## 1

#### Interpretation – The affirmative must defend the hypothetical implementation of a topical government policy. Premptive extra topical violation too – shouldn’t defend more than the rez

#### Resolved is used to introduce a policy resolution—limited to only the exact immediate question of the resolution – this is important because that’s all we have before the round.

**Robert 15** [General Henry M. Robert, US Army, 1915, http://www.bartleby.com/176/4.html]

A motion is a proposal that the assembly take certain action, or that it express itself as holding certain views. It is made by a member's obtaining the floor as already described and saying, "I move that" (which is equivalent to saying, "I propose that"), and then stating the action he proposes to have taken. Thus a member "moves" (proposes) that a resolution be adopted, or amended, or referred to a committee, or that a vote of thanks be extended, etc.; or "That it is the sense of this meeting (or assembly) that industrial training," etc. Every resolution should be in writing, and the presiding officer has a right to require any main motion, amendment, or instructions to a committee to be in writing. When a main motion is of such importance or length as to be in writing it is usually written in the form of a resolution; that is, **beginning with the words, "Resolved,** **That**," the word "Resolved " being underscored (printed in italics) and followed by a comma, and the word "That" beginning with a capital "T." If the word "Resolved" were replaced by the words "I move," the resolution would become a motion. A resolution is always a main motion. In some sections of the country the word "resolve" is frequently used instead of "resolution." In assemblies with paid employees, instructions given to employees are called "orders" instead of "resolutions," and the enacting word, "Ordered" is used instead of "Resolved." [continues] After a question has been stated by the chair, it is before the assembly for consideration and action. All resolutions, reports of committees, communications to the assembly, and all amendments proposed to them, and all other motions except the Undebatable Motions mentioned in 45, may be debated before final action is taken on them, unless by a two-thirds vote the assembly decides to dispose of them without debate. By a two-thirds vote is meant two-thirds of the votes cast, a quorum being present. In the debate each member has the right to speak twice on the same question on the same day (except on an appeal), but cannot make a second speech on the same question as long as any member who has not spoken on that question desires the floor. No one can speak longer than ten minutes at a time without permission of the assembly. **Debate must be limited to the merits of the immediately pending question** — that is, the last question stated by the chair that is still pending; except that in a few cases the main question is also open to debate [45]. Speakers must address their remarks to the presiding officer, be courteous in their language and deportment, and avoid all personalities, never alluding to the officers or other members by name, where possible to avoid it, nor to the motives of members. thing ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Government action is necessary to regulate private entities.

**Blaustein 18** (Blaustein, Richard. “Private-Sector Space Activities Require Government Regulation, Says US Report.” Physics World, IOP Publishing, 4 July 2018, physicsworld.com/a/private-sector-space-activities-require-government-regulation-says-us-report/.)//DebateDrills AY

**The US Congress must introduce legislation to regulate the activities of private companies operating in space.** That is according to a new report by the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, which says **the need for reform has been heightened by the “burgeoning” commercial space sector** in the US. One leader in the booming US private space sector is [Space X](http://www.spacex.com/), which was founded by Tesla head Elon Musk in 2002. The firm, which has had a number of recent high-profile rocket launches, is setting its sights on missions to Mars. Even Jeff Bezos, who founded the online shopping giant Amazon, is getting in on the act with plans for his firm Blue Origin to send a manned mission to the Moon.

#### Violation – They affirm “global orbital counter-operations” which isn’t a policy action. also cross- ex

#### Prefer our Interpretation—

#### 1] Their model makes neg engagement impossible by letting the aff skirt the resolutional stasis point, rendering our topic-specific preparation and research useless. Abdicating debates about the resolution makes all limits impossible – being “germane” or “about” the resolution isn’t enough.

#### We have 2 impacts.

#### Procedural fairness and competitive equity – their interpretation *explodes limits*, opening the floodgates to an infinite scope of 1ACs that Ns can't reasonably be expected to prepare for – it also allows the aff to *pre-determine the terrain of competition* and contestation by adopting any methodology, analytic, or literature base, which only grants the neg *concessionary ground* and forces us to debate against truisms – this kills neg ground and creates a structural side-bias for the aff. Vote neg if the aff wins they are a good idea in the slightest- means that the aff has engaged within the legal dystopic future which is what they say debate is. Debate

#### Idea Testing/Argument-skills – A well-defined resolution is crucial to allow the neg to refute the aff in an in-depth fashion---this process of negation produces iterative testing and improvement, where we learn to improve our arguments based on our opponents’ arguments. This process does not proscribe particular styles or forms of argument, but does require a common point of disagreement around which arguments can be organized. No impact turns—T is just an argument as to why aff is a bad idea. View this argument as an *impact filter* for the entire round.

Ralf Poscher 16, director of the Institute for Staatswissenschaft & Philosophy of Law, Professor of Public Law and Legal Philosophy, “Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement,” in *Metaphilosophy of Law*, ed. Gizbert-Studnicki, Dyrda, Banas, 2/19/16, SSRN recut amrita

