# 2NR

No perf con:

1] negation theory – the burden of the neg is to prove the aff is a bad idea

2] they link harder – the security k links to proactive action, i.e. terrorists are going to nuke us so we should intervene but saying that action is bad and that it in turn would hurt us isn’t securitization in that it prevents proactive action

3] condo takes this out – we should get to contest the aff from multiple actions which is good for the activity

# 1NC

## OFF

#### Interp – if the aff defends banning a specific form of appropriation of outer space by private entities, they must defend a total ban of that form of appropriation.

#### Unjust means contrary to law – only ban changes the law

The Law Dictionary, ND, Def of Unjust, URL: <https://thelawdictionary.org/unjust/#:~:text=Contrary%20to%20right%20and%20justice,conduct%20furnished%20by%20the%20laws>, KR

Contrary to right and justice, or to the enjoyment of his rights by another, or to the standards of conduct furnished by the laws.

#### Unjust means opposed to law.

FreeDictionary [TheFreeDictionary, Unjust, xx-xx-xxxx,https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Unjust, 12-17-2021 amrita]

**UNJUST.** That which is done against the perfect rights of another; that which **is against the established law**; that which is opposed to a law which is the test of right and wrong.

#### Restrict means:

Dictionary.com, “restrict”, URL: <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/restriction>, KR

something that restricts; a restrictive condition or regulation; limitation.

#### And to limit means:

Merriam Webster, “limit”, URL: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/limits>, KR

to restrict the bounds or limits of

#### Violation – they restrict asteroid mining.

#### Standards –

#### 1] Ground – their model of debate allows spiking out of neg disads and counterplans arbitrarily because you merely defend a “restriction” of actions of private entities into space mining rather than a total ban

#### 2] Limits – there are an infinite number of degrees in which you could restrict different forms of asteroid mining which explodes neg prep and makes cutting stable negative positions impossible.

#### Drop the debater – T indicts their entire advocacy and comes before 1AR theory because it affected the entire debate after it

#### No RVIs – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance,

Competing interps: a) race to the bottom b) arbitrary and judge intervention c) collapses to offene and defense

## OFF

#### Two links:

#### 1] The characterization of space as conflict-prone zone encourages the securitization of space – that hyperintensities conflict by driving arms races and increasing military investment

Peoples, 2011, aylor Francis, “The Securitization of Outer Space: Challenges for Arms Control”, Columba holds a BA in History, Politics and Social Studies from the University of Limerick, Ireland, and MScEcon & PhD qualifications in International Politics, URL: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2011.556846?scroll=top&needAccess=true>, KR

It is worth noting that the securitization of outer space – in terms of the identification of space with security – is, in itself, not a novel phenomenon or development. The extent to which ostensibly civil uses of outer space have been linked implicitly and explicitly to national security functions historically – or, as in the case of the space race between the United States and Soviet Union, have acted as a surrogate for direct military engagement – is well documented.50 Similarly, the characteriz- ation of the Sputnik launch in 1957 as placing the United States ‘in the greatest danger in its history’ suggests that the representation of space technologies as poten- tial existential threats is not entirely new either.51 What is of significance, though, is the intensification, expansion and entrenchment of securitizing moves as features of national space policies. The Space Security Index report Space Security 2009, in its overview of national policies, explicitly noted that, on the one hand, ‘National space policies consistently emphasize international cooperation and the peaceful uses of outer space’, but on the other hand that there is a ‘Growing focus within national policies on the security uses of outer space’.52 The report cited as evidence: Japan’s 2008 space law framework, which lifted its previous ban on national security and military space activities; China’s 2006 National Defense White Paper, which identifies national security as principle of China’s emerging space programme; France’s White Paper on Defense and National Security, which calls for an overhaul of its national space strategy; and the renewed priority on ‘space for security’ within EU policy.53

Within recent United States space policy securitization has been most noticeably prevalent and institutionalized, which is significant given the continued preeminence of the United States as a space power. As is noted in one recent assessment, around 50 countries, intergovernmental consortia, and nongovernmental organizations have at least one satellite in space, ‘mostly for reasons that have more to do with economic performance and Earth monitoring than with military applications.’54 However, in spite of the increasing diversity of interests in space and the increased range of func- tions space-based technologies now fulfil, the United States defence budget still remains the single largest source of investment in space technologies. In part this sus- tained investment arises out of American deployment and development of missile defence systems. Space and missile defences have been intimately connected issues historically and there are obvious technological overlaps between the two. Missile defence systems, including the ground-based system (Ground-Based Mid- course Defence or GMD) currently deployed by the United States at sites in Alaska and California, are dependent on satellite and space-based tracking technol- ogies to detect and track incoming missiles, and there is a possibility that the future connection between missile defence and space will be even stronger if current plans for missile defence are pursued to their fullest extent. Two such systems are already in the early stage of their development: the Space-Based Laser (SBL), which, like the Strategic Defence Initiative or Star Wars proposals of the 1980s, envisages using lasers to shoot down missiles in flight;55 and the ‘NFIRE’ or Near Field Infrared Experiment, a proposal to launch interceptor missiles not from the ground, as in the currently deployed GMD, but from space.56

