently harassed and forced to quit, losing her income and making her ineligible for Medicaid. She became homeless, and because of her male ID she was barred from women’s shelters and fearful of further abuse at shelters for men. Without an address, medical benefits, or an income Bianca was unable to complete the process to correct her ID and could not afford the hormone treatments that allowed her to maintain a feminine appearance. Bianca’s ability to pass as a cisgender woman protected her on the street from further harassment by both the public and the police. In order to afford hormone injections, Bianca engaged in sex work. The injections were not regulated because they had to be obtained illegally which placed Bianca at increased risk of infection by HIV, hepatitis, and other diseases. Although Bianca’s story is not recent, the factors that contributed to her difficulties are relevant: transgender youth are still significantly over-represented in groups of early school leavers, homeless youth, and survivors of violence (Morton et al., 2018; Keuroghlian, Shtasel, & Bassuk, 2014). In the language of the undercommons Bianca planned to survive by expressing her gender, but this plan was subverted by school policy, causing her not to graduate and significantly reducing her prospects for employment. Following the first rule of policy according to the undercommons, Bianca’s school would not accept her attendance until she fixed her gender. Bianca then followed the second rule of policy and made attempts to become a participant. She tried to stay at shelters and enrolled in a social welfare work program. In each of these cases, she experienced the crisis of harassment. Following the third rule of policy, these crises were framed as the result of Bianca’s wrong participation: she did not have the right identification. For survival, Bianca must then become a fugitive by engaging in criminalized activity: sex work and the illegal procurement of hormones. In an educational context, considering policy, according to The Undercommons, pushes educators to ask how the rules in our schools create, rather than respond to, fugitivity among students. Fugitivity Being a fugitive according to The Undercommons means being marked as an outsider. Fugitivity happens to people when: first they act, and second policy outlaws those actions. But fugitivity must also be embraced. Those who refuse the rules of policy, as outlined above, become fugitive. Fugitives will not be fixed, refuse to participate, and deny responsibility for the crises that befall them. Fugitivity recognises systemic racism, classism, ableism, and cis/heteronormativity in the disallowance of demographic-specific behaviour. It is fugitive sociality that composes the undercommons in order to provide refuge and resistance. In high schools, the undercommons provides social refuge in the form of patient listening and covert smiles to: hat wearing, cell phone texting, hall running, affection displaying, fugitive students; and granola bar giving, grade fudging, student failing, smiling before Christmas, fugitive teachers. These now-fugitive activities are planning behaviours, they sustain study for those that commit them. These things have been happening since before policy determined that education is a predictable and measurable thing. Fugitive planners generate study with unforeseeable ends and immeasurable learning. Turning planners into fugitives has some effects: ease of administration and evaluation is one; the reinforcement of unjust hierarchies is another.

## **2**

### ESPEC

#### Affirmatives must specify and separately delineate an enforcement mechanism used for a just government to recognize to unconditional right to strike

#### Neg for shiftiness – they can redefine the 1AC’s enforcement mechanism in the 1AR which allows them to recontextualize their enforcement mechanism to wriggle out of DA’s since all DA links are predicated on type of enforcement i.e. international perception das, great power competition da, research da’s that may apply to bilateral bans but not to export controls.

#### Implication is to reject all permutations in the 1ar on ICJ and Harris so they can’t shift out of stuff in the 2ac

#### b] Fairness – its constitutive to debate as competitive activity that requires objective evaluation. Controls the I/L to education because you don’t learn from an already skewed round.

## **3**

### Spec Right to Strike

#### Interp – the aff must specify what the right to strike is in a delineated text in the 1AC.

#### Violation – they don’t

#### Standards

#### 1] Topic Lit is unclear of what a right to strike is – specing is k2 understanding what stance the aff takes

#### National Labor Relations Board (National Labor Relations Board, xx-xx-xxxx, "The Right to Strike," No Publication, <https://www.nlrb.gov/strikes> )

Lawful and unlawful strikes. The lawfulness of a strike may depend on the object, or purpose, of the strike, on its timing, or on the conduct of the strikers. The object, or objects, of a strike and whether the objects are lawful are matters that are not always easy to determine. Such issues often have to be decided by the National Labor Relations Board. The consequences can be severe to striking employees and struck employers, involving as they do questions of reinstatement and backpay.