Hegel’s dialectical thinking powerfully exploits the idea of negation. It is a central feature of spirit and consciousness that they have the power to negate. The spirit “is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it. This […] is the magical power that converts it into being.”102 The tarrying with the negative is part of what Hegel calls the “labour of the negative”103. In a loose reference to this Hegelian notion Gerald Postema points to yet another feature of disagreements as a necessary ingredient of the process of practical reasoning. Only if our reasoning is exposed to contrary arguments can we test its merits. We must go through the “labor of the negative” to have trust in our deliberative processes.104 This also holds where we seem to be in agreement. Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be deceptive in various ways. The first phenomenon Postema draws attention to is the group polarization effect. When a group of like‐minded people deliberates an issue, informational and reputational cascades produce more extreme views in the process of their deliberations.105 The polarization and biases that are well documented for such groups 106 can be countered at least in some settings by the inclusion of dissenting voices. In these scenarios, disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases.107 A second deliberative dysfunction mitigated by disagreement is superficial agreement, which can even be manipulatively used in the sense of a “presumptuous ‘We’”108. Disagreement can help to police such distortions of deliberative processes by challenging superficial agreements. Disagreements may thus signal that a deliberative process is not contaminated with dysfunctional agreements stemming from polarization or superficiality. Protecting our discourse against such contaminations is valuable even if we do not come to terms. Each of the opposing positions will profit from the catharsis it received “by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it”. These advantages of disagreement in collective deliberations are mirrored on the individual level. Even if the probability of reaching a consensus with our opponents is very low from the beginning, as might be the case in deeply entrenched conflicts, entering into an exchange of arguments can still serve to test and improve our position. We have to do the “labor of the negative” for ourselves. Even if we cannot come up with a line of argument that coheres well with everybody else’s beliefs, attitudes and dispositions, we can still come up with a line of argument that achieves this goal for our own personal beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. To provide ourselves with the most coherent system of our own beliefs, attitudes and dispositions is – at least in important issues – an aspect of personal integrity – to borrow one of Dworkin’s favorite expressions for a less aspirational idea. In hard cases we must – in some way – lay out the argument for ourselves to figure out what we believe to be the right answer. We might not know what we believe ourselves in questions of abortion, the death penalty, torture, and stem cell research, until we have developed a line of argument against the background of our subjective beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. In these cases it might be rational to discuss the issue with someone unlikely to share some of our more fundamental convictions or who opposes the view towards which we lean. This might even be the most helpful way of corroborating a view, because we know that our adversary is much more motivated to find a potential flaw in our argument than someone with whom we know we are in agreement. It might be more helpful to discuss a liberal position with Scalia than with Breyer if we want to make sure that we have not overlooked some counter‐argument to our case. It would be too narrow an understanding of our practice of legal disagreement and argumentation if we restricted its purpose to persuading an adversary in the case at hand and inferred from this narrow understanding the irrationality of argumentation in hard cases, in which we know beforehand that we will not be able to persuade. Rational argumentation is a much more complex practice in a more complex social framework. Argumentation with an adversary can have purposes beyond persuading him: to test one’s own convictions, to engage our opponent in inferential commitments and to persuade third parties are only some of these; to rally our troops or express our convictions might be others. To make our peace with Kant we could say that “there must be a hope of coming to terms” with someone though not necessarily with our opponent, but maybe only a third party or even just ourselves and not necessarily only on the issue at hand, but maybe through inferential commitments in a different arena. f) The Advantage Over Non‐Argumentative Alternatives It goes without saying that in real world legal disagreements, all of the reasons listed above usually play in concert and will typically hold true to different degrees relative to different participants in the debate: There will be some participants for whom our hope of coming to terms might still be justified and others for whom only some of the other reasons hold and some for whom it is a mixture of all of the reasons in shifting degrees as our disagreements evolve. It is also apparent that, with the exception of the first reason, the rationality of our disagreements is of a secondary nature. The rational does not lie in the discovery of a single right answer to the topic of debate, since in hard cases there are no single right answers. Instead, our disagreements are instrumental to rationales which lie beyond the topic at hand, like the exploration of our communalities or of our inferential commitments. Since these reasons are of this secondary nature, they must stand up to alternative ways of settling irreconcilable disagreements that have other secondary reasons in their favor – like swiftness of decision making or using fewer resources. Why does our legal practice require lengthy arguments and discursive efforts even in appellate or supreme court cases of irreconcilable legal disagreements? The closure has to come by some non‐argumentative mean and courts have always relied on them. For the medieval courts of the Germanic tradition it is bequeathed that judges had to fight it out literally if they disagreed on a question of law – though the king allowed them to pick surrogate fighters.109 It is understandable that the process of civilization has led us to non‐violent non‐ argumentative means to determine the law. But what was wrong with District Judge Currin of Umatilla County in Oregon, who – in his late days – decided inconclusive traffic violations by publicly flipping a coin?110 If we are counting heads at the end of our lengthy argumentative proceedings anyway, why not decide hard cases by gut voting at the outset and spare everybody the cost of developing elaborate arguments on questions, where there is not fact of the matter to be discovered? One reason lies in the mixed nature of our reasons in actual legal disagreements. The different second order reasons can be held apart analytically, but not in real life cases. The hope of coming to terms will often play a role at least for some time relative to some participants in the debate. A second reason is that the objectives listed above could not be achieved by a non‐argumentative procedure. Flipping a coin, throwing dice or taking a gut vote would not help us to explore our communalities or our inferential commitments nor help to scrutinize the positions in play. A third reason is the overall rational aspiration of the law that Dworkin relates to in his integrity account111. In a justificatory sense112 the law aspires to give a coherent account of itself – even if it is not the only right one – required by equal respect under conditions of normative disagreement.113 Combining legal argumentation with the non‐argumentative decision‐ making procedure of counting reasoned opinions serves the coherence aspiration of the law in at least two ways: First, the labor of the negative reduces the chances that constructions of the law that have major flaws or inconsistencies built into the arguments supporting them will prevail. Second, since every position must be a reasoned one within the given framework of the law, it must be one that somehow fits into the overall structure of the law along coherent lines. It thus protects against incoherent “checkerboard” treatments114 of hard cases. It is the combination of reasoned disagreement and the non‐rational decision‐making mechanism of counting reasoned opinions that provides for both in hard cases: a decision and one – of multiple possible – coherent constructions of the law. Pure non‐rational procedures – like flipping a coin – would only provide for the decision part. Pure argumentative procedures – which are not geared towards a decision procedure – would undercut the incentive structure of our agonistic disagreements.115 In the face of unresolvable disagreements endless debates would seem an idle enterprise. That the debates are about winning or losing helps to keep the participants engaged. That the decision depends on counting reasoned opinions guarantees that the engagement focuses on rational argumentation. No plain non‐argumentative procedure would achieve this result. If the judges were to flip a coin at the end of the trial in hard cases, there would be little incentive to engage in an exchange of arguments. It is specifically the count of reasoned opinions which provides for rational scrutiny in our legal disagreements and thus contributes to the rationales discussed above. 2. The Semantics of Agonistic Disagreements The agonistic account does not presuppose a fact of the matter, it is not accompanied by an ontological commitment, and the question of how the fact of the matter could be known to us is not even raised. Thus the agonistic account of legal disagreement is not confronted with the metaphysical or epistemological questions that plague one‐right‐answer theories in particular. However, it must still come up with a semantics that explains in what sense we disagree about the same issue and are not just talking at cross purposes. In a series of articles David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have reconstructed legal disagreements in semantic terms as metalinguistic negotiations on the usage of a term that at the center of a hard case like “cruel and unusual punishment” in a death‐penalty case.116 Even though the different sides in the debate define the term differently, they are not talking past each other, since they are engaged in a metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the same term. The metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the term serves as a semantic anchor for a disagreement on the substantive issues connected with the term because of its functional role in the law. The “cruel and unusual punishment”‐clause thus serves to argue about the permissibility of the death penalty. This account, however only provides a very superficial semantic commonality. But the commonality between the participants of a legal disagreement go deeper than a discussion whether the term “bank” should in future only to be used for financial institutions, which fulfills every criteria for semantic negotiations that Plunkett and Sundell propose. Unlike in mere semantic negotiations, like the on the disambiguation of the term “bank”, there is also some kind of identity of the substantive issues at stake in legal disagreements.

