# 2NR

#### Private entity = majority nonstate

Warners 20 (Bill, JD Candidate, May 2021, at UIC John Marshall Law School) "Patents 254 Miles up: Jurisdictional Issues Onboard the International Space Station." UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law, vol. 19, no. 4, 2020, p. 365-380. HeinOnline.

To satisfy these three necessary requirements for a new patent regime, the ISS IGA must add an additional clause ("Clause 7") in Article 21 specifically establishing a patent regime for private nonstate third parties onboard the ISS. First, Clause 7 would define the term "private entity" as an individual, organization, or business which is primarily privately owned and/or managed by nonstate affiliates. Specifically defining the term "private entity" prevents confusion as to what entities qualify under the agreement and the difference between "public" and "private."99 This definition would also support the connection of Clause 1 in Article 21 to "Article 2 of the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization." 100 A succinct definition also alleviates international concerns that the changes to the ISS IGA pushes out Partner State influence. 101 Some in the international community may still point out that Clause 7 still pushes towards a trend of outer space privatization. However, this argument fails to consider that private entities in outer space have operated in space almostas comprehensively as national organizations. 102

# 1NC

## OFF

#### Interpretation – the aff may not defend that the appropriation of outer space by a certain set of private entities is unjust.

#### Entities is a generic bare plural

Nebel 20 [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Indefinite Singular Generics in Debate” Victory Briefs, 19 August 2020. no url AG

I agree that if “a democracy” in the resolution just meant “one or more democracy,” then a country-specific affirmative could be topical. But, as I will explain in this topic analysis, that isn’t what “a democracy” means in the resolution. To see why, we first need to back up a bit and review (or learn) the idea of generic generalizations.

The most common way of expressing a generic in English is through a *bare plural*. A bare plural is a plural noun phrase, like “dogs” and “cats,” that lacks an overt determiner. (A determiner is a word that tells us which or how many: determiners include quantifier words like “all,” “some,” and “most,” demonstratives like “this” and “those,” posses- sives like “mine” and “its,” and so on.) LD resolutions often contain bare plurals, and that is the most common clue to their genericity.

We have already seen some examples of generics that are not bare plurals: “A whale is a mammal,” “A beaver builds dams,” and “The woolly mammoth is extinct.” The first two examples use indefinite singulars—singular nouns preceded by the indefinite article “a”—and the third is a definite singular since it is preceded by the definite article “the.” Generics can also be expressed with bare singulars (“Syrup is viscous”) and even verbs (as we’ll see later on). The resolution’s “a democracy” is an indefinite singular, and so it very well might be—and, as we’ll soon see, is—generic.

But it is also important to keep in mind that, just as not all generics are bare plurals, not all bare plurals are generic. “Dogs are barking” is true as long as some dogs are barking. Bare plurals can be used in particular ways to express existential statements. The key question for any given debate resolution that contains a bare plural is whether that occurrence of the bare plural is generic or existential.

The same is true of indefinite singulars. As debaters will be quick to point out, some uses of the indefinite singular really do mean “some” or “one or more”: “A cat is on the mat” is clearly not a generic generalization about cats; it’s true as long as some cat is on the mat. The question is whether the indefinite singular “a democracy” is existential or generic in the resolution.

Now, my own view is that, if we understand the difference between existential and generic statements, and if we approach the question impartially, without any invest- ment in one side of the debate, we can almost always just tell which reading is correct just by thinking about it. It is clear that “In a democracy, voting ought to be compul- sory” doesn’t mean “There is one or more democracy in which voting ought to be com- pulsory.” I don’t think a fancy argument should be required to show this any more than a fancy argument should be required to show that “A duck doesn’t lay eggs” is a generic—a false one because ducks do lay eggs, even though some ducks (namely males) don’t. And if a debater contests this by insisting that “a democracy” is existen- tial, the judge should be willing to resolve competing claims by, well, judging—that is, by using her judgment. Contesting a claim by insisting on its negation or demanding justification doesn’t put any obligation on the judge to be neutral about it. (Otherwise the negative could make every debate irresolvable by just insisting on the negation of every statement in the affirmative speeches.) Even if the insistence is backed by some sort of argument, we can reasonably reject an argument if we know its conclusion to be false, even if we are not in a position to know exactly where the argument goes wrong. Particularly in matters of logic and language, speakers have more direct knowledge of particular cases (e.g., that some specific inference is invalid or some specific sentence is infelicitious) than of the underlying explanations.

But that is just my view, and not every judge agrees with me, so it will be helpful to consider some arguments for the conclusion that we already know to be true: that, even if the United States is a democracy and ought to have compulsory voting, that doesn’t suffice to show that, in a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory—in other words, that “a democracy” in the resolution is generic, not existential.

Second, existential uses of the indefinite, such as “A cat is on the mat,” are upward- entailing.3 This means that if you replace the noun with a more general one, such as “An animal is on the mat,” the sentence will still be true. So let’s do that with “a democracy.” Does the resolution entail “In a society, voting ought to be compulsory”? Intuitively not, because you could think that voting ought to be compulsory in democracies but not in other sorts of societies. This suggests that “a democracy” in the resolution is not existential.

#### It applies to this topic – a] entities is an existential bare plural bc it has no determiner

#### Violation – they spec China

#### Standards

#### 1] Limits – they can spec infinite different entities like spaceX, etc.. - that’s supercharged by the ability to spec combinations of types of entities. This takes out functional limits – it’s impossible for me to research every possible combination of entities, governments, and appropriation.

#### 2] TVA solves – just read your aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff – we don’t stop them from reading new FWs, mechanisms or advantages. PICs aren’t aff offense – a] it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff being non-T b] There’s only a small number of pics on this topic c] PICs incentivize them to write better affs that can generate solvency deficits to PICs

## OFF

#### Space domination is central to Xi’s vision of China – his leadership and regime depends upon a substantial victory against the United States in the space race.

Shepherd and Kygne 21 [James Kynge is global China editor, based in Hong Kong. He is also editor of #techAsia, the leading newsletter on new Asian tech themes that covers the whole region including China, India, south-east Asia and Japan. Christian Shepherd is a former Beijing correspondent.] “China’s ambitions in space: national pride or taking on the Americans?,” May 8th, 2021, <https://www.ft.com/content/8a6bb0c0-9a6f-46c0-8438-48984c5e32dc>, VM

“For Xi, the space station is at the centre of his **vision of China** as a **“space power** in all respects” — a global **leader** of scientific **endeavours,** economic activity and military might in space. Half a century after it was inaugurated, China’s space programme has grown from the handful of scientists launching a satellite from the Gobi desert to become an important source of prestige and legitimacy for the party. Once the space station is completed next year, after a series of additional launches to add scientific laboratory modules, crew and cargo, it will pave the way for crewed missions that aim to take Chinese astronauts, or “taikonauts”, to the Moon some time after 2030. Beyond human space flight, China is also hoping to land its first rover on Mars later this month. Its commercial space industry boasts **more than 150 companies** vying to build satellites and launch rockets to meet ballooning demand for extraterrestrial infrastructure and services. At the same time, Moscow and Beijing agreed in March to work together to build a lunar research base. “As with the US, the Soviet Union and Russia, building a space station is highly symbolic, it is highly visible and it is perhaps uniquely arousing of **patriotic sentiment**,” says Alanna Krolikowski, a scholar at the Missouri University of Science and Technology. “It’s the equivalent of building cathedrals in the 21st century.” China wants to be seen as a creator and innovator of the next transformative technologies, Krolikowski adds. Demonstrations of world-leading breakthroughs are in especially high demand ahead of the centenary year of the party’s founding, which will be celebrated in July. “Social instability might be what keeps China’s leaders up at night but what gets them out of bed in the morning is making China a science and technology **superpower**,” she says. But beneath that grand narrative lurks a dangerous mixture of political mistrust and a lack of international co-ordination that threatens to undermine Beijing’s bid to reap the prestige and economic rewards from being **a space superpower**. China has developed advanced weaponry capable of knocking out US satellites — part of a growing competition in space with the American military. Analysts fear that an accelerated pace of rocket and satellite launches, combined with a reluctance to share details of projects deemed of critical national importance, creates ripe conditions for it to stumble into a new space arms race with the US, whether it wants one or not. One core problem is separating out Beijing’s peaceful and **aggressive goals in space**. “The difficulty for western policymaking about China’s space programme is that we don’t know what [Beijing] wants to do,” says Mark Hilborne, an expert in defence studies at King’s College London.”

#### Reduction of space programs specifically hurts China’s goal

Fabian ‘19[Christopher David Fabian – written as part of the author’s completion of a Masters in Science (Space Studies) from the University of North Dakota. Fabian holds a BA from the US Air Force Academy and was a Captain in the SPCS - a space control unit tasked with providing 24/7 support to the space sensor network (SSN), maintaining the space catalog and managing United States Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) space situational awareness (SSA) sharing program to United States, foreign government, and commercial entities. The author’s thesis was Chaired and overseen by field expert Dr. Michael S. Dodge. Dodge currently serves as an Assistant Professor & Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Space Studies at the University of North Dakota. Prior to joining the faculty at UND, Prof. Dodge was Research Counsel & Law Instructor at the University of Mississippi School of Law's program in Air & Space Law. Before teaching at UoM Law, Prof. Dodge received his LL.M. degree in Aviation & Space Law from McGill University in the Fall of 2011 (thesis: “Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and the GPS-Galileo Agreement”). Before attending McGill, he obtained his J.D. in 2008 from the University of Mississippi School of Law, where he was also the first recipient of the Certificate in Remote Sensing, Air, and Space Law. He obtained dual degrees in B.S. (in Biological Sciences) and B.A. (in Philosophy) in 2005, from the University of Southern Mississippi. – “A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy” - May 2019 –#E&F - <https://commons.und.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3456&context=theses>]

Space power and manned space accomplishments serve to benefit China in five ways. First, success in space forms a nationalist narrative and creates a positive focal point for national pride, counter to the negative images of the Tianamen Square massacre and China’s consistently poor human rights record. 117 Maintaining an independent and self-reliant space program helps the CCP craft a narrative based on technological development, social progress, and sustainable development. This lends legitimacy to CCP leadership of China and stokes nationalism. 118 Additionally, the dissemination and control of satellite communication gives the CCP a medium by which to propagate its own political interpretation of world events.119

Second, the economic benefit gained from China’s space program is essential to upholding the informal social contract between the Chinese people and the CCP, one that is based on continued economic growth and an increase in quality of life. China seeks to make its space program a driver of economic and technological advancement in a variety of ways. Primarily, they *believe* that spin-off technologies from the space program could have up to a 1:10 cost to benefit ratio.120 This creates a cycle where the Chinese space program generates technology, technology spurs economic development, and economic development supports the space program.121 The export of commercial space services will be a driver of economic development as a producer of both jobs and hard currency. 122 Additionally, the space industry spurs the development of a high technology industry by creating a market for high-skill labor and products. 123 The industrial and academic base required for the development of a strong space program is projected to have multi-order effects across other key industries and inspire young Chinese to pursue a career in the sciences.124 Next, the use of satellite application technologies is critical to China’s economic development.125 The use of geological, weather, and positional data is essential to developing China’s limited resources and guarding her fragile environment.126 A multitrillion-dollar infrastructure project called the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) was announced by Xi in 2013. The purpose of this project is to harness latent Chinese industrial capacity to enhance strategic connection between China and the rest of the Eurasian landmass.127 China’s space development has been specifically linked to BRI by the China National Space Administration’s (CNSA) director of international cooperation, Jiang Hui. In a brief to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), Hui highlighted a long term plan focused on building the Chinese space industry and leveraging space capabilities (particularly geospatial, communication, and navigation systems) to build a spatial information corridor.128

