# 1

#### Our Interpretation is the affirmative should instrumentally defend the resolution. To clarify, you don’t need to defend that a particular actor takes the action, just defend that the resolution is implemented – hold the line, CX and the 1AC prove there’s no I-meet – anything new in the 1AR is either extra-T since it includes the non-topical parts of the Aff or effects-T since it’s a future result of the advocacy which both link to our offense.

#### “Resolved” means to enact by law.

Words & Phrases ’64

(Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### [3] Standards to Prefer:

#### First - Fairness – radically re-contextualizing the resolution lets them defend any method tangentially related to the topic exploding Limits, which erases neg ground via perms and renders research burdens untenable by eviscerating predictable limits. Procedural questions come first – debate is a game and it makes no sense to skew a competitive activity as it requires effective negation which incentivizes argument refinement, but skewed burdens deck pedagogical engagement.

#### Second - Implementation Education – Nitty gritty debates about Impelmentation Education are key to actualize revolutionary movements – the Aff’s model aligns w/ liberal leftist politics of complacency that criticizes but never actualizes.

Chandler 10 (David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster – This card internally quotes Jodi Dean, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 'No Communicating Left' (review article), Radical Philosophy, No. 160 (March/April 2010), pp.53-55. ISSN 0300 211X) //Elmer  
Dean pulls few punches in her devastating critique of the American left for its complacency, its limited capacity, and even its lack of awareness of the need to offer a stand of political resistance to power. This is how she concludes her book: The eight years of the Bush administration were a diversion. Intoxicated with a sense of purpose, we could oppose war, torture, indefinite detention, warrantless wiretapping, a seemingly endless series of real crimes… such opposition keeps us feeling like we matter… We have an ethical sense. But **we lack a coherent politics**. (p.175) Dean highlights clearly the disintegration of the collective left and its simulacra in the individuated life-style politics of today’s depoliticized radicalism, where it appears that particular individual demands and identities are to be respected but there is no possibility of universalising them into a collective challenge to the system: no possibility of a left which stands for something beyond itself. She argues that, rather than confront this problem, the left take refuge in the fantasy that technology will overcome their inability to engage and that the circulation of ideas and information on the internet will construct the collectivities and communities of interest, which are lacking in reality. For Dean, this ‘technology fetishism’ marks the left’s failure: its ‘abandonment of workers and the poor; its retreat from the state and repudiation of collective action; and its acceptance of the neoliberal economy as the “only game in town”’ (p.33). In fact, she uncovers the gaping hole at the heart of the left, highlighting that radicalism appears to be based less on changing the world than on the articulation of an alternative oppositionalist identity: a non-strategic, non-instrumental, articulation of a protest against power. In a nutshell, the left are too busy providing alternative voices, spaces and forums to think about engaging with mass society in an organised, collective, attempt to achieve societal transformation. For Dean, this is fake or hollow political activity, pursued more for its own sake than for future political ends. This is a politics of ethical distancing, of selfflattery and narcissism, which excuses or even celebrates the self-marginalization of the left: as either the result of the overwhelming capacity of neoliberal power to act, to control, and to regulate; or as the result of the apathy, stupidity, or laziness of the masses - or the ‘sheeple’ (p.171) - for their failure to join the radical cause. Dean suggests that the left needs to rethink its values and approaches and her book is intended to be a wake-up call to abandon narcissistic complacency. In doing this, she highlights a range of problems connected around the thematic of the left’s defence of democracy in an age of communicative capitalism. She argues that the left’s focus on extending or defending democracy by asserting their role in giving voice and creating spaces merely reproduces the domination of communicative capitalism, where there is no shared space of debate and disagreement but the proliferation of mediums and messages without the responsibility to develop and defend positions or to engage and no external measure of accountability. Communicative capitalism is held to thrive on this fragmented, atomizing, and individuated, framework of communication, which gives the impression of a shared discourse, community, or movement but leaves reality just as it is, with neoliberal frameworks of domination, inequality, and destruction continuing unopposed (pp.162-75).

#### Third – SSD – their model that allows them to side-step the topic on both the Aff and Neg hurts debate as a site of role experimentation – choosing to individually engage both sides solves argument refinement and self-reflexivity breeding constantly evolving methodology which is key to activist resistance BUT side-stepping it ingrains ideological dogmatism by imposing artificial lines in the sand for what not to experiment replicating imperial ideologies about exclusion.

Mitchell et Al 7, Mitchell, Gordon, et al. "Debate as a weapon of mass destruction." Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 4.2 (2007): 221-225. (Professor of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh)//Elmer