#### Vote neg – T is key to set the correct and ethical model of debate which means it comes first also means no impact turns because it’s a procedural and DTD since round is skewed.

#### CI—tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for. Reasonability is arbitrary and unpredictable, inviting a race to the bottom and we’ll win it links to our offense.

#### Precision o/w – anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### No RVIs—it’s your burden to be fair and T—same reason you don’t win for answering inherency or putting defense on a disad.

## 2

#### —Do the aff except in instances of violence. In response to the unjust appropriation of outer space by private entities, we will affirm nonviolent global orbital counter-operations.

#### The CP solves but competes through nonviolence. Their capitulation to violence as an organizational strategy invokes a violent form of self-preservation that destroys challenges to racial cap.

**Butler 20** JudithButler, Comparative Literature @ Berkeley, 20, “The force of nonviolence: The ethical in the political.” Verso Books, 2020.29-32.

One of **the most popular argument**s on the left **to defend the tactical use of violence** begins with the claim that many people already live in the force field of violence. Because violence **is** already happening, the argument continues, there is no real choice about whether or not to enter into violence through one’s action: **we are already inside the field of violence**. According to that view, the distance that moral deliberation takes on the question of whether or not to act in a violent way is a privilege and luxury, betraying something about the power of its own location. In that view, the consideration of violent action is not a choice, since one is already—and unwillingly—within the force field of violence. Because violence is happening all the time (and it is happening regularly to minorities), such resistance is but a form of counter-violence. 7 Apart from a general and traditional left claim about the necessity of a “violent struggle” for revolutionary purposes, there are more specific justificatory strategies at work: violence is happening against us, so we are justified in taking violent action against those who (a) started the violence and (b) directed it against us. We do this in the name of our own lives and our right to persist in the world. As for the claim that resistance to violence is counter-violence, we might still pose a set of questions: Even if violence is circulating all the time and we find ourselves in a force field of violence, do we want to have a say about whether violence continues to circulate? If it circulates all the time, is it therefore inevitable that it circulates? What would it mean to dispute the inevitability of its circulation? The argument may be, “Others do it, and so should we”; or else, “Others do it against us, so we should do it against them, in the name of self-preservation.” These are each different, but important claims. The first holds to a principle of straightforward reciprocity, suggesting that whatever actions the other takes, I am licensed to take as well. **That line of** **argumentation**, however, sidesteps the question of whether what the other does is justifiable. The second claim **links violence with self-defense and self-preservation**, an argument we will take up in the subsequent chapters. For the moment, though, let us ask: **Who is this “self” defended in the name of selfdefense? 8 How is that self delineated from other selves, from history, land, or other defining relations?** Is the one to whom violence is done not also in some sense part of the “self” who defends itself through an act of violence? There is a sense in which violence done to another is at once a violence done to the self, but only if the relation between them defines them both quite fundamentally. This last proposition indicates a central concern of this book. For if the one who practices nonviolence is related to the one against whom violence is contemplated, then there appears to be a prior social relation between them; they are part of one another, or one self is implicated in another self. **Nonviolence would**, then, be a way **of acknowledg**ing that **social relation**, however fraught it may be, and of affirming the normative aspirations that follow from that prior social relatedness. As a result, an ethics of nonviolence cannot be predicated on individualism, and it must take the lead in waging a critique of individualism as the basis of ethics and politics alike. An ethics and politics of nonviolence would have to account for this way that selves are implicated in each other’s lives, bound by a set of relations that can be as destructive as they can be sustaining. The relations that bind and define extend **beyond the dyadic human encounter**, which is why nonviolence pertains not only to human relations, but to all living **and inter-constitutive relations**. To launch this inquiry into social relations, however, we would have to know what kind of potential or actual social bond holds between both subjects in a violent encounter. **If the self is constituted through its relations with others, then part of what it means to preserve or negate a self is to preserve** or negate the extended social ties that define the self and its world. Over and against the idea that the self will be bound to act violently in the name of its individual self-preservation, this inquiry supposes that nonviolence requires a critique of egological ethics as well as of the political legacy of individualism in order to open up the idea of selfhood as a fraught field of social relationality. That relationality is, of course, defined in part by negativity, that is, by conflict, anger, and aggression. The destructive potential of human relations does not deny all relationality, and relational perspectives cannot evade the persistence of this potential or actual destruction of social ties. As a result, **relationality is not by itself a good thing**, a sign of connectedness, an ethical norm to be posited over and against destruction: rather, relationality is a vexed and ambivalent field in which the question of ethical obligation has to be worked out in light of a persistent and constitutive destructive potential. Whatever “doing the right thing” turns out to be, it depends on passing through the division or struggle that conditions that ethical decision to begin with. That task is never exclusively reflexive, that is, dependent on my relation to myself alone. Indeed, when the world presents as a force field of violence, the task of nonviolence is to find ways of living and acting in that world such that violence is checked or ameliorated, or its direction turned, precisely at moments when it seems to saturate that world and offer no way out. The body can be the vector of that turn, but so too can discourse, collective practices, infrastructures, and institutions. **In response to the objection that a position in favor of nonviolence is simply unrealistic, this argument maintains that nonviolence requires a critique of what counts as reality, and it affirms the power and necessity of counterrealism in times like these**. Perhaps nonviolence requires a certain leavetaking from reality as it is currently constituted, laying open the possibilities that belong to a newer political imaginary. Many on the left argue that they believe in nonviolence but make an exception for self-defense. To understand their claim, we would need to know who the “self” is—its territorial limits and boundaries, its constitutive ties. If the self that I defend is me, my relatives, others who belong to my community, nation, or religion, or those who share a language with me, then I am a closet communitarian who will, it seems, preserve the lives of those who are like me, but certainly not those who are unlike me. Moreover, I apparently live **in a world in which that “self” is recognizable as a self**. Once we see that **certain selves are considered worth defending while others are not,** is there not a problem of inequality that follows from the justification of violence in the service of selfdefense? One cannot explain this form of inequality, which accords measures of grievability to groups across the global spectrum, without taking account of the racial schemes that make such grotesque distinctions between which lives are valuable (and potentially grievable, if lost) and those which are not. Given that self-defense is very often regarded as the justifiable exception to the norms guiding a nonviolent practice, we have to consider both (a) who counts as such a self and (b) how encompassing is the “self” of self-defense (again, does it include one’s family, community, religion, nation, traditional land, customary practices?). For lives not considered grievable (those treated as if they can be neither lost nor mourned), dwelling already **in what** Frantz **Fanon called “the zone of non-being,”** the assertion of a life that matters, as we see in the Black Lives Matter movement, can break through the schema. Lives matter in the sense that they assume physical form within the sphere of appearance; lives matter because they are to be valued equally. And yet, the claim of self-defense on the part of those who wield power is too often a defense of power, of its prerogatives, and of the inequalities it presupposes and produces. **The “self” who is defended in such cases is one who identifies with others who belong to whiteness**, to a specific nation, to a party in a border dispute; and so the terms of self-defense augment the purposes of war. Such a “self” can function as a kind of regime, including as part of its extended self all those who bear similitude to one’s color, class, and privilege, thus expelling from the regime of the subject/self all those marked by difference within that economy. Although we think of self-defense as a response to a blow initiated from the outside, **the privileged self requires no such instigation to draw its boundaries and police its exclusions. “Any possible threat”—that is, any imagined threat, any phantasm of threat—is enough to unleash its self-entitled violence**. As the philosopher Elsa Dorlin has pointed out, only some selves are regarded as entitled to selfdefense. 9 Whose claims of self-defense, for instance, are more readily believed in a court of law, and whose are more likely to be discounted and dismissed? Who, in other words, bears a self that is regarded as defensible, an existence that can appear within the legal frames of power as a life worthy, worth defending, not worth losing?

