## 1 (80)

### 1NC – Core

#### [Signatories of the OST ought to:

#### --Announce that appropriation of outer space by private actors violates the Outer Space Treaty and that this is a settled matter of customary international law

#### --Announce that this action is taken pursuant to *opinio juris* (the belief that the action is taken pursuant to a legal obligation) and that non-compliant actors are in violation of international law

#### --Fully comply, not appropriating outer space in a manner inconsistent with these proclamations

#### Solves the Aff.

[Fabio](https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Air+and+Space+Law/33.3/AILA2008021) **Tronchetti 8**. Dr. Fabio Tronchetti works as a Co-Director of the Institute of Space Law and Strategy and as a Zhuoyue Associate Professor at Beihang University, “The Non–Appropriation Principle as a Structural Norm of International Law: A New Way of Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty,” Air and Space Law, Volume 33, No 3, 2008, <https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Air+and+Space+Law/33.3/AILA2008021>, RJP, **DebateDrills**.

The non–appropriation principle represents the fundamental rule of the space law system. Since the beginning of the space era, it has allowed for the safe and orderly development of space activities. Nowadays, however, the principle is under attack. Some proposals, arguing the need for abolishing it in order to promote commercial use of outer space are undermining its relevance and threatening its role as a guiding principle for present and future space activities. This paper aims at safeguarding the non–appropriative nature of outer space by suggesting a new interpretation of the non–appropriation principle that is based on the view that this principle should be regarded as a customary rule of international law of a special character, namely ‘a structural norm’ of international law.

#### That competes --- ((SKIPP til las card)

#### 1] Widespread support for OST overhaul means a new treaty is likely---top military leaders are pushing it.

Theresa **Hitchens 21**. Theresa Hitchens is the Space and Air Force reporter at Breaking Defense. The former Defense News editor was a senior research associate at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). Before that, she spent six years in Geneva, Switzerland as director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). “US Should Push New Space Treaty: Atlantic Council,” Breaking Defense, April 12, 2021, <https://breakingdefense.com/2021/04/us-should-push-new-space-treaty-atlantic-council/>, RJP, **DebateDrills**

WASHINGTON: The US should push hard to overhaul the entire international legal framework for outer space — including replacing the foundational [1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST),](https://breakingdefense.com/tag/outer-space-treaty/) a new report from the Atlantic Council says.

As it moves to do so, the US also should more aggressively court allies with an eye to establishing a “collective security alliance for space” among likeminded countries to “deter aggression” and defend “key resources and access.”

“The 1967 Treaty is dated. It was written, literally, in a different era,” said former Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James in an Atlantic Council briefing today. “At present it is too broad, and in some cases it’s probably overly specific.”

The year-long study, [“The Future of Security In Space: A Thirty-Years US Strategy”](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/TheFutureofSecurityinSpace.pdf)was co-chaired by James and retired Marine Corps Gen. Hoss Cartwright, former vice chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In essence, it argues that the US needs to lead international efforts to craft a new rules-based regime to govern all space activities — from exploration to commercial ventures to military interactions. As the two argued in a recent [op-ed in Breaking D,](https://breakingdefense.com/2021/03/the-space-rush-new-us-strategy-must-bring-order-regulation/) “Great-power competition among the United States, China, and Russia has launched into outer space without rules governing the game.”

“The international law of space, centered on the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, is outdated and insufficient for a future of space in which economic activity is primary. The international community needs a new foundational space treaty, and the United States should precipitate its negotiation,” the study argues.

James elaborated that the idea would be to craft a more expansive treaty that covers emerging issues like debris mitigation and removal and [commercial extraction of resources](https://breakingdefense.com/tag/space-resource-extraction/) from the Moon and/or asteroids. That said, she stressed that the US should not abandon the OST — which has been signed by 193 nations — unless and until something new is there to replace it.

#### 2] Space law is typically treaty-based---Russian and Chinese proposals prove.

Stephanie **Nebehay 8**. Reporter, Reuters, “China, Russia to Offer Treaty to Ban Arms in Space,” Reuters, January 26, 2008, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-arms-space/china-russia-to-offer-treaty-to-ban-arms-in-space-idUSL2578979020080125>, RJP, **DebateDrills**

GENEVA (Reuters) - China and Russia will submit a joint proposal next month for an international treaty to ban the deployment of weapons in outer space, a senior Russian arms negotiator said on Friday.

Valery Loshchinin, Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations-sponsored Conference on Disarmament, said the draft treaty would be presented to the 65-member forum on February 12.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is due to address the Geneva forum, which constitutes the world’s main disarmament negotiating body, on that day. Loshchinin gave no details on the proposal which has been circulated to some senior diplomats.

Tensions between Russia and the United States have deepened in recent years over U.S. plans to revive its stalled “Star Wars” program from the 1980s with a new generation of missile defense shields.

Nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction are banned from space under a 1967 international treaty. But Washington’s plans have stirred concerns about non-nuclear arms in space.

#### 3] Treaties are the foundation of space law.

Sophie **Goguichvili et. al 21**. Program Associate, the Wilson Center, “The Global Legal Landscape of Space: Who Writes the Rules on the Final Frontier?” The Wilson Center, October 1, 2021, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/global-legal-landscape-space-who-writes-rules-final-frontier>, RJP, **DebateDrills**

As previously mentioned, a series of treaties adopted by the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) form the foundation of the global space governance system. The first and most significant of these treaties is the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” more commonly known as the **Outer Space Treaty**or**OST** for short (1967). The Outer Space Treaty is considered the most comprehensive space treaty and provides the basic framework for international space law, namely: the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes by all States for the benefit of mankind (Art. I); the outlaw of national appropriation or claims of sovereignty of outer space or celestial objects (Art. II); a ban on the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies (Art. IV); that astronauts should be regarded as the envoys of mankind (Art. V); and that States are required to supervise the activities of their national entities (Art. VI).

#### We solve better, since CIL is far superior to treaties for space AND causes follow-on.

Koplow, 9 – Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.

David A. Koplow, “ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Michigan Journal of International Law. Volume 30, Summer 2009. <http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1452&context=facpub>

Finally, the Article concludes with some policy recommendations, suggesting mechanisms for the world community to press forward with autonomous efforts to promote stability and security in outer space, even in the face of recalcitrance from the leading space powers. I would certainly support the negotiation and implementation of a comprehensive new treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space, and a carefully drafted, widely accepted accord could accomplish much, well beyond what customary law alone could create. But the treaty process, too, has costs and disadvantages, and the world need not pursue just one of these alternatives in isolation.

If the absence of global consensus currently inhibits agreements that countries could already sign, perhaps the world community can nevertheless get some "satisfaction" via the operation of CIL, constructing a similar (although not completely equivalent) edifice of international regulation of ASATs based simply on what countries do.