Second, while the pedagogical benefits of **switch-side debating for participants are compelling**,10 some worry that the technique may perversely and unwittingly serve the ends of an aggressively militaristic foreign policy. In the context of the 1954 controversy, Ronald Walter Greene and Darrin Hicks suggest that the articulation of the debate community as a zone of dissent against McCarthyist tendencies developed into a larger and somewhat uncritical affirmation of switch-side debate as a ‘‘technology’’ of liberal participatory democracy. This technology is part and parcel of the post-McCarthy ethical citizen, prepared to discuss issues from multiple viewpoints. The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, ‘‘The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.’’11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which epitomizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the Bush administration’s framing of war as an instrument of democracy promotion to grasp how the switch-side technique can be appropriated as a justification for violence. It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating **spirit of critical inquiry**. For example, Georgetown University law professor **Neal Katyal** served as lead plaintiff’s counsel in Hamdan, which **challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions**. 12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14 The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret **threat to absolutism**: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘**with us or against us**,’’ the **embracing of intellectual experimentation** in an age of orthodoxy, **and reflexivity** in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent\***the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction**.’’ immediately tyrannical, far more immediately damaging to either liberal or participatory democracy, than the ritualized requirements that students occasionally take the opposite side of what they believe. Third, as I have suggested and will continue to suggest, while a debate project requiring participants to understand and often "speak for" opposing points of view may carry a great deal of liberal baggage, it is at its core a project more ethically deliberative than institutionally liberal. Where Hicks and Greene see debate producing "the liberal citizen-subject," I see debate at least having the potential to produce "the deliberative human being." The fact that some academic debaters are recruited by the CSIS and the CIA does not undermine this thesis. Absent healthy debate programs, these think-tanks and **government agencies would still recruit** what they saw as the best and brightest students. And absent a debate community that rewards anti-institutional political rhetoric as much as liberal rhetoric, those students would have little-to-no chance of being exposed to truly **oppositional ideas.** Moreover, if we allow ourselves to believe that it is "culturally imperialist" to help other peoples build institutions of debate and deliberation, we not only **ignore living political struggles t**hat occur in every culture, **but we fall victim to a dangerous ethnocentrism** in holding that "they do not value deliberation like we do." If the argument is that our participation in fostering debate communities abroad greases the wheels of globalization, the correct response, in debate terminology, is that such globalization is non-unique, inevitable, and there is only a risk that collaborating across cultures in public debate and deliberation will foster resistance to domination—just as debate accomplishes wherever it goes. Indeed, Andy Wallace, in a recent article, suggests that Islamic fundamentalism is a byproduct of the colonization of the lifeworld of the Middle East; if this is true, then one solution would be to foster cross-cultural deliberation among people on both sides of the cultural divide willing to question their own preconceptions of the social good. Hicks and Greene might be correct insofar as elites in various cultures can either forbid or reappropriate deliberation, but for those outside of that institutional power, **democratic discussion would have a positively subversive effect**.

#### TVA – [the plan but with implementation – it works because you ban property which is anti-colonialist]

#### TVA is terminal defense – proves our models aren’t mutually exclusive - any response to the substance of the TVA is offense for us because it proves our model allows for clear contestation. Form over Content doesn’t take it out since we don’t restrict Form, just the substantive burden of the Aff.

#### Prefer Competing Interpretations – reasonability is arbitrary and causes a race to the bottom. This means reject Aff Impact Turns predicated on their theory since we weren’t able to adequately prepare for it.

# 2

#### Counterplan: The appropriation of outer space by private entities except for Viasat is unjust.

#### Viasat boosts Indigenous economies.

SBS 1/12

[Indigenous Australians to lead space industry at new Alice Springs earth ground station, <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/indigenous-australians-to-lead-space-industry-at-new-alice-springs-earth-ground-station/b35811cc-1ecb-4a90-9be2-d6c1f4486e3b>, Jan 12 2022, SBS News] [SS]

**A** multi-million-dollar **earth ground station** will be built in the Northern Territory's Alice Springs, **set to be the first development of its kind on Aboriginal-owned land in Australia**. **Indigenous Australians will become leading participants in the global satellite and space industry,** **with the** Real-Time Earth (RTE) **facility expected to bring new jobs and economic opportunities to** remote **Australia**. Global communications company **Viasat** Inc. has **partnered with Aboriginal not-for-profit science and tech**nology **company** Centre for Appropriate Technology Ltd (CfAT**) to deliver the project, financed by Indigenous Business Australia.** It will be used **to track** the next generation of low earth orbiting **satellites for** earth observation used for scientific research, **environmental monitoring, and commercial applications**. CfAT chairperson Peter Renehan said **the facility "puts Aboriginal people at the forefront of Australia’s growing space sector**". "This state-of-the-art development will provide a positive contribution to the local economy **through employment opportunities** for local businesses during each phase of construction **as well as ongoing jobs for local Aboriginal people** once operational," she said. "CfAT exists to provide people in regional and remote Australia with options for maintaining their relationship with country. "**We** do this by **providing technologically innovative solutions to infrastructure challenges** with digital connectivity as a core focus of the companies work." A KPMG report Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people own or have controlling interests in about 40 per cent of the Australian land mass under various forms of title and legislation. Indigenous Business Australia Chairperson Eddie Fry said the new earth ground station was important for both the Australian space industry and the Indigenous community. "**Aboriginal** and Torres Strait Islander **people own or control significant areas of land** in remote areas **where there is limited economic potential**," he said. "**This** first of its kind development on Aboriginal land **gives** the community both **economic and social returns**." He added Alice Springs was an optimal environment for this type of technology due to a large number of cloud-free days, limited radio interference and access to fibre network on the grounds. Indigenous Australians Minister Ken Wyatt said developments such as this showcased how Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people could continue leading roles in our nation’s innovation. "**Indigenous Australians hold a powerful economic force through their connections with land, culture and community,**” he said. "**This** exciting project **is a prime example of the power of country to help deliver commercial returns through technology, employment and career opportunities."**

#### Indigenous led economics solve warming.

Swiderska ‘21

[Here's why Indigenous economics is the key to saving nature, <https://www.iied.org/heres-why-indigenous-economics-key-saving-nature>, Krystyna Swiderska, April 13 2021] [SS]