#### 2] Ground – a] you can delink out of pics and disads we read about certain groups not being able to strike ie teachers or healthcare workers or out of pics based on strikes purposes. Means that we never have stable ground when constructing the 1NC and you can shift out of any core ground we read b] On case discussion is limited to generics when we don’t know exactly what you defend which discourages nuanced debates and engagement on case

## **Case**

### 1NC – Disclosure

**I – meet, My wiki has been down, I told you I would send what you need**

Graphical user interface, text, application

Description automatically generated

**CI: Debaters do not need to disclose on wiki if they have a tech problem and reach to disclose via other means**

**Prefer neg;**

1. **Access – people can have bad wifi and technical problems – disad to your model and excludes people who live in areas with worse wifi – email solves since you can just send what you need to read, instead of dropping people for bad wifi**
2. **Solves – we literally told you that we would send what you need**

**Their interp**

### 1NC – FW

### 1NC – Hijack #1

#### The aff collapses to monism – affect theory is just substance monism, that the world and every instance of it are just different folds of affect – deleuze is just straight up a monist.

#### That negates – a) ought statements require conduct between agents – even if one has a duty for them self, it assumes a difference between the self and the mind; otherwise it’s not a duty since its just self-imposed and b) plurality impossible means change is impossible as it goes from one state from existing to not existing, but monism proves that one thing exists which can’t not exist since it’s everything so elimination is impossible.

### 1NC – Hijack #2

#### Deleuze triggers determinism. If I win this it proves the subject has no capcity for fluidity, and even if they do, it is a form of static fluidity that prevents true becoming, which denies their framework.

#### 1. If the subject is PURELY affect then the subject has no control over their reactions or actions since the way they relate to the world is entirely influenced by the physical substance of affect that makes up the world which means they have no capacity to be fluid.

#### 2. The best neuroscientific, psychological, and medical evidence evidence free will doesn’t exist. This article is a giant literature review of different fields.

Andrea **Lavazza**, Neuroethics, Centro Universitario Internazionale, Arezzo, Italy, Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It, **2016**, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4887467/> ///AHS PB BRACKETED FOR CLARITY

**All** these **experiments seem to indicate that free will is an illusion**. Yet, these relevant experiments can be interpreted in many ways. A possible view is that, in some way, determinism can be observed directly within ourselves. This interpretation might lead to the conclusion that free will is just an illusion. In fact, if one considers as a condition of free will the fact that it should be causa sui (i.e., it should be able to consciously start new causal chains), such a condition is incompatible with determinism as it is usually defined. For it, in fact, all events are linked by casual relations in the form of natural laws, which started long before we were born and which we cannot escape. However, determinism has generally been regarded as a metaphysical claim, not refutable by empirical findings. One could properly talk of automatism in the brain, not of determinism, based on the evidence available. (In any case, endorsing indeterminism might lead to consider our behavior as the causal product of choices that every time produce different results, as if we rolled a dice. This doesn’t seem to make us any freer than if determinism were overturned; cf. Levy, 2011). Most importantly, another feature of freedom seems to be a pure illusion, namely the role of consciousness. The experiments considered thus far heavily question the claim that consciousness actually causes voluntary behavior. **Neural activation starts the decisional process culminating in the movement, while consciousness “comes after”, when “things are done”. Therefore, [and] consciousness cannot trigger our voluntary decisions**. But the role of consciousness in voluntary choices is part of the definition of free will (but the very definition of consciousness is a matter of debate, cf. Chalmers, 1996). Empirical research in psychology also shows that our mind works and makes choices without our conscious control. As proposed by psychologist Wegner (2002, 2003, 2004) and Aarts et al. (2004), **we are “built” to have the impression to consciously control our actions or to have the power to freely choose, even though all that is only a cognitive illusion**. Many priming experiments show that people act “mechanically” (even when their behavior might appear suited to the environment and even refined). Automatic cognitive processes, of which we aren’t always aware, originate our decisions, and they were only discovered thanks to **the most advanced scientific research**. Ultimately, consciousness, which should exercise control and assess the reasons for a choice, is thus allegedly causally ineffective: a mere epiphenomenon, to use the terminology of the philosophy of mind. This is what has been called Zombie Challenge, “based on an amazing wealth of findings in recent cognitive science that **demonstrate** the surprising ways in which **our everyday behavior is controlled by automatic processes that unfold in the complete absence of consciousness**” (Vierkant et al., 2013).