## 2 (100)

#### The plan requires clarifying international space law---causes strategic bargaining to extract concessions

Alexander William Salter 16, Assistant Professor of Economics, Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University, "SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS", 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 (2016), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/19-2-2-salter-final\_0.pdf

V. MITIGATION VS. REMOVAL

Relying on international law to create an environment conducive to space debris removal initially seems promising. The Virginia school of political economy has convincingly shown the importance of political-legal institutions in creating the incentives that determine whether those who act within those institutions behave cooperatively or predatorily.47 In the context of space debris, the role of nation-states, or their space agencies, would be to create an international legal framework that clearly specifies the rules that will govern space debris removal and the interactions in space more generally. The certainty afforded by clear and nondiscriminatory48 rules would enable the parties of the space debris “social contract” to use efficient strategies for coping with space debris. However, this ideal result is, in practice, far from certain. To borrow a concept from Buchanan and Tullock’s framework,49 the costs of amending the rules in the case of international space law are exceptionally high. Although a social contract is beneficial in that it prevents stronger nation-states from imposing their will on weaker nation-states, it also creates incentives for the main spacefaring nations to block reforms that are overall welfare-enhancing but that do not sufficiently or directly benefit the stronger nations.

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (more commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty) is the foundation for current international space law.50 All major spacefaring nations are signatories. Article VIII of this treaty is the largest legal barrier to space debris removal efforts. This article stipulates that parties to the treaty retain jurisdiction over objects they launch into space, whether in orbit or on a celestial body such as the Moon. This article means that American organizations, whether private firms or the government, cannot remove pieces of Chinese or Russian debris without the permission of their respective governments. Perhaps contrary to intuition, consent will probably not be easy to secure.

A major difficulty lies in the realization that much debris is valuable scrap material that is already in orbit. A significant fraction of the costs associated with putting spacecraft in orbit comes from escaping Earth’s gravity well. The presence of valuable material already in space can justifiably be claimed as a valuable resource for repairs to current spacecraft and eventual manufacturing in space. As an example, approximately 1,000 tons of aluminum orbit as debris from the upper stages of launch vehicles alone. Launching those materials into orbit could cost between $5 billion and $10 billion and would take several years.51 Another difficulty lies in the fact that no definition of space debris is currently accepted internationally. This could prove problematic for removal efforts, if there is disagreement as to whether a given object is useless space junk, or a potentially useful space asset. Although this ambiguity may appear purely semantic, resolving it does pose some legal difficulties. Doing so would require consensus among the spacefaring nations. The negotiation process for obtaining consent would be costly.

Less obvious, but still important, is the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, normally referred to as the Liability Convention. The Liability Convention expanded on the issue of liability in Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty. Under the Liability Convention, any government “shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft, and liable for damage due to its faults in space.”52 In other words, if a US party attempts to remove debris and accidentally damages another nation’s space objects, the US government would be liable for damages. More generally, because launching states would bear costs associated with accidents during debris removal, those states may be unwilling to participate in or permit such efforts. In theory, insurance can partly remediate the costs, but that remediation would still make debris removal engagement less appealing.

A global effort to remediate debris would, by necessity, involve the three major spacefaring nations: the United States, Russia, and China.53 However, any effort would also require—at a minimum—a significant clarification and—at most —a complete overhaul of existing space law.54 One cannot assume that parties to the necessary political bargains would limit parleying to space-related issues. Agreements between sovereign nation-states must be self-enforcing.55 To secure consent, various parties to the change in the international legal-institutional framework may bargain strategically and may hold out for unrelated concessions as a way of maximizing private surplus. The costs, especially the decision-making costs, of changing the legal framework to secure a global response to a global commons problem are potentially quite high.

#### Russia uses negotiations to push the PPWT---erodes US space dominance---unilat solves

Michael Listner 18, JD, Regent University School of Law, the founder and principal of the legal and policy think-tank/consultation firm Space Law and Policy Solutions, Sept 17 2018, "The art of lawfare and the real war in outer space", The Space Review, www.thespacereview.com/article/3571/1

A battle for primacy in outer space took place on August 14, 2018, among the Russian Federation, the United States, and, indirectly, the People’s Republic of China. This battle did not involve the exotic technology of science fiction, antisatellite weapons (ASATs), or the incapacitation of satellites; it was not part of a hot war and did not even occur in outer space. Rather, it took place in the halls of the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland, and concerned the interdiction of the hypothetical deployment of instrumentalities of a hot war in outer space. The carefully orchestrated arena for this battle by the proponents of banning so-called space weapons involved methodologies, institutions, and agents of international law but was undermined by a vigorous counterattack by the United States using the same forum and suite of instruments so skillfully levied against it.1 This battle, of course, is not a single instance but the latest skirmish of a much larger conflict involving real war in space.

There’s been significant attention—and overstatem­ent— about the effect of a proposed Space Force by the United States, including an arms race and dominance as articulated by the United States,2 yet little attention has been given to the contest that continues to be fought over outer space using the tools of international law and policy, both of which are instruments of “lawfare.” Maj. General Charles N. Dunlap, Jr. (retired)3 first defined lawfare in the paper “Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Conflicts,” as “a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective.”4 This definition can be expanded to the use of hard law, soft law, and non-governmental organizations and institutions within the international arena to achieve a national objective and geopolitical end that would otherwise require the use of hard power. As observed by General Dunlap, lawfare imputes the teachings of Sun Tzu in particular this teaching: “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”5

Lawfare is not a new concept and has been used in many domains, but the tools brought to bear have become more prolific, and the domain of outer space has been and continues to be a theater where it is applied. The earliest example of lawfare (even though the term was not yet coined) in outer space occurred pre-Sputnik with Soviet Union attempting to use customary law to make claims of sovereignty extending beyond the atmosphere to the space above its territory. This claim was preempted by the launch of Sputnik 1 and the act of the satellite flying over the territory of other nations.6 The Eisenhower Administration saw this as an opportunity to meet a national space policy goal and likewise used customary law as an implement of lawfare and successfully created the principle of free access to outer space, which it utilized for photoreconnaissance activities in lieu of overflights of another nation’s sovereign airspace.7 The Soviet Union unsuccessfully attempted to defeat this move using lawfare in the United Nations through a proposal that would have prohibited the use of outer space for the purpose of intelligence gathering.8

Since that setback, the art of lawfare in outer space has settled on the objective ascribed to another teaching of Sun Tzu:

“With regard to precipitous heights, if you proceed your adversary, occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up. Remember, if the enemy has occupied precipitous heights before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.”9

The second part of this teaching exemplifies the role of lawfare in the present war in outer space: to employ the tools and institutions of international law as a means to legally corner an adversary and gain geopolitical advantage in soft power, with the aim of slowing and eroding the advantage that adversary has attained through preeminence in the domain of outer space, and replace it with their own. This objective is accomplished by two general means: legally-binding measures, most commonly in the form of treaties, and so-called non-binding measures couched as sustainability.

Lawfare in space continued in the intervening years between Sputnik-1 and the signature and ratification of the Outer Space Treaty and afterward. The weapon of choice: disarmament proposals for outer space. Provisions for banning so-called space weapons in the Outer Space Treaty were rejected by the Soviet Union in favor of separate arms control measures.10 These measures included proposals, some of which related to the proscription of ASATs, designed to not only gain an advantage in outer space but to gauge political intent and resolve.11

The lawfare offensive escalated after the proposed Strategic Defense Initiative with an effort curtail space-based missile defense technology through a ban on so-called space weapons and a proverbial arms race in outer space. The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), introduced in 1985, continues to seek a legally binding measure to place any weapon in outer space, including those designed for self-defense. It spawned measures such as the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), co-sponsored by Russia and China. This and other measures have met resistance as unverifiable and certainly are not likely to gain the advice and consent of the US Senate for ratification. The end game of the use of lawfare in the form of efforts like PAROS—the latest attempt at which was defeated in Geneva—is to propose legally binding measures that proponents would ignore to their advantage in any event. The sponsors and advocates of these hard-law measures recognize they will not come to fruition but, in the process of promoting them, will enhance their soft power and moral authority, which can be applied to entice their adversary down.