**Western economics is** not only **destroying the environment**. It is also destroying Indigenous peoples’ holistic development models that ensure balance with nature, and provide alternative paradigms for sustainable development. For many of the world’s 476 million Indigenous peoples, balance and reciprocity (PDF) with nature are fundamental principles that guide all aspects of life**. Rather than privileging human economic goals** and pursuing nature conservation separately, many **Indigenous societies seek to achieve ‘holistic wellbeing’** or ‘Buen Vivir’, which means the wellbeing of both people and nature together. Take the Quechua and Aymara people in Peru, for example, who make up nearly a fifth of Peru’s population. According to their Andean cosmovision, the world is divided into three communities or ‘ayllus’: i) the wild or natural world, ii) the human and domesticated world, and iii) the sacred world. To achieve wellbeing (‘Sumaq Causay’), these three communities must be in balance, which requires reciprocity between them (‘ayni’). These Andean concepts come from the Incas, the largest pre-Columbian empire, and are still very much alive in the Andes. So too are barter markets (PDF), which provide people at different altitudes with access to essential nutrients and help sustain rich Andean biodiversity. Balance with nature, reciprocity and solidarity (the obligation to help those in need) are key principles embedded in many Indigenous cultures across the world, from the Americas, to China, India and Kenya. **These Indigenous economies** (PDF) **promote sufficiency rather than infinite growth**, and equity and redistribution of wealth rather than accumulation. Many **subsistence economies are also characterised by circular agriculture models, which minimise waste** and carbon emissions. The separation of people and nature threatens both In Peru and across the world, the nature- and **people-friendly informal economies of Indigenous peoples are steadily being eroded by Western**, neo-liberal economic **policies** that separate people and nature, and view Indigenous cultures and subsistence economies as ‘backward’ and in need of modernisation. Ironically, the same **Indigenous economies** that **have conserved and enhanced biodiversity for millennia are now threatened by environmental policies that often fail to recognise the value of Indigenous knowledge**, thus contributing to its erosion. Most of the world’s remaining biodiversity is located on lands owned or managed by Indigenous peoples. A global scientific assessment (PDF) by the Intergovernmental Panel on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) found that “nature is generally declining less rapidly in Indigenous peoples’ lands than in other lands”. However, the IPBES assessment also found **nature managed by Indigenous peoples and local communities** (IPLCs**) is under** increasing **pressure,** as is the knowledge of how to manage it. Areas managed by IPLCs “are facing growing resource extraction, commodity production, mining and transport and energy infrastructure”. Negative impacts from all these pressures include “continued loss of subsistence and traditional livelihoods” and impacts on “health and wellbeing from pollution and water insecurity”. These impacts “also challenge the transmission of Indigenous and local knowledge” and “the ability of indigenous peoples and local communities to conserve and sustainably manage wild and domesticated biodiversity that are also relevant to broader society”. **Mainstream economic activities on Indigenous lands have rarely benefited Indigenous Peoples**, who make up 6% of the world’s population but 19% of the extreme poor. In fact, their situation has often deteriorated (PDF), due to loss of land and natural resources, and the weakening of cultural ties and social cohesion. Integration with market economies has led to social tension and conflict, limited opportunities for meaningful employment, low returns for producers and a shift towards consumerist lifestyles. The dominant approach to nature conservation through protected areas also reflects a Western worldview that separates people and nature, often excluding Indigenous people to protect biodiversity. Many state-run protected areas have resulted in negative social impacts, are losing biodiversity and are not effectively or equitably managed, as IPBES found (PDF). Bridging the divide Clearly, alternative development and **conservation models that bridge the nature-people divide are urgently needed** to achieve the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. Indigenous Peoples’ holistic worldviews provide alternative development paradigms, which benefit both people and nature. For example, Indigenous Peoples’ ‘mixed economies’, which combine subsistence and market activities, sustain Indigenous values that underpin biodiversity conservation, while contributing to nutrition, health, wellbeing and climate resilience, and generating income. Local markets and short value chains are often prioritised, rather than global export markets. **Indigenous Peoples have started to shape new community enterprise models that assert control over their territories and promote Indigenous traditions of sustainability and enterprise for the common good**. **These Indigenous enterprises have delivered multiple benefits** for livelihoods, culture, social capital and biodiversity conservation. For example, in the Potato Park in Peru, a Biocultural Heritage Territory governed by six Quechua communities, collective micro-enterprises (for gastronomy, agro-ecotourism, crafts, herbal teas and so on) are guided by Andean principles and holistic wellbeing goals. Ten per cent of the revenues from each micro-enterprise is invested in a communal fund and redistributed annually to reward biocultural heritage stewards and help those in need. Thanks to their ancestral Indigenous knowledge, linked with science, the Potato Park communities have ensured food security despite severe climate change impacts and the COVID-19 pandemic. During the pandemic, the communities donated a ton of potatoes to hungry people in Cusco, in line with the principle of solidarity. The social ties and mutual care and solidarity that Indigenous communities have displayed in the pandemic, highlights the type of social relations that are core to resilient economies and an inclusive green recovery. The concept of 'biocultural heritage', which is derived from Indigenous Peoples’ holistic worldviews and traditions, recognises the inextricable linkages between nature, culture and development. The way forward A new narrative is needed which recognises the highly progressive and dynamic nature of Indigenous knowledge and economic systems that put nature and equity at the heart of development. **Indigenous Peoples have a leading role to play in shaping alternative paradigms to mainstream economic models that are destroying the environment and traditional cultures. Achieving the Sustainable Development** Goals **(SDGs),** **and undoing years of racial injustice** that lie at the root of poverty and inequality**, requires structural reform** across economic and environment sectors, from local to global levels**, to put Indigenous Peoples at the heart of decision-making**. This year provides an opportunity for governments and political leaders to demonstrate real commitment to achieving the SDGs and leaving no one behind. It is not too late to reform the leadership structure for the UN Food Systems Summit in September 2021, so that representatives of poor, hungry, marginalised and Indigenous Peoples play a leading role. Or to reform the proposed post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework (PDF), to be agreed at the biodiversity convention COP15 in October, so that the knowledge and leadership of Indigenous Peoples and local communities is integrated across the targets. Indigenous Peoples have answers for many of the world’s most intractable challenges: inequality, ecocide, climate change. We cannot address these challenges without their wisdom and leadership.

