## ASpec

#### Interp: The affirmative must specify the agent that does the plan in the ac.

#### The standard is strat skew--1ars can clarify to delink neg offense mooting the 1nc and kills clash by skirting NC discussion e.g. if I read a courts DA, you can you defend congress. Independently links to resolvability--judge can’t know who to vote on if we don’t know what the 1ac advocates and we can’t clash with it or read nuanced arguments absent such knowledge either. Resolvability outweighs, all arguments presume you can resolve them and otherwise Ws or Ls can’t properly happen. Cx doesn’t check--

#### 1 - Moots AC prep since I have to wait to cx and precludes using cx strategically for substance

#### 2 - You get extra time to prep our interp if we ask in cx and have an incentive to be infinitely abusive and just kick it if we call you out on it

#### 3 - Its non verifiable since judges don’t flow it

#### 4 - Key to inclusion since novices might forget to ask and get crushed since you shifted

#### No solvency – there’s no such actor as the “Federal Government”, only specific branches

**Brovero 94** (Adrienne, Debate Coach, “Immigration Policies”, Debater’s Research Guide, http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Brovero1994Immigration.htm)

The problem is not that there is not a plan; this time there is one. The problem is that there is no agent specified. The federal government does not enact policies, agents or agencies within the federal government enact policies. The agent enacting a policy is a very important aspect of the policy. For some of the same reasons the affirmative team should specify a plan of action, the affirmative team should specify an agent of action.

#### We’ll insert re-highlighting Normal means is the courts - their solvency evidence says the courts reinterpret the first amendment to designate prisoner hunger strikes as constitutionally protected free speech

Harvard Law Review, 19 - ("Striking the Right Balance: Toward a Better Understanding of Prison Strikes," Harvard Law Review 03/8/2019, accessed 10-28-2021, <https://harvardlawreview.org/2019/03/striking-the-right-balance-toward-a-better-understanding-of-prison-strikes/)//ML>