Even if the developmental status of space-based missile defence interceptors remains uncertain (not least due to the budgetary constraints involved), the currently deployed ground-based system also poses a complex issue in terms of arms control. Though ostensibly intended for defensive purposes, ground and sea-based com- ponents of American missile defence could theoretically be employed as an ASAT – Anti-Satellite attack – device, and the use of sea-based Aegis ballistic missile defence capabilities and its Standard Missile 3 (SM3) to shoot down the malfunction- ing USA-193 spy satellite in February 2008 has done little to dispel concerns over the offensive applications of current missile defence capabilities.57 In addition, the United States also conducts research into more exotic forms of space weaponry, and funds a variety of technologies aimed at creating a force application capacity from space. The Department of Defense has reportedly explored several high- concept space weapons systems such as Hypervelocity Rod Bundles (tungsten rods dropped on targets from space that would theoretically use gravity as accelerant in a manner akin to a meteor, or Rods from God as they are also colloquially known), the Experimental Spacecraft System (XSS) (a manoeuvrable microsatellite weighing only 100 kilograms which could prospectively be used to attack other satellites), and the Common Aerospace Vehicle or CAV (this so-called Spaceplane would be unmanned and would orbit the earth, entering the atmosphere when needed to deploy precision guided munitions against selected targets). 58

Such programmes with possible space weapons applications (beyond ground-to- space ASAT capabilities) are still in their relative infancy, and the technical prospects for such technologies, as with the more exotic missile defence proposals outlined above, are far from certain.59 Yet much of the rhetoric emanating from the United States in recent years has made expansive claims to space dominance far beyond existing capabilities. In short, rather than seeking to control the means of violence in and from space, much of the military discourse on space has generally cast the United States as a trailblazer in this regard, with exotic systems cited as a necessity for future military dominance in and from space.60 Historically these claims have tended to emanate primarily from the Air Force and Air Force Space Command. In 1998, Space Command defined the control of space (‘space control’) as ‘The ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others use of space, if required’61, and space was also con- sidered as part of the remit for ‘full spectrum dominance’ in Joint Vision 2020.62 Space warriors within and beyond the United States military also make frequent reference to the ‘. . .importance of dominating space in peace and war’.63

Yet, ‘The decision to weaponize space does not lie within the military (seeking short-term military advantage in support of national security) but at the higher- level of national policy (seeking long-term national security, economic well-being, and worldwide legitimacy of US constitutional values).’64 Instances of the securitiza- tion of outer space within military circles are hardly surprising, given vested interests and the perceived utility of space support for American forces; what is more signifi- cant though is the extent to which national policy, though stopping short of explicit advocating of space weapons, has tended to similarly maintain the centrality of space for national security. 65 As Moore’s ‘biography’ of the idea of unilateral space dom- inance in the United States attests to, this school of thought has long held a prominent place in American strategic circles.66 Of significance, though, is the extent to which this type of thinking has migrated into official policy, portraying American access to, and dominance of, outer space as key to national survival in the process. The tenure of the George W. Bush administration in particular saw military and policy discourse move much closer in terms of goals and language used, entrenching securitization within United States space policy as a whole. In the terms used above, the views of space warriors made much greater inroads under the Bush administration, and this has had a significant bearing on how the United States has positioned itself in terms of arms control and how other states – particularly China and Russia – have subsequently defined their own positions.67

The evolution of official American discourse on outer space over the past decade attests to this subtle shift. In 2001, the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (or Rumsfeld Space Commission as it is often referred to owing to Donald Rumsfeld’s position as chair) pointed out that a number of states hostile to the United States could attain ASAT capabilities, and, infamously, warned that if the United States did not secure space it would face a Space Pearl Harbor. Members of the Bush administration subsequently went on to effectively endorse the space control concept, asserting the primacy of space for security by openly linking its potential civil and military uses (and thus suggesting only a minimal distinction between the two). Then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz argued in a 2002 speech on missile defence that ‘as we look ahead we need to think about areas that would provide higher leverage. Nowhere is that more true than in space. Space offers attractive options not only for missile defense but for a broad range of interrelated civil and military missions. It truly is the ultimate highground.’68 The culmination of this line of thinking in policy terms came with the release of the National Space Policy (NSP) in August 2006, which stated that:

The United States considers space capabilities – including the ground and space segments and supporting links – vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either those rights or developing capabilities intended to so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests.69

The framing of the arguments from those within the Bush administration thus clearly aligns with the dynamics of securitization as identified by Buzan et al. The idea of a Pearl Harbor from Space invokes the nightmare scenario of a surprise attack on American interests in or from space, and was accompanied in the Rumsfeld Commission’s report by the sense of urgency characteristic of securitizing moves: ‘the present extent of US dependence on space [and] the rapid pace at which this dependence is increasing and the vulnerabilities it creates, all demand that US national security space interests be recognized as a top national security priority’.70 The Pearl Harbor analogy implied a focus on a surprise attack itself, but the rest of the report stressed the radical implications of such an attack, suggesting a potential existential threat to American commerce, society and, ultimately, way of life. As the report noted, ‘Space enters homes, businesses, schools, hospitals and government offices through its applications for transportation, health, the environment, telecom- munications, education, agriculture and energy. Much like highways and airways, water lines and electric grids, services supplied from space are already an important part of the US and global infrastructures.’71

In turn, the NSP of 2006 repeated many of these same securitizing moves. It elev- ated national security functions of United States space policy, declaring these as vital to national interests, and national security as ‘critically dependent upon space capabilities... this dependence will grow.’ Similarly, the NSP described United States space systems as critical to ‘. . .a wide range of civil, commercial, and national security users’, identifying the wider security implications of space as well as its more direct military uses.72 Crucially, this securitization of space was then used to justify exceptional measures with regards to arms control and the previous era of multilateral space agreements. Among the ‘actions necessary’ to protect space capabilities the NSP declared that:

#### 2] Fear of nuclear war assigns blame to an “unstable” enemy.

**Mack:** John E. Mack, M.D. "The Enemy System (Short Version)" johnemackinstitute.org/1988/08/the-enemy-system-short-version/