#### Green capitalism solves warming.

**Scales 17** (Ivan R., Sir Harvey McGrath lecturer in Geography and Fellow, St Catharine's College, "Green capitalism", The International Encyclopedia of Geography, 2017, DOA: 7-26-2017) //Snowball

Although the various ideas underpinning green capitalism have a long history, it is only since the emergence of the concept of sustainable development in the 1980s that they have become mainstream. This represents a significant shift away from the “limits to growth” and “zero growth” environmentalism of the 1960s and 1970s, which argued for radical political, economic, and cultural changes to drastically cut production and consumption. Green capitalism also fits well with neoliberal economic thinking, which places an emphasis on individual liberty, minimal involvement of the state, and free markets as the most efficient way to coordinate the diverse needs of people.

Emerging forms of green capitalism

Accounting for nature and paying for ecosystem services There have been growing efforts to include the value of natural capital into business activities and government policy. These depend on (i) being able to calculate the value of various ecosystem services and (ii) creating mechanisms whereby those who benefit from ecosystem services pay those who maintain those services. Calculating the economic value of ecosystem services remains technically challenging. With regard to creating financial flows to pay for natural capital, the most advanced attempts to establish such schemes have been under the banner of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES). These are defined as voluntary transactions that involve the purchase of a well-defined ecosystem service from a service provider, who is paid if (and only if) the provision of that ecosystem service is secured (Wunder 2005). From a green capitalist perspective the advantage of PES is that they conform to Coase’s view that environmental issues are best left to negotiations between individuals or groups with clear ownership rights over natural resources.

A green industrial revolution: harnessing the competitive and innovative aspects of market forces to improve manufacturing processes

Internalizing the value of natural capital into the operation of markets is the first step toward green capitalism. Once pollution has a cost and natural capital has financial value it is expected that the logic of capitalism will drive innovation and efficiency to reduce costs and maximize income. In the same way that the first industrial revolution harnessed machinery and new forms of fossil fuel energy to dramatically increase productivity, a green industrial revolution would harness technology to deliver radical improvements in efficiency.

Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins (1999) propose a range of ways that a green industrial revolution might occur. First, radical improvements in productivity and efficiency could allow societies to produce more from fewer resources. Looking at the automobile industry, for example, ultra-light “hypercars” with fuel-efficient engines could dramatically reduce fuel consumption. In order to generate radical leaps in productivity, Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins (1999) advocate biomimicry, a design principle that imitates biological processes and structures in order to improve manufacturing and create new materials. For example, the physical properties of spider silk could be mimicked to make ultra-strong and ultra-light materials.

# 3

#### Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, suggesting that democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent. In fact, many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements—large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.

China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to [innovate](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china). It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. That’s why ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise – the plan is seen as a complete 180

**Patel 21** [Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called [Document 60](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a[2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

Making friends

The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders.

“China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.

Although China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry, the nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about. While Chinese companies may look private on paper, they must still submit to government guidance and control, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy, especially if the government is a frequent customer. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895).

And Hines adds that it’s not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### Shifts in regime perception threatens CCP’s legitimacy from nationalist hardliners

Weiss 19 Jessica Weiss 1-29-2019 “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China” <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/uploads/3/0/6/3/30636001/19-01-24-elite-statements-isq-ca.pdf> (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University)//Elmer

Public support—or the appearance of it—matters to many autocracies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, modern dictatorships are “highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to affect it.”6 Mao Zedong told his comrades: “When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion.”7 Because autocracies often rely on **nationalist mythmaking**,8 success or failure in defending the national honor in international crises could burnish the leadership’s patriotic credentials or spark opposition. **Shared outrage at the regime’s foreign policy failures could galvanize street protests or elite fissures, creating intraparty upheaval** or inviting military officers to step in to restore order. Fearing a domestic backlash, authoritarian leaders may feel compelled to take a tough international stance. Although authoritarian leaders are rarely held accountable to public opinion through free and fair elections, fears of popular unrest and irregular ouster often weigh heavily on autocrats seeking to maximize their tenure in office. Considering the harsh consequences that authoritarian elites face if pushed out of office, even a small increase in the probability of ouster could alter authoritarian incentives in international crises.9 A history of nationalist uprisings make Chinese citizens and leaders especially aware of the linkage between international disputes and domestic unrest. The weakness of the PRC’s predecessor in defending Chinese sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 galvanized protests and a general strike, forcing the government to sack three officials and reject the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded territories in China to Japan. These precedents have made Chinese officials particularly sensitive to the appearance of hewing to public opinion. As the People’s Daily chief editor wrote: “History and reality have shown us that public opinion and regime safety are inseparable.”10 One Chinese scholar even claimed: “the Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”11

#### Xi will launch diversionary war to domestic backlash – escalates in multiple hotspots

Norris 17, William J. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges. CFR Discussion Paper, 2017. (Associate professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service)//Elmer

