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#### The Atlantic slave trade marked the birth of modern logistics and racial capitalism that was characterized by endless access and a drive for endless control. Even through this global regime of racialized violence, logistics is vulnerable to logisticality – a glitch amongst those in the grips of total access.

Harney et al. 18 Stefano Harney in conversation with Niccolò Cuppini and Mattia Frapporti, September 2018, “Logistics Genealogies: A Dialogue with Stefano Harney,” Social Text 136 • Vol. 36, No. 3, DOI 10.1215/01642472-6917802 Recut Justin

Modern logistics is a commercial logistics, with all the multiple sources that feed what Cedric Robinson calls racial capitalism. And it’s a capitalist science. Even today’s military logistics is most commonly outsourced to commercial rms, who make huge prfiots off the logistics of contempo- rary permanent war. As a commercial logistics, as a capitalist science, it can be traced directly and emphatically to the Atlantic slave trade. The Atlantic slave trade was the birth of modern logistics, as it was also the birth of a new kind of war on our species being, and the birth of racial cap- italism, which amounts to saying the same thing. This trade entailed the first global movement of mass commodities, voluminous and grotesque. Moreover, these humans were also perishable and volatile commodities that could “go missing” and were hard “to extract,” requiring complex, even diabolical, logistical technologies, supported by finance, insurance, law, and of course state and extrastate violence. Ian Baucom locates the origins of modern insurance in the Atlantic slave trade in his important work Spectres of the Altantic. We know from Sergio Bologna how much contemporary finance and logistics are entwined in today’s overleveraged global shipping industry, but this was true of the Atlantic slave trade too, where speculative finance was already at work. The story of the Zong slave ship is central to Baucom’s account and is also beautifully, unbearably rendered by M. NourbeSe Philip in her book-length poem Zong!, captur- ing what the birth of modern logistics did to any possible project of the human by bringing finance and logistics together in a devilish alliance over the commodity that really “could speak,” the “thing” that talks or is somehow in touch, neither subject nor proper object, a massive, subter- ranean, ethereal, undercommon threat to the individuation of modern “Man” emerging at the same time. But the Atlantic slave trade was also the birth of modern logistics because modern logistics is not just about how to transport large amounts of commodities or information or energy, or even how to move these ef- ficiently, but also about the sociopathic demand for access: topographical, jurisdictional, but as importantly bodily and social access. The nearly complete access that was imposed upon the African enslaved, upon the African continent, and upon the lands and indigenous peoples settled for plantations, this kind of access remains the ambition of logistics today, and it is for this reason that the slave trade remains so contemporary, that abolition as Jared Sexton rightly says is yet to come. And we might add that this abolition requires the abolishment of logistics which in its flows created a people without standing anywhere. We act in abolition not for a ground to stand on but for groundations beyond standing. Modern logistics, with its warehousing and its containers, is as much about controlling the flow as ensuring the flow, as much about the interface of movement of commodities and financialization of commodities as it is about just get- ting goods somewhere. That interface is an opportunity for speculation, and today the line itself, the supply line and the assembly line, their speed, efficiency, and metrics, are a source of massive financial speculation. This is also the horrific legacy of the Atlantic slave trade, the containerization of people, of the sociopathic access demanded to labor and sex, and the storage, in forts, in the hold. And even more murderously, the elimination of goods, of cargo, when the price falls, or considerations of finance as in the incident of the slave ship the Zong, in which 133 enslaved persons were thrown overboard for insurance purposes during a logistical operation. In short, this aggregated access allowed for the most evil calculations about the perishability of goods, the planned obsolescence of products, and the cost of replacement, in a word, financial speculation on the supply line that was in the case of the African enslaved in the Atlantic trade often indis- tinguishable from the assembly line. Marx said the rst thing the worker makes is himself. The slave was worker on the line and at the same time the supply coming off the line and into the line. The same concerns with speculation on the line, the line as a modulation of investment and exploi- tation of labor are still found today at Walmart or Starbucks, not so far from their origins, at least for the most part. As Susan Zieger reminds us in her study of “Box” Brown and logistics — he was the slave who mailed himself in a box to “freedom” from the slave-plantation South to the slave-dependent North in the United States — logistics incorporates loss in its logics. As Fred Moten and I say, logistics tracks us because it assumes fugitivity. Indeed, what is called surveillance might also be called preemptive logistics. It is possible that all we know of surveillance studies, including its most incisive work in black surveillance like Simone Browne’s, could also go under the name preemptive logistics, even predictive logistics, the anticipation not of resistance but of a kind of impenetrability even in the give. In other words, our entangled, indeterminate, undercommon rub- up of curvy lines, kinks, loops, and crooked lines summons logistics. It reacts to our sumptuous tangle. Our entanglement requires them to draw up contingency plans, which are plans to make our indeterminacy mere contingency, to account for what goes missing. Logistics is the science of loss, the science of their lost means, which is to say it will always be the white science and the science of being white. Logistics is the science of their loss, not ours, though we, and those closest to blackness in particu- lar, suffer horrific losses from their loss. However, it was not just modern logistics that was born in this hell-fire. It was also the birth of what Fred and I call logisticality, a social capacity found most intensely amongst those who found themselves, who found each other, under the duress of almost total access but in the grip of each other. As Frank Wilderson writes at the end of Incognegro, his brilliant more-than-memoir: “Something happened to us in the hold.” And not just in the hold. In her heart-breaking but unavoidable book Lose Your Mother, Saidiya Hartman speaks of the fugitivity that the ungoverned and the ungovernable of Africa were forced to invent because of the reach of the Atlantic slave trade. Those captured by the trade either were or became the people Cedric Robinson understands in Africa as living by a principle of “individual” incompleteness. Such peoples existed everywhere, as James Scott asserts in The Art of Not Being Governed. Scott details how highland peoples in Southeast Asia avoided the massive slave trade of the padi states, at trade that dominated precolonial Southeast Asia to the point that slaves became not only the biggest trade but currency itself. In many languages of the padi states these peoples were already known by the name slave before they were enslaved. These peoples refused to form political societies, have leaders, or see land as owned or even shared in ownership. They gathered, and they wandered. No written languages, they sought refuge with each other. But the hold, the middle passage, the ­fire that African peoples went through, those who were captured, and those who became fugitive, created something perhaps unprecedented in its total span across societies and histories. This is what Fred and I call logisticality, the ability to fi­nd each other, to move together, to break the rule of Newtonian time and space, disorder it, and legislate new time and space to disorder, to gather, stranded into refuge together. A people came into existence without origin — anoriginal, as Nahum Chandler would say — who were “in touch,” whose response to the sociopathic demand for access was paradoxically and necessarily a radical opening of being, a practice of touch without surface or border or edge, a practice of hapticality. Fred and I understand hapticality as a kind of touch without surface that undoes, that saps the fever of individuation, in a sometimes violent and profane exorcism. It is not a reassuring touch. It unensures precisely because it’s a loving touch. In a sense, African slaves who came through the ­re could be said to have reversed logistics and overturned it. Now the slaver sought this logisticality, sought but could not fully capture something that had been produced in capture but also preceded it as Robinson and Scott suggest, calling capture into being in all its murderous regulatory force. We can understand this logisticality in two registers, as I’ve suggested: First, in C. L. R. James’s famous contention that slaves ran the plantations in the Caribbean — that it was the slaves who had the capacity and know-how to work across half a dozen African and European languages in this early crucible of world capitalism — it was the slaves who worked the nascent capitalist machinery of the sugar mills and who handled the logistics of transport to the ships, and sometimes on the ships. It was the slaves who worked in exchanges of different currencies, commodities, and calculations of the future, with world prices. The slaves also ran the households, providing the care, nurturing, and attention. Now as James would be quick to point out, all this occurred despite the unbounded inhumanity and cruelty of the owners, as for instance he details in his chapter on owners and on the property in the Black Jacobins. All of this was also going on in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries at a time when, as James notes, most of our families in Italy and across Europe, as we might say, “still only knew the bell tower.” This logisticality — the quantum ­nding, this hapticality, this feel without surface that hurts and loves — could also be understood as a capacity to recreate Robinson’s principle of incompleteness and, indeed, to detect and translate such principles of incompleteness and ungovernability, of the unregulated, the disorderly and the unruled, to feel these things, and feel others feeling you being undone. This hapticality was never going to be fully enslaved, even when American slavery turned to its speci­c Taylorist brutality and slave breeding with the rise of the cotton trade and industrial capitalism at the end of the eighteenth century. But more importantly, it survives as the basis of the black radical tradition, in radical social poesis, as Laura Harris says. It survives in/as blackness. So the shipped, the containerized, the accessed of the Atlantic slave trade gave birth to modern logistics but also conjured something in the break of this massive enclosure of those who lived together by the principle of incompleteness. And despite this, it is fundamentally necessary to place that hapticality against what Christina Sharpe, writing recently about the slave ship and its wake, might call its “weather,” the pervasive antiblack racism that this founding of modern logistics also bequeathed the contemporary world and perpetuates today.