#### That Negates – Determinism denies the moral value of prohibitions and obligations, if all actions are already locked in then trying to make subjects morally culpable for them is meaningless as it is already predetermined the subject would do that. This negates the prescriptive value of ought statements making the aff incoherent.

### 1NC – Core

#### Deleuze definitively negates:

#### 1] Strikes have been made productive by capital – resistance only strengthens the system.

Beller 95 [Jonathan; Adjunct Professor of English, Film Studies, and Women’s Gender and Sexuality Studies at Barnard. In the 1990s in articles for Communication Research, boundary 2 andpostmodern culture, he became the first critical theorist of what he called "attention economy" and formulated the attention theory of value. His work in media studies includes materialist analysis of cinema, photography, computation, information, and money/finance. This work understands media platforms as various forms of social mediation, semiotics and political economy. His research is situated in film studies, media studies, critical race theory, feminist theory and anti-imperialist and decolonial epistemology and struggle. Beller's books include The Cinematic Mode of Production: Attention Economy and the Society of the Spectacle (2006); Acquiring Eyes: Philippine Visuality, Nationalist Struggle, and the World-Media System (2006); The Message is Murder: Substrates of Computational Capital (2017) and The World Computer: Derivative Conditions of Racial Capitalism (2019, forthcoming Duke University Press). Current interests include the utilization of programmable money for activist projects and work on a new book tentatively entitled Derivative Revolution. He is a member of the Social Text editorial collective; “The Spectatorship of the Proletariat,” Duke University Press; Autumn 1995; <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/303727.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A1fcfb260a82662c726f0fac8b621a07b>] Justin

Because today capital "thinks" several cycles in advance of itself, or, to put it another way, because it has several historical stages of its own development simultaneously available to itself that can be utilized in vary- ing proportions, one could well argue that isolated labor strikes are made productive for capital and that phenomena such as the general strike or Samir Amin's "de-linking" are impossible.' The argument for the productive value of the strike for capital would not in itself necessarily be to ignore what Jacques Derrida has recently called "Marx's injunction."2 In discuss- ing the capitalization of the resistance to capital, given perhaps its most dramatic form in and after 1989, one might still hear the ghostly admoni- tions of the "specter of Marx," which, for Derrida "reaffirms the question of life and death." Furthermore, one might hear the moans and intimations of such an absent presence without oneself becoming as dead as Marxism is purported to be