## 3

#### CP- Do the aff minus their rejection of politics.

#### They suture neoliberalism-- individual action depoliticizes any concrete power struggles and causes climate change, fascism, and rampant inequality.

Gude 12 Shawn Gude, Shawn Gude is an associate editor at Jacobin. “Occupy Anti-Politics.” Jacobin. November 13, 2012. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2012/11/occupy-anti-politics

In my new neighborhood, in Baltimore, “Occupy the Vote: Re-Elect Obama” signs still pepper the landscape. They’re planted in front yards, posted in front windows, positioned on sidewalk strips. This irks me, to an extent — this wanton appropriation of the Occupy name, used to declare allegiance to a president firmly ensconced in the very neoliberal consensus the movement hoped to dislodge. Yet as much as I find the diction disquieting, its social movement-electoral politics linkage is provocative and pregnant, given Occupy’s missteps. Last year at this time, the Left was emboldened and highly visible. And now? Occupiers are providing important support to existing struggles and launching their own campaigns. Last week, Sarah Jaffe documented Occupy’s heartening role in the post-Sandy recovery [in these pages](http://jacobinmag.com/2012/11/power-to-the-people/). But this is all occurring locally, on a relatively small scale. As [Thomas Frank points out](http://www.thebaffler.com/past/to_the_precinct_station) in the current issue of the Baffler, the term “the one percent” has been the movement’s only lasting contribution to national politics; a tax code classification morphed into a usefully polarizing pejorative. But that’s it. The way Obama and Romney campaigned, you’d think Occupy never happened. So what went wrong? Frank is unsparing in his criticism, hitting occupiers for being self-absorbed and self-aggrandizing, more taken by esoteric theorizing than apt to take consequential action. Frank also assembles a rather conventional list of objections to Occupy: its absence of enumerated demands, its consensus model and distaste for structure, its outsized love for building community. The blows that really land all have a common thread. Each are, at bottom, instances of occupiers’ aversion to politics. This antipathy wasn’t unanimous among the movement’s ranks, but it was pervasive. And it was, along with police repression, one of the key reasons Occupy failed. Early on, many occupiers, myself included, fretted that established progressive groups and Democratic partisans would try to funnel the élan of Occupy into mainstream politics; the movement would then quickly wither and die. Co-opt: utter the word, and the implicated party was instantly put on the defensive. These worries weren’t entirely born of paranoia, and activists were right to keep a wary eye on the center-left. But the vigilance had the unfortunate tendency of cloistering and marginalizing the movement. Activists customarily viewed anyone connected to electoral politics with suspicion. And when not a few occupiers averred that the movement was resolutely anti-political, they weren’t being glib — they meant electoral politics, the political process, everything. The world they sought would have no politics, no debased struggles for power. They didn’t just want to democratize power, but eradicate it. In their minds, the encampments were harmonious, experimental sites of prefiguration, a glimpse into the politics-free future. Transforming a stodgy corporate park into a liveable space, they would provide the model. The desire to foster community and build emotional bonds was well-intentioned and, in small doses, salutary. Developing and maintaining relationships is vitally important to retaining and attracting new people, to building a strong movement. Casual participants are more apt to leave — or limit their involvement — if they lack personal connections to other movement members. Particularly trying junctures are easier to handle if you know your comrades have your back, and vice versa. Facing a phalanx of riot cops becomes disconcerting, not disabling (that is, until they start letting their truncheons fly). So community is important. Occupiers were wrong, however, when they viewed it as a resounding step towards a more egalitarian, just society. I remember a beautiful moment this spring. It was a Sunday night in Chicago, the weekend of the Occupy anti-NATO protests. Most everyone was tired after several days of meandering marching. Following a thousands-strong, permitted march earlier in the day, several hundred of us had tried and failed to break through a police line; our chimerical goal was to shut down the conference. Now it was night, and hundreds of us had headed north to the Art Institute, the site of a dinner for NATO leaders’ spouses. Police ringed the building. We could make some noise and mount a sit-in, but little else. Soon, it started pouring. The rain didn’t precipitate despair among the youthful throng, though, but euphoria. There was a street dance party, and then a group hug. A feeling of deep, visceral cohesiveness with my fellow occupiers overcame me. I felt fulfilled. This was, in many ways, Occupy encapsulated. It was marvelous. And, in retrospect, meaningless. The one percent is content with the fetishization of feelings, because it poses little threat to their plutocratic power: Build your small, mutual aid communities. We’ll continue our rapacious behavior, unmolested and untouched. We’ll continue to brandish the coercive power of the state, a state that, if so pressured, could pose an existential threat to capitalist power. Politically, Occupy accomplished little because we were often too wary of acting politically, of making demands on the political system, of acknowledging conflict and structuring our movement accordingly. Many in the movement thought structure carried the patina of the establishment, that demand making would simply serve to legitimize the malevolent state. So we got an amorphous, highly decentralized movement that, after a miraculous flourish in its embryonic stages, tapered off. This wasn’t the practice of politics. It was an attempt to transcend it. Joseph Schwartz, a political philosopher at Temple University, argues in his 1995 book The Permanence of the Political that the Left has long had these anti-political inclinations — “either through the stifling solidaristic general will of Rousseau, the spontaneous postscarcity anarchism of Marx’s ‘full communism,’ or the technocratic, scientistic rule of Lenin’s vanguard party.” Schwartz continues: [A]lthough viewed by some as patron saints of “radical democracy,” these theorists did not conceptualize a further democratization of political life but rather the transcendence of politics through the creation of societies characterized by minimal social conflict and universally shared conceptions of the public or human good. Sound familiar? Even for those who find the state of American politics repulsive (and I, emphatically, do) the principle, the idea, of politics and the democratic process must be defended. Jaundiced resignation redounds to the benefit of the Right. They relish anti-political cynicism. They oppose concerted collective action, so they harness the sentiment to subvert politics itself. They adopt a sort of aloof, cooler-than-thou detachment from the political arena, a pernicious posture that ineluctably elevates apathy and inaction to the status of beau ideal. Politics-averse leftists risk falling into the same pattern of passivity and discrediting the necessarily political solutions to our social ills. What we have in the case of climate change, for example, is both the largest market failure and most daunting collective action problem in human history. The hyper-decentralized, quasi-primitivist solutions popular in some corners of the radical left are laughably inadequate or execrably anti-humanist. The antidote to a collective problem is collective action. So too with issues of inequality, poverty, and imperialism. Acting politically means confronting power, not side-stepping it. It means reshaping existing institutions, not just building alternative ones. It means directly and indirectly engaging the state, not cocooning oneself from it. Even as we on the democratic left offer impassioned critiques of our political system we mustn’t eschew politics. We’ve already seen what that can do to our most promising social movements.

