# 1

#### The 1AC’s understanding of “space” (what is the ultimate function of the space race, Space exploration) , replicates a Western theorization of place as neutral space, which relegates indigenous peoples to colonial authority by creating “cultural blanks” to be filled in by peaceful settlement

Barker and Pickerill 12 (Adam J Barker, and Jenny Pickerill, Department of Geography @ Univ of Leicester. “Radicalizing Relationships To and Through Shared Geographies: Why Anarchists Need to Understand Indigenous Connections to Lands and Place” Antipode.

Colonial Impacts on Perceptions of Place Indigenous understandings of place have generated criticism of many aspects of society in the northern bloc: Christian theology’s influence on political and economic colonial practice (Deloria 2003); the concept of “sovereignty” and the state system (Alfred 2006); constitutionalism as a method of governmental organization (Tully 1995; 2000); capitalism and relationships under a capitalist system (Adams 1989:17); language and culture (Basso 1996) and many other understandings of place, space, nature, and human relationships. Indigenous relationships to place fundamentally challenge colonial spatial concepts, from the ways that we move from place to place and through spaces (Pandya 1990) to how we move through time (Jojola 2004). Indeed Coulthard (2010:79) asserts that for Indigenous people place is central to understandings of life, whereas “most Western societies . . . derive meaning from the world in historical/developmental terms, thereby placing time as the narrative of central importance”. Historically, EuroAmerican cultures conceived of human relations to the environment in one of two ways, which John Rennie Short labels the “classical and romantic” (Short 1991:6): either “natural” places are improved through development and human spatial creation and use (with “wilderness” as a frightening, exterior “ other”), or despoiled through human contact and change (with the natural environment as a pristine and perfect spatial concept, and the suggestion that human identity must be bounded within it). Both conceptually marginalize or fully erase Indigenous presence in place. Contra this erasure, Indigenous peoples’ understandings of place have become important to the understanding of colonial geographies and the efforts of anti-colonial activists.2 Indigenous peoples have traditionally related to place through spatially stretched and dynamic networks of relationships (Cajete 2004; Johnson and Murton 2007). These networks bear some resemblance to Sarah Whatmore’s concept of hybrid geography, “which recognizes agency as a relational achievement, involving the creative presence of organic beings, technological devices and discursive codes, as well as people, in the fabrics of everyday living” (Whatmore 1999:26). Through these, Indigenous peoples have challenged the classical/romantic dichotomy that continues to haunt some aspects of anarchist spatial perceptions. For Indigenous peoples, place holistically encapsulates networks of relations between humans, features of the land, non-human animals, and living beings perceived as spirits or non-physical entities. All of these—humans included— are understood to have autonomy and will, but also obligation and responsibility to all of the other elements to which they are related and among whom they are situated. As such, we acknowledge that land and place are different to each other but seek to use the way they are interrelated throughout this article. Although land can be considered as material, its meaning is constantly interwoven into the relationality of place so that land is often taken to have multiple meanings beyond its simple materiality—as a resource, as identity and as relationship (Coulthard 2010). Indigenous peoples assaulted by settler colonization have and continue to face concerted attempts to break Indigenous connections to place. Religious conversion, for example, has had a massive impact on the ways that Indigenous peoples perceive the spaces occupied by spirit and otherwise metaphysical beings. Though no longer considered “tantamount to a complete transformation of cultural identity” (Axtell 1981:42), conversion to and participation in hierarchical-organized, spatially dislocated, and temporally defined Judeo-Christian religions (Deloria 2003:62–77) encouraged Indigenous peoples to see the spiritual as something above (literally) and beyond the direct contact of the human world. The general result is displacement and dislocation. Indigenous peoples are displaced from their relational networks by introduced relationships that increasingly reorient Indigenous social organization towards colonial authority. Indigenous places are dislocated in the sense that The knowledge of and relationship to them, essential for generating spatial meaning in Indigenous contexts, is marginalized or over-written. This creates observable “cultural blanks” (Little Bear 2000) among Indigenous youth; Settler peoples, conversely, fill corresponding blanks that result from traditions that fit incompletely with changed/changing geographies (Harris 2004) with myths of peaceful expansion, cultural superiority, and frontier valour (Regan 2010). Chris Gibson (1999), in discussing Australian settler colonialism, warns against over-focusing on cultural colonization; it is important to note that the economics of settler colonization also depend on displacement and dislocation. While some Indigenous peoples benefitted from trade relations with colonial agents, the networks of capitalist dominance and exploitation intensified through settler colonization eventually forced many Indigenous individuals to choose between a waged economy that denied opportunities to connect to place and fulfil communal responsibilities, or poverty in the circumscribed spaces of the reserve (Harris 2002:285–289).Many Indigenous scholars, activists, and community members have recognized that dislocation from place and disconnection from spatial networks of relations undermine Indigenous identities (Alfred 2009:28; Little Bear 2004); this has led to calls for Indigenous peoples to reassert connections to place and reinvigorate relational networks. As Holm et al note, even Indigenous peoples dislocated from their traditional homelands can and do rely on relational networks and stories of “lost sacred lands” to maintain their identities and community cohesion (Holm, Pearson and Chavis 2003:14). Settler colonization continues to target these connections— and by extension Indigenous being in the sense described by Alfred and Corntassel— for erasure. 

**Liberal philosophy and ideal theory’s attempt to establish a single normative account of the world – (semiology, rather than capital, as the key component of domination, semiocapitalism’s control over subjectivity is the root cause of all violence) is bound by settler colonial power structures. The white settler subject inserts itself as the norm; the ideal model of a purely rational subject intrinsically deems redness as savagery. In Winnbust they assume the subject is not a sexualized or racialized body - We must distance ourselves from such threats, and we do so most often by projecting them onto sexualized, racialized, and classed bodies.. Thus we criticize the structural foundations your theory finds coherence that means (a) your framing is another link and (b) even if your theory is true our criticism is a perquisite to accessing its truth. Supercharged by the reps off**

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While no one knows exactly what constitutes whiteness, we can historicize the concept and offer some general statements about the dynamics it signifies. Even this process is difficult, as **whiteness** as a socio-historical construct **is constantly shifting in light of new circumstances and changing interactions with various manifestations of power**. With these qualifications in mind we believe that a dominant impulse of **whiteness took shape around the European Enlightenment’s notion of rationality with its privileged construction of a transcendental white, male, rational subject who operated at the recesses of power while concurrently giving every indication that he escaped the confines of time and space.** In this context **whiteness was naturalized as a universal entity** that operated as more than a mere ethnic positionalityemerging from a particular time, the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and a particular space, Western Europe. Reason in this historical configuration is whitened and **human nature itself is grounded upon this reasoning capacity. Lost** in the defining process **is the socially constructed nature of reason itself**, not to mention **its emergence as a signifier of whiteness**.Thus**, in its rationalistic womb whiteness begins to establish itself as a norm that represents a**n authoritative, delimited, and **hierarchical mode of thought**. **In the emerging colonial contexts** in which Whites would increasingly find themselves in the decades and centuries **following the Enlightenment**, **the encounter with non-Whiteness would be framed in rationalistic terms - whiteness representing orderliness, rationality, and self-control and non-whiteness as chaos, irrationality, violence, and the breakdown of self-regulation**. **Rationality emerged as the conceptual base around which civilization and savagery could be delineated** (Giroux 1992; Alcoff 1995; Keating 1995). This rationalistic modernist whiteness is shaped and confirmed by its close association with science. As a scientific construct **whiteness privileges mind over body, intellectual over experiential ways of knowing, mental abstractions over passion, bodily sensations, and tactile understanding** (Semali and Kincheloe 1999; Kincheloe, Steinberg, and Hinchey 1999). In the study of multicultural education such epistemological tendencies take on dramatic importance. In educators’ efforts to understand the forces that drive the curriculum and the purposes of Western education, modernist whiteness is a central player. The insight it provides into the social construction of schooling, intelligence, and the disciplines of psychology and educational psychology in general opens a gateway into white consciousness and its reactions to the world around it. Objectivity and dominant articulations of masculinity as signs of stability and the highest expression of white achievement still work to construct everyday life and social relations a Black Studies presents a global critique of Western modernity and Western modes of knowledge production, while constructing alternative modes of thought and working for abolishing the West’s conception of Man. t the end of the twentieth century. Because such dynamics have been naturalized and universalized, **whiteness assumes an invisible power unlike previous forms of domination in human history. Such an invisible power can be deployed by those individuals and groups who are able to identify themselves within the boundaries of reason and to project irrationality, sensuality, and spontaneity on to the other.** Thus, European ethnic groups such as the Irish in nineteenth-century industrializing America were able to differentiate themselves from passionate ethnic groups who were supposedly unable to regulate their own emotional predispositions and gain a rational and objective view of the world. Such **peoples** **- who were being colonized**, exploited, enslaved, and eliminated **by Europeans during their Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment eras - were viewed as irrational and, thus, inferior in their status as human beings**. As inferior beings, they had no claim to the same rights as Europeans - hence, white **racism and colonialism were morally justified around the conflation of whiteness and reason**. In order for whiteness to place itself in the privileged seat of rationality and superiority, it would have to construct pervasive portraits of non-Whites, Africans in particular, as irrational, disorderly, and prone to uncivilized behavior (Nakayama and Krizek 1995; Stowe 1996; Alcoff 1995; Haymes 1996). As rock of rationality in a sea of chaos and disorder, whiteness presented itself as a non-colored, non-blemished pure category. Even a mere drop of non-white blood was enough historically to relegate a person to the category of "colored." Being white, thus, meant possessing the privilege of being uncontaminated by any other bloodline. A mixed race child in this context has often been rejected by the white side of his or her heritage - the rhetorical construct of race purity demands that the mixed race individual be identified by allusion to the non-white group, for example, she’s half Latina or half Chinese. Individuals are rarely half-white. As Michel Foucault often argued, reason is a form of disciplinary power. Around Foucault’s axiom, critical multiculturalists contend that reason can never be separated from power. Those without reason defined in the Western scientific way are excluded from power and are relegated to the position of unreasonable other. Whites in their racial purity understood the dictates of the "White Man’s Burden" and became the beneficent teachers of the barbarians. **To Western eyes the contrast between white and non-white culture was stark: reason as opposed to ignorance; scientific knowledge instead of indigenous knowledge; philosophies of mind versus folk psychologies; religious truth in lieu of primitive superstition; and professional history as opposed to oral mythologies**. Thus, **rationality was inscribed in a variety of hierarchical relations between European colonizers and their colonies** early on, and between Western multinationals and their "underdeveloped" markets in later days. Such **power relations** **were erased by the white claim of** cultural **neutrality** around the transhistorical norm of reason -in this construction rationality was not assumed to be the intellectual commodity of any specific culture. Indeed, colonial hierarchies immersed in exploitation were justified around the interplay of pure whiteness, impure non-whiteness, and neutral reason. Traditional **colonialism was grounded on colonialized people’s deviation from the norm of rationality**, thus making colonization a rational response to **inequality**. In the twentieth century thiswhite norm of rationality was extended to the economic sphere where the philosophy of the free market and exchange values were universalized into signifiers of civilization. Once all the nations on earth are drawn into the white reason of the market economy, then all land can be subdivided into real estate, all human beings’ worth can be monetarily calculated, values of abstract individualism and financial success can be embraced by every community in every country, and education can be reformulated around the cultivation of human capital.When these dynamics come to pass, the white millennium will have commenced - white power will have been consolidated around land and money. The Western ability to regulate diverse peoples through their inclusion in data banks filled with information about their credit histories, institutional affiliations, psychological "health," academic credentials, work experiences, and family backgrounds will reach unprecedented levels. **The accomplishment of this ultimate global colonial task will mark the end of white history in the familiar end-of-history parlance.** **This does not mean that white supremacy ends, but that it has produced a hegemony so seamless that the need for further structural or ideological change becomes unnecessary. The science, reason, and technology of white culture will have achieved their inevitable triumph** (MacCannell 1992; Nakayama and Krizek 1995; Alcoff 1995; Giroux 1992). Whatever the complexity of the concept, whiteness, at least one feature is discernible - **whiteness cannot escape the materiality of its history, its effects on the everyday lives of those who fall outside its conceptual net as well as on white people themselves.** Critical scholarship on whiteness should focus attention on the documentation of such effects.Whiteness study in a critical multiculturalist context should delineate the various ways such material effects shape cultural and institutional pedagogies and position individuals in relation to the power of white reason. Understanding these dynamics is central to the curriculums of black studies, Chicano studies, postcolonialism, indigenous studies, not to mention educational reform movements in elementary, secondary, and higher education. The history of the world’s diverse peoples in general as well as minority groups in Western societies in particular has often been told from a white historiographical perspective. Such accounts erased the values, epistemologies, and belief systems that grounded the cultural practices of diverse peoples. Without such cultural grounding students have often been unable to appreciate the manifestations of brilliance displayed by non-white cultural groups. Caught in the white interpretive filter they were unable to make sense of diverse historical and contemporary cultural productions as anything other than proof of white historical success. The fact that one of the most important themes of the last half of the twentieth century - the revolt of the "irrationals" against white historical domination - has not been presented as a salient part of the white (or non-white) story is revealing, a testimony to the continuing power of whiteness and its concurrent fragility (Banfield 1991; Frankenberg 1993; Stowe 1996; Vattimo 1992).

