Our Model of topicality has affimarives

## Peaceful Strikes CP

#### CP Text: The United States ought to recognize the unconditional right of incarcerated workers to conduct peaceful strikes.

#### The cp competes:

#### 1] Violent strikes are real and exist

Grant, Wallace, 91, Unviersity of Chicago, “Why Do Strikes Turn Violent?”, URL: <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/229651?journalCode=ajs>, KR

Finally, Taft and Ross's (1969) widely cited study of American industrial violence is one of the few to include a discussion of violent strikes that have occurred since World War II. But their analysis consists of an in-depth discussion of a few highly publicized violent strikes, which thus precludes any systematic comparison of violent and nonviolent strikes. They do, however, concur with the expectations (not the findings)of both previous researchers that strikes over union-organization issues are more likely to be violent than strikes over other issues. However, these other findings from the Taft and Ross study have limited applicability here because of the nature of their sample and analysis.

In short, there is no rigorous, quantitative study of strike violence in advanced industrial countries in the post-World War II era. However, research by Jamieson (1968), Taft and Ross (1969), and others suggests that violence has been an important feature of strikes in this era, particularly in the United States and Canada. Hence, the opportunity to investi-gate industrial violence during the late 1950s and early 1960s should illuminate the processes that contribute to the outbreak of violence among weak-insider groups.

#### 2] Unconditional means all – choosing in the 1ar incentivizes shiftiness which makes it impossible to be neg

Cambridge Dictionary No Date, (Cambridge Dictionary, “Unconditional”), https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unconditional // MNHS NL

complete and not limited in any way: the unconditional love that parents feel for their children

unconditional surrender

#### Even under the aff, prisoners resort to violence under strikes if needs aren’t met, they view it as good but it creates a hierarchial order that hurts prison stability

Harvard Law Review, 19 - ("Striking the Right Balance: Toward a Better Understanding of Prison Strikes," Harvard Law Review 03/8/2019, accessed 10-28-2021, <https://harvardlawreview.org/2019/03/striking-the-right-balance-toward-a-better-understanding-of-prison-strikes/),> KR

Bargaining is, in many respects, already very common in prisons, “for the simple reason that [prison] administrators rarely have sufficient resources to gain complete conformity to all the rules.”

However, such bargaining typically happens in an informal, ongoing, private process; in their recurrent, day-to-day contact with inmates, prison administrators use their arsenal of tools to “negotiate” only with select inmate leaders, with the central goal of maintaining “short term surface order.”

This informal bargaining is “dysfunctional” to the long-term stability of prison institutions and “the real needs of those incarcerated within” them — creating hierarchical relationships that breed mistrust and leave many inmates powerless and feeling aggrieved.

As a result, inmates often feel that they have to resort to violence to protect themselves from exploitation, express their dissatisfaction, and obtain redress.1

Alternatively, peaceful, collective prison strikes avoid these harmful consequences by allowing for “open” and “formal” negotiations between all inmates and prison staff.

Such transparent and legitimated bargaining benefits both inmates and prisons as a whole. By initiating peaceful protests such as work stoppages, all inmates are able “to solve problems, maximize gains, articulate goals, develop alternative strategies, and deal with [administrators] without resorting to force or violence.”

And by permitting peaceful strikes, prison administrators “provide inmates with a channel for airing grievances and gaining official response . . . giv[ing] the institution a kind of safety-valve for peaceful, rather than violent, change” — avoiding potentially expensive and time-consuming litigation and even helping rehabilitate inmates,all while deemphasizing hierarchical structures in prisons that harm institutional order.

## 2

## T – A

#### Interp – The affirmative may not specifity a governmnet AND a type of worker

#### the resolution must be proven true in all instances, not one particular instance

CCC Capital Community College [a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation], “Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles AG

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### Violation – They spec \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ country

#### Standards:

#### 1] Limits – they can spec 123 different governments - that’s supercharged by the ability to spec combinations of types of strikes. This takes out functional limits – it’s impossible for me to research every possible combination of the 195 countries and worker types

ITUC 20**,** (International Trade Union Confederation, “World’s Worst Countries for Workers”), ITUC, 2020, https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc\_globalrightsindex\_2020\_en.pdf // MNHS NL recut DD AG

In 2020, strikes have been severely restricted or banned in 123 out of 144 countries. In a significant number of these countries, industrial actions were brutally repressed by the authorities and workers exercising their right to strike often faced criminal prosecution and summary dismissals.

#### 2. The aff makes the right to strike conditional on worker type which is the opposite of unconditional

Cambridge Dictionary No Date, (Cambridge Dictionary, “Unconditional”), https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unconditional // MNHS NL

complete and not limited in any way: the unconditional love that parents feel for their children

unconditional surrender

#### 2] Prep hazard – the negative is forced into generic Kant NCs each round – their model encourages random country of the week affs that make it impossible for the negative to cut stable neg links to the affirmative. Generics like the econ DA don’t check bc each country has various economic situations

#### 3] TVA solves – just read your aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff – we don’t stop them from reading new FWs, mechanisms or advantages. PICs aren’t aff offense – a] it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff being non-T b] There’s only a small number of pics on this topic c] PICs incentivize them to write better affs that can generate solvency deficits to PICs

## 3

#### White Supremacy operates as a ponzi-scheme – questions of reforming the criminal justice system is the abusers attempt to bring home a rose that locks in violent power hierchies and quells abolitionistic organizing,

Saleh-Hanna 15 [Viviane Saleh-Hanna, Associate professor/chair person, Crime & Justice Studies @Umass Dartmouth, “Black feminist hauntology – Rememory: The ghosts of abolition”, Penal field, Abolitionism, Vol XII, 6-7-15]//Raunak Dua

White Supremacy is a Ponzi-Scheme Trapping its Victims within Racialized Cycles of Abuse Through Black Feminist Hauntology, racial colonialism re-appears an implicitly abusive system of power (capitalism) and control (enslaved, reservation-bound, imprisoned and many more varying forms of conquest). A system built upon White supremacist conceptions of humanity and conquest is a system that must appear and re-appear in varying forms to uphold its own lies. It functions like a ponzi-scheme5 borrowing from one liberation movement’s language and ideologies to the next, co-opting the images of freedom to conceal its racist, morally corrupt bankruptcy. The scheme can only crumble – and quickly – when new lenders stop providing funds. Thus, White supremacy’s fuel has always resided in an implicit anti-Blackness it knows it can bank on, for its political campaigns, its policies of reform, its anti-Black constructions of abolition6, its varying punishing and thinking institutions. That ponzi-scheme flourishes when feminism remains dominantly White, when Marxism remains dominantly White, when postmodernism remain dominantly White, when neocolonial and postcolonial studies became dominantly White, and so on. While the ponzi-scheme analogy helps us understand how White supremacy perpetuates itself despite moral bankruptcy, its actual practices are best understood through our knowledge of abusive relationships. 24Race-relations, through colonial conquest, have developed inter-generational, wide-reaching, institutionalized and structurally abusive relationships that mirror cycles of abuse made familiar to us in feminist scholarship. Abusers start by isolating their victims from family and support networks, proceed by entangling their victims in a web of self-doubt and dangerously involuntary dependence, and entrap their victims by building an illusion of change to come or abuse to end. The institutional beatings of a systemic abuser manifests itself behind a million small and large acts of injustice behind the looming figure of a White man, on a horse, with a gun in one hand and a bouquet of flowers in the other. Buried deep within that figure are the qualities that form the modern abusive husband who is born out of the colonial soldier’s massacres, the White feminist who constructs her own womanhood in juxtaposition to her colonized stepdaughter, the one who was born because her husband, a slaveholder, a prison guard, a president of the United States raped that child’s enslaved, imprisoned mother. Racial colonialism binds us up in one place and constructs us through a classically capitalist competition of humanity in which Whiteness, backed by militarized power (penal and otherwise) becomes dependent upon racializing violence to construct itself. 25White hetero-patriarchal violence classically legitimizes racial abuse by othering so it can blame the victim. It occurs in cycles starting with isolation, followed by beatings, then apologies accompanied by gifts in what feminists call the ‘honeymoon’ phase rife with formerly broken promises. Typically as the honeymoon ends tensions begin to build and soon after the abused partner bears the brunt of her abusers ways and inevitably, the cycle continues with beatings once again manifesting themselves in overtly abusive measures of control. Through Black Feminist Hauntology we apply this cycle of violence so well discussed in feminist scholarship (e.g. Snider, 1998; Harris, 2011) to a structural understanding of colonizing race-relations in the United States. These are inter-generational, foundationally abusive: the original acts of isolation began with colonial land-theft (isolating Indigenous peoples from their land, identities and ways of life) and slavery (isolating African peoples from their homelands, families, ways of life and worship, their very identities). The first severe and often lethal beatings were performed by Europeans through chattel slavery and Indigenous genocides. Centuries of abuse were followed by a brief honeymoon phase phase (in the structural Black and White Racial relationship) in the United States named ‘reconstruction’ after the 13th amendment was passed in 1895: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction (United States Constitution, emphasis added). Heavily embedded in this amendment is the abuser’s warning, that slavery could re-emerge if his victim does not follow his rules (i.e. if she is convicted of a crime). This moment in race-relations, the passing of the 13th amendment, is mirrored every time an abuser comes home with flowers or blood diamonds, depending on his inherited or achieved status, to atone for his violence. As we know, these gifts are accompanied by ‘never again’ messages underscored by classic, ‘do not provoke me’ tones of victim blaming. Race-relations through colonial conquest continue to exist within these tensions and the beatings eventually resurface. During Reconstruction Whiteness emerged solidly rooted in the formations of the ku klux klan and their support within White neighborhood associations manifesting in White police enforcement and their politically popular endorsement of lynching (Hale, 1999). Those beatings performed through lynching, and accompanied by varieties of Black resistance, commenced for decades and claimed thousands of lives. This abuse was briefly followed by a honeymoon moment in which the Civil Rights Act was signed in 1964. Shortly afterward COINTELPRO waged its war on freedom struggles, the war on drugs became institutionalized, privatized prisons were revived, and prison labor entered into the New York Stock exchange to be bought and sold by corporations investing in these most expensive and ‘low risk’ stocks (Browne, 1996). The criminal justice system emerged empowered to carry on the beatings that chattel slavery and jim crow violence had performed before it accompanied by each generation’s resistance, struggles to survive. Today, the public, recorded and endorsed police murders of Black people in the United States are confronted with ghosted words, “Hands up don’t shoot” and “I can’t breathe”, uttered from the graves, sustained by protesters shouting back White supremacy’s ultimate unspeakable sentiment: “Black Lives Matter”. Anti-Black police violence today is ghosted by its historic antecedents, was forward-haunted by lynching and the countless deaths inflicted by armed White men on plantations colonizing the vast majority of the Western Hemisphere, overshadowing but unable to fully erase the fact that chattel slavery extends well beyond the Confederate States of the Southern United States and pollutes the Northern regions of the United States, Canada, Western Europe (Cooper, 2007) and vast lands and islands south of the United States. Chattel slavery was the underpinning institution for White modernity and as generations of White Supremacy’s abusive institutional beatings arises, with each comes its own systemic perpetrator’s versions of why the victims of abusive race-relations are ‘responsible’ for that violence. Much like an abused woman must first recognize that she is trapped in an abusive relationship before she can find the language needed to critique it, it is only through an understanding of colonial cycles of abuse that we can transcend these exploitative explanations – of crime, of segregation, of slavery, of the inevitability of Black and Indigenous death mirrored in the progression of White supremacist life – to fully consider an exit from White supremacist hetero-patriarchy altogether. 26Oftentimes, the first step in exiting an abusive relationship alive requires the abused to see, in her abuser, his potential to kill, coupled by her desire to remain alive. She must recognize his intentions to continue abusing her, his obsessive need to control her. It is not that he cannot or will not change, it is that he does not want to or does not have to change. Margaret Garner knew that, which is why she left Sweet Home Plantation. That was why she killed her daughter, because she had to kill her: If I had not killed her she would have died and that is something I could not bear to happen to her (Morrison, 1987, 200).