But in order to ensure that the Constitution truly does not stop at the prison walls, courts cannot simply accept prison administrators’ fears regarding strikes at face value and instead should rigorously test their credibility and basis in fact.143 And more importantly, by over-deferring and failing to engage in any analysis of the merits of prison strikes, courts miss an important opportunity. As this Note has argued, prison strikes represent an underappreciated aspect of prison life — the means by which prisoners have, throughout the course of American history, surfaced pressing problems of our carceral state and initiated important transformations in our prison system. Therefore, it is imperative to meaningfully consider why and how such strikes merit legal protection — even if such protection appears to fly in the face of the current state of the law and to defy conventional wisdom. To that end, this Part first explores the First Amendment as one potential avenue for considering the merits of prison strikes, by presenting three critical First Amendment values contained within prison strikes,144 and it then briefly discusses other potential legal avenues for courts and scholars to consider. A. Considering the First Amendment Values of Prison Strikes The right to strike within prisons may be conceptually viewed as a composite of three separate fundamental First Amendment freedoms: the freedom to peacefully associate, the freedom of speech, and the freedom to assemble and petition for redress of grievances.145 Each is considered in turn. 1. Association. — The right to peaceful association is one that captures the right of individuals to commune with others for the expression of ideas and for effective advocacy.146 Strikes, like prison unions, represent an important means of association for prisoners — allowing them to “lay claim to a social identity as ‘workers’ . . . and in doing so generate claims to respect and solidarity.”147 This identity and solidarity can, in turn, enable inmates to engage in productive and peaceful bargains with prison officials for better conditions, higher pay, and other reform desires. Bargaining is, in many respects, already very common in prisons, “for the simple reason that [prison] administrators rarely have sufficient resources to gain complete conformity to all the rules.”148 However, such bargaining typically happens in an informal, ongoing, private process;149 in their recurrent, day-to-day contact with inmates, prison administrators use their arsenal of tools150 to “negotiate” only with select inmate leaders,151 with the central goal of maintaining “short term surface order.”152 This informal bargaining is “dysfunctional” to the long-term stability of prison institutions and “the real needs of those incarcerated within” them153 — creating hierarchical relationships154 that breed mistrust155 and leave many inmates powerless and feeling aggrieved.156 As a result, inmates often feel that they have to resort to violence to protect themselves from exploitation, express their dissatisfaction, and obtain redress.157 Alternatively, peaceful, collective prison strikes avoid these harmful consequences by allowing for “open” and “formal” negotiations between all inmates and prison staff.158 Such transparent and legitimated bargaining benefits both inmates and prisons as a whole. By initiating peaceful protests such as work stoppages, all inmates are able “to solve problems, maximize gains, articulate goals, develop alternative strategies, and deal with [administrators] without resorting to force or violence.”159 And by permitting peaceful strikes, prison administrators “provide inmates with a channel for airing grievances and gaining official response . . . giv[ing] the institution a kind of safety-valve for peaceful, rather than violent, change”160 — avoiding potentially expensive and time-consuming litigation and even helping rehabilitate inmates,161 all while deemphasizing hierarchical structures in prisons that harm institutional order.162 2. Speech. — A prison strike also represents a critical way by which inmates can express themselves.163 First, as alluded to above, a strike allows inmates to claim and communicate an identity — as more than just marginalized, ignored convicts with little to no self-determination, but instead as workers and human beings entitled to basic dignity. Such collective actions represent the “performative declaration and affirmation of rights that one does not (yet) have.”164 And, as Professor Jocelyn Simonson discusses, these strikes are collective contestations to “demand dignity, calling attention to the ways in which [prisoners] are treated as less than human and in the process reclaiming their own agency.”165 Such dignitary considerations, which courts have sought to protect under First Amendment principles, should therefore naturally extend to prisoners attempting to, through strikes, express their basic selfworth.166 Beyond representing a form of inherent, individual expression for inmates, prison strikes also represent a broader form of expression, allowing inmates to be visible to and