Third, China is using spacepower as a way to develop prestige and reap soft power gains. The success of the Chinese space program infers significant leadership connotation in the region and is intended to establish Beijing at the forefront of Asia’s technology and economic development. 129 Orbital accomplishments and space technology development is *seen* as a herald for advancement in agriculture, resource management, communications, and disaster management as well as a symbol of national scientific and economic infrastructures. Therefore, they play a deeply symbolic role in Asia, with significant prestige to be gained by accomplishing space “firsts” within the region. 130 Beijing has made an effort to translate the success of its space program for the purposes of seizing regional leadership, boosting soft power, and incorporating space into BRI. 131 It created the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) in 2008, which consists of China, Iran, Mongolia, Peru, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, and Thailand.132 China has donated ground systems, personnel training, and remote sensing data to member countries.133 Two other major Asian space cooperation organizations exist: the Japanese created and led Asian-Pacific Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) and the Indian created and led Center for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP).134 The purpose of these organizations is to reduce the costs of expensive space programs through resource pooling and increasing diplomatic ties between partner nations. Unfortunately, member nation overlap is mostly limited to smaller countries, and the presence of three competing organizations in the same region, each with similar missions led by separate space powers, may result in factionalism rather than cooperation.135 In addition to strengthening China economically, the export of commercial space services and the use of satellite application technologies may also have far reaching diplomatic benefits. China has served as an eager provider of space services and technologies to international markets, particularly for developing countries.136 Providing low-cost, partially subsidized space services to developing nations is a powerful diplomatic initiative relating to resource extraction and basing rights. 137 China provided Brazil a low-cost alternative to the LANDSAT remote sensing data via a cooperative venture called Chinese-Brazilian Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS). The cost was split 70/30 by China and Brazil.138 China manufactured, launched, and operated communications and imaging satellites for oil rich Venezuela.139 Similarly, China generously subsidized Nigeria’s first communications satellite for $550M as part of the BRI, with Nigerian oil rights serving as collateral.140 Bolivia enjoyed a similar arrangement, as 85% of its first communications satellite was subsidized by loans from China and built by the Great Wall Industry Corporation.141 Likewise, China designed, launched, and heavily subsidized a Pakistani geosynchronous communication satellite under BRI in exchange for Beidou ground stations in Karachi and Lahore. 142 This was followed by the development and launch of a remote sensing satellite in 2018.143 These acts of space diplomacy are consistent with China’s larger foreign policy efforts to open international markets.

Fourth, the Chinese space program sets the groundwork for scientific and economic exchange between China and Europe. Since the 1960s, Europe has sought independence from the U.S. space industry. Aside from the general predilection to maintain sovereignty, this desire has been amplified by a series of heavy handed U.S. space policy decisions. During the acquisition and early assembly of the space station throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Europeans were frustrated with the partnership with the U.S. Rapidly changing requirements and budget cuts gave them reason to enter negotiations with less than full faith in U.S. commitments. The nature of this partnership made Europeans feel as though they were being treated as a subcontractor rather than a full partner, and constantly proliferating Department of Defense (DoD) requirements served as an early example of Pentagon influence in civilian space.145 The Gulf War and the subsequent emphasis on space as a military technology in U.S. policy led Europe to grow weary of U.S. shutter control for commercial assets and selective service for government owned utilities.146 Likewise, the Cox report and corresponding restrictive export control initiatives (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulation (EAR) in the early 2000s caused backlash in Europe, creating a demand for export-control-free products and leading Europe to seek non-U.S. markets for its space technology.147 Wariness of U.S. restrictions created a mutual desire for ITAR-free products. Europe primarily seeks to gain a market for high technology products while China seeks training and scientific exchange.148 These desires drive Sino-E.U. cooperation and set the foundation for China’s science and technology diplomacy to Europe. 149 In the past decade, increasing parity between U.S. and “rest-of-world” technologies has made ITAR free products more feasible.150

Fifth, the opportunity cost of the perpetual “guns verses butter” debate applies to the space domain as well. For example, the U.S. military’s space budget is over $12 billion (unclassified spending) while NASA’s projected FY2019 budget is $21 billion.151 A system of mutual restraint would have the benefit of potentially freeing up billions of dollars from the military space budget to dedicate to civilian space spending. Although military space spending would remain high, a significant amount of money could be cut from space control spending ($2B), reducing the cost of existing military space projects due to loosened requirements on survivability, redundancy, and maneuverability. 152 Although China’s government spending is opaque, rough estimates are available. As of 2017, the U.S. spends approximately $610B (3.1% of GDP) annually on defense while China spends only $228B (1.9% of GDP).153 In terms of purchase power parity (PPP), China’s actual budget doubles to $434B.154 Likewise, China’s $3.5B space budget appears to be dwarfed by U.S. space spending. However, when % of GDP and PPP are taken into account, China appears to be much more competitive with the U.S. in terms of space budget. 155 Therefore, it is expected that China will reap similar budgetary benefits from a system of mutual restraint. This adds an even stronger incentive for both nations to cooperate.

In an absolute sense, the benefits of free access to space and the ability to pursue robust commercial utilization gives the impression of a strong desire for mutual cooperation. However, the zero-sum relationship should not be overlooked. The market for space technology is both limited and competitive, meaning that free access to space and the development of the space industry free from tariff or political restriction benefits China significantly, to the extent that it can increase relative market share in the $320 billion space economy. 156 Moving beyond competition within the space industry, the relative gain that the U.S. and China each derive from the utilization of space modifies the magnitude of preference for mutual cooperation. For example, if China gains X from a system of mutual cooperation while the U.S. gains X + 15, then the magnitude of China’s preference for this outcome must be proportionally lower than that of the U.S. Although the multi-order effects of the space industry are difficult to quantify, a simple analysis of spending and space assets can give an estimate of the relative importance of each nation’s space program. Table 1 is a quick reference comparing U.S. and Chinese space assets. 157

#### That’s key to strength and legitimacy

Perlez 17 [Jane Perlez and Chris Buckley, 1-24-2017, citing Paul Haenle, Director of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing, also served as China director for the National Security Council under Presidents Bush and Obama, and Minxin Pei, cited above. "Trump Injects High Risk Into Relations With China," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/world/asia/trump-us-china-trade-trans-pacific-partnership.html]

The next few months, as Mr. Xi focuses on choosing new members of the ruling Standing Committee for his second five-year term, will be a particularly tense political period, and economic instability is the last thing he needs. Similarly, he will try at all costs to appear strong to his domestic, nationalistic audience in the face of challenges from Mr. Trump on Taiwan and the South China Sea. Mr. Trump has suggested that the One China policy, under which the United States recognizes the government of Beijing and not Taiwan, is not sacrosanct, a major concern for Mr. Xi. Mr. Xi toured the Boeing assembly plant outside of Seattle in 2015. In a trade war, China could reduce imports of American aircraft from Boeing and agricultural products. Credit Pool photo by Jason Redmond “In a year of political transition, Xi cannot afford to come across as weak,” said Paul Haenle, the director of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing, who served as China director for the National Security Council under President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama. “Taiwan is the core of core issues for China — a bottom line. Many Chinese stress that it is nonnegotiable.” But for now, at least, the increased contention with Washington is likely to strengthen Mr. Xi’s political hand at home by rallying public and elite support against a foreign threat, said Minxin Pei, a professor at Claremont McKenna College in California who studies Chinese politics and Chinese-American relations. “Short term, it will almost certainly give the Chinese government a boost in its public support,” Dr. Pei said in a telephone interview. “It helps Xi, because whenever there is such pressure from outside, Chinese officials tend to rally around the top leader.”

#### Taiwan war

**Norris, 17** -- Texas A&M Chinese foreign and security policy professor

[William, he teaches graduate-level courses in Chinese domestic politics, East Asian security, and Chinese foreign policy, he is also a nonresident associate with the nuclear policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges," June 2017, https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report\_pdf/Discussion\_Paper\_Norris\_China\_OR.pdf, accessed 9-4-19, footnote 23 included]

Populist pressures might tempt the party leadership to encourage diversionary nationalism. The logic of this concern is straightforward: the Communist Party might seek to distract a restless domestic population with adventurism abroad.19 The Xi administration wants to appear tough in its defense of foreign encroachments against China’s interests. This need stems from a long-running narrative about how a weak Qing dynasty was unable to defend China in the face of European imperial expansion, epitomized by the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth century. The party is particularly sensitive to perceptions of weakness because much of its claim to legitimacy—manifested in Xi’s Chinese Dream campaign today—stems from the party’s claims of leading the restoration of Chinese greatness. For example, the May Fourth Movement, a popular protest in 1919 that helped catalyze the CPC, called into question the legitimacy of the Republic of China government running the country at that time because the regime was seen as not having effectively defended China’s territorial and sovereignty interests at the Versailles Peace Conference.

Diversionary nationalist frictions would likely occur if the Chinese leadership portrayed a foreign adversary' as having made the first move, thus forcing Xi to stand up for China’s interests. An example is the 2012 attempt by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private owner.20 Although the Japanese central government sought to avert a crisis by stepping in to purchase the islands—having them bought and administered by Ishihara’s Tokyo metropolitan government would have dragged Japan into a confrontation with China—China saw this move as part of a deliberate orchestration by Japan to nationalize the islands. Xi seemingly had no choice but to defend China’s claims against an attempt by Japan to consolidate its position on the dispute.21 This issue touched off a period of heated tensions between China and Japan, lasting more than two years.22 Such dynamics are not limited to Japan. Other possible areas of conflict include, but are not necessarily limited to, Taiwan, India, and the South China Sea (especially with the Philippines and Vietnam).

The Chinese government will use such tactics if it believes that the costs are relatively low. Ideally, China would like to appear tough while avoiding material repercussions or a serious diplomatic breakdown. Standing up against foreign encroachment—without facing much blowback—could provide Xi’s administration with a tempting source of noneconomic legitimacy'. However, over the next few years, Xi will probably not be actively looking to get embroiled abroad. Cushioning the fallout from slower growth while managing a structural economic transition will be difficult enough. Courting potential international crises that distract the central leadership would make this task even more daunting.