# Case

### AT: FW

#### FW: The 1AC must tangibly and causally demonstrate HOW they AFFECT the success of global counter operation. This is the minimum condition for NOT immediately voting negative on presumption.

#### Burden of Proof- The 1AC has to defend a positive change from the status quo and their evidence concedes that these operations exist. What does the 1AC do is the operative question?

#### Their OWN ev says so. 1AC Mezzadra and Nielsen says quote “the operation is effectual rather than performative, the sense in which it is Presumption

#### Presumption ALWAYS flips neg against K affs – That places a hard cap on debatable material since it ensures the aff must robustly defend their advocacy AND that the negative has a shot at engagement.

#### Now, vote neg:

#### They cant solve public space operations. Their evidence is about repurposing technology but they have no description for what that means or how they get NASA’s tech.

#### Counteroperations fail. They get crushed by backlash which matters since they conceded these operations are only valuable if they SUCCESSFUL. How do they beat NewSpace?

### AT: Case Proper

#### Their Genovese 17 evidence lists out elements of technoscientific development they disagree with. It says quote technoscientific development—as I have argued in previous chapters—science and science fiction are melded into a Baudrillardian simulation where artificial intelligence, autonomous rocket boosters that land on autonomous drone ships, and a constant human presence in outer space is the sedimentation of hyperreality.

Extinction good and scholarship and discourse are key to preventing the impact

Nick **Bostrom 2**, PhD, Faculty in Philosophy at Oxford, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,” <http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html>.

**Existential risks have a cluster of features that make it useful to identify them as a special category: the extreme magnitude of the harm that would come from an existential disaster; the futility of the trial-and-error approach; the lack of evolved biological and cultural coping methods; the fact that existential risk dilution is a global public good; the shared stakeholdership of all future generations; the international nature of many of the required countermeasures; the necessarily highly speculative and multidisciplinary nature of the topic; the subtle and diverse methodological problems involved in assessing the probability of existential risks; and the comparative neglect of the whole area.** From our survey of the most important existential risks and their key attributes, **we can extract tentative recommendations for ethics** and policy: 9.1 Raise the profile of existential risks **We need more research into existential risks – detailed studies of particular aspects of specific risks** as well as more general investigations of associated ethical, methodological, security and policy issues. **Public awareness should also be built up so that constructive political debate about possible countermeasures becomes possible**. Now, it’s a commonplace that researchers always conclude that more research needs to be done in their field. But in

#### We’ll defend these simulations as good.

#### Crisis Escalation- Computational entanglement through AI and autonomous weapons solves crisis escalation.

Corneliu Bjola 19, Head of the Oxford Digital Diplomacy Research Group, University of Oxford, 11/10/19, “Diplomacy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence,” http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano\_en/contenido?WCM\_GLOBAL\_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano\_in/zonas\_in/ari98-2019-bjola-diplomacy-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence

Taking note of the fact that developments in AI are so dynamic and the implications so wide-ranging, another report prepared by a German think tank calls on Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) to immediately begin planning strategies that can respond effectively to the influence of AI in international affairs. Economic disruption, security & autonomous weapons, and democracy & ethics are the three areas they identify as priorities at the intersection of AI and foreign policy. Although they believe that transformational changes to diplomatic institutions will eventually be needed to meet the challenges ahead, they favour, in the short term, an incremental approach to AI that builds on the successes (and learns from the failures) of “cyber-foreign policy”, which, in many countries, has been already internalised in the culture of the relevant institutions, including of the MFAs.13 In the same vein, the authors of a report prepared for the Centre for a New American Security see great potential for AI in national security-related areas, including diplomacy. For example, AI can help improve communication between governments and foreign publics by lowering language barriers between countries, enhance the security of diplomatic missions via image recognition and information sorting technologies, and support international humanitarian operations by monitoring elections, assisting in peacekeeping operations, and ensuring that financial aid disbursements are not misused through anomaly detection.14