#### Thus the alternative is one of refusal, a reshifting of posthumanist discource to interrupt settler communicative spheres like debate

King 2017 (Tiffany, Assistant Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies at the Georgia State University “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight” *Critical Ethnic Studies* 3, No. 1, pp. 163-170)

Native feminist politics of decolonial refusal and Black feminist abolitionist politics of skepticism informed by a misandry and misanthropic distrust of and animus toward the (over)representation of man/men as the human diverge from the polite, communicative acts of the public sphere, much like the politics of the “feminist killjoy.”4 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: I use “misandry” (hatred of men) and “misanthropic” (distrust or deep skepticism about humankind or humanity) to illustrate how Sylvia Wynter and other Black scholars attend to the ways that the human— and **investments in the human—and its revised forms or genres of the human as woman/feminist still reproduce violent exclusions that make the death of Black and Native people viable and in-evitable**. In other words, **neither men nor women (as humans) can absorb Black females/males/children/LGBT and trans people into their collective folds. Both the hatred of “misandry” and the distrust and pessimism of “misanthropy” are appropriate methods to describe the inflection of the critique levied by Wynter and the other Black scholars examined in this article**. END FOOTNOTE] Throughout this article, I deploy the term “feminist” both ambivalently and strategically to mark and distinguish the scholarly tradition created by Black and Native women, queer, trans, and other people marginalized within these respective communities and their anticolonial and abolitionist movements.5 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: See Sylvia Wynter’s afterword, “Beyond Miranda’s Meanings: Un/silencing the ‘Demonic Ground’ of Caliban’s ‘Woman,’” in Out of the Kumbla: Caribbean Women and Literature, ed. Carole Boyce Davies (Chicago, Ill.: Africa World Press, 1990) 355– 72. Wynter warns Black women in the United States and the Caribbean that they need not uncritically embrace womanism as a political position, which can effectively oppose the elisions, racism, and false universalism of white feminism. “Feminism” as well as “womanism” are bounded and exclusive terms that do not effectively throw the category of the human into continual flux. END FOOTENOTE], Until a more useful and legible term emerges, I will use “feminist” to mark the practices of refusal and skepticism (misandry/misanthropy) as ones that largely exist outside more masculinist traditions within Indigenous/Native studies and Black studies**. “Decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” depart from the kinds of masculinist anticolonial traditions that attempt to reason Native/ Black man to White Man within humanist logic in at least two significant ways**. First, **neither participate in the communicative acts of the humanist public sphere from within the terms of the debate**. Further, they do not play by the rules.6 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: See the critiques of the anticolonial tradition within Caribbean philosophy articulated by Shona Jackson in her book Creole Indigeneity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012). Jackson argues that **anticolonial Caribbean masculinist philosophy tends to argue from inside the logic of Western philosophy in order to counter it.** For instance, in a valorization of the laborer as human and inheritor of the nation-state, Caribbean philosophy tends to reproduce the Hegelian telos of labor as a humanizing agent for the slave, which inadvertently makes the slave a subordinate human and effectively erases the ostensibly “nonlaboring” humanity of Indigenous peoples in the Anglophone Caribbean. END FOOTENOTE] Specifically, the Native and Black “feminist” politics discussed throughout launch a critique of both the logic of the discussion about the human and identity as well as the mode of communication. In fact, **practices of refusal and skepticism interrupt and flout codes of civil and collegial discursive protocol to focus on and illumine the violence that structures the posthumanist discourse.** Attending to the comportment, tone, and intensity of an engagement is just as important as focusing on its content. **The** particular **manner in which Black and Native feminists push back against violence is important**. **The force**, break with decorum, and style **in which Black and Native feminists confront discursive violence can change the nature of future encounters**. Given that Black women who confront the logics of “nonrepresentational theory” are really confronting genocide and the white, whimsical disavowal of Black and Native negation on the way to subjectlessness, it is understandable that there is an equally discordant response. **Refusal and skepticism are modes of engagement that are uncooperative and force an impasse in a discursive exchange.** This article tracks how traditions of “**decolonial refusal**” and “abolitionist skepticism” that emerge from Native/Indigenous and Black studies **expose the limits and violence of contemporary nonidentitarian and nonrepresentational impulses within white “critical” theory.** Further, this article asks whether Western forms of nonrepresentational (subjectless and nonidentitarian) theory can truly transcend the human through self- critique, self-abnegation, and masochism alone. External pressure, specifically the kind of pressure that “decolonial **refusal**” and “abolitionist skepticism” as forms of resistance that **enact outright rejection of or view “posthumanist” attempts with a “hermeneutics of suspicion,**”7 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: See the work of Black feminists such as Susana M. Morris, author of Close Kin and Distant Relatives: The Paradox of Respectability in Black Women’s Literature (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014), as well as womanist theologians who appropriate the phrase “hermeneutics of suspicion” as coined by Paul Ricoeur to describe the reading and interpretive practices of Black woman who are distrustful of traditional tropes about heteronormativity or conventional ways of thinking about what is natural and normal. Further, in Morris’s case, as well as within the tradition of Black women of faith and theologians, canonical and biblical texts are interpreted through a lens that acknowledges white supremacy and misogyny, and critically challenges racism and sexism (or kyriarchy in Morris’s case). Within Black feminist and womanist traditions, it is a position that can recognize the limitations of text and that refuses to accept the doctrine, theories, or message of an ideology wholesale. END FOOTENOTE**] is needed in order to truly address the recurrent problem of the violence of the human in continental theory.** While this article does not directly stake a claim in embracing or rejecting identity per se, it does take up the category of the human. **Because the category of the human is modified by identity in ways that position certain people** (white, male, able- bodied) within greater or lesser proximity to humanness, **identity is already taken up in this discussion**. Conversations about the human are very much tethered to conversations about identity. In the final section, the article will explore how Black and Native/Indigenous absorption into the category of the human would disfigure the category of the human beyond recognition. **Engaging how forms of Native decolonization and Black abolition scrutinize the violently exclusive means in which the human has been written and conceived is generative because it sets some workable terms of engagement for interrogating Western and mainstream claims to and disavowals of identity**. Rather than answer how Native decolonization and Black abolition construe the human or identity, the article examines how Native and Black feminists use refusal and misandry to question the very systems, institutions, and order of knowledge that secure humanity as an exclusive experience and bound identity in violent ways. I consider the practices and postures of refusal assumed by Native/Indigenous scholars such as Audra Simpson, Eve Tuck, Jodi Byrd, and Linda Tuhiwai Smith to be particularly instructive for exposing the violence of ostensibly nonrepresentational Deleuzoguattarian rhizomes and lines of flight. While reparative readings and “working with what is productive” about Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s work is certainly a part of the Native feminist scholarly tradition, this article focuses on the underexamined ways that Native feminists refuse to entertain certain logics and foundations that actually structure Deleuzoguattarian thought.8 [I thank one of the reviewers, who reminded me that Native feminist thought’s engagement with continental theory, specifically the work of Deleuze and Guattari, can be likened more to “constellations” as it takes up Deleuzoguattarian thought rather than a single point that always departs from a place of refusal. END FOOTENOTE] Further, I discuss **“decolonial refusal**” in relation to how Black scholars like Sylvia Wynter, Zakiyyah Iman Jackson, and Amber Jamilla Musser work within a Black feminist tradition animated **by a kind of skepticism or suspicion capable of ferreting out the trace of the white liberal human within (self-)professed subjectless, futureless, and nonrepresentational white theoretical traditions.** In other words, in the work of Sylvia Wynter**, one senses a general suspicion and deep distrust of the ability of Western theory— specifically its attempt at self- critique and self- correction in the name of justice for humanity— to revise its cognitive orders to work itself out of its current “closed system,” which reproduces exclusion and structural oppositions based on the negation of the other**.9 [INSERT FOOTENOTE: See Katherine McKittrick, “Diachronic Loops/Deadweight Tonnage/Bad Made Measure,” Cultural Geographies 23, no. 1 (2016): 3– 18, doi:10.1177/14744740156 12716, for an exemplary explication of how Sylvia Wynter uses the decolonial scholarship of an “autopoiesis.” END FOOTENOTE] Wynter’s study of decolonial theory and its elaboration of autopoiesis informs her understanding of how the human and its overrepresentation as man emerges. Recognizing that humans (of various genres) write themselves through a “self- perpetuating and self- referencing closed belief system” that often prevents them from seeing or noticing “the process of recursion,” Wynter works to expose these blind spots.10 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: See McKittrick, “Diachronic Loops,” in which the author cites the importance of the work of H. Maturana and F. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living (London: D. Reidel, 1972), for the study of the human’s process of self- writing. END FOOTNOTE] Wynter understands that **one of the limitations of Western liberal thought is that it cannot see itself in the process of writing itself.** I observe a similar kind of cynicism about the way the academic left invokes “post humanism” in the work of Jackson and Musser. Musser in particular questions the capacity of queer theories to turn to sensations like masochism within the field of affect studies to overcome the subject. Further, Jackson’s and Musser’s work is skeptical that white transcendence can happen on its own terms or rely solely on its own processes of self-critique and self- correction. I read Jackson’s and Musser’s work as distrustful of the ability for “posthumanism” to be accountable to Black and Indigenous peoples or for affect theory on its own to not replicate and reinforce the subjugation of the other as it moves toward self- annihilation. Both the human and the post human are causes for suspicion within Black studies. Like Wynter, the field of Black studies has consistently made the liberal human an object of study and scrutiny, particularly the nefarious manner in which it violently produces Black existence as other than and at times nonhuman. Wynter’s empirical method of tracking the internal epistemic crises and revolutions of Europe from the outside has functioned as a model for one way that Black studies can unfurl a critique of the human as well as Western modes of thought. I use the terms “misanthropy” and “misandry” in this article to evoke how Black studies has remained attentive to, wary about, and deeply distrustful of the human condition, humankind, and the humanas-man/men in the case of Black “feminists.” Both Black studies’ distrust of the “human” and Black feminism’s distrust of humanism in its version as man/men (which at times seeks to incorporate Black men) relentlessly scrutinize how the category of the human and in this case the “posthuman” reproduce Black death. I link misandry (skepticism of humankind-as-man) to the kind of skepticism and “hermeneutics of suspicion” that Black feminist scholars like Wynter, Jackson, and Musser at times apply to their reading and engagement with revisions to or expansions of the category of the human, posthuman discourses, and nonrepresentational theory In this article, I connect discursive performance of skepticism to embodied and affective responses I have witnessed in the academy that challenge the sanctioned modes of protocol, politesse, and decorum in the university. For example, Wynter assumes a critically disinterested posture as she gazes empirically on and examines intra-European epistemic shifts over time. Paget Henry has described Wynter as an anthropologist of the Occident, as Europe becomes an object of study rather than the center of thought and humanity.11 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Paget Henry, Caliban’s Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2002), 19. END FOOTENOTE] Throughout the body of Wynter’s work, she seems to be more interested in drawing our attention to the capacity of European orders of knowledge to shift over time— or their fragility— than in celebrating the progress that European systems of knowledge have claimed to make. Wynter’s tracking is just a tracking and not a celebration of the progress narrative that Western civilization tells about itself and its capacity to define, refine, and recognize new kinds of humanity over time. This comportment of critical disinterest is often read as an affront to the codes and customs of scholarly discourse and dialogue in the academic community, particularly when it is in response to the white thinkers of the Western cannon. **Decolonial refusal and abolitionist skepticism respond to how perverse and reprehensible it is to ask Indigenous and Black people who cannot seem to escape death to move beyond the human or the desire to be human**. In fact, Black and **Indigenous people have never been fully folded into the category of the human**. As Zakiyyah Iman Jackson has argued**, It has largely gone unnoticed by posthumanists that their queries into ontology often find their homologous (even anticipatory) appearance in decolonial philosophies that confront slavery and colonialism’s inextricability from the Enlightenment humanism they are trying to displace. Perhaps this foresight on the part of decolonial theory is rather unsurprising considering that exigencies of race have crucially anticipated and shaped discourses governing the non- human** (animal, technology, object, and plant).12 [Zakkiyah Iman Jackson, “Review: Animal: New Directions in the Theorization of Race and Posthumanism,” Feminist Studies 39, no. 3 (2013): 681. END FOOTENOTE] A crucial point that Jackson emphasizes is that Black and Indigenous studies, particularly decolonial studies, has already grappled with and anticipated the late twentieth century impulses inspired by Leo Bersani and Lee Edelman to annihilate the self and jettison the future. **Indigenous and Black “sex**” (as activity, reproduction, pleasure, world-building, and not-human sexuality) **are already subsumed by death**. For some reason, white critical theory cannot seem to fathom that self- annihilation is something white people need to figure out by themselves. In other words, “they can have that.”13 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: This is a colloquialism or form of vernacular often used by Blacks and People of Color to express that they disagree with something and more specifically reject an idea and will leave that to the people whom it concerns to deal with. END FOOTNOTE] Within Native feminist theorizing, ethnographic refusal can be traced to Audra Simpson’s 2007 article, “On Ethnographic Refusal.” In this seminal work, Simpson reflects on and gains inspiration from the tradition of refusal practiced by the people of Kahnawake.14 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Simpson’s ethnographic work specifically focuses on the Kahnawake Mohawk who reside in a reservation in the territory is now referred to as southwest Quebec. END FOOTNOTE] **Simpson shares that** **Kahnawake refusals are at the core and spirit of her own ethnographic and ethical practices of refusal.** I was interested in the larger picture, in the discursive, material and moral territory that was simultaneously historical and contemporary (this “national” space) and the ways in which Kahnawakero:non, **the “people of Kahnawake,” had refused the authority of the state at almost every turn.** The ways in which their formation of the initial membership code (now replaced by a lineage code and board of elders to implement the code and determine cases) was refused; the ways in which their interactions with border guards at the international boundary line were predicated upon a refusal; how refusal worked in everyday encounters to enunciate repeatedly to ourselves and to outsiders that “this is who we are, this is who you are, these are my rights.”15 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Audra Simpson, “On Ethnographic Refusal: Indigeneity, ‘Voice’ and Colonial Citizenship,” Junctures: The Journal for Thematic Dialogue, no. 9 (December 2007): 73. END FOOTNOTE] Because Simpson was concerned with applying the political and everyday modes of Kahnawake refusal, she attended to the “collective limit” established by her and her Kahnawake participants. 16 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Ibid., 77. END FOOTNOTE] The collective limit was relationally and ethically determined by what was shared but more importantly by what was not shared. Simpson’s ability to discern the collective limit could only be achieved through a form of relational knowledge production that regards and cares for the other. Simpson recounts how one of her participants forced her to recognize a collective limit. Approaching and then arriving at the limit, Simpson experiences the following: And although I pushed him, hoping that there might be something explicit said from the space of his exclusion— or more explicit than he gave me— it was enough that he said what he said. “Enough” is certainly enough. “Enough,” I realised, was when I reached the limit of my own return and our collective arrival. Can I do this and still come home; what am I revealing here and why? Where will this get us? Who benefits from this and why? And “enough” was when they shut down (or told me to turn off the recorder), or told me outright funny things like “nobody seems to know”— when everybody does know and talks about it all the time. Dominion then has to be exercised over these representations, and that was determined when enough was said. The ethnographic limit then, was reached not just when it would cause harm (or extreme discomfort)— the limit was arrived at when the representation would bite all of us and compromise the representational territory that we have gained for ourselves in the past 100 years.17 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Ibid., 78. END FOOTNOTE] Extending her discussion of ethnographic refusal beyond the bounds of ethnographic concerns, Simpson also ponders whether this enactment of refusal can be applied to theoretical work. Simpson outright poses a question: “What is theoretically generative about these refusals?”18 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Ibid. END FOOTNOTE] The question that Simpson asks in 2007 is clarified by Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang in the 2014 essay “R- Words: Refusing Research.” **Arguing that modes of refusal extended into the theoretical and methodological terrains of knowledge production are productive and necessary,** Tuck and Yang state: For the purposes of our discussion, the most important insight to draw from Simpson’s article is her emphasis that **refusals are not subtractive, but are theoretically generative, expansive. Refusal is not just a “no,” but a redirection to ideas otherwise unacknowledged or unquestioned.** Unlike a settler colonial configuration of knowledge that is petulantly exasperated and resentful of limits, **a methodology of refusal regards limits on knowledge as productive, as indeed a good thing**.19 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “R- Words: Refusing Research,” in Humanizing Research: Decolonizing Qualitative Inquiry with Youth and Communities (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE, 2014), 239. END FOOTNOTE] In line with Simpson’s intervention, Tuck and Yang posit that “refusal itself could be developed into both method and theory.”20 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Ibid., 242. END FOOTNOTE] For Tuck and Yang, a generative practice of refusal and a decolonial and abolitionist tradition is making Western thought “turn back upon itself as settler colonial knowledge, as opposed to universal, liberal, or neutral knowledge without horizon.”21 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Ibid., 243. END FOOTNOTE] In fact, the coauthors suggest “making the settler colonial metanarrative the object of . . . research.”22 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Ibid., 244. END FOOTNOTE] What this move effectively does is question the uninterrogated assumptions and exposes the violent particularities of the metanarrative. **Scrutiny as a practice of refusal also slows down or perhaps halts the momentum of the machinery that allows, as Tuck and Yang argue, “knowledge to facilitate interdictions on Indigenous and Black life**.”23 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Ibid., 244. END FOOTNOTE] Taking a cue from Simpson and Tuck and Yang, I turn to Tuck’s 2010 critique of Deleuze’s notion of “desire” as an example of the theoretical practice of refusal, which Simpson wonders about and which Tuck and Yang elaborated on in 2014. Eve Tuck’s 2010 article “Breaking Up with Deleuze” refuses Deleuze’s understanding and imposition of his definition of desire for Native studies and Native resurgence in particular. Tuck refuses the Deleuzoguattarian nomadic due to its totalizing moves and specifically its evasion and refusal of Native and alternative notions of refusal that emerge from Native struggles for survival.24 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Eve Tuck, “Breaking Up with Deleuze: Desire and Valuing the Irreconcilable,” International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 23, no. 5 (2010): 635– 50. END FOOTNOTE] For Tuck, paying attention to “the continuity of ancestors,” or genealogies, in Native and in all modes of knowledge production is imperative. For Indigenous and Native studies, it reverses the erasure enacted by continental European and settler-colonial theory, which uses a tradition of ongoing genocide to annihilate Native thinkers and subsequently their epistemologies and theories. Prior to Byrd’s indictment of Deleuzoguattarian laudatory accounts of America’s terrain of “Indians without Ancestry,” Tuck reroutes us back to ancestral and genealogical thinking as a way of asserting Indigenous presence and its epistemological systems and traditions, devoid of Cartesian boundary- making impulses and desires. Tuck’s work also prepares us in 2010 for the critique that Byrd levies in 2011, which exposes the traditions, roots, and genealogies of Western poststructuralist theory. Such theory created the conditions of possibility and emergence for Deleuzoguattarian genocidal forms of rhizomatic and nonrepresentational thought. Black Caribbean feminist Michelle V. Rowley argues we need to especially attend to a theory’s “politics and conditions of emergence.”25 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: See Michelle V. Rowley, “The Idea of Ancestry: Of Feminist Genealogies and Many Other Things,” in Feminist Theory Reader: Local and Global Perspectives, 3rd ed., ed. Carole R. McCann and Syeung Kyung Kim (New York: Routledge, 2013), 810– 81, where Rowley argues that transnational feminisms need to attend to how the white feminist wave as a metaphor and theory emerges, disciplines are thought, and more importantly how “its wins” are gained through the exploitation and suffering of women from the Global South. Rowley describes this work as attending to the “politics and conditions of emergence” of feminist metaphors and theories. END FOOTNOTE] In other words, we need to consider on whose backs or through whose blood a theory developed and then circulated while hiding its own violence.