heard by the public at large. Over the course of American history, inmates — by virtue of being locked up in isolated, impregnable penitentiaries — have largely been a silent and ignored segment of the American population.167 Through peaceful protests like the 2018 national prison strike, however, their suffering, their calls for reform, and their voices are, for the first time, directly expressed on a large scale, ringing out loudly beyond the prison walls and jumpstarting important conversations of criminal justice reform. It is critical to protect such expression; “[i]ndeed, it is from the voices of those who have been most harmed by the punitive nature of our criminal justice system that we can hear the most profound reimaginings of how the system might be truly responsive to local demands for justice and equality.”168 3. Petition for Redress. Inmates’ strikes can be seen not only as expressions of their dignity and general efforts to express their voices beyond prison walls but also as significant methods of assembly to call attention to specific grievances and seek redress from the government.169 While in theory “[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country,”170 in practice, “prisons often escape the daily microscope focused on other American institutions such as schools, churches, and government.”171 Courts grant prison administrators wide deference not only in running day-to-day life within prisons but also in restricting press access to prisons.172 Therefore, much of the American public — already closed off from and largely indifferent to the lives of prisoners — is kept even more in the dark about prison conditions and the state of our carceral system as a whole. Prison conditions, from what has been documented, are horrendous across states. Many prisons are severely overcrowded and seriously understaffed;173 inmates routinely experience physical abuse and even death at the hands of prison guards,174 receive inadequate protection from guards, are deprived of basic necessities,175 are given substandard medical care,176 and are forced to live in squalor and tolerate extreme circumstances;177 most prisoners have minimal, if any, access, to rehabilitative or mental health services;178 and prisoners have little legal recourse, as internal prison grievance procedures are often stacked against inmates,179 and judicial deference and federal legislation have effectively shut the courthouse doors on prisoners’ civil rights claims.180 And across prisons, criminal sentencing laws not only have contributed to an unprecedented era of mass incarceration, but also have forced African Americans and people of color broadly to bear much of this burden.181 As the Marshall Project states, “[s]ociety won’t fix a prison system it can’t see”;182 peaceful prison strikes like the 2018 strike, however, draw back the “iron curtain” of prison walls, bringing to light many of the pressing issues described above. Through these strikes, inmates are able not only to express their grievances to their prison administrators, but also to “publicize their on-the-ground realities to the larger world”183 and, in turn, gain attention from and access to the political branches able to implement policy reforms.184 As recent history has shown, inmates have experienced some success by pressing their claims against the government through publicized strikes. For example, as described above, the California strikes in 2011 and 2013 generated public outcry that eventually resulted in transfor- mations to the California prison system’s solitary confinement policies.185 In Alabama, inmates’ participation in the 2016 nationwide prison strike helped prompt the Department of Justice to open an investigation into the state’s prison conditions.186 And more broadly speaking, strikes like the 2018 strike have begun to “remedy power imbalances, bring aggregate structural harms into view, and shift deeply entrenched legal and constitutional” barriers to critical prison reforms.187 B. Considering Additional Legal Avenues for Protecting Prison Strikes The foregoing analysis suggests that the First Amendment is a critical, worthwhile vehicle for considering the merits of a right to strike for prisoners. As Justice Black recognized, the importance of such analysis likely transcends prisoners themselves. He wrote: “I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.”188 But this Note acknowledges that judicial recognition of prison strikes’ First Amendment values requires significant doctrinal change. Convincing the Supreme Court to overturn its Jones and Turner precedents, and instead to adopt a test with less deference than is currently afforded to prison administrators, is unlikely. As a result, future research is necessary to identify other potential avenues to consider the legal status and merits of prison strikes. As alluded to above, labor law presents one such promising avenue, as does state constitutional and statutory law. Drawing from the broader j jurisprudence around hunger strikes, and this area of the law’s focus on the body, may present yet another avenue to consider.