Populist pressures might tempt the **party leadership** to encourage **diversionary nationalism**. The logic of this concern is straightforward: the Communist Party might seek to **distract a restless domestic population** with **adventurism abroad**.19 The **Xi** administration wants to **appear tough** in its **defense of foreign encroachments** against China’s interests. This need stems from a long-running narrative about how a weak Qing dynasty was unable to defend China in the face of European imperial expansion, epitomized by the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth century. The party is **particularly sensitive** to **perceptions of weakness** because much of its **claim to legitimacy**—manifested in **Xi’s Chinese Dream** campaign today—stems from the party’s claims of leading the **restoration of Chinese greatness**. For example, the May Fourth Movement, a popular protest in 1919 that helped catalyze the CPC, called into question the legitimacy of the Republic of China government running the country at that time because the regime was seen as not having effectively defended China’s territorial and sovereignty interests at the Versailles Peace Conference. **Diversionary nationalist frictions** would likely occur if the Chinese leadership portrayed a foreign adversary as having made the first move, thus forcing Xi to stand up for China’s interests. An example is the 2012 attempt by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private owner.20 Although the Japanese central government sought to avert a crisis by stepping in to purchase the islands—having them bought and administered by Ishihara’s Tokyo metropolitan government would have dragged Japan into a confrontation with China—China saw this move as part of a deliberate orchestration by Japan to nationalize the islands. Xi seemingly had no choice but to defend China’s claims against an attempt by Japan to consolidate its position on the dispute.21 This issue touched off a period of heated tensions between China and Japan, lasting more than two years.22 Such dynamics are not limited to Japan. Other possible areas of conflict include, but are not necessarily limited to, **Taiwan**, **India**, and the **South China Sea** (especially with the **Philippines** and **Vietnam**). The Chinese government will use such tactics if it believes that the costs are relatively low. Ideally, China would like to appear tough while avoiding material repercussions or a serious diplomatic breakdown. Standing up against foreign encroachment—without facing much blowback—could provide Xi’s administration with a tempting source of noneconomic legitimacy. However, over the next few years, Xi will probably not be actively looking to get embroiled abroad. Cushioning the fallout from slower growth while managing a structural economic transition will be difficult enough. Courting potential international crises that distract the central leadership would make this task even more daunting. Even if the top leadership did not wish to provoke conflict, a smaller budgetary allotment for security could cause **military interests** in China to **deliberately instigate trouble** to **justify** their **claims over increasingly scarce resources**. For example, an air force interested in ensuring its funding for a midair tanker program might find the existence of far-flung territorial disputes to be useful in making its case. Such a case would be made even stronger by a pattern of recent frictions that highlights the necessity of greater air power projection. Budgetary pressures may be partly behind a recent People’s Liberation Army reorganization and headcount reduction. A slowing economy might cause a further deceleration in China’s military spending, thus increasing such pressures as budgetary belts tighten. Challenges to Xi’s Leadership Xi Jinping’s efforts to address economic challenges could fail, unleashing consequences that extend well beyond China’s economic health. For example, an **economic collapse** could give rise to a Vladimir **Putin–like redemption figure** in China. Xi’s approach of centralizing authority over a diverse, complex, and massive social, political, and economic system is a **recipe for brittleness**. Rather than designing a resilient, decentralized governance structure that can gracefully cope with localized failures at particular nodes in a network, a highly centralized architecture **risks catastrophic**, **system-level failure**. Although centralized authority offers the tantalizing chimera of stronger control from the center, it also puts all the responsibility squarely on Xi’s shoulders. With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate **unintended international repercussions**. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have **ripple effects abroad**. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, **raising the risks** of **strategic miscalculation** on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23 Weakened Fetters of Economic Interdependence If China successfully transitioned away from its export-driven growth model toward a consumption-driven economic engine over the next four or five years, it could no longer feel as constrained by economic interdependence. To the extent that such constraints are loosened, the U.S.-China relationship will be more prone to conflict and friction.24 While China has never been the archetypal liberal economic power bent on benign integration with the global economy, its export-driven growth model produced a strong strategic preference for stability. Although past behavior is not necessarily indicative of future strategic calculus, China’s “economic circuit breaker” logic seems to have held its most aggressive nationalism below the threshold of war since 1979. A China that is both comparatively strong and less dependent on the global economy would be a novel development in modern geopolitics. As China changes the composition of its international economic linkages, global integration could place fewer constraints on it. Whereas China has been highly reliant on the import of raw materials and semifinished goods for reexport, a consumption-driven China could have a different international trade profile. China could still rely on imported goods, but their centrality to the country’s overall economic growth would be altered. Imports of luxury goods, consumer products, international brands, and services may not exert a significant constraining influence, since loss of access to such items may not be seen as strategically vital. If these flows were interrupted or jeopardized, the result would be more akin to an inconvenience than a strategic setback for China’s rise. That said, China is likely to continue to highly depend on imported oil even if the economic end to which that energy resource is directed shifts away from industrial and export production toward domestic consumption.

#### US–China war goes nuclear – crisis mis-management ensures conventional escalation - extinction

Kulacki 20 [Dr. Gregory Kulacki focuses on cross-cultural communication between the United States and China on nuclear and space arms control and is the China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020. Would China Use Nuclear Weapons First In A War With The United States?, Thediplomat.com, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/would-china-use-nuclear-weapons-first-in-a-war-with-the-united-states/] srey