Even if the top leadership did not wish to provoke conflict, a smaller budgetary allotment for security could cause military interests in China to deliberately instigate trouble to justify their claims over increasingly scarce resources. For example, an air force interested in ensuring its funding for a midair tanker program might find the existence of far-flung territorial disputes to be useful in making its case. Such a case would be made even stronger by a pattern of recent frictions that highlights the necessity of greater air power projection. Budgetary pressures may be partly behind a recent People’s Liberation Army reorganization and headcount reduction. A slowing economy might cause a further deceleration in China’s military spending, thus increasing such pressures as budgetary belts tighten.

CHALLENGES TO XI’S LEADERSHIP

Xi Jinping’s efforts to address economic challenges could fail, unleashing consequences that extend well beyond China’s economic health. For example, an economic collapse could give rise to a Vladimir Putin-like redemption figure in China. Xi’s approach of centralizing authority over a diverse, complex, and massive social, political, and economic system is a recipe for brittleness. Rather than designing a resilient, decentralized governance structure that can gracefully cope with localized failures at particular nodes in a network, a highly centralized architecture risks catastrophic, system-level failure. Although centralized authority offers the tantalizing chimera of stronger control from the center, it also puts all the responsibility squarely on Xi’s shoulders.

With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate unintended international repercussions. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have ripple effects abroad. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, raising the risks of strategic miscalculation on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23

23. This outcome is only one of several potentially dangerous consequences. Others include a rebellious military, destabilizing foreign policy, outright civil war, renewed military conflict with Taiwan, virulent anti-Americanism, and financial collapse and contagion.

## OFF

#### CP: The United States Federal Government should establish warning zones in geosynchronous orbit around private satellites.

#### Solves ASAT proliferation + the aff but doesn’t violate or change the OST and current space norms.

Cerny et. al 21[Michael B. Cerny is an Oxford MPhil candidate and has a Bachelor’s in International Relations from Emory University, Raphael J. Piliero is a Fulbright Scholar in Taiwan and has a Bachelors from Georgetown University. David Bernstein has a Bachelors from Georgetown, Brandon W. Kelley is the Associate Director of Debate at Georgetown , May 2021,*Space and Missile Wars: What Awaits*, Chapter 5: Countering Co-Orbital ASATs: Warning Zones in GEO as a Lawful Trigger for Self-Defense https://npolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Space\_and\_Missile\_Wars.pdf, 12-18-2021 amrita]

Ascertaining intent is at the heart of addressing the risks posed by co-orbital ASATs. Chow writes that prohibiting passage through a zone around a satellite is impossible because of the difficulty distinguishing between co-orbital ASATs and civilian satellites, and the necessity of these forms of passage for regular satellite operations.408 In a maritime context, warning zones allow ships to navigate a similar dilemma. In the global War on Terror, it can be difficult for navies to distinguish between threatening and peaceful civilian seacraft, so warning zones have been applied by navies to ascertain the intent of seacraft as they pass through a warning zone.409 By establishing a "defense bubble" around the naval vessels, warning zones allow commanders to ascertain the intent of incoming seacraft, whether they be warships, small boats, or jet skis.410 Furthermore, by direct ing all maritime traffic around the zone and requiring that all traffic passing through the zone communicate their intentions, commanders are able to clarify any threats and determine the need to invoke self-defense.411 Upon notice, state or civilian seacraft might avoid entering the zone itself or choose to do so while communicating their intent to the United States Navy.412 **The unilateral establishment of warning zones around U**nited **S**tates satellites **presents a** potential **solution to** the threat of **co-orbital ASATs without violating Articles I and II of the OST**. First, the establishment of warning zones would not limit ‘free access’ to the area of the zone as specified by Article I. According to the general practice of warning zones, the establishment of the zone itself does not limit another state from entering the area. Furthermore, the penetration of the zone by another state does not license the use of force by the state enforcing the zone. As explained by the Commander’s Handbook— "Specifically, when operating in international waters, commanders may assert notice (via notices to airmen and notices to mariners) that within a certain geographic area for a certain period of time dangerous military activities will be taking place. Commanders may request that entities traversing the area communicate with them and state their intentions. Moreover, such notice may include reference to the fact that if ships and aircraft traversing the area are deemed to represent an imminent threat to US naval forces, they may be subject to proportionate measures in self-defense. Ships and aircraft are not required to remain outside such zones and force may not be used against such entities merely because they entered the zone. Commanders may use force against such entities only to defend against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent, including interference with declared military activities."413 **Warning zones** would **also avoid the ‘national appropriation’ principle** under Article II. Referring back to the initial three qualifications of the treaty, the first of these qualifications is that national appropriation is prohibited "by claim of sovereignty."414 As our previous analysis suggests, warning zones would not constitute a claim of sovereignty because they do not grant any sovereign right over the area of outer space. As a result, we direct our analysis towards the secondary and tertiary qualifications of what constitutes national appropriation "by means of use or occupation," or "by any other means."415

#### Ground-based asats are already developed and here to stay BUT co-orbital ASATs and space-based weapons are what truly causes nuclear war

Chow 17’Chow, Brian G. "Stalkers in space: Defeating the threat." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 11.2 (2017): 82-116.

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The United States has 554 operational satellites, the largest number of satellites among all countries and organizations in the world (see table 1).1 While these space capabilities offer great advantages for the US military, they simultaneously create great vulnerabilities. The Department of Defense (DOD) is increasingly concerned, particularly about the space threat from China. In its annual reports to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China for 2013,2 2014,3 2015,4 and 2016,5 the DOD has warned repeatedly: “PLA [People’s Liberation Army] writings emphasize the necessity of ‘destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance . . . and communications satellites,’ suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to ‘blind and deafen the enemy.’ ” Gen John Hyten, the former head of Air Force Space Command, said without space assets, the United States would be forced to revert to industrial age warfare: “It’s Vietnam, Korea and World War II”—no more precision missiles and smart bombs.6 Hyten was also quoted as saying that “China will soon be able to threaten US satellites in every orbital regime, from low Earth orbit a few hundred miles above the Earth, to geosynchronous orbit more than 20,000 miles up—where some of the military’s most important satellites circle the Earth. . . . Now we have to figure out how to defend those satellites.”7 As threats from ground-based ASATs (such as traditional threats from ballistic missiles, lasers, and jammers and the newer cyber attacks8 ) grow, it is easy to continue focusing on these much more well-known ASATs and ignore China’s developing co-orbital ASAT—hereafter what this article refers to as space stalkers. In November 2015, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission released its annual report to Congress stating that “since 2008, China has tested increasingly complex space proximity capabilities.”9 It confirmed what it and others have been suggesting, that “China’s recent space activities indicate it is developing co-orbital antisatellite systems to target US space assets. These systems consist of a satellite armed with a weapon such as an explosive charge, fragmentation device, kinetic energy weapon, laser, radio frequency weapon, jammer, or robotic arm.”10 Space objects capable of rendezvous proximity operations and particularly equipped with a robotic arm could pose a game-changing threat as these objects could be placed in orbit during peacetime. During a crisis, such as China seizing Taiwan or territorial disputes in the South China Sea, these space objects could be maneuvered to tailgate US satellites and become space stalkers. They could simultaneously attack multiple critical satellites from such a close proximity that the United States would not have time to react. The space stalkers could destroy enough critical satellites to force the United States back toward General Hyten’s warning of fighting primitive “industrial age warfare” with greatly increased collateral damage. On 29 November 2016, CNN broadcast the documentary “War in Space: The Next Battlefield,” based on interviews of more than 10 high-ranking military personnel of the entire chain of command for space warfare. These interviews described the concerns of senior space officials about the threat from “kamikaze and kidnapper satellites launched by Russia and China.”11 Geosynchronous satellites have long been considered safe from attacks, especially simultaneous attacks, since direct-ascent ASAT ballistic missiles would typically take about four hours to reach geosynchronous satellites.12 However, these satellites could soon be under serious threat. Setting up the space stalkers to be co-orbital with, and in close proximity to, their prey is the easiest way to coordinate simultaneous attacks. If China could place these highly maneuverable space stalkers in close proximity to multiple US critical satellites, simultaneous attacks would be possible with little advance warning, leaving the United States inadequate time to save the targeted satellites. The space-stalking threat is unique and cannot be mitigated by focusing on and responding to traditional satellite threats. Even if the United States could perfectly deter and defend against all the traditional ASAT threats and the newer cyber attacks, adversaries could still use multiple stalkers to mount a devastating first strike against critical US satellites. Thus, the United States must specifically deal with the emerging spacestalker threat.

## OFF

#### China views resources in space as key to foreign policy iniatives

Blair, Yali, 19, 03/2019, “The Space Security Dilemma”, Bruce G. Blair is the President of the World Security Institute. He was a project director at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution from 1987-2000. Mr. Blair is the author of numerous articles and books on security issues including the Logic of Accidental Nuclear War and Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces. He is presently completing a new book on U.S. nuclear policy.sChen Yali is the editor-in-chief of Washington Observer. She is also a Program Manager of Chen Shi China Research Group based in Beijing. Chen worked for China Daily as a reporter and opinion writer on politics and international affairs between 1994 and 2000, URL: <https://www.globalzero.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BB_Editors-Notes-Space-Security-Dilemma_2006.pdf>, KR

A zero-sum mindset toward space is hardening in China as a result of this apprehension, as amply illustrated in the public media. Space is eyed in China as an area of resources and possibilities to be acquired before it’s too late. ShuXing, whose book is reviewed later in this journal, likens the grabbing of satellite orbits to the “Enclosure Movement” in late 18th Century England in which the more capability one has, the more resources one can seize. Another reviewed author argued that countries scramble into space to fight for the tremendous resources found there and “once this fight for resources causes irreconcilable conflicts, it may lead to radical space confrontations.” A space war seems to many Chinese to be another form of resource war. Such urgency in seeking control over resources is not unique to space, but also applies to energy and other areas. Given China’s population and rapid economic growth, controlling resources is understandably a paramount concern. Regarding space, however, a zero-sum (‘win-lose’) attitude is narrow-minded and misguided. If feverish competition for resources in space causes Sino-American relations to deteriorate or leads to the outbreak of war between them, then both parties lose.

Maj. Gen. Chang Xianqi and Sui Junqin of the PLA Institute of Command and Technology (aka. Armament Command and Technology Academy) offer a straightforward description of the aims of China’s space activities over the next five to 20 years, and explain why perceptions or accusations of hidden military aims in China’s manned space flight program (which sent two astronauts into space in October 2005) do not withstand logical scrutiny. They characterize the country’s space mission as dedicated to advancing science and to supporting China’s economic modernization. They dismiss two key allegations concerning the manned space program that the Shenzhou spacecraft’s ability for mid-course orbital maneuvering indicates a Chinese military effort to apply the technology to Chinese strategic missiles in order to give these missiles the ability to avoid U.S. missile defenses, and that China envisions its manned spacecraft as platforms for conducting real-time reconnaissance and intelligence collection for military ends. China’s orbital maneuver technology, they note, is decades old and evolved independently of the U.S. missile defense program, while the inefficiencies of conducting surveillance from manned platforms compared to satellites are widely appreciated and have led other space-faring nations to choose satellites for this mission.