## Test Case Spec

#### Interpretation: If the affirmative fiats action by the federal courts, they must specify a test case for the ruling.

#### Federal courts require test cases to rule.

King 2000 (Brian, 10 Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy 215, [http://www.law.ku.edu/journal/articles/v10n2/v10p215.html](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.law.ku.edu_journal_articles_v10n2_v10p215.html&d=DwMFaQ&c=clK7kQUTWtAVEOVIgvi0NU5BOUHhpN0H8p7CSfnc_gI&r=pcBVEVOC2sulVzOmL9NEwQ&m=4pUKKE0l5dLUH_r7JBrMJmDfiDJxcee8dW00doX2QBo&s=EtcmXQkgg9ir1uK5XRtmILqGkefq624BZfc5JLXX7Lw&e=))

Without a judicial case or controversy, the federal courts, being part of the limited federal government, lack the authority to hear and decide a matter, and thus, must dismiss the suit.  Therefore, in a jurisprudential analysis of justiciability under Article III, the key concept, the one upon which all justiciability cases turn, is a judicial case or controversy.  Exactly what the Founders meant by the requirement of a judicial case or controversy has been debated since the founding.  Professor Nichol has exclaimed:  “To the great surprise of all but the most cynical, after over 200 years we still have no real idea what the term ‘case or controversy’ means.” [http://www.law.ku.edu/journal/articles/v10n2/v10p215.html - \_ftn10](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.law.ku.edu_journal_articles_v10n2_v10p215.html-23-5Fftn10&d=DwMFaQ&c=clK7kQUTWtAVEOVIgvi0NU5BOUHhpN0H8p7CSfnc_gI&r=pcBVEVOC2sulVzOmL9NEwQ&m=4pUKKE0l5dLUH_r7JBrMJmDfiDJxcee8dW00doX2QBo&s=jiegLd3VhqG2j6pS6-5_OBEulvlo__3oY6v8uCsHEOc&e=)Admittedly, the concept has at times seemed amorphous.  Yet using a jurisprudential analysis can help limit and define the concept of a judicial case or controversy.  Using the set theory, both the characteristics of a judicial case or controversy and the rationales behind the requirement of a judicial case or controversy will be identified and described below.  The goal of this part of the article is not to teach the law of federal courts, but to uncover a more structured way to analyze justiciability under Article III by defining a judicial case or controversy and identifying the theories behind the definition.[http://www.law.ku.edu/journal/articles/v10n2/v10p215.html - \_ftn11](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.law.ku.edu_journal_articles_v10n2_v10p215.html-23-5Fftn11&d=DwMFaQ&c=clK7kQUTWtAVEOVIgvi0NU5BOUHhpN0H8p7CSfnc_gI&r=pcBVEVOC2sulVzOmL9NEwQ&m=4pUKKE0l5dLUH_r7JBrMJmDfiDJxcee8dW00doX2QBo&s=79BHi_HkgZ_jdrcKrmKhCjASubMWNLcHJDftGWafSwA&e=) The law of justiciability is more than just an amalgamation of rules and exceptions that are often criticized as being manipulated by judges; it is a structured analysis with the definition of a judicial case or controversy at the center.