Admiral Charles A. Richard, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, recently told the Senate Armed Service Committee he “could drive a truck” through the holes in China’s no first use policy. But when Senator John Hawley (R-MO) asked him why he said that, Commander Richard backtracked, described China’s policy as “very opaque” and said his assessment was based on “very little” information. That’s surprising. **China** has been exceptionally **clear** **about** its **intentions** **on** the possible **first** **use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons**. On the day of its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, China declared it “will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.” That **unambiguous** **statement** **has** **been** a **cornerstone** **of** **Chinese** **nuclear** **weapons** policy for 56 years and has been repeated frequently in authoritative Chinese publications for domestic and international audiences, including a highly classified training manual for the operators of China’s nuclear forces. Richard should know about those publications, particularly the training manual. A U.S. Department of Defense translation has been circulating within the U.S. nuclear weapons policy community for more than a decade. The commander’s comments to the committee indicate a familiarity with the most controversial section of the manual, which, in the eyes of some U.S. analysts, indicates there may be some circumstances where **China** **would** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **first** **in** a **war** **with** **the** **U**nited **S**tates. This U.S. misperception is understandable, especially given the difficulties the Defense Department encountered translating the text into English. The language, carefully considered in the context of the entire book, articulates a strong reaffirmation of China’s no first use policy. But it also reveals **Chinese** military planners are **struggling** **with** **crisis** **management** **and** **considering** **steps** **that** could **create** **ambiguity** **with** **disastrous** **consequences**. Towards the end of the 405-page text on the operations of China’s strategic rocket forces, in a chapter entitled, “Second Artillery Deterrence Operations,” the authors explain what China’s nuclear forces train to do if **“**a strong military power possessing nuclear‐armed missiles and an absolute advantage in high‐tech conventional weapons is carrying out intense and continuous attacks against our major strategic targets and we have no good military strategy to resist the enemy.**”** The military power they’re talking about is the United States. The authors indicate China’s nuclear missile forces train to take specific steps, including increasing readiness and conducting launch exercises, to “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks.” The manual refers to these steps as an “adjustment” to China’s nuclear policy and a “lowering” of China’s threshold for brandishing its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders would only take these steps in extreme circumstances. The text highlights several triggers such as U.S. conventional bombing of China’s nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, heavy conventional bombing of large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, or other acts of **conventional** **warfare** **that** “**seriously** **threatened**” the “safety and **survival**” of the nation. U.S. Misunderstanding Richard seems to believe this planned adjustment in China’s nuclear posture means China is **preparing** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** first under these circumstances. He told Hawley that there are a “number of situations where they may conclude that first use has occurred that do not meet our definition of first use.” The head of the U.S. Strategic Command appears to assume, as do other U.S. analysts, that the **Chinese** would **interpret** **these** types of U.S. conventional **attacks** **as** **equivalent** **to** a **U.S. first use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons** against China. But that’s not what the text says. “Lowering the threshold” refers to China putting its nuclear weapons on alert — it does not indicate Chinese leaders might lower their threshold for deciding to use nuclear weapons in a crisis. Nor does the text indicate Chinese nuclear forces are training to launch nuclear weapons first in a war with the United States. China, unlike the United States, keeps its nuclear forces off-alert. Its warheads are not mated to its missiles. China’s nuclear-armed submarines are not continuously at sea on armed patrols. The manual describes how China’s nuclear warheads and the missiles that deliver them are controlled by two separate chains of command. Chinese missileers train to bring them together and launch them after China has been attacked with nuclear weapons. All of these behaviors are consistent with a no first use policy. The “adjustment” Chinese nuclear forces are preparing to make if the United States is bombing China with impunity is to place China’s nuclear forces in a state of readiness similar to the state the nuclear forces of the United States are in all the time. This step is intended not only to end the bombing, but also to convince U.S. decision-makers they cannot expect to destroy China’s nuclear retaliatory capability if the crisis escalates. Chinese Miscalculation Unfortunately, alerting Chinese nuclear forces at such a moment could have terrifying consequences. Given the relatively small size of China’s nuclear force, a U.S. president might be tempted to try to limit the possible damage from a Chinese nuclear attack by destroying as many of China’s nuclear weapons as possible before they’re launched, especially if the head of the U.S. Strategic Command told the president China was preparing to strike first. One study concluded that if the United States used nuclear weapons to attempt to knock out a small fraction of the Chinese ICBMs that could reach the United States it may kill tens of millions of Chinese civilians. The authors of the text assume alerting China’s nuclear forces would “create a great shock in the enemy’s psyche.” That’s a fair assumption. But they also assume this shock could “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks against our major strategic targets.” That’s highly questionable. There is a **substantial** **risk** **the** **U**nited **S**tates **would** **respond** **to** this implicit **Chinese** **threat** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **by** **escalating**, rather than halting, its **conventional** **attacks**. If China’s nuclear forces were targeted, it would put even greater strain on the operators of China’s nuclear forces. A **slippery** **slope** **to** **nuclear** **war** Chinese military planners are aware that attempting to coerce the United States into halting conventional bombardment by alerting their nuclear forces could fail. They also know it might trigger a nuclear war. But if it does, they are equally clear China won’t be the one to start it. Nuclear attack is often preceded by nuclear coercion. Because of this, in the midst of the process of a high, strong degree of nuclear coercion we should prepare well for a nuclear retaliatory attack. The more complete the preparation, the higher the credibility of nuclear coercion, the easier it is to accomplish the objective of nuclear coercion, and the lower the possibility that the nuclear missile forces will be used in actual fighting. They assume if China demonstrates it is well prepared to retaliate the United States would not risk a damage limitation strike using nuclear weapons. And even if the United States were to attack China’s nuclear forces with conventional weapons, China still would not strike first. In the opening section of the next chapter on “nuclear retaliatory attack operations” the manual instructs, as it does on numerous occasions throughout the entire text: According to our country’s principle, its stand of no first use of nuclear weapons, the Second Artillery will carry out a nuclear missile attack against the enemy’s important strategic targets, according to the combat orders of the Supreme Command, only after the enemy has carried out a nuclear attack against our country. Richard is wrong. There are no holes in China’s no first use policy. But the worse-case planning articulated in this highly classified military text is a significant and deeply troubling departure from China’s traditional thinking about the role of nuclear weapons. Mao Zedong famously called nuclear weapons “a paper tiger.” Many assumed he was being cavalier about the consequences of nuclear war. But what he meant is that they would not be used to fight and win wars. U.S. nuclear threats during the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait Crisis in the 1950s – threats not followed by an actual nuclear attack – validated Mao’s intuition that nuclear weapons were primarily psychological weapons. Chinese leaders decided to acquire nuclear weapons to free their minds from what Mao’s generation called “**nuclear** **blackmail**.” A former director of China’s nuclear weapons laboratories told me China developed them so its leaders could “sit up with a straight spine.” Countering nuclear blackmail – along with compelling other nuclear weapons states to negotiate their elimination – were the only two purposes Chinese nuclear weapons were meant to serve. Contemporary Chinese military planners appear to have added a new purpose: compelling the United States to halt a conventional attack. Even though it only applies in extreme circumstances, it **increases** the **risk** **that** a **war** between the United States and China **will** **end** **in** a nuclear exchange with unpredictable and **catastrophic** **consequences**. Adding this new purpose could also be the first step on a slippery slope to an incremental broadening the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese national security policy. Americans would be a lot safer if we could avoid that. The United States government should applaud China’s no first use policy instead of repeatedly calling it into question. And it would be wise to adopt the same policy for the United States. If both countries declared they would never use nuclear weapons first it may not guarantee they can avoid a nuclear exchange during a military crisis, but it would make one far less likely.