#### The role of the ballot is to center indigenous scholarship and research. Indigenous theories must come before settler frameworks. We need to hold colonizers accountable to open the space up for new narratives and disrupt colonial institutions.

Carlson ‘16 [Elizabeth Carlson, Oct 21 2016, Anti-colonial methodologies and practices for settler colonial studies, Settler Colonial Studies, 7:4, 496-517, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1241213] [SS]

Macoun and Strakosch contend that ‘most settlers who use [settler colonial theory] are concerned to disturb rather than re-enact colonial hierarchies, and seek to contribute to Indigenous political struggles’.40 The particular research project out of which this article arises, focuses on the ways experienced white settler anti-colonial, decolonial, or solidarity activists have worked to disrupt and subvert settler colonialism within themselves, their organizations, their relationships, their pedagogies, their connections with land, their com- munities, and sometimes also in the Canadian government, with a goal of inspiring others to engage in or deepen such work, and of contributing to social change. As has been noted, **in subverting settler colonialism, the role of white settler academics is at the periphery, making space for Indigenous resurgence and knowledges, and pushing back against colonial institutions,** structures, practices, mentalities, and land theft. In order to do this, anti-colonial settler scholars can sit on departmental and university committees, supporting anti-colonial and anti-oppressive ethical choices to push for changes in Euro- centric and colonial curricula, narratives, policies, and structures**. We can seek to disrupt rather than enact colonial values and practices, and engage in anti-colonial actions within the academy.** This also applies to our writing: Settler scholars seeking to challenge colonial power relations should be doubly attentive to the operation of [colonial] narratives, and the way that we as individual scholars perform and deploy academic authority. For us, this has involved the need to interrogate our work – along with other settler cultural productions.41 **When settler scholars subvert colonialism in the academy, the ethics of their work are improved, and potentially more space is made for Indigenous scholars who wish to main- tain their own values in the academy.** Arlo Kempf says that ‘where anticolonialism is a tool used to invoke resistance for the colo- nized, it is a tool used to invoke accountability for the colonizer’.**42 Relational accountability should be a cornerstone of settler colonial studies.** I believe settler colonial studies and scholars should ethically and overtly place themselves in relationship to the centuries of Indigenous oral, and later academic scholarship that conceptualizes and resists settler colonialism without necessarily using the term: SCT may be revelatory to many settler scholars, but Indigenous people have been speaking for a long time about colonial continuities based on their lived experiences. Some SCTs have sought to connect with these discussions and to foreground Indigenous resistance, survival and agency. Others, however, seem to use SCT as a pathway to explain the colonial encounter without engaging with Indigenous people and experiences – either on the grounds that this structural analysis already conceptually explains Indigenous experience, or because Indigen- ous resistance is rendered invisible.43 Ethical settler colonial theory (SCT) would recognize the foundational role Indigenous scholarship has in critiques of settler colonialism. It would acknowledge the limitations of settler scholars in articulating settler colonialism without dialogue with Indigenous peoples, and take as its norm making this dialogue evident. In my view, **it is critical that we not view settler colonial studies as a new or unique field being established, which would enact a discovery narrative and contribute to Indigenous  erasure, but rather take a longer and broader view**. Indigenous oral and academic scholars are indeed the originators of this work. This space is not empty. Of course, powerful forces of socialization and discipline impact scholars in the academy. **There is much pressure to claim unique space**, to establish a name for ourselves, and to make academic discoveries. I am suggesting that **settler colonial studies and anti-colonial scholars resist these hegemo- nic pressures and maintain a higher anti-colonial ethic.** As has been argued, ‘**the theory itself places ethical demands on us as settlers, including the demand that we actively refuse its potential to re-empower our own academic voices and to marginalize Indigen- ous resistance’**.44 As settler scholars, we can reposition our work relationally and contextually with humi- lity and accountability. **We can centre Indigenous resistance, knowledges, and scholarship in our work, and contextualize our work in Indigenous sovereignty.** We can view oral Indi- genous scholarship as legitimate scholarly sources. We can acknowledge explicitly and often the Indigenous traditions of resistance and scholarship that have taught us and pro- vided the foundations for our work. **If our work has no foundation of Indigenous scholar- ship and mentorship, I believe our contributions to settler colonial studies are even more deeply problematic.** I embody the principle of relational and epistemic accountability by acknowledging here that my interest in the larger study out of which the anti-colonial research method- ology is based was inspired by a lifetime of influences. In particular, my work in this area has been influenced by years of guidance from a number of Indigenous and African-Amer- ican mentors including Nicholas Cooper-Lewter, Nii Gaani Aki Inini (Dave Courchene Jr), Zoongigaabowitmiskoakikwe, and my late brother Byron Matwewinin.45 I entered into dis- cussions with Indigenous scholars, friends, and Elders (in particular, Zoongigaabowitmis- koakikwe, Michael Hart, Leona Star-Manoakeesick, and Gladys Rowe),46 observing their protocols of gifts and offerings for the feedback I was requesting, depending on the context. In addition, my reading of Indigenous scholarship located the study as a response to a call by Indigenous scholars that settler peoples engage in decolonization processes and work. Throughout the research and writing process I made it a point to attend Indi- genous-led community events and gatherings to stay connected to community and con- tinue to learn. When I met with Leona Star-Manoakeesick, we discussed how Ownership, Control, Access, Possession research principles might relate to my research.47 Leona challenged me to think about who constitutes the community that relates to my research as a begin- ning step, and shared that accountability to Indigenous peoples would also mean account- ability to the land. Her input greatly influenced the methodology principles and practices. As I achieved greater clarity about the study, I engaged in formal consultations with a number of other Indigenous scholars, knowledge keepers, and/or activists. Chickadee Richard, Belinda Vandenbroek, Don Robinson, Aimée Craft, Louis Sorin, and Manito Mukwa (Troy Fontaine),48 provided guidance, input, and encouragement regarding the initial research design and process, much of which shifted and strengthened my initial thoughts and was readily integrated into the research. I was gifted key insights and values on which to build the research, and meaningful ideas for interview questions and interview participants. During the initial phases of the research, I was inspired by scho- larship that urges settler peoples on Indigenous lands who wish to identify themselves in the context of Indigenous sovereignty to learn and use words that local Indigenous peoples use for them.49 A number of individuals helped me in my quest to learn about Anishinaabemowin conceptions of white people – Nii Gaani Aki Inini (Dave Courchene), Rose Roulette, Niizhosake (Sherry Copenace), Daabaasanaquwat ‘Lowcloud’ (Peter Atkin- son), Byron Matwewinin, and Pebaamibines.50 **I further sought to embody relational accountability by centring Indigenous scholarship and literatures in my research proposal and literature review.** Aspects of the data analysis process were shared with a smaller group of Indigenous scholars (Leona Star-Manoakeesick, Aimée Craft, and Dawnis Kennedy),51 who provided feedback which shaped the analysis and the writing of the research report. Towards the end of the research process, I organized a research feast, which is described further below. **Relational accountability was embodied by sharing the research with the community and receiving feedback from it.**

# 2

#### Counterplan: Disengage with the hyperreal without the focus on the plan.

#### The 1ac is reality TV’s parody of the real world – their performance of radicalism creates a double world that attempts to simulate strategies, becoming lost in the hyperreal at the expense of empathy. Ask yourself – what does radical mimicry mean? Does it mean anything?

Robinson 12 Andrew Robinson, 5-18-2012, “Jean Baudrillard: a new system of meaning,” Ceasefire, <https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-7/>, sjbe

Social relations are reorganised in terms of binary codes, such as question/answer and stimulus/response pairings. In cases such as data mining, even individuals can be mapped as sets of digital information. The whole of social reality becomes subject to a regime of ‘descriptive transparency’. Baudrillard sees this process as an infinite division of social reality – the application of a series of binary oppositions. The reading of texts becomes a perpetual test, like a question-answer test. Dialogue between text and reader disappears. Instead, textual choices locate the reader at a point in the code. This creates a densely monological relation. The system makes a naked demand to which no response is possible. Similarly, objects become tests. The object no longer exists to serve a use. It is a sign which locates the consumer at a particular point in the code. People learn to respond to and decode the code in its own terms, as a series of either-or options. The system tries to induce constant active participation in this process, seeking a joyous, spontaneous feedback. Television, for instance, requires viewers to constantly complete an image they have only partially processed. The system also seeks a kind of permanent mobilisation: people are still fixed in place, whether in factories, consumption sites, prisons, schools, or retraining. This process is a mirror of the code’s attempts to imagine everything as having a place. Rather than a system of production, the system becomes a reading strip, filled with signs to be coded and decoded. Everyone is turned into a terminal for the system. The system does not appear to be totally controlling, because it is binary. For Baudrillard, this binary system is a way of introducing tactical flexibility into a monopoly system. It is not a genuinely competitive system, but rather, a system of counting or doubling (two identical alternatives). The World Trade Centre is seen as a symbol of the system’s omnipotence, and of its practices of doubling. This system of testing and questioning alters the construction of meaning. There is now a new regime of truth – not of the mirror or the panoptical gaze, but a ‘manipulative truth’ of a code which interrogates via tests, remembers one’s preferences, or genetically determines things in advance. It is a regime of collective voyeurism – the public spying on itself. It leads to a new kind of uncertainty arising from an excess of information of indeterminate meaning. For Baudrillard, this regime is a kind of formal participation which is often portrayed as full participation. It is not full participation because there is practically no way of saying “no” to the system. It effectively induces a kind of psychological participation. This participation is now replacing repression as the main form of control. Our intelligence and ability to communicate are reduced theoretically to the ability to provide contrasting or appropriate responses to increasing varieties of stimuli. This leads, for instance, to a crisis of electoral representation. The so-called representatives control the process of opinion-formation so well, they no longer represent something outside themselves. They become unrepresentative for this reason. Opinion surveys and television represent nothing. They illogically project the new order – the order of statistics, operationalism and simulation – onto a traditional value-system of representation and free will. The two orders are actually incommensurable. But the illusion of their compatibility moralises the regime of simulation. It creates a moral philosophy of information. Baudrillard sees this new regime of truth as a regime of doubling. The world is catalogued and analysed, turned into models, then artificially resurrected from the models made of it. This creates a doubled world which is at once artificial and strangely similar to the original. It short-circuits and then duplicates reality through signs. This leads to a world in which the ‘real’, the ‘event’, and real antagonism are prevented in advance. Baudrillard takes as examples the replacement of people touching each other with touch therapy, of localised food-production with artificially-produced ‘natural’ foods, of walking as a part of life with jogging as a fitness regimen. In another passage, Baudrillard discusses reality TV (and one might add, spaces under CCTV surveillance), as creating the illusion of watching things as they would be with no cameras there. He discusses the routinising of strikes in a similar way. And he talks of therapeutic methods as the functional isolation of the social. In another essay, he speaks of today’s films as seeming a little too good, too perfect, missing the blemishes and the ‘imaginary’ of the phenomena they imitate. It is as if they are perfected of their processual origins, of the marks of history. They no longer have meaning or aesthetics strictly speaking. For instance, today’s action and sci-fi films increasingly approximate to sequences of special effects. They often lack the charm of their technologically simpler predecessors. But they approximate ever more closely to a perfect simulation of reality. For Baudrillard this is a symptom of social changes, of the replacement of reference by simulation. It means that television and film are now socially ineffectual. They are image, not imaginary. The action takes place ‘on the screens and nowhere else’. Even when events are real, as in humanitarian crises, the viewer can’t really imagine them. They are consigned to a special, televisual location. And this ‘cool’, deintensified location increasingly spreads to news and politics along with fiction. The message is lost in the medium, the medium in the real, and the medium and real alike in the hyperreal. The distinct effects of the media are now indiscernible from the wider context. There are no remaining ‘media’ in the sense of mediations which communicate between distinct realities. Such a ‘dialectic’ of communication is replaced by the circularity of the model. Television – and computers – lack irony and artifice. They lack symbolic exchange. Cinema, in contrast, was once an ‘image’ in an older sense. But it is being contaminated. Films increasingly exist only through a persistent commentary and reinterpretation. It becomes harder to reach the film itself, rather than texts referring to texts. This in turn makes them dysfunctional. They are a means of manipulation in all directions at once (they carry police press releases but also activist press releases as fact). They both simulate within the system and carry the simulation which destroys it. They condemn terrorism but also spread its effects. Events now have no existence beyond the screen which deflects them. Baudrillard discusses porn in these terms: as sex without sexuality, without sensuality or pleasure, or something more sexual than sex, performing the brute descriptive fact of sex without any real investment, [as combinations of encoded possibilities](http://mailman.lbo-talk.org/2000/2000-August/014004.html). It functions to neutralise sex, and to spread an energy of neutralisation. It is not contrasted with ‘good sex’ somewhere else. Rather, it seems to suggest that sex does not depend on the existence of pleasurable sex or sexual desire. Sex still functions without desire. The dream of cloning goes even further, pursuing the emergence of humans from the genetic code, without a sexuality linked to death. Perhaps it would even reproduce a particular identity infinitely, without any difference appearing. The android is another example here: too perfect to be true, like humanity stripped of its blemishes and its processual origins. There are other examples. Faces stripped of masks. Skin treated as a complete cover without orifices. In mapping, there is a lack of unexplored spaces where imaginary sites can be placed. In other fields, things are cloned or reproduced as distinct segments or modules (such as academic modules or specific skills), with the possibility of reconstructing the whole from any of the interchangeable parts. This is the end both of autonomous parts and of the meaning of the whole. The clone, like the reproduced work of art for Benjamin, loses its aura. It may even become akin to a cancer cell, proliferating without regard for its context. In various fields, the fading of meaning, the neutralisation through overexposure of the signs associated with pleasure and enjoyment, occurs. This process is itself seductive – there is a pleasure in the process of overexposure itself. Things only have lightness through their secrecy or absence. When everything is present and visible, it becomes a brute material fact, like a rotting body, or like sex in a porn video. The pure image is the end of the imaginary. By destroying the distance between the thing and its image, it stops the functioning of Lacanian/Freudian fantasy mechanisms. For Baudrillard, like Lacan and Freud, there cannot be an imaginary or real except at a certain distance from the object. The overexposure of objects through simulation brings about the end of the imaginary. Pure images, transparent to each other, shatter if brought into relations, yet contact and penetrate each other all too easily. The imaginary relies on what is known in psychoanalysis as the scene, a site which is invested with unconscious energy, which is repeated in fantasy and trauma, and (in Lacan) imagined to be the site where the absent cause of desire exists. In order for such a scene to be imagined, there need to be gaps and incomplete spaces where it can be imagined to be. Overexposure and ‘obscenity’ (the absolute proximity of the thing seen) thus destroys the scene. It is replaced by a ‘screen’, or a surface without depth. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the imaginary functions because of its relationship to the Real, which is not a representable secret. Forcing the revelation of the secret leads to its loss, like the goose that laid the golden eggs. It creates an experience of unbearable obscenity or excessive reality. When there are no secrets left, there is no longer a site to invest with the Real, and construct an imaginary around. Forcing the subject to reveal its secret necessarily fails, because the secret is really a connection outside the self, a relation. Without the imaginary, there are no breaks between things. The separations which create difference and intensity are struck with inertia. One is then opened to the undivided multiplication of each phenomenon to excess. Hypervisibility, the loss of secrets and illusions, leads to a kind of indifference: ‘heaven becomes indifferent to the earth’. The simulation or generation of reality from models destroys the social role of the imaginary. A universal market of signs, models and values leaves no space for the imaginary. It becomes impossible to simulate things in the old way: a fake crime is treated as a real crime, and so on. The imaginary disappears because of the lack of a vanishing point where intensities can be invested. Because the system has reached its limits and is saturated, something else takes its place in the imaginary. Intense energies displace themselves from the system, back into the field of symbolic exchange.

#### Colonialism cannot be theorized through the affirmative’s lens of state action – shifts towards a discussion of state control and influence fail to look towards particular rhetoric – as in 1AC Pawlett. The aff’s focus on the state glosses over colonialism. **Rifkin 9**

Mark Rifkin, Associate Professor of English & WGS @ UNC-Greensboro “Indigenizing Agamben: Rethinking Sovereignty in Light of the ‘Peculiar’ Status of Native Peoples,” Cultural Critique, Number 73, pp. 88-124

In using Agamben’s work to address U.S. Indian policy, though, it needs to be reworked. In particular, his emphasis on biopolitics tends to come at the expense of a discussion of geopolitics, the production of race supplanting the production of space as a way of envisioning the work of the sovereignty he critiques, and while his concept of the exception has been immensely influential in contemporary scholar- ship and cultural criticism, such accounts largely have left aside discussion of Indigenous peoples. Attending to Native peoples’ position within settler-state sovereignties requires investigating and adjusting three aspects of Agamben’s thinking: the persistent inside/outside tropology he uses to address the exception, specifically the ways it serves as a metaphor divorced from territoriality; the notion of “bare life” as the basis of the exception, especially the individualizing ways that he uses that concept; and the implicit depiction of sovereignty as a self-confident exercise of authority free from anxiety over the legitimacy of state actions.5 Such revision allows for a reconsideration of the “zone of indistinction” produced by and within sovereignty, opening up analysis of the ways settler-states regulate not only proper kinds of embodiment (“bare life”) but also legitimate modes of collectivity and occupancy—what I will call bare habitance.¶ If the “overriding sovereignty” of the United States is predicated on the creation of a state of exception, then the struggle for sovereignty by Native peoples can be envisioned as less about control of particular policy domains than of metapolitical authority—the ability to define the content and scope of “law” and “politics.” Such a shift draws attention away from critiques of the particular rhetorics used to justify the state’s plenary power and toward a macrological effort to contest the “overriding” assertion of a right to exert control over Native polities. My argument, then, explores the limits of forms of analysis organized around the critique of the settler-state’s employment of racialized discourses of savagery and the emphasis on cultural distinctions between Euramerican and Indigenous modes of governance. Both of these strategies within Indigenous political theory treat sovereignty as a particular kind of political content that can be juxtaposed with a substantively different—more Native-friendly or Indigenous-centered—content, but by contrast, I suggest that discourses of racial difference and equality as well as of cultural recognition are deployed by the state in ways that reaffirm its geopolitical self-evidence and its authority to determine what issues, processes, and statuses will count as meaningful within the political system. While arguments about Euramerican racism and the disjunctions be- tween Native traditions and imposed structures of governance can be quite powerful in challenging aspects of settler-state policy, they cannot account for the structuring violence performed by the figure of sovereignty. Drawing on Agamben, I will argue that “sovereignty” functions as a placeholder that has no determinate content.6 The state has been described as an entity that exercises a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of violence, and what I am suggesting is that the state of exception produced through Indian policy creates a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of legitimacy, an exclusive uncontestable right to define what will count as a viable legal or political form(ul)ation. That fundamentally circular and self-validating, as well as anxious and fraught, performance grounds the legitimacy of state rule on nothing more than the axiomatic negation of Native peoples’ authority to determine or adjudicate for themselves the normative principles by which they will be governed. Through Agamben’s theory of the exception, then, I will explore how the supposedly underlying sovereignty of the U.S. settler-state is a retrospective projection generated by, and dependent on, the “peculiar”-ization of Native peoples

**Even if the aff claims it’ll get over it, it WONT**

# 3

#### Baudrillard is a sexist who advocates for SACRIFICING WOMEN – don’t let them get away with reading repugnant scholarship

Brodribb 92, Somer Brodribb 1992 teaches feminist theory/politics and women’s social and political thought at the University of Victoria, British Columbia. She studied in the Feminist focus of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, NOTHING MAT(T)ERS: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism, First published by Spinifex Press)

Jean Baudrillard blames the failure of the “revolution” on women and change, women’s change. He sees puritanical “hysterics” everywhere whom he accuses of exaggeration about sexual abuse (1986, p. 42). The radical nostalgia which pervades his postmodern scribbling is for Rousseau’s (1979) Sophie and Lasch’s haven in a heartless world. For Baudrillard, a rapist is a violent fetus who longs for ancient prohibitions not sexual liberation (1986, p. 47). Baudrillard’s pessimism is actually his hope for a defeat of feminist initiated change and a return to man and god in contract, the eternal sacrifice of woman. His ramblings in his cups of cool whisky (1986, p. 7) are given the status of thought. He considers himself outré and daring to criticize feminists but, as anyone who has taken a feminist position knows, misogynous attack is banal and regular. Sorry, Baudrillard: it is outré to support and to be a feminist. But is this in vino veritas, when Baudrillard proposes a Dionysian sacrifice of woman to the image of beauty, purity, eternity? In Amérique, he writes: “One should always bring something to sacrifice in the desert and offer it as a victim. A woman. If something has to disappear there, something equal in beauty to the desert, why not a woman? (1986, p. 66). When queried about this “gratuitously provocative statement” Baudrillard replied, “Sacrificing a woman in the desert is a logical operation because in the desert one loses one’s identity. It’s a sublime act and part of the drama of the desert. Making a woman the object of the sacrifice is perhaps the greatest compliment I could give her” (Moore: 1989, p. 54). A compliment postmodernism will make over and over, like opera.18 Commenting on a sacrificial scene in D.H.Lawrence’s The Woman Who Rode Away, Millett writes: This is a formula for sexual cannibalism: substitute the knife for the penis and penetration, the cave for a womb, and for a bed, a place of execution—and you provide a murder whereby one acquires one’s victim’s power. Lawrence’s demented fantasy has arranged for the male to penetrate the female with the instrument of death so as to steal her mana... The act here at the centre of the Lawrentian sexual religion is coitus as killing, its central vignette a picture of human sacrifice performed upon the woman to the greater glory and potency of the male (1971, p. 292).

#### Baudrillard is racist, sexist, and contradictory – even if they win the reps offense it’s a critique of his philosophy.

Best 91, Steven (Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas El Paso), and Douglas Kellner. Postmodern theory: Critical interrogations. Guilford Press, 1991.

Furthermore, Baudrillard's analysis operates on a excessively high level of abstraction. He fails to make key distinctions and engages in misplaced abstraction. For instance, Ron Silliman pointed out in his response to Baudrillard at the Montana conference that Baudrillard failed to distinguish between tranvestism and transexuality. Transvestites play at dressing as members of the opposite sex and enjoy the 'gender fucking' and subversion of dress codes; transsexuals, by contrast, are often tortured and suffering individuals who can appear uncomfortable in either sex —as evidenced by the high rate of suicides of those who undergo sex change operations. But human suffering is erased from Baudrillard's semiological universe which abstractly describes certain sign spectacles abstracted from material underpinnings.

The same bad abstraction appears in his travelogue America (1988d). Baudrillard speeds through the desert of America and merely sees signs floating by. He looks at Reagan on TV and sees only his smile. He hangs out in southern California and concludes that the United States is a 'realized utopia'. He fails to see, however, the homeless, the poor, racism and sexism, people dying of AIDS, oppressed immigrants, and fails to relate any of the phenomena observed to the vicissitudes of capitalism (he denies that capital ever existed in America!), or to the conservative political hegemony of the 1980s. Baudrillard's imaginary is thus a highly abstract sign fetishism which abstracts from social relations and political economy in order to perceive the play of signs in the transvestite spectacles of the transaesthetic, transsexual, and transpolitical. Baudrillard's 'trans' manoeuvres, however, are those of an idealist skimming the surface of appearances while speeding across an environment which he never contextualizes, understands, or really comes to terms with. Indeed, Baudrillard's erasure of the fundamentality of sexual and racial differences is highly insensitive and even grotesque. Most blacks and people of colour experience virulent racism in the United States and the fact of racial difference — Baudrillard to the contrary — remains a salient feature of contemporary US society. Most blacks do not achieve the media fame and wealth of a Michael Jackson and cannot easily mix racial and sexual features in new configurations. As is obvious to anyone who has lived for any length of time in the United States, racial oppression and difference is a deep-rooted feature of contemporary US society from which Baudrillard abstracts in his 'theory' of fractal value. Indeed, Baudrillard's current positions are profoundly superficial and are characterized by sloppy generalizations, extreme abstraction, semiological idealism and oft repeated banalities, such as: we are in a 'post-orgy condition' of simulations, entropy, fractal subjects, indifference, transvestism, and so on, ad nauseam. If he were merely expressing opinions or claiming to present a possible perspective on things, one would be able to enjoy his pataphysical meanderings, but Baudrillard's writing is increasingly pretentious, claiming to describe 'the real state of things', to speak for the masses, and to tell `us' what we really believe. For instance, the essay on Transaesthetics' opens with the declamation:

It is commonly held that the avant-garde no longer exists, whether this avant-garde is sexual, political or artistic; that this movement which corresponds to the linear acceleration of a history, to an anticipatory capacity and henceforth of a radical critique in the name of desire, in the name of the revolution, in the name of the liberation of forms, that this revolutionary movement has come to a close. Essentially this is true. This glorious movement which is called modernity did not lead us to a transmutation of all values, as we had once dreamed, but to a dissemination and involution of value which resulted in a state of utter confusion for us. This confusion expresses itself, first and foremost, by our inability to grasp anew the principle of an aesthetic determinacy of things, might it be political or sexual.

Baudrillard thus contradicts himself in denying that reality exists any longer in an era of simulations and hyperreality, and then constantly appealing to 'the real conditions of things today'. Note also the glib references to 'this is true' and 'utter confusion' that has resulted 'for us', while pointing to 'our inability' to perceive this or that. The easy complicity of Baudrillard and the masses, him and 'us', is pretentious and hypocritical in addition, for the implication of the whole lecture is that he really understands what is going on while 'we' remain confused and deluded. His positions are grounded in mere subjective intuition or ironic play which he wants to pass off as profound truths and which his gullible followers appropriately praise. Despite postmodern critiques of totalizing thought, Baudrillard represents totalizing thought at its worst and despite critiques of representational thought which is confident that it is describing reality as it is, Baudrillard foists his musings and asides as insight into the very heart of things.

#### Reps are a voter – A. inclusivity -Inclusivity is a prereq to engaging in debate because if there is no one to debate we cant debate. Leads to psychological violence which outweighs on safety. B. they make the debate space unsafe and your role as an educator and adjudicator is to make the space safer - Reject them for normalizing a sexist author C. Must be drop the debater for norms setting

# Case

#### Negri 14 - A logic of futurism belies settler genocide—unlike the atemporal state of nature, the settler relies on the future to justify violence.

Schotten 16 (C. Heike, Associate Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Massachusetts, Boston “Queering Sovereignty, Decolonizing Desire,” Conference Presentation at *Spatializing Sovereignty* organized by The Society for Radical Geography, Spatial Theory, and Everyday Life at Mills College at Carnegie Hall in Oakland, California. 4 March 2016. http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/84081898. 8:07 - 19:56 Transcribed by Tabatha R. at rev.com) NIJ

Okay so in the state of nature, which Hobbes defines as a place where there's no security, there is, in Edelman's terms, no future. This is true not only because we are responsible solely for our own survival, an endeavor we cannot possibly succeed at on our own, but it is also because given this radical insecurity, we are incapable of imagining any other moment or time than now. Hobbes himself acknowledges there is no "accounting of time" in the state of nature, which of course makes sense; in a condition of perpetual war, the future is unimaginable because it is so tenuous. As well, the past becomes effectively irrelevant, hence the institution of sovereignty in Hobbes' version secures our physical preservation and I’m arguing that it does so by bringing temporality itself into existence and producing a future. Okay, so that's the first point. The second point is that, in this act, the sovereign establishes the very meaning and content of life itself. For understood temporally, there is a way in which there is no distinction between life and death in the state of nature, in so far as there is no way to tell present from future. The state of nature's enduring present entails that life there is a kind of limbo-like existence, a suspension of living or perpetual near-death experience wherein we can never be certain of anything. This may be why it is so important to Hobbes to establish the commonwealth in the first place: Not simply to preserve life, as he explicitly suggests, but actually more primarily to definitively demarcate life as life and differentiate it from death. I mean, there's a normative enterprise going on here, right? Indeed, although the sovereign is the beacon of peace, war and death are just as must a byproduct of the institution of sovereignty as life and peace are. So what I take from this is that sovereignty, in short, is the definitive bio-political regime, in so far as it constitutes and determines life as such, distinguishing it from what only becomes subsequently recognizable as death. The third point is that sovereignty institutes this life-death distinction via a moralized logic that relegates life to the domain of civilization and value, and death to the domain of savagery and nihilism. This becomes clear in the conflicted and confusing ways Hobbes characterizes the state of nature as simultaneously a time, a place, and a condition. Now as I just argued that the state of nature is a time — like if it is an era or an epoch — it's a time with no time, a moment that is completely timeless, an era lacking any dynamism or principle of change. If the state of nature is instead a condition, which he also claims, he is clear that it is one of savagery, writing "It may peradventure be thought there never was such a time nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so over all the world, but there are many places where they live so now," and he cites as an example, "the savage people in many places of America." Bolstering the view that the state of nature is a story about humanity's pre-history, Hobbes here rehearses the enlightenment trope of indigenous peoples as European humanity's ancestors and/or pre-modern childhood. Savagery is, therefore, associated with solid temporality, timelessness, and the failure of forward movement or progress. Conclusively, when referencing a geographical location, the state of nature is America, and the 17th-century European notion of the new world, an empty land ripe for exploration and conquest. These specifications of the state of nature in Hobbes make clear that establishment of sovereignty imposes a clear distinction not simply between peace and war, life and death, but also between modernity and backwardness, civilization and savagery. Each of these categorical pairs functions as a surrogate for the others. Taken together, they suggest the deep implications of the categories of life and death with colonization and conquest for European politics and political theory. The fourth point is that the commonwealth, or sovereign or sovereignty, can't actually solve the problem Hobbes says it does. So if there's no state and we're all going to murder each other, the solution is obviously a really big bad, coercive state, right? And that's going to solve the problem? It can't solve the problem, and that's because it can't solve the problem of desire, which has futurism built into its very structure. Hobbes actually gets short shrift as a psychologist. He actually talks quite a bit about desire and affect. So desire, according to Hobbes, is a voluntary motion of the body, whose aim, regardless of object, is attainment — possession, consumption, enjoyment. Yet this attainment poses a dilemma, for as he says, the aim of desire is "not to enjoy once only and for one instant of time, but to assure forever the way of one's future desire." According to Hobbes, in other words, desire seeks perpetuity of enjoyment. It aims at a consumption that can never fully completed. The fifth point — we're almost done — is that Hobbes asserts, therefore, that human beings are perpetual power-seekers, not because we want more and more, but because we want to preserve what we have now forever. His claim is that mere maintenance of the present requires accumulation, undertaking a perpetual reference to an unknown future. Thus, even despite the security from physical violence the sovereign provides, he cannot alleviate the anxiety that runs apace with desire. Everything we do today is undertaken for the sake of a future, which, if we're successful, will be no different from the present. But the sovereign can't guarantee that, right? Sixth then, and finally, this means that Hobbes' colonial story of the emergence of life and death from the state of nature is based on an underlying logic of desire that explains why settler colonial societies transform into expansionist security states. Hobbes' understanding of desire and its dilemmas elaborates George W. Bush's doctrine of preemptive warfare, the logic of Israeli self-defense in the face of so-called "existential threats," and the rationale behind stand-your-ground laws that exonerated the murderer of Trayvon Martin. The fact of this logic's hegemony in economics and political science as rational-choice theory or in international relations as Big R Realism make clear that futurist temporality is the unquestioned philosophical foundation of the U.S. economic and political order, as well as the obviously imperial investments of these economic disciplines. In short, it is the temporalization of desire itself that explains both the settler colonial foundations of survival, life and the value of life, as well as its transformation into an expansionist imperial project. Okay, that was part one. Part two: settlement and the global war on terror. So how does this reading of Hobbes through Edelman help us understand the emergence of empire? Lorenzo Veracini has argued that settler colonialism is distinct from other types of colonialism in so far as it seeks to erase itself as settler colonialism. Following Patrick Wolf's argument that settler colonialism pursues a logic of elimination, whereby settlers seek to replace the native and indigenize themselves post-facto, Veracini argues that because it aims at the elimination of the native, settler colonization necessarily aims at its own elimination. The truly successful settler colonial project, then, would therefore efface the native entirely, whether through genocide or assimilation or some other form of disappearance, the politics of recognition as Glen Coulthard has recently argued. Unless and until elimination is accomplished, settler states will engage in all sort of contortions, both political and ideological, to obscure the native in order to naturalize the conquest. Veracini represents this future of settler colonialism as either conceptually embedded its definition or else as a kind of bad faith on settlers' part, potentially implying that a guilty conscience somehow seeks to ward off complicity with conquest. I think that Edelman's understanding of futurism, however, helps explicate just how and why this anxious, reiterative, and reactionary veiling impulse is definitive of bio-political sovereignty. Hobbes' narratization of the drive of the state of nature is, like any other narratization of the drive, an imposition and thus an explicitly ideological move that serves a particular political agenda. It is the specifically futurist character of this imposition that destines it for failure and thus explains its anxious and recursive structure. Edelman regards this narrative movement toward a viable political future as fundamentally fantasmatic, not to mention conservative and ideological. Futurism, in other words – and these are his words — "perpetuates the fantasy of meaning's eventual realization," a realization that is by definition impossible, in so far as it is always only ever to come. Right? That's what the future is: It's beyond our grasp, it's always just out of reach. Built into Hobbes' understanding of desire, in other words, is the failed tautology of futurism, which as Edelman instructs, is fundamentally and futilely political. My contention is that this constitutive failure of futurism can be understood as the dynamic content of conquest in settler societies, as the original civilizationist imposition of temporality, an act that explains their subsequent transmogrification into expansionist security states. So, rather than face the violence that brought peace and life itself into being, Hobbes instead naturalizes this founding act by declaring it to be a "general inclination of all mankind" to engage in what he calls a "perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceases only in death." In other words, he both institutes life and pushes it forward via a futurist narrativization of the drive into an insatiable, cumulative desire. Yet while desire may push us ever forward, ever beyond the initial moment of settlement, it cannot erase that settlement or relieve settlers' sovereignty of conquest. This is neither because of settler colonialist theoretical definition nor because settlers secretly feel guilty, but rather because the impossibility of fulfilling futurism's fantastical promises requires some other way of meeting the needs it manufactures if settler sovereignty is to maintain itself and it polity in tact. Settler societies resort to any number of destructive forms of managing futurism's failing, from transfer and removal to outright extermination through war, massacre, starvation, and disease. Yet this anxious reiterative activity is wholly predicable from an Edelmanian perspective and ineliminable from the structure of settler sovereignty because the futurist narrativization of the drive has rendered settlers beholden to an unsustainable temporality that must produce queerness or death in order to continue to produce meaning, survival, and civilization for itself. Settler sovereignty, thus, cannot do without the death native it brings into being. The native as death must exist in order to purchase life and survival for the settler. And yet, as Veracini and Wolf argue, the native cannot exist if the settler is to indigenize herself as native to the land she has expropriated, hence the production of new enemies, new queers, new deathly threats to settlement and its civilization and its way of life. The settler colonial foundation of bio-political sovereignty gives way to an expansionist imperial security state that finds new enemies abroad and new obstacles to its endless expansion, thereby solving, albeit only ever partially and temporarily, the problem of futurist failure that constituted settlement to begin with.

#### Foreclosing the failure of radical ecological and social arrangements in space cements the normative architecture of capital. Specifically their Negri evidence.

Valentine 12 - David Valentine, Anthropological Quarterly, Fall 2012“Exit Strategy: Profit, Cosmology, and the Future of Humans in Space” [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/488890] Accessed 1/13/22 SAO

Should we take these cosmological accounts seriously? Recently, as I explained my attempt to do so to a colleague, he became very angry with me. He argued that the cosmological mission of NewSpace entrepreneurs can only be fantasy, and to treat it as anything else was intellectually and politically dangerous because it obscured the extractive and exploitative ideologies that are fundamentally at the heart of any capitalist endeavor. Giving a counter example, I noted that several of my interlocutors are concerned about potentially civilization-killing asteroids hitting Earth and that their plans are practical and non-fantastic in the sense that species have been eradicated by asteroids before, a possibility that exceeds the demands, fantasies, or time frame of capitalism. I mentioned the famous Tunguska event of 1908 where a comet or asteroid hit a remote area of Siberia with a force roughly equivalent to 1,000 times the power of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. My colleague himself exploded at this point: “capitalism does more damage on the face of the Earth every day than that asteroid did at that moment!” While I’m not sure whether he was accurate or how one might assess the material impact of capitalist endeavors in a single day vis-á-vis a large asteroid strike, his point is not to be ignored. Yet what struck me most about this argument is, again, the implication that Earth and its recent human history brackets the totality of human experience and of its future, and that the evidence of capitalism’s effects on the Earth relegates potential asteroid strikes or human settlement in space necessarily to the realm of fantasy. On the other hand, my NewSpace interlocutors see the assumption— on the part of most of the public, governments, and social critics—that the human future is constrained by the upper limits of the Earth’s atmosphere and by the time-span of modernity as itself a dangerous fantasy. In the words of one presenter at the 2011 ISDC: “Something is going to hit us, we need to survive. We have to convince people of that.” In this view, the Earth-bound gaze ignores Earth’s context in a broader environment of the solar system and assumes an historical context which spans merely hundreds rather than billions of years. They see history in terms of a species imperative to expand in order to protect life and intelligence by distributing humans across the solar system and even the galaxy (as shown by Olson and Farman in this issue). But they too assume that Earth-originating, historically-recent free market principles will underpin such expansion, even as some might imagine or hint at other social and exchange forms arising in the encounter with space. What I seek here is another kind of exit strategy: an escape from the assumption (whether rightist or leftist) that the encounter with space will simply produce a repetition, extension, or logical conclusion of history, human sociality, exchange relations or any other human phenomena that have emerged on the surface of our planet. From libertarian supporters of NewSpace endeavors, this requires following through on the radical promises they see offered by a future in space with an acknowledgment that the context of space may produce radically-different kinds of social and exchange relations. From those who see human settlement of outer space as a fantasy or a dangerous distraction from the realities of environmental collapse and capitalist excesses, this requires a willingness to engage seriously with the possibilities of space as a context for human futures. From both, it requires an engagement with contemporary human activity that is not already explained by the brief span of modern human history. Again, it is important to reiterate I am not proposing a contradiction between cosmology and capital. NewSpacers are excellent capitalists; they certainly want to make money, and they see market forces as key to the settlement of space. Concomitantly, other entrepreneurs have visions of the social good that their enterprises will bring about, and may find finance capitalism’s short-termism equally vexing and necessary to navigate. Yet, NewSpace is unique not only in that it encompasses diverse industry sectors, but more importantly because it envisions itself as shaping the total future of the human species and of life on Earth itself; in this way, it is cosmological. And again, these are not exclusive goals. Several of my interviewees have contested my characterization of a necessary tension between NewSpace entrepreneurs’ and investors’ goals. In interviews, people like Kollipara, whom I cited above, see a distinction between these goals but not a tension. For Kollipara, profit is both the proximal engine and purpose of NewSpace enterprises, and he sees the investment problems of NewSpace industries as natural problems of any nascent industry. But going is still the end goal: like most other interviewees, Kollipara was willing to accept my ticket to Mars, to abandon his Earthly wealth to be part of the vanguard of the human future. While the market is seen by Kollipara and others as the natural engine for this radical evolution of the human future, the two are not smoothly aligned, and one cannot fully explain the other. I conclude with another return: to the future. The very idea of “the future” provokes suspicion in anthropologists because of its suturing to the teleologies of modernity and capitalism. And “space” is the iconic site of modernity’s future. Yet, again, as Collins (2008) notes, if we accept that “the future” is necessarily the steady path of neoliberalism (or, alternatively, its overturning by a socialist revolution), aren’t we just buying into those very teleologies? In turn, if we don’t pay attention to the explicit utopian human futures of people who are powerful enough to at least set them in motion, are we not preventing ourselves from becoming involved in one of the emerging debates about what a human future should look like? To be sure, the future that NewSpacers envision is already known to them; like the anthropologies that Collins critiques, it is a future past, though in this case built on the premise of free markets, American exceptionalism, science fiction precedents, a valorization of colonialism, and libertarian principles and ethics. But if NewSpace is in a position to enact at least some of its cosmological visions, I am arguing we should engage with those visions in their own terms, and not foreclose them within the unfolding of a story that we already know (the eternal success of neoliberalism or the inevitability of an environmental and socialist revolution) so that we may engage with this future and the surprising sociality and exchange relations that may emerge from it. This requires taking these future visions of humans in space—no matter how apparently extreme— seriously, as a cosmology with teeth.

#### Guttari ’96 - Settler colonialism is the foundation of hyperreality – the simulacrum of the ‘Red Man’ provides the tools to create and erase truths like indigenous histories – K first

Graham 16 Matthew C. Graham, February 2016, “Heralding the Other: Sousa, Simulacra, and Settler Colonialism,” Action, Criticism, & Theory for Music Education Journal Volume 15 Number 2, <http://act.maydaygroup.org/articles/Graham15_2.pdf>

Settler Colonialism as a Structure Settler colonialism is a specific colonial configuration in which a substantial population immigrates into a foreign territory. This invasion (Wolfe 2006) is not intended as a finite, temporary occupation, but rather a permanent settlement. Although colonizing forces often leverage the political and military might of an imperial state or homeland (and, for a time, might retain allegiances to that authority), the legitimacy of the occupation is ultimately justified from within the settler colony. Whereas external modes of colonialization maintain a strong distinction between homeland and colony, settler colonialism operates through the reconfiguration of the latter into the former [colony into the homeland] (Veracini 2013). This metamorphosis is never totalizing or complete; it must be continually maintained and enforced. Thus, settler colonialism is not an event but an omnipresent, oppressive social structure (Wolfe 1999, 2006; Glenn 2015). Tuck and Yang (2012) offer a framework for understanding settler colonialism in the United States as a process entangling three groups; (1) the settler colonialists of Western European descent, (2) the indigenous people whose presence on the land precedes the settler colonialist, and (3) the African “chattel slave” forced laborers (6). In this framework, the ongoing processes of disenfranchising indigenous people and exploiting black labor are necessary for the realization of the settler colonist’s capitalist interests. Settler colonialism can be seen in specific events (such as the massacre at Wounded Knee and the Dred Scott case) and legal institutions (like slavery and the reservation system). Examining only discrete and overt manifestations, however, obfuscates the presuppositions through which the above atrocities could be justified. Therefore, we must examine the unspoken assumptions that allowed for the perpetration of these historic events as well as perpetuates current expressions of settler colonialism. The generic depictions of indigenous people, settlers of European descent, and African slaves and their descendants are prime examples of such presuppositions. Traditionally, these discursively assumed norms have been termed “stereotypes” (e.g. Stedman 1982; Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez 2009); however, it has been argued that stereotypes are exaggerations of extant features and, thus, are grounded in reality and experience (Judd and Park 1993). Within settler colonialism, this is not true; these depictions emerge not from experience but out of a need for mechanisms to maintain a specific societal configuration. Baudrillard’s notion of simulacra offers a way to think about these depictions within settler colonialism, independent of the groups to whom the representations purport to correspond. Stereotypes and Simulacra The simulacrum is never that which conceals the truth—it is the truth which conceals that there is none. The simulacrum is true. (Ecclesiastes1, in Baudrillard 1994, 1) The eminent French philosopher Jean Baudrillard offers the simulacrum (and its plural, simulacra) as that which purports to serve as a representation of the real (or at least that-which-is-real in abstraction) but in fact precedes it, functioning without relationship to reality. It is the evocation of an ideal type, a caricaturized generalization whose authenticity is derived solely from the discursive regimes inside of which it is embedded. It is the ascription of a category that does not exist, hailed into existence by and as the simulacrum (Baudrillard 1994). The philosophic conception of “simulacra” can be traced to Plato’s dialogues (Childers and Hentzi 1995). In Sophist, Plato cites the practice of exaggerating certain features within an artistic composition in order for the overall work to appear correct to the viewer. In order for the mammoth statues of antiquity (such as the Statue of Zeus at Olympia) to seem proportionate to an observer at its base, features such as the upper torso and head had to be shaped disproportionately large in comparison to the overall structure. The veracity of this representation corresponds to artist’s conception of the intended audience’s engagement with the work rather than to reality. Plato differentiates this corrupt representation from the authentic image: the simulacrum from an accurate reproduction of the real. Plato likened this artistic practice to the philosophic tendency to distorting the truth in order to substantiate the validity of an example (Plato 2001). Thus, it is the Platonic task to adjudicate representations as either “good” or “bad” (Deleuze 1983). The key distinction between Baudrillard’s application of the term simulacrum and its Platonic heritage stems from the relation of the image to reality. In the Platonic sense, a simulacrum is a distortion or perversion of reality but retains connections to the real. The question of authenticity is connected to considerations of intentionality and positionality; the distorted truth of the simulacrum is a result of the artist relating the object to its intended viewer rather than authentically reproducing the object. Conversely, Baudrillard contends that the simulacrum itself becomes true through the societal function it fulfills. A simulacrum is not a perversion of reality but rather a “truth" in its own right: not real, but true. The use of Baudrillard’s notion of the simulacrum to examine how indigenous peoples, settlers of European descent, and African slaves and their descendants are portrayed in Dwellers of the Western World has two key benefits. First, considering these portrayals as simulacra decenters the representation from reality; the simulacrum of each group can be considered as independent from individuals within the group. Second, untethering representation from reality and examining these portrayals as simulacra invites consideration of not what the depiction means, but rather, how the representation works; it stimulates a consideration of the discursive function of the representation. Thus, the use of the Baudrillard’s concept of simulacra in the following analysis is not an interrogation of John Philip Sousa’s intention nor an examination of the intrinsic meaning of Dwellers of the Western World. Instead, this analysis examines how the portrayal of indigenous people, settlers of European descent, and African slaves and their descendants discursively function to perpetuate the structure of settler colonialism, both historical and present. Settler Colonialism in Dwellers of the Western World Before analyzing the racial discourses that can be read through Dwellers of the Western World, it is imperative that we attend to the gendered nature of these representations. The evocation of simulacra as masculine in each of the three movements (The Red Man, The White Man, and The Black Man) “promotes male privilege by being male dominated, male identified, and male centered” (Johnson 1997, 5). This is not surprising as “colonization has always been a gendered process” (Lawrence 2003, 5); however, it highlights the intersectionality of the concurrent processes of racialization and gendering. One key way in which settler colonialism operates is through the establishment of normative gender roles. The heteropatriarchal organization of the “traditional family,” the policing of heteronormative sexuality, and the imposition of male-centric inheritance laws all operate to fracture indigenous identity through a denial of indigenous ontologies (Arvin, Tuck, and Morrill 2013). Thus, the evocation of each group within the composition in masculine terms is a key and core aspect of how Dwellers of the Western World preserves and perpetuates settler colonialism. In the following discursive analysis of Dwellers of the Western World, the examination of each movement begins with a brief exposition regarding the societal function the simulacrum plays within settler colonialism. Following the general description, this study then reviews how each simulacrum is generally evoked though and by music. Finally, each section concludes with examine how the simulacrum is specifically heralded in Dwellers of the Western World. “The Red Man”2 and Simulacrum of Absence The simulacrum of ‘The Red Man’ may be contrarily depicted as either an emotionally explosive brute or a stoic barbarian. He is almost always portrayed as primitive and backwards, juxtaposed against the supposed technological (and intellectual) advancement of the simulacrum of ‘The White Man’ (Bird 1996). He is portrayed as a historicized “other,” a relic of the past. Stereotypical depictions in “traditional” regalia serve to temporally distance him from the here and now (Ross and Lester 1996). The simulacrum of ‘The Red Man,’ as he is often portrayed in American culture, serves many purposes. First, the simulacrum of ‘The Red Man’ provides justification for the policy “Kill the Indian, save the man” (Pratt 1973, 260). This trope of the “ignorant savage” allows for Western thinkers to view themselves as great liberators, freeing ‘The Red Man’ from himself. It is this Western notion of unrestrained freedom that has allows the settler colonial state to occupy indigenous lands and commit the genocide of indigenous peoples (Alfred 2005). Secondly, the simulacrum serves as a mechanism for the erasure of indigenous people; those in search of the signified ‘Red Man’ will be unable to find him. Current manifestations of indigeneity, in failing to correspond to the simulacrum of ‘The Red Man,’ are denied. Settler colonial occupation of land, predicated on the assumed absence of the original inhabitants, is substantiated by this repudiation. Thus, the immutable “authentic” ethnographic representation has destroyed ‘The Red Man’; the indigenous person “dying for having been ‘discovered’” (Baudrillard and Foss 1983, 13). Musically, the simulacrum of ‘The Red Man’ is heralded through the (mis)appropriation of indigenous music through a Western metaphysics of aesthetics. “That which is now described as dance, song and ceremony was (simplistically put) much more a way of passing on information including history, lore and law, than the recreational pursuits that are presently ascribed” (Immiboagurramilbun 2005 cited in Somerville 2012, 13). This conceptualization of music is beyond a Western epistemology that considers music as a cultural byproduct rather than an ontologically inseparable part of the people and place from which it comes. As a result, within a Western framework the “song” can be disentangled from its purpose and place and becomes knowable only as what the song is, not what it does, for whom, where. Furthermore, additional violation occurs through the generation of an idealized form of generic pan-indigenous music through a process of aggregation. These generalized musical representations bear resemblance neither to the sonorities of any indigenous group, nor attend to the relationship of “song” to culture and, more importantly, place. Despite the fact that indigenous epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies are inexorably tied to land, musical generalizations serve as broad brush strokes painting all indigenous people the same shade of red. This generic, pan-indigenous framework undermines the fundamental relation of people to country and instead offers a sonically abstracted sense of placeless commonality amongst disparate indigenous groups. Detached from land and lumped together through this process of abstraction, the heralded “Red Man” becomes both homogenous and moveable. Thus, atrocities such as the reservation system seem to be justifiable; indigenous peoples are assumed to possess neither uniqueness nor an attachment to place. Furthermore, expressions of indigeneity that fail to correspond to abstracted pan-indigenous sonorities are denied their authenticity. The heralded simulacrum of ‘The Red Man’ erases the indigenous person, and settler colonial occupation of land is tenable.

#### Their desire for information exhaustion is synonymous with the continual elimination of indigenous peoples

Tuck and Yang 12 Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, 2012, “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society SJCP//JG

L. Frank Baum (author of The Wizard of Oz) famously asserted in 1890 that the safety of white settlers was only guaranteed by the “total annihilation of the few remaining Indians” (as quoted in Hastings, 2007). D.H. Lawrence, reading James Fenimore Cooper (discussed at length later in this article), Nathaniel Hawthorne, Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, Henry David Thoreau, Herman Melville, Walt Whitman and others for his Studies in Classic American Literature (1924), describes Americans’ fascination with Indigeneity as one of simultaneous desire and repulsion (Deloria, 1998). “No place,” Lawrence observed, “exerts its full influence upon a newcomer until the old inhabitant is dead or absorbed.” Lawrence argued that in order to meet the “demon of the continent” head on and this finalize the “unexpressed spirit of America,” white Americans needed either to destroy Indians or assimilate them into a white American world...both aimed at making Indians vanish from the landscape. (Lawrence, as quoted in Deloria, 1998, p. 4). Everything within a settler colonial society strains to destroy or assimilate the Native in order to disappear them from the land - this is how a society can have multiple simultaneous and conflicting messages about Indigenous peoples, such as all Indians are dead, located in faraway reservations, that contemporary Indigenous people are less indigenous than prior generations, and that all Americans are a “little bit Indian.” These desires to erase - to let time do its thing and wait for the older form of living to die out, or to even help speed things along (euthanize) because the death of pre-modern ways of life is thought to be inevitable - these are all desires for another kind of resolve to the colonial situation, resolved through the absolute and total destruction or assimilation of original inhabitants. Numerous scholars have observed that Indigeneity prompts multiple forms of settler anxiety, even if only because the presence of Indigenous peoples - who make a priori claims to land and ways of being - is a constant reminder that the settler colonial project is incomplete (Fanon, 1963; Vine Deloria, 1988; Grande, 2004; Bruyneel, 2007). The easy adoption of decolonization as a metaphor (and nothing else) is a form of this anxiety, because it is a premature attempt at reconciliation. The absorption of decolonization by settler social justice frameworks is one way the settler, disturbed by her own settler status, tries to escape or contain the unbearable searchlight of complicity, of having harmed others just by being one’s self. The desire to reconcile is just as relentless as the desire to disappear the Native; it is a desire to not have to deal with this (Indian) problem anymore.

#### The 1AC’s focus on space sustainability is driven by the desire to prevent the collapse of the international- restrictions are self-imposed to preserve the capitalist

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The spatial fix of outer space

No longer terra nullius, space is now the new terra firma of capitalistkind: its naturalized terroir, its next necessary terrain. The logic of capitalism dictates that capital should seek to expand outwards into the vastness of space, a point recognized by a recent ethnography of NewSpace actors (Valentine, 2016, p. 1050). The operations of capitalistkind serve to resolve a series of (potential) crises of capitalism, revolving around the slow, steady decline of spatial fixes (see e.g., Harvey, 1985, p. 51–66) as they come crashing up against the quickly vanishing blank spaces remaining on earthly maps and declining (terrestrial) opportunities for profitable investment of surplus capital (Dickens and Ormrod, 2007a, p. 49–78).

A ‘spatial fix' involves the geographic modulation of capital accumulation, consisting in the outward expansion of capital onto new geographic terrains, or into new spaces, with the aim of filling a gap in the home terrains of capital. Jessop (2006, p. 149) notes that spatial fixes may involve a number of strategies, including the creation of new markets within the capitalist world, engaging in trade with non-capitalist economies, and exporting surplus capital to undeveloped or underdeveloped regions. The first two address the problem of insufficient demand and the latter option creates a productive (or valorizing) outlet for excess capital. Capitalism must regularly discover, develop, and appropriate such new spaces because of its inherent tendency to generate surplus capital, i.e., capital bereft of profitable purpose. In Harvey’s (2006, p. xviii) terms, a spatial fix revolves around ‘geographical expansions and restructuring…as a temporary solution to crises understood…in terms of the overaccumulation of capital'. It is a temporary solution because these newly appropriated spaces will in turn become exhausted of profitable potential and are likely to produce their own stocks of surplus capital; while ‘capital surpluses that otherwise stood to be devalued, could be absorbed through geographical expansions and spatio-temporal displacements' (Harvey, 2006, p. xviii), this outwards drive of capitalism is inherently limitless: there is no end point or final destination for capitalism. Instead, capitalism must continuously propel itself onwards in search of pristine sites of renewed capital accumulation. In this way, Harvey writes, society constantly ‘creates fresh productive powers elsewhere to absorb its overaccumulated capital' (Harvey, 1981, p. 8).

Historically, spatial fixes have played an important role in conserving the capitalist system. As Jessop (2006, p. 149) points out, ‘The export of surplus money capital, surplus commodities, and/or surplus labour-power outside the space(s) where they originate enabled capital to avoid, at least for a period, the threat of devaluation'. But these new spaces for capital are not necessarily limited to physical terrains, as with colonial expansion in the nineteenth century; as Greene and Joseph (2015) note, various digital spaces, such as the Internet, can also be considered as spatial fixes: the Web absorbs overaccumulated capital, heightens consumption of virtual and physical goods, and makes inexpensive, flexible sources of labor available to employers. Greene and Joseph offer the example of online high-speed frequency trading as a digital spatial fix that furthers the ‘annihilation of space by time' first noted by Marx in his Grundrisse (see Marx, 1973, p. 524).

Outer space serves at least two purposes in this regard. In the short-to medium-term, it allows for the export of surplus capital into emerging industries, such as satellite imaging and communication. These are significant sites of capital accumulation: global revenues in the worldwide satellite market in 2016 amounted to $260 billion (SIA, 2017, p. 4). Clearly, much of this activity is taking place ‘on the ground'; it is occurring in the ‘terrestrial economy'. But all that capital would have to find some other meaningful or productive outlet were it not for the expansion of capital into space. Second, outer space serves as an arena of technological innovation, which feeds back into the terrestrial economy, helping to avert crisis by pushing capital out of technological stagnation and innovation shortfalls.

In short, outer space serves as a spatial fix. It swallows up surplus capital, promising to deliver valuable resources, technological innovations, and communication services to capitalists back on Earth. This places outer space on the same level as traditional colonization, analyzed in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, which Hegel thought of as a product of the ‘inner dialectic of civil society', which drives the market to ‘push beyond its own limits and seek markets, and so its necessary means of subsistence, in other lands which are either deficient in the goods it has overproduced, or else generally backward in creative industry, etc.' (Hegel, 2008, p. 222). In this regard, SpaceX and related ventures are not so very different from maritime colonialists and the trader-exploiters of the British East India Company. But there is something new at stake. As the Silicon Valley entrepreneur Peter Diamandis has gleefully noted: ‘There are twenty-trillion-dollar checks up there, waiting to be cashed!' (Seaney and Glendenning, 2016). Capitalistkind consists in the naturalization of capitalist consciousness and practice, the (false) universalization of a particular mode of political economy as inherent to the human condition, followed by the projection of this naturalized universality into space—capitalist humanity as a Fukuyamite ‘end of history', the end-point of (earthly) historical unfolding, but the starting point of humanity’s first serious advances in space.

What role, then, for the state? The frontiersmen of NewSpace tend to think of themselves as libertarians, pioneers beyond the domain of state bureaucracy (see Nelson and Block, 2018). ‘The government should leave the design work and ownership of the product to the private sector', the author of a 2017 report, Capitalism in Space, advocates. ‘The private companies know best how to build their own products to maximize performance while lowering cost' (Zimmerman, 2017, p. 27). One ethnographer notes that ‘politically, right-libertarianism prevails' amongst NewSpace entrepreneurs (Valentine, 2016, p. 1047–1048). Just as Donald Rumsfeld dismissed the opponents to the Iraq War as ‘Old Europe', so too are state entities’ interests in space exploration shrugged off as symptoms of ‘Old Space'. Elon Musk, we are told in a recent biography, unlike the sluggish Big State actors of yore, ‘would apply some of the start-up techniques he’d learned in Silicon Valley to run SpaceX lean and fast…As a private company, SpaceX would also avoid the waste and cost overruns associated with government contractors' (Vance, 2015, p. 114). This libertarianism-in-space has found a willing chorus of academic supporters. The legal scholar Virgiliu Pop introduces the notion of the frontier paradigm (combining laissez-faire economics, market competition, and an individualist ethic) into the domain of space law, claiming that this paradigm has ‘proven its worth on our planet' and will ‘most likely…do so in the extraterrestrial realms' as well (Pop, 2009, p. vi). This frontier paradigm is not entirely new: a ‘Columbus mythology', centering on the ‘noble explorer', was continuously evoked in the United States during the Cold War space race (Dickens and Ormrod, 2016, pp. 79, 162–164).

But the entrepreneurial libertarianism of capitalistkind is undermined by the reliance of the entire NewSpace complex on extensive support from the state, ‘a public-private financing model underpinning long-shot start-ups' that in the case of Musk’s three main companies (SpaceX, SolarCity Corp., and Tesla) has been underpinned by $4.9 billion dollars in government subsidies (Hirsch, 2015). In the nascent field of space tourism, Cohen (2017) argues that what began as an almost entirely private venture quickly ground to a halt in the face of insurmountable technical and financial obstacles, only solved by piggybacking on large state-run projects, such as selling trips to the International Space Station, against the objections of NASA scientists. The business model of NewSpace depends on the taxpayer’s dollar while making pretensions to individual selfreliance. The vast majority of present-day clients of private aerospace corporations are government clients, usually military in origin. Furthermore, the bulk of rocket launches in the United States take place on government property, usually operated by the US Air Force or NASA.13

This inward tension between state dependency and capitalist autonomy is itself a product of neoliberalism’s contradictory demand for a minimal, “slim” state, while simultaneously (and in fact) relying on a state reengineered and retooled for the purposes of capital accumulation (Wacquant, 2012). As Lazzarato writes, ‘To be able to be “laissez-faire”, it is necessary to intervene a great deal' (2017, p. 7). Space libertarianism is libertarian in name only: behind every NewSpace venture looms a thick web of government spending programs, regulatory agencies, public infrastructure, and universities bolstered by research grants from the state. SpaceX would not exist were it not for state-sponsored contracts of satellite launches. Similarly, in 2018, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—the famed origin of the World Wide Web—announced that it would launch a ‘responsive launch competition', meaning essentially the reuse of launch vehicles, representing an attempt by the state to ‘harness growing commercial capabilities' and place them in the service of the state’s interest in ensuring ‘national security' (Foust, 2018b).

This libertarianism has been steadily growing in the nexus between Silicon Valley, Stanford University, Wall Street, and the Washington political establishment, which tend to place a high value on Randian ‘objectivism' and participate in a long American intellectual heritage of individualistic ‘bootstrapping' and (allegedly) gritty self-reliance. But as Nelson and Block (2018, p. 189–197) recognize, one of the central symbolic operations of capitalistkind resides in concealing its reliance on the state by mobilizing the charm of its entrepreneurial constituents and the spectacle of space. There is a case to be made for the idea that SpaceX and its ilk resemble semi-private corporations like the British East India Company. The latter, “incorporated by royal charter from Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth I in 1600 to trade in silk and spices, and other profitable Indian commodities,” recruited soldiers and built a ‘commercial business [that] quickly became a business of conquest' (Tharoor, 2017). SpaceX, too, is increasingly imbricated with an attempt on the part of a particular state, the United States, to colonize and appropriate resources derived from a particular area, that of outer space; it, too, depends on the infrastructure, contracts, and regulatory environment that thus far only a state seems able to provide. Its private character, like that of the East India Company, is troubled by being deeply embedded in the state. As one commentator has observed of SpaceX, ‘If there’s a consistent charge against Elon Musk and his high-flying companies…it’s that they’re not really examples of independent, innovative market capitalism. Rather, they’re government contractors, dependent on taxpayer money to stay afloat' (cit. Nelson and Block, 2018, p. 189).

Perhaps this should not come as a surprise. As Bourdieu (2005, p. 12) observed, ‘The economic field is, more than any other, inhabited by the state, which contributes at every moment to its existence and persistence, and also to the structure of the relations of force that characterize it'. The state lays out the preconditions for market exchanges. Under neoliberalism, the state is the preeminent facilitator of markets. The neoliberal state is not so much a Minimalstaat, night watchman state, or slim state as it is the prima causa of market society (see, e.g., Wacquant, 2012). Similarly, in the political theory of Deleuze and Guattari, any economic development presupposes the political differentiation caused by the state (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a, p. 237–238). Even in the global environment of contemporary capitalism, the market cannot operate without the state becoming integrated with capitalism itself, as ‘it is the modern state that gives capitalism its models of realization' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b, p. 480). For capitalism to survive in outer space, the state must create a regulatory environment, subsidize infrastructure, and hand down contracts – in short, assemble outer space as a domain made accessible in legal, technical, and economic ways.

#### Their so-called denial of “semiocapitalism’s control over subjectivity” are the tools of the colonizer to destabilize identities to rationalize the destruction of Native livelihood.

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In view of the above, it is clear to see how fluid boundaries, the relativizing of difference and negation of grand narratives—primarily serves whitestream America. The multiphrenia of postmodern plurality, its "world of simulation" and obliteration of any sense of objective reality, has given rise to a frenetic search for the "authentic" led by culture vultures and capitalist bandits fraught with "imperialist nostalgia."25 In response, American Indian communities have restricted access to the discursive spaces of American Indian culture and identity and the non-discursive borders of American Indian communities. In short, the notion of fluidity has never worked to the advantage of indigenous peoples. Federal agencies have invoked the language of fluid or unstable identities as the rationale for dismantling the structures of tribal life**.** Whitestream America has seized upon the message of relativism to declare open season on Indians, and whitestream academics have employed the language of signification and simulation to transmute centuries of war between indigenous peoples and their respective nation-states into a "genetic and cultural dialogue" (Valle and Tones 1995, 141). Thus, in spite of its "democratic" promise, postmodernism and its ludic theories of identity fail to provide indigenous communities the theoretical grounding for asserting their claims as colonized peoples, and, more important, impede construction of transcendent emancipatory theories. Despite the pressures of cultural encroachment and cultural imperialism, however, indigenous communities continue to evolve as sites of political contestation and cultural empowerment. They manage to survive the dangers of colonialist forces by employing proactive strategies, which emphasize education, empowerment, and self-determination, and defensive tactics that protect against unfettered economic and political encroachment. Thus, whatever else the borders of indigenous communities may or may not demarcate, they continue to serve as potent geographic filters of all that is non-Indian—dividing between the real and metaphoric spaces that differentiate Indian country from the rest of whitestream America. Pedagogical Implications of Postmodern Theories As students learn to navigate the plurality of difference, it is equally important to avoid falling into the (postmodern) trap of relativism. A postmodern theory of difference that insists on impartiality masks the power and privilege that underpins whitestream culture and perspectives. In other words, American Indian students do not enter into a social space in which identities compete with equal power for legitimacy; rather, they are infused into a political terrain that presumes their inferiority. For example, postmodern musings of subjectivity as disembodied and free-floating ignore the fact that American Indian students, along with other indigenous peoples, are "engaged with the state in a complex relationship in which there are varying degrees of interdependency at play" (Alfred 1999, 85). As such, American Indian students are neither free to "reinvent" themselves nor able to liberally "transgress" borders of difference, but, rather, remain captive to the determined spaces of colonialist rule. These students experience the binds of the paradox inherent to current modes of identity theory and it becomes increasingly evident that "neither the cold linearity of blood-quantum nor the tortured weakness of self-identification" (both systems designed and legitimated by the state) will provide them any relief (Alfred 1999, 84). Thus, while postmodern theorists rightly question the whole notion of origins and work to disrupt the grand narrative of modernism, its hyperelastic and all-inclusive categories offer little to no protection against the colonialist forces of cultural encroachment and capitalist commodification.

#### Narratives of sustainable space exploration are constructed fantasies of risk analysis that desire an impossible knowledge and recreate power hierarchies through controlled risk politics

**Ormord, 12** – James, School of Applied Social Science, University of Brighton, (“Beyond world risk society? A critique of Ulrich Beck’s world risk society thesis as a framework for understanding risk associated with human activity in outer space.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2013, volume 31, pages 727 – 744)

Beck has been criticised for his ‘confusion’ about whether or not exposure to risk is unevenly distributed according to social and geographic divisions (Lupton, 1999, page 68). He has argued that “pollution follows the poor” (Beck, 1999, page 5) and has accepted that the rich can sometimes buy themselves safety, but he has also stated that nuclear contamination, for example, “is egalitarian, and in that sense ‘democratic’” (page 61), and he hopes for our unification into a global “civilizational community of fate” (2006, page 7; also 1992, page 47). In elaborating what he calls a “political economy of risk”, however, he appears to accept that the economic consequences of risk are unevenly socially distributed (1999, page 61). It is therefore surprising that he refers to the subpolitics of risk as an ‘enemyless’ politics. For even if it is accepted that risks themselves unite us in principle, there are clearly, as in the instances discussed above, those who benefit from the proliferation of risk. I have argued throughout the paper that there are serious problems with Beck’s account of how a cosmopolitan public sphere will emerge. The contradictions of risk themselves are portrayed as the most powerful force in undermining the risk makers, whilst it is merely for social movements to make risk scandalous, and various “moralizing groups” to put risk on the social agenda (1999, page 67). Beck sees progress as occurring “not through class struggle or revolution as in Marx, but as an unintended consequence of modernity itself” (Lupton, 1999, page 67). Politics “nestles down” in everyday life as risk decisions become impossible to ignore (Beck, 1997, page 152). His hope for cosmopolitan ecological democracy revolves around consumer boycotts and buycotts, and in balloting over ecological issues. In his assertion that “in sorting through the trash for recycling, everyone is compelled to cooperate as a minor activist in the overall rescue mission for the earth and humankind” (1997, page 91, emphasis added), activism is dissolved into individualised consumer behaviour administered by the state (see Smith, 2009, page 17). The theoretical problem posed by the relative failure to politicise the public about the risks involved in space activity is precisely that it does not impose itself on the everyday lives of those who stand to suffer. Nor are the risks concentrated in any socially or geographically determined sector of the population, with the exception of localised risks around manufacture and launch facilities such as the Baikonur Cosmodrome. The decision by SNAP-9A scientists to design the plutonium capsule to break up in the event of a disaster was in this sense a perfect tactic to avoid politicising any particular group. Issues concerning risk associated with human activity in space may find greater symbolic anchoring in areas immediately surrounding manufacture and launch sites, accounting for the geographic concentration of activism within those areas, but there is no necessary reason why people should engage with them. Accounting for why some people are mobilised to contest these risks whilst others are not, even when they share the same interests, values and knowledge, is difficult using Beck’s theoretical framework. As Lupton (1999, page 62) argues, “a usual response to grave dangers is to deny their existence as a kind of psychological self-protective mechanism, an attempt to maintain a sense of normality”. As she says, Beck accepts this (see Beck, 1995, pages 42–57). He argues that in the most “hopelessly hazardous situations … there is a growing tendency not merely to accept the hazard, but to deny it by every means at one’s disposal” (pages 48–49). He even makes the point that the imperceptibility of danger could in principle make this easy, but comes back again to the idea that we confront unavoidable risk decisions in day-to-day scenarios: “The lake one was about to leap into is revealed as a sewer, the superb, crispy lettuce in one’s mouth turns out to be contaminated and foul” (page 55). The “tolerance of despoliation and hazards”, says Beck, “wears thin only where people see their way of life jeopardized, in a manner they can both know and interpret, within the horizon of their expectations and valuations” (page 46). I have highlighted throughout that, where risks are not directly confronted and are uncertain, the operation of economic power becomes more important. One dimension to how power operates under these circumstances has recurred throughout the paper: the ability to create and manage fantasies about catastrophe. The more sophisticated the technologies used to rationalise risk become, the more significant what it cannot model becomes. Various approaches to psychoanalysis have examined how fantasy creates both what is feared (its ‘horrific’ dimension) and the pacifying solution that relieves this fear (its ‘beautific’ dimension). This is true of Kleinian psychoanalysis (eg, Klein, 1946, page 6), but particularly of contemporary Lacanian psychoanalysis, which has dealt with images of catastrophe specifically. This provides tools to explore in more depth Beck’s category of ‘things we are unwilling to know’. The Lacanian social theorist Slavoj Žižek (2008, page xii), for example, adds another category—‘unknown knowns’—to Donald Rumsfeld’s typology of knowledge. Žižek argues that when gaps appear in the symbolic order (in this case rationalising risk discourses) fantasy operates to conceal the true horror of the Lacanian Real; that which cannot be articulated. Žižek (2008, pages 5–6) provides the example of safety demonstrations on aeroplanes. These demonstrations do not serve to pacify our true fears about a crash landing, but to construct the horrific scenario. The true horror remains our inability to know how the crash scenario will play out. Precisely the same is true of NASA’s Environmental Impact Statements, which are known to be fabrications but are still preferred to uncertainty (the UN demands an impossible risk assessment that is probabilistic and geographically limited). The image of a collision cascade in orbit taking out global communications is also a fantasy, as are Haynes’s and McKay’s mutant bacteria. These fantasies each allow us to contemplate uncertainty. But each has a different effect, engineered and selected to function in the interests of those in power. Environmental Impact Assessments provide scenarios that legitimate State acquiescence to capital. They cover over not only science’s failings, but also those of the State and capital in turn. They function to draw activists into what Beck (1995, page 42) describes as “orgies of mathematics and science” that work to prevent a truly reflexive discussion of risk. Whilst informed activists engage with these scenarios as though they were rationalities (and, for example, demand to see more of the information on which they are based), less informed members of the public leave them to it. Collision cascade fantasies and solutions for them in the form of fantastic technologies also sustain a relationship between capital and the State in which disaster and solution must be conceived within the existing regime governing space activities. Not many people have direct economic interests in planetary engineering as yet, bar a marginal group of scientists. Desiring an impossible knowledge, these fantasies give scientists recourse to seek further funding (though more advanced modelling will make the unknown more, not less, terrifying), whilst at the same time making any politicisation of their work seem absurd. Meanwhile, the notion of planetary engineering itself functions as a fantasy sustaining our unsustainable relationship with the Earthly environment. Such fantasies are especially effective in immobilising public concern because of their remote setting in outer space. Space colonisation advocate Kraaft Ehricke (1972) referred to the development of outer space as the ‘benign industrial revolution’ precisely because it removed the negative consequences of industrial activity to a place where they no longer mattered. The same principle underpinned proposals to dump nuclear waste in outer space. Such a manoeuvre is a form of Beck’s “symbolic detoxification”, and the relationship between purity, exclusion, and avoidance has been tackled in the literature on risk (eg, Douglas, 1992; Joffe, 1999). Conclusion I have argued that, whilst many of the descriptive concepts established in Beck’s world risk society thesis can capture the existing state of risk beyond the globe, these risks reveal some of the problems with Beck’s theoretical understanding of risk politics. Contrary to Beck’s understanding, I have argued that there is nothing inevitable about these issues entering into a cosmopolitan public sphere. I have argued that this is especially true given the economic interests that keep uncertainty about these risks away from the public. I recommend that we should remain sceptical about apparently cosmopolitan international cooperation regarding risk in outer space, arguing that this exists only where the interests of states and capital coincide. I have also outlined some of the ways in which space activity is set to increase in order to resolve Earthly problems. These necessarily entail new and increased risks, and are not the result simply of overspecialised science, but are driven by the need for new capital fixes. Because of the existence of these mechanisms, it cannot be trusted that progress will be made through the inevitable functional realignment of risk politics. The influence of power on risk politics beyond the global level must instead be recognised and collectively challenged, and especially the function of fantasy within this. An equal and open discussion of both the ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ (to use Beck’s terms) produced by space activity can only proceed on this basis.

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