#### The plan forces China to respond since they can’t pursue resources – that form of militarization creates arms control and escalation crises

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While the China space threat consists of a spectrum of possibilities, the U.S. space threat to China clearly goes beyond the realm of possibilities, Zhang Hui at Harvard University contends in his article that examines threats from a Chinese perspective. Drawing on authoritative sources, he argues that the United States is unambiguously committed not only to exploiting space for military purposes, but also to controlling space by all necessary means including weapons deployed in space. The objective is not only to protect U.S. space assets, but to deny adversaries the use of space in wartime. In its most ambitious rendition, controlling space applies even to the transitory period of several minutes when an adversary’s missiles are passing through space enroute to their wartime targets on enemy soil. This prospective role for U.S. space control weapons – shooting down an adversary’s ballistic missiles – is the central concern of Zhang’s analysis, as it represents the most serious threat to China’s security. A space-based U.S. missile defense system, especially one designed to shoot down ballistic missiles during their several minutes of boosted flight after launch (boost-phase defenses), would pose the gravest potential threat by enabling the United States to neutralize China’s strategic nuclear missile deterrent.

In some respects Zhang and many U.S. analysts understate the degree of potential threat to China by stressing the huge cost of the thousands of space- based interceptors needed to maintain an around-the-clock vigil of Chinese missile launches, and by stressing the relative ease by which China’s missiles could punch holes in this defensive constellation. The understatement derives from the fact that a far less extensive galaxy of U.S. space-based interceptors would be needed if the United States could choose the moment for initiating hostilities as part of a preemptive offensive strategy. Even a constellation of dozens of interceptors could be decisive if the United States enjoyed the luxury of setting the terms of the onset of conflict and the interceptors were optimally positioned at that moment.

In Zhang’s view, China could counter by deploying anti-space weapons designed to cripple the U.S. missile defense network, but such a step could ignite an arms race in space (and, we might add, create impulses to preemptively strike in space during a crisis). Alternatively, China could ramp up its arsenal of nuclear missiles and warheads to the point at which it would overwhelm the U.S. defense capability, but the downsides are numerous. A Chinese missile build-up could trigger nuclear reactions from India. If Pakistan follows suit, an arms race in South Asia could result. It could also require China to re-start its fissile materials production facilities and thereby unravel China’s commitment to the multinational treaty calling for all countries to stop future production of such materials.

#### Turns aff war impacts and hyper-escalate their conflict scenarios since other states have incentives to match China

## CASE

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#### 1] 1AC Curio isn’t about appropriation – it’s about buying materials through an export market which isn’t something the aff solves

#### 2] There’s no contextualization of why chinese space leadership is synchronous with private appropriation – the autry ev is about things like infrastructure, SBSP, etc.. which are done by the public sector – at worst case alt causes this

Autry and Kwast 19 Greg Autry and Steve Kwast 8-22-2019 "America Is Losing the Second Space Race to China" (Greg Autry, a clinical professor of space leadership, policy, and business at Arizona State University’s Thunderbird School of Global Management, and Steve Kwast)//Elmer

America Is Losing the Second Space Race to China The private sector can give the United States a much-needed rocket boost. The current U.S. space defense strategy is inadequate and on a path to failure. President Donald Trump’s vision for a Space Force is big enough. As he said on June 18, “It is not enough to merely have an American presence in space. We must have American dominance in space.” But the Air Force is not matching this vision. Instead, the leadership is currently focused on incremental improvements to existing equipment and organizational structures. Dominating the vast and dynamic environment of space will require revolutionary capabilities and resources far deeper than traditional Department of Defense thinking can fund, manage, or even conceive of. Success depends on a much more active partnership with the commercial space industry— and its disruptive capabilities. U.S. military space planners are preparing to repeat a conflict they imagined back in the 1980s, which never actually occurred, against a vanished Soviet empire. Meanwhile, China is executing a winning strategy in the world of today. It is burning hard toward domination of the future space markets that will define the next century. They are planning infrastructure in space that will control 21st-century telecommunications, energy, transportation, and manufacturing. In doing so, they will acquire trillion-dollar revenues as well as the deep capabilities that come from continuous operational experience in space. This will deliver space dominance and global hegemony to China’s authoritarian rulers. Despite the fact that many in the policy and intelligence communities understand exactly what China is doing and have been trying to alert leadership, Air Force leadership has convinced the White House to fund only a slightly better satellite command with the same leadership, while sticking a new label onto their outmoded thinking. A U.S. Space Force or Corps with a satellite command will never fulfill Trump’s call to dominate space. Air Force leadership is demonstrating the same hubris that Gen. George Custer used in convincing Congress, over President Ulysses S. Grant’s better experience intuition, that he could overtake the Black Hills with repeating rifles and artillery. That strategy of technological overconfidence inflamed conflict rather than subduing it, and the 7th Cavalry were wiped out at the Battle of the Little Bighorn. The West was actually won by the settlers, ranchers, miners, and railroad barons who were able to convert the wealth of the territory itself into the means of holding it. They laid the groundwork that made the 20th century the American Century and delivered freedom to millions of people in Europe and Asia. Of course, they also trampled the indigenous people of the American West in their wake—but empty space comes with no such bloody cost. The very emptiness and wealth of this new, if not quite final, frontier, however, means that competition for resources and strategic locations in cislunar space (between the Earth and moon) will be intense over the next two decades. The outcome of this competition will determine the fate of humanity in the next century. China’s impending dominance will neutralize U.S. geopolitical power by allowing Beijing to control global information flows from the high ground of space. Imagine a school in Bolivia or a farmer in Kenya choosing between paying for a U.S. satellite internet or image provider or receiving those services for free as a “gift of the Chinese people.” It will be of little concern to global consumers that the news they receive is slanted or that searches for “free speech” link to articles about corruption in Western democracies. Nor will they care if concentration camps in Tibet and the Uighur areas of western China are obscured, or if U.S. military action is presented as tyranny and Chinese expansion is described as peacekeeping or liberation. China’s aggressive investment in space solar power will allow it to provide cheap, clean power to the world, displacing U.S. energy firms while placing a second yoke around the developing world. Significantly, such orbital power stations have dual use potential and, if properly designed, could serve as powerful offensive weapons platforms. China’s first step in this process is to conquer the growing small space launch market. Beijing is providing nominally commercial firms with government-manufactured, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles they can use to dump launch services on the market below cost. These start-ups are already undercutting U.S. pricing by 80 percent. Based on its previous success in using dumping to take out U.S. developed industries such as solar power modules and drones, China will quickly move upstream to attack the leading U.S. launch providers and secure a global commercial monopoly. Owning the launch market will give them an unsurmountable advantage against U.S. competitors in satellite internet, imaging, and power. The United States can still build a strategy to win. At this moment, it holds the competitive advantage in every critical space technology and has the finest set of commercial space firms in the world. It has pockets of innovative military thinkers within groups like the Defense Innovation Unit, under Mike Griffin, the Pentagon’s top research and development official. If the United States simply protects the intellectual property its creative minds unleash and defend its truly free markets from strategic mercantilist attack, it will not lose this new space race. The United States has done this before. It beat Germany to the nuclear bomb, it beat the Soviet Union to the nuclear triad, and it won the first space race. None of those victories was achieved by embracing the existing bureaucracy. Each of them depended on the president of the day following the only proven path to victory in a technological domain: establish a small team with a positively disruptive mindset and empower that team to investigate a wide range of new concepts, work with emerging technologies, and test innovative strategies. Today that means giving a dedicated Space Force the freedom to easily partner with commercial firms and leverage the private capital in building sustainable infrastructure that actually reduces the likelihood of conflict while securing a better economic future for the nation and the world.

#### 3] China commercial space fails

Liu et al 19 (Irina, Evan Linck, Bhavya Lal, Keith W. Crane, Xueying Han, Thomas J. Colvin, IDA Science and Technology Policy Institute) Evaluation of China’s Commercial Space Sector, Institute for Defense Analysis Science & Technology Institute <https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx> EE

China’s commercial space sector is also beset by several challenges. First, most companies are relatively unsophisticated from a business perspective, and do not have a clear idea of who their customers are. The Chinese VC ecosystem is also not as robust as that in the United States; Chinese VCs set shorter timelines for returns on investment than U.S. VC firms. Since most companies are watching the successes of American commercial sector, being a second mover, even as a fast follower, limits their opportunities. Second, while the companies have support from the central and provincial governments, some parts of the government bureaucracy and some SOEs are dismissive of the emerging space companies, which makes it difficult for them to become true competitors to the incumbent SOEs. Third, China has a “brand image” problem, which could hurt foreign sales, especially in countries that tend to be closely affiliated with the United States. Fourth, as with other high-tech sectors, Chinese commercial space companies are experiencing labor market pressures as salaries in the aerospace sector have risen sharply, and they face intense competition for trained staff, which may limit their ability to grow. Lastly, the lack of commercial space-specific regulations and policies may hurt the sector, as businesses would prefer the stability of rules, and the legitimacy they bring, rather than relying on one-off relationships with government officials.

#### 4] No solvency – the plan doesn’t get rid of most Chinese innovation

Liu et al 19 (Irina, Evan Linck, Bhavya Lal, Keith W. Crane, Xueying Han, Thomas J. Colvin, IDA Science and Technology Policy Institute) Evaluation of China’s Commercial Space Sector, Institute for Defense Analysis Science & Technology Institute <https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx> EE

1. Definition of a Commercial Company

Prior to examining the commercial space industry, we first define what companies we include in our evaluation, as the boundary of what includes a commercial company in China varies depending on whom is asked. For example, many SOEs conduct commercial activities with the private sector, buying and selling goods and services from and to households and businesses. However, many of these SOEs prioritize state goals over profitability and do not face traditional market pressures (e.g., they may receive funding from the state to offset losses if costs exceed revenues). In China, therefore, a commercial company is an enterprise that has a primary goal of pursuing profits, rather than meeting government policy goals.

Notably, this definition of commercial differs from the conception of commercial in the United States. The 2010 National Space Policy defined the term commercial as:

space goods, services, or activities provided by private sector enterprises that bear a reasonable portion of the investment risk and responsibility for the activity, operate in accordance with typical market-based incentives for controlling cost and optimizing return on investment, and have the legal capacity to offer these goods or services to existing or potential nongovernmental customers.

Commercialization, under a U.S. perspective, has two dimensions:

1. risk-taking, especially financial, by entities other than the government. Generally, for a company’s activities to be considered commercial, at least some private capital must be at risk or the company must sell to the private sector.

2. the breadth of the customer base, which includes both governmental and nongovernmental customers

Although the above definition fits well with companies in the United States and Europe, ownership in China can be complex (Szamosszegi and Kyle 2011). For example, a majority state-owned company may sell services to households and businesses commercially and have some private investors. Many of the Chinese experts with whom we spoke would consider such a company to be commercial, despite being backed by the state, provided its primary purpose was to sell commercially in pursuit of profits.