# 4

#### **Thus, the standard is maximizing expected well being.**

Prefer additionally:

#### **1] extinction first**

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### It’s excluded by traditional policymaking apparatuses: our brains are psychologically biased against high magnitude scenarios since we’re emotionally unable to understand the suffering of millions of pople

Dunn 07

[Elizabeth Dunn and Claire Ashton, “On emoitional innumeracy: Predicted and actual affective responses to grand-scale tragedies”, May 29 2007 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology]

The present research demonstrates that people overestimate the intensity of their emotional responses to grand-scale tragedies. Participants predicted that they would feel significantly worse if thousands of people were killed in a disaster than if only a few people were killed, and yet they exhibited an ‘‘emotional flatline,’’ feeling equally sad regardless of the number of people killed. This unforeseeable emotional flatline was demonstrated in response to deaths stemming from human violence and natural disasters, both close to home and far away (including hurricanes in the United States, a forest fire in Spain, and the Iraq War). Participants’ actual emotional responses were calibrated with fatalities only when abstract death tolls were translated into concrete images. We argue that affective forecasts and emotional experiences may arise from separate systems, leading to reliable forecasting errors, as well as influencing subsequent judgments. 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Affective forecasting; Scope sensitivity; Temporal discounting; Cognitive experiential self theory Would you be more upset about a hurricane in which 5000 people were killed than one in which 5 people were killed? Although most people might predict feeling worse in response to the larger scale tragedy, most people might be wrong; recent research demonstrates that people often go astray in imagining their own future emotional responses to events (e.g., Dunn & Laham, 2006; Dunn, Biesanz, Human, & Finn, 2007; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003; Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000). Such predictions (or affective forecasts) may be inaccurate in part because affective forecasts and actual emotional experiences are likely to be driven by different modes of information processing. According to Epstein’s (1994, 1998) cognitive-experiential self theory (CEST), humans apprehend reality through the operation of two distinct information processing systems: the rational system, which is relatively slow and logical and represents a recent evolutionary development, and the experiential system, which is relatively fast and holistic and evolutionarily ancient (for similar dual-process theories, see Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Sloman, 1996). As a uniquely human capacity that relies on logical reasoning, affective forecasting should stem primarily from the operation of the rational system. Because the rational system is responsive to abstract symbols, words, and numbers (Epstein, 1998), affective forecasts should be sensitive to the scope of a tragedy; that is, people should predict feeling worse as a function of the number of individuals killed. Emotions, however, are a signature product of the experiential system, which responds not to abstract numbers, but to concrete images, metaphors, and narratives (Epstein, 1998). Therefore, actual emotional experiences may be relatively insensitive to the scope of a tragedy. Existing research suggests that people are largely insensitive to scope when they make economic or policy-oriented decisions; people place little weight on the number of individuals a program will help or the amount of a good to be 0022-1031/$ - see front matter 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2007.04.011 \* Corresponding author. Fax: +1 604 822 6923. E-mail address: edunn@psych.ubc.ca (E.W. Dunn). www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp Available online at www.sciencedirect.com Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 692–698 provided in deciding how much they are willing to pay or what tradeoffs they are willing to accept (e.g., Baron & Greene, 1996; Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, & Friedrich, 1997; Hsee, Rottenstreich, & Xiao, 2005). Decisions become particularly scope insensitive when people are led to rely on their feelings during decision-making (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004), suggesting that scope-insensitive decisions may be rooted in scope-insensitive emotional responses (for related arguments, see Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). Thus, recent research on decision-making provides indirect support for the idea that emotions—as a product of the experiential system—are relatively unresponsive to abstract numbers, such that people may exhibit an ‘‘emotional flatline’’ in the face of increasing death tolls. To the extent that affective forecasting is supported by the rational system, however, affective forecasts should be relatively sensitive to scope (operationally defined here as death toll), such that people may predict feeling increasingly negative as a function of the number of people killed in a disaster. As a result, affective forecasts and emotional experiences should diverge as the scope of a disaster increases, leading to greater forecasting errors with regard to grand-scale versus small-scale disasters. We tested this idea in a series of studies by asking participants to predict how they would feel or to report their actual feelings regarding specific tragedies, given various death tolls. In Study 1, we conducted an initial real-world demonstration of this idea by manipulating the perceived scope of US hurricanes.

#### 2] use epistemic modesty – multiply probability of the fwk times the magnitude of the impacts - clash – encourages both substantive and phil debates so that we talk about all the offense

#### 3] controls the i/l

# case

#### Presumption flips neg against K affs – they have the burden of proof since they are defending pre-fiat offense. That’s key to ensure the neg has a shot at engagement.

#### Vote neg on presumption:

#### 1] Systems- the 1AC says institutions create social realities that replicate violence but in-round discourse does nothing to alter conditions. All you do is encourage teams to write better K blocks.