#### Specifically, regulating the strike into the right to strike allows the state to dictate revolution – that diffuses planning into policy and subverts radicality.

Crépon 19 Mark Crépon (French philosopher), translated by Micol Bez “The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin’s ‘Toward the Critique of Violence,’” Critical Times, 2:2, August 2019, DOI 10.1215/26410478-7708331 Recut Justin

If we wish to understand how the question of the right to strike arises for Walter Benjamin in the seventh paragraph of his essay “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” it is impor­ tant to first analyze the previous paragraph, which concerns the state’s monopoly on violence. It is here that Benjamin questions the argument that such a monopoly derives from the impossibility of a system of legal ends to preserve itself as long as the pursuit of natural ends through violent means remains. Benjamin responds to this dogmatic thesis with the following hypothesis, arguably one of his most impor­ tant reflections: “To counter it, one would perhaps have to consider the surprising possibility that law’s interest in monopolizing violence vis­à­vis the individual is explained by the intention not of preserving legal ends, but rather of preserving law itself. [This is the possibility] that violence, when it does not lie in the hands of law, poses a danger to law, not by virtue of the ends that it may pursue but by virtue of its mere existence outside of law.”1 In other words, nothing would endanger the law more than the possibility of its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control. The function of the law would therefore be, first and foremost, to contain violence within its own boundaries. It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis, Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war. Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within class struggle. To begin with, the very idea of such a struggle implies certain forms of violence. The strike could then be understood as one of the recognizable forms that this violence can take. However, this analytical framework is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law in France in 1864. What this recognition engages is, in fact, the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike. Thus, the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best, if not the only, way for the state to circumscribe within (and via) the law the relative violence of class struggles. We might consider this to be the per­ fect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of ques­ tioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider. First, is it legitimate to present the strike as a form of violence? Who has a vested interest in such a representation? In other words, how can we trace a clear and unequivocal demarcation between violence and nonviolence? Are we not always bound to find residues of violence, even in those actions that we would be tempted to consider nonviolent? The second line of questioning is just as important and is rooted in the distinction established by Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, between the “political strike” and the “proletarian general strike,” to which Benja­ min dedicates a set of complementary analyses in §13 of his essay. Here, again, we are faced with a question of limits. What is at stake is the possibility for a certain type of strike (the proletarian general strike) to exceed the limits of the right to strike— turning, in other words, the right to strike against the law itself. The phenomenon is that of an autoimmune process, in which the right to strike that is meant to protect the law against the possible violence of class strugles is transformed into a means for the destruction of the law. The diference between the two types of strikes is nevertheless introduced with a condition: “The validity of this statement, however, is not unrestricted because it is not unconditional,” notes Benjamin in §7. We would be mistaken in believing that the right to strike is granted and guaranteed uncondi­ tionally. Rather, it is structurally subjected to a conflict of interpretations, those of the workers, on the one hand, and of the state on the other. From the point of view of the state, the partial strike cannot under any circumstance be understood as a right to exercise violence, but rather as the right to extract oneself from a preexisting (and verifiable) violence: that of the employer. In this sense, the partial strike should be considered a nonviolent action, what Benjamin named a “pure means.” The interpretations diverge on two main points. The first clearly depends on the alleged “violence of the employer,” a predicate that begs the question: Who might have the authority to recognize such violence? Evidently it is not the employer. The danger is that the state would similarly lack the incentive to make such a judgment call. It is nearly impossible, in fact, to find a single instance of a strike in which this recognition of violence was not subject to considerable controversy. The political game is thus the following: the state legislated the right to strike in order to con­ tain class strugles, with the condition that workers must have “good reason” to strike. However, it is unlikely that a state systematically allied with (and accomplice to) employers will ever recognize reasons as good, and, as a consequence, it will deem any invocation of the right to strike as illegitimate. Workers will therefore be seen as abusing a right granted by the state, and in so doing transforming it into a violent means. On this point, Benjamin’s analyses remain extremely pertinent and profoundly contemporary. They unveil the enduring strategy of governments confronted with a strike (in education, transportation, or healthcare, for example) who, afer claiming to understand the reasons for the protest and the grievances of the workers, deny that the arguments constitute sufcient reason for a strike that will likely paralyze this or that sector of the economy. They deny, in other words, that the conditions denounced by the workers display an intrinsic violence that jus­ tifies the strike. Let us note here a point that Benjamin does not mention, but that is part of Sorel’s reflections: this denial inevitably contaminates the (socialist) lef once it gains power. What might previously have seemed a good reason to strike when it was the opposition is deemed an insufcient one once it is the ruling party. In the face of popular protest, it always invokes a lack of sufcient rationale, allow­ ing it to avoid recognizing the intrinsic violence of a given social or economic situ­ ation, or of a new policy. And it is because it refuses to see this violence and to take responsibility for it that the left regularly loses workers’ support.