Non-binding resolutions and measures in the form of political agreements and guidelines are being used concurrently in the lawfare engagement in outer space, where proposals for legally binding measures alone fall short of the goal of creating hard law and challenging dominance in outer space. These resolutions and measures, which emphasize sustainability, are designed to perform an end run around the formalities of a treaty to entice agreement on issues that would otherwise be unacceptable in a hard-law agreement. These measures have the dual effect to create soft-power support on the one hand and hard law on the other. This tool of lawfare, which uses clichés of cooperation and sustainability, is a ploy that applies the ambiguous nature of customary international law to achieve what cannot be done through treaties: to “entice the adversary away” and create legal and political constraints to bind and degrade its use of outer space or prevent it from maintaining its superiority, all the while allowing others to play catchup and replace one form of dominance with another. While lawfare is by nature asymmetric, this indirect approach could be considered a subset an irregular tactic of lawfare, as opposed to the use of formal treaties in lawfare.

The crux is that, like space objects used in outer space, international law and its implements are dual-use in that they can be used for proactive ends or weaponized, with those using the appliances of lawfare to encourage cession of the high ground choosing the latter rather than the former. The decision to weaponize international law and its institutions to prosecute this war in space brings into question the efficacy of new rules or norms. Indeed, the idea of expanding the jurisprudence of outer space through custom, as being suggested by the United States, and more recently gap-filling rules being suggested by academia that could become custom, presents the real chance that, rather than the creation of the ploughshare of sustainability, new and more effective swords for lawfare will be forged.

To paraphrase Sun Tzu, “all war is deception.” In the case of outer space, the pretext in the current war in space is that an arms race and a hot war in outer space is inevitable, and can only be avoided by formal rules or international governance. Conversely, a hot war can be prevented in no small part by using lawfare to engage in the contemporary war in space using the tools of, and the abundant resources found in, the experience of attorneys and litigators in particular to supplement and support diplomats to extend the velvet glove when applicable, and bare knuckles when necessary. If the August 14 statement in Geneva is any indicator, the United States may have just done that and begun the shift from light-touch diplomacy to bringing its legal warriors to bear in full-contact lawfare to engage and win the current war in outer space and help deter a more serious hot war from occurring without sacrificing the superiority it possesses in outer space.

#### The PPWT prohibits space-based missile defense

Jack M. Beard 16, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska College of Law, Feb 15 2016, "Soft Law ’s Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities", University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2016, <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1086&context=spacelaw>

B. Avoid Arms Control Traps in Space

Any successful effort to achieve legally binding restrictions on military activities or weapons in space must focus on specific, definable, and limited objectives or run afoul of issues that have historically ensured deadlock among suspicious and insecure adversaries.306 Some seemingly desirable goals, however, are likely to ensure failure.

The first such problematic goal involves attempting to use arms control agreements or other instruments to comprehensively ensure peace in space. Unfortunately, the integration of modern military systems on earth, sea, air and space guarantees that at some point states seeking to disrupt or deny the ability of an adversary (such as the United States) to project power will find space capabilities to be a particularly appealing target, especially in the early stages of a crisis or conflict.307 The presence of so many things of military value in space thus makes actions by an adversary to neutralize, disrupt or destroy these things likely during a major conflict on earth.308

The second problematic arms control goal in space that seems certain to ensure stalemate involves attempting to define and prohibit military technologies with a view to broadly prevent the weaponization of space. Clearly defining a space weapon for purposes of any legally binding arms control agreement is a daunting task, one which is made particularly challenging by the “essentially military nature of space technology.”309 As noted, space technologies are routinely viewed as dual-use in nature, meaning that they can be readily employed for both civilian and military uses. Determining the ultimate purpose of many space technologies may thus depend on discerning the intentions of states, a process perhaps better suited for psychological than legal evaluation. 310

Further complicating the classification of space military technologies is the inherent difficulty in distinguishing most space weapons on the basis of their offensive and defensive roles or even their specific missions.311 For example, this problem lies at the heart of debates over the status and future of ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs, since the technology underlying BMD systems and offensive ASAT weapons is often indistinguishable.312 Vague and broad soft law instruments do not resolve this problem, but create instead their own confusion and insecurity. Vague and broad provisions in legally binding agreements that do not or cannot distinguish between these missions are similarly problematic.

These issues, particularly difficulties in distinguishing ASAT and BMD systems, have figured prominently in complicating negotiations on space weapons over previous decades.313 Similarly, these concerns were a significant factor in initial U.S. opposition to the arms control measure proposed by China and Russia (the PPWT) since it prohibits states from placing any type of weapon in outer space (regardless of its military mission), thus effectively prohibiting the deployment of ballistic missile defense systems. 314 Furthermore, even if clear legal restrictions could be developed, verifying compliance with respect to technology in orbit around Earth would be very difficult (a point conceded even by China with respect to its own proposed PPWT).315

#### Causes rogue state missile threats---that escalates

Patrick M. Shanahan 19, Acting Secretary of Defense from January to June 2019, previously vice president and general manager of Boeing Missile Defense Systems, Jan 2019, "2019 MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW", US Department of Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF

U.S. Homeland Missile Defense will Stay Ahead of Rogue States’ Missile Threats

Technology trends point to the possibility of increasing rogue state missile threats to the U.S. homeland. Vulnerability to rogue state missile threats would endanger the American people and infrastructure, undermine the U.S. diplomatic position of strength, and could lead potential adversaries to mistakenly perceive the United States as susceptible to coercive escalation threats intended to preclude U.S. resolve to resist aggression abroad. Such misperceptions risk undermining our deterrence posture and messaging, and could lead adversaries to dangerous miscalculations regarding our commitment and resolve.

It is therefore imperative that U.S. missile defense capabilities provide effective protection against rogue state missile threats to the homeland now and into the future. The United States is technically capable of doing so and has adopted an active missile defense force-sizing measure for protection of the homeland. DoD will develop, acquire, and maintain the U.S. homeland missile defense capabilities necessary to effectively protect against possible missile attacks on the homeland posed by the long-range missile arsenals of rogue states, defined today as North Korea and Iran, and to support the other missile defense roles identified in this MDR.

This force-sizing measure for active U.S. missile defense is fully consistent with the 2018 NPR, and in order to keep pace with the threat, DoD will utilize existing defense systems and an increasing mix of advanced technologies, such as kinetic or directed-energy boost-phase defenses, and other advanced systems. It is technically challenging but feasible over time, affordable, and a strategic imperative. It will require the examination and possible fielding of advanced technologies to provide greater efficiencies for U.S. active missile defense capabilities, including space-based sensors and boost-phase defense capabilities. Further, because the related requirements will evolve as the long-range threat posed by rogue states evolves, it does not allow a static U.S. homeland defense architecture. Rather, it calls for a missile defense architecture that can adapt to emerging and unanticipated threats, including by adding capacity and the capability to surge missile defense as necessary in times of crisis or conflict.

