# 1

#### A] Interpretation: The affirmative may only defend that a just government ought to recognize the unconditiaonl right of workers to strike, and may only garner offense off hypothetical enactment of that resolution.

#### B] Violation –

#### Resolved means a policy

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Unconditional

US Legal. Unconditional Law and Legal Definition. https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/unconditional/

Unconditional means without conditions; without restrictions; or absolute. For instance, unconditional promise is a promise that is unqualified in nature. A party who makes an unconditional promise must perform that promise even though the other party has not performed according to the bargain.

#### Right

Law.Com. Services and Resources Legal Dictionary. https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1857

1) n. an entitlement to something, whether to concepts like justice and due process or to ownership of property or some interest in property, real or persona

#### Workers

UK Practical Law. Glossary. Worker. https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/6-200-3640?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true

Section 230(3), ERA 1996 defines a worker as an individual who has entered into or works under (a) a contract of employment or (b) any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual.

#### Strike

Encyclopedia.com. Strike. https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/economics-business-and-labor/labor/strike

(of employees) refuse to work as a form of organized protest, typically in an attempt to obtain a particular concession or concessions from their employer: workers may strike over threatened job losses.∎ [tr.] undertake such action against (an employer).

#### No cheaty I-meets – they’re clearly not T – at best, they don’t defend

**If they make an i-meet they lose a] they said strikes good b] exemplifies the nonblack ppl can’t read afropess stuff c] strikes have historically happened and do work**

#### C] Vote neg to preserve substantive engagement --

#### 1] Preparation- repacking the topic gives the aff a huge edge, they can prepare for 6 months on an issue that catches us by surprise. Preparation is better than thinking on your feet- research demonstrates pedagogical humility and research skills are the only portable debate training – the process of debate outweighs the content – only our interp generates the argumentative skills needed to rigorously defend their affirmative out of round and create engaged citizens who have the self reflexivity to advocate for positive change

**Additionally, unpredictability causes debaters to latch onto un-vetted ideals as political end-points—there are an infinite number of unintended pitfalls to the aff. A well-prepared negative is better able to identify those and nudge the aff towards improvement—this turns solvency.**

#### 2] Limits- there are a finite amount of just governments, but an infinite number of non topical affirmatives. Consider this our “library disad”- not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months.

#### 3] Switch side debate is good -- it forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives which prevents ideological dogmatism. Even if they prove the topic is bad, our argument is that the process of preparing and defending proposals is an educational benefit of engaging it.

**Last—presume every 1AC truth claim false because it hasn’t been properly tested.**

#### D] TVA

#### 1] Read an aff about strikes being bad for democracy and say democracy bad

**2] Read an aff about strikes being the first step to a capitalist revolution**

#### 3] Solvency deficits to the TVA are neg ground – they aren’t entitled to a perfect aff

#### E] Even if you don’t by our education impacts, fairness is an intrinsic good and the only possible impact to your ballot -- debate is a game: forced winner/loser, competitive norms, and the tournament invite prove. Alternative impacts like activism or education can be pursued in other forums – the ballot can’t change our subjectivities BUT it can rectify in round fairness

#### F] Paradigm issues

#### 1] TFW has to be drop the debater – it indicts their method of engagement and proves we couldn’t engage fairly with their aff – crossapply truth testing

#### 2] Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary, you can’t be reasonably topical, and causes a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation.

#### 3] RVIs and impact turns encourage all in on theory which decks substance and incentivize baiting theory with abusive practices.

#### 4] No impact turns— every argument is framework in that we have to attempt to exclude aff offense and the process of testing T is good even if its false

# 2

#### The affirmative’s conception of history and social relations is wrong ­–

#### A. History – Afro-pessimism’s ahistorical (non)praxis creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of colonial domination that prevents holding people accountable for specific instances of violence. “Humanity” is a social construct and anti-blackness is not fait-accompli. The aff conflates ontological effect with cause and there is no singular Beginning to history.

Radhakrishnan, PhD, 19

(R., English@Binghamton, ProfEnglish@UCIrvine, *The Epistemology of Pessimism*, The Comparatist, Volume 43, October, pp. 41-67)