#### That continuous improvement paradoxically necessitates racialized genocide and ecological destruction.

**Moten and Harney 21** [Fred Moten, Professor of Performance Studies for the Tisch School of the Arts at NYU, PhD in English from UC Berkeley, 2020 MacArthur Genius Fellow, Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management for the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University, PhD in Social and Political Sciences from the University of Cambridge, co-founder of Ground Provisions—a curatorial collective, founder of the School for Study—a nomadic study collective, 2021, *All Incomplete*, pp 13-18] GZ Recut Justin

What does it mean to stand for improvement? Or worse, to stand for what business calls **a ‘commitment to continuous improvement‘?** It **means** to stand for **the brutal speciation of all**. To take a stand for speciation is the beginning of a **diabolical usufruct**. **Improvement comes to us by way of an innovation in land tenure**, where **individuated ownership, derived from increasing the land’s productivity, is given in the perpetual**, and thus arrested, becoming of exception’s miniature. This is to say that from the outset, **the ability to own** – and that ability’s first derivative, **self-possession** – **is entwined with the ability to make more productive**. In order to be improved, to be rendered more productive, **land must be violently reduced to its productivity**, which is the **regulatory diminishment and management of earthly generativity**. Speciation is this general **reduction of the earth to productivity** and **submission of the earth to techniques of domination** that isolate and enforce particular increases in and accelerations of **productivity**. In this regard, (necessarily European) man, in and as the exception, imposes speciation upon himself, in an operation that **extracts and excepts himself from the earth** in order to confirm his supposed **dominion over it**. And just as **the earth must be forcefully speciated to be possessed**, man must **forcefully speciate himself** in order to enact this kind of possession. This is to say that **racialization is present in the very idea of dominion over the earth**; in the very idea and enactment of the exception; **in the very nuts and bolts of possession-by-improvement**. Forms of racialization that both Michel Foucault and, especially and most vividly, Robinson identify in medieval Europe become *usufructed* with modern possession through improvement. Speciated humans are **endlessly improved** through the **endless work** they do on their **endless way to becoming Man**. This is the usufruct of man. In early modern England, establishing title to land by making it more productive meant **eliminating biodiversity** and isolating and breeding a species – barley or rye or pigs. Localized ecosystems were aggressively transformed so that **monocultural productivity smothers anacultural generativity**. **The emergent relation between speciation and racialization is the very conception and conceptualization of the settler**. Maintenance of that relation is his vigil and his eve. For the encloser, possession is established through improvement – this is true for the possession of land and for the possession of self. **The Enlightenment is the universalization/ globalization of the imperative to possess and its corollary, the imperative to improve**. However, this productivity must always confront its contradictory impoverishment: the **destruction of its biosphere** and its **estrangement in, if not from, entanglement**, both of which combine to ensure **the liquidation of the human differential that is already present in the very idea of man, the exception**. To stand for such improvement is to **invoke policy**, which attributes depletion to the difference, which is to say the wealth, **whose simultaneous destruction and accumulation policy is meant to operationalize**. **This attribution of a supposedly essential lack**, an inevitable and supposedly natural diminution, is achieved alongside **the imposition of possession-by-improvement**. **To make policy is to impose speciation upon everybody and everything, to inflict impoverishment in the name of improvement, to invoke the universal law of the usufruct of man**. In this context, continuous improvement, as it emerged with decolonization and particularly with the defeat of national capitalism in the 1970s, is the continuous crisis of speciation in the surround of the general antagonism. This is the contradiction Robinson constantly invoked and analyzed with the kind of profound and solemn optimism that comes from being with, and being of service to, your friends.