In coming years, rogue state missile threats to the U.S. homeland will likely expand in numbers and complexity. There are and will remain inherent uncertainties regarding the potential pace and scope of that expansion. Consequently, the United States will not accept any limitation or constraint on the development or deployment of missile defense capabilities needed to protect the homeland against rogue missile threats. Accepting limits now could constrain or preclude missile defense technologies and options necessary in the future to effectively protect the American people.

As U.S. active defenses for the homeland continue to improve to stay ahead of rogue states’ missile threats, they could also provide a measure of protection against accidental or unauthorized missile launches. This defensive capability could be significant in the event of destabilizing domestic developments in any potential adversary armed with strategic weapons, and as long-range missile capabilities proliferate in coming years.

U.S. missile defense capabilities will be sized to provide continuing effective protection of the U.S. homeland against rogue states’ offensive missile threats. The United States relies on nuclear deterrence to address the large and more sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, as well as to deter attacks from any source consistent with long-standing U.S. declaratory policy as re-affirmed in the 2018 NPR.

## 3 110

#### The affirmative offers a solution: implement [insert aff plan] to secure [insert aff impact]. This is the wrong approach—we exist within a “control society,” where power is exercised not through repression, but continuous control-- frame this round as an interrogation of productivity and desire.

Deleuze 92[Gilles Deleuze was a French philosopher who, from the early 1950s until his death in 1995, wrote on philosophy, literature, film, and fine art. His most popular works were the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, both co-written with psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, Postscript on the Societies of Control on JSTOR, Winter 1992,The MIT press,https://www.jstor.org/stable/778828?seq=1, 12-11-2021 amrita]

The different internments or spaces of enclosure through which the individual passes are independent variables: each time one is supposed to start from zero, and although a common language for all these places exists, it is analogical. On the other hand, **the different control mechanisms are inseparable variations, forming a system of variable geometry the language of which is numerical** (which doesn’t necessarily mean binary). Enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point. This is obvious in the matter of salaries: the factory was a body that contained its internal forces at a level of equilibrium, the highest possible in terms of production, the lowest possible in terms of wages; but **in a society of control, the corporation has replaced the factory, and** the corporation is a spirit, a gas. Of course the factory was already familiar with the system of bonuses, but **the corporation works more deeply to impose a modulation of each salary, in states of perpetual metastability** that operate through challenges, contests, and highly comic group sessions. If the most idiotic television game shows are so successful, it’s because they express the corporate situation with great precision. The factory constituted individuals as a single body to the double advantage of the boss who surveyed each element within the mass and the unions who mobilized a mass resistance; but **the corporation constantly presents the brashest rivalry as a healthy form of emulation, an excellent motivational force that opposes individuals** against one another and runs through each, dividing each within. The modulating principle of “salary according to merit**” has not failed to tempt national education itself**. Indeed, just as the corporation replaces the factory, **perpetual training tends to replace the school, and continuous control to replace the examination, which is the surest way of delivering the school over to the corporation**. In the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in the societies of control one is never finished with anything—the corporation, the educational system, the armed services being metastable states coexisting in one and the same modulation, like a universal system of deformation. In The Trial, Kafka, who had already placed himself at the pivotal point between two types of social formation, described the most fearsome of juridical forms. The apparent acquittal of the disciplinary societies (between two incarcerations); and the limitless postponements of the societies of control (in continuous variation) are two very different modes of juridical life, and if our law is hesitant, itself in crisis, it’s because we are leaving one in order to enter into the other. **The disciplinary societies have two poles: the signature that designates the individual, and the number or administrative numeration that indicates his or her position within a mass**. This is because the disciplines never saw any incompatibility between these two, and because at the same time power individualizes and masses together, that is, constitutes those over whom it exercises power into a body and molds the individuality of each member of that body. (Foucault saw the origin of this double charge in the pastoral power of the priest—the flock and each of its animals—but civil power moves in turn and by other means to make itself lay “priest.”) **In the societies of control, on the other hand, what is important** is no **longer either a signature or a number, but a code:** the code is a password, while on the other hand the disciplinary societies are regulated by watchwords (as much from the point of view of integration as from that of resistance). The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access to information, or reject it. **We no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair.** Individuals have become “dividuals,” and masses, samples, data, markets, or “banks.” Perhaps it is money that expresses the distinction between the two societies best, since discipline always referred back to minted money that locks gold in as numerical standard, while control relates to floating rates of exchange, modulated according to a rate established by a set of standard currencies. The old monetary mole is the animal of the spaces of enclosure, but the serpent is that of the societies of control. We have passed from one animal to the other, from the mole to the serpent, in the system under which we live, but also in our manner of living and in our relations with others. The disciplinary man was a discontinuous producer of energy, but the man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network. Everywhere surfing has already replaced the older sports. Types of machines are easily matched with each type of society—not that machines are determining, but because they express those social forms capable of generating them and using them. The old societies of sovereignty made use of simple machines—levers, pulleys, clocks; but the recent disciplinary societies equipped themselves with machines involving energy, with the passive danger of entropy and the active danger of sabotage; the societies of control operate with machines of a third type, computers, whose passive danger is jamming and whose active one is piracy and the introduction of viruses. This technological evolution must be, even more profoundly, a mutation of capitalism, an already well-known or familiar mutation that can be summed up as follows: nineteenth-century capitalism is a capitalism of concentration, for production and for property. **It therefore erects the factory as a space of enclosure, the capitalist being the owner of the means of production but also, progressively, the owner of other spaces conceived through analogy** (the worker’s familial house, the school). As for markets, they are conquered sometimes by specialization, sometimes by colonization, sometimes by lowering the costs of production. But**, in the present situation, capitalism is no longer involved in production, which it often relegates to the Third World, even for the complex forms of textiles, metallurgy, or oil production. It’s a capitalism of higher-order production.** It no longer buys raw materials and no longer sells the finished products: it buys the finished products or assembles parts. What it wants to sell is services and what it wants to buy is stocks. **This is no longer a capitalism for production but for the product, which is to say, for being sold or marketed. Thus it is essentially dispersive, and the factory has given way to the corporation.** The family, the school, the army, the factory are **no longer the distinct analogical spaces that converge towards an owner—state or private power—but coded figures—deformable and transformable—of a single corporation that now has only stockholders**. Even art has left the spaces of enclosure in order to enter into the open circuits of the bank. The conquests of the market are made by grabbing control and no longer by disciplinary training, by fixing the exchange rate much more than by lowering costs, by transformation of the product more than by specialization of production. Corruption thereby gains a new power. Marketing has become the center or the “soul” of the corporation. We are taught that corporations have a soul, which is the most terrifying news in the world. The operation of markets is now the instrument of social control and forms the impudent breed of our masters. Control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but also continuous and without limit, while discipline was of long duration, infinite and discontinuous. Man is no longer man enclosed, but man in debt. It is true that capitalism has retained as a constant the extreme poverty of three-quarters of humanity, too poor for debt, too numerous for confinement: control will not only have to deal with erosions of frontiers but with the explosions within shanty towns or ghettos.

#### Distinctions between the private and public sphere do not exist-- the affirmative’s theorization of such is the latest tactic of control society to modulate the enunciation of behavior and subjectivity through fascist mechanisms.

Hardt 98 [Michael Hardt is an American political philosopher and literary theorist. Hardt is best known for his book Empire, which was co-written with Antonio Negri. It has been praised by Slavoj Žižek as the "Communist Manifesto of the 21st Century". He is currently a professor of literature at Duke University, The Global Society of Control on JSTOR, Fall 1998, Discourse Vol. 20, No. 3, Gilles Deleuze: A Reason to Believe in this World, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41389503, 12-14-2021 amrita]

There Is No More Outside The passage from disciplinary society to **the society of control is characterized** first of all **by the collapse of** the walls **that defined** the **institutions. There is progressively less distinction,** in other words, between inside and outside. This is really part of a general change in the way that power marks space in the passage from modernity to postmodernity. Modern sovereignty has always been conceived in terms of a (real or imagined) territory and the relation of that territory to its outside. Early modern social theorists, for example,from Hobbes to Rousseau, understood the civil order as a limited and interior space that is opposed or contrasted to the external order of nature. The bounded space of civil order, its place, is defined by its separation from the external spaces of nature. In an analogous fashion, the theorists of modern psychology understood drives, passions, instincts, and the unconscious metaphorically in spatial terms as an outside within the human mind, a continuation of nature deep within us. Here the sovereignty of the Self rests on a dialectical relation between the natural order of drives and the civil order of reason or consciousness. Finally, modern anthropology's various discourses on primitive societies often function as the outside that defines the bounds of the civil world. **The process of modernization**, then, in all these varied contexts, **is the internalization of the outside,** that is, the civilization of nature. In the postmodern world, **however, this dialectic** between inside and outside, between the civil order and the natural order, **has come to an end**. This is one precise sense in which the contemporary world is postmodern. "Postmodernism," Fredric Jameson tells us, "is what **you have when the modernization process is complete and nature is gone for good**."3 Certainly we continue to have forests and crickets and thunderstorms in our world, and we continue to understand our psyches as driven by natural instincts and passions, but we have no nature in the sense that these forces and phenomena are no longer understood as outside, that is, they are not seen as original and independent of the artifice of the civil order. In a postmodern world all phenomena and forces are artificial, or as some might say, part of history. The modern dialectic of inside and outside **has been replaced by a play of degrees** and intensities, of hybridity **and** artificiality. Secondly, the outside **has also declined in terms of** a rather different modern **dialectic that defined the relation between public and private in liberal political theory**. The **public spaces** of modern society, **which constitute the place of liberal politics, tend to disappear** in the postmodern world. According to the liberal tradition, the modern individual, at home in its private spaces, regards the public as its outside. The outside is the place proper to politics, where the action of the individual is exposed in the presence of others and there seeks recognition. In the process of postmodernization, however, **such public spaces are increasingly becoming privatized**. The urban landscape is shifting from the modern focus on the common square and the public encounter to the closed spaces of malls, freeways, and gated communities. The architecture and urban planning of megalopolises such as Los Angeles and Sao Paulo have tended to limit public access and interaction as well as limited chance encounters of different social subjects, creating rather a series of protected interior and isolated spaces. Alternatively, consider how the banlieu of Paris has become a series of amorphous and indefinite spaces that promote isolation rather than any interaction or communication. **Public space has been privatized to such an extent** that **it no longer makes sense to understand social organization in terms of a dialectic between private and public spaces**, between inside and outside. The **place of modern liberal politics has disappeared** **and thus from this optic our postmodern and imperial society** **is characterized by a deficit of the political**. In effect, the place of politics has been deactualized. In this regard, Guy Debord's analysis of the society of the spectacle, thirty years after its composition, seems ever more apt and urgent.4 In postmodern society the spectacle is a virtual place, or more accurately, a non-place of politics. The **spectacle is at once unified** and diffuse in such a way that **it is impossible to distinguish** any inside from outside - the natural from the social, **the private from the public**. The **liberal notion of the public**, the place outside where we act in the presence of others, **has been** both **universalized** (because we are always now under the gaze of others, monitored by safety cameras) **and sublimated** or de-actualized in the virtual spaces of the spectacle. The end of the outside is the end of liberal politics. Finally, from the perspective of Empire, or rather from that of the contemporary world order, there is no longer an outside **also in a** third sense, a properly **military sense**. When Francis Fukuyama claims that the contemporary historical passage is defined by the end of history, he means that the era of major conflicts has come to an end: in other words, sovereign power will no longer confront its Other, it will no longer face its outside, but rather progressively expand its boundaries to envelop the entire globe as its proper domain.5 The history of imperialist, inter-imperialist, and anti-imperialist wars is over. The end of that history has ushered in the reign of peace. Or really, we have entered the era of minor and internal conflicts. Every imperial war is a civil war, a police action- from Los Angeles and Granada to Mogadishu and Sarajevo. **In fact, the separation of tasks between the external and internal arms of power (between the army and the police, the CIA and the FBI) is increasingly vague and indeterminate.** In our terms the end of history that Fukuyama refers to is the end of the crisis at the center of modernity, the coherent and defining conflict that was the foundation and raison d'etre for modern sovereignty. History has ended precisely and only to the extent that it is conceived in Hegelian terms- as the movement of a dialectic of contradictions, a play of absolute negations and subsumption. The binaries that defined modern conflict have become blurred. The Other that might delimit a sovereign Self has become fractured and indistinct, and there is no longer an outside that can bound the place of sovereignty. At one point in the Cold War, in an exaggerated version of the crisis of modernity, every enemy imaginable (from women's garden clubs and Hollywood films to national liberation movements) could be identified as communist, that is, part of the unified enemy. The outside is what gave the crisis of the modern and imperialist world its coherence. **Today it is increasingly difficult for the ideologues of the United States to name the enemy, or rather there seem to be minor and elusive enemies everywhere.6 The end of the crisis of modernity has given rise to a proliferation of minor and indefinite crises in the imperial society of control, or as we prefer, to an omni-crisis.** It is useful to remember here that the capitalist market is one machine that has always run counter to any division between inside and outside. The capitalist market is thwarted by exclusions and it **thrives by including always increasing numbers within its sphere**. Profit can only be generated through contact, engagement, interchange, and commerce. The realization of the world market would constitute the point of arrival of this tendency. In its ideal form there is no outside to the world market: the entire globe is its domain.7 We might use the form of the world market as a model for understanding the form of imperial sovereignty in its entirety. Perhaps, just as Foucault recognized the panopticon as the diagram of modern power and disciplinary society, the world market might serve adequately (even though it is not an architecture; it is really an anti-architecture) as the diagram of imperial power and the society of control.8 The striated space of modernity constructs places that are continually engaged in and founded on a dialectical play with their outsides**. The space of imperial sovereignty, in contrast, is smooth. It might appear that it is free of the binary divisions of modern boundaries, or striation, but really it is criss-crossed by so many fault lines that it only appears as a continuous, uniform space. In** this sense, the clearly defined crisis of modernity gives way to an omnicrisis in the imperial framework. In this smooth space of empire, there is no place of power- it is both everywhere and nowhere. The empire is an u-topos , or rather a non-place.

#### This may seem innocuous, but it creates a war on difference, a new totalitarian model that is premised upon reactive orientations to desire, leaving only a simulation of political participation creating fascism-- that turns case.

Karatzogianni and Robinson 13. [Athina Karatzogianni is a Senior Lecturer in Media and Communication at the University of Leicester (UK), Andrew Robinson is an independent researcher and writer, “Schizorevolutions vs. Microfascisms: A Deleuzo-Nietzschean Perspective on State, Security, and Active/Reactive Networks,” Selected Works, July 2013, http://works.bepress.com/athina\_ karatzogianni, 8-17-2019, amrita]

Thesis 2: The threatened state transmutes into the terror state. The return of state violence from the kernel of state exceptionalism is a growing problem. It is grounded on a reaction of the terrified state by conceiving the entire situation as it is formerly conceived specific sites of exception and emergency (c.f. Agamben, 1998, 2005). New forms of social control directed against minor deviance or uncontrolled flows are expanding into a war against difference and a systematic denial of the ‘right to have rights’ (Robinson, 2007). The project is not simply an extension of liberal-democratic models of social control, but breaks with such models in directly criminalizing nonconformity from a prescribed way of life and attempting to extensively regulate everyday life through repression. This new repressive model, expressing a kind of neo-totalitarianism, should be taken to include such measures and structures as the rise of gated communities, CCTV, RFID, ID cards, ASBOs, dispersal zones, paramilitary policing methods, the ‘social cleansing’ of groups such as homeless people and street drinkers from public spaces, increasing restrictions on protests and attacks on ‘extremist’ groups, the use of extreme sentencing against minor deviance, and of course the swathe of “anti-terrorism” laws which provide a pretext for expanded repression. This increasingly vicious state response leads to extremely intrusive state measures. The magazine Datacide analyses the wave of repression as ‘the real subsumption of every singularity in the domain of the State. From now on if your attributes don't quite extend to crime, a judge's word suffices to ensure that crime will reach out and embrace your attributes’ (Hyland n.d.). To decompose networks, the state seeks to shadow them ever more closely. The closure of space is an inherent aspect of this project of control. While open space is a necessary enabling good from the standpoint of active desire, it is perceived as a threat by the terrified state, because it is space in which demonised Others can gather and recompose networks outside state control. Hence, for the threatened state, open space is space for the enemy, space of risk. Given that open space is in contrast necessary for difference to function (since otherwise it is excluded as unrepresentable or excessive), the attempts to render all space closed and governable involve a constant war on difference which expands ever more deeply into everyday life. As Guattari aptly argues, neoliberal capitalism tends to construe difference as unwanted ‘noise’ (1996: 137). Society thus becomes a hothouse of constant crackdowns and surveillance, which at best simulates, and at worst creates, a situation where horizontal connections either cannot emerge or are constantly persecuted. Theories such as those of Agamben and Kropotkin show the predisposition of the state to pursue total control. But why is the state pursuing this project now? To understand this, one must recognise the multiple ways in which capitalism can handle difference. Hence, there are two poles the state can pursue, social-democratic (adding axioms) or totalitarian (subtracting axioms), which have the same function in relation to capitalism, but are quite different in other regards. State terror involves the replacement of addition of axioms (inclusion through representation) with subtraction of axioms (repression of difference). This parallels the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power in international relations. Crucially, ‘hard’ power is deflationary (Mann 2005: 83-4). While ideological integration can be increased by intensified command, ‘soft’ power over anyone who remains outside the dominant frame is dissipated. Everyday deviance becomes resistance because of the project of control which attacks it. It also becomes necessarily more insurrectionary, in direct response to the cumulative attempts to stamp it out through micro-regulation. What the state gains in coercive power, it loses in its ability to influence or engage with its other. But the state, operating under intense uncertainty and fear, is giving up trying to seem legitimate across a field of difference. A recent example of this concerns the treatment of whistleblowers: Bradley [Chelsea] Manning and by extent the publisher Julian Assange in the WikiLeaks case (for a discussion of affect see Karatzogianni, 2012) and Edward Snowden in relation to the recent revelations about NSA surveillance program PRISM (Poitras and Greenwald’s video Interview with Edward Snowden, 9 June 2013). This is not to say that it dispenses with articulation. It simply restricts it tautologically to its own ideological space (Negri 2003: 27). Legitimation is replaced by information, technocracy and a simulation of participation (Negri 2003: 90, 111.). There is a peculiarly close relationship between the state logic of command and the field of what is variously termed ‘ideology’ (in Althusser), ‘mythology’ (in Barthes) and ‘fantasy’ (in Lacan): second- order significations embedded in everyday representations, through which a simulated lifeworld is created, in which people live in passivity, creating their real performative connection to their conditions of existence and bringing them into psychological complicity in their own repression. Such phenomena are crucial to the construction of demonised Others which provides the discursive basis for projects of state control. ‘[Conflict is] deflected... through the automatic micro-functioning of ideology through information systems. This is the normal, ‘everyday’ fascism, whose most noticeable feature is how unnoticeable it is’ (Negri 1998a: 190). In denial of generalisable rights, the in-group defines social space for itself and itself alone. The result is a denial of basic dignity and rights to those who fall outside "society", who, in line with their metaphysical status, are to be cast out, locked away, or put beyond a society defined as being for "us and us only" (the mythical division between social and anti-social). The neo-totalitarian state resurrects the tendency to build a state ideology, but this ideology is now disguised as a shared referent of polyarchic parties and nominally free media. Failing to think in statist terms is no longer any different from criminal intent. Romantically crossing an airport barrier for a goodbye kiss is taken as a major crime, for the state, being terrified, responds disproportionately; the romantic is blamed for producing this response (Baker and Robins, 2010). He should have thought like the state to begin with, and not corrupted its functioning with trivialities such as love. Such is the core of the terror-state: constant exertion of energy to ward off constant anxiety, at the cost of a war on difference. Networks under Threat - Network Terror Thesis 3: Networked movements escape the state-form. Thesis 4: State terror targets and terrifies movements. Thesis 5: Movement terror is an outcome of state terror against movements. At the intersection of the threatened state and the sources of its anxiety lies the collapse of marginal integration and ‘addition of axioms’ in neoliberalism. Capitalism has been clenching its fists on the world for some time, and many spaces and people are falling through its fingers. The formal sector of the economy is shrinking, leaving behind it swathes of social life marginalized from capitalist inclusion. Much of the global periphery is in effect being forcibly ‘delinked’ from the world economy as inclusion through patronage is scaled down due to neoliberalism. For instance, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa has almost dropped out of the formal international economy’ (Mann, 2005: 55-6). Religious, militia and informal economic organisations have replaced the state on the ground across swathes of Africa, and ‘whole regions have now become virtually independent, probably for the foreseeable future, of all central control’ (Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, 1999: 19-20). These spaces are the locus of the state’s fear of ‘black holes’ where state power breaks down and insurgents can flourish (Korteweg, 2008; Innes, 2008). On a human scale, exclusion, or ‘forced escape’, is even more noticeable. Arif Dirlik argues that capitalism controls enough resources that it no longer needs to control the majority of people; it can simply ignore and exclude four-fifths of the world (1994: 54-5). William Robinson refers to a new stratum of ‘supernumeraries’ in countries like Haiti, who are completely marginalised from production, useless to capitalism and prone to revolt (1996: 342, 378). This became even more evident with the extreme recent seismic event in January 2010 a paradigmatic failure to save lives. This stratum is another locus of the state’s fears. Such people are in Žižek’s terms the ‘social symptom’ of the current world order, ‘the part which, although inherent to the existing universal order, has no ‘proper place’ within it’ (Žižek, 1999, p. 224). Hence, as Caffentzis puts it, ‘Once again, as at the dawn of capitalism, the physiognomy of the world proletariat is that of the pauper, the vagabond, the criminal, the panhandler, the refugee sweatshop worker, the mercenary, the rioter’ (1992: 321). Viewed in affirmative terms, these excluded sites and peoples are associated with the network form. The last few decades have seen a proliferation of network-based movements -- some emancipatory, others less so -- drawing their membership from marginalised groups and creating autonomous zones in marginal spaces. In the South, such movements often grow out of the everyday networks of survival which ‘provide an infrastructure for the community and a measure of functional autonomy’ (Hecht and Simone, 1994: 14-15; c.f. Lomnitz, 1977; Chatterjee 1993). The discontented excluded lie at the heart of today’s asymmetrical wars. For instance, Giustozzi has investigated the origins of the Pakistani Taleban, revealing that it flourishes mainly among young people who do not receive ‘peace, income, a sense of purpose, a social network’ from the established structure of tribal power (Giustozzi 2007: 39), while Watts (2007) has referred to what is known locally as the ‘restive youth problem’ as central to the conflict in the Niger Delta. One can also refer here to mass protest revolts such as those in Greece and the French banlieues, and spectacular revolts against state power in which police stations and state symbols are attacked, such as the Boko Haram revolt in Nigeria and the uprising of Primero Comando da Capital (PCC) in Sao Paolo. Ignoring for the moment the distinctions among such movements, their vitality can clearly be traced to their networked and marginal loci. Resisting or eluding the terror-state’s grab for space, horizontal networks flow around the state’s restrictions, moving into residual unregulated spaces, gaps in the state’s capacity to repress, across national borders, or into the virtual. Repression drives dissent from open to clandestine forms, creating a field of diffuse resistance and deviance, which ‘returns’ as intractable social problems and inert effects**.**