From an AI perspective, consular services could be a low-hanging fruit for AI integration in diplomacy as decisions are amenable to digitisation, the analytical contribution is reasonable relevant and the technology favours collaboration between users and the machine. Consular services rely on highly structured decisions, as they largely involve recurring and routinised operations based on clear and stable procedures, which do not need to be treated as new each time a decision has to be made (except for crisis situations, which are discussed further below). From a knowledge perspective, AI-assisted consular services may embody declarative (know-what) and procedural knowledge (know-how) to automate routinised operations and scaffold human cognition by reducing cognitive effort. This can be done by using data mining and data discovery techniques to organize the data and make it possible to identify patterns and relationships that would be difficult to observe otherwise (e.g., variation of demand for services by location, time, and audience profile).Case study #1: AI as Digital Consul Assistant

The consulate of country X has been facing uneven demand for emergency passports, visa requests and business certifications in the past five years. The situation has led to a growing backlog, significant loss of public reputation and a tense relationship between the consulate and the MFA. An AI system trained with data from the past five years uses descriptive analytics to identify patterns in the applications and concludes that August, May and December are the most likely months to witness an increase of the demand in the three categories next year. AI predictions are confirmed for August and May but not for December. AI recalibrates its advice using updated data and the new predictions help consular officers manage requests more effectively. As the MFA confidence in the AI system grows, the digital assistant is then introduced to other consulates experiencing similar problems.

Digital platforms could also emerge as indispensable tools for managing diplomatic crises in the digital age and for good reasons. They can help embassies and MFAs make sense of the nature and gravity of the events in real-time, streamline the decision-making process, manage the public’s expectations, and facilitate crisis termination. At the same time, they need to be used with great care as factual inaccuracies, coordination gaps, mismatched disclosure level, and poor symbolic signalling could easily derail digital efforts of crisis management.15 AI systems could provide great assistance to diplomats in times of crisis by helping them make sense of what it is happening (descriptive analytics) and identify possible trends (predictive analytics). The main challenge for AI is the semi-structured nature of the decisions to be taken. While many MFAs have pre-designed plans to activate in case of a crisis, it is safe to assume that reality often defies the best crafted plans. Given the high level of uncertainty in which crisis decision-making operates and the inevitable scrutiny and demand of accountability to occur if something goes wrong, AI integration can work only if humans retain control over the process. As a recent SIPRI study pointed out, AI systems may fail spectacularly when confronted with tasks or environments that differ slightly to those they were trained for. Their algorithms are also opaque, which makes difficult for humans to explain how they work and whether they include bias that could lead to problematic –if not dangerous– behaviours.16

1. **The alternative is human-centric warfare is privy to biases, error, and ethical practices---LAWs are net better.**

**Umbrello, et al, 20**—Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, University of Turin (Steven, with Phil Torres, Project for Future Human Flourishing, and Angelo De Bellis, University of Edinburgh, “The future of war: could lethal autonomous weapons make conflict more ethical?,” AI & Society, 35, 273–282 (2020),)

Yet, we would argue, such positions are predicated on an **unfounded fear** that taking control away from humans will enable robotic weaponry to **demolish current**, **human-involved warfare practices**. **Extrapolating techno-development trends into the future**, it is **reasonable to expect** future robotic weapons to acquire the capacity to **reliably** and **accurately differentiate** between combatants and noncombatants (Sharkey 2012; Egeland 2016); this **could even occur in the near future** (see Guizzo 2016). Indeed, Ronald Arkin (2008) anticipates such technologies—in particular, recognition software—to not only be **developed** but **surpass human performance capabilities** (see also O’Meara 2011; Egeland 2016). As he writes, “we must protect the innocent non-combatants in the battlespace far better than we currently do. Technology can, must, and should be used toward that end.” Like Nadeau, Arkin believes that moral LAWs would act in an **ethically superior way** to humans in war, saying that: The commonplace occurrence of slaughtering civilians in conflict over millennia gives rise to my pessimism in reforming human behaviour yet provides optimism for robots being able to exceed human moral performance in similar circumstances (Arkin 2015). One must also take into account the consequences of humans personally engaging in warfare. Historical records, including those of concurrent military engagements, recount numerous acts of barbarism as a result of the harsh conditions that combatants are exposed to (Arkin 2015). In fact, Lin et al. (2008) discuss how one of the most attractive prospects of LAWs is their inability to be affected by emotions on the battlefield (Lin et al. 2008). It is the emotional distress that often causes combatants to mistreat the enemy and commit war crimes. Hence, the introduction of LAWs that are unaffected by such emotional stress serves as an incentive for continued development (Klincewicz 2015).3 Second, the **emotional** and **physical pressures** that human combatants must endure during wartime have **performance costs**. The fatigue of a long and drawn-out battle affects the ability of individual soldiers to **perform optimally**, and thus affects the **accuracy of their shots** (Burke et al. 2007; Nibbeling et al. 2014). LAWs are **naturally unaffected** by similar physical pitfalls and can always—as long as the physical infrastructure is designed optimally from the start—permit the LAWs to **continually perform accurately** and **as expected**. The ability for LAWs to engage in **unwavering**, **precise combat** also **resolves some ethical issues** that arise from human-waged war. In light of the fact that LAWs do not possess emotions to guide their behaviors or personal stakes that affect their combat approaches, LAWs will always perform duties accurately under **even the most** physically—or to a human, emotionally—**stressful conditions**, thus enabling them to, at least more often than not, kill in a **more humane manner**. LAWs can be programmed to only engage targets in manners deemed most ethical based on the dynamics of war at the time of combat: the changing environment, the weapons being used by both the aggressor and the defender, and the characteristics of the target (human, robot, or physical structure). **Already**, computerized weapons platforms can engage targets **far more accurately than any human counterpart can** (Geibel 1997; Shachtman 2007; Katz and Lappin 2012; United States Navy 2017). Strong arguments can be levied that LAWs outfitted with such weapons platforms could engage in otherwise normal wartime duties but in a means that is **far more accurate** and thus **ethical**4 as a consequence of LAWs’ **technological superiority**. Part of this ethical prowess exhibited by LAWs is not only because they **never tire**, but because they are **impervious** to the **psychological shortcomings of humans**. Though a contentious topic, **several high-profile cognitive psychologists** suggest that humans **fabricate reasons for their actions after committing them** (Davidson 1982; Nadeau 2006). Thus, it is human to be **irrational**, to **make unreasoned decisions** toward an action that is then validated after carrying through. Such is **not the nature of a robot**. As mentioned, LAWs **do not have any particular affinity to** or **personal interests in surviving battle**; they **do not have any drive to exhibit particular harshness** against enemies of a certain culture; and they **do not**, outside of their goals, **worry about winning the war** and heading back home after using any unsavory methods to do so. What they do mind is their **particular set of rules**, their **value-laden code** that dictates **how they are to conduct themselves in an ethical manner** during combat.