How do we evaluate the epistemic validity of Afro-Pessimism? Is the validity cognitive, conative, or both? Furthermore, what is Afro-Pessimism’s critical take on history, historicity, and temporality? The claim that Afro-Pessimism makes, the claim that it wills to make is that the case of the slave in human history is like no other. This situation is non-fungible and not open to the logic of analogy. The slave has no other human genesis than the historiography and the temporality offered by the Master/Slave regime/episteme. This beginning is punitively and implosively inaugural, i.e., for the slave human who is not a human there is not the option of the pre-master/ slave temporality. On the other hand, it is possible for the worker to talk about pre-Capital and the Colonized to invoke the pre-Colonial. Slave being has been naturalized, ontologized, chronically scripted into the human of the slave. In the case of the slave, to be human is to be outside the human: to be included by exclusion, to avail of Giorgio Agamben’s wisdom.8 Here is my critique of this thesis. Why is it not feasible to do a double read of this inaugural and ontological mode of subjugation? Yes, on the one hand, this subjugation has been actualized at an ontological level; but on the other hand, this inaugural subjugation in and by itself is a historical effect and a historical function. The only difference is that the effect has been achieved so consummately and hermetically as to seem real and natural. As Foucault would argue in the context of the inmates of the Panopticon, the so called “soul” of the inmate is in fact not an a priori, but in fact the ideological and material production of the Panopticon as dispositif. The worker under capitalism and industrial production (I am thinking here of Chaplin’s Modern Times and the poignant Bartleby in Melville’s fiction), the so called nature of the Colonized (Thomas Babington Macaulay’s infamous minutes on education in the Indian context), the stereotypic and racist production of Orientalism and the Oriental, PLO vis vis the racist state of Israel, the essential untouchability of the dalit under Hindu casteism: all of these are instances of ontological effects produced by systems of domination and oppression. Though profoundly and demonstrably historical, these effects have been made to seem trans-historical, primordial, divinely ordained, or just plain natural. But, to repeat myself, all these “inaugural” modes of subjugation are in history and no beginning, however oppressive and hermetic, to borrow from Edward Said, can be the Beginning (Edward Said, Beginnings). I do understand that these examples are not reciprocally or analogically equivalent: India had been existing long before British Colonization, the so-called Orient antedates Orientalism, reification and alienation by the mode of production does not preclude possibilities of dialectical opposition or readings of the mode of production against the grain, whereas the case of the dalit is close to the predicament of the black subject; but even here, dalit movements haven’t embraced pessimism as the only option. Some of the dalit movements have worked to transform Hinduism from within (with Gandhi being the least credible point of departure), whereas revolutionaries like Ambedkar opted out of Hinduism and positioned dalit politics within Buddhism. And indeed, who has earned the right to be more pessimistic than the Palestinian subject who is forced into a contrapuntal dialog with her ruthless and murderous opponent, Israel, and is furthermore obligated to forget and forgive the unconscionable facticity of the existence of Israel, and continue to negotiate for recognition by Israel? So, how is the Afro-Pessimist case different? What would it mean for Afro-Pessimism to be historical, on its own terms? “The Negro is not. Any more than a White Man,” so thundered Frantz Fanon (Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks 231). In articulating this cry, Fanon was investing his subjectivity in the history of a binary double-consciousness. He understood deeply the complexity of his predicament: even though his will, his desire, and his objective was to theorize and historicize proactively, and not in a reactive or paranoid mode, the Negro in all her magnificent autonomy, is constrained to engage with the white man in an antagonistic conversation. Fanon’s fundamental revolutionary objective is to destroy the binary machine, that very structure that inaugurated the regime of Race. In his attempt to delineate Negro agency, Fanon cannot afford to be dismissive of the issue of structure; there can be no effective agency except via the instrumentality as well as the cognitive authority of structure. The question is: which structure? Before African agency can anchor itself in its native structure, it has to dismantle the entire existing structure that has perpetuated and naturalized an ontology based on race. But the all important caveat, as Achille Mbembe and others have pointed out, the overthrow of the binary dispositif has to be perspectival, i.e., from the point of view of the colonized/the black subject/the negro.9 No structure destroys itself formally or non-ideologically. The other point to remember, and this has a specific bearing on the disposition of Afro-Pessimism, is that structure and structural oppression are not ahistorical. Here again, as in the case of the ideological production of the ontology effect, structures behave as if they have always been there, as though structural temporality and structural epistemic location have once and for all preempted and eliminated other temporalities and other locations. It is in the nature of structure to perform in the manner of the fait accompli: ineluctable and as natural as law. The production of the slave by the machinery of the Master/Slave, despite its totalizing stranglehold over all matters human, is still a historical production: neither primordial, nor inaugural in the form of a genetic or hard-wired categorical imperative. So, what is Afro-Pessimism’s deal with history? Like Fanon’s quarrel with history, Afro-Pessimism’s quarrel too is not just historical, but historiographic and meta-historical. Unless and until the very history of current history is destroyed and a new history re-invented ex nihilo, Afro-Pessimism’s response is a No in thunder. The point I want to make is that Afro-Pessimism could see this in a different manner, cognitively speaking; but it wills not to. Not all African American theorists subscribe to Afro-Pessimism. Du Bois, for one, to choose a major figure, would not buy into the Afro-Pessimist thesis. It is by way of a supreme act of will that Afro-Pessimism chooses to be pessimistic. In the name of what principle is this choice valorized: based on what lesson learned or not learned from history? Let us consider the possibility that Afro-Pessimism could be “guilty” of an ahistorical practice in the name of history. Is it conceivable that Afro-Pessimism in willing to say an eternal No is in fact essentializing history? Why does Afro-Pessimism choose to interpret the history of the Master Slave paradigm as timelessly inaugural? Why do Master and Slave turn into allegorical place holders rather than take their place in history as determinate perpetrators and victims? Why cannot one history be vanquished and replaced by an antagonistic history? It is productive to maintain, as does Fanon, that the antagonism between the Colonizer and the Colonized is pure and absolute, and not open to dialectic mediation. There is no common principle or a dialectically emerging telos that governs and gives meaning to the enmity between the Colonizer and the Colonized. It is in this sense that Fanon asserts that the two are two different species. But his stance is historical; his problem is, which history and whose history? Troubled as he is, shuttling as he does from white to black, and back and forth again in an agitated psycho-somatic disequilibrium, Fanon holds out some kind of a hope towards a new humanism. Beset as it is with all sorts of pitfalls and dilemmas, there is hope in Fanon that the psycho-libidinal, and not just the overtly political, longue duree can be dismantled by way of a native, black, post-colonial, African nationalism. Fanon anathematizes Europe/the West without recourse, indicts the West for its slaughter of the human, and I would argue that both Fanon’s rhetoric and ideological fervor measure up to the febrile intensity of Afro-Pessimism. But his conclusion takes a different turn. A new and dare I say, counter-mnemonic humanism is conceivable for Fanon. It is by way of a prolegomenon and a clearing of the ground towards a new humanism that Fanon declares, “The Negro is not. Anymore than a White Man.” The point I want to underscore here is that Fanon drives home the truth that “the human” is never anything but a construction and an invention. Yes it is true that in the ruthless hands of the Colonizer humanism was perverted, “denigrated,” and the orders of slavery and colonialism were made to seem inaugural of the human condition. But again, this was all a construct, a construct eminently vulnerable to total destruction.