**The** extraordinary **dimensions of the nuclear threat have** also **spawned** examples of **apocalyptic thinking**, **in which the world is divided into forces of good and evil**, and the belief that, **in the event of a nuclear holocaust, the good would be saved and the evil would perish**. In such thinking the primitive, polarizing tendencies of the child’s mind are all too evident. Creating a Safer World Hesse’s finding that even older children do not perceive their own country’s responsibility for states of enmity is in accord with those of psychologists and social scientists – that **there is no self-awareness or self-responsibility at the political level which corresponds to the awareness of personal responsibility with which we are familiar in a clinical setting**.” In political life, **the assignment of blame, disclaiming of responsibility, and the denial of one’s own nation’s contribution to tensions and enmity are the norm.[**23] The first task, therefore, is to apply the insights of the behavioral sciences to create a new expectation of political self-responsibility. Nuclear weapons have connected all the peoples of the earth. **Not only the nuclear superpowers but also all peoples are now interdependent and mutually vulnerable**. **Nations may have conflicting values but they cannot afford to have enemies.** Education in elementary and secondary schools that reflects this new reality should be our highest priority. **Instead of constant blaming of the other side, we need to give new attention to the adversary’s culture and history, to his real intentions as well as his hopes, dreams, and values**. To understand is not to forgive, but awareness and knowledge could lead to a more realistic appreciation of who has contributed what to the problems and tensions that exist in the world. Young people should be taught in their homes and schools how to identify and resist ideological propaganda. **In the nuclear age we need to redefine hackneyed ideas such as national security or the national interest**. just as we can no longer afford enemies, there is no longer such a notion as national security. **The security of each depends on the other, and the communication of this reality must become a major focus of our educational system**. Similarly, **the national interest can no longer be defined unilaterally but exists in a context of mutual interests and dependencies.** Physicians who understand the physical realities of nuclear technology, and are gaining a greater awareness of these psycho-political dynamics, can play a vital part in educating their patients and the general public about the basic requirements of planetary safety in the nuclear age. Political self-responsibility can begin at an early age. Nancy Condee asked Tolya, a nine-year-old Russian boy, “What kinds of solutions should be sought to reduce tensions between our two countries?” The boy replied: “I would tell Reagan that the thing he’s building in space is going to cause war. I’d tell him ‘Build it slowly! Take your time! Don’t rush!’ If he could spend a million years building it, we would have a million years of peace. And only afterwards, as soon as it was already built, then we would have war”.

#### Their security discourse causes genocide and interventionism in the name of cleansing the world of violent “others”

Friis 2k - Friis, UN Sector at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2k, (Karsten, Peace and Conflict Studies 7.2, “From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths,” <http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=2>). NS

The problem with societal securitization is one of representation. It is rarely clear in advance who it is that speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since literately anyone can stand up as representatives, there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share, however, is a conviction that they are best at providing (a new) order. If they can do this convincingly, they gain legitimacy. What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown an object of knowledge. To present a discernable Other is a way of doing this. The Other is represented as an Other -- as an unified single actor with a similar unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital “O”). They are objectified, made into an object of knowledge, by representation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of the Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable. In Jef Huysmans (1998:241) words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of threat. A mediation of chaos is more basic than a mediation of threat, as it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings. It is a mediation of “ontological security”, which means “...a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order” (Huysmans 1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political identification, is often overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just as important. This may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat. Such a dichotomization implies a necessity to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls “strangers”). This is because they “...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the impossibility of being categorized”, and does not threaten the community, “...but the possibility of ordering itself” (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur by their very existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneur’s mediation of chaos. As mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also representations of competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: “Over and over again we see that the “liberals” within a group undergoing a mobilisation process for group conflict are the first ones to go”. The liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination, from suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation. This is a threat to the ontological order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. Therefore the liminar must disappear. It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups throughout the world have experienced, or it must be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also become an Other, as its connection to the Self is cut and their former common culture is renounced and made insignificant. In Anne Norton’s (1988:55) words, “The presence of difference in the ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the archetypal other, denying the resemblance to the self.” Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242) calls a mediation of “daily security”. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has become a visible, clear-cut Other. In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has been regarded by the securitizing actors as the solution to the ontological problem they have posed. Securitization was not considered a political move, in the sense that there were any choices. It was a necessity: Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.10 This way the world-picture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made into reality. The mythical second-order language is made into first-order language, and its “innocent” reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has become a “natural” necessity with a need to make order, even if it implies making the world match the map. Maybe that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a total expatriation or a total “solution” (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the battlefield. If the enemy is not even considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is way beyond any war conventions, any jus in bello. This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both in launching his world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.

#### The alternative is to reject securitization – this opens up space for emancipatory political engagement.

**Neocleous:** [Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of securityaltogether **-** to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world'and reiteration of one fear**,** anxiety and insecurity after **another** will also make it hard to do**.** But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles **t**hat arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character ofsecurity on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole**."**' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word.What this might mean**,** precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state;it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

## OFF

#### Counterplan: Space faring nations should enter into a prior and binding consultation with the International Court of Justice over asteroid mining done by private entities.

#### Advisory opinions from ICJ are necessary to clarify and develop international space law and they say yes

Simpson and Johnson 17 [Simpson, Michael & Johnson, Christopher. (2017). Lacunae and Silence in International Space Law – A Hypothetical Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice.]

Since international space law has developed for at least 60 years in an environment devoid of judicial opinions on live controversies, it lacks the judicial contribution to clarification and elaboration of terms and principles normally enjoyed by a body of law. For this reason, advisory opinions may be particularly useful in this area. The mechanism for seizing the Court also appears to be favorably developed. In the nuclear weapons case, the ICJ turned down a 1993 request from the World Meteorological Organization on the grounds that WMO, acting ultra vires lacked standing. Only when the UN General Assembly later made the request in its own name did the Court take up the question.

Since many of the questions amenable to illumination through advisory opinions are within the remit of the UN Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), which itself reports through Fourth Committee to the General Assembly, the procedural pathway to a UNGA request is both established and clear. Equally as helpful is that UNCOPUOS operates by consensus. Thus, early requests for clarification, could easily establish that the necessary political will to seek increased clarity was present and permit to begin with less controversial concepts. Once the efficacy of advisory opinions to clarify elements of space law is established, the General Assembly could possibly decide to forward more challenging issues even where consensus in COPUOS could not be expected.

III. NON-LIQUET AT THE ICJ.

It is a general principle of law at both the national and international level (indeed inherited from ancient Roman law) that when asked to deliver a judgement, a court knows the law (Iura novit curia). So it should seem as an unexpected and rare surprise when a court does not, indeed, know the law. In the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, the Court considered the existing law applicable to the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and their treatment under the various sources and bodies of law. The Court was asked to consider “is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances permitted under international law?” However, the Court slightly rephrased that question merely to “determine the legality or illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.”11 In seeking an answer, the Court looked to custom and to treaties, and looking to a diverse field of special regimes of international law, including the law of armed conflict (LOAC) a.k.a. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (including jus ad bellum and jus in bellow), environmental law, and human rights law. However, the law, as a system and as a whole, was weighed and found wanting. The Court concluded:

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Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports (1996) p. 226, 238 para.

97. Accordingly, in view of the present state of international law viewed as a whole, as examined above by the Court, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court is led to observe that it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in such circumstance of self-defense, in which its very survival would be at stake.

Non liquet, meaning, it is not clear, is where a court finds the law insufficient, and does not permit a conclusion one way or the other regarding the issue it is presented with.

12

IV. SPACE LAW, LACUNAE, AND NON-LIQUET

The idea that gaps in the law or uncertainty with its provisions can render judicial decisions impossible, difficult, or unwise is at least as old as Roman law. As such the concepts of lacunae and non liquet still bear the Latin names that would have been familiar to lawyers and legal scholars throughout the Roman Empire. As explained by Mark Bogdansky, non liquet can be extended to cover both the case where no legal rule can be found that applies to a case under consideration and to the case where lack of clarity in the facts or in a principle of law makes it impossible to discern clearly the implications of that principle in light of the facts presented. Bogdansky refers to the former situation as ontological non liquet and to the latter as epistemological. We will use lacunae to refer to apparent gaps in international space law and will confine our use of “non liquet” to situations where a principle has been articulated but is not clear.

Definitions become extremely important in discussing the impact of lacunae and non liquet on international space law. Note for example the list of lacunae in José Monserrat Filho’s excellent paper, “Space Law In The Light Of Bobbio's Theory Of Legal Ordering,” IAC-12.E7. 5. 6.

1. Definition of “space object”, “space debris”, “space activities”, “space launching”;

2. Binding “Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines”;

3. Prohibition of all kind of weapons in Earth orbits;

4. Definition and delimitation of the outer space;

5. Regulation of commercialization of space activities;

6. Environmental damage in Liability Convention;

7. Industrial exploitation of lunar natural resources;

8. Remote sensing activities in the XXI century;

9. Satellite data as evidence in criminal proceedings;

10. The use of nuclear power sources in space;

11. The human presence in space.

12

While items 2, 3, 6, and 11 fit clearly into our definition of lacunae, the others represent cases where legal principles have been articulated, but are subject to substantial disagreement as to their application to various fact situations. Where lacunae exist, the utility of advisory opinions is greatly constrained. The foundational principles of positivism and sovereignty that are key pillars of international law do not lend themselves to judicial activism in creating legal rules in the absence of political action to create them. On the other hand, where a situation of non liquet emerges from disagreement over definitions or the application of a legal principle to a particular situation, an advisory opinion could have either one of two beneficial outcomes.

In the first case an advisory opinion could clarify the meaning of terms where uncertainty exists. This situation would require strong arguments to support the opinion and justify it. It might be elaborated on the basis of original intent reflected in the travaux préparatoires, clear patterns of application of terms and principles in the action of States parties to the agreements where uncertainty exists or lack of clarity is perceived, or lucid reasoning by analogy to similar situations where greater certainty can be demonstrated.

The second case could result from an opinion that clarification cannot be provided and that the matter remains non liquet. In this case, there would be an unambiguous signal that political/ diplomatic action would be required to clarify the issues in dispute. Take for example the hypothetical example of a case seeking clarification of the non-appropriation clause of the Outer Space Treaty. A non liquet in such a case would leave those wishing to assert that a prohibition against off Earth mining existed in international law without a legal vindication of their position while those wishing to engage in such mining would face uncertainty because the Court had not ruled definitively that non appropriation did not apply to them. Since the mining advocates would be handicapped by uncertainty in their approaches to potential investors, both sides would have an incentive to seek a political resolution with the compromises that was likely to entail.

## OFF

#### The plan requires clarifying international space law---causes strategic bargaining to extract concessions

Alexander William Salter 16, Assistant Professor of Economics, Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University, "SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS", 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 (2016), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/19-2-2-salter-final\_0.pdf

V. MITIGATION VS. REMOVAL

Relying on international law to create an environment conducive to space debris removal initially seems promising. The Virginia school of political economy has convincingly shown the importance of political-legal institutions in creating the incentives that determine whether those who act within those institutions behave cooperatively or predatorily.47 In the context of space debris, the role of nation-states, or their space agencies, would be to create an international legal framework that clearly specifies the rules that will govern space debris removal and the interactions in space more generally. The certainty afforded by clear and nondiscriminatory48 rules would enable the parties of the space debris “social contract” to use efficient strategies for coping with space debris. However, this ideal result is, in practice, far from certain. To borrow a concept from Buchanan and Tullock’s framework,49 the costs of amending the rules in the case of international space law are exceptionally high. Although a social contract is beneficial in that it prevents stronger nation-states from imposing their will on weaker nation-states, it also creates incentives for the main spacefaring nations to block reforms that are overall welfare-enhancing but that do not sufficiently or directly benefit the stronger nations.

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (more commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty) is the foundation for current international space law.50 All major spacefaring nations are signatories. Article VIII of this treaty is the largest legal barrier to space debris removal efforts. This article stipulates that parties to the treaty retain jurisdiction over objects they launch into space, whether in orbit or on a celestial body such as the Moon. This article means that American organizations, whether private firms or the government, cannot remove pieces of Chinese or Russian debris without the permission of their respective governments. Perhaps contrary to intuition, consent will probably not be easy to secure.

A major difficulty lies in the realization that much debris is valuable scrap material that is already in orbit. A significant fraction of the costs associated with putting spacecraft in orbit comes from escaping Earth’s gravity well. The presence of valuable material already in space can justifiably be claimed as a valuable resource for repairs to current spacecraft and eventual manufacturing in space. As an example, approximately 1,000 tons of aluminum orbit as debris from the upper stages of launch vehicles alone. Launching those materials into orbit could cost between $5 billion and $10 billion and would take several years.51 Another difficulty lies in the fact that no definition of space debris is currently accepted internationally. This could prove problematic for removal efforts, if there is disagreement as to whether a given object is useless space junk, or a potentially useful space asset. Although this ambiguity may appear purely semantic, resolving it does pose some legal difficulties. Doing so would require consensus among the spacefaring nations. The negotiation process for obtaining consent would be costly.

Less obvious, but still important, is the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, normally referred to as the Liability Convention. The Liability Convention expanded on the issue of liability in Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty. Under the Liability Convention, any government “shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft, and liable for damage due to its faults in space.”52 In other words, if a US party attempts to remove debris and accidentally damages another nation’s space objects, the US government would be liable for damages. More generally, because launching states would bear costs associated with accidents during debris removal, those states may be unwilling to participate in or permit such efforts. In theory, insurance can partly remediate the costs, but that remediation would still make debris removal engagement less appealing.

A global effort to remediate debris would, by necessity, involve the three major spacefaring nations: the United States, Russia, and China.53 However, any effort would also require—at a minimum—a significant clarification and—at most —a complete overhaul of existing space law.54 One cannot assume that parties to the necessary political bargains would limit parleying to space-related issues. Agreements between sovereign nation-states must be self-enforcing.55 To secure consent, various parties to the change in the international legal-institutional framework may bargain strategically and may hold out for unrelated concessions as a way of maximizing private surplus. The costs, especially the decision-making costs, of changing the legal framework to secure a global response to a global commons problem are potentially quite high.

#### Russia uses negotiations to push the PPWT---erodes US space dominance---unilat solves

Michael Listner 18, JD, Regent University School of Law, the founder and principal of the legal and policy think-tank/consultation firm Space Law and Policy Solutions, Sept 17 2018, "The art of lawfare and the real war in outer space", The Space Review, www.thespacereview.com/article/3571/1

A battle for primacy in outer space took place on August 14, 2018, among the Russian Federation, the United States, and, indirectly, the People’s Republic of China. This battle did not involve the exotic technology of science fiction, antisatellite weapons (ASATs), or the incapacitation of satellites; it was not part of a hot war and did not even occur in outer space. Rather, it took place in the halls of the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland, and concerned the interdiction of the hypothetical deployment of instrumentalities of a hot war in outer space. The carefully orchestrated arena for this battle by the proponents of banning so-called space weapons involved methodologies, institutions, and agents of international law but was undermined by a vigorous counterattack by the United States using the same forum and suite of instruments so skillfully levied against it.1 This battle, of course, is not a single instance but the latest skirmish of a much larger conflict involving real war in space.

There’s been significant attention—and overstatem­ent— about the effect of a proposed Space Force by the United States, including an arms race and dominance as articulated by the United States,2 yet little attention has been given to the contest that continues to be fought over outer space using the tools of international law and policy, both of which are instruments of “lawfare.” Maj. General Charles N. Dunlap, Jr. (retired)3 first defined lawfare in the paper “Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Conflicts,” as “a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective.”4 This definition can be expanded to the use of hard law, soft law, and non-governmental organizations and institutions within the international arena to achieve a national objective and geopolitical end that would otherwise require the use of hard power. As observed by General Dunlap, lawfare imputes the teachings of Sun Tzu in particular this teaching: “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”5

Lawfare is not a new concept and has been used in many domains, but the tools brought to bear have become more prolific, and the domain of outer space has been and continues to be a theater where it is applied. The earliest example of lawfare (even though the term was not yet coined) in outer space occurred pre-Sputnik with Soviet Union attempting to use customary law to make claims of sovereignty extending beyond the atmosphere to the space above its territory. This claim was preempted by the launch of Sputnik 1 and the act of the satellite flying over the territory of other nations.6 The Eisenhower Administration saw this as an opportunity to meet a national space policy goal and likewise used customary law as an implement of lawfare and successfully created the principle of free access to outer space, which it utilized for photoreconnaissance activities in lieu of overflights of another nation’s sovereign airspace.7 The Soviet Union unsuccessfully attempted to defeat this move using lawfare in the United Nations through a proposal that would have prohibited the use of outer space for the purpose of intelligence gathering.8

Since that setback, the art of lawfare in outer space has settled on the objective ascribed to another teaching of Sun Tzu:

“With regard to precipitous heights, if you proceed your adversary, occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up. Remember, if the enemy has occupied precipitous heights before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.”9

The second part of this teaching exemplifies the role of lawfare in the present war in outer space: to employ the tools and institutions of international law as a means to legally corner an adversary and gain geopolitical advantage in soft power, with the aim of slowing and eroding the advantage that adversary has attained through preeminence in the domain of outer space, and replace it with their own. This objective is accomplished by two general means: legally-binding measures, most commonly in the form of treaties, and so-called non-binding measures couched as sustainability.

Lawfare in space continued in the intervening years between Sputnik-1 and the signature and ratification of the Outer Space Treaty and afterward. The weapon of choice: disarmament proposals for outer space. Provisions for banning so-called space weapons in the Outer Space Treaty were rejected by the Soviet Union in favor of separate arms control measures.10 These measures included proposals, some of which related to the proscription of ASATs, designed to not only gain an advantage in outer space but to gauge political intent and resolve.11

The lawfare offensive escalated after the proposed Strategic Defense Initiative with an effort curtail space-based missile defense technology through a ban on so-called space weapons and a proverbial arms race in outer space. The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), introduced in 1985, continues to seek a legally binding measure to place any weapon in outer space, including those designed for self-defense. It spawned measures such as the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), co-sponsored by Russia and China. This and other measures have met resistance as unverifiable and certainly are not likely to gain the advice and consent of the US Senate for ratification. The end game of the use of lawfare in the form of efforts like PAROS—the latest attempt at which was defeated in Geneva—is to propose legally binding measures that proponents would ignore to their advantage in any event. The sponsors and advocates of these hard-law measures recognize they will not come to fruition but, in the process of promoting them, will enhance their soft power and moral authority, which can be applied to entice their adversary down.

Non-binding resolutions and measures in the form of political agreements and guidelines are being used concurrently in the lawfare engagement in outer space, where proposals for legally binding measures alone fall short of the goal of creating hard law and challenging dominance in outer space. These resolutions and measures, which emphasize sustainability, are designed to perform an end run around the formalities of a treaty to entice agreement on issues that would otherwise be unacceptable in a hard-law agreement. These measures have the dual effect to create soft-power support on the one hand and hard law on the other. This tool of lawfare, which uses clichés of cooperation and sustainability, is a ploy that applies the ambiguous nature of customary international law to achieve what cannot be done through treaties: to “entice the adversary away” and create legal and political constraints to bind and degrade its use of outer space or prevent it from maintaining its superiority, all the while allowing others to play catchup and replace one form of dominance with another. While lawfare is by nature asymmetric, this indirect approach could be considered a subset an irregular tactic of lawfare, as opposed to the use of formal treaties in lawfare.

The crux is that, like space objects used in outer space, international law and its implements are dual-use in that they can be used for proactive ends or weaponized, with those using the appliances of lawfare to encourage cession of the high ground choosing the latter rather than the former. The decision to weaponize international law and its institutions to prosecute this war in space brings into question the efficacy of new rules or norms. Indeed, the idea of expanding the jurisprudence of outer space through custom, as being suggested by the United States, and more recently gap-filling rules being suggested by academia that could become custom, presents the real chance that, rather than the creation of the ploughshare of sustainability, new and more effective swords for lawfare will be forged.

To paraphrase Sun Tzu, “all war is deception.” In the case of outer space, the pretext in the current war in space is that an arms race and a hot war in outer space is inevitable, and can only be avoided by formal rules or international governance. Conversely, a hot war can be prevented in no small part by using lawfare to engage in the contemporary war in space using the tools of, and the abundant resources found in, the experience of attorneys and litigators in particular to supplement and support diplomats to extend the velvet glove when applicable, and bare knuckles when necessary. If the August 14 statement in Geneva is any indicator, the United States may have just done that and begun the shift from light-touch diplomacy to bringing its legal warriors to bear in full-contact lawfare to engage and win the current war in outer space and help deter a more serious hot war from occurring without sacrificing the superiority it possesses in outer space.

#### The PPWT prohibits space-based missile defense

Jack M. Beard 16, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska College of Law, Feb 15 2016, "Soft Law ’s Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities", University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2016, <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1086&context=spacelaw>

B. Avoid Arms Control Traps in Space

Any successful effort to achieve legally binding restrictions on military activities or weapons in space must focus on specific, definable, and limited objectives or run afoul of issues that have historically ensured deadlock among suspicious and insecure adversaries.306 Some seemingly desirable goals, however, are likely to ensure failure.

The first such problematic goal involves attempting to use arms control agreements or other instruments to comprehensively ensure peace in space. Unfortunately, the integration of modern military systems on earth, sea, air and space guarantees that at some point states seeking to disrupt or deny the ability of an adversary (such as the United States) to project power will find space capabilities to be a particularly appealing target, especially in the early stages of a crisis or conflict.307 The presence of so many things of military value in space thus makes actions by an adversary to neutralize, disrupt or destroy these things likely during a major conflict on earth.308

The second problematic arms control goal in space that seems certain to ensure stalemate involves attempting to define and prohibit military technologies with a view to broadly prevent the weaponization of space. Clearly defining a space weapon for purposes of any legally binding arms control agreement is a daunting task, one which is made particularly challenging by the “essentially military nature of space technology.”309 As noted, space technologies are routinely viewed as dual-use in nature, meaning that they can be readily employed for both civilian and military uses. Determining the ultimate purpose of many space technologies may thus depend on discerning the intentions of states, a process perhaps better suited for psychological than legal evaluation. 310

Further complicating the classification of space military technologies is the inherent difficulty in distinguishing most space weapons on the basis of their offensive and defensive roles or even their specific missions.311 For example, this problem lies at the heart of debates over the status and future of ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs, since the technology underlying BMD systems and offensive ASAT weapons is often indistinguishable.312 Vague and broad soft law instruments do not resolve this problem, but create instead their own confusion and insecurity. Vague and broad provisions in legally binding agreements that do not or cannot distinguish between these missions are similarly problematic.