#### The right to strike is a dangerous distraction that prevents the labor movement from challenging systems at the root cause that make it structurally impossible for legal institutions to protect workers. Empirically “right to strike” legislation hamstrings actual strikes via circumventive policies that jail strikers for engaging in theft, violence, etc while allowing for a façade of acceptance and forcing union representation, wages, and economic equality to plummet. The AFF results in scattered, ineffective, and “respectable” strikes and labor disputes re-routed towards legal arbitration while increased legal incorporation results in more tools for the elite to constrain the labor movement -- turns case and kills workers’ movement writ large.

White 18 (Ahmed White – Nicholaus Rosenbaum Professor of Law @ University of Colorado Law School, “Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike”, https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2369&context=articles , 2018, pgs. 1065-1073, EmmieeM)

One of the most important statutes ever enacted, the National Labor Relations Act envisaged the right to strike as the centerpiece of a system of labor law whose central aims included dramatically diminishing the pervasive exploitation and steep inequality that are endemic to modern capitalism. These goals have never been more relevant. But they have proved difficult to realize via the labor law, in large part because an effective right to strike has long been elusive, undermined by courts, Congress, the NLRB, and powerful elements of the business community. Recognizing this, labor scholars have made the restoration of the right to strike a cornerstone of labor law scholarship. Authorities in the field have developed an impressive literature that stresses the importance of strikes and strongly criticizes the arguments that judges, legislators, and others have used to justify their degradation of the right to strike. But this literature has developed without its authors ever answering a fundamental question, which is whether an effective right to strike is a viable aspiration in the first place. This Article takes up this question. It documents the crucial role that strikes have played in building the labor movement, legitimating the labor law itself, and indeed validating the New Deal and, with this, the modern administrative state; and it confirms the integral role that strikes play in contesting the corrosive power capitalism accords employers over the workplace and the spoils of production. But this Article also shows how the strikes that were effective in these crucial ways were not conventional strikes, limited to the simple withholding of labor and the advertisement of workers’ grievances. Instead, they inevitably embraced disorderly, coercive tactics like mass picketing and sit-down strikes to a degree that suggests that tactics such as these are indeed essential if strikes are to be effective. Yet strikes that have featured these tactics have never enjoyed any legitimacy beyond the ranks of labor, radical activists, and academic sympathizers. Their inherent affronts to property and public order place them well beyond the purview of what could ever constitute a viable legal right in liberal society; and they have been treated accordingly by courts, Congress, and other elite authorities. From this vantage, it becomes clear that an effective right to strike is not only an impossible distraction but a dangerous fantasy that prevents labor’s champions from confronting the broader, sobering truths that this country’s legal and political system are, at root, anathema to a truly viable system of labor rights and that labor’s salvation must be sought elsewhere.

INTRODUCTION

“They say ‘you got a right to strike but you can’t picket,’ an’ they know a strike won’t work without picket-in’.”1 This is the angry lament of Mac McLeod, a central character in John Steinbeck’s 1936 novel, In Dubious Battle, delivered just after Mac and fellow unionists were enjoined by a carload of heavily-armed police “to keep order.”2 “You can march as long as you don’t block traffic,” said the head cop, “but you are not going to interfere with anybody. Get that?”3

Recently adapted to film in a movie that is notably long on stars but short on distribution,4 the novel is considered one of Steinbeck’s finest.5 It is also perhaps the most powerful depiction of a labor strike in American literature. A bitter reflection on the intense interpersonal conflicts, moral dilemmas, and political impasses that are central to labor struggles, and based on the author’s acquaintances with workers and organizers in the region, the book tells the tragic story of a fruitpickers strike led by radicals in Depression-era California.6 In Dubious Battle broaches a set of crucial issues, which are seldom discussed anymore, concerning the nature of strikes and the acceptable limits of class struggle and workers’ protests in liberal society.7

For much of this country’s post-Civil War history, “hitting the bricks” was a way for workers to try to push back against capitalist employers. Sometimes the strikers succeeded, gaining union recognition and better working conditions. But often enough, their impertinence was repaid with arrests, beatings, and blacklisting; and the strikes ended in failure, sometimes with blood pooled on the streets and soaked into the dirt, as in Steinbeck’s story. Hundreds, possibly thousands lost their lives8 —one can only roughly estimate the numbers, so commonplace and prosaic were these practices in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, excluding the years 1906 through 1913, for which there are no records, between 1881 and 1935, the year Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (or Wagner Act, in its early form), there were in the neighborhood of 80,000 strikes in America, involving about 30 million workers.9 Despite all the dangers and the likelihood that their efforts would prove futile, workers in these millions downed the tools and picketed, convinced that doing so was not only necessary to their immediate interests but a mandate of their position in class society.

The Wagner Act purported, for the first time in American history, to extend a definite, readily enforceable right to strike to most American workers. Not coincidentally, the years surrounding its enactment featured the most intense wave of labor conflict in the country’s history. When the statute became effective in 1937 (having been widely ignored by employers and blocked by hostile courts), the violence of strikes began to diminish, though not so much their frequency. For much of the period after the Second World War, strikes remained common even as they also became less ambitious in their aims and less militant in their conduct. Beginning about forty years ago, things changed again. Strikes suddenly became rare as well, to the point that workers today basically do not strike at all. From 1947 through 1976, the government documented an average of just over 300 “major work stoppages” (strikes and lockouts involving at least 1000 workers) every year; over the last decade, the annual average was only 14.10 Even the much-ballyhooed mini-strike wave of 2018 appears to be largely an illusion built on a combination of wishful thinking and a convenient misconstruction of a string of well-reported, and sometimes impressive, strikes, as a trend.11 In any event, militancy of the sort that was commonplace when Steinbeck wrote his book, along with the open strife and bloodshed that made the novel a work of undeniable realism, are nearly unheard of today.

The waning of bloody battles may be a good thing. But there is not much to celebrate about the overall demise of strikes—not if you are a worker or care about the working class. For strikes are the most important mode of working class protest, the best way, it seems, for workers to directly challenge capitalist hegemony by their own hand, to alter the terms of exploitation if not to build a new world. As they have declined, so has the strength of the labor movement and, with this, the ability of workers to contest the power that employers wield over their work lives and economic fortunes. And so it is that with the demise of strikes, union representation has plummeted, wages have stagnated, economic inequality skyrocketed, and the everyday caprices and tyrannies of capitalist management have been entwined in the web of demeaning indignities, patronizing indulgences, and suffocating bureaucratic rules that define the contemporary workplace.

Nevertheless, in most quarters the decline in strikes has been taken in stride, if noticed at all. For most people, strikes are hardly more than historical relics or quaint curiosities that seldom affect their daily lives or command much of their attention. Ironically, this is probably one reason the very modest labor conflict of the last year has been so overcharacterized. Once a preoccupation of newspaper editorialists, lawyers, and other commentators, a concern of government, and the subject of numerous hearings and reports, abundant litigation, and seemingly endless attempts at legislation, strikes are now rarely of any interest in any of these quarters. Where judges, politicians, and editorialists once worried greatly over how to deal with strikes of the kind that Steinbeck fictionalized, how to protect the economy (not to mention the interests of individual capitalists) from the disruptive effects of labor unrest, and sometimes how to preserve the ability of workers to strike in meaningful ways, their successors stand mute in the context of the near extinction of this form of protest. It has been two decades since Congress, which once grappled with these issues on a regular basis, has seriously confronted the question of strikes.12 Its last engagement with the right to strike attempts, in the early 1990s, to enact modest changes in the law relative to employers’ use of replacement workers during strikes. And even this effort, which collapsed in the mid 1990s, hardly seemed possessed of the kind of urgency that characterized earlier forays on these issues.13

Among the few Americans who well remember what strikes are and why they are important are labor scholars. For them, at least, strikes remain a preoccupation. Prominent students of labor like James Atleson, Julius Getman, Karl Klare, and James Pope—to name the most notable of this group—have expended much effort over the past few decades identifying and critiquing legal doctrines which have undermined the right to strike. Important to them in this regard are doctrines that give employers the prerogative to easily replace striking workers; that allow employers to enjoin and even fire strikers on the ground that they have engaged in coercive “misconduct,” or because they have protested the wrong issue or in the wrong way; that prohibit sympathy strikes and general strikes, and spontaneous “wildcat” strikes; and that funnel labor disputes off of picket lines and into legal proceedings and arbitrations.14

These doctrines have eviscerated a once-vital right to strike, these scholars tell us, subverting a prerogative that earlier in the century was central to improving conditions for workers and lending legitimacy to the very idea that workers have rights to claim in the first place. Indeed, in the 1930s and 1940s, especially, a massive and sustained campaign of strikes proved crucial to the formation of the modern labor movement, the political and legal validation of the Wagner Act, and ultimately the survival of the New Deal itself. This was true even as the Wagner Act itself seemed to play a crucial role in conveying to workers, for the first time, an effective right to strike. But the problem as far as the right to strike goes, we are told, is that the statute was later weakened and corrupted by the connivances of judges and Congress, urged on by a business community relentless in its contempt for organized labor, and abetted at times by inept or corrupt union leaders and a weak and politically diffident National Labor Relations Board (NLRB, the entity with primary authority for enforcing the labor law). And so the Wagner Act is said to have had a great potential, only to have been tragically “deradicalized,” as Klare puts it; and workers are said to have “lost” the right to strike, in Pope’s words, with devastating consequences for workers today and ominous portents for generations ahead.15 Critically, these authors argue, an effective right to strike must be restored at the expense of these unjustified impositions.16 Only then will the labor law regain its relevance and the labor movement its ability to improve the lives of workers.

Early on, this attempt to defend an effective right to strike was the object of mean-spirited criticism by more conventional scholars who, in the guise of unmasking its interpretative shortcomings, rejected its radicalism and recoiled at its underlying supposition that law is not only malleable and untethered to its formal, elite iterations, but within the province of workers to reshape around their own interests and visions.17 Despite these efforts, which focused on the work of Klare and Katherine Stone, whose critique of post-war “industrial pluralism” shared a similar reasoning—or maybe, to some extent, anyway, because of them—support for this campaign to restore the right to strike seems like a mandate among scholars and commentators who purport to take seriously the interests of workers.18 And yet for all its appeal, this project nevertheless suffers from a remarkably negligent oversight, one that has nothing to do with morality of its pretense that the law is malleable and that workers can remake it—a proposition that is broadly true and eminently defensible. Instead, it has to do with its practical feasibility. In fact, as this Article argues, a critical reflection on this question suggests that the effort to realize an effective right to strike is actually quite impossible and that attempts to do so, however earnest and thoughtful they may be, represent as dubious a battle as the hopeless walkout dramatized in Steinbeck’s book.

This doleful conclusion rests on a frank understanding of the legal and political realities in which strikes necessarily play out. There are many kinds of strikes, but those that are apt to be successful in challenging employers’ power and interests entail a level of militancy that sets them against well-entrenched notion of property and public order. This was true in the 1930s and 1940s when these values contradicted, at once, strike militancy and whatever radical potential the Wagner Act may have had. Ironically, it is perhaps even truer today, now that workers do in fact enjoy the right to strike, albeit only in more conventional ways. Seen in this light, those doctrines that have undermined the right to strike are not aberrations or jurisprudential failings—not mistakes in any sense, in fact, nor a retreat from some earlier, truer iteration of the labor law. Rather, they represent a settling of the labor law on bedrock precepts of the American life. However illegitimate those precepts may be from a vantage that questions capitalism’s essential legitimacy and takes the rights of workers seriously, they reign supreme, foreclosing an effective right to strike.

All of this, as I argue in this Article, is made plainly evident by a critical review of the history of strikes and striking. To anticipate a bit more of the argument that follows, the strikes most crucial to the building of the labor movement in the 1930s and 1940s were not built only around peaceful picketing and a withholding of labor. Rather, they were sit-down strikes and strikes built on mass picketing, as well as, to some extent, secondary boycotts. And strikes of this kind were never considered lawful or politically appropriate. Ironically, it was these strikes that legitimated the Wagner Act itself and the New Deal. But they could not legitimate themselves.

Those who call for resurrecting the right to strike contend that the flourishing of strike militancy reflected, if not the inherent politics of the original Wagner Act before it was “de-radicalized,” then at least its potential. To be sure, it is clear that the Wagner Act was a remarkable document which did more to advance workers’ rights than any statute in American history; and it was at least ambiguous on the question of the legal status of strike militancy. But what seemed like its support for worker militancy was not a product of any particular potential. Rather, it was a reflection of the difficulty that judges, legislators, and other authorities, who dedicated themselves to restraining these strikes even as they flourished, encountered in prosecuting these values amid the unique economic and political conditions of the 1930s and 1940s. These obstructive conditions were quite temporary, though, and the authorities’ efforts culminated soon enough in the near-categorical prohibition of the tactics that had made strikes so effective. It is in this way that the history of strikes shows less in the way of de-radicalization than an encounter with the unyielding outer boundaries of what labor protest and labor rights can be in liberal society.

As this all played out, it left in its wake a right to strike, but one whose power consists almost entirely of the ability of workers to pressure employers by withholding labor, while also maybe publicizing the workers’ issues and bolstering their morale. But while publicity and morale are not irrelevant, in the end they are not effective weapons in their own right. Nor are they generally advanced when strikes are broken. Moreover, the withholding of labor, unless it could be managed on a very large scale—something the law also tends to prohibit by its restrictions on secondary boycotts, by barring sympathy strikes and general strikes—is inherently ineffective in all but a small number of cases where workers remain irreplaceable. Of course, striking in such a conventional way accords with liberal notions of property and social order; but precisely because of this it is simply not coercive enough to be effective. And it is bound to remain ineffective, particularly in a context where workers far outnumber decent jobs, where mechanization and automation have steadily eaten away at the centrality of skill, where the perils that employers face in the course of labor disputes are as impersonal as the risks to workers are not, where employers wield overwhelming advantages in wealth and power over workers, where the state’s machinery for enforcing property rights and social order have never been more potent—where, in fact, capital is capital and workers are workers.

From this perspective, the quest for an effective right to strike emerges as a fantasy—an appealing fantasy for many, but a fantasy no less, steeped in a misplaced and exaggerated faith in the law and a misreading of the class politics of modern liberalism. The campaign to resurrect such a right appears, too, not only as a dead-end and a distraction, but an undertaking that risks blinding those who support viable unionism and the interests of the working class to the more important and fundamental fact that liberalism and the legal system are, in the end, antithetical to a meaningful system of labor rights. It is for this reason that the call for an effective right to strike should be set aside in favor of more direct endorsement of militancy and a turn away from the law and instead towards a political program that might advance the interests of the working class regardless of what the law might hold.

The argument that follows further elaborates these main contentions about the history of striking and the nature of strikes in liberal society, augmented by a discussion of the legal terrain on which all of this has played out. It unfolds in three main parts. Part I describes how the concept of a right to strike developed in concert with the history of striking itself, how both were influenced by the evolving condition of labor, and how this history created the circumstances under which it became possible to conceive of an effective right to strike without making this possible in fact. Part II consists of a critical review of the fate of coercive and disorderly strikes, especially those featuring sit-down tactics and mass picketing. It considers how the courts, the NLRB, and Congress confronted these strikes, and how they moved with increasing vigor to proscribe them as soon as these strikes emerged as effective forms of labor protest. Part III looks more carefully at the underpinnings of this repudiation of strike militancy, finding in court rulings and other pronouncements against the strikes an opposition to coercion and disorder that, even if sometimes invoked disingenuously, is nonetheless firmly anchored in modern liberalism and its conception of the appropriate boundaries of class protest and labor conflict. On this rests the argument that an effective right to strike is impossible and the pursuit of it, problematic. The final part is a brief conclusion that sums up some of the implications of this argument.

#### Vote Negative to Endorse a politics of Abolition

#### By condemning humanity to the Earth, abolition contends that another world is possible. Abolition is not a destructive act but a creative one that affirms the possibility of building a new world here on Earth, it is an anti-Civilizational distension of “freedom” that defies the gendered racial ascendancy of the white human. By grappling with the question of how we build a world otherwise, abolition engenders forms of social poesis in the form of mutual aid, training, and self-defense programs that give us the skills to build that world.

Rodriguez 19. Dylan, Professor of Ethnic Studies and Chair of the Academic Senate, University of California, Riverside, "Abolition as Praxis of Human Being: A Foreword." Harvard Law Review, vol. 132, no. 6, April 2019, pp. 1575.

What are the historical conditions and political imperatives of "abolition" as a contemporary praxis? How does abolition generate a radical critique of carceral power - of "incarceration" as a logic of state and social formation? What are the limitations of liberal-to-progressive demands to reform (allegedly) dysfunctional and/or scandalous systems of legitimated state violence (for example, "mass incarceration" or "police brutality")? How does abolitionist praxis facilitate notions of freedom, justice, security, and community that do not rely on systems of carceral state power, including but not limited to criminal justice, policing, and (domestic) militarization/war? Abolition is a dream toward futurity vested in insurgent, counterCivilizational histories - genealogies of collective genius' that perform liberation under conditions of duress. The late Black-liberation warrior, organizer, and Vice President of the Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika 2 Safiya Bukhari once wrote, in characteristically crystallized terms, "[b]y definition, security means the freedom from danger, fear, and anxiety."3 Security and freedom, for peoples subjected to the normalized state- and culturally condoned violence of (global) U.S. nation-building, require a decisive departure from typical demands for policy reform, formal equality, and amped-up electoral participation; rather, what is needed is a mustering of collective voice that abrogates the political-discursive limits of "demand" itself.4 The long historical praxis of abolition is grounded in a Black radical genealogy of revolt and transformative insurgency against racial chattel enslavement and the transatlantic trafficking of captive Africans.5 Understood as part of the historical present tense, abolitionist critique, organizing, and collective movement (across scales of geography and collectivity) honor and extend this tradition. The contributors to this issue of the Harvard Law Review signify the breadth, rigor, and strategic brilliance of contemporary abolitionist praxis, as their work represents a broader field of creative and rigorously theorized struggle against the continuities of carceral state violence, including but not limited to imprisonment, jailing, detention, and policing. In this sense, abolition is not merely a practice of negation - a collective attempt to eliminate institutionalized dominance over targeted peoples and populations but also a radically imaginative, generative, and socially productive communal (and community-building) practice. Abolition seeks (as it performs) a radical reconfiguration of justice, subjectivity, and social formation that does not depend on the existence of either the carceral state (a statecraft that institutionalizes various forms of targeted human capture) or carceral power as such (a totality of state-sanctioned and extrastate relations of gendered racial-colonial dominance). Contemporary reformist approaches to addressing the apparent overreach and scandalous excesses of the carceral state - characterized by calls to end "police brutality" and "mass incarceration" - fail to recognize that the very logics of the overlapping criminal justice and policing regimes systemically perpetuate racial, sexual, gender, colonial, and class violence through carceral power. Thus, in addition to being ineffective at achieving their generally stated goals of alleviating vulnerable peoples' subjection to legitimated state violence, reformist approaches ultimately reinforce a violent system that is fundamentally asymmetrical in its production and organization of normalized misery, social surveillance, vulnerability to state terror, and incarceration.6 It is within this irreconcilable reformist contradiction that an abolitionist historical mandate provides a useful and necessary departure from the liberal assumption that either the carceral state or carceral power is an inevitable and permanent feature of the social formation. This historical mandate animates abolition as a creative, imaginative, and speculative collective labor: while liberal-to-progressive reformism attempts to protect and sustain the institutional and cultural-political coherence of an existing system by adjusting and/or refurbishing it, abolitionism addresses the historical roots of that system in relations of oppressive, continuous, and asymmetrical violence and raises the radical question of whether those relations must be uprooted and transformed (rather than reformed or "fixed") for the sake of particular peoples' existence and survival as such.7 Consider abolition as both a long accumulation and future planning of acts, performed by and in the name of peoples and communities relentlessly laboring for their own physiological and cultural integrity as such. Embrace the obligation that accompanies the term abolition - a complex, dynamic, and deeply historical shorthand, if you will - in the work of constantly remaking sociality, politics, ecology, place, and (human) being against the duress that some call dehumanization, others name colonialism, and still others identify as slavery and incarceration. Abolition, then, is constituted by so many acts long overlapping, dispersed across geographies and historical moments, that reveal the underside of the New World and its descendant forms - the police, jail, prison, criminal court, detention center, reservation, plantation, and "border." No longer limited by canonized narratives of late nineteenth-century (and disproportionately white) abolitionists seeking redemption of the American project against its own constitutional racial-colonial-chattel carcerality, or even by recent articulations of early twenty-first-century abolition across a spectrum of progressive-to-radical rejoinders to gendered racist state violence, another conceptualization of the term becomes possible. Now and long before, abolition is and was a practice, an analytical method, a present-tense visioning, an infrastructure in the making, a creative project, a performance, a counterwar, an ideological struggle, a pedagogy and curriculum, an alleged impossibility that is furtively present, pulsing, produced in the persistent insurgencies of human being that undermine the totalizing logics of empire, chattel, occupation, heteropatriarchy, racial-colonial genocide, and Civilization as a juridical-narrative epoch. I join my fellow contributors to this issue of the Harvard Law Review in defying a liberal-to-reactionary (white/multiculturalist) common sense8 that rejects abolitionist creativity by languishing in simplistic notions of "what is practical," "what is realistic," "what the people will understand/accept/do," or even "what must be reformed first/now/soon." Alongside current and recent communities of organizers such as Critical Resistance,9 Black Youth Project loo,10 We Charge Genocide," Idle No More, 1 2 and #NoDAPL and the Standing Rock Sioux,13 I embrace a conception of abolition that is inseparable from its roots in (feminist, queer) Black liberation and (feminist, queer) Indigenous anticolonialism/decolonization. 14 To contextualize abolition within and across these complex, vibrant traditions is to significantly complicate (and productively disarticulate) teleological or formulaic notions of classical Marxist social transformation, while intervening in patriarchal and masculinist constructions of freedom/self-determination and obliterating liberal-optimistic paradigms of incrementalist, reformist social justice. Abolition, in its radical totality, consists of constant, critical assessment of the economic, ecological, political, cultural, and spiritual conditions for the security and liberation of subjected peoples' fullest collective being and posits that revolutions of material, economic, and political systems compose the necessary but not definitive or completed conditions for abolitionist praxis. Consider abolition, then, as a counter-Civilizational distension of "freedom" that defies the modern disciplinary (and generally militarized) orders of the citizen, the nation-state, jurisprudence, politicality, and most importantly - the gendered racial ascendancy of the white human and its deadly regimes of normalized physiological and culturalepistemic integrity. (The latter, in short, is: the rigorously reproduced worldliness of white life in a relation of power/violence over and against other life, including nonhuman life; this includes the toxic political, affective, and discursive differentiation of premature, tragic, unjust, brutal, and/or massive white death - the interruption of white ascendancy - from the long and deep asymmetries of Indigenous death, queer death, Black death, Third World death, and so forth. This is the formation of historical dominance that Professors Sylvia Wynter and Katherine McKittrick elsewhere term "white radiance."15) A long abolitionist project is already present in the terms, reflections, and scholarly-activist theorizations offered in the following pages by Patrisse Cullors, Angel Sanchez, and Professor Allegra McLeod. This project suggests a speculative practice of immanent futurity for people who cannot presume an individual (or even collective) tomorrow in the long historical presence of gendered racist state violence structured in militarism, policing, occupation, and incarceration.1 6 Such a fragile futurity convenes a creative force that is, at once, interruptive and destructive in form and method. For example, to demystify and fracture the prototheological (and always white-supremacist) sanctification of police as suprahuman and supralegal (though somehow simultaneously vulnerable) embodiments of universal (that is, undifferentiated and nonhierarchical) justice, safety, and communal (bodily) integrity is but one urgent signaling of abolitionist method in the here and now. When some on the far right (including the emergent alt-right) stake out the terms of moral panic by marshaling fearful, defensive reactions to a "war on cops," screaming and whispering that "blue lives matter" in rebuttal to the intense and visible activation of so many around the fact of Black life's institutionalized subjection to state terror, there is a grain of truth buried in their cynical, reprehensible posturing. Here, then, is a central pedagogical and conceptual task for abolitionist praxis, requisite to the task of disarticulating the assumptions of the mass incarceration-reform narrative and offering a different, insurgent story against Civilization: to define and historicize "incarceration" against its modern juridical-cultural coherence as such.

#### A world without war and genocide begins here—students and teachers are instrumental to the operative functions of the prison regime. You should refuse the formulaic and state-oriented approach of the affirmative in favor of a revolutionary position of abolition.

Rodríguez 10 - Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies @ UC Riverside [Dylan Rodríguez, “The Disorientation of the Teaching Act: Abolition as Pedagogical Position,” Radical Teacher, Number 88 (Summer 2010)

The (Pedagogical) Necessity of the Impossible

A compulsory deferral of abolitionist pedagogical possibilities composes the largely unaddressed precedent of teaching in the current historical period. It is this deferral—generally unacknowledged and largely presumed—that both undermines the emergence of an abolitionist pedagogical praxis and illuminates abolitionism’s necessity as a dynamic practice of social transformation, over and against liberal and progressive appropriations of “critical/radical pedagogy.” Contrary to the thinly disguised ideological Alinskyism that contemporary liberal, progressive, critical, and “radical” teaching generally and tacitly assumes in relation to the prison regime, what is usually required, and what usually works as a strategy for teaching against the carceral common sense, is a pedagogical approach that asks the unaskable, posits the necessity of the impossible, and embraces the creative danger inherent in liberationist futures. About a decade of teaching a variety of courses at the undergraduate and graduate levels at one of the most demographically diverse research universities in the United States (the University [End Page 12] of California, Riverside) has allowed me the opportunity to experiment with the curricular content, assignment form, pedagogical mode, and conceptual organization of coursework that directly or tangentially addresses the formation of the U.S. prison regime and prison industrial complex. Students are consistently (and often unanimously) eager to locate their studies within an abolitionist genealogy—often understanding their work as potentially connected to a living history of radical social movements and epistemological-political revolt—and tend to embrace the high academic demands and rigor of these courses with far less resistance and ambivalence than in many of my other Ethnic Studies courses. There are some immediate analytical and scholarly tools that form a basic pedagogical apparatus for productively exploding the generalized common sense that creates and surrounds the U.S. prison regime. In fact, it is crucial for teachers and students to collectively understand that it is precisely the circulation and concrete enactment of this common sense that makes it central to the prison regime, not simply an ideological “supplement” of it. Put differently, many students and teachers have a tendency to presume that the cultural symbols and popular discourses that signify and give common sense meaning to prisons and policing are external to the prison regime, as if these symbols and discourses (produced through mass media, state spokespersons and elected officials, right-wing think tanks, video games, television crime dramas, etc.) simply amount to “bad” or “deceptive” propaganda that conspiratorially hide some essential “truth” about prisons that can be uncovered. This is a seductive and self-explanatory, but far too simplistic, way of understanding how the prison regime thrives. What we require, instead, is a sustained analytical discussion that considers how multiple layers of knowledge—including common sense and its different cultural forms—are constantly producing a “lived truth” of policing and prisons that has nothing at all to do with an essential, objective truth. Rather, this fabricated, lived truth forms the template of everyday life through which we come to believe that we more or less understand and “know” the prison and policing apparatus, and which dynamically produces our consent and/or surrender to its epochal oppressive violence. As a pedagogical tool, this framework compels students and teachers to examine how deeply engaged they are in the violent common sense of the prison and the racist state. Who is left for dead in the common discourse of crime, “innocence,” and “guilt”? How has the mundane institutionalized violence of the racist state become so normalized as to be generally beyond comment? What has made the prison and policing apparatus in its current form appear to be so permanent, necessary, and immovable within the common sense of social change and historical transformation? In this sense, teachers and students can attempt to concretely understand how they are a dynamic part of the prison regime’s production and reproduction—and thus how they might also be part of its abolition through the work of building and teaching a radical and liberatory common sense (this is political work that anyone can do, ideally as part of a community of social movement). Additionally, the abolitionist teacher can prioritize a rigorous—and vigorous—critique of the endemic complicities of liberal/progressive reformism to the [End Page 13] transformation, expansion, and ultimate reproduction of racist state violence and (proto)genocide; this entails a radical critique of everything from the sociopolitical legacies of “civil rights” and the oppressive capacities of “human rights” to the racist state’s direct assimilation of 1970s-era “prison reform” agendas into the blueprints for massive prison expansion discussed above.17 The abolitionist teacher must be willing to occupy the difficult and often uncomfortable position of political leadership in the classroom. To some, this reads as a direct violation of Freirian conceptions of critical pedagogy, but I would argue that it is really an elaboration and amplification of the revolutionary spirit at the heart of Freire’s entire lifework. That is, how can a teacher expect her/his students to undertake the courageous and difficult work of inhabiting an abolitionist positionality—even if only as an “academic” exercise—unless the teacher herself/himself embodies, performs, and oozes that very same political desire? In fact, it often seems that doing the latter is enough to compel many students (at least momentarily) to become intimate and familiar with the allegedly impossible. Finally, the horizon of the possible is only constrained by one’s pedagogical willingness to locate a particular political struggle (here, prison abolition) within the long and living history of liberation movements. In this context, “prison abolition” can be understood as one important strain within a continuously unfurling fabric of liberationist political horizons, in which the imagination of the possible and the practical is shaped but not limited by the specific material and institutional conditions within which one lives. It is useful to continually ask: on whose shoulders does one sit, when undertaking the audacious identifications and political practices endemic to an abolitionist pedagogy? There is something profoundly indelible and emboldening in realizing that one’s “own” political struggle is deeply connected to a vibrant, robust, creative, and beautiful legacy of collective imagination and creative social labor (and of course, there are crucial ways of comprehending historical liberation struggles in all their forms, from guerilla warfare to dance). While I do not expect to arrive at a wholly satisfactory pedagogical endpoint anytime soon, and am therefore hesitant to offer prescriptive examples of “how to teach” within an abolitionist framework, I also believe that rigorous experimentation and creative pedagogical radicalism is the very soul of this praxis. There is, in the end, no teaching formula or pedagogical system that finally fulfills the abolitionist social vision, there is only a political desire that understands the immediacy of struggling for human liberation from precisely those forms of systemic violence and institutionalized dehumanization that are most culturally and politically sanctioned, valorized, and taken for granted within one’s own pedagogical moment. To refuse [End Page 14] or resist this desire is to be unaccountable to the historical truth of our moment, in which the structural logic and physiological technologies of social liquidation (removal from or effective neutralization within civil society) have merged with history’s greatest experiment in punitive human captivity, a linkage that increasingly lays bare racism’s logical outcome in genocide.18 Abolitionist Position and Praxis Given the historical context I have briefly outlined, and the practical-theoretical need for situating an abolitionist praxis within a longer tradition of freedom struggle, I contend that there can be no liberatory teaching act, nor can there be an adequately critical pedagogical practice, that does not also attempt to become an abolitionist one. Provisionally, I am conceptualizing abolition as a praxis of liberation that is creative and experimental rather than formulaic and rigidly programmatic. Abolition is a “radical” political position, as well as a perpetually creative and experimental pedagogy, because formulaic approaches cannot adequately apprehend the biopolitics, dynamic statecraft, and internalized violence of genocidal and proto-genocidal systems of human domination. As a productive and creative praxis, this conception of abolition posits the material possibility and historical necessity of a social capacity for human freedom based on a cultural-economic infrastructure that supports the transformation of oppressive relations that are the legacy of genocidal conquest, settler colonialism, racial slavery/capitalism,19 compulsory hetero-patriarchies, and global white supremacy. In this sense, abolitionist praxis does not singularly concern itself with the “abolition of the prison industrial complex,” although it fundamentally and strategically prioritizes the prison as a central site for catalyzing broader, radical social transformations. In significant part, this suggests envisioning and ultimately constructing “a constellation of alternative strategies and institutions, with the ultimate aim of removing the prison from the social and ideological landscape of our society.”20 In locating abolitionist praxis within a longer political genealogy that anticipates the task of remaking the world under transformed material circumstances, this position refracts the most radical and revolutionary dimensions of a historical Black freedom struggle that positioned the abolition of “slavery” as the condition of possibility for Black—hence “human”—freedom. To situate contemporary abolitionism as such is also to recall the U.S. racist state’s (and its liberal allies’) displacement and effective political criminalization of Black radical abolitionism through the 13th Amendment’s 1865 recodification of the slave relation through the juridical reinvention of a racial-carceral relation: Amendment XIII Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.21 [emphasis added] Given the institutional elaborations of racial criminalization, policing, and massive imprisonment that have prevailed on the 13th Amendment’s essential authorization to replace a regime of racist chattel slavery with racist carceral state violence, it is incumbent on the radical teacher to assess the density of her/his entanglement in this historically layered condition of [End Page 15] violence, immobilization, and capture. Prior to the work of formulating an effective curriculum and teaching strategy for critically engaging the prison industrial complex, in other words, is the even more difficult work of examining the assumptive limitations of any “radical pedagogy” that does not attempt to displace an epistemological and cultural common sense in which the relative order and peace of the classroom is perpetually reproduced by the systemic disorder and deep violence of the prison regime. In relation to the radical challenging of common sense discussed above, another critical analytical tool for building an abolitionist pedagogy entails the rigorous, scholarly dismantling of the “presentist” and deeply ahistorical understanding of policing and prisons. Students (and many teachers) frequently enter such dialogues with an utterly mystified conception of the policing and prison apparatus, and do not generally understand that 1) these apparatuses in their current form are very recent creations, and have not been around “forever”; and 2) the rise of these institutional forms of criminalization, domestic war, and mass-scale imprisonment forms one link in a historical chain of genocidal and proto-genocidal mobilizations of the racist state that regularly take place as part of the deadly global process of U.S. nation-building. In other words, not only is the prison regime a very recent invention of the state (and therefore is neither a “permanent” nor indestructible institutional assemblage), but it is institutionally and historically inseparable from the precedent and contemporaneous structures of large-scale racist state violence. Asserting the above as part of the core analytical framework of the pedagogical structure can greatly enable a discussion of abolitionist possibility that thinks of the critical dialogue as a necessary continuation of long historical struggles against land conquest, slavery, racial colonialism, and imperialist war. This also means that our discussions take place within a longer temporal community with those liberation struggles, such that we are neither “crazy” nor “isolated.” I have seen students and teachers speak radical truth to power under difficult and vulnerable circumstances based on this understanding that they are part of a historical record. I have had little trouble “convincing” most students—across distinctions of race, class, gender, age, sexuality, and geography—of the gravity and emergency of our historical moment. It is the analytical, political, and practical move toward an abolitionist positionality that is (perhaps predictably) far more challenging. This is in part due to the fraudulent and stubborn default position of centrist-to-progressive liberalism/reformism (including assertions of “civil” and “human” rights) as the only feasible or legible response to reactionary, violent, racist forms of state power. Perhaps more troublesome, however, is that this resistance to engaging with abolitionist praxis seems to also derive from a deep and broad epistemological and cultural disciplining of the political imagination that makes liberationist dreams unspeakable. This disciplining is most overtly produced through hegemonic state and cultural apparatuses and their representatives (including elected officials, popular political pundits and public intellectuals, schools, family units, religious institutions, etc.), but is also compounded through the pragmatic imperatives of many liberal and progressive nonprofit organizations and social movements that reproduce the political limitations of the [End Page 16] nonprofit industrial complex. 22 In this context, the liberationist historical identifications hailed by an abolitionist social imagination also require that such repression of political-intellectual imagination be fought, demystified, and displaced. Perhaps, then, there is no viable or defensible pedagogical position other than an abolitionist one. To live and work, learn and teach, and survive and thrive in a time defined by the capacity and political willingness to eliminate and neutralize populations through a culturally valorized, state sanctioned nexus of institutional violence, is to better understand why abolitionist praxis in this historical moment is primarily pedagogical, within and against the “system” in which it occurs. While it is conceivable that in future moments, abolitionist praxis can focus more centrally on matters of (creating and not simply opposing) public policy, infrastructure building, and economic reorganization, the present moment clearly demands a convening of radical pedagogical energies that can build the collective human power, epistemic and knowledge apparatuses, and material sites of learning that are the precondition of authentic and liberatory social transformations. The prison regime is the institutionalization and systemic expansion of massive human misery. It is the production of bodily and psychic disarticulation on multiple scales, across different physiological capacities. The prison industrial complex is, in its logic of organization and its production of common sense, at least proto-genocidal. Finally, the prison regime is inseparable from—that is, present in—the schooling regime in which teachers are entangled. Prison is not simply a place to which one is displaced and where one’s physiological being is disarticulated, at the rule and whim of the state and its designated representatives (police, parole officers, school teachers). The prison regime is the assumptive premise of classroom teaching generally. While many of us must live in labored denial of this fact in order to teach as we must about “American democracy,” “freedom,” and “(civil) rights,” there are opportune moments in which it is useful to come clean: the vast majority of what occurs in U.S. classrooms—from preschool to graduate school—cannot accommodate the bare truth of the proto-genocidal prison regime as a violent ordering of the world, a primary component of civil society/school, and a material presence in our everyday teaching

## Case

### Solvency

#### 1] Squo Solves – Right to Strike not key – vote neg on presumption – your ev says so

INSERT 1AC Harvard Law Review, 19 - ("Striking the Right Balance: Toward a Better Understanding of Prison Strikes," Harvard Law Review 03/8/2019, accessed 10-28-2021, <https://harvardlawreview.org/2019/03/striking-the-right-balance-toward-a-better-understanding-of-prison-strikes/)//ML>

But in order to ensure that the Constitution truly does not stop at the prison walls, courts cannot simply accept prison administrators’ fears regarding strikes at face value and instead should rigorously test their credibility and basis in fact.143 And more importantly, by over-deferring and failing to engage in any analysis of the merits of prison strikes, courts miss an important opportunity. As this Note has argued, prison strikes represent an underappreciated aspect of prison life — the means by which prisoners have, throughout the course of American history, surfaced pressing problems of our carceral state and initiated important transformations in our prison system. Therefore, it is imperative to meaningfully consider why and how such strikes merit legal protection — even if such protection appears to fly in the face of the current state of the law and to defy conventional wisdom. To that end, this Part first explores the First Amendment as one potential avenue for considering the merits of prison strikes, by presenting three critical First Amendment values contained within prison strikes,144 and it then briefly discusses other potential legal avenues for courts and scholars to consider. A. Considering the First Amendment Values of Prison Strikes The right to strike within prisons may be conceptually viewed as a composite of three separate fundamental First Amendment freedoms: the freedom to peacefully associate, the freedom of speech, and the freedom to assemble and petition for redress of grievances.145 Each is considered in turn. 1. Association. — The right to peaceful association is one that captures the right of individuals to commune with others for the expression of ideas and for effective advocacy.146 Strikes, like prison unions, represent an important means of association for prisoners — allowing them to “lay claim to a social identity as ‘workers’ . . . and in doing so generate claims to respect and solidarity.”147 This identity and solidarity can, in turn, enable inmates to engage in productive and peaceful bargains with prison officials for better conditions, higher pay, and other reform desires. Bargaining is, in many respects, already very common in prisons, “for the simple reason that [prison] administrators rarely have sufficient resources to gain complete conformity to all the rules.”148 However, such bargaining typically happens in an informal, ongoing, private process;149 in their recurrent, day-to-day contact with inmates, prison administrators use their arsenal of tools150 to “negotiate” only with select inmate leaders,151 with the central goal of maintaining “short term surface order.”152 This informal bargaining is “dysfunctional” to the long-term stability of prison institutions and “the real needs of those incarcerated within” them153 — creating hierarchical relationships154 that breed mistrust155 and leave many inmates powerless and feeling aggrieved.156 As a result, inmates often feel that they have to resort to violence to protect themselves from exploitation, express their dissatisfaction, and obtain redress.157 Alternatively, peaceful, collective prison strikes avoid these harmful consequences by allowing for “open” and “formal” negotiations between all inmates and prison staff.158 Such transparent and legitimated bargaining benefits both inmates and prisons as a whole. By initiating peaceful protests such as work stoppages, all inmates are able “to solve problems, maximize gains, articulate goals, develop alternative strategies, and deal with [administrators] without resorting to force or violence.”159 And by permitting peaceful strikes, prison administrators “provide inmates with a channel for airing grievances and gaining official response . . . giv[ing] the institution a kind of safety-valve for peaceful, rather than violent, change”160 — avoiding potentially expensive and time-consuming litigation and even helping rehabilitate inmates,161 all while deemphasizing hierarchical structures in prisons that harm institutional order.162 2. Speech. — A prison strike also represents a critical way by which inmates can express themselves.163 First, as alluded to above, a strike allows inmates to claim and communicate an identity — as more than just marginalized, ignored convicts with little to no self-determination, but instead as workers and human beings entitled to basic dignity. Such collective actions represent the “performative declaration and affirmation of rights that one does not (yet) have.”164 And, as Professor Jocelyn Simonson discusses, these strikes are collective contestations to “demand dignity, calling attention to the ways in which [prisoners] are treated as less than human and in the process reclaiming their own agency.”165 Such dignitary considerations, which courts have sought to protect under First Amendment principles, should therefore naturally extend to prisoners attempting to, through strikes, express their basic selfworth.166 Beyond representing a form of inherent, individual expression for inmates, prison strikes also represent a broader form of expression, allowing inmates to be visible to and heard by the public at large. Over the course of American history, inmates — by virtue of being locked up in isolated, impregnable penitentiaries — have largely been a silent and ignored segment of the American population.167 Through peaceful protests like the 2018 national prison strike, however, their suffering, their calls for reform, and their voices are, for the first time, directly expressed on a large scale, ringing out loudly beyond the prison walls and jumpstarting important conversations of criminal justice reform. It is critical to protect such expression; “[i]ndeed, it is from the voices of those who have been most harmed by the punitive nature of our criminal justice system that we can hear the most profound reimaginings of how the system might be truly responsive to local demands for justice and equality.”168 3. Petition for Redress. Inmates’ strikes can be seen not only as expressions of their dignity and general efforts to express their voices beyond prison walls but also as significant methods of assembly to call attention to specific grievances and seek redress from the government.169 While in theory “[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country,”170 in practice, “prisons often escape the daily microscope focused on other American institutions such as schools, churches, and government.”171 Courts grant prison administrators wide deference not only in running day-to-day life within prisons but also in restricting press access to prisons.172 Therefore, much of the American public — already closed off from and largely indifferent to the lives of prisoners — is kept even more in the dark about prison conditions and the state of our carceral system as a whole. Prison conditions, from what has been documented, are horrendous across states. Many prisons are severely overcrowded and seriously understaffed;173 inmates routinely experience physical abuse and even death at the hands of prison guards,174 receive inadequate protection from guards, are deprived of basic necessities,175 are given substandard medical care,176 and are forced to live in squalor and tolerate extreme circumstances;177 most prisoners have minimal, if any, access, to rehabilitative or mental health services;178 and prisoners have little legal recourse, as internal prison grievance procedures are often stacked against inmates,179 and judicial deference and federal legislation have effectively shut the courthouse doors on prisoners’ civil rights claims.180 And across prisons, criminal sentencing laws not only have contributed to an unprecedented era of mass incarceration, but also have forced African Americans and people of color broadly to bear much of this burden.181 As the Marshall Project states, “[s]ociety won’t fix a prison system it can’t see”;182 **peaceful prison strikes** like the 2018 strike, however, draw back the “iron curtain” of prison walls, **bringing to light many of the pressing** issues described above. Through these strikes, inmates are able not only to express their grievances to their prison administrators, but also to “publicize their on-the-ground realities to the larger world”183 and, in turn, gain attention from and access to the political branches able to implement policy reforms.184 As recent history has shown, inmates have experienced some success by pressing their claims against the government through publicized strikes. For example, as described above, the **California strikes** in 2011 and 2013 **generated public outcry that** eventually **resulted in transfor- mations to the** California prison system’s **solitary confinement policies**.185 In **Alabama**, **inmates’ participation** in the 2016 nationwide prison strike helped **prompt** the **D**epartment **o**f **J**ustice **to open an investigation into the state’s prison conditions**.186 And more broadly speaking, **strikes** like the 2018 strike have **begun** **to “remedy power imbalances**, bring aggregate structural harms into view, and **shift** deeply entrenched legal and constitutional” **barriers to critical prison reforms**.187 B. Considering Additional Legal Avenues for Protecting Prison Strikes The foregoing analysis suggests that the First Amendment is a critical, worthwhile vehicle for considering the merits of a right to strike for prisoners. As Justice Black recognized, the importance of such analysis likely transcends prisoners themselves. He wrote: “I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.”188 But this Note acknowledges that judicial recognition of prison strikes’ First Amendment values requires significant doctrinal change. Convincing the Supreme Court to overturn its Jones and Turner precedents, and instead to adopt a test with less deference than is currently afforded to prison administrators, is unlikely. As a result, future research is necessary to identify other potential avenues to consider the legal status and merits of prison strikes. As alluded to above, labor law presents one such promising avenue, as does state constitutional and statutory law. Drawing from the broader j

#### 2] Prison strikes don’t work – empirics prove

Thompson ’16 (Christie; writer for the Marshall Project; 9-21-2016; “Do Prison Strikes Work?”; Marshall Project; https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/09/21/do-prison-strikes-work; Accessed: 11-8-2021; AU)

On Sept. 9, prisoners across the country stopped showing up for their work assignments to protest what they call slave-like conditions for incarcerated workers. Inmates make pennies an hour keeping the prison running — such as cleaning and cooking — or providing cheap manufacturing for private businesses. Inmates involved in the protest are calling for higher wages, better working conditions and less severe punishment while on the job. The work stoppage was organized by inmates in multiple states and labor activists with the Industrial Workers of the World to coincide with the 45th anniversary of the Attica riot, which was preceded by a strike in the prison’s metal shop. Prisoners and labor organizers on the outside hoped it would be the largest prison strike in history. It’s hard to quantify exactly how many prisoners in how many states have participated, as prison officials and organizers give conflicting accounts of its scope. Activists claim inmates in at least 11 states are taking part. This strike is the latest in a long history of prisoners trying to use what little leverage they have — whether work stoppages or hunger strikes — to demand change from administrators. Some have been more successful **than others**. Here’s a look at five other prison strikes and **what came of them**: Post-WWII Labor Strikes University of Michigan professor Heather Ann Thompson’s history of labor movements in prison details how a series of work stoppages and sit-down protests took off in prisons across the U.S. in 1947. In little over a decade, hundreds of prisoners in Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Wisconsin, Louisiana, Ohio, and Georgia stopped working to protest long hours, trifling pay, and grueling work environments. Prisoners in Georgia and Louisiana went even further and slit their heel tendons so they could not be forced to work. While the work stoppages **did not lead** to immediate **changes**, they inspired another era of prison protest in the ‘60’s and ‘70’s, which included the Attica work stoppage and eventual riot. Those movements achieved **slight pay raises** and improved safety precautions in some states and led to the creation of prisoner-led unions. 2010 Georgia Labor Strike In 2010, state prisoners across Georgia launched what many then called the largest prison work strike in U.S. history — though official numbers are difficult to confirm. At the protest’s height, organizers said thousands of inmates participated across at least six state prisons. Georgia inmates were paid nothing for their work, as dictated by state law, and were asking for better conditions and more access to programming. Not only were Georgia inmates not showing up to their job assignments — they refused to leave their cells at all until their demands were met. The strike **lasted six days**, and garnered coverage in news outlets like The New York Times. It ended when prisoners decided to leave their cells to go to the law library and try to sue for improvements instead. (It’s **unclear** what became of those efforts). **Prisoners in Georgia are still not paid for their labor**. 2011-2013 Pelican Bay Hunger Strike In 2011, 400 prisoners in California’s supermax prison started refusing their meals. Their numbers grew to 7,000 as they were joined by prisoners all over the state. The inmates had a list of five demands, including limits on solitary confinement and changes to how the prison determines gang membership. Their fast ended after three weeks when prison officials agreed to reconsider some of their solitary confinement policies. Inmates returned to hunger-striking later in 2011 and again in 2013 saying the **changes were too small and too slow**. But the protests did have a significant impact. After the initial strike, the chair of the California Assembly’s Public Safety Committee held a hearing on conditions at Pelican Bay. In 2012, the nonprofit Center for Constitutional Rights filed a class-action lawsuit against the state over its use of prolonged isolation. Todd Ashker, one of the strike’s organizers, was the lead plaintiff. The suit was settled in September 2015, addressing many of the strikers’ concerns about how people end up in solitary and how long they remain there. 2013 Guantanamo Hunger Strike Detainees at the U.S. military prison in Cuba began hunger-striking in March 2013 to fight against their indefinite detention and alleged mistreatment. At the strike’s peak in July that year, 106 men were refusing to eat and 45 were being force-fed through nasal tubes. The strike — for its duration, size, and the graphic nature of force-feeding — **outraged** the public and policymakers and increased pressure on President Obama to fulfill his promise of closing the controversial prison. Since the strike, Obama has lowered the number of men held at Guantanamo from over 2,000 to 61, but has yet to close the prison entirely. 2015-2016 Immigration Detention Center Hunger StrikesSince 2015, hunger strikes have begun at various immigration detention centers — prison-like facilities where immigrants are held while their deportation case is decided — throughout the U.S. Roughly 200 detainees at Eloy Detention Center in Arizona stopped eating in June 2015, in part to pressure an investigation into recent deaths at the facility. That fall, immigrants in detention in California, Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas also stopped eating to object to their indefinite detention and poor conditions. More recently, 22 mothers being held with their children in a family detention center in Pennsylvania went on a hunger strike this August. Their strike accompanied a series of handwritten letters they sent to immigration officials asking to be released from indefinite detention. The strike has continued off-and-on since then, with even their children threatening to refuse to attend classes in solidarity with their mothers. It’s too soon to tell what the impact of their protests might be.

#### 3] Can’t solve prison guards and cops – they don’t care and won’t listen – they break the law all the time

#### 4] Multiple alt causes to recidivism – aff is a drop in the bucket.

Tegeng et al. ’18 (Goche; professor in the Department of Psychology at Wollo University; 2018; “Exploring Factors Contributing to Recidivism: The Case of Dessie and Woldiya Correctional Centers”; Arts and Social Sciences Journal; https://www.hilarispublisher.com/open-access/exploring-factors-contributing-to-recidivism-the-case-of-dessie-and-woldiya-correctional-centers-2151-6200-1000384.pdf; Accessed: 11-8-2021; AU)

Recidivism is “one of the most fundamental concepts in criminal justice” and relevant in understanding the core functions of the criminal justice system such as incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation [1]. Within criminal justice agencies, the level of recidivism is an important outcome variable that provides the basis for determining the extent to which an agency has been able to effectively intervene in the criminality of the offender populations it serves, identifying the needs for more effective programs, communicating the need for increased resources, and demonstrating accountability to the public and to legislators [2]. There are **many different plausible contributing factors** that might explain why released offenders could not successfully reenter the community. A notable number of studies examined the contributing factors to recidivism among released offenders. The **most plausible reasons** to explain the relatively high recidivism rate among released offenders were centered on the offenders’ **educational illiteracy**, **lack** of vocational **job skills**, lack of interpersonal skills, or **criminal history**. Besides, socio-economic factors such as gender, **age and employment status** influence the possibility of committing crimes after first conviction. In terms of gender, men are more likely to return to prison because of **criminal peer associations**, **carrying weapons**, alcohol abuse, and **aggressive feelings** [3]. According to United States Sentencing commission 24.3 and 13.7 percent of males and females were recidivates respectively in USA. **Age is** also another demographic **determinant factor** for recidivism. A study in USA shows that recidivism rates decline relatively consistently as age increases. So youths are more likely to offend than older people. Among all offenders under age 21, the recidivism rate is 35.5 percent, while offenders over age 50 have a recidivism rate of 9.5 percent (United States Sentencing commission, 2004). Therefore, incarceration, particularly at a young age, can lead to an accumulation of disadvantages over the life course, with future opportunities severely restricted [4]. On the other hand, the **absence of employment** is a consistent factor in recidivism and parole or probation violations, and **having a criminal history** limits employment opportunities and **depresses wages**. In New York State, labor statistics show that **89%** of formerly incarcerated people who violate the terms of their probation or parole are unemployed at the time of violation. Further research suggests that 1 year after release, up to 60% of former inmates are not employed. Nationally, according to a study by Bushway and Reuter [5], one in three incarcerated people reported being unemployed before entering state prison, and fewer than half had a job lined up before release. Moreover, family is **another main factor** in the formation of individual and social personally of the child. From the child’s point of view, parents are the most important and most valuable models of the universe. Prisoners’ recidivism rates are associated with the amount of contact they receive with their families [6]. Less care of family to their children [7] and lack of family involvement is **strongly related** to crime and incarceration rates. In line with this, studies in Australia revealed that, offenders with limited family support or attachment are more likely to reoffend. Alongside, drugs problem is one of the **main headline crime stories** of our times which leads to crime. The urge to commit crimes by drug addicts and alcoholics is **motivated** by the desire to support their habits. Much of these offenders’ behavior can be linked to substance abuse and addictions (UNODC, 2012). Because they tend to serve short-term sentences, their access to treatment and other programmers while in detention is quite limited and they remain at high risk of reoffending. The issue crime in general and recidivism in particular has attracted the interest of some researchers in Ethiopia. These studies were basically focused on criminal behavior; juvenile delinquency and the criminal justice system i.e. have tried to point out from legal perspectives. Yet the amount of researches and the knowledge obtained from those researches do not suffice to explain the extent and depth of the problem related to recidivism rather they try to highlight the issue from criminal behavior. Andargachew [8] in his book “The Crime Problem and Its Correction” found that Ethiopian prisons are suffered from over crowdedness, lack of sanitation, and insufficient amount and quality of food service. He has also focused the history of Ethiopian police force as well as the history of judicial system in Ethiopia. However, Andargachew failed address the issue of recidivism and lack of rehabilitation on repeat offenders. Daniel [9] also studied Crime incidences in Addis Ababa with an emphasis on the nature, spatial pattern, causes, consequences and possible remedies and showed different variables causing criminal behavior. But he too failed to identify the major causes of recidivism. Nayak [10] studies magnitude and impact Juvenile Delinquency in Gondar, explored that Juveniles who were from large sized /or disintegrated family commit delinquent act than smaller sized and healthy family. It has a greater impact on different levels like, individual, family, community and society at large. Yet, he also lacked from discussing recidivism. In addition to this, Meti [11] in his/her study in Addis Ababa tried analyze the influence of socio economic factors on crime with particular emphasis on the triggering factors that prompt criminal behavior is a timely endeavor. But he still refrained from explaining the factors contributing to recidivism. On top of that, methodologically, the aforementioned studies gave a huge emphasis on quantitative method in the understanding of crime and criminal behavior, for the sake of describing socio-economic and demographic characteristics of study participants’ vis-à-vis recidivism. On the contrary, in the present study attempt has made to incorporate qualitative method intensively due to the fact that lived experience of recidivists are more understandable through a detailed and rich data that could be collected by giving more attention to qualitative method.