#### Endorse community-based radical organizing built around collective solidarity—the plan is doomed to failure if it is tied to discussions of how space is bad. Space has the radical potential to be different and you should affirm a subversion of their politic—no perms.

Battaglia 12 [Debbora Battaglia is a professor at Mount Holyoke College. “Arresting hospitality: the case of the 'handshake in space,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 18, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41506671>., 12-14-2021 amrita]

Towards an extra-territorial ethics of hospitality While acknowledging that anthropologists of play and ludic limits could have a field day with some of this paper's ethnographic material,26 I have tried to do something more far-reaching here – seeking in the complex exchanges of various natural, techno- cultural, and social force-fields the features of an extra-territorial ethics of hospitality, for shaping possible nature-culture futures on the ground. Circling by degrees around 'handshake' scenarios that are basically all about social relations crafted in small actions of non-sovereignty, I seek to posit the diplomatic strategy of suspending welcome as an emblematic action of denying power claimed in the name of territory (Boden)27: Apollo and Soyuz may have sourced to state structures and geopolitical security concerns, but the project could go beyond these. Denying rights to hosting, authoring, or authorizing hospitality other than mutually (as we saw in the hard fact of androgynous technology and manoeuvres for mutual rescue), astronauts and cosmonauts replaced sovereign claims to space with their own relational code — one in which 'the welcomed guest is treated as a friend or ally, as opposed to the stranger treated as an enemy (friend/enemy, hospitality/hostility)' (Derrida 2000: 4). But the ethnography exceeds Derrida's anthropocentrism. Because both spacecraft and humans are as much of space as in it, we are moved to appreciate the value of cutting 'guest' and 'host' free to engage nature-culture relations. To take up sidelong the point that Agamben (2005) carries forward from Carl Schmitt for defining sovereignty, space-as-itself is here the only possible sovereign power: that to which exceptions to human laws source. It is in this sense that the cosmonauts and astronauts of Apollo-Soyuz were acting both humbly and boldly as 'little gods' who would deny a politics of territory a place of privilege in space or on Earth, even as the nations to which they owed their allegiance committed to this value officially in rhetorics of colonization and/or conquest. It is thus that space creates space for a God concept in the company of which both religious orthodoxies and orthodox science can only be uncomfortable (cf. Derrida 2002). It follows that forms of civility become visible in this instance as protentive actions for laws not only in suspension but in submission to space-as-itself — the extreme testing-ground of laws beyond arbitrage, by which the values of the nominal are not only appreciated but strongly felt, as fieldworking astronauts' and cosmonauts' first-person narratives show. Long-duration space station missions enabled by the techno-logical advances of ASTP will in future lend their micro-spaces more readily to narratives and images of sovereignty, including the sovereignty of property. But not in the spacetime of the welcome withheld. It is because purposeful ruptures of nominal conduct interfere with nature-culture business-as-usual that hospitality can abide there, as it were in the aporia. Beyond being merely tolerated, gifts of disruption within insider space communities seized the moment for ‘worlding’ differently than by fixed rules of engagement. Bruno Latour writes in War of the worlds: what about peace?, ‘Modernism distinguishes itself from its successor—what should it be called? "Second modernity"? ... — in this one small respect: from now on the battle is about the making of the common world and the outcome is uncertain. That's all. And that's enough to change everything’ (2002: 33, emphasis added). Derrida takes this anthropological turn when he speaks of hospitality arising not from 'the love of man as a sentimental motive' — it is not about philanthropy — but (quoting Kant) from 'the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else's territory'. Hospitality is to be thought of as a universal ‘obligation, a right, and a duty all regulated by law’ (2000: 4).28 And this is more or less precisely stated by the USSR Command Centre spokesperson in a post-flight statement to the world press: The flight was conducted in accordance with an agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. This document foresaw the execution of projects for the creation of joint means of motion and docking of the Soviet and American manned spacecraft and stations, with the purpose of increasing the safety of spaceflights and securing the possibility of realizing in the future joint scientific experiments.29

## Case

#### Plan gets circumvented. It gets funneled through public private partnerships with space agencies.

**Davenport 20** (Christian Davenport covers NASA and the space industry for The Washington Post's Financial desk. He joined The Post in 2000 and has served as an editor on the Metro desk and as a reporter covering military affairs. He is the author of "The Space Barons: Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos and the Quest to Colonize the Cosmos". “A dollar can’t buy you a cup of coffee but that’s what NASA intends to pay for some moon rocks”. December 3, 2020.)

**NASA** **announced** Thursday **that several companies had won contracts to mine the moon** and turn over small samples to the space agency for a small fee. In one case, a company called Lunar Outpost bid $1 for the work, a price NASA jumped at after deciding the Colorado-based robotics firm had the technical ability to deliver. “You’d be surprised at what a dollar can buy you in space,” Mike Gold, NASA’s acting associate administrator for international and interagency relations, said in a call with reporters. But the modest financial incentives are not the driver of the program. Nor to a large extent is the actual lunar soil. NASA is asking for only small amounts — between 50 and 500 grams (or 1.8 ounces to about 18 ounces). While there would be scientific benefits to the mission, **it’s** really **a tech**nology **development program, allowing companies to practice extracting resources from the lunar surface** and then selling them. It would also establish a legal precedent that would pave the way for companies to mine celestial bodies in an effort blessed by the U.S. government to help build a sustainable presence on the moon and elsewhere. To do that, **NASA** says it **needs its astronauts**, like the western pioneers, to “live off the land,” **using the resources in space instead of hauling them from Earth**. The moon, for example, has plenty of water in the form of ice. **That’s not only key to sustaining human life, but** the hydrogen and oxygen in water **could also be used as rocket fuel, making the moon a potential gas station in space** that could help explorers reach farther into the solar system. **Asteroids also have significant resources, particularly precious metals that could be used for in-space manufacturing.** While the prospect of large mining and manufacturing facilities in orbit is still many years away, NASA wants to use the mining program as a small step toward that goal. NASA is now trying to return astronauts to the moon under its Artemis program for the first time since 1972. Unlike its predecessor, Apollo, where the astronauts visited the lunar surface for a short while before coming home, the Artemis program would create a permanent presence on and around the moon. “**The ability to extract and utilize space resources is the key to achieving this objective of sustainability**,” Gold said. “We must learn to generate our own water, air and even fuel. Living off the land will enable ambitious exploration activities that will result in awe-inspiring science and unprecedented discoveries.” In 2015, then-President Barack Obama signed a law that allowed private companies the right to own the resources they mined in space. Under the program announced Thursday, NASA said the materials would be transferred from the private companies to NASA. **The effort would not violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty**, NASA