Alternatively, a company that is mostly privately-held that has some investment from provincial or municipal VC firms or from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and sells solely to the government would also be considered commercial. As such, we use a different framework than one used in the United States for defining “commercial,” as we believe it is more appropriate. Although both these hypothetical companies would be considered commercial, they would be referred to differently in Chinese. Companies that are more privately-held are referred to as 民营企业 (mínyíng qǐyè), meaning a company operated by a civil entity. Companies that are majority-owned by the state fall under the label 国有企业 (guóyǒu qǐyè), meaning state-owned enterprise.

Interviews and a literature review revealed that Chinese nationals do not consider all SOEs that offer commercial services as commercial companies. This distinction was manifested in literature and news reports on China’s commercial space industry, as authors often differentiate between commercial space (商业航天, shāngyè hángtiān) and space commercialization (航天商业化, hángtiān shāngyèhuà), with the latter referring to government-focused SOEs selling their space products and services in commercial markets 4 and the former referring to both commercially-focused state-owned companies and privately-held companies selling to commercial markets.

As ownership does not necessarily determine how a Chinese space company operates, for the purposes of this report we define a commercial company in China as an enterprise that is primarily operated in pursuit of profit, as opposed to an organization that conducts commercial activities primarily to meet public policy goals, which is characteristic of SOEs. Notably, this definition can include companies that are fully state-owned. We make a distinction between state-owned enterprises, which pursue the goals of the state, and state-owned companies, which pursue profits, rather than public policy goals, even though their shares are owned by state entities.

In classifying a company as commercial, we evaluated each company on the basis of three questions (the third question departs from the definition above):

• Does the company have some private parties taking risk (through ownership, investment or other means), even if the majority shareholder is an SOE? 4

• If not, do they sell their products to customers other than the Chinese government, in domestic or foreign markets?

• Even when they are fully or partially state-owned, do they appear to demonstrate independence from their parent SOE or government agency?

These questions are meant to identify companies that have some separation from the Chinese government that could play a role in the global space market. Although we use an inclusive definition for what constitutes a commercial company, we do break these companies into three categories: state-owned, mixed-ownership, and privately-held, as ownership can affect other attributes of their businesses.

a. State-owned

Most SOEs are owned and controlled by the State-owned Assets and Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council or similar commissions organized by provincial, municipal, or county governments. SOEs in turn may fully or partially own subsidiaries. Partially owned SOE subsidiaries may be joint ventures with domestic or foreign private sector groups, funded by public or private VC, or publicly traded. As the goal of this report is to examine China’s commercial space sector, we do not examine SOEs or their large subsidiaries that do not focus on making profits. They include CASC or its major subsidiaries such as the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology 4 This assumes that private owners always have a profit perspective, which may not always be the case for all private companies. An example is Blue Origin in the United States, which, until recently, had operated more as a philanthropically-driven technology development company rather than a profit-driven commercial one. 5 (CALT), Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology (SAST), or the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) that sells CASC’s products and services, including those of the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST). In our statistics, we include some fully state-owned companies, such as Expace, as these companies are primarily focused on making profits and show some independence from their parent SOE.

b. Mixed-ownership

A number of the commercial space companies we identified have a mix of public and private ownership. This does not mean that the government dictates how these companies operate or what they do. We find mixed-ownership companies fall into three categories.

• The first group is SOE-backed companies that have large percentages of private ownership, such as APT Satellite. These companies demonstrate a large degree of independence from their parent SOE, but may rely on it for certain services (e.g., satellite manufacturing).

• The second group of mixed-ownership space companies are spin-offs from CAS institutes and universities, such as Chang Guang Satellite. Spin-offs from CAS often give CAS a minority stake, in exchange for in-kind subsidies, such as use of CAS facilities or researchers. The remainder of the shares is divided among the founder, members of the board, some employees, and public and private VC firms.

• The third group of mixed-ownership companies are otherwise privately-held companies that have received some investment from a provincial or municipal VC firm. Provincial and municipal governments offer this investment to attract high technology businesses and jobs to their areas. Beyond influencing where a business locates itself, this investment does not appear to affect business decisions.

c. Privately-held Non-state-owned space companies we identified can be divided into four (somewhat overlapping) categories.

• Perhaps most important for this report are China’s space start-ups, which are much like the start-up space companies elsewhere in the world. In general, these companies have existed since 2014 and have business plans similar to those of other New Space companies in the West. The largest of these companies have over $100 million in VC funding and several hundred employees; the smallest are still PowerPoint companies with little funding and few employees, but big goals. 6

• The second group of companies are small, privately-held companies that have had time to become established. Many of these companies were founded to act as component suppliers to SOEs. Today, they still supply SOEs but may also supply other private companies.

• The third group of companies are older, more established companies that initially supplied SOEs, but are publicly traded (e.g., Zhuhai Orbita). Several of these companies have pivoted in recent years to owning and operating their own satellites. • The last group of companies include large, publicly traded non-space companies that have acquired small space companies or expanded into space markets (e.g., Tatwah Smartech).

#### The companies they reference are state-owned companies

Liu et al 19 (Irina, Evan Linck, Bhavya Lal, Keith W. Crane, Xueying Han, Thomas J. Colvin, IDA Science and Technology Policy Institute) Evaluation of China’s Commercial Space Sector, Institute for Defense Analysis Science & Technology Institute <https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx> EE

To date, nearly all of China’s accomplishments in space have been achieved by the Chinese government, state-owned enterprises (SOE), or their subsidiaries and suppliers. Historically, China’s space industry has predominantly consisted of SOEs controlled by China’s central or provincial governments. Since 1999, two SOEs, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC, 中国航天科技集团) and the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation (CASIC, 中国航天科工集团),2 have had a near duopoly on launch and space technology in China, with CASC serving as the primary SOE responsible for launch and space technologies.3

#### 5] Whoops! They left off the next paragraph of their own evidence which flows neg and admits Chinese space companies aren’t even private – vote neg on no solvency

\*\*DEBATEDRILLS READS GREEN

1AC Patel 21 — (Neel V. Patel, Neel is the space reporter for MIT Technology Review, and he writes The Airlock newsletter. Before joining, he worked as a freelance science and technology journalist, contributing stories to Popular Science, The Daily Beast, Slate, Wired, the Verge, and elsewhere. Prior to that, he was an associate editor for Inverse, where he grew and led the website’s space coverage., “China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US“, MIT Technology Review, 1-21-2021, Available Online at https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance, accessed 1-11-2022, HKR-AR) recut DebateDrills EE

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called Document 60 that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a 2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses. More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it released the first images taken by the satellite, Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

Making friends

The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders.

**“China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,”** says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.

Although China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry, the nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about. While Chinese companies may look private on paper, they must still submit to government guidance and control, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy, especially if the government is a frequent customer. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895).

And Hines adds that it’s not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### 6] Their author also admits funding issues make Chinese commercial space exploration extremely difficult

1AC Patel 21 — (Neel V. Patel, Neel is the space reporter for MIT Technology Review, and he writes The Airlock newsletter. Before joining, he worked as a freelance science and technology journalist, contributing stories to Popular Science, The Daily Beast, Slate, Wired, the Verge, and elsewhere. Prior to that, he was an associate editor for Inverse, where he grew and led the website’s space coverage., “China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US“, MIT Technology Review, 1-21-2021, Available Online at https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance, accessed 1-11-2022, HKR-AR) recut DebateDrills EE

Other challenges

None of these new companies are yet profitable, and it will be quite some time before they are. “There isn’t any sign of indication that this industry will flop,” says Hines. “But many experts do think a lot of these companies will go out of business.” Apart from the challenge of attracting customers outside China, many companies are still trying to figure out who exactly their customers ought to be.

American companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin had billionaire founders ready to burn cash to take on large risks, push past big failures, and finally get off the ground. And while a Chinese billionaire [entered the industry last year,](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-03/geely-to-make-satellites-as-billionaire-li-follows-musk-to-space?sref=E9Urfma4)“there is no Chinese Elon Musk to push these riskier ventures forward,” says Hines. It’s also unclear whether Chinese companies, even those supported by wealthy backers, will have that appetite for risk.

#### 7] China’s ASATs are operated by the Strategic Support Force – proven by 1AC Chow and Kelley.

#### The SSF is a governmental entity – they’re not a private actor.

Pollpeter et Al 17 Pollpeter, Kevin L., Michael S. Chase, and Eric Heginbotham. The creation of the PLA strategic support force and its implications for Chinese Military Space Operations. RAND Corporation Santa Monica United States, 2017. (Analyst at Rand)//Elmer

This report explores the missions and organization of China's military space enterprise, focusing on the organizational structure of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force (SSF). Created on December 31, 2015, as part of a major reorganization of China's military, the SSF is charged with developing and employing most of the PLA's space capabilities. Its creation signifies a shift in the PLA's prioritization of space and an increased role for PLA space capabilities. Chinese military strategists see military space capabilities and operations as a key component of strategic deterrence, critical to enabling the PLA to fight informatized local wars and counter U.S. military intervention in the region and essential for supporting operations aimed at protecting China's emerging interests in more-distant parts of the world. The main function of the SSF's space component appears to be the launch and operation of satellites to provide the PLA with command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. It appears that information warfare, including space warfare, long identified by PLA analysts as a critical element of future military operations, has entered a new phase of development in which an emphasis on space and information warfare, long-range precision strikes, and the requirements associated with conducting operations at greater distances from China has necessitated the establishment of a new and different type of organization.

#### This means the Aff doesn’t effect ASATs – they will say Commercial Sectors produce them, that’s irrelevant since the PLA operates them as an act of appropriation which isn’t effected by the plan.

#### 8] Russia thumps the aff – their ev say they develop same co orbital dual use tech

#### 9] No link:

#### Even if they’re right that they work on commercial projects to help each other – the larger iniative is space dominance which the aff doesn’t solve

#### their card literally says they’ve already militarized it so they don’t need alliances (which is what the impact ev is ABOUT, not alliances)

1AC Bowman and Thompson 3/31 [(Bradley Bowman, the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies) (Jared Thompson, a U.S. Air Force major and visiting military analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.) “Russia and China Seek to Tie America’s Hands in Space” Foreign Policy 3/31/2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/russia-china-space-war-treaty-demilitarization-satellites/] BC

Consider the actions of the United States’ two great-power adversaries when it comes to anti-satellite weapons. China and Russia have sprinted to develop and deploy both ground-based and space-based weapons targeting satellites while simultaneously pushing the United States to sign a treaty banning such weapons.

To protect its vital space-based military capabilities—including communications, intelligence, and missile defense satellites—and effectively deter authoritarian aggression, Washington should avoid being drawn into suspect international treaties on space that China and Russia have no intention of honoring.

The Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), which Beijing and Moscow have submitted at the United Nations, is a perfect example. PPWT signatories commit “not to place any weapons in outer space.” It also says parties to the treaty may not “resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects” or engage in activities “inconsistent” with the purpose of the treaty.

On the surface, that sounds innocuous. Who, after all, wants an arms race in space?

The reality, however, is that China and Russia are already racing to field anti-satellite weapons and have been for quite some time. “The space domain is competitive, congested, and contested,” Gen. James Dickinson, the head of U.S. Space Command, said in January. “Our competitors, most notably China and Russia, have militarized this domain.”