These issues, particularly difficulties in distinguishing ASAT and BMD systems, have figured prominently in complicating negotiations on space weapons over previous decades.313 Similarly, these concerns were a significant factor in initial U.S. opposition to the arms control measure proposed by China and Russia (the PPWT) since it prohibits states from placing any type of weapon in outer space (regardless of its military mission), thus effectively prohibiting the deployment of ballistic missile defense systems. 314 Furthermore, even if clear legal restrictions could be developed, verifying compliance with respect to technology in orbit around Earth would be very difficult (a point conceded even by China with respect to its own proposed PPWT).315

#### Causes rogue state missile threats---that escalates

Patrick M. Shanahan 19, Acting Secretary of Defense from January to June 2019, previously vice president and general manager of Boeing Missile Defense Systems, Jan 2019, "2019 MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW", US Department of Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF

U.S. Homeland Missile Defense will Stay Ahead of Rogue States’ Missile Threats

Technology trends point to the possibility of increasing rogue state missile threats to the U.S. homeland. Vulnerability to rogue state missile threats would endanger the American people and infrastructure, undermine the U.S. diplomatic position of strength, and could lead potential adversaries to mistakenly perceive the United States as susceptible to coercive escalation threats intended to preclude U.S. resolve to resist aggression abroad. Such misperceptions risk undermining our deterrence posture and messaging, and could lead adversaries to dangerous miscalculations regarding our commitment and resolve.

It is therefore imperative that U.S. missile defense capabilities provide effective protection against rogue state missile threats to the homeland now and into the future. The United States is technically capable of doing so and has adopted an active missile defense force-sizing measure for protection of the homeland. DoD will develop, acquire, and maintain the U.S. homeland missile defense capabilities necessary to effectively protect against possible missile attacks on the homeland posed by the long-range missile arsenals of rogue states, defined today as North Korea and Iran, and to support the other missile defense roles identified in this MDR.

This force-sizing measure for active U.S. missile defense is fully consistent with the 2018 NPR, and in order to keep pace with the threat, DoD will utilize existing defense systems and an increasing mix of advanced technologies, such as kinetic or directed-energy boost-phase defenses, and other advanced systems. It is technically challenging but feasible over time, affordable, and a strategic imperative. It will require the examination and possible fielding of advanced technologies to provide greater efficiencies for U.S. active missile defense capabilities, including space-based sensors

and boost-phase defense capabilities. Further, because the related requirements will evolve as the long-range threat posed by rogue states evolves, it does not allow a static U.S. homeland defense architecture. Rather, it calls for a missile defense architecture that can adapt to emerging and unanticipated threats, including by adding capacity and the capability to surge missile defense as necessary in times of crisis or conflict.

In coming years, rogue state missile threats to the U.S. homeland will likely expand in numbers and complexity. There are and will remain inherent uncertainties regarding the potential pace and scope of that expansion. Consequently, the United States will not accept any limitation or constraint on the development or deployment of missile defense capabilities needed to protect the homeland against rogue missile threats. Accepting limits now could constrain or preclude missile defense technologies and options necessary in the future to effectively protect the American people.

As U.S. active defenses for the homeland continue to improve to stay ahead of rogue states’ missile threats, they could also provide a measure of protection against accidental or unauthorized missile launches. This defensive capability could be significant in the event of destabilizing domestic developments in any potential adversary armed with strategic weapons, and as long-range missile capabilities proliferate in coming years.

U.S. missile defense capabilities will be sized to provide continuing effective protection of the U.S. homeland against rogue states’ offensive missile threats. The United States relies on nuclear deterrence to address the large and more sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, as well as to deter attacks from any source consistent with long-standing U.S. declaratory policy as re-affirmed in the 2018 NPR.

## CASE

#### Asteroid mining is an unqualified good – it’s essential to advanced asteroid deflection, deep space travel, and fighting climate change

Heise 18 -- Jack Heise (Judicial Law Clerk at U.S. Courts of Appeals), Space, the Final Frontier of Enterprise: Incentivizing Asteroid Mining Under a Revised International Framework, 40 Mich. J. Int'l L. 189 (2018). https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol40/iss1/5 WJ

Asteroid mining has the potential to facilitate space travel, an outcome the OST holds to be in the interest of humanity as a whole.39 The potential of asteroid mining to reduce the cost of spaceflight, moreover, could facilitate the growth of the space economy. Asteroid mining thus aligns with another stated purposes of the OST in the sense that an expanded space econ- omy could provide substantial benefits to all mankind.40 First, in seeking to face the challenges posed by space travel, the public sector space race gave rise to numerous technological innovations, ranging from LEDs to emergency blankets to memory foam.41 It seems likely that the private space race would result in a similar degree of innovation, the products of which could benefit people across the globe.