#### 2] Spillover- they are missing an internal link as to why they need the ballot or why the reading of the aff forwards change. Empirically denied – Zion read anti-Blackness for two years and won the TOC – D/B – either Hostage Taking has already collapsed debate making the Aff non-inherent OR it’s a form of cruel hope.

#### 3] Competition- debate is the wrong forum for change and competition moots any ethical value of the aff. Winning rounds just makes it seem like you want to win and a loss is internalized as a technical mistake.

**Individual rounds do not change subjectivity, even if they spur immediate reflection, those insights aren’t integrated into deep-stored memory—this means you can vote negative on presumption. Encouraging focused research is the only chance to change attitudes**

Goodin and Niemeyer 3Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the better debater – anything else is arbitrary and exclusionary

#### 1] Doesn’t allow for specific discussions of other oppression like queer people or people with disabilities – even if we can have some form of discussion it’ll never be centered on the issue. No internal link claims – they can’t account for things like the caste system in India which happened across the world

#### 2] Outweighs on materiality – we can’t create real change in the round, if you don’t know what their role of the ballot does, you shouldn’t vote for it. Material violence first – it’s the best basis for struggle for Black scholars fighting on the streets – abstracting violence is de-radicalizing since it incentivizes arm-chair philosophy.

#### 3] Theorizing isn’t Offense – you don’t win for saying colonialism exists as an FYI – only grant them colonialism offense from what their method solves for which means Presumption is a sequencing question for evaluating the case.

4] rob impossible

#### *Ptx is possible – Loving v Virginia, Strauder v. West Virginia, Dempsey v. Moore, Powell v. Alabama the civil rights act, the 14th Amendment, desegregation of the armed forces, demographic shifts all prove progress and recognition within civil society can happen. Empirics outweighs ontology claims - they take into account all factors and test their validity*

#### No space col coming

Szocik 18 (Konrad Szocik, Assistant Professor at the University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow, Poland (Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science), 2018. “Should and could humans go to Mars? Yes, but not now and not in the near future”. Futures. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2018.08.004)

11. Conclusions Deep faith in power of human reason supported by experience and experiments is not enough to organize safe and effective human mission to Mars. The main obstacle to go to Mars now and in the near future is a technological barrier. Future technological advancement may be counterbalanced by increasing threats. The risk of catastrophes and threats is increasing every year. Challenges associated with overpopulation, limited resources and climate changes including extensive fires probably will inhibit any serious investing in human space program. Only an urgent, real, and serious rationale would be able to argue for need for current longterm, deep-space human interplanetary program, but there is no such urgent rationale now and probably it will not appear in the near future. Human interplanetary missions look more like an extravagant display of human creativity, complacency, and high self-esteem than like a real need of humanity and a real possibility. The multi-generational international collaboration that seems to be necessary for effective human mission to Mars is problematic for political and financial reasons. Last but not least. I did not find in papers discussing the idea of refuge (Baum et al. 2015; Jebari 2015; Turchin and Green 2017) any deep analysis of the psychological challenge of living in a close, confined shelter or capsule, whether in an earthly or a space habitat. This challenge may be greater in space refuge but we may expect that many years of isolation in nuclear submarine may be psychologically deleterious as well.12 Margaret Boone Rappaport and Christopher Corbally (2019) in excellent and detailed way show how challenging psychologically will be every minute of life in confined Mars base. Their analysis may be referred to Earth refuge as well. This psychological harm raises ethical questions. Among them one of the most important is the basic question of the ethics of quality of life: is such kind of life worth to be alive?

#### No solvency, Capitalism will expand elsewhere if not in space bcz simply minimizing private entities in space they’re just allowing capitalism to expand in other ways

**Shamas & Holden, 2019**, Victor Shamas &, Oslo Metropolitan University, Work Research Institute (AFI), Oslo, Norway; Thomas Holden, Independent scholar, Oslo, Norway, 2019, Palgrave Communications, One giant leap for capitalistkind: private enterprise in outer space, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9

Outer space serves at least two purposes in this regard. In the short-to medium-term, it allows for the export of surplus capital into emerging industries, such as satellite imaging and communication. These are significant sites of capital accumulation: global revenues in the worldwide satellite market in 2016 amounted to $260 billion (SIA, 2017, p. 4). Clearly**, much of this activity is taking place ‘on the ground'; it is occurring in the ‘terrestrial economy'. But all that capital would have to find some other meaningful or productive outlet were it not for the expansion of capital into space**.

#### No link: Governments solve the excesses of capitalism in space. Fernolz 19

Tim Fernolz, 2019, How to build a space economy that avoids the mistakes of terrestrial capitalism, https://qz.com/work/1767415/can-nasa-build-a-space-economy-that-leaves-capitalisms-problems-behind/

The good news is that **we aren’t close to a world like the one depicted in the movie Elysium, where the ultra-wealthy repair to space and leave the rest of us behind. Our public and private interests will be far more intertwined**, in part because governments have designed it that way. **Most of the major space agencies are compelled by law in their home countries to support private economic activity, which means for example that NASA, by law, views the success of US companies in space as part of its mission, and not a distraction or a threat.** The reality is that **public space agencies, particularly NASA in the United States, remain the largest spenders in space and control the conditions for private organizations acting in orbit. Their challenge—and opportunity—is to manage the transition to a new, multi-stakeholder world in orbit by successfully subsidizing new initiatives without letting the benefits escape the public at large. Much of the work of establishing our space economy is prosaically earthly: Competition policy, labor rights, and corporate taxation. But with critiques of capitalism’s distributional failures at the center of public discourse, there are also sweeping challenges to address: Namely, can the orbital economy be structured better than its terrestrial analogue?**

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