#### Capitalism is sustainable

Bailey ’18 [Ronald; March 12; B.A. in Economics from the University of Virginia, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, citing a compilation of interdisciplinary research; Reason, “Climate Change Problems Will Be Solved Through Economic Growth,” <https://reason.com/2018/03/12/climate-change-problems-will-be-solved-t>; RP]

"It is, I promise, worse than you think," David Wallace-Wells wrote in an infamously apocalyptic 2017 New York Magazine article. "Indeed, absent a significant adjustment to how billions of humans conduct their lives, parts of the Earth will likely become close to uninhabitable, and other parts horrifically inhospitable, as soon as the end of this century." The "it" is man-made climate change. Temperatures will become scalding, crops will wither, and rising seas will inundate coastal cities, Wallace-Wells warns. But toward the end of his screed, he somewhat dismissively observes that "by and large, the scientists have an enormous confidence in the ingenuity of humans….Now we've found a way to engineer our own doomsday, and surely we will find a way to engineer our way out of it, one way or another." Over at Scientific American, John Horgan considers some eco-modernist views on how humanity will indeed go about engineering our way out of the problems that climate change may pose. In an essay called "Should We Chill Out About Global Warming?," Horgan reports the more dynamic and positive analyses of two eco-modernist thinkers, Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker and science journalist Will Boisvert. In an essay for The Breakthrough Journal, Pinker notes that such optimism "is commonly dismissed as the 'faith that technology will save us.' In fact, it is a skepticism that the status quo will doom us—that knowledge and behavior will remain frozen in their current state for perpetuity. Indeed, a naive faith in stasis has repeatedly led to prophecies of environmental doomsdays that never happened." In his new book, Enlightenment Now, Pinker points out that "as the world gets richer and more tech-savvy, it dematerializes, decarbonizes, and densifies, sparing land and species." Economic growth and technological progress are the solutions not only to climate change but to most of the problems that bedevil humanity. Boisvert, meanwhile, tackles and rebuts the apocalyptic prophecies made by eco-pessimists like Wallace-Wells, specifically with regard to food production and availabilty, water supplies, heat waves, and rising seas. "No, this isn't a denialist screed," Boisvert writes. "Human greenhouse emissions will warm the planet, raise the seas and derange the weather, and the resulting heat, flood and drought will be cataclysmic. Cataclysmic—but not apocalyptic. While the climate upheaval will be large, the consequences for human well-being will be small. Looked at in the broader context of economic development, climate change will barely slow our progress in the effort to raise living standards." Boisvert proceeds to show how a series of technologies—drought-resistant crops, cheap desalination, widespread adoption of air-conditioning, modern construction techniques—will ameliorate and overcome the problems caused by rising temperatures. He is entirely correct when he notes, "The most inexorable feature of climate-change modeling isn't the advance of the sea but the steady economic growth that will make life better despite global warming." Horgan, Pinker, and Boisvert are all essentially endorsing what I have called "the progress solution" to climate change. As I wrote in 2009, "It is surely not unreasonable to argue that if one wants to help future generations deal with climate change, the best policies would be those that encourage rapid economic growth. This would endow future generations with the wealth and superior technologies that could be used to handle whatever comes at them including climate change." Six years later I added that that "richer is more climate-friendly, especially for developing countries. Why? Because faster growth means higher incomes, which correlate with lower population growth. Greater wealth also means higher agricultural productivity, freeing up land for forests to grow as well as speedier progress toward developing and deploying cheaper non–fossil fuel energy technologies. These trends can act synergistically to ameliorate man-made climate change." Horgan concludes, "Greens fear that optimism will foster complacency and hence undermine activism. But I find the essays of Pinker and Boisvert inspiring, not enervating….These days, despair is a bigger problem than optimism." Counseling despair has always been wrong when human ingenuity is left free to solve problems, and that will prove to be the case with climate change as well.

[Answer universla black hol ]

1. Lithium –
2. No more

#### Specifically, US private space companies are key for space colonization.

**Chatzky et al 9/23** [Andrew Chatzky, [Anshu Siripurapu](https://www.cfr.org/bio/anshu-siripurapu), and [Steven J. Markovich](https://www.cfr.org/bio/steven-j-markovich), 9-23-2021, "Space Exploration and U.S. Competitiveness," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/space-exploration-and-us-competitiveness]//DDPT

Space exploration is expensive, but it is a relatively minor line item in the U.S. budget. NASA’s spending peaked at almost 4.5 percent of the federal budget in 1966, declined to 1 percent by 1975, and has gradually fallen to about half a percent in recent years. (In comparison, defense spending has hovered around 20 percent of the budget in recent years.) Congress appropriated about $23 billion for NASA in 2021, an increase of roughly 3 percent from the previous year.

Due to the Space Shuttle’s retirement in 2011, NASA did not have the means to send astronauts into space by itself for nearly a decade. U.S. astronauts have had to ride [Russia’s Soyuz capsule](https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/how-much-does-space-travel-cost-ncna919011) to the ISS—at a cost of up to $82 million per seat. In 2010, former Apollo astronauts [Neil Armstrong and Eugene Cernan](https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126775979) warned that U.S. leadership in space exploration could suffer. Such criticisms, as well as Trump’s stated desire to land astronauts on the moon during his tenure, spurred the president to boost his budget requests for the agency.