Second, a successful mission to Mars could provide benefits beyond a mere sense of interplanetary accomplishment. NASA suggests that, given the parallels between the formation and evolution of Mars and Earth, a voyage there could help “us learn more about our own planet’s history and future.”42 The scientific advancements from such a mission cannot currently be anticipated and are difficult to predict, but “expand[ing] the frontiers of knowledge” in this manner could well bring benefits to all mankind.43

Third, the development of asteroid mining technology could also help advance asteroid diversion tactics. The development of the technology required to conduct successful asteroid mining operations could “help us to divert any incoming asteroids.”44 This is of great importance since NASA recently eliminated its Asteroid Redirect Mission due to funding cuts;45 NASA’s project was hailed by some scientists as a “critical step in demonstrating we can protect our planet from a future asteroid impact . . . .”46 Asteroid mining could step in and fill an important void.

While the probability of an Armageddon-causing impact is low, the effects of an impact would be extremely severe.47 Even some mitigation of this risk as a byproduct of as- teroid mining would be a benefit to humanity as a whole.

Finally, reduced launch costs could facilitate measures to combat global climate change. One proposed solution for canceling out predicted increases in average worldwide temperature is to “prevent[] . . . about 1% of incoming solar radiation—insolation—from reaching the Earth. This could be done by scattering into space from the vicinity of Earth an appropriately small frac- tion of total insolation.”48 Asteroid mining could facilitate such measures in that “[t]echnologies that could greatly decrease the cost of space-launch could make a telling difference in the practicality of all types of space- deployed scattering systems of scales appropriate to insolation modulation.”49 There are certainly intermediate measures to combat climate change that ought to be taken first, but asteroid mining would facilitate this expedited solution. While some of the benefits of asteroid mining would doubtless accrue primarily to those nations with asteroid mining companies within their borders, the benefits noted in this section—space exploration as a gen- eral proposition, technological and scientific development, improvement of asteroid diversion technology, and facilitated means of swiftly countering climate change—would inure substantially to the benefit of all mankind.

#### Warming causes extinction

Yangyang Xu 17, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at Texas A&M University; and Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, 9/26/17, “Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 114, No. 39, p. 10315-10323

We are proposing the following extension to the DAI risk categorization: warming greater than 1.5 °C as “dangerous”; warming greater than 3 °C as “catastrophic?”; and warming in excess of 5 °C as “unknown??,” with the understanding that changes of this magnitude, not experienced in the last 20+ million years, pose existential threats to a majority of the population. The question mark denotes the subjective nature of our deduction and the fact that catastrophe can strike at even lower warming levels. The justifications for the proposed extension to risk categorization are given below.

From the IPCC burning embers diagram and from the language of the Paris Agreement, we infer that the DAI begins at warming greater than 1.5 °C. Our criteria for extending the risk category beyond DAI include the potential risks of climate change to the physical climate system, the ecosystem, human health, and species extinction. Let us first consider the category of catastrophic (3 to 5 °C warming). The first major concern is the issue of tipping points. Several studies (48, 49) have concluded that 3 to 5 °C global warming is likely to be the threshold for tipping points such as the collapse of the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African monsoon, among others. While natural scientists refer to these as abrupt and irreversible climate changes, economists refer to them as catastrophic events (49).

Warming of such magnitudes also has catastrophic human health effects. Many recent studies (50, 51) have focused on the direct influence of extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events (defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent decades (52). Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat stress. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature mortalities (53). The major finding of a recent study (51) is that, currently, about 13.6% of land area with a population of 30.6% is exposed to deadly heat. The authors of that study defined deadly heat as exceeding a threshold of temperature as well as humidity. The thresholds were determined from numerous heat wave events and data for mortalities attributed to heat waves. According to this study, a 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates.

Climate risks can vary markedly depending on the socioeconomic status and culture of the population, and so we must take up the question of “dangerous to whom?” (54). Our discussion in this study is focused more on people and not on the ecosystem, and even with this limited scope, there are multitudes of categories of people. We will focus on the poorest 3 billion people living mostly in tropical rural areas, who are still relying on 18th-century technologies for meeting basic needs such as cooking and heating. Their contribution to CO2 pollution is roughly 5% compared with the 50% contribution by the wealthiest 1 billion (55). This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C (54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C.

Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ∼1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO2) can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to the dangers of extinction (57).

The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as unknown??, implying the possibility of existential threats. Fig. 2 displays these three risk categorizations (vertical dashed lines).

#### No space wars --- Resource constraints, the OST, and space taboos

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James Pavur, “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space”, 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle T. Minárik, S. Alatalu, S. Biondi, M. Signoretti, I. Tolga, G. Visky (Eds.), <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_12_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf>

1. Limited Accessibility Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420]. Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23]. B. Attributable Norms There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit. Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained
2. into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly. One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime. C. Environmental Interdependence A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.

### ADV1

#### Public sector mining thumps.

NASA 19 [NASA, 6-11-2019, "NASA Invests in Concepts Aimed at Exploring Craters, Mining Asteroids," <https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-invests-in-tech-concepts-aimed-at-exploring-lunar-craters-mining-asteroids/>] //DDPT

NASA Invests in Tech Concepts Aimed at Exploring Lunar Craters, Mining Asteroids

Robotically surveying lunar craters in record time and mining resources in space could help NASA establish a sustained human presence at the Moon – part of the agency’s broader [Moon to Mars exploration](https://www.nasa.gov/specials/moon2mars/) approach. Two mission concepts to explore these capabilities have been selected as the first-ever Phase III studies within the [NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts](https://www.nasa.gov/niac) (NIAC) program.

“We are pursuing new technologies across our development portfolio that could help make deep space exploration more Earth-independent by utilizing resources on the Moon and beyond,” said Jim Reuter, associate administrator of NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate. “These NIAC Phase III selections are a component of that forward-looking research and we hope new insights will help us achieve more firsts in space.”