#### 5] prisons circumvent by punishing prisoners with false reports- AND they’ll initiate lockdowns, cut communication lines, transfer strike leaders, bribe prisoners, and break up strikes without criminalizing the strikes themselves

Nam-Sonenstein, 18 -- Publishing Editor at Shadowproof and columnist at Prison Protest

[Brian Nam-Sonenstein, "Florida Officials Deny Operation PUSH Is Ongoing, Even As They Retaliate Against Prisoners," Shadowproof, 1-25-18, https://shadowproof.com/2018/01/25/operation-push-update/, accessed 11-18-21]

Kevin “Rashid” Johnson, an activist and intellectual incarcerated at Florida State Prison, was charged with “inciting or attempting to incite a riot” five days before a nonviolent prison labor strike and boycott known as Operation PUSH.

A disciplinary report filed on January 10 states Warden Barry Reddish sent an article Johnson wrote about Operation PUSH and a “series of other articles” on the action to an administrative lieutenant. The article made “numerous allegations of mistreatment of inmates at Florida state prison and proclaims Florida to be the worst prison system of the four various states [where] he’s been incarcerated.”

It does not specify which passages specifically incited a riot and at no point does Johnson’s article include a call to action.

In an “emergency note” Johnson sent to his lawyers on January 19, he alleged Florida Department of Correction (FDC) officials tortured him.

“Am being literally tortured in retaliation for article on prison strike and conditions \*by the warden\*,” Johnson wrote. “No heat. Cell like \*outside\*, temp in 30s. Toilet doesn’t work. Window to outside doesn’t close and cold air blowing in cell.”

“Its daytime and so cold can barely write,” he wrote.

His supporters fear for his life and are asking members of the public to call Florida State Prison and demand they move him to a safer cell immediately.

“Nowhere is anyone told to do anything,” Johnson wrote in response to the riot charge. “It is only a piece of journalism, which is constitutionally protected exercise of speech and press. Also FDC prisoners have no internet access, so how is something published online inciting prisoners?”

Johnson’s article runs through the demands and motivations behind Operation PUSH. He describes slave labor conditions, violence and abuse, and a lack of medical care in the Florida system, connecting these conditions to the establishment of the state’s first penitentiary just three years after slavery was abolished for all with the ratification of the 13th Amendment (excluding those convicted of felonies).

He uses his own experiences over the last six months in the Florida prison system as context for Operation PUSH and compares it to three other states where he has been incarcerated.

“I can personally attest that conditions here are among the worst I’ve seen,” Johnson writes.

The department has a record of corruption and deception, Johnson notes, pointing to the 2012 murder of Darren Rainey by corrections officers.

Rainey was a mentally ill prisoner who burned to death because officers locked him in a shower rigged to reach 160 degrees Fahrenheit—40 degrees above the state limit—and then covered it up. His death led to further revelations about death, corruption, and abuse across the Florida prison system.

Data released this year shows the number of prisoner deaths in Florida rose 20 percent to 428 deaths in 2017, even as the number of prisoners declined. By comparison, more incarcerated people died in Florida prisons last year than have been executed in all of the United States since 2007.

Johnson called the riot charge “retaliation, plain and simple, for publicizing abusive conditions.”

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On January 15, when Operation PUSH was to begin (and also the day after Johnson’s disciplinary report), FDC canceled visitation at three facilities : Blackwater Correctional Institution, Everglades Correctional Institution and the Reception and Medical Center (RMC).

When the day arrived, RMC went on lockdown and sources indicate staffing levels were tripled at that facility. Around 50 protesters gathered outside to show solidarity with striking prisoners. Similar demonstrations took place around the state and in other parts of the country. News of Operation PUSH and its demands spread across U.S. and international media, including several mainstream outlets, like Newsweek and the Guardian.

The following day, as abolitionist scholar and activist Angela Davis announced her support of Operation PUSH at a speech in Florida, outside organizers for the Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee (IWOC) reported they lost communication with their sources on the inside. (IWOC is a chapter organization under the Industrial Workers of the World that seeks to unionize incarcerated people and serves as a liaison for their political organizing.)

“The only logical answer is repression tactics,” IWOC organizers declared. Lockdowns and shakedowns had likely interrupted lines of communication. At least two organizers were thrown in solitary confinement “without reason,” and dozens more were isolated in the days before the strike began.

Meanwhile, a large protest assembled outside FDC headquarters in Tallahassee. Protesters took over the lobby for several hours, demanding a meeting with department head Julie Jones to present the demands and call for an end to the retaliation.

Around 3:00 PM, police officers attempted to break up the protest. One activist with the anti-racist organization The Dream Defenders was arrested and charged with property damage/criminal mischief of $1000 or more, resisting an officer, and trespassing. She was bonded out of jail later that night. Several others were injured in the scuffle as police tried to eject protesters from the building.

FDC made some of its first statements about Operation PUSH the next day, acknowledging the arrest and alleging “protesters became increasingly disruptive and breached the doors into a secure area of the building.”

“In attempt to enter the secure area, protesters battered FDC staff,” they claimed. FDC also said there was “no interruption to daily operations” and denied any prisoner resistance took place.

Meanwhile, Supporting Prisoners And Real Change (SPARC), which is a platform for Florida prisoners and families in Florida, reported “key organizers” were placed in solitary confinement and faced investigation for “no reason given.”

IWOC reported the Avon Park facility deactivated prison phones on the second day of the protest, “denying these political prisoners their right to inform their loved ones that they are safe.” They said “dozens” of suspected organizers were now in isolation.

Solidarity actions continued around the country. On January 19, members of Workers World held a teach-in on prison abolition and documentary film screening in Georgia. There were banner drops in Omaha, Nebraska, earlier that morning.

SPARC released a list of over 150 organizations, who expressed solidarity with Operation PUSH on January 20.

On January 22, outside activists flooded FDC phone lines with a call-in action demanding the department recognize prisoner demands. In response, the department released another statement denying any protest was happening and said normal operations continued in all prisons across the state.

“Despite recent reports, prisons and institutions across the state have had no interruption to daily operations. There were no inmate work stoppages or strikes,” the statement read.

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Publicly, FDC insists there is no Operation PUSH inside its facilities. Yet incarcerated people have reported “active participation or repression of some sort” in at least sixteen state prisons.

SPARC argues this is part of FDC’s strategy of severing communication to “create the perception of inactivity and break the spirits of those participating in the strike.” Incarcerated organizers have expressed the importance of solidarity and communication with those on the outside, both for morale and for protection, for many years.

FDC threatened organizers with “harsher retaliation” if they corresponded or in some cases merely received literature from advocacy groups like IWOC and Fight Toxic Prisons.

Lockdowns, disconnected phone lines, and mass searches interrupted lines of communication, and incarcerated people suspected of organizing resistance were split up and transferred to other facilities.

Multiple incarcerated people reported being given a choice: work with the FDC against Operation PUSH and receive a transfer to a so-called “sweeter” work camp. Otherwise, face solitary confinement for corresponding with organizers on the outside.

Prison officials used gang designations to stifle the nonviolent protest, labeling suspected organizers as members of a Security Threat Group (STG). This classification level subjects prisoners to further isolation, surveillance, harassment, and loss of rights and privileges.

In an interview with the website It’s Going Down, IWOC organizer Karen Smith said suspects were investigated and charged for using contraband phones. Investigators in some cases went so far as to decide certain social media posts were tied to particular individuals even if they didn’t have a phone.

Smith called the repression “harsh and complete.” The FDC is watching social media pages and keeping close tabs on people who receive literature from outside groups, she said.

FDC’s reaction to Operation PUSH is somewhat of a departure from how the state handled prisoner resistance in recent years.

When protesters changed their tactics for Operation PUSH to focus on a nonviolent economic protest, the FDC changed theirs, too, engaging in what SPARC called “low-intensity, psychological warfare rather than blunt force.” Given the authoritarian nature of prison systems, which are afforded total obscurity and practically unlimited control over prisoner movement and communication, the FDC is well positioned to adapt its forms of repression.

“It should come as no surprise that the [FDC] can’t be trusted to report strikes occurring in Florida state prisons, just as they have been lying, or to borrow from a PUSH prisoner, ‘using wordplay,’ around the rip-off of their canteen prices,” SPARC wrote. “They have been working for weeks to eliminate the chance of the strike’s success. Claiming that it never existed is another tactic for trying to stop it. Never trust the oppressors to adequately report the facts.”

SPARC found that building outside support in advance, which prisoners felt was necessary to boost morale and participation in Operation PUSH, “provided ample notification and time for the [FDC] to bribe, threaten, and gather scab labor.”