#### 10] Space alliance is an alt casue – nothing in the rogin ev indicates its based on private growth but rather military missiles that have existed now

#### 11] Rajapolan ev concedes that china is already breaking norms in ASATS which means there’s no large increase sufficient to cause rapid prolif

#### 12] US military expansion triggers China/Russian counterbalancing that makes conflict inevitable

Kofman 18 Michael Kofman, Michael Kofman is a Senior Research Scientist at CNA Corporation and a Fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute. Previously he served as Program Manager at National Defense University. “SEARCHING FOR STRATEGY IN WASHINGTON’S COMPETITION WITH RUSSIA.” War on the Rocks. January 30, 2018. https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/searching-strategy-washingtons-competition-russia/

Reading the [recently released 2018 National Defense Strategy](https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf), which trumpets the national security establishment’s emergence from “a period of strategic atrophy,” one can be forgiven for wondering what took so long. The new formulation emanating from the Pentagon, that “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern of U.S. national security,” is both refreshing and long overdue. America seems to be the last of the great powers to self-consciously join a geopolitical competition that has been unfolding for some years with Russia and China.

Yet this strategy will not suffice to maintain the U.S. position in the international system. Indeed, it is a symptom of the very same strategic atrophy decried in the first lines of the document. The National Defense Strategy’s urgency is valid and its desire to focus on inter-state conflict meritorious. Its tone and framing is, in many ways, a good start. But it betrays a poor understanding of the nature of the problem and the adversaries with whom we are competing. My focus here will be on strategic competition with Russia, although I also offer a few remarks on China.

In principle, one can agree with [Kori Schake’s positive review](https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/22/mad-dog-mattiss-defense-strategy-is-bold/) “that the document propounds a clear vision to the current challenges to U.S. security, the roles military force will play in protecting against those challenges, and the priorities for spending and activity to strengthen the enterprise.” The vision is clear, but it is not necessarily correct. There is great clarity in terms of contested domains, capabilities in demand, and the loss of military advantage. Unfortunately, this document is absolute gobbledygook on the challenge posed by revisionist powers and the way forward to arresting a concomitant decline in U.S. military power and influence. It does not seem to benefit from a firm understanding of international politics or deterrence concepts. There is a very retro 1980s vibe to this document, more looking backward to the competition that was — and in that sense, [nostalgic](https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-make-trumps-national-security-strategy/#essay3)— than forward to the competition that is and will be.

The National Defense Strategy both overstates the military challenge and, at the same time, misses the point on the strategic challenges facing the United States. Thus, it comes off somewhat as a blind swordsman, unable to cogently describe the threat, or the strategic environment, but confident that a larger sword is needed. Much of the Russian establishment is having a conversation on the importance of non-military means in determining the outcome of a contest prior to the onset of combat operations, i.e. [winning without fighting](http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/July-August-2017/Thomas-Russias-Way-of-War/). And while this conversation is unfolding, America’s strategy is fixated on conventional dominance, deterrence by denial, and chasing after unobtanium: the ability to win regional wars against peer nuclear states who field a strong nuclear and conventional deterrent. The Pentagon remains wholly committed to the fantasy of having conventional wars with nuclear states, where they will let us win, accepting defeat without a nuclear exchange.

The document offers a recitation of grievances against classic great power behaviors. There is no effort made to lay out Russian strategy as the Pentagon understands it, and what it is the two countries are actually competing over, versus what Washington simply doesn’t like and must contain. Therefore, the text lacks a concept of how the United States will attack Russia’s strategy, gain leverage, and – in the long-term – deter or compel Russia over those things that America finds of vital interest.

While this is an unclassified summary of a larger document, it seems the only discernible theory of victory is restoring America’s eroding military advantages. It’s clear how this answers the Pentagon’s need for more, but what this solves in terms of the Russia problem set, be it in Syria, Ukraine, or forms of competition below the threshold of war, remains a mystery. A more effective strategy would signal a clear intent to establish U.S. coercive credibility, demonstrate resolve, and lay out a plan to deter over that which matters, while at the same time assuring America’s adversaries that the competition is not existential, and thus can be bounded.

What are those things that really matter as far as Russia is concerned? What is the real challenge the Department of Defense should be seeking to solve? The first problem is that Russia is not adhering to the previously agreed rules governing European security, a region where the United States is highly exposed because of weak allies and extended deterrence commitments that are difficult to make good on after NATO expansion. Following that problem is the observed reality that, as the confrontation expands, Russia is undeterred from political, cyber, and information attacks on the U.S. homeland and its allies. Thus, an effective U.S. strategy would establish “rules of the road” for the current confrontation, just as the United States did during the Cold War. Either through deterrence or mutual agreement, the United States needs to find ways to constrain Russian advantages. Third, managing competition with Russia by pouring gasoline on it will make it harder for the United States to marshal  resources to manage a much stronger challenge looming from China. The United States is unappreciative of Russian resilience, believing demographic and economic challenges will somehow make this problem fade away. And finally, in managing a confrontation with both powers, there is a need to prevent U.S. responses from engendering a Sino-Russian entente, a strategic development for which the U.S. policy community is unprepared.

From Russia With Inter-State Strategic Competition

At first blush the 2018 National Defense Strategy is a crowning achievement for Moscow. Russian leaders have long sought recognition as a strategic competitor. This document bestows that honor and – even better for the Kremlin – places Russia in the same bracket as China. Throughout the document testimonials can be found to Russian military and non-military power. At least privately, Moscow will welcome this strategy as an acknowledgment of its coercive credibility.

Still, the National Defense Strategy has an odd list of complaints about Russia, stating that “the use of emerging technologies to discredit and subvert democratic processes in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine is concern enough, but when coupled with its expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal the challenge is clear.” Is it clear? Upon reading this sentence, it did not seem that clear to me. The Russian challenge is hardly delimited to nuclear weapons and political warfare, nor are those necessarily combined. The actual impact and efficacy of the latter remains contested. Assuredly, the Russia-Georgia War of 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the almost entirely conventional fighting continuing in Ukraine are hardly the product of emerging technologies to subvert democratic processes, unless this is new jargon for tanks and artillery.

The National Defense Strategy portrays the United States as seeking to fight certain Russian capabilities, rather than understanding how the adversary approaches use of military and non-military instruments, their strategy, and the nature of the competition. The locus of Russian thinking today is on how to shape adversary decision-making from crisis to escalation in conflict, based on the right integration of capabilities and methods to either deter, deter-in-conflict, or compel the adversary. That is what winning is about in a competition between nuclear powers, especially when most conflicts between great powers are over other third countries, allies, and cases of extended deterrence, where there is an asymmetry of interests. They understand that war is a contest of wills, a conflict between two systems. While Moscow certainly does not have all of the tools required to make this a complete strategy, its head is in the right place on what a competitive approach can look like leveraging one country’s advantages and the other’s vulnerabilities.

The Pentagon’s vision for success appears to be the ability to win a conventional war with two powers, both of which have considerable local advantages, effective nuclear arsenals, and a potent capacity to impose costs on the U.S. homeland in domains that are offense dominant. The National Defense Strategy posits that “in wartime, the fully mobilized Joint Force will be capable of: defeating aggression by a major power; deterring opportunistic aggression elsewhere.” However, throughout the document the strategy conceives of deterrence as the capacity to win. Why is this a problem? Ask yourself three honest questions: Is nuclear war winnable against peer nuclear powers? Is a conventional war between peer nuclear powers winnable without it escalating to nuclear war? That is, would Russia let the United States “win” a general conventional war without using nuclear weapons first?

Nyet!

This is why Russia has a robust arsenal of tactical and non-strategic nuclear weapons, together with a modernized strategic nuclear force. Forget about domains, lethality, and all the jargon. The risk of conventional war escalating into nuclear war is a large part of the deterrence reality, one that has long served American and Russian interests. Whatever fears and nefarious thoughts we may harbor towards each other, escalation dynamics and the resulting risk instill sobriety. Confrontation short of armed conflict remains the principal challenge. The military balance is an important factor, but indirect competition plays a larger role in shaping the international landscape. Even in an idyllic world, where the United States gets to fight strictly conventional wars against nuclear powers, we must think about competitive strategies. Russia, which represents [3.1 percent of global GD](http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD)P, poses an outsized threat. [Moscow spends a fraction what the United States does](http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm495_Gorenburg_Nov2017.pdf) on a fairly sustainable program of defense modernization. Consider China, which may come to rival both the U.S. defense budget and research and development budget in the not too distant future, and imagine how competitive conventional deterrence by denial is likely to be as an approach later into the 2020s.

Russia’s successful campaign in Syria is yet another demonstration of how adversaries can employ limited conventional power, integrated with other instruments, to achieve political ends. This is relevant not only because Russia has demonstrated the ability to put together its own coalition (something China has not), but because it is visibly adept at changing the policies of U.S. allies in a particular conflict, including Turkey, Israel, and even Saudi Arabia. While the National Defense Strategy sets out the goal of attracting new partners, it fails to acknowledge the threat being posed to existing alliances and partnerships from fairly successful international politics as practiced by our competitors. We did not come up short in domain superiority in Syria, or failed the race for military advantage, but rather failed to translate them into successful statecraft and international politics.

Reading the Strategy in Moscow

How will our Russian adversaries receive this document? As I mentioned above, they will first be flattered that they are now clearly recognized by the United States as a strategic competitor, indelicately binned with China, which is a much stronger power. Scanning through the strategy’s to-do list, the language on alliances and partnerships is rather nonthreatening from Moscow’s perspective, as it implies a ‘circle the wagons’ mentality around NATO, while any further alliance expansions seem aimed at Asia. This is what Moscow hoped to achieve: an America focused on vital interests rather than competing for Russia’s “near abroad.” Although the devil is in the details as to what ‘fortifying NATO’ truly means. The big text giveth and the small text taketh away.

Russia’s General Staff will be fixed closely to the lines discussing plans for forward stocks and munitions, layered missile defense, autonomous systems, and some ambiguously worded plan to strike within air defenses to take out ‘mobile power-projection platforms’ (whatever that means). Russia is concerned about the size of the U.S. footprint in Europe, how quickly it can be expanded, and the creep of strategic infrastructure towards its borders, i.e. missile defenses. The question in Moscow will be how Washington intends to achieve a ‘favorable regional military balance’ and which of its capabilities will be forward deployed to help realize this vision versus those intended to be surged into theater.

On the other hand, plans for defense in cyberspace and space will probably be viewed as cost prohibitive projects in offense dominated domains where Russia is a near peer, and likely to remain competitive at a much lower price. The strong, but strategically questionable, desire to chase down Russian coercive credibility on nuclear escalation is also not especially worrisome for Moscow. [Russia’s doctrine allows the use of nuclear weapons](http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf) not just in retaliation for nuclear attacks, but in cases where a conventional attack jeopardizes the existence of the state. It is intentionally ambiguous on what that means, but is principally defensive in nature and based on conditions with a strong asymmetry of interests.

This is a logical offset to U.S. conventional superiority, founded in the view that America’s conventional arsenal poses a strategic threat given how many regimes Washington has taken apart with it in the past 25 years. It is also central and inherently credible, whereas America’s nuclear deterrent is extended, and therefore less so. As the issue rests around resolve, and the interests at stake in the conflict, it is therefore very unlikely that Washington can alter anything by acquiring a modicum of nuclear weapons of a similar nature. The capabilities will add options, but options we would be wise not to use in a threshold of conflict where Russia will have much greater resolve, and escalation dominance.

That said, a fixation on sticks to try and acquire capabilities of a similar kind is natural. Blame too much wargaming and scenario-based thinking. The Pentagon just has to convince itself that somehow, just somehow, it can have a purely conventional war and win. On the whole it can do little harm to buy such things, unless raising entrapment concerns among allies is considered harm. They may prove useful to offset China in the long term. The rest of the proposed measures can be summarized as the traditional ‘get more stuff better’ approach, together with a sprinkling of jargon and liberal application of the word ‘competitive.’

Order Obsession: Russia and China Are Not the Same

The strategy disappoints in its imprecise and confounding language on the strategic challenge posed by Russia and China. It states: “It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian National Defense Strategy — gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.” This is where the National Defense Strategy oversimplifies and muddies the challenge. For one, Russia and China do not want the same thing, nor are their natural drives to maximize security via buffers or establish regional hegemony any different from other great powers. The question rests on sources of conduct. Russia is more focused on maximizing security, which has important but bounded consequences for U.S. interests, whereas China has grander visions for expanding its power and say in the international system.

China may pose a genuine challenge to U.S. global leadership, but Russia seeks great power exemptions and traditional privileges, such as a sphere of influence, buffer states facing NATO, and the recognition that its security needs supersede the political independence of its neighbors. However, there is no evidence of a special shared vision for an authoritarian world order between Moscow and Beijing. On the contrary, it is Washington that seems frequently confused as to the difference between the post-World War II order, which was established and underwritten by great powers left standing after that conflagration, including the Soviet Union, and the post-Cold War order, which saw a further expansion of American influence and political ideology in the international system.

The good news is that historically, an existing international order cannot be quickly destroyed and replaced with a new one absent a great power war. The orders we have come to know, whether it be the Concert of Europe in 1815, the post-World War I order under the League of Nations, or the post-World War II order centered around the United Nations and other institutions, [were the products of great power wars](https://www.amazon.com/After-Victory-Institutions-Strategic-Rebuilding/dp/0691050910). Such a dramatic transition is unlikely for the simple reason that great powers today are peer nuclear weapon states who deter each other. The nature of the order can change over time through erosion, compromise, or new institutions, as it is hardly set in stone, but there is no clear path for either Russia or China to rapidly overturn the foundations of the current international system.

The United States also cannot readily retreat from the current international order and simply allow it to crumble. As this new strategy illustrates, America is pinned by its own vast alliance and partner network. The American commitment to the international order is structural, intertwined with institutions, alliances, and the desire to maintain primacy in international politics.

Indeed, the prevalence of inter-state competition below the threshold of conflict, including proxy wars, is a symptom of stability in the system rather than the growing disorder marked by the recently announced National Defense Strategy. It is visible because the relative power balance has changed, but the overall escalation dynamic makes it impossible for revisionist powers to overturn the order even if they so desired. Equally there is little to suggest that Russia or China have malign designs to rework the economic foundations of the current order. Unfortunately, the fact that the order itself may survive doesn’t answer the fundamental question for the United States on if and how it will be able to retain leadership and influence in the order that persists. Neither does the 2018 National Defense Strategy.

The current strategy fails to speak to the structural confrontation that already exists with Russia, and the one brewing with China. As a consequence, the Pentagon’s vision to “expand the competitive space” is in stark contradiction with its desire to maintain the international order and deter adversaries. That is how orders not destroyed by wars can erode away, as realpolitik and competition takes primacy over institutions and norms. Increasing inter-state competition, with both parties, will only result in a further deterioration of what Washington considers to be norms or rules of the road, and the creation of alternative structures by other powers in an effort to reduce the competitive space. It will also lead to proxy wars, a negative sum gain for the international system and U.S. interests.

The entire document is whistling past the graveyard on the more strategic matter at play, which is that the inter-state competition described is not a free for all. It is principally taking place between Russia and China on the one hand, and the United States on the other. Iran too is likely more worried about the U.S. than its regional adversary Saudi Arabia. The net product of a strategy aimed at winning against both powers – and incidentally the chief rogue states, Iran and North Korea, with whom the long-term competitors are too on friendly terms – can very well be a Russia-China entente. More often than not, alliances are made by powers in response to threats. That is, only the United States can make a Russia-China entente take place by posing a much greater threat to both of them than they do to each other and engaging in a set of actions that make that threat more ‘same’ than different from a strategic perspective.

Although widely panned by the policy community today as improbable, the prospect that these two countries will increasingly work together politically, economically, and in the security space is [looking ever more likely](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMC_Brief_CP_Trenin_EuropeAsia_2015Eng.pdf). Some may consider it hedging, or a ‘soft alliance,’ but there are many levels of pacts, ententes, and agreements beyond formal alliances that can change the course of history. Russia in particular has few other options to sustain the confrontation, China may come along in due time. In general, the probability of an event happening tends to increase with each policy official who is certain it is impossible.

The National Defense Strategy is a good indicator that while Washington recognizes the rise or resurgence of competitors, it’s still in denial about itself, and the likelihood that a strategy to retain primacy is probably both unrealistic and unnecessary to maintain leadership. Well, it’s probably necessary for defending a preferred force sizing construct and service priorities. That said, it’s unclear if the strategy settles the question on whether Russia is a long-term challenge or a strategic adversary. The grievances listed are frankly scenario based, and largely confined to Russia’s behavior in Europe. It is hard to break a mainstay of the policy community’s assumptions that Russia will go away sometime in the 2020s. Whether because it will run out of money, people, or spontaneously transform into a democracy with no conflicting national interests, there is always a hidden expectation that Russia will depart the scene and allow the Pentagon to have the more intimate competition with China that it so very much desires.

A Better Set of Answers

As [leading historians, like Stephen Kotkin](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/russias-perpetual-geopolitics), have argued, Russia is a perpetually weak great power. It has moments of resurgence, thanks to state campaigns of internal mobilization, but then frequently falls behind. Yet it is also eminently resilient. There is a strong likelihood of Moscow posing a sustained if not increasingly bellicose challenge all the while Beijing looms in the forefront.

At the same time Russia is a highly vulnerable country, always suspecting the United States wants to further fragment what’s left of its sphere of influence and develop capabilities to nullify its nuclear deterrent. Having never recovered psychologically from Operation Barbarossa in 1941, Russia’s military is always fearful of a first strike. This is fertile ground to plow, as Russia will spend heavily to defend against U.S. airpower superiority, expand its nuclear arsenal as an offset, and seek to fortify regions like the Arctic at exorbitant prices. Moscow fears the strategic potential of the U.S. long range conventional arsenal, and is still a long way away from establishing its own conventional options to retaliate in kind.

There is also ample room for strategic ambush as Russia increasingly eyes the expansion of its role in the Middle East, to become an alternative power broker on the cheap. Great powers are often their own greatest enemies. They overreach, drive their neighbors to balance and make allies with adversaries, and leave room for strategic riposte. Although current investments in military reforms and modernization have a strong inertia effect, the United States can engage in a host of policies that sap Russian ability for internal balancing, thus making it increasingly less competitive beyond the 2020s. Russia in the Middle East is less a challenge, and more an opportunity to take advantage of.

Dominance and the pursuit of winning has often been a fool’s errand with Russia. As Napoleon watched Russian leadership set their own capital ablaze in 1812, before his painful retreat, he learned the lessons that having conventional overmatch and winning against Russia are poorly related. Since Moscow ultimately decides what winning is, and in the current scenario it looks like a nuclear exchange that the United States probably does not win by any measure of that word, the concept is meaningless as a strategic framework for dealing with this power. Contrary to the deeply held beliefs of the authors of this strategy, [deterrence is not absolute, but relative](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM2218.html). Absolute deterrence is almost unachievable with Russia given the geography, and in time may be equally impracticable with China given the balance of military power.

However, there is no indication that Moscow is especially interested in that which the United States is desperately seeking to defend, attacking NATO conventionally, while the National Defense Strategy has little to offer on how to counter prolonged strategies of erosion, subversion, and fragmentation. It tries to solve Russian aggression, a low probability event, and has little for the more likely problems and indirect means of competition already in progress. Furthermore, it offers nothing in terms of assurance to the competing powers. The strategy’s indelicate proposition that the United States will “expand the competitive space” while being “open to opportunities for cooperation but from a position of strength and based on our national interests,” is tantamount to a demand for submission, from a superpower declining in absolute and relative strength. Absent assurances that the competition can be bound, that it is actually over something and not over everything, not only will Russia not be deterred, but it will be encouraged to expand the confrontation absent any other way forward.

The strategy’s slogan that “the surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one,” is also misplaced. In retrospect, most of the participants of the two world wars also planned to deter by preparing to win. They sought the force structure and posture intended to resist each other’s attacks in a contest for superiority. Strategies aimed at victory and those at deterrence are not the same thing, though the latter is frequently used in policy texts to smuggle in the former. Overzealous pursuit of dominance and forward based military presence may not be the surest way to victory, but it is often the surest way to create security dilemmas and force bidding contests against powers with tremendous regional advantages.  Not only can such answers cause the very wars they seek to prevent, but they hold the potential to spend the United States into oblivion.

This strategy reflects a good understanding of America’s policy establishment. There is plenty red meat for the grist here. It is consistent with its intellectual progenitors, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense [Elbridge Colby’s long-held vision that the key to conventional deterrence](http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-82/Article/793233/avoiding-becoming-a-paper-tiger-presence-in-a-warfighting-defense-strategy/)is maintaining an advantage in conventional military power, particularly with respect to a given potentially contested area. In particular, scholarship indicates that conventional deterrence has been most effective when adversaries judged that a potential defender’s conventional forces could resist their attacks, particularly in a relatively short timeframe.

This perspective discards much of the work of greats like Bernard Brodie, that deterrence is not about the myopic pursuit of dominance or superiority, nor is deterring necessarily identified with winning (how can it be with nuclear peers?), but the ‘win to deter’ view clearly undergirds the strategic vision in the National Defense Strategy.

America is hardly the first power to face a decline from unipolarity, struggling to find competitive strategies to maintain primacy, while finding its extended network of alliances and partners under threat from capable challengers. Nor is the United States the first to launch ruinous campaigns to the Middle East and Central Asia, only to find it should have husbanded those resources for strategic adversaries. The 2018 National Defense Strategy offers clear answers to these long-term challenges, a direct assault with what resources are left to muster for the coming decades, reminiscent of Shakespeare’s “once more onto the breach, dear friends, once more; or close the wall up with our English dead,” from Henry V.

Yet the answers found in the current National Defense Strategy are unconvincing. They are better suited for winning table top wargames than winning strategic competitions with actual adversaries. Albeit provocative, it might be easier to conceive of European Command and Pacific Command as the modern day Western and Eastern Roman Empire, taking bets on where conventional deterrence by ‘winning’ and a strategy based on direct competition will prove unsustainable first. Reading the current National Defense Strategy, one wonders how “dynamic force employment,” a “lethal, agile, and resilient force posture,” can truly redress the negative secular trends in the strategic environment described by the text. Is resilience compatible with agility? Expanding alliances and deterrence commitments with dynamism? Clawing back dominance across all domains and spectrums of conflict with sustainability? Expanding the competitive space while trying to keep the international order from weakening due to the expanding competition?

[The secretary of defense rightfully reminds us](https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1419671/national-defense-strategy-a-good-fit-for-our-times-mattis-says/source/GovDelivery/) that “no strategy can long survive without necessary funding and the stable, predictable budgets required to defend America in the modern age.” Yet perhaps there is a silver lining in this admonition, since it’s unclear that such a strategy focused on direct competition can be sustained by America’s economy in light of other national priorities. Perhaps it is best we stay emergent and lean, keeping our strategy iterative, and adjusting as the future unfolds. This strategy is a good step forward from the strategic miasma in which we were, but it is unlikely to take us where we can, or necessarily should go.

#### 13] Multiplex world has emerged inevitably without US pursuit.

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The emerging world order is thus not a multipolar world, but a multiplex world.[18](https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/multiplex-world-order/#fn-12859-18) It is a world of multiple modernities, where Western liberal modernity (and its preferred pathways to economic development and governance) is only a part of what is on offer. A multiplex world is like a multiplex cinema—one that gives its audience a choice of various movies, actors, directors, and plots all under the same roof. Trump and Brexit have shown that there are serious variations and differences in the script of world order even within the West—not just between the West and the rest, as is commonly assumed. At the same time, a multiplex world is a world of interconnectedness and interdependence. It is not a singular global order, liberal or otherwise, but a complex of crosscutting, if not competing, international orders and globalisms.

A multiplex world is not defined by the hegemony of any single nation or idea. This does not necessarily mean the United States is in decline—this is still arguable. But it does mean that the United States is no longer in a position to create the rules and dominate the institutions of global governance and world order in the manner it had for much of the post–World War II period. And while elements of the old liberal order will survive, they will have to accommodate new actors and approaches that do not bend to America’s commands and preferences.

It is wrong to say that globalization is over. Instead, in a multiplex world it will take, and is already taking, a different form. Globalization may become less driven by trade and more by developmental concerns. This might give more space to the initiatives of the emerging powers, which tend to focus more on infrastructure than on free trade. Thus, the new globalization could well be led less by the West and more by the East, especially China and India, as it had been for a thousand years before European colonialism. On its own, China may not be able to lead globalization outright, but it has the potential to reshape it with initiatives like the One Belt, One Road strategy and the AIIB.

Moreover, the new globalization will be anchored more by South-South linkages rather than North-South ones. This is already happening: According to the United Nations Development Programme, the South has increased its share of global output from one third in 1990 to almost a half today, and it has increased its share of world merchandise trade from 25 percent in 1980 to 47 percent in 2010.[19](https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/multiplex-world-order/#fn-12859-19) And South-South trade jumped from less than 8 percent of world merchandise trade in 1980 to about 25 percent in 2014.[20](https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/multiplex-world-order/#fn-12859-20) According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, South-South flows in foreign direct investment now constitute over a third of global flows.[21](https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/multiplex-world-order/#fn-12859-21) These trends could reshape globalization.

Due to the prominence of China and other emerging powers, the new globalization might also be more respectful of sovereignty, especially compared to the Western-led globalization during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which has been associated with colonialism and direct and indirect military intervention to secure Western economic and strategic interests (a long list of examples would include the Suez and numerous interventions in Latin America). This is not to say that emerging powers do not use force or violate sovereignty. With its growing overseas investments, China will be tempted to abandon its professed policy of noninterference and to use force or coercion in support of its economic and strategic goals. But in line with the outlooks of the emerging powers, the new globalization is likely to be more economic and less political or ideological (especially compared to the West’s promotion of democracy and human rights).

Many of Trump’s stated policy positions suggest a nationalist, inward-looking U.S. foreign policy. His policies on trade and security are undermining global institutions, such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations, and disrupting climate change negotiations. In many ways, this may push the system of global governance to be even less U.S.

- and Western-centric. But here, too, as noted earlier, the post-war architecture of global governance was already moving in that direction. Global governance has already begun accommodating the growing roles of private bodies (corporations, foundations, etc.), civil society groups, and regional arrangements, thus reducing the position of formal intergovernmental organizations. And the emerging powers have already been clamoring for a greater voice and leadership in existing institutions while also creating new global and regional mechanisms, such as the BRICS-initiated New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (a financial mechanism), the AIIB, China’s OBOR and its Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia mechanism, and India’s own plans for infrastructure development in South Asia, to name a few. And while the demand for global governance will remain, the architecture will continue to fragment and decenter, confirming the onset of the multiplex world.

#### That means trying to fight back ensures counterbalancing and war

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America’s place in the world is experiencing an historic turning point. All the mumbo-jumbo about being the “exceptional” and “indispensable” nation, the natural “leader” of something called the “West,” the guarantor of some kind of international system of “rules” is finally being cast into the dustbin of history.

This moment is not just about leaving the Iran nuclear agreement, or even the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris climate agreement. It is not simply attributable to the unpredictable, childish impulses of the current president. Nor is it the result of Obama’s failure to enforce a red line in Syria, or “leading from behind” in Libya. It is not even about Bush’s invasion of Iraq with the goal of regime change, setting in motion the destruction of what little political stability existed in the Middle East.

Of course, it is about all these decisions. But in every case, those decisions, and even the critics of those decisions, have failed to realize how they have played into, helped cause, and now accelerate a fundamental shift in global realities—the centrifugal redistribution of power and influence in the international system that has brought to an end the “American century.” The United States has become just another power in a system for which it no longer sets or enforces the rules, if it ever really did.

Both political parties fail to cope with this reality. Democrats and liberals insist that Trump’s foreign-policy decisions threaten the “rules-based” international order America built and dominated. A simple change in leadership, they believe, can restore order and America’s primacy. Republicans [demand](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/03/24/john-bolton-wants-regime-change-in-iran-and-so-does-the-cult-that-paid-him/?utm_term=.68aa7b4e3cce) bellicose American assertiveness, believing that force and military strength guarantee that the world will behave. Columnists bewail America’s declining status, [arguing](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trump-has-put-america-in-the-worst-of-all-possible-worlds/2018/05/11/ff68940c-5553-11e8-9c91-7dab596e8252_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.76f57dea9018) that greater iinvestment in allies and diplomacy, combined with military engagement might reverse the tide. Think tanks scurry to [define](https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/credibility-matters-strengthening-american-deterrence-in-an-age-of-geopolit) new national security and military policies that can put America back on top.

This debate is a circular firing squad. Both liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans are struggling to recreate a myth: that the US dominates the world by dint of power, values, wisdom, even God’s decisions. America, and only America, can bring order and security to the world. Any other option spells chaos.

Power Shifts

The latest foreign policy whim—withdrawing from the nuclear agreement with Iran—is the most recent nail in the coffin lid in which the myth is buried. Rather than restore leadership, withdrawing from the agreement simply accelerates the global rebalancing already underway, a tectonic shift that began with the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The signs are everywhere.

In the Middle East, the power shift is palpable. The United States has treated Iran as a pariah since 1979, trying to stuff the ayatollahs back into some imaginary bottle, hoping that they will go away or be overthrown. This approach has failed, and the withdrawal from the nuclear deal will only make that failure more evident. Iran is a regional power, defending its interests, engaging other powers and movements inside and outside the region, such as Russia. US regime change in Iraq not only destabilized the region but helped usher the Iranians into this active regional role. The other influential countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel, will have to deal with this reality.

In addition to these three countries, Russia is also key to regional stability and instability. There’s no way of pushing the Russians out, short of direct conflict. Nor can Turkey be forced to comply with American policy. It is clearly asserting its own interests and influence in three directions at the same time: Central Asia and Russia, Europe, and the Middle East. The invasion of Iraq may have helped open this Pandora’s box. The US is rapidly becoming a marginal player in the chaotic security environment of the Middle East. In Asia, decades of US condemnation and containment of China have failed. How dare China rise? How dare China steal intellectual property, stifle democracy, arm its artificial islands in the South China Sea, develop a powerful military, mess in Africa (complete with a military base in Djibouti), and intrude into Latin America? And yet, to paraphrase Galileo, “they move.” There is a new, global, competitive player in the system, a reality the United States can not contain or reverse. That player is disrupting that lovely system of rules, acting without U.S. permission or approval. It is even creating new international institutions—an infrastructure development bank and a global trading infrastructure programs (the Belt and Road initiative) to which the US is not even a party. The balance has changed, permanently, and the rules are being rewritten, whether the United States likes it or not.

At the end of the Cold War, American power surrounded Russia, coopting its former satellites, provoking a Russian reaction. Today, the Russian government is, poisoning its citizens overseas, arming Assad, intruding on elections globally, stifling dissent and killing dissenters, and rebuilding its military. Confront Russia, condemn Putin, pretend that they are isolated, treat them with contempt and moral judgment, but Putin does not go away. He is asserting his view of Russia’s interests and Russia’s role in the world, like any great power is likely to do. No amount of US pressure, sanctions, or policy is likely to change that reality. Russia is consciously and actively rebalancing the United States, with some success.

American bullying and presidential rhetoric may have played a role in the apparent, but uncertain, willingness of the North Korean regime to put its nuclear program on the table. But if that program disappears, the putative Nobel Peace Prize may actually belong to President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and even Kim Jong Un, for seizing an opportunity. Even that regional balance and the key players are shifting.

Reckoning with the Shift

America has not been able to use its dominant military to prevent this evolution or restore order. Where it has been deployed in large numbers—Iraq and Afghanistan—U.S. military force has failed. War grinds on in Afghanistan with no light suddenly appearing at the end of the tunnel, despite the promises of generations of officers. Rousting the Islamic State from Iraq has not solved the internal problems of that unhappy country, which is still recovering from a US occupation. Special Operations forces in dozens of countries whack at terrorist moles only to find others arising in their place, stimulated by the confrontation. Order is not restored; the American rules are not being obeyed.

If the US fails to read global rebalancing accurately and tries either to bully the rest of the world or to “restore” the liberal internati

onal order, the entire world will find itself at an even more dangerous moment. Bullying will only accelerate the centrifugal trend. Asserting the superiority of an American “order” and American “rules” will no longer persuade other rising powers.

The rules will change with the rebalancing. Eliminating the Trump presidency will not restore the previous order. His actions are not an aberration, but an accelerant, spreading the fires that were already under way.

The challenge is to completely redesign US foreign and national security policy to fit with a world where America is just another power, competing and cooperating for influence. The United States must learn to play well with others in the global sandbox.

#### Sus ev goes both ways AND our ev isn’t from the bejing media which is what the indict is about