#### We affirm Anarcho-Blackness as an undercommon insurgency.

Bey 20 Marquis Bey, 2020, “Anarcho-Blackness: Notes Toward a Black Anarchism,” AK Press, SJBE

IT IS MISGUIDED TO PRESUME THAT AN ANARCHIC WORLD, A WORLD IN which, for classical anarchists, the State is eliminated—or a world in which, for Black queer feminist anarchists, racial capitalism and cisheteronormative patriarchy is overturned —is the “end” of anarchist pursuits. Anarcho-Blackness, with its disruptive disorderly conduct—its mode of conducting itself as, in other words, disorderly—advances a critical praxis that answers the fundamental political question, “What is to be done?” Kind of. The question “What is to be done?” demands an answer, not that the texture, tenor, or terms of that answer can be readily discerned. Nor does admitting this exculpate us from needing to, nevertheless, provide an answer. So again: what is to be done? Indeed, accosted by right-wing populism, virulent white supremacy, transantagonism, heteronormative patriarchy, and the litany of other violent regimes in our midst, we so earnestly want them to cease. We demand that it all end, now, and for justifiable reasons. I, though, animated by anarchism’s critical praxis—its practice of a criticality—do not place my crosshairs on a moment beyond now, when things might come to a close. This is not motivated by a nihilistic pessimism about the fate of the current political moment, where I cannot fathom cessation or even mitigation of various violences; this is not motivated by a perverse infatuation with the bounding persistence of hegemonic terrors. It is motivated by a kind of zeal, in fact, one where refusing an end allows for a perpetual openness that enables, always, the possibility of another beginning. Black anarchism’s emphasis on the constitutivity of the concepts of critical and praxis is fundamental here, as it itself is constituted through an indebtedness to Black queer and trans feminisms. This project is deeply theoretical, but also practical and material, because there is nothing more theoretically practical than trying to figure out how to fundamentally change the very system by which we live; indeed, to quote Zoé Samudzi, “What does it mean to create community that is safe for Black women, for Black trans women? That’s an incredibly theoretical exercise because that requires that we have all of these conversations and start to create material politics around misogynoir and trans misogynoir.”1 So the critical praxis and its theoretical heft is a ruthless interrogation of the established and institutionalized—in the vein of Marx’s 1843 call for die rücksichtlose Kritik alles Bestehenden (the ruthless criticism of all that exists); and if praxis is a doing, an agential enactment that bears on sociality, then a critical praxis marks an interrogative social enactment. What kind of politics might this lead to? What kind of world might this engender, and who might show up to this promiscuous gathering? The space cultivated by this critical praxis is where a Black anarchic politics and those subjectivated by an anarcho-Blackness, its attendant Black queer feminist electrical circuitry, show up. Those maroons, subversive intellectuals, fugitives, queers, feminists, anarchists, and rebellious workers meet to conspire together in the undercommons: a non-place where everyone is Black, queer, anarchic, because they are changed by the undercommons, which is not a place you enter but a groove that enters you. Critical praxis becomes a radical invitation to not only do but to be done by the undercommon insurgency that makes its own demands. And such an interrogation must suspend the presumption of an end goal. We know from Moten and Harney, and Jack Halberstam, that what we think we want before the crisis that precipitates our insurgency will necessarily shift after we’ve attained the limits of what our coalitional knowledge could compile. It is not because we are insufficient, as if insufficiency is a deficiency rather than a willingness to risk getting at the outer limits of what we dared to think; it is because we cannot, and must not, assume that the logics and rubrics we have when moving within the maelstrom of the hegemonic—radically altered as they may be—can operate to our benefit when we’ve unseated the hegemon. We will need new rubrics and metrics, unrubrics and unmetrics, because a radically other-world requires radically other means to love it, to caress it, to be all the way in it. So why is there no “end”? To assert this might seem to sidestep what Foucault claims in the Preface of Anti- Oedipus: to be “less concerned with why this or that than with how to proceed.” Refusing to bank on the “end” is, at least in part, how to proceed. “An abdication of political responsibility?” Moten and Harney write, anticipating the accusation. “OK. Whatever. We’re just anti-politically romantic about actually existing social life.”2 I submit that one’s concern must be an ethical one that—to supplement an oversight in Moten and Harney—not only sets its sights on social life that “actually” (I shiver at the hubris of this word) exists but, more substantively, fertilizes the conditions of possibility for otherwise and unsung and unknown emergence. There is no “end” because to know the end is to think one knows the totality of the landscape, a line of thinking that cannot account for that which falls outside the dictates of legibility. There might always be something else just outside, and we cannot close the discussion when we think it is over. Fugitive planning plans for what it cannot plan for by refusing to plan for it. So there is no end in sight because sight is not the only sense available to us. (But there is also no end in touch, smell, feel, or taste—or any other “sense.”) There is no end in sight because our end may only be someone else’s beginning or middle. Thus, our critical praxis, our interrogative social enactment, does something precisely when it commits to a political endeavor proliferating life where no life is said to be found. And the “where” of “life where no life is said to be found” is the place brought about by abolition. Abolition is fundamentally anarchic, as will be discussed at greater length in the final chapter. It is the eradication “of a society that could have prisons, that could have slavery, that could have the wage, and therefore not abolition as the elimination of anything but abolition as the founding of a new society.”3 This entails, to put it simply, the eradication of society inasmuch as “Society” is predicated on, constituted by, the existence of these things. Anarchism is the ground on which we assert the destitution of the terrain, a destitution that marks, according to the Invisible Committee, “a rupture in the fatality that condemns revolutions to reproduce what they have driven out, shattering the iron cage of counter-revolution.”4 Following this line of thinking, we might also say that destitution is another name for the position of Blackness, that “irreparable disturbance.”5 Destituting the world-as-is, the Blackening of the world, shifts what counts as the “real” terrain of politics. To be ungoverned is a quotidian practice (a way of life), and the space in which that practice is lived is a space of anarchy—not nihilism or chaos but life by other means. Anarcho-life. What Black anarchists seek to do is to found a new society, not necessarily by bringing about the destruction of myriad edifices of terror, violence, circumscription, and normativity but by cultivating the spaces and places that, by dint of their existence, instantiate the impossibility of the normative bastions that now surround us. We might call this justice, might call this a non-utopic utopia, a sanctuary. We might call it the undercommons. How, then, to do this? Upon a re-reading of The Undercommons, I was drawn, obsessively, to one phrase, one that struck me at first as dangerously wrongheaded. But, then, the revolutionary will always be dangerous. The revolutionary call that Moten and Harney require and that I’ve been obsessed with is this: they insist that our radical politics, our anarchic world-building must be “unconditional—the door swings open for refuge even though it may let in police agents and destruction.”6 As my grandmother might quip, what kind of foolishness is this? But it is not foolishness precisely because the only ethical call that could bring about the radical revolutionary overturning we seek is one that does not discriminate or develop criteria for inclusion and, consequently, exclusion. If the door swings open without a bouncer checking names, it means that whoever shows up will be let in, unconditionally, without conditions. The ethical demand here is to be monstrously inclusive, a lesson learned in the Black Radical Tradition, Black feminisms, and trans activism. Yes, the Law might send agents to infiltrate our conspiratorial sessions. Or, even worse, as has happened, our enemy might show up and sit with us in prayer before gunning us down. But, at the same time, a salvational figure might show up or, better yet, a fugitive might show up, asking us to provide her refuge and a safe harbor. And we must let her in—this is what is to be done—we must feed and shelter her, because this fugitive, any fugitive, might be the one we didn’t know we were doing all this insurgent conspiratorial work for. Answering “What is to be done?” carries a deeply ethical valence. The manner by which things get done and the result of the doing inflects to whom we owe allegiances, who is or is not on our minds, and most fundamentally for whom we wish to see the world changed. The doing we seek is committed to making a world for people we don’t yet know, people who might need a drastically different world, while understanding that even our idea of “worldness” might be predicated on the logics of normative regimes that limit our horizons. It is imperative, then, to commit to the work without presuming to know who the work is for, only committing to the work because it might allow for those we did not know existed to finally live. When we volunteer at the soup kitchen we must turn no one away, even and especially when they look like they just ate a hearty bowl of soup; when we are faced with imminent violence we must refuse to proliferate violence, because we’ve come into being via a violation and this bestows upon us the ethical commitment to mitigate that violence; when we hear a knock at the door and someone asking for help because they are being chased we must let them in. Again, “the door swings open...” Each entity that crosses the threshold is another possible signatory on our missives for “the antipolitics of dissent.”7 To take praxis seriously, a praxis that has as its never-‐ ending end the proliferation of nonnormative life and the livelihood of the unemerged, is to risk what we ultimately come to. We cannot be afraid of what we find in our critical praxis precisely because, if it commits to the aforementioned, it will indeed be scary and impossible to prepare for. That is the work of the monstrous—a liberatory, unanticipated salvation, that troubling interrogation of gender Susan Stryker finds in the trans; that divine portent that Derrida would argue is unannounceable, which is to say untamable, unable to be absorbed into existing logics; that claimable thingliness that Hortense Spillers says might “rewrite after all a radically different text.”8 Critical praxis in the undercommons—insurgent work being done by folks who were let in without paperwork and without vouchers because they, despite where they came from, got down to work for the revolution—is work for monsters, monstrous work. In the end, what I am asking for is assemblic work for those who are impoverished in spirit, who come together, an intimate proximity reached because we are doing the work not because of an ontologized accident. What I am asking for is a willingness to move toward becoming subjectivated by an analytical queerness, a radical transitivity, an anoriginal Blackness, where Blackness names a sociopoetic force of subversive irregularity and, as Moten expressed to me in an email exchange, “must be claimed by any and every body” who seeks to do anarchic work. What is being asked for, what is to be done, is a Blackening that inducts all those who live and be in the undercommons, stealing life so it can steal more life, pilfering resources and asking no permission, taking no responsibility, because the ones who need this stuff might not know they need it, and neither do we. But if we must hack into government security systems and disseminate the firewalled information, that is what is to be done; if we must lie about the destination of funding we are given, allocating it to unauthorized and unadvised and undisclosed locations, that is what is to be done; if we must sully ourselves by hanging around a bad crowd that is bad only because the good’s violent optics and ethics deem it so, then that is what is to be done.

## 2

### CP

#### The United States ought to:

#### Recognize a right of workers to strike, except for workers who are essential to a country’s food supply

#### Provide those workers with a right to impartial conciliation followed by arbitration procedures

#### **Workers right to strike can be conditional in the context of food supply---exceptions are limited to avoid abuses, AND enable alternatives that channel worker demands**

Brudney 21, James J., Joseph Crowley Chair in Labor and Employment Law, Fordham Law School. Yale Journal of International Law, 2021. “The Right to Strike as Customary International Law” <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=yjil> brett

The international right to strike is far from absolute. It may be restricted in exceptional circumstances, or even prohibited, pursuant to national regulation. For a start, Convention 87 provides that members of the armed forces and the police may be excluded from the scope of the Convention in general, including the right to strike.57 In addition, applications by the CFA and CEACR have concluded that three distinct forms of substantive restriction on the right to strike are compatible with Convention 87.

1. Substantive Limitations

One important restriction applies to certain categories of public servants. The CEACR and CFA have made clear that public employees generally enjoy the same right to strike as their counterparts in the private sector; at the same time, in order to ensure continuity of functions in the three branches of government, this right may be restricted for public servants exercising authority in the name of the State.58 Examples include officials performing tasks that involve the administration of necessary executive branch functions or that relate to the administration of justice.

Each country hasits own approach to classifying public servants exercising authority in the name of the State. When considering the international right under Convention 87, some public servant exceptions seem clearly applicable, such as officials auditing or collecting internal revenues, customs officers, or judges and their close judicial assistants. 59 Some public servant exceptions seem inapplicable, such as teachers, or public servants in State-owned commercial enterprises.60 Whether public servants are exercising authority in the name of the State can be a close question under particular national law, one on which the CEACR and CFA have offered encouragement and guidance,61 as has the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).62

A second equally important restriction on the right to strike involves essential services in the strict sense of the term. This is an area in which both the CEACR and CFA have developed a detailed set of applications and guidelines. 63 The two committees consider that essential services, for the purposes of restricting or prohibiting the right to strike, are only those “the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population.”64

This definition of essential services “in the strict sense of the term” stems from the idea that “essential services” as a limitation on the right to strike would lose its meaning if statutes or judicial decisions defined those services in too broad a manner. 65 The interruption of services that cause or have the potential to cause economic hardships—even serious economic hardships—is not ordinarily sufficient to qualify the interrupted service as essential. Indeed, the very purpose of a strike is to interrupt services or production and thereby cause a degree of economic hardship. That is the leverage workers can exercise; it is what allows a strike to be effective in bringing the parties to the table and securing a negotiated settlement.

The two ILO supervisory committees also have made clear that the essential services concept is not static in nature. Thus, a non-essential service may become essential if the strike exceeds a certain duration or extent, or as a function of the special characteristics of a country. 66 One example is that of an island State where at some point ferry transportation services become essential to bring food and medical supplies to the population.67

When examining concrete cases, the supervisory bodies have considered a range of services, both public and private, too broad to summarize here. As illustrative, the two bodies have determined that essential services in the strict sense of the term include air traffic control services, 68 telephone services, 69 prison services, firefighting services, and water and electricity services. 70 The CEACR and CFA also have identified a range of services that presumptively are deemed not to be essential in the strict sense of the term.71

In addition, in circumstances where a total prohibition on the right to strike is not appropriate, the magnitude of impact on the basic needs of consumers or the general public, or the need for safe operation of facilities, may justify introduction of a negotiated minimum service.72 Such a service, however, must truly be a minimum service, that is one limited to meeting the basic needs of the population or the minimum requirements of the service, while maintaining the effectiveness of the pressure brought to bear through the strike by a majority of workers.73

The third substantive restriction on the right to strike under Convention 87 relates to situations of acute national or local crisis, although only for a limited period and only to the extent necessary to meet the requirements of the situation.74

With respect to all three forms of substantive restriction, the CFA and CEACR have indicated that certain alternative options should be guaranteed for workers who are deprived of the right to strike. These options include impartial conciliation followed by arbitration procedures in which any awards are binding on both parties and are to be implemented in full and rapid terms.75

#### **Strikes are inevitable and cause food insecurity---empirics**

Lopes et al 19, Mariana Souza Lopes--Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Research Group on Nutrition Interventions, Belo Horizonte, MG, Brazil. Melissa Luciana de Araújo--Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Research Group on Urban Agriculture, Belo Horizonte, MG, Brazil. Aline Cristine Souza Lopes--Nutrition Department, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Research Group on Nutrition Interventions. PHN, (2019) <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/public-health-nutrition/article/national-general-truck-drivers-strike-and-food-security-in-a-brazilian-metropolis/90C14AC48923A17597DED720365E810B> brett

Food security exists when people have, at all times, a guaranteed and adequate food supply. Food security involves access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets individual dietary requirements and food preferences for a healthy life without restricting access to other fundamental needs( 1 ) and sovereignty( 2 ). Therefore, the risk of food insecurity is influenced by the availability, price, access and quality of the food supply to the consumer, especially in a crisis situation( 3 ). Studies that have explored the global food crisis and market instability indicate that there is an independent association between crisis situations and food security( 4 , 5 ). For example, a recent Brazilian study showed that there was a marked increase in the prevalence of food insecurity during the Brazilian economic crisis( 4 ).

In Brazil, the Centrais de Abastecimento de Minas Gerais S.A. (CEASA-MINAS) distributes produce. The aims of the CEASA-MINAS are to: (i) improve the process of marketing and distribution of products; and (ii) connect producers and consumers in urban centres. The CEASA-MINAS is supported by mixed-capital (public and private) resources and operates under governmental supervision. Consequently, the CEASA-MINAS plays an important role in guaranteeing food security and the human right to food( 6 ).

The state of Minas Gerais is the third-largest economy in Brazil and has one of the best transport networks in the country. The CEASA-MINAS has six units in this state and its headquarters is in the city of Contagem, in the metropolitan region of Belo Horizonte. The headquarters is the principal unit and is named CEASA-Minas Grande BH( 7 ). In 2018, the CEASA-Minas Grande BH traded about 2000 tonnes of food, which corresponded to 80 % of the total market in the state( 8 ). Therefore, this business unit is the subject of the present study.

The supply of unprocessed or minimally processed foods\* in the CEASA-MINAS is self-supplied by the state of Minas Gerais. In spite of this, food is transported via long routes in the state due to its large territory (586 528 km2). The distribution network is more complex for fruit. The supply of fruit at the CEASA-Minas Grande BH has multiple origins and the fruits are carried by trucks over long distances. Some leafy vegetables are produced near the food supply centre( 10 ). In general, the food supply of the CEASA-Minas Grande BH covers a radius of 200 km, but there are items that originate from distances of up to 2000 km away( 11 ). The 1081 municipality suppliers of the CEASA-Minas Grande BH move, on average, 25 700 trucks per month via Brazilian roadways( 8 ).

Consequently, a national general truck drivers’ strike may have important consequences for the economy and food supply chain of a country that is dependent on road networks. Such an event occurred on 21–30 May 2018. During this 10 d strike, Brazilians experienced an extreme event characterized by roadblocks and the unavailability of fuel, medicine, food, and the inputs for food production processes. The disruption of the supply of animal feed had a devastating impact: millions of chickens and pigs were slaughtered because producers had no food for them( 12 ). The drivers were on strike in order to make diesel oil tax-free and to obtain better working conditions( 13 ).