#### B. Relationality – it is inevitable and is crucial leverage for social change.

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This is precisely where radically pessimistic projects differ from Gramscian subalternity. Gramsci concedes that subalternity is and has to be double-conscious. His six point and beyond program on behalf of the subaltern project envisions a strategic perspectival engagement with the hegemonic discourse as a precondition for the autonomous emergency of subalternity. Moreover, Gramsci has no interest whatsoever in maintaining the singular purity of the subaltern voice. Subalternity is not a good place to be at: it is a condition to be remedied and transcended via a strategy that cannot but be heteronomous and double-conscious. Also, Gramsci actively seeks hegemony for the subaltern but in a manner that would enable subalternity to go beyond the hegemonic in the very act of seeking hegemony: hence Gramsci’s process-centric subdivision of the subaltern project into the economic-corporate, the political, and the ethical, a scenario of becoming where the intellectual plays the role of the permanent persuader. Gramsci also concedes that there is an organic relationship between the emerging identity of the subaltern subject and the transformative effect it has on the hegemonic discourse. To put in Spinozist terms, the conatus of the subaltern subject has to go and perform beyond its locus to realize its will. To realize its own-most being, the revolutionary subject has to deal with the antagonistic alterity of the dominant discourse, act upon it adversarially, i.e., recognize the hegemony as a necessary enemy, and include this dimension of the struggle as part of its identity. In other words, the becoming itself of the subaltern has to happen unevenly and simultaneously on two terrains: one, its being for itself in relative autonomy, and two, its antagonistic signification on the body politic of the hegemonic discourse. Gramsci does not believe in the non-complicity of strategy: a strategy is what it is, a strategy. The instrumental relationship of strategy to cause cannot be de-instrumentalized in the name of ideological non-complicity. Instrumentality is unavoidable, and instrumentality is never uncontaminated, never quite fully up to the occasion. The challenge is how to use strategy and not be used by it. I would maintain that Du Boisian double consciousness is very much in alignment with the Gramscian program, and I would also say the same of Edward Said’s Palestinian contrapuntal engagement with Zionism (Said, “Zionism from the point of view of its victims”). Zionism’s denial of the very existence of Palestine is no less “inaugural,” or for that matter, the Hindu casteist denial of the humanity of the untouchable dalit, than the denial of Black humanity by anti-Black Humanism. My thesis is that relationality is a given and cannot be disavowed, or opted out of in a gesture of separatism. In fact, the very gesture of separatism reinstates that given relationality without which separatism can have no meaning. . . That coexistence founds existence, that the two are consubstantial and coextensive is an a priori beyond refutation. Who should speak for whom and not, and under what conditions? How should the distinction be made between who is saying it, and what is being said? What is the qualitative difference between Afro-Pessimism speaking for itself in all its difference and speaking for all humanity?22 The particular then has to realize the representative gravitas of universal freight without in any way diluting or compromising the immediate difference of the particular. The precious and unique insights and truths that belong to Afro-Pessimism or the LGBTQ movement, or Black Lives Matter, or the Dalit struggle have to be generalized into the truth of the human condition without loss to the particularity of perspective. To use a different example, how can feminism perform both as itself and as a project of feminizing the entire body politic? If feminism remained just feminism, is it really living up to its world-historical destiny?23 Is the particular ruthlessly subsumed without a trace by the general, the universal? Is there a way to recognize the new universal as the Afro-Pessimist, the Dalit, or the Queer Universal (where queer signifies both itself and the transitive reach out towards queering the entire fabric of reality and existