# 2NR

# 1NC

## OFF

#### Interpretation – the Aff may not specify a specific form of Intellectual Property AND a specific state

#### Medicines is a generic bare plural

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There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. Consider our examples above. In ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” salva veritate, but in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) we cannot. If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true. However, “tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) does not entail that animals are striped, but ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995).

Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.)

#### It applies to this topic – “Member nations ought to reduce IP for covid – therefore, member nations ought to reduce IP for all” is illogical

#### 1] Limits: There’s inf medicines they could specify, coupled with various types of countries. Kills neg burdens – it’s impossible for me to research every possible combination of the 195 countries and medicines.

#### 2] TVA Solves – just read your aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff. We aren’t stopping them from reading new FWs, mechanisms, or advantages. PICs don’t solve – it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff making it impossible for me to win

#### Voters:

#### 1] Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it

#### 2] Precision o/w – anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### 3] Drop the debater – a) they have a 7-6 rebuttal advantage and the 2ar to make args I can’t respond to, b) it deters future abuse and sets a positive norm.

#### 4] Use competing interps – a) reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since we don’t know your bs meter, b) collapses to competing interps – we justify 2 brightlines under an offense defense paradigm just like 2 interps.

#### 5]No RVIs – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance, b) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms substance after resolving theory

#### 6] Evaluate T before 1AR theory – a) norms – we only have a couple months to set T norms but can set 1AR theory norms anytime, b) magnitude – T affects a larger portion of the debate since the aff advocacy determines every speech after it

## OFF

#### Interpretation and violation: Intellectual property must create limited-term monopolies that bring ideas into the public sphere – data exclusivity does the opposite by preventing the release of information

**Wilkinson 21** (Margaret Ann, Professor of Law at Western University, Canada, Director of the Area of Concentration in Intellectual Property, Information and Technology Law)

\*\* TPM = Technological Property Management

\*\* RMI = Rights Management Information

Wilkinson, Margaret Ann. "Is protection of data through data exclusivity, technological protection measures or rights management information actually intellectual property?". In The Future of Intellectual Property, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021)doi: <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781800885349.00015> EE

4. ALL CHICKENS?

(a) Is the Nature of Data Exclusivity Like an IP Device?

Karin Timmermans, defined data exclusivity, as articulated in TRIPS, as ‘prevent[ ing] regulatory authorities from relying on data submitted by originator companies in order to register a generic product’.96 She characterized data exclusivity as a purely regulatory concept, identifying its target as regulators, not the patent system, but noted a risk existed to ‘monopolize the use of clinical trial data and blur the boundaries between the [IP] regime and regulatory requirements for pharmaceuticals.’97 Duncan Curley and Marleen H.J. van den Horst actually distinguish data exclusivity from IP when they write:

[d]ata exclusivity is not like other [IP] rights, such as patents or copyrights. The latter rights may be enforced privately against infringers in the courts. Data exclusivity is better characterized as a governmental or administrative obligation not to allow data that has been provided to support a registration dossier for a medicine to be used by third parties.98

Charles Clift points out that, unlike patent, data exclusivity does not require registration or other formalities:99 the data acquires protection if it meets the legislated criteria that establishes the data exclusivity.

The Canadian courts, in Apotex v Canada (Health), discussed above, have squarely faced the argument100 that data exclusivity is directed toward ‘commercial considerations, not public safety’.101 The Court ultimately held that data exclusivity is not directed to commercial considerations but rather ‘by granting innovators a period of market protection for eight years, the [legislation] puts in place a regime which provides incentives for innovators to continue their search for “innovative drugs.”’102

In each of the international settings discussed above and shown in Table 9.1, data exclusivity, TPM and RMI are treated as IP in the sense of being placed in texts in an IP context. But can such placement define the nature of the contents? If the various protections so classified as IP within international instruments are found to differ in nature, is it appropriate or useful to try to sort them into subclasses of IP as either 'primary' IP or 'secondary' IP? Historically, the classic devices of patent and copyright have been brought together under the term 'intellectual property' through their similarity in being private monopo-lies created to encourage public dissemination of ideas:um might they thereforebe considered 'primary' and all those created afterwards, but which seem to be related to them, secondary?10` The definitions of 'secondary' posit some greater relationship than simply being 'earlier.' The Merriam Webster defi-nition of 'secondary' includes 'immediately derived from something original, primary or basie'iGs Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionarym definitions include one, tracing back to 1398, that begins with, 'Belonging to the second order in a series related by successive derivation, causation, or dependence; derived from, based on, or dependent on something else which is primary; not original, derivative.

(b) Is the Nature of TPM or RMI Like an IP Device?

Neither the concept of TPM nor that of RMI involves the creation of a monopoly market – in this neither resembles copyright. Neither can be assigned or licensed. Neither TPM nor RMI have term lengths: if TPM or RMI are in place on or in technology then the laws against circumventing them will apply.103

(c) Primary and Secondary

In each of the international settings discussed above and shown in Table 9.1, data exclusivity, TPM and RMI are treated as IP in the sense of being placed in texts in an IP context. But can such placement define the nature of the contents?

If the various protections so classified as IP within international instruments are found to differ in nature, is it appropriate or useful to try to sort them into subclasses of IP as either ‘primary’ IP or ‘secondary’ IP? Historically, the classic devices of patent and copyright have been brought together under the term ‘intellectual property’ through their similarity in being private monopolies created to encourage public dissemination of ideas:104 might they therefore be considered ‘primary’ and all those created afterwards, but which seem to be related to them, secondary?105 The definitions of ‘secondary’ posit some greater relationship than simply being ‘earlier.’ The Merriam Webster definition of ‘secondary’ includes ‘immediately derived from something original, primary or basic’.106 Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary107 definitions include one, tracing back to 1398, that begins with, ‘Belonging to the second order in a series related by successive derivation, causation, or dependence; derived from, based on, or dependent on something else which is primary; not original, derivative.’

As the analyses above have shown, data exclusivity is not dependent upon the presence of patent nor does it take the form of an IP device, for, although it has a limited term, it does not create a monopoly market rather it censors the flow of information for the period of its existence. TPM and RM1, on the other hand, formally show more dependence on the existence of copyright (than data exclusivity does on patent) because their enactment invariably refers to 'works' and other vocabulary familiar in copyright — but, also invariably, TPM and RMI capture far more information than the subject matter of copyright. Like data exclusivity, neither 'PM nor RMI have limited terms. And, again like data exclusivity, TPM and RMI do not create monopoly markets — rather, between them, they shore up existing channels of distribution and make them effective beyond the copyright terms of whatever materials arc flowing (along with un-copyrighted materials and data) within them. All three appear inde-pendent of patent and copyright, rather than secondary to them.

5. NEITHER CHICKENS NOR EGGS: CHALK AND CHEESE

Both patent and copyright are conceptions arising centuries ago – before the notion of the modern corporation emerged in the 19th century.108 Now corporations are legally separate and apart from the individuals who are inventors and authors (see Figure 9.1), the entire context of patent and copyright is changed.109 Nonetheless as Thomas Vinje and Ashwin van Rooijen havewritten,

[t]hrough their limited term and scope of protection, [IP] rights … aim, inter alia, to promote and balance dynamic efficiency (innovation) and static efficiency (price competition in innovative goods) … whereas … limitations to such protection enable competitors and society as a whole to use the innovative subject matter.110

Diagram

Description automatically generated

Inevitably commercially valuable patents and copyrights now come into corporate hands.111 Once IP devices represented a two-way bargain between society (the public), on the one hand, learning from the information disseminated in patents and works, and the inventors and authors (and small businesses operated by other individuals), on the other, who enjoyed the fruits of inventors’ and authors’ ingenuity through control of patents and works for defined periods. The rise of the corporate ‘person’ led to a change from the two-way bargain between authors and the public in the copyright of earlier centuries to three-way bargaining (first, between individual authors and corporate publishing interests, followed by bargaining between the corporate publishers and the public) because authors in the industrial age had to assign their copyrights in toto to corporate publishers in order to get published. Authors lost control over their creations and corporations controlled the interactions with the public, which, in turn, led to the development and spread of non-transferable authors’ moral rights, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.112

Diagram, venn diagram

Description automatically generated The rise of corporations and consequent legal changes also caused non-IP legal devices to appear, such as personal data protection laws regulating the corporate sector (in the interests of protecting the privacy of individuals but balancing that right to privacy with the needs of society)113 and the global movement towards protection of business confidences as part of IP. This latter protection invariably accrues to corporations – which is reflected in the placement of ‘Confidential Information’ in Figure 9.2.

None of these new devices for protecting information (moral rights, protection of confidential information, protection of personal data) has developed in a way that embraces the classic IP tenets: a limited term marketplace monopoly in return for dissemination of information.114 This is equally true of the new developments in protection through data exclusivity, TPM and RMI – despite the fact that all three have found homes in legislation, treaties and trade agreements that label them as IP (see again Table 9.1).

As Lisa Diependale et al note in discussing data exclusivity:

[t]he granting of temporary exclusive user rights to data is a highly remarkable development since, traditionally, data, information, knowledge, have not been considered capable of being property which can be owned… It has long been the case that the form in which data is presented… can be property protectable by copyright, but not the data itself.115

Data exclusivity, TPM and RMI, much like moral rights protection, personal data protection and protection of confidential information, are, when legally enshrined, mechanisms controlling the flow of information in society – keeping information to defined distribution channels. Those who do not have access to those channels legally cannot have legal access to that information. Nor can those within those channels share the information with those not also entitled to use those channels: the law is imposing censoring mechanisms. These are not IP mechanisms because there are no incentives to make information public – rather there are legally imposed barriers to doing so. None of the three shares the characteristics that patent and copyright have in common: none of the three are limited term monopolies designed to bring ideas into the public realm. As is illustrated in Figure 9.2 – and confirmed by Canadian courts in the TREB decision discussed at the outset of this chapter, data should remain in the public, societal realm. Copyright and patent on the other hand, can exist simultaneously in the corporate, individual, and societal realms. Data exclusivity, TPM and RMI, like confidential information, inhabit only the corporate realm.

115

#### Standards:

#### 1. Limits – data exclusivity is straight up just not IP. Their interp allows anything tangentially related to patents like employee noncompetes and medical software DRM which explodes the topic.

## OFF

#### CP: The TRIPs Council should vote to reduce intellectual property protections for [The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan ought to reduce data exclusivity for medicines.], amending TRIPs to mandate the [above text

#### The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan should:

#### --Publicly rescind support for the WTO waiver

#### -- Veto this motion and refuse to comply

#### The remaining member nations should initiate proceedings against Jordan through the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body which ought to find against Jordan. Jordan ought to comply with this ruling.

#### Counterplan competes ---

#### 1] The plan has the “member nations” act individually, while the counterplan is the WTO through the Council and eventually the DSB.

**Collins Dictionary n.d.** “member nations” RJP, DebateDrills https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/member-nations

member nations

The [United](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/unite) [Nations](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/nation) is an [international](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/international) organization [comprised](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/comprise) of about 180 member nations.

Sociology (1995)

At the Nato [summit](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/summit), he called on all the member nations to [pledge](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/pledge) to [spend](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/spend) at least 2% of their [national](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/national) [income](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/income) on [defence](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/defence).

Times, Sunday Times (2015)

The [beneficiaries](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/beneficiary) will not be [limited](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/limit) to EU member nations, but [worldwide](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/worldwide).

Times, Sunday Times (2012)

Definition of 'nation'

nation

(neɪʃən)[Explore 'nation' in the dictionary](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/nation)

COUNTABLE NOUN

A nation is an individual country considered together with its social and political structures.

#### 2] Immediacy

#### Ought and should are used interchangeably.

Anastasia **Koltai 18**. CEO of MyEnglishTeacher, “Difference Between Ought to and Should,” MyEnglishTeacher, September 25, 2018, <https://www.myenglishteacher.eu/blog/difference-between-ought-to-and-should/>, RJP, DebateDrills.

In most cases, SHOULD and OUGHT TO are used interchangeably today. Both SHOULD and OUGHT TO are used to express advice, obligation, or duty.

#### “Should” is immediate

Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling *in praesenti*.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn16)

[CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE]

[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn13) "*Should*" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with *ought* but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an *obligation* *and to be more than advisory*); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, [802 P.2d 813](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813) (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an *obligation* to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) *In praesenti* means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is *presently* or *immediately effective*, as opposed to something that *will* or *would* become effective *in the future [in futurol*]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

#### DSB is underutilized currently but using it for major dispute settlement shores it up---that’s key to combat Chinese IP violations.

James **Bacchus 18**. Member of the [Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies](https://www.cato.org/herbert-stiefel-center-trade-policy-studies), the Distinguished University Professor of Global Affairs and director of the Center for Global Economic and Environmental Opportunity at the University of Central Florida. He was a founding judge and was twice the chairman—the chief judge—of the highest court of world trade, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization in Geneva, Switzerland. “How the World Trade Organization Can Curb China’s Intellectual Property Transgressions,” CATO, March 22, 2018, <https://www.cato.org/blog/how-world-trade-organization-can-curb-chinas-intellectual-property-transgressions>, RJP, DebateDrills.

Quite rightly, President Donald Trump and his Administration are targeting the transgressions of China against US intellectual property rights in their unfolding trade strategy. But why not use the WTO rules that offer a real remedy for the United States without resorting to illegal unilateral action outside the WTO?  
  
Seventeen years after China joined the WTO, China still falls considerably short of fulfilling its WTO obligations to protect intellectual property. About 70 percent of the software in use in China, valued at nearly $8.7 billion, is pirated. The annual cost to the US economy worldwide from pirated software, counterfeit goods, and the theft of trade secrets could be as high as $600 billion, with China at the top of the IP infringement list. China is the source of 87 percent of the counterfeit goods seized upon entry into the United States.  
  
One possible response by the United States is the one the Trump Administration seems to be taking: slapping billions of dollars of tariffs on imports of more than 100 Chinese products through unilateral trade action. Given its protectionist predilections, taking this approach is surely tempting to the Trump Administration. Doing so will, however, harm American workers, businesses, and consumers, and contribute to further turmoil in the global economy.

The results will likely include retaliation by China against the goods and services of American companies and workers; lawful economic sanctions imposed by China on American exports to China after the US lost to China in WTO cases; the hidden tax of higher prices for American consumers; less competitiveness in the US market and in other markets for American companies that depend on Chinese imports as intermediate goods in production; and doubtless still more American and global economic landmines from the downward spiral of tit-for-tat in international trade confrontations.  
  
These tariffs are not only self-defeating and counter-productive; they are also illegal under international law. Where an international dispute falls within the scope of coverage of the WTO treaty, taking unilateral action without first going to WTO dispute settlement for a legal ruling on whether there is a WTO violation is, in and of itself, a violation of the treaty. The WTO treaty establishes mandatory jurisdiction for the WTO dispute settlement system for all treaty-related disputes between and among WTO Members. The WTO Appellate Body has explained, “Article 23.1 of the (WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding) imposes a general obligation to redress a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements only by recourse to the rules and procedures of the DSU, and not through unilateral action.”  
  
Thus, the United States is not permitted by the international rules to which it has long since agreed to be the judge and the jury in its own case. Imposing tariffs on Chinese products without first obtaining a WTO ruling that Chinese actions are inconsistent with China’s WTO obligations is a clear violation by the United States of its WTO obligations to China – as WTO jurists will doubtless rule when China responds to the tariffs by challenging the tariffs in the WTO.  
  
Such a legal loss by the United States, with all its unforeseeable economic and geopolitical consequences, can be avoided while still confronting Chinese IP violations effectively. Before resorting to unilateral action outside the WTO and in violation of international law, the United States should take a closer look at the substantial rights it enjoys under the WTO treaty for protecting US intellectual property against abuse.  
  
Potential remedies in the WTO exist and should not be ignored. These remedies can be enforced through the pressure of WTO economic sanctions. WTO rules do not yet cover all the irritants that must be addressed in US-China trade relations. Even so, instead of just concluding that there are no adequate remedies under WTO rules to help stop IP infringement, the United States should first try to use the remedies in rules we have already negotiated that bind China along with all other WTO Members.  
  
A number of these rules have not yet been tested against China or any other country – which is not proof they will not work. Generally, when tried for the first time, WTO rules have been found to work, and, generally, when China has been found to be acting inconsistently with its WTO obligations, it has complied with WTO rulings. The actual extent of Chinese compliance with WTO judgments can be questioned; in some instances it is seen by some as only “paper compliance.” But whether any one WTO rule can in fact be enforced cannot be known if no WTO Member bothers to try to enforce it.  
  
The WTO rules in the WTO Agreement on the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – the so-called TRIPS Agreement – are unique among WTO rules because they impose affirmative obligations. Yet, this affirmative aspect of WTO intellectual property rules has been largely unexplored in WTO dispute settlement. In particular, WTO Members have so far refrained from challenging other WTO Members for failing to enforce intellectual property rights.  
  
On enforcement, Article 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement imposes an affirmative obligation on all WTO Members: “Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures… are available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.”  
  
Note that this “shall” be done by all WTO Members; it is mandatory for compliance with their WTO obligations. And yet what does this obligation mean by requiring that effective actions against infringements must be “available”? Is this obligation fulfilled by having sound laws on the books, as is generally the case with China? Or must those laws also be enforced effectively in practice, which is often not the case with China?  
  
The Appellate Body has said that “making something *available* means making it ‘obtainable,’ putting it ‘within one’s reach’ and ‘at one’s disposal’ in a way that has sufficient form or efficacy.” Thus, simply having a law on the books is not enough. That law must have real force in the real world of commerce. This ruling by the Appellate Body related to the use of the word “available” in Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement and to a legal claim seeking fair and equitable access to civil judicial procedures. Yet the same reasoning applies equally to the enforcement of substantive rights under Article 41.  
  
In the past, the United States has challenged certain parts of the overall Chinese legal system for intellectual property protection – and successfully – in WTO dispute settlement. Despite its overall concerns about enforcement by China of US intellectual property rights, the United States has not, however, challenged the Chinese system as a whole in the WTO. Instead of indulging in the illegality of unilateral tariffs outside the legal framework of the WTO, the Trump Administration should initiate a comprehensive legal challenge in the WTO, not merely, as before, to the bits and pieces of particular Chinese IP enforcement, but rather *to the entirety of the Chinese IP enforcement system*.  
  
To be sure, a systemic challenge by the United States to the application of all China’s inadequate measures relating to intellectual property protection would put the WTO dispute settlement system to a test. It would, what’s more, put both China and the United States to the test of their commitment to the WTO and, especially, to a rules-based world trading system.  
  
As Trump’s trade lawyers will hasten to say, a systemic IP case against China in the WTO would also involve a perhaps unprecedented amount of fact-gathering. It would necessitate an outpouring of voluminous legal pleadings. It would, furthermore, force the WTO Members and the WTO jurists to face some fundamental questions about the rules-based trading system. Yet it could also provide the basis for fashioning a legal remedy that would in the end be mutually acceptable to both countries, and could therefore help prevent commercial conflict and reduce a significant obstacle to mutually beneficial US-China relations.

#### Stopping tech stealing is key to avoid war

Timothy R. **Heath 18**. RAND Senior Defense and International Analyst, “Avoiding “Avoiding U.S.-China Competition Is Futile: Why the Best Option Is to Manage Strategic Rivalry”; Asia Policy; Vol 13 No 2; April 2018, RJP, DebateDrills

This article argues that the structural drivers of U.S.-China competition are too deep to resolve through cooperative engagement and that policymakers must instead accept the reality of strategic rivalry and aim to manage it at a lower level of intensity. main argument Rising tensions between China and the U.S. have spurred fears that the two countries could end up in conflict or recreate the Cold War. To avoid these outcomes, analysts have proposed ways to defuse competition and promote cooperation. However, because these arguments do not address the structural drivers underpinning U.S.-China competition, such proposals are unlikely to end the rivalry. Conflict is not inevitable, however, and aggressive strategies that unnecessarily aggravate the sources of rivalry are likely to prove dangerously counterproductive. The best option at this point is, paradoxically, for the U.S. to accept the reality of the growing strategic rivalry and manage it at a lower level of intensity. policy implications • Maintaining a technological edge is critical for the U.S. to successfully manage the rivalry with China. Policies should be pursued to ensure that the U.S. continues to attract and nurture the best science and technology talent and retains its status as the global leader in technology. • To compete with China’s narrative about leading regional integration, the U.S. should both put forth a compelling vision for the region that encompasses widely held economic, security, and political values and continue to bolster its diplomatic and military positions in Asia. • To maintain the U.S.-China rivalry at a stable level, policymakers in both countries should prioritize measures that discourage the mobilization of popular sentiment against the other country and encourage cultural exchanges. • U.S.-China competition will likely become increasingly entwined with rivalries between China and U.S. allies and partners such as Japan and India. U.S. policymakers will need to take into account the independent dynamics of those separate rivalries when managing relations with China. The United States and China find themselves increasingly enmeshed in a strategic rivalry, the basic nature of which remains poorly understood in the United States. To be sure, disagreements between the two countries have gained widespread attention. Disputes involving Chinese confrontations with U.S. allies and partners such as Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan have frequently grabbed the headlines. At other times, disagreements over Chinese trade practices and U.S. military activities in the South China Sea have occasioned discord. All these sources of conflict are genuine, but they mask the main drivers of rivalry, which are twofold. First, the United States and China are locked in a contest for primacy—most clearly in Asia and probably globally as well. The United States has been the dominant power, and China seeks to eventually supplant it. By definition, two different states cannot simultaneously share primacy at either the regional or global level. Second, economic, demographic, and military trajectories suggest that China has the potential to contend in a significant way for leadership at the global systemic level. At this level, the most decisive competition will be for technological leadership. Should China supplant the United States as the world’s premier country in terms of technology, its claim to regional and global supremacy will be difficult to deny. And once it has gained that supremacy, China will be well positioned to restructure institutional arrangements to privilege itself and disadvantage the United States. Although this competition is occurring simultaneously at both levels, observers have focused primarily on the struggle for primacy at the regional level and overlooked or downplayed the competition at the global systemic level.1 To counter China’s pursuit of regional primacy, the United States has bolstered its alliances in Asia (albeit inconsistently), expanded diplomatic outreach to China and rising powers in Southeast Asia, and revised its military posture—efforts captured by President Barack Obama’s “rebalance to Asia.” President Donald Trump may have abandoned the rebalance, but many of the related initiatives remain more or less in place.2 China’s challenge at the global systemic level, especially in the field of technology, has received less attention. Confidence in the proven U.S. ability to produce new technologies and facile assumptions about the difficulties China will face in promoting innovation in new industries have led many to dismiss the challenge posed by China. **But the contest for technological leadership is actually even more consequential than that for regional primacy.** Should China succeed in surpassing the United States as the world’s technological leader, U.S. diplomacy and military power will not suffice to hold the line either in Asia or around the globe**.** Under those conditions, countries throughout the world, including U.S. allies in Asia, will be forced to come to terms with the new leading economy. Military power projection could be far less relevant as China moves to consolidate its leading status at both the regional and global levels in such a scenario. Accordingly, although the United States cannot abandon its efforts to bolster its diplomatic and military position in Asia, the country must step up its efforts to strengthen its faltering lead in new technology development. While China clearly grasps the stakes, it is not clear that the United States does. For example, China’s government has promoted R&D into quantum computing. The investment appears to be paying off, as the country has leaped ahead of the United States in developing quantum communications.3 Similarly, the U.S. Congress has proposed to dispense with subsidies for the purchase of electric vehicles, even as China pushes ahead in its plan to become the lead producer of this technology.4 And while the U.S. government seeks to restrict immigration and discourage foreign students from attending U.S. universities (and staying after they receive their advanced training), China has revised its policies to welcome foreigners, prioritizing those with science and technology expertise. Moreover, Chinese investment in basic R&D is rapidly catching up to that of the United States.5 Studies have also noted a shrinking U.S. lead in science and technology as such investment is beginning to bear fruit.6 Similarly, the United States has lost its once-undisputed lead in the per capita number of engineers and scientists.7 Understanding the nature of the U.S.-China rivalry at the regional and global systemic levels, as well as how these two levels interact with one another, is essential if the United States is to successfully manage the challenge posed by China in a manner that avoids war. This study aims to contribute to that understanding. The article is organized into the following sections: u pp. 95–102 provide an overview of the growing rivalry between China and the United States, including a discussion of the meaning and role of strategic rivalry in interstate conflict and a comparison with the U.S.-China rivalry during the Cold War. u pp. 102–4 review the dynamics of the rivalry at the regional systemic level. u pp. 104–10 analyze the dynamics of the rivalry at the global systemic level. u pp. 110–15 examine why proposals to avoid rivalry through cooperation or aggressive competition are unlikely to succeed. u pp. 115–19 discuss the idea of strategic rivalry management and offer recommendations on ways to sustain the rivalry at a lower level of intensity the growing rivalry between the united states and china Strains between China and the United States have deepened in the past few years over a proliferating array of issues. President Trump has stepped up accusations against China of unfair trade practices and inadequate pressure on North Korea. He also provoked controversy early in his term when he floated the idea of increasing official contacts with Taiwan, which Beijing considers a renegade province.8 These disputes add to tensions that had expanded under President Obama, who moved to strengthen U.S. alliances in Asia, promote a regional trade pact, criticize Chinese behavior in the cyber and maritime domains, and shift more military assets to the Asia-Pacific as part of the rebalance to Asia strategy.9 China has in turn dismissed U.S. concerns about the construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, intensified its criticism of U.S. security leadership in Asia, and tightened its grip on disputed maritime territories.10 The baleful state of bilateral relations has spurred plenty of finger-pointing. On the Chinese side, officials denounce the United States’ “Cold War mindset” and warn of conflict if Washington does not adjust its policies.11 A 2015 defense white paper described an “intensifying competition” between the great powers.12 Military officials and many Chinese analysts regard increasing tension between the two countries as unavoidable, although they do not regard war as likely. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deputy chief of staff Qi Jianguo commented that “no conflict and no confrontation does not mean no struggle” between China and the United States.13 According to Chinese official media, polls in China suggest a large majority believes that the United States intends to pursue a containment policy.14 Reflecting this point of view, Niu Xinchun, a scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, argued that the “greatest obstacle to the further integration of emerging countries such as China into the international system comes from the United States.”15 Western officials and commentators tend to blame China for current strains. Senior U.S. leaders have criticized “assertive” Chinese behavior, while some analysts blame Xi Jinping for pushing a more confrontational set of policies.16 Other Western observers worry that a further souring of relations could lead to conflict.17 But even if war remains unlikely, the deepening tensions increase the risks of miscalculation, crises, and potential military clashes involving the world’s two largest powers. Echoing a view widely held among U.S. foreign policy experts and officials, former CIA director General Michael Hayden has warned that mishandling the U.S.-China relationship could be “catastrophic.”18 Rivalry at the Heart of the U.S.-China Relationship This widespread concern reflects a realistic appraisal of the dangers inherent in the U.S.-China relationship. But developing successful policies to manage an increasingly sensitive and complex situation requires an accurate assessment of the phenomenon of interstate rivalry that lies at the heart of that relationship. Rivalry is a concept that, while widely acknowledged, remains poorly understood. To be sure, most experts take for granted the idea that powerful nations compete for status and influence, and they acknowledge the danger posed by a rising power’s challenge to a status quo power. Yet investigation into the phenomenon of rivalry too often stops at these well-trodden findings. Less often discussed are the conclusions regarding the dynamics of rivalry that experts on conflict studies have arrived at within the past few years. Much of this scholarship draws from improvements to the analyses and data regarding interstate crisis and conflict.19 This research has generated useful and interesting insights regarding the start and conclusion of rivalries, crises, and war, although these remain largely unexplored outside academic circles. Analysts have established, for example, that rivalry is perhaps the most important driver of interstate conflict. As defined by political scientists, “rivals” are states that regard each other as “enemies,” sources of real or potential threat, and as competitors. At the root of rivalries thus lie disputes over incompatible goals and perceptions that countries possess both the ability (real or potential) and the intention to harm each other. Wars have historically tended to be fought by pairings of these states and their allies. Rivals have opposed each other in 77% of wars since 1816 and in over 90% of wars since 1945.20 Not only are rivals more likely to fight than non-rivals, but rivals also have a tendency to be recidivists because they are unable to resolve their political differences on the battlefield. Yet that does not always discourage them from trying to do so repeatedly. Rivals that cannot prevail due to parity frequently compete for advantage by building internal strength through arms racing or by leveraging external power through the strengthening of alliances and partnerships. Rivals are also prone to serial militarized crises**.** Mutual perceptions of each other as hostile enemies and the inconclusive outcome of previous militarized disputes typically fuel a pattern of recurrent crises characterized by deepening resentment, distrust, and growing willingness to risk escalation. Studies have also established that the risk of conflict increases sharply after three episodes of militarized crises.21 Rivalries do not progress in a linear direction, however. Their intensity can wax and wane in response to shocks and other important developments. Periods of relative stability can alternate with turbulent periods of tension and conflict. Similarly, cooperative activities can be interspersed with periods of acute tension and hostility. Nevertheless, the link between rivalry, crises, and interstate conflict is pervasive. Drawing from these sources, one can describe the Sino-U.S. relationship as a rivalry characterized as a competition between two major powers over incompatible goals regarding their status, leadership, and influence over a particular region—in this case principally the Asia-Pacific. The dynamics of this type of strategic rivalry differ in significant ways from the far more numerous rivalries over territory that have characterized conflict between so many countries, especially weaker and poorer ones. In contrast with rivalries over territories, strategic rivals do not necessarily share borders, although allies of one power may be engaged in a territorial dispute with the other major power. Strategic rivalries among major powers tend to be especially long-lived, with the average enduring for about 55 years.22 Strategic rivalries are incredibly complex phenomena that include overlapping and often reinforcing layers of disputes over leadership, status, and territory between the principal rivals and their allies. Such rivalries are almost always multilateral affairs that also involve allies and partners, some of which have their own rivalries with the other side. Competition in the economic, political, and military domains can serve as expressions as well as drivers of rivalry, as can sports and cultural competition. Strategic rivalries can be confined to one region, with the basic conflict reducible in some respects to which rival will occupy the top rung of the regional hierarchy. In other cases, however, a rivalry can span regional and global domains either sequentially or simultaneously. The U.S.-China rivalry, for instance, is already both a regional and, to a lesser extent, a global rivalry, but there is still considerable room for competition to expand. The complex and overlapping nature of the disputes makes strategic rivalries extremely crisis- and conflict-prone. Strategic rivalries come in a grim package deal that includes strained and hostile relations, serial crises, and in some cases wars. The comprehensive and multifaceted nature of the disputes also explains why such rivalries have proved so durable and why their wars have been so devastating. Conflict between strategic rivals has historically occasioned the most destructive wars, of which World Wars I and II are the most recent examples. The fact that experts at the time of each historic episode of systemic conflict consistently underestimated the duration or extent of war offers cold comfort to analysts today who seek to predict the trajectory of any conflict that might involve China and the United States. Comparisons of the Current Environment with the U.S.-China Rivalry during the Cold War How did the two countries arrive at this position? The most widely accepted narrative argues that China’s rapid economic growth has provided the resources with which it can press demands on long unresolved issues such as unification with Taiwan. China and the United States may have enjoyed stable relations in the 1980s when they cooperated on a limited basis against the Soviet Union, but that foundation of cooperation eroded considerably once the Soviet bloc dissolved in the early 1990s. Moreover, China’s rapid growth in economic power has given the country fresh resources to press its own demands on the United States and U.S. allies. By 2010, China’s economy had outpaced that of Japan to become the second-largest in the world.23 The persistence of long-standing sources of antagonism, such as the U.S. security partnership with Taiwan, has both reflected and aggravated a broader competition for leadership. For its own reasons, Washington has resisted Beijing’s demands, and the result has been growing fear and distrust.24 The intensifying rivalry between the rising power and the status quo leader is as old as antiquity itself. Indeed, Graham Allison coined the term “Thucydides trap” to describe such a situation, a term that he subsequently applied to the current U.S.-China situation.25 The popular narrative is not entirely incorrect, yet in some ways it remains incomplete. A closer look at history reminds us that antagonism between China and the United States is not unprecedented. In the 1950s and 1960s, the two countries engaged in an intense strategic competition for status and influence in Asia, one that occasionally burned hot, as it did when they clashed on the Korean Peninsula or more indirectly in Vietnam. This Cold War–era rivalry saw a complex network of competing alliances and partnerships, principally in Asia. The United States supported Taiwan and South Korea in bitter disputes with China and its allies, North Korea and the Soviet Union. This rivalry terminated in the 1970s primarily due to Beijing’s decision to counter a growing Soviet menace and the United States’ decision to pursue China as a potential partner for its own rivalry with the Soviet Union. But the existence of a period of intense U.S.-Chinese tension and competition provides a helpful baseline of comparison. What requires explanation is not the fact that the United States and China are engaged in a rivalry but the difference between today’s rivalry and that of the Cold War. What distinguishes the rivalry today from that of the earlier period is both the closer parity in relative power—albeit still more potential than real—between the two countries and the comprehensiveness, complexity, and systemic nature of the disputes between them. Paradoxically, these features make the current rivalry potentially far more threatening to the United States, despite the fact that so far U.S.-China relations have remained peaceful, and even though the U.S. and Chinese militaries fought each other in the Korean War. The dangerous potential of the current rivalry ultimately owes to the risk that China could rise to the position of global system leader and subordinate the United States accordingly. As has happened in previous power transitions, China as a system leader could exploit existing arrangements to its benefit and to the detriment of the outgoing leader, the United States. Due to the enormous rewards that accrue to a systemic leader and the high costs for the state that loses this position**,** struggles for global leadership have historically proved to be especially destructive. The possibility that China and the United States could find themselves in a similar struggle, while unlikely at this point, cannot be ruled out given the reality of the relative decline in U.S. power and the concomitant increase in Chinese comprehensive national power. At the most basic level, this fact may be measured superficially by the U.S. share of world GDP, which eroded from 40% in 1950 to 16% in 2014, adjusted for purchasing power parity. Over the same period, China’s share expanded from around 5% to 17%.26 An important consequence of the narrowing of the gap in comprehensive power has been an intensifying competition for leadership in the international economic and political order. In this way, the popular discussion of the Thucydides trap correctly recognizes the dangers of the U.S.-China competition. This feature contrasts sharply with the previous episode of rivalry. In the 1950s and 1960s, the asymmetry in power meant that the United States and China competed for influence and even clashed militarily in countries along China’s borders, but rarely elsewhere. As a largely rural, impoverished country, China had little stake in the system of global trade promoted by the industrialized West. Excluded from the United Nations, Maoist China also lacked the institutional ability to influence geopolitics and project power much beyond its immediate environs—and even that capability was sorely handicapped. Outside Asia, the United States faced minimal competition from China and generally regarded the Soviet Union as a more pressing threat. By contrast, the current competition features a China fully enmeshed in a political and economic order led by the United States. While generally supportive of this order, China is also seeking to revise aspects of the regional and international order that it regards as obstacles to the country’s revitalization as a great power. The main theater of this competition for influence and leadership is the Asia-Pacific, as it was in the Cold War, but U.S.-China rivalry increasingly is expanding globally. Moreover, unlike the largely military, regional, and ideological Cold War competition, the current contest is far more multifaceted and comprehensive in nature; it includes military, economic, technological, and political dimensions. The following two sections review the state of the competition at both the regional and the global systemic levels. the u.s.-china rivalry at the regional level At the regional level, U.S.-China competition spans the political, economic, and military realms. Politically, the two countries have feuded over the role of liberal values and ideals, a dispute that widened after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. However, the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis elevated the potential threat of conflict between the two countries and may therefore be regarded as the starting point of the current rivalry. Coinciding with impressive gains in China’s economic and military power following two decades of market reforms, the standoff saw Washington and Beijing deploy military assets to back up their respective positions regarding Taiwan’s right to hold a presidential election, elevating the risk of a clash. Since then, the competition for political influence and leadership has intensified. In 2011, the United States announced its rebalance to Asia, which was aimed in part at shoring up U.S. alliances, partnerships, and influence.27 Although on the surface Washington has abandoned the effort, the Trump administration has reintroduced a vision for Asia’s economic and security order premised on values favorable to U.S. interests.28 The 2017 National Security Strategy stated, for example, that the United States upholds a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”29 Beijing, by contrast, has increased its efforts to advance a vision for a regional order premised on Chinese leadership. In recent years, China has promoted major economic and geostrategic initiatives to deepen Asia’s economic integration through the Belt and Road Initiative, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and other initiatives.30 In 2017, China for the first time issued a white paper that outlined the government’s vision for Asia-Pacific security. The paper stated that China takes the advancement of regional prosperity and stability “as its own responsibility.”31 These policies build on directives issued by Xi Jinping in 2013, when he called for policies to bolster China’s attractiveness as a regional leader.32 Economically, the two countries are competing over the evolution of Asia’s economic future—a region anticipated to drive global growth in coming decades. Both countries are also competing to shape the terms of trade. President Trump may have abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but his advisers have advocated other measures to shape favorable trade terms.33 Meanwhile, China has stepped up advocacy of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a proposed free trade agreement for the region that excludes the United States.34 China also has promoted the AIIB, while the United States and Japan continue to instead support the Asian Development Bank.35 Militarily, the growing arms race and the establishment of rival security institutions stand among the most obvious manifestations of an increasing competition in this domain. China and the United States have designed an array of military capabilities and doctrines partly aimed at each other. The PLA has developed weapons systems to counter potential U.S. intervention in any contingency along China’s periphery, which the United States has in turn sought to counter with its own innovations, such as the Joint Operational Access Concept.36 U.S. secretaries of defense Chuck Hagel and Ashton Carter outlined a “third offset” strategy to compete with China and Russia in military technology.37 To promote regional security, the United States has strengthened its military alliances and partnerships, while China has strengthened ties with Russia and argued that regional security is best protected through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, and other Chinese-led institutions. In 2014, Xi indirectly rebuked the United States for seeking to bolster its security leadership in the region, stating that “it is for the people of Asia to uphold the security of Asia.”38

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#### Current WTO legislation on IP rights promotes innovation – the link is that the plan is a reduction of data exclusivity which hedges against generics, thereby increasing the pharma value of the original source.

Ezell et al 4/29 Jaci McDole, Stephen Ezell [Stephen Ezell is vice president, global innovation policy, at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF). He focuses on science and technology policy, international competitiveness, trade, manufacturing, and services issues.] 4/29/21, “Ten Ways IP Has Enabled Innovations That Have Helped Sustain the World Through the Pandemic” Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, <https://itif.org/publications/2021/04/29/ten-ways-ip-has-enabled-innovations-have-helped-sustain-world-through> DD AG

Although anti-IP proponents have attacked biopharmaceutical manufacturers particularly hard, the reality is all IP-protected innovations are at risk if these rights are ignored, or vitiated. Certain arguments have shown a desire for the term “COVID-19 innovations” to include everything from vaccines, therapeutics, diagnostics, and PPE to biotechnology, AI-related data, and educational materials.14 This could potentially open the floodgates to invalidate IP protection on many of the innovations highlighted in this report.

However, much of the current discussion concerning IP focuses almost entirely on litigation fears or R&D incentives. Although R&D is an important aspect of IP, as previously mentioned, these discussions ignore the fact that IP protection can be—and often is—used for other purposes, including generating initial capital to create a company and begin manufacturing and, more importantly, using licensing agreements and IP to track the supply chain and ensure quality control of products.

In 2018, Forbes identified counterfeiting as the largest criminal enterprise in the world.15 The global struggle against counterfeit and non-regulated products, which has hit Latin America particularly hard during the pandemic, proves the need for safety and quality assurance in supply chains.16 Some communities already ravaged by COVID-19 are seeing higher mortality rates related to counterfeit vaccines, therapeutics, PPE, and cleaning and sanitizing products.17

Polish authorities discovered vials of antiwrinkle treatment labeled as COVID-19 vaccines. 18 In Mexico, fake vaccines sold for approximately $1,000 per dose.19 Chinese and South African police seized thousands of counterfeit vaccine doses from warehouses and manufacturing plants.20 Meanwhile, dozens of websites worldwide claiming to sell vaccines or be affiliated with vaccine manufacturers have been taken down.21 But the problem is not limited to biopharmaceuticals. The National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center has recovered $48 million worth of counterfeit PPE and other products.22

Collaborative efforts between law enforcement and manufacturers have kept numerous counterfeits from reaching the population. In countries with strong IP protection, the chances of counterfeit products reaching the market are significantly lower. This is largely because counterfeiting tends to be an IP-related issue, and these countries generally provide superior means of tracking the supply chain through trademarks, trade secrets, and licensing agreements. This enables greater quality control and helps manufacturers maintain a level of public confidence in their products.

By controlling the flow of knowledge associated with IP, voluntary licensing agreements provide innovators with opportunities to collaborate, while ensuring their partners are properly equipped and capable of producing quality products. Throughout this difficult time, the world has seen unexpected collaborations, especially between biopharmaceutical companies worldwide such as Gilead and Eva Pharma or Bharat Biotech and Ocugen, Inc.

Throughout history, and most significantly in the nineteenth century through the widespread development of patent systems and the ensuing Industrial Revolution, IP has contributed toward greater economic growth.23 This is promising news as the world struggles for economic recovery. A 2021 joint study by the EU Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and European Patent Office (EPO) shows a strong, positive correlation between IP rights and economic performance.24 It states that “IP-owning firms represent a significantly larger proportion of economic activity and employment across Europe,” with IP-intensive industries contributing to 45 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) (€6.6 trillion; US$7.9 trillion).25 The study also shows 38.9 percent of employment is directly or indirectly attributed to IP-intensive industries, and IP generates higher wages and greater revenue per employee, especially for small-to-medium-sized enterprises.26 That concords with the United States, where the Department of Commerce estimated that IP-intensive industries support at least 45 million jobs and contribute more than $6 trillion dollars to, or 38.2 percent of, GDP.27

In 2020, global patent filings through the World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO) Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) system reached a record 275,900 filings amidst the pandemic, growing 4 percent from 2019.28 The top-four nations, which accounted for 180,530 of the patent applications, were China, the United States, Japan, and Korea, respectively.29 While several countries saw an increase in patent filings, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia both saw significant increases in the number of annual applications, with the top two filing growths of 73 percent and 26 percent, respectively.30

#### Reductions in protections kill medical innovation, economic growth, and knowledge building for the future

McDole and Ezell 04/29 – Jaci McDole is a senior policy analyst covering intellectual property (IP) and innovation policy at ITIF. She focuses on IP and its correlations to global innovation and trade. Her work includes ITIF’s Innovate4Health Initiatives (2017–2019) and A Covid-19 TRIPS Waiver Makes No More Sense for Copyrights Than It Does for Patents (2021). McDole comes to ITIF from the Institute for Intellectual Property Research, an organization she cofounded to study and further robust global IP policies. Stephen J. Ezell is ITIF vice president for Global Innovation Policy. He focuses on science, technology, and innovation policy as well as international competitiveness and trade policy issues. He is the coauthor of Innovating in a Service Driven Economy: Insights Application, and Practice (Palgrave McMillan, 2015) and Innovation Economics: The Race for Global Advantage (Yale 2012). The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) is an independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan research and educational institute focusing on the intersection of technological innovation and public policy. Recognized by its peers in the think tank community as the global center of excellence for science and technology policy, ITIF’s mission is to formulate and promote policy solutions that accelerate innovation and boost productivity to spur growth, opportunity, and progress; April 29, 2021; “Ten Ways IP Has Enabled Innovations That Have Helped Sustain the World Through the Pandemic”; <https://itif.org/publications/2021/04/29/ten-ways-ip-has-enabled-innovations-have-helped-sustain-world-through> //advay

Innovation can—and does—happen anywhere and at any time. As society ground to a halt in 2020, innovators around the world worked tirelessly to develop treatments, vaccines, and solutions to COVID-19 pandemic-related challenges. From personal protective equipment (PPE) to treatments and vaccines to autonomous delivery robots to remote and social distancing solutions for the workplace, intellectual property (IP) played an indispensable role in enabling research, development, and commercialization of many of the innovations meeting the challenges of the pandemic. IP enables start-ups to gain access to much-needed capital. IP gives innovators the confidence to invest in research and development (R&D) and provides incentives for commercialization. Indeed, it is difficult to innovate without the protection of ideas.

Despite this, some—particularly anti-business IP opponents—have blamed IP rights for a host of problems, including limited access to therapeutics, vaccines, and biotechnology. They offer seemingly simple solutions—weaken or eliminate IP rights—and innovation will flow like manna from heaven. Eliminating IP rights might accelerate the diffusion of some pre-existing innovations, but it would absolutely limit future innovations. Innovators, a bit like Charlie Brown kicking the football held by Lucy, would be wary of trusting governments who might say, “Well, this time we won’t take away your IP rights, so go ahead and invest large amounts of time and money.” Given the nature of COVID-19, nations around the world cannot afford to take this risk. Future pandemics and other challenges for which we will need to rely on IP-protected innovations to overcome are near certain to arise.

Moreover, the blame game usually ignores the real, underlying problems. For access to innovations to fight COVID-19, especially biotechnology, vaccines, and therapeutics, the underlying problems are regulatory delays and a lack of adequate and appropriate manufacturing infrastructure.1 The lack of infrastructure has resulted in supply chain bottlenecks in places where few are currently equipped to handle the manufacturing requirements.2 Meanwhile, regulatory delays have prevented vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics from entering certain markets.3

To better understand the role of IP in enabling solutions related to COVID-19 challenges, this report relies on 10 case studies drawn from a variety of nations, technical fields, and firm sizes. This is but a handful of the thousands of IP-enabled innovations that have sprung forth over the past year in an effort to meet the tremendous challenges brought on by COVID-19 globally. From a paramedic in Mexico to a veteran vaccine manufacturing company in India and a tech start-up in Estonia to a U.S.-based company offering workplace Internet of Things (IoT) services, small and large organizations alike are working to combat the pandemic. Some have adapted existing innovations, while others have developed novel solutions. All are working to take the world out of the pandemic and into the future.

The case studies are:

Bharat Biotech: Covaxin

Gilead: Remdesivir

LumiraDX: SARS-COV-2 Antigen POC Test

Teal Bio: Teal Bio Respirator

XE Ingeniería Médica: CápsulaXE

Surgical Theater: Precision VR

Tombot: Jennie

Starship Technologies: Autonomous Delivery Robots

Triax Technologies: Proximity Trace

Zoom: Video Conferencing

As the case studies show, IP is critical to enabling innovation. Policymakers around the world need to ensure robust IP protections are—and remain—in place if they wish their citizens to have safe and innovative solutions to health care, workplace, and societal challenges in the future.

THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN R&D-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES

Intangible assets, such as IP rights, comprised approximately 84 percent of the corporate value of S&P 500 companies in 2018.4 For start-ups, this means much of the capital needed to operate is directly related to IP (see Teal Bio case study for more on this). IP also plays an especially important role for R&D-intensive industries.5

To take the example of the biopharmaceutical industry, it is characterized by high-risk, time-consuming, and expensive processes including basic research, drug discovery, pre-clinical trials, three stages of human clinical trials, regulatory review, and post-approval research and safety monitoring. The drug development process spans an average of 11.5 to 15 years.6 For every 5,000 to 10,000 compounds screened on average during the basic research and drug discovery phases, approximately 250 molecular compounds, or 2.5 to 5 percent, make it to preclinical testing. Out of those 250 molecular compounds, approximately 5 make it to clinical testing. That is, 0.05 to 0.1 percent of drugs make it from basic research into clinical trials. Of those rare few which make it to clinical testing, less than 12 percent are ultimately approved for use by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).7

In addition to high risks, drug development is costly, and the expenses associated with it are increasing. A 2019 report by the Deloitte Center for Health Solutions concluded that since 2010 the average cost of bringing a new drug to market increased by 67 percent.8 Numerous studies have examined the substantial cost of biopharmaceutical R&D, and most confirm investing in new drug development requires $1.7 billion to $3.2 billion up front on average.9 A 2018 study by the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness found similar risks and figures for vaccines, stating, “In general, vaccine development from discovery to licensure can cost billions of dollars, can take over 10 years to complete, and has an average 94 percent chance of failure.”10 Yet, a 2010 study found that 80 percent of new drugs—that is, the less than 12 percent ultimately approved by the FDA—made less than their capitalized R&D costs.11 Another study found that only 1 percent (maybe three new drugs each year) of the most successful 10 percent of FDA approved drugs generate half of the profits of the entire drug industry.12

#### To say the least, biopharmaceutical R&D represents a high-stakes, long-term endeavor with precarious returns. Without IP protection, biopharmaceutical manufacturers have little incentive to take the risks necessary to engage in the R&D process because they would be unable to recoup even a fraction of the costs incurred. Diminished revenues also result in reduced investments in R&D which means less research into cancer drugs, Alzheimer cures, vaccines, and more. IP rights give life-sciences enterprises the confidence needed to undertake the difficult, risky, and expensive process of life-sciences innovation secure in the knowledge they can capture a share of the gains from their innovations, which is indispensable not only to recouping the up-front R&D costs of a given drug, but which can generate sufficient profits to enable investment in future generations of biomedical innovation and thus perpetuate the enterprises into the future.13Future pandemics are more likely and more deadly which makes innovation key to stop extinction

Ceballos 5/27 Gerardo Ceballos [PhD, Dr Gerardo Ceballos is an ecologist and conservationist at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. He is particularly recognized for his influential work on global patterns of distribution of diversity, endemism, and extinction risk in vertebrates. He is also well-known for his contribution to understanding the magnitude and impacts of the sixth mass extinction.], 5/27/21, “THE SIXTH MASS EXTINCTION AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY”, Population Matters, <https://populationmatters.org/news/2021/05/sixth-mass-extinction-and-future-humanity> DD AG

Somewhere, sometime in late 2019, a coronavirus from a wild species, perhaps a bat or a pangolin, infected a human in China. This could have been an obscure event, lost without trace in the annals of history, as it is very likely this has occurred many times in the last centuries. But this particular event was somehow different. The coronavirus became an epidemic first and a pandemic later. Covid-19 became the worst pandemic since the Spanish flu in 1918. The horrific human suffering it has caused, and its economic, social and political impacts, are still unraveling.

The reason Covid-19 and more than forty other very dangerous viruses, such as Lassa fever, HIV and Ebola, have jumped from wild animals to humans in the last four decades is the destruction of natural environments and the trafficking and consumption of wild animals.

The wildlife trade is to satisfy the insatiable and extravagant demand for these species in the Asian market, in countries such as China, Vietnam and Indonesia. The illegal wildlife trade is a gigantic business. It is as lucrative as the drug trade, but without the legal implications. The immense appetite of China and other Asian societies for exotic animals has promoted exponential growth in trade and profits. Wild and domestic animals sold in “wet markets” are kept in unsanitary and unethical conditions. There, feces, urine and food waste from cages at the top spill into cages at the bottom, creating the perfect conditions for viruses to leap from wild animals to domestic animals and humans. Thousands of wildlife species or their products are traded annually.

Wildlife trade is one of several human impacts, including habitat loss and fragmentation, pollution, toxification and invasive species, that have caused the extinction of thousands of species and threaten many more. Indeed, most people are unaware that the current extinction crisis is unprecedented in human history. Extinction occurs when the last individual of a species dies. The UN recently estimated that one million species, such as the panda, the orangutan and the Sumatran rhino, are at risk of extinction.

The second finding is that population extinctions, which are the prelude to species extinctions, are occurring at very fast rates (Ceballos et al., 2017). Around 32 percent of a sample of 27,000 species have declining populations and have experienced massive geographic range contractions. Population extinctions are a very severe and widespread environmental problem which we have called “Biological Annihilation”.

Finally, our third finding indicates that the magnitude of the extinction crisis is underestimated because there are thousands of species on the brink of extinction (Ceballos et al., 2020). Those species will likely become extinct in the near future unless a massive conservation effort is launched soon.

Many times, people have asked me why we should care about the loss of a species. There are ethical, moral, philosophical, religious and other reasons to be concerned. But perhaps the one that is most tangible for most people is the loss of ecosystem services, which are the benefits that humans derive from the proper function of nature. Ecosystem services include the proper mix of gases in the atmosphere that support life on Earth, the quantity and quality of water, pollination of wild crops and plants, fertilization of the soil, and protection against emerging pests and diseases, among many others. Every time a species is lost, ecosystem services are likely to erode and human well-being is reduced.

The loss of so many ecosystems and species is pushing us towards the point of collapse of civilization. The good news is that there is still time to reduce the current extinction crisis. The species and ecosystems that we manage to save in the next 10 – 15 years will define the future of biodiversity and civilization. What it is at stake is the future of mankind.

## Case

### Scenario

#### ] no link to econ collapse – data exclusivity just makes it harder for generics to exist but that’s not a reason they’re entire econ would collapse

#### ] no link – jordan doesn’t have that many patents so the plan can’t solve data exclusitvity – we read blue

1AC Armouti and Nsour 16 “Data Exclusivity for Pharmaceuticals: Was It the Best Choice for Jordan Under the U.S.- Jordan Free Trade Agreement?” WAEL ARMOUTI [LL.M in intellectual property law, Faculty of Law, the University of Jordan (Amman, Jordan), Legal Affairs Director at Jordan Food and Drug Administration (JFDA).] AND MOHAMMAD F.A. NSOUR [Lawyer and associate law professor at the University of Jordan.] OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 17, 259 2016] <https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/20019/Nsour.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> SM

The Jordanian pharmaceutical industry is considered to be a generic industry, one which does not involve innovation products. Few Jordanian companies have patents in this field, and the existing patents are mostly related to new techniques of old chemical entities, rather than to a new chemical entity. This lack of patents issued on the basis of innovation is due to insufficient financial resources for conducting the clinical trials that are required for new chemical entities, and also due to there being no foreign investment to support the local research and development or to strengthen the companies’ infrastructure.274

#### ] turn – data exclusitivity creates an incentive to innovate since it would provide a large econ gain through seperation of generics – oweighs the aff since w/o incentives to innovate generics can’t exist

#### ] no link to impact – their cards are bullish – even if countries need jordan for econ support that doesn’t mean they rely on them – salih specifically is about current imported jordan drugs which also means that current imports checks

#### ] evergreening alt causes this – even if generics can’t use lab data, countries can extend pharma measures T --- the only major study confirms

Arnold Ventures 20 9-24-2020 "'Evergreening' Stunts Competition, Costs Consumers and Taxpayers" <https://www.arnoldventures.org/stories/evergreening-stunts-competition-costs-consumers-and-taxpayers/> (Arnold Ventures is focused on evidence-based giving in a wide range of categories including: criminal justice, education, health care, and public finance)//Elmer

In 2011, Elsa Dixler was diagnosed with multiple myeloma. That August, she was prescribed Revlimid, a drug that had come on the market six years earlier. By January 2012, she went into full remission, where she has remained since. So long as Revlimid retains its effectiveness, she will take it for the rest of her life. “I was able to go back to work, see my daughter receive her Ph.D, and have a pretty normal life,” said Dixler, a Brooklyn resident who is now 74. “So, on the one hand, I feel enormously grateful.” But Dixler’s normal life has come at a steep financial cost to her family and to taxpayers. Revlimid typically costs nearly $800 per capsule, and Dixler takes one capsule per day for 21 days, then seven days off, and then resumes her daily dose, requiring 273 capsules a year. Since retiring from The New York Times at the end of 2017, she has been on Medicare. Dixler entered the Part D coverage gap (known as the donut hole) “within minutes,” she said. She estimates that adding her deductible, her copayment of $12,000, and what her Part D insurance provider pays totals approximately $197,500 a year. Revlimid should have **been subject to competition** from generic drug makers starting in 2009, bringing down its cost by many orders of magnitude. But by obtaining **27 additional patents**, eight orphan drug exclusivities and 91 total additional protections from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) since Revlimid’s introduction in 2005, its manufacturer, Celgene, has extended the drug’s **monopoly** **period** **by 18 years** — through March 8, 2028. “I cannot fathom the immorality of a business that relies on **squeezing people with cancer**,” Dixler said, noting her astonishment that Revlimid has obtained orphan drug protections when it treats a disease that is not rare and does not serve a very limited population. She also observed that Revlimid’s underlying drug is thalidomide, which has been around for decades. “They didn’t invent a new drug, rather, they found a new use for it,” she said. “The cost of Revlimid has imposed constraints on our retirement,” Dixler said, “but when I hear other people’s stories, I feel very lucky. A lot of people have been devastated financially.” Revlimid is a case study in a process known as “evergreening” — artificially sustaining a monopoly for years and even decades by manipulating intellectual property laws and regulations. Evergreening is most commonly used with blockbuster drugs generating the highest prices and profits. **Of the roughly 100 best-selling drugs, more than 70 percent have extended their protection** from competition at least once. More than half have extended the protection cliff multiple times. The true scope and cost of evergreening has been brought into sharper focus by a groundbreaking, publicly available, comprehensive database released Thursday by the Center for Innovation at the University of California Hastings College of Law and supported by Arnold Ventures. **The Evergreen Drug Patent Search is the first database to exhaustively track the patent protections filed by pharmaceutical companies**. Using data from 2005 to 2018 on brand-name drugs listed in the FDA’s Orange Book — a listing of relevant patents for brand name, small molecule drugs — it demonstrates the full extent of how evergreening has been used by Big Pharma to prolong patents and delay the entry of generic, lower-cost competition. “Competition is the backbone of the U.S. economy,” said Professor Robin Feldman, Director of the UC Hastings Center for Innovation, who spearheaded the database’s creation. “But it’s not what we’re seeing in the drug industry. “With evergreening, pharmaceutical companies repeatedly make slight, often trivial, modifications to drugs, dosage levels, delivery systems or other aspects to obtain new protections,” she said. “They pile these protections on over and over again — so often that 78 percent of the drugs associated with new patents were not new drugs coming on the market, but existing drugs.” Competition is the backbone of the U.S. economy. But it’s not what we’re **seeing in the drug industry**. Professor Robin Feldman Director of the UC Hastings Center for Innovation In recent decades, evergreening has systematically undermined the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, which created the generic drug industry. Commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, it established a new patent and market exclusivity regime in which new drugs are protected from competition for a specified period of time sufficient to allow manufacturers to recoup their investments and earn a reasonable profit. When that protection expires, generic drug makers are incentivized to enter the market through a streamlined regulatory and judicial process. Drug prices typically drop by as much as 20 percent when the first generic enters the market**, and with more than one generic manufacturer, prices can plummet by 80 to 85 percent**. “Hatch-Waxman created an innovation/reward/competition cycle, but it’s been distorted into an innovation/reward/more reward cycle,” Feldman said. “To paraphrase something a former FDA commissioner once said, the greatest creativity in Big Pharma should come from the research and development departments, not from the legal and marketing departments.” Feldman led the development of the Evergreen Drug Patent Search in response to repeated requests from Congressional committees, members of Congress, state regulators and journalists for information about specific drugs and companies. “We want to make it so anyone can have the question about drug protections at their fingertips whenever they want,” Feldman said. “It’s designed to be easy and user-friendly, and to enhance public understanding about how competition may be limited rather than enhanced through the drug patent system.” The **database** was **created through** a painstaking process of **combing** through **160,000 data points** **to examine every instance where a pharmaceutical company added a new drug patent or exclusivity**. “Most of it was done by hand,” Feldman said, “with multiple people reviewing it at every stage. And along the way we repeatedly made conservative choices. **We erred on the side of underrepresenting the evergreen gain** to be sure we were as fair and reasonable as possible.” Among the 2,065 drugs covered in Evergreen Drug Patent Search, there are many examples of the evergreening strategy used by pharma to delay the entry of competition, especially generics, often for widely prescribed drugs, including those used to treat heartburn, chronic pain, and opioid addiction. Nexium Before Nexium, there was Prilosec, a popular drug to treat gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD). But its patent exclusivity was due to expire in April 2001. In the late 1990s, with a precipitous drop in revenue looming, Prilosec’s manufacturer, AstraZeneca, decided to develop a replacement drug. Using “one-half of the Prilosec molecule — an isomer of it,” the result was Nexium, which received approval in February 2001. Essentially an evergreened version of Prilosec, Nexium’s exclusivity was then extended by more than 15 years, as AstraZeneca received 97 protections stemming from 16 patents. These included revised dosages, compounds, and formulations. Feldman said that tinkering changes such as Nexium’s do not involve the substantial research and development required for a new drug, nor do they constitute true innovations, yet for a decade and a half, patients and taxpayers were forced to pay far more than was warranted for GERD relief. In fact, in 2016 — one year after patent exclusivity expired — Nexium still topped all drugs in Medicare Part D spending, totaling $1.06 billion. Suboxone Use of this combination of buprenorphine and naloxone for treating opioid addiction has exploded in the wake of the opioid epidemic. Since its approval, Suboxone’s manufacturer, Reckitt Benckiser (now operating as Indivior), extended its protection cliff eight times, gaining nearly two extra decades of exclusivity through early 2030. The drug maker gained six patents for creating a film version of the drug — notably around the time protection was expiring for its tablet version. (The therapeutic benefits of the film and tablet are identical.) An earlier version of Suboxone also obtained an orphan drug designation, despite an opioid epidemic that has expanded Suboxone’s customer base to millions of potential customers. Suboxone generates more than $1 billion in annual revenue and ranks among the 40 top-selling drugs in the U.S. Truvada When Truvada, commonly referred to as PrEP, was approved in 2004, this HIV-prevention drug was a breakthrough. But 16 years later — and 14 years after its original exclusivity was to expire — it retains its monopoly status. Truvada’s manufacturer, Gilead, has received 15 patents and 120 protections since it came on the market, extending its exclusivity for more than 17 years, until July 3, 2024. In countries where generic Truvada is available, PrEP costs $100 or less per month, compared to $1,600 to $2,000 in the U.S. As a result, Truvada is unaffordable to many people **who need protection from HIV**. Barred from access, they are left vulnerable to infection. “We’re establishing a precedent that a pharmaceutical company can charge whatever it wants even as it allows an epidemic to continue, and the government refuses to intervene,” said James Krellenstein, co-founder of the group PrEP4All. “That should scare every American. If it’s HIV today, it will be another disease tomorrow.” EpiPen First approved in 1987, the EpiPen has saved the lives of countless numbers of people with deadly allergies. But it is protected from competition until 2025 — 38 years after its introduction — because its owner, Mylan, has filed five patents, four since 2010, all involving tweaks to the automatic injector. The actual medication used, epinephrine, has existed for more than a century — the innovation here is in the delivery device. Because these small changes to the injector have maintained its monopoly for so long, the cost of an EpiPen package (containing two injectors) has risen from $94 when Mylan purchased the device to between $650 and $700 today. For many people, especially parents of children with severe reactions to common allergens like peanuts, EpiPen’s increasing price tag imposes an onerous financial burden. What Can Be Done As the Evergreen Drug Patent Search makes clear, the positive impact of Hatch-Waxman has been steadily and severely eroded by a regulatory system vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated forms of manipulation. “You might say that the patent and regulatory system has been weaponized,” Feldman said. “When billions of dollars are at stake, there’s a lot of money available to look for ways to exploit the legal system. And companies have become adept at this, as our work has found.” There are several key steps that Congress could take to restore the balance between innovation and competition that is the key to a successful prescription drug regulatory process. These may include: Imposing restrictions on the number of patents that prescription drug manufacturers can defend in court to discourage the use of anticompetitive patent thickets. Limiting the patentability of so-called secondary patents — which don’t improve the safety or efficacy of a drug — through patent and exclusivity reform. Reforming the 180-day generic exclusivity, which can currently be abused to block other competitive therapies. “**The Evergreen Drug Patent Search provides the publicly available, evidence-based foundation that defines the extent of the problem**, and it can be used to develop policies that solve the problem of anti-competitive patent abuses,” said Kristi Martin, VP of Drug Pricing at Arnold Ventures. “Our incentives have gotten out of whack,” Martin said. “The luxury of monopoly protection should only be provided to innovations that provide meaningful benefits in saving lives, curing illnesses, or improving the quality of people’s lives. It should not be provided to those gaming the system. If we can change that, we can save consumers, employers, and taxpayers many billions of dollars while increasing the incentives for pharmaceutical companies to achieve breakthroughs."

#### ] Middle East instability is inevitable---the aff can’t resolve structural issues that guarantee continued violence

Greg R. Lawson 3-19, 2015, Statehouse Liaison and Policy Analyst with the Buckeye Institute, “Divide and Conquer: Richelieu's Playbook for the Middle East,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/divide-conquer-richelieus-playbook-the-middle-east-12441?page=2

Today, the Middle East no longer has any order. It now passes for conventional wisdom that the post-World War I outline of the modern Middle East created out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire **is no more than an expression on the map**. **A new order must** eventually **develop** in the region **in order for the horrors that plague the nightly news to** eventually **be stopped**. Yet as with the Thirty Years' War, it is unlikely that this eventual outcome can be achieved until the region endures its own **long, hard slog through a civilizational, inter-communal, and geopolitical conflict**. If the Europe we begin to recognize after 1648 could not have existed without the tragedy of the Thirty Years' War, why do so many think the Middle East can somehow avoid a similar trajectory on its path to modernity? Hope cannot substitute for strategy. If a situation is tragic, it is best to honestly acknowledge this and adapt appropriately.

If one adapts Richelieu’s methods to American policy in the modern Middle East, one can begin to see the outlines of a coherent strategy emerge if one were to substitute the Middle East for Germany in a Thirty Years' War-type narrative. Though this goes against the grain of conventional wisdom, a brief analysis of what passes for such wisdom raises significant doubts as to whether it is really “wisdom” rather than mere conventional thinking. Conventional wisdom usually holds that the United States must remain actively engaged in everything in the Middle East, from fighting the Islamic State to the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process.

Richard Haas argues that the prevention of WMD proliferation, stable Middle Eastern oil flows, and, of course, counter-terrorism against the Islamic State are all critical American interests. While this makes some sense, even Haas admits that **the Middle East is now likely a problem to be managed and** not solved. Yet, this very conventional wisdom seems unable to take into cognisance the key triad of challenges threatening to finally undo Pax Americana: America’s domestic challenges, the rise of Great Power competition and the looming establishment of a Sino-Russian axis, and **the general instability of the regional order in the greater Middle East, a region** that Zbigniew **Brzezinski has termed the “**Global Balkans**.”**

The sine qua non of American geopolitical strategy since the end of the Second World War through 2003 was to embrace stability and order whether through the containment of its ideological opponent during the Cold War or through attempting to lock in existing gains. The decision to invade Iraq in 2003 by the Bush administration and topple the regime of Saddam Hussein upended that strategy. The effort to “end tyranny” in the world was a fundamentally destabilizing action. The irony is that America has been unable to stomach the consequences that flowed from that decision.

The naïve view that a functional and, at least semi-Western, democracy would take root in the heart of Mesopotamia was alluring to many (this author initially included). However, **illusions turned into nightmares. Arab Springs turned into Thirty Years' Wars, chemical attacks, decapitations, and burning people alive in cages.**

### 1NC – Turn

#### Second scenario is cyber attacks

#### Only instability in the Middle East can prevent Russian economic implosion

Baev 15 (Pavel K. Baev is a Research Director and Professor at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). He is also a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for the United States and Europe (CUSE) at the Brookings Institutions, Washington DC, and a Senior Associate Fellow at the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Paris. 24 April 2015. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/pavel-k-baev/russia-is-spoiling-for-fight-in-middle-east>)

The first is the dramatic (and, for Russia, devastating) decline in oil prices, which has been caused by profound shifts in global energy markets. This trend might only be reversed rapidly by a further spike of instability in the Middle East, which would disrupt supplies coming from the Persian Gulf. The 30-40% price drop that occurred in the second half of 2014 happened while three major suppliers—Iraq, Iran, and Libya—were already performing far below capacity. It is reasonable to assume that a normalisation of production in any of them would push the benchmark price even lower. Russia may thus find it necessary to prevent progress in conflict resolution (and, hence, stabilisation in one or more of these three major producers). It could mean the difference between severe economic crisis and implosion.

#### They’ll use cyberattacks, which cause extinction

Perkovich 18 [George, Olivier and Nomellini chair and vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Really? We’re Gonna Nuke Russia for a Cyberattack?” 1/18, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/18/donald-trump-russia-nuclear-cyberattack-216477>]

For three reasons, the Trump administration would be wise to reconsider and more carefully calibrate the circumstances under which it would initiate nuclear war. The first reason has to do with the fact that nuclear war would be much more devastating to the United States than would any conceivable cyberattack. Russia and China appear to be the most likely adversaries that in the near term might be able to use cyberweapons to disable significant segments of the U.S. electricity system. Indeed, Russian attackers already did so to Ukraine, in a December 2015 operation that shut down power for approximately 230,000 Ukrainians for up to six hours. That attack, Wired magazine reported last June, may have been a dress rehearsal for a future assault on the U.S. power grid. Now imagine it was much worse, and all of Ukraine was without electricity for weeks. If Ukraine possessed nuclear weapons, would any sane person in Washington have recommended that Ukrainian leaders retaliate by nuking Russia, and thereby inviting Russian nuclear attacks on Ukraine? The cure would have been much worse than the disease. The same strategic logic applies to the United States. A cyberattack on U.S. civilian infrastructure could be enormously disruptive and costly. Depending on the scale and durability of outages of electricity, piped water, etc., the effect could be like what Puerto Rico is experiencing due to Hurricane Maria (though without the collapsed roadways and buildings). But, if a U.S. president initiated nuclear war in response to a massive cyberattack*, Russia and China would be expected to retaliate with nuclear weapons.* This could leave the mainland U.S. in the condition of Puerto Rico *minus all the people, buildings and wildlife*. Russia and China would suffer gravely in the process, but the U.S. would lose much more than it would gain by moving from cyberwar to nuclear war. Here’s the second reason it’s crazy to retaliate with nuclear weapons: The United States’ conventional and cyber capabilities combined are greater than its adversaries’. Thus, the United States for decades has wanted to keep conflicts from going nuclear, where it would be harder if not impossible to “win.” The U.S. continues to develop and deploy its own cyber capabilities to disrupt adversaries’ civilian and dual-use infrastructure—energy, water, finance, etc. This helps deter adversaries from initiating cyberwarfare on a large scale, and, if deterrence fails, to enable *countervailing cyberattacks and perhaps conventional warfare*.