Despite the drivers’ important claims, in a crisis situation, 200 km can be as long as 2000 km and the repercussions may result in negative impacts for food security. Given the importance of transport conditions for the food security of the Brazilian population, the present paper aimed to analyse the impact of the national general truck drivers’ strike on the availability, variety and price of unprocessed foods sold by a food supply centre in a Brazilian metropolis.

#### Food insecurity goes nuclear

Hartley et al 12 (Major General John Hartley AO (Retd), CEO and Institute, Director Future Directions International, Roundtable Chairman. Alyson Clarke, FDI Executive Officer Gary Kleyn, Manager, FDI Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme, “International Conflict Triggers and Potential Conflict Points Resulting from Food and Water Insecurity” 25 May 2012 http://futuredirections.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Workshop\_Report\_-\_Intl\_Conflict\_Triggers\_-\_May\_25.pdf) brett

There is little dispute that conflict can lead to food and water crises. This paper will consider parts of the world, however, where food and water insecurity can be the cause of conflict and, at worst, result in war. While dealing predominately with food and water issues, the paper also recognises the nexus that exists between food and water and energy security. There is a growing appreciation that the conflicts in the next century will most likely be fought over a lack of resources. Yet, in a sense, this is not new. Researchers point to the French and Russian revolutions as conflicts induced by a lack of food. More recently, Germany’s World War Two efforts are said to have been inspired, at least in part, by its perceived need to gain access to more food. Yet the general sense among those that attended FDI’s recent workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the future could be significantly greater as a result of population pressures, changing weather, urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world. In his book, Small Farmers Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDI’s March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses the problem and why countries across the globe are starting to take note. He writes (p.36), “…if people are hungry, especially in cities, the state is not stable – riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result.” “Hunger feeds anarchy.” This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if “large regions of the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale, bloody wars are liable to follow.” He continues: “An increasingly credible scenario for World War 3 is not so much a confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts.” He also says: “The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources.” As another workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources, either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves. Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because people are going hungry. A study by the International Peace Research Institute indicates that where food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon. The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine as a potential trigger for conflicts and possibly even nuclear war.

## 3

### ESPEC

#### Affirmatives must specify and separately delineate an enforcement mechanism used for a just government to recognize to unconditional right to strike

#### Neg for shiftiness – they can redefine the 1AC’s enforcement mechanism in the 1AR which allows them to recontextualize their enforcement mechanism to wriggle out of DA’s since all DA links are predicated on type of enforcement i.e. international perception das, great power competition da, research da’s that may apply to bilateral bans but not to export controls.

#### b] Fairness – its constitutive to debate as competitive activity that requires objective evaluation. Controls the I/L to education because you don’t learn from an already skewed round.

#### c] DTD – a] deters future abuse b] my strat has already been skewed so it’s the only way to rectify the abuse

#### d] Competing interps – a] reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation b] reasonability collapses since brightlines operate on an offense-defense paradigm

#### e] Norming outweighs – a] constitutivism – it’s the intrinsic purpose of theory b] magnitude – it’s the only out of round impact which link turns their arguments because they assume a good model of debate

#### f] No RVIs – a] Forces the 1NC to go all-in on Theory which kills substance education, b] Encourages Baiting since the 1AC will purposely be abusive, and c] Illogical – you shouldn’t win for not being abusive.

## 4

### Spec Right to Strike

#### Interp – the aff must specify what the right to strike is in a delineated text in the 1AC.

#### Violation – they don’t

#### Standards

#### 1] Topic Lit is unclear of what a right to strike is – specing is k2 understanding what stance the aff takes

#### National Labor Relations Board (National Labor Relations Board, xx-xx-xxxx, "The Right to Strike," No Publication, <https://www.nlrb.gov/strikes> )

Lawful and unlawful strikes. The lawfulness of a strike may depend on the object, or purpose, of the strike, on its timing, or on the conduct of the strikers. The object, or objects, of a strike and whether the objects are lawful are matters that are not always easy to determine. Such issues often have to be decided by the National Labor Relations Board. The consequences can be severe to striking employees and struck employers, involving as they do questions of reinstatement and backpay.

#### 2] Ground – a] you can delink out of pics and disads we read about certain groups not being able to strike ie teachers or healthcare workers or out of pics based on strikes purposes. Means that we never have stable ground when constructing the 1NC and you can shift out of any core ground we read b] On case discussion is limited to generics when we don’t know exactly what you defend which discourages nuanced debates and engagement on case

## Case

#### Strikes fail and spark countermobilization.

Grant and Wallace 91 [Don Sherman Grant; Ohio State University; Michael Wallace; Indiana University; “Why Do Strikes Turn Violent?” University of Chicago Press; March 1991; <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2781338.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aca3144a9ae9e4ac65e285f2c67451ffb>] Justin

\*\*RM = Resource-Mobilization, or Strikes

3. Violent tactics.-Violent tactics are viewed by RM theorists exclu- sively as purposeful strategies by challengers for inciting social change with little recognition of how countermobilization strategies of elites also create violence. The role of elite counterstrategies has been virtually ig- nored in research on collective violence. Of course, history is replete with examples of elites' inflicting violence on challenging groups with the full sanction of the state. Typically, elite-sponsored violence occurs when the power resources and legal apparatus are so one-sidedly in the elites' favor that the outcome is never in doubt. In conflicts with weak insiders, elites may not act so openly unless weak insiders flaunt the law. Typically, elite strategies do not overtly promote violence but rather provoke violence by the other side in hopes of eliciting public condemnation or more vigorous state repression of challenger initiatives. This is a critical dynamic in struggles involving weak insiders such as unions. In these cases, worker violence, even when it appears justified, erodes public support for the workers' cause and damages the union's insider status.