**This means the aff has no solvency since the supreme court cannot pass the plan**

**Violation – they don’t specify one**

#### Standards

#### Ground – the test case is an enforcement mechanism which affects what precedent is set – lack of specification denies the negative disads to the precedent set because it can vary wildly from little to no precedent to broad sweeping precedent. Key to clash and fairness because lack of ground sets the negative behind and prevents discussions on costs of the plan

#### The aff is extra-topical - it requires a rewriting of supreme court institutional rules that is not germane to the topic. The aff has zero correspondence to reality. Extra-t is a voter because it’s impossible to prep something not predicated on the stable basis of the resolution.

## DA – Sua Sponte (1:30)

#### Ruling sua sponte undermines the judicial process.

Poor & Goldschmidt ’15 [E. King & James E; DRI member and partner in Quarles & Brady LLP’s Chicago office, chair of the firm’s appellate practice, member of the board of directors of the Appellate Lawyers Association, author of two petitions for certiorari granted by the Supreme Court, 25 years of law experience; commercial litigation attorney, associate in Quarles & Brady LLP’s Milwaukee office; October 2015; “Sua Sponte Decisions on Appeal”; <https://www.quarles.com/content/uploads/2015/10/FTD-1510-Poor-Goldschmidt.pdf>; For the Defense, Appellate Advocacy; accessed 4/3/18; TV] \*Edited for reading clarity.

But these permissive exceptions are not consistently applied, and there remain ample examples of courts adhering to the principle of party presentation. See Hartmann v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 9 F.3d 1207 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying the appellate waiver rule, due to an error by counsel, against orphans whose step- mother killed their father after bribing an insurance agent to defraud the orphans). Commentators agree that such exceptions, together with balancing tests specific to various federal circuits, are susceptible to outcome-oriented application and may just be so many manifestations of the gorilla rule. Miller, supra, at 1279. “No General Rule” This patchwork of rules and exceptions leaves sua sponte decision making without any widely-accepted body of authority that is consistently applied, let alone any controlling authority on this question. As the Supreme Court summed up in Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976), “[t]he matter of what questions may be taken and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases. We announce no general rule.” If the general rule is really that there is “no general rule,” then where does that leave us? One place to begin is to ask, what happens to our adversary system and the values underlying it when a court resolves a case without hearing from the parties involved? Undermining the Adversarial Process When a court raises an issue on its own and decides it without hearing from the parties involved, it chips away at our adversary system. When a court chooses to treat a case as a vehicle to decide an issue that the court believes is an overlooked, dispositive issue, rather than one addressed by the parties, then the court has ventured away from its role as a neutral decision maker into a subjective realm. In doing so, the court concludes on its own that a particular new question will dispose of the case. It then returns to being a neutral decision maker to decide the very issue which it has selected as dis- positive. A. Milani & M. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 245, 277–78 (2002). But when a court itself selects new issues—without party participation—and then decides those very same issues, the values underlying our adversary system are compromised. The parties are far more likely than the reviewing court to explore the peculiarities and nuances of the case; after all, they have every incentive to do so. On the other hand, considerations of effciency may cause courts to be more likely to reach conclusions on issues that they them- selves have already identified as resolving the case more directly. Id. Moreover, even if identifying new issues does not actually undermine a court’s impartiality, it may still create that impression: “When [the court] a decision maker becomes an active questioner or otherwise participates in a case, she is likely to be perceived as partisan rather than neutral.” Id. at 280. Decisions reached under a court’s own initiative do not “promote respect either for the Court’s adjudicatory process or for the stability of its decisions,” and other commentators have described such decisions as “unseemly,” “not likely to be regarded favorably,” a breach of the parties’ trust, and a sacrifice of the court’s function as an adjudicator. Id. at 280–81 (quoting Justice Harlan’s dissent in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 677 (1960)). Such perceptions work against both litigants’ and society’s acceptance of judicial decisions. Id. at 284. As explained elsewhere, “If the grounds for the decision fall completely outside the framework of the argument, making all that was discussed or proved at the hearing irrelevant... the adjudicative process has become a sham, for the parties’ participation in the decision has lost all meaning.” Id. at 285 (quoting L. Fuller, e Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 388 (1978)).

#### That corrodes rule of law via abdicating judicial legitimacy.

Donaldson ’17 [Michael J; Partner at Burnet, Duckworth & Palmer, LLP, Master of Laws from Columbia; 2017; “Justice in Full Is Time Well Spent: Why the Supreme Court Should Ban Sua Sponte Dismissals”; http://www.bdplaw.com/publications/justice-in-full-is-time-well-spent-why-the-supreme-court-should-ban-sua-sponte-dismissals/; Quinnipiac Law Review, Vol 36; accessed 9/15/21; TV]

There is a lot wrong with sua sponte dismissals. They are inconsistent with the adversary system, and change the judge's role from referee to contestant.85 They can undermine respect for the legal system. And they increase the likelihood of errors, leading to unnecessary appeals and a waste of judicial resources." But most importantly, they lack the very due process the courts are supposed to safeguard. A. Failure to Provide Due Process Sua sponte decisions are inconsistent with due process.89 Period. There is no other way to look at it. 90 Not only does a plaintiff surprised by a sua sponte dismissal not receive "due" process, she receives no process at all.91 She has no idea her lawsuit is in jeopardy of being dismissed, no idea what the reasons for that dismissal might be, and no opportunity to respond. 92 This is the case whether the court's dismissal decision is right or wrong. 93 As Allan Vestal puts it: When [issues are] considered sua sponte both parties are taken completely by surprise and the court decides the matter on grounds not urged by either. Neither has had any opportunity to consider the matter, and both are now bound by res judicata grounded on considerations which represent not well reasoned positions for the litigants, but rather only the fortuitous decision of a 94 wayward court. The reference to res judicata here is important. As Milani and Smith point out, the res judicata doctrine requires a party or its privy to be a participant in the former proceeding before the court can bind him to the consequences of that proceeding because, according to the Supreme Court, "The opportunity to be heard is an essential requisite of due process of law in judicial proceedings."95 If this is the standard applied to former proceedings, how can it not apply to proceedings currently before the court? Lon Fuller once wrote of sua sponte decisionmaking: [I]f the grounds for the decision fall completely outside the framework of the argument, making all that was discussed or proved at the hearing irrelevant ... the adjudicative process has become a sham, for the parties' participation in the decision has lost all meaning.9 6 The situation is even harder to defend when there is no hearing at all. 9 B. Undermining Respect for the Legal System The perception that the courts are regularly failing to provide due process cannot do anything but undermine respect for the legal system.9 8 Sir Robert Megarry, in the speech quoted at the beginning of this article,99 underlined the importance of sending the unsuccessful litigant away feeling as though he has had a fair hearing.' Justice Harlan was obviously cognizant of this problem in his dissent in Mapp, when he warned that the Court's sua sponte decision in that case was "not likely to promote respect ... for the court's adjudicatory process."o This is not a farfetched concern. Offenkrantz and Lichter note that in the Second Circuit's high-profile decision to "[sua sponte remove] Judge Shira Scheindlin from further proceedings in two stop-and-frisk cases," an order which left the Judge "completely blindsided," "newspapers were reporting that appellate courts had carte blanche to raise and decide important issues in a case without ever seeking the input of any of the parties to it."' 0 2 Megarry tells a story of a client of his who had a fatal flaw in his case, but insisted on going ahead anyway.10 3 Instead of seizing on the fatal flaw at the outset, the trial judge heard the case all the way through.1 0 4 The client won on his two collateral points, but, as expected, lost on the key issue. o Megarry tells the story of what happened next: The course taken by the judge must have prolonged the hearing by an hour or two. But the effect on the defeated tenant was striking. True, he had lost the last point and the case as a whole; but he had been victorious on the other two points. All that nonsense about the agent's lack of authority and the letter not having been received in time had been blown away by the judge. It was a pity about the wording of the letter, of course; but he had seen his case being put in full, and none of his grievances had been left unheard or unresolved. This is as it should be. Courts must not, as Megarry puts it, give in to "the temptation of brevity."'0 o Their very legitimacy hangs in the balance. A loss of respect for the courts marks the beginning of the unraveling of the rule of law. This is simply too high of a price to pay for efficiency.

#### Extinction.

Davis and Morse ’18 [Christina and Julia; September 19; Professor of Government at Harvard University; Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Santa Barbara; International Studies Quarterly, “Protecting Trade by Legalizing Political Disputes: Why Countries Bring Cases to the International Court of Justice,” vol. 62]

Trade, Conflict, and Adjudication

We argue that countries turn to international adjudication to protect trade flows under conditions of strong economic interdependence. This argument is built on two key assumptions. First, states believe that an international dispute over territory, fishing rights, or another salient issue could harm trade. Second, states view international adjudication as an effective way to end the dispute. Given the risk of harm to economic relations and the potential for courts to contribute to conflict resolution, states with high trade value vested in a relationship will be more willing to undertake costly litigation. This section elaborates on the general conditions of our theory and then explains why the ICJ is a good venue for testing the relationship between economic interdependence and international adjudication. The Adverse Impact of Conflict on Trade The premise that conflict disrupts trade is central to the theory of commercial peace. Russett and Oneal (2001) draw on the work of philosopher Immanuel Kant to argue that interdependence deters conflict by raising its costs. According to this reasoning, war interrupts trade while peace promotes stable commerce, leading states to calculate that the gains of peace are significant compared to the costs of war.4 Other perspectives focus on the informational role of interdependence to lower uncertainty between states (Reed 2003). Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (2001) contend economic interdependence allows states to signal their resolve through their willingness to bear the economic costs of confrontation.5 A host of empirical studies supports the idea that conflict reduces trade (Keshk, Reuveny, and Pollins 2004; Long 2008). Several potential channels connect trade and conflict, including direct damage to infrastructure and transportation resulting from actual conflict, sanctions policies, and informal discrimination by governments or private actors. Glick and Taylor (2010) find that the effect of war on trade is significant and persistent. At a lower level, political tensions may also suppress trade (Pollins 1989; Fuchs and Klann 2013). Consumer boycotts and financial market reactions in some cases have led to adverse market impact (Fisman, Hamao, and Wang 2014; Heilmann 2016; Pandya 2016). Simmons (2005) finds that territorial disputes have a sizable negative impact on trade even in the absence of militarized action. Others suggest states anticipate the potential adverse impact of conflict on trade, and therefore trade less to begin with if they think that war is likely. In such a scenario, the marginal economic costs of war should be insufficient to change a state's calculation for going to war (Morrow 1999; Barbieri 2002). Gowa and Hicks (2017) contend that trade is largely diverted through third-party channels, which compensate for having less direct trade with the adversary. We assume that leaders and business constituencies on average believe that conflict damages trade relations. Political conflict could lead governments to adopt sanctions against an adversary or to restrict financial flows. Violence likely disrupts trading routes and slows the movement of goods. The potential for adverse financial market reactions and consumer response adds further unpredictability about the risk of spillover from political disagreement into economic harm. Substitution through third parties could alleviate the harm, but this would still increase trade costs. The expected harm to trade motivates states to pursue the resolution of disputes. Adjudication as a Conflict Resolution Mechanism When states want to resolve an interstate dispute, why would they choose adjudication rather than negotiations, economic sanctions, or militarized action? In some cases, the decision follows an episode of military conflict as part of an effort to normalize relations. In other disputes, countries may turn to a legal venue to prevent a problem from ever reaching the stage that could produce serious political tensions or threats of force. The literature offers three broad types of explanations for why states pursue adjudication: legitimacy, informational benefits, and domestic obstacles to settlement. At the systemic level, international norms support peaceful conflict resolution. Some contend that rule of law has come to shape the identities of states, forming norms about appropriate action in both the domestic and international spheres (Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 902). When international law has been established through fair procedures and offers coherent principles, it forms a legitimate source of authority in international affairs that generates an independent “compliance pull” on state behavior (Franck 1990, 65). International courts combine both legitimacy and authority as they help states solve specific disputes about how to interpret international law; the growing role for international courts in international affairs represents an important trend (Alter 2014; Alter, Helfer, and Madsen 2016). Integration with national courts has reinforced states’ use of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which stands out for its expansive caseload and impact on state behavior (Alter 1998). The ICJ has achieved a relatively strong record of compliance with rulings (Schulte 2004; Llamzon 2007; Mitchell and Hensel 2007; Johns 2012). Legal settlement can help states coordinate policies through the provision of information. Compared to bilateral negotiations or nonbinding third-party arbitration, adjudication conveys a government's willingness to reach an agreement (Helfer and Slaughter 2005; Gent and Shannon 2010). Having taken the public step to initiate legal action, a government would appear inconsistent and incur a reputational penalty if it also took unilateral measures such as sanctions or military actions before the legal process had reached a conclusion. This shapes the diplomatic context because participants know that the matter will neither escalate into violence nor disappear through neglect. A court ruling offers a focal point amidst uncertainty about how to interpret the terms of an agreement (Ginsburg and McAdams 2004; Huth, Croco, and Appel 2011). As the record-keeper of past actions, courts support systems of tit-for-tat and reputational enforcement (Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990; Carrubba 2005; Mitchell and Hensel 2007). In these informational theories of courts, states may comply with court rulings in the absence of coercive measures or the threat of sanctions because the reputational costs of noncompliance are too high. Rather than simply interpret law, courts coordinate expectations about enforcement. Johns (2012) models the circumstances whereby mobilization of third-party actions in support of a court ruling generates endogenous enforcement that can affect outcomes. In this way, multilateral enforcement makes an international court different from the pressure available in bilateral negotiations. International courts also offer a way for states to frame settlements to appeal to domestic audiences (Fang 2008). Simmons notes that even when the same deal could be reached in negotiations or through a court decision, a negotiated settlement could be viewed as a sign of weakness while legal resolution would be a positive signal for future cooperation (Simmons 2002, 834). This dynamic occurs because “domestic groups will find it more attractive to make concessions to a disinterested institution than to a political adversary” (Simmons 2002, 834). In research on several prominent ICJ cases, Fischer (1982, 271) emphasizes the court has helped governments to save face. Consequently, those governments unable to reach agreements over domestic opposition may find it easier to do so with the involvement of a third-party ruling. Allee and Huth (2006a) show that governments with higher levels of domestic political constraints are more likely to choose adjudication over negotiation for settling territorial disputes. Domestic political constraints also increase the probability of filing complaints at the WTO (Davis 2012). The mobilization of domestic groups plays a critical role in litigation patterns at the ECJ (Alter and Vargas 2000).