#### No uniqueness – there’s no industry for mining asteroids now – the bubble burst

Foust 19 (Jeff. 1/7. Jeff Foust is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. “The asteroid mining bubble has burst” <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3633/1>) 8/27/19 RK

Of all the market being pursued by space startups in the last decade, asteroid mining was perhaps the longest-term, and maybe also the most far-fetched. While space tourism has struggled to get off the ground the business case is clear once companies like Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic start flying—which may finally happen this year. Constellations of small satellites for remote sensing or broadband communications are taking shape now, stimulating demand for new launch vehicles, even if the supply of such vehicles is likely to exceed any reasonable demand forecast. Asteroid mining, though, required the patience to develop technologies to prospect, and then extract, resources like volatiles from asteroids, then find in-space applications for them. “The DSI team provided very innovative solutions to the problem of exploring the solar system at a reasonable cost, and we are eager to see if that can be developed with the help of Bradford technologies,” Fichtenbaum said. Yet those obstacles didn’t stop two companies several years ago from starting up with goals of harvesting resources from asteroids. First came Planetary Resources, which announced plans in 2012 to develop asteroid mining systems , with the backing of prominent business people (see “Planetary Resources believes asteroid mining has come of age”, The Space Review, April 30, 2012.) Nine months later, Deep Space Industries (DSI) announces its own, similar asteroid mining plans (see “Asteroid mining boom or bubble?”, The Space Review, January 28, 2013.) Six years later, the answer to the question posed in that headline is clearly “bubble.” In just two months, both DSI and Planetary Resources, which struggled to raise money and even shifted focus away from asteroid mining, have been acquired by other companies. Their plans to harvest the riches of the solar system are on hold, perhaps indefinitely. On New Year’s Day, Bradford Space announced its acquisition of DSI. Bradford, owned by a US investment group, the American Industrial Acquisition Corporation, but with facilities in Europe, manufactures spacecraft components, including a non-toxic propulsion system called ECAPS.

#### Too many barriers to successful asteroid mining – err neg because the commercial space industry is overly optimistic

Scoles 17 (Sarah. 1/23. Contributing writer at WIRED Science, a contributing editor at Popular Science, and the author of the book ​Making Contact: Jill Tarter and the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence. “ASTEROID MINING SOUNDS HARD, RIGHT? YOU DON’T KNOW THE HALF OF IT” <https://www.wired.com/2017/01/asteroid-mining-sounds-hard-right-dont-know-half/>) 8/27/19 RK

THE COMMERCIAL SPACE industry pushes a particular brand of optimism. Its urge to inspire manifests as soaring soundtracks to three-minute mission-promo videos, press releases with words like “humanity,” and slick graphics of spacecraft that don’t exist yet but could any day now. In the particular case of asteroid mining, business leaders are selling a future in which materials plucked from space rocks make up for Earth’s shortfalls and support a thriving civilization. Everyone is rich, all are happy, and no one wants for anything. O pioneers! We are them! OK, fine, that’s an exaggeration. But the toned-down version of asteroid mining’s prospects is still hyperreal. "Our vision is to catalyze humanity's growth, both on and off the Earth," says Peter Diamandis, co-founder of mining company Planetary Resources, in a PR video. A graphical spacecraft, presumably future-theirs, flies away from our planet while he speaks. "At the end, the entire human race will be the beneficiary, as we expand our reach beyond the Earth, into the solar system," he continues. But traveling the road to space-based industry will require giant leaps. Like picking the most lucrative asteroids—the ones with lots of water and precious metals—from far afield. And negotiating spacecraft near their complicated gravitational fields. To do that, companies will have to leave the comfy confines of Earth's orbit, where they currently do all their experimenting. In May, Planetary Resources raised $21 million of venture capital for an Earth-observation program called Ceres. Ten small satellites will fly low around the planet, taking twice-daily images of Earth in wavelengths ranging from mid-infrared to visible—images that will “benefit multiple industries including agriculture, oil & gas, water quality, financial intelligence and forestry.” These satellites will, essentially, be prospecting Earth, using the same sensors Planetary Resources has developed to prospect asteroids. The utility, says president and CEO Chris Lewicki, is dual. “We are taking pictures of the Earth and using them not only to understand how our technology works but also to understand more about our planet,” he says. True enough, but it's also about the balance sheet: Earth-facing spacecraft, as all that venture capital suggests, are big money. Which is important for a company that has to continue existing until it can actually mine asteroids. The other big name in the industry, Deep Space Industries, is also in the Earth-observation business, kind of: It sells its spacecraft technologies to other companies, some of whom want to use them to peer down at our planet. Like HawkEye 360, a company that plans to monitor and map radio-wave broadcasts in near real-time. Deep Space Industries is the prime contractor developing and making the satellites that will become HawkEye's Pathfinder prototype. “Earth observation is kind of the hot thing in space right now,” says Meagan Crawford, Deep Space Industries' chief operating officer. “It’s where most of the value is being created.” But unlike Planetary Resources, Deep Space Industries isn’t planning its own world-watching missions, even if they plan to profit from others’. Their personal path to an asteroid is straighter: They hope to launch the prototype Prospector-X this year to see how its propulsion performs, how its avionics stand up to space radiation, and how its optical navigation system fares against obstacles. It will be in Earth orbit, but it’s not on the Earth-observation beat. It’s meant to show that the follow-on Prospector-1 will work—hopefully going to an asteroid by the end of the decade, the same timescale on which Deep Space is also working. “We think the best way to determine what these asteroids are really like is to go touch and feel and interact with one,” Crawford says. Spacecraft shortfalls Becoming a prime prospector of Earth doesn’t quite translate to asteroids, as the two space-body types are quite different. For one, Earth is, like, right here. Asteroids are way out there, moving very fast. And that makes getting to know them hard. The companies need to know about a specific rock's composition before embarking on a mining mission—something they can't accomplish with the same sensors they are deploying in Earth orbit, the same ones they hope to use to get detailed information once they are actually close to an asteroid. Scientific missions specced to learn more about what asteroids are made of, like NASA's newly funded Lucy and Psyche, will help the companies get the knowledge they need to get power. But Crawford admits that "the biggest missing piece for asteroid mining is scientific knowledge of target asteroids." Asteroids’ specifics are still fuzzy. That’s why space agencies keep sending missions like Lucy and Psyche, as well as the already-launched OSIRIS-REx, Dawn, and Hayabusa to them: because we don’t know a super lot about their details, beyond predictive models based on broad categories.

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