Though this essay is in no way directly concerned with the viability of the labor strike per se, it is most definitely concerned with the objective of the strike, that is, the reappropriation of historically sedimented human labor (the means of production) by disenfranchised individuals and groups. Such reappropriation of historically sedimented labor and of living labor, I suggest, is, in fact, going on all the time; it is endemic to social change. As Antonio Negri argues, in endeavoring to establish the subjectivity of labor in history, not only does labor produce capital, but labor, in its resistance to capital exploitation forces structural and technological innovations in capi- talism. Though this is surely the case, we have lacked, since the advent of cinema in particular, a specific theory that accounts for the development of certain new regimes for the production of cultural and economic value via mental activity; we do not yet know how to account for the present-day dynamics of value production and appropriation that operate through the conversion of mental activity into social force. The capitalization of mental activity is an enabling factor in capital's ability to continue all previous forms of violation. By looking at the recycling of the resistance to capital by capital (the making productive of the strike against capital by capital) our affective production of hegemony may be foregrounded, and possibilities for the dis- ruption of coercion and exploitation may be foregrounded as well. Toward those ends (and perhaps to the surprise of some), I would like to discuss the development of mass media during the time of early modern cinema, more specifically, those particular developments that can be found to crys- tallize in Sergei Mikhailovich Eisenstein's 1924-1925 film The Strike.3 For it was here, precisely, in revolutionary cinema, that capital's encroachment into the visual sphere met with resistance. And yet, in spite of its intentions, The Strike, like capital itself, participates in producing a new regime of the sensorium by advancing an increasing integration of machines and culture, of labor and perception. We can use The Strike to mark an emergent socio- historical change in the character of what Marx called "sensuous labor" and, by direct implication, to mark as well a new strategy for the production and appropriation of value.

#### 2] Boundaries DA – the right to strike isn’t a collective win – it allows the state to dictate the bounds by which revolution can take place which allows it instances of micro fascism to coopt the movement.

#### 3] Strikes show contempt for the ordinary man which precludes becoming.

Mason et al 16 [Rowena Mason, Andrew Sparrow, Rajeev Syaland, Jamie Grierson; “No 10 accuses striking workers of 'contempt for ordinary people'” The Guardian; 1/19/16; <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/dec/19/no-10-accuses-striking-workers-of-contempt-for-ordinary-people>] Justin

\*\*Brackets in Original

Downing Street has accused rail, postal and airline workers going on strike of causing “untold misery” and showing “contempt for ordinary people”.

Theresa May’s deputy official spokesman condemned the walkouts in the run-up to Christmas in unusually strong terms on Monday morning, saying the disruption they will cause was “massively unwarranted”.

He suggested the prime minister would not be prioritising further strike laws demanded by some Conservative MPs but refused to rule this out as a possibility if the industrial action gets worse.

Asked about the strikes affecting Southern rail, the Royal Mail and British Airways, he said: “What the prime minister thinks is that the strikes are wrong and that they are causing untold misery to hundreds of thousands of people.

“There are hundreds of thousands of people having their lives disrupted on a massively unwarranted scale by these strikes … If [these strikes] have anything in common, it is shared contempt for ordinary people trying to go about their daily lives … [The unions’] actions are clearly designed to bring about maximum damage and disruption during the festive period.”

#### Unions are inaccessible to minorities – that leads to increasing inequality.

Ahlquist 17 [John; School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California San Diego; “Labor Unions, Political Representation, and Economic Inequality,” 3/9/17; AnnualReviews; <https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051215-023225>] Justin

Immigration may exacerbate inequality to the extent that immigrants take jobs for lower wages than native workers do. Immigration may also put pressure on existing unions, since immigrants may be harder to organize owing to linguistic or cultural differences. For these reasons—along with simple prejudice—unions in immigrant-receiving countries, mainly Australia, Canada, and the United States, opposed immigration for several decades. Rosenfeld & Kleykamp (2009) use CPS data to look at the most recent wave of Hispanic immigration and find that Hispanics continue to join unions. They find that Hispanic unionization rates, unlike those for African Americans, can largely be explained by positional factors. Many American unions have recognized that organizing immigrants is crucial to their survival (Milkman 2006), but immigrants’ more precarious job status has made union gains harder to consolidate through the Great Recession (Catron 2013).

The situation for female workers is more complicated. The gendering of employment and the expectation that women would leave the labor force after marriage have long limited women’s access to unionized parts of the economy (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2011). In some countries union bargaining objectives, norms of fairness, and public policy were predicated on an assumed singleearner household. But standardized terms of employment and promotion along with an expanded public sector may attract more women into union jobs. The effect of unionization on wage inequality between men and women is therefore ambiguous. Union density in rich democracies shows no association with the gap between median male and female wages. However, in the United States and United Kingdom, the gender wage gap narrowed at the same time unionization fell.