Commercializing Space

Historically, 85 to 90 percent of NASA’s budget went to private contractors—largely to design and manufacture rockets and spacecraft—while NASA maintained close oversight and operated the equipment. But now NASA often privatizes operations as well. Advocates of space commercialization believe [private firms](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/nasa-newspace/) such as SpaceX and Orbital Sciences, both of which won contracts to ferry ISS cargo, can provide routine LEO access at a lower cost. They say NASA could then focus more on missions that push scientific and exploration frontiers. Some go further to suggest that NASA become more like the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the National Science Foundation by setting objectives, such as capturing an asteroid, and then giving grants to private firms. But critics of privatization argue that development grants and limited competition will yield scant savings. Astrophysicist Neil deGrasse Tyson believes that while private enterprises can handle routine space flight, they are [unable to bear](https://bigthink.com/videos/neil-degrasse-tyson-bringing-commercial-space-fantasies-back-to-earth) the large and unknown risks of advancing the space frontier.

In May 2020, SpaceX became the first private company to successfully ferry two NASA astronauts to the ISS, using its Falcon 9 rocket and attached Crew Dragon capsule. President Trump said the launch “makes clear the commercial space industry is the future.” The astronauts safely returned to Earth in August, and in November, NASA certified SpaceX to begin routine missions.

#### Space exploration solves extinction and endless resource wars.

Collins 10 [Patrick Collins, professor of economics at Azabu University in Japan, and a Collaborating Researcher with the Institute for Space & Astronautical Science, as well as adviser to a number of companies, Adriano V. Autino is President of the Space Renaissance International; Manager, CEO/CTO, Systems Engineering Consultant / Trainer at Andromeda Systems Engineering LLC; and Supplier of methodological tools and consultancy at Intermarine S.p.A, Acta Astronautica, Volume 66, Issues 11–12, June–July 2010, “What the growth of a space tourism industry could contribute to employment, economic growth, environmental protection, education, culture and world peace”, Pages 1553–1562]

7. World peace and preservation of human civilisation

The major source of social friction, including international friction, has surely always been unequal access to resources. People fight to control the valuable resources on and under the land, and in and under the sea. The natural resources of Earth are limited in quantity, and economically accessible resources even more so. As the population grows, and demand grows for a higher material standard of living, industrial activity grows exponentially. The threat of resources becoming scarce has led to the concept of “Resource Wars”. Having begun long ago with wars to control the gold and diamonds of Africa and South America, and oil in the Middle East, the current phase is at centre stage of world events today [37]. A particular danger of “resource wars” is that, if the general public can be persuaded to support them, they may become impossible to stop as resources become increasingly scarce. Many commentators have noted the similarity of the language of US and UK government advocates of “war on terror” to the language of the novel “1984” which describes a dystopian future of endless, fraudulent war in which citizens are reduced to slaves.

7.1. Expansion into near-Earth space is the only alternative to endless “resource wars”

As an alternative to the “resource wars” already devastating many countries today, opening access to the unlimited resources of near-Earth space could clearly facilitate world peace and security. The US National Security Space Office, at the start of its report on the potential of space-based solar power (SSP) published in early 2007, stated: “Expanding human populations and declining natural resources are potential sources of local and strategic conflict in the 21st Century, and many see energy as the foremost threat to national security” [38]. The report ended by encouraging urgent research on the feasibility of SSP: “Considering the timescales that are involved, and the exponential growth of population and resource pressures within that same strategic period, it is imperative that this work for “drilling up” vs. drilling down for energy security begins immediately” [38].

Although the use of extra-terrestrial resources on a substantial scale may still be some decades away, it is important to recognise that simply acknowledging its feasibility using known technology is the surest way of ending the threat of resource wars. That is, if it is assumed that the resources available for human use are limited to those on Earth, then it can be argued that resource wars are inescapable [22] and [37]. If, by contrast, it is assumed that the resources of space are economically accessible, this not only eliminates the need for resource wars, it can also preserve the benefits of civilisation which are being eroded today by “resource war-mongers”, most notably the governments of the “Anglo-Saxon” countries and their “neo-con” advisers. It is also worth noting that the $1 trillion that these have already committed to wars in the Middle-East in the 21st century is orders of magnitude more than the public investment needed to aid companies sufficiently to start the commercial use of space resources.

Industrial and financial groups which profit from monopolistic control of terrestrial supplies of various natural resources, like those which profit from wars, have an economic interest in protecting their profitable situation. However, these groups’ continuing profits are justified neither by capitalism nor by democracy: they could be preserved only by maintaining the pretence that use of space resources is not feasible, and by preventing the development of low-cost space travel. Once the feasibility of low-cost space travel is understood, “resource wars” are clearly foolish as well as tragic. A visiting extra-terrestrial would be pityingly amused at the foolish antics of homo sapiens using long-range rockets to fight each other over dwindling terrestrial resources—rather than using the same rockets to travel in space and have the use of all the resources they need!

7.2. High return in safety from extra-terrestrial settlement

Investment in low-cost orbital access and other space infrastructure will facilitate the establishment of settlements on the Moon, Mars, asteroids and in man[/woman]-made space structures. In the first phase, development of new regulatory infrastructure in various Earth orbits, including property/usufruct rights, real estate, mortgage financing and insurance, traffic management, pilotage, policing and other services will enable the population living in Earth orbits to grow very large. Such activities aimed at making near-Earth space habitable are the logical extension of humans’ historical spread over the surface of the Earth. As trade spreads through near-Earth space, settlements are likely to follow, of which the inhabitants will add to the wealth of different cultures which humans have created in the many different environments in which they live.

Success of such extra-terrestrial settlements will have the additional benefit of reducing the danger of human extinction due to planet-wide or cosmic accidents [27]. These horrors include both man-made disasters such as nuclear war, plagues or growing pollution, and natural disasters such as super-volcanoes or asteroid impact. It is hard to think of any objective that is more important than preserving peace. Weapons developed in recent decades are so destructive, and have such horrific, long-term side-effects that their use should be discouraged as strongly as possible by the international community. Hence, reducing the incentive to use these weapons by rapidly developing the ability to use space-based resources on a large scale is surely equally important [11] and [16]. The achievement of this depends on low space travel costs which, at the present time, appear to be achievable only through the development of a vigorous space tourism industry.