4. Homogeneity and similarity.-Many RM theorists incorrectly as- sume that members of aggrieved groups are homogeneous in their inter- ests and share similar positions in the social structure. This (assumed) homogeneity of interests is rare for members of outsider groups and even more suspect for members of weak-insider groups. Indeed, groups are rarely uniform and often include relatively advantaged persons who have other, more peaceful channels in which to pursue their goals. Internal stratification processes mean that different persons have varying invest- ments in current structural arrangements, in addition to their collective interest in affecting social change. Again, these forces are especially prev- alent for weak insiders: even the group's lowest-status members are likely to have a marginal stake in the system; high-status members are likely to have a larger stake and, therefore, less commitment to dramatic change in the status quo.

Internal differences may lead to fragmentation of interests and lack of consensus about tactics, especially tactics suggesting violent confronta- tion. While group members share common grievances, individual mem- bers may be differentially aggrieved by the current state of affairs or differentially exposed to elite repression. White's (1989) research on the violent tactics of the Irish Republican Army shows that working-class members and student activists, when compared with middle-class partici- pants, are more vulnerable to state-sponsored repression, more likely to be available for protest activities, and reap more benefits from political violence. When we apply them to our study of strike violence, we find that differences in skill levels are known to coincide with major intraclass 1120 Strikes divisions in material interests (Form 1985) and are likely to coincide with the tendency for violent action. For instance, skilled-craft workers, who are more socially and politically conservative than unskilled workers, are less likely to view relations with employers as inherently antagonistic and are prone to separate themselves from unskilled workers, factors that should decrease their participation in violence.

#### [1] Strikes fail to fulfill duty

**Fourie 17** Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers" <https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> (Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG

Kantian Ethics Kantian ethics suggest that actions are morally permissible based on **whether it fulfils a person's duty** (Banks, 2006). To further the concept of duty, Kantian ethics held the notion of Categorical Imperatives which is believed to determine the morality of duties as it enforces and commands adherence, complicity and application. The Categorical Imperatives consist of three formulas. Once such a formula is to "act only on the maximum whereby at the same time you can will that it become a universal law" (Parrott, 2006, p. 51). Through this perspective, Kant held that persons are to engage in actions that they are willing to allow others to engage in as well without conditions and exceptions. Applying this formula to the ethicality of social workers **participating in labor strike** demonstrations, it becomes evident that such an action is **not morally permissible or executing its duty**. Arguably, as much as social workers are trained professionals and rendering services that are crucial to the functioning and well-being of society, they remain ordinary citizens who also at some point will **require crucial services**. Examples of these crucial services that may cause significant harm because of its absence due to labor strike action are **medical personnel, suicide watch centers, mental health care professionals, law enforcement, court systems**, municipal service delivery, etc. With these services not available, social workers will experience suffering, frustration, unhappiness, harm as the clients will do with their absence from the office. To this regard, participating and demonstrating labor strike action is not adhering to duty or morally permissible.

#### [2] Uses others as a mere means to an end

**Fourie 17** Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers" <https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> (Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG

A further formula of the Categorical Imperative is "so, act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other context, never solely as a means to an end but always as an end within itself' (Parrott, 2006, p. 51). By this Kant meant people should be valued and respected as an individual and not used for the benefit of others. Participating in a labor-strike demonstration/action is **a direct violation of this** categorical perspective as it would not be ethically permissible because the severe dependence and well-being of clients, the effective functioning of the employer organization, and society **is used to duly and unduly influence the bargaining process for better working conditions**. In participating in the labor strike demonstration, the humanity, and well-being of clients and society **is not seen as crucial** **and as an 'end'**, but rather used to demonstrate the undeniable need for the skills and expertise of social workers. Furthermore, through withholding services, social worker professionals demonstrate that the well-being and welfare of society have lost its inherent importance/value. Though the value of overall well-being is taught throughout the social work training process and is enshrined in the professional ethical codes.

## UV

#### Reject 1AR theory- A] 7-6 time skew means it’s endlessly aff biased B] I don’t have a 3nr which allows for endless extrapolation C] 1AR theory is skewed to the aff because they have a 2ar judge psychology warrant.

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells –it checks 2AR sandbagging by preventing really abusive 1NCs while still giving the 2N a chance.

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up a blippy 20 second shell to 3 min of the 2AR while I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention

#### Conditionality --- it’s good

#### 1] It’s most logical --- the role of the neg is to prove the Aff bad, while the Aff should prove that they’re optimal. Every counterplan establishes an opportunity cost to the plan --- any limit on that is arbitrary – this also proves you should judge kick if the squo is better than the counterplan

#### 2] Key to neg flex --- they set the terms of debate and know the plan better than us, so multiple options ensures the neg doesn’t auto lose after the 2AC

#### 3] Fosters advocacy skills --- it forces the Aff to defend every component of the plan, allows rigorous testing, and allows better information processing by enabling discussion on a litany of issues

#### 4] It’s most real world – policymakers attack a bill from different angles, and don’t limit themselves to one criticism – they can amend and change positions to find the best option

### F/L - A2 Clash

#### Inevitable - you can already kick out of disads and advantages so conditionality doesn't significantly harm clash, so other standards outweigh

#### Counterinterp solves since the 2NR collapses to a set of arguments that clash with the aff

#### Neg strategy standard controls the internal link to clash since it incentivizes the aff to research about CPs that work well against the aff which caused greater in-depth rigorous research to frontline your aff

### F/L - A2 Strat Skew

#### 1] This is no different from T or theory—those are conditional and they just have to prove the aff world or interpretation is better.

#### 2] Don’t evaluate the minor imbalances conditionality creates—if you want to play a fair game, play monopoly or football.

#### 3] Neg flex outweighs 1AR time allocation---they have infinite prep time to rigorously test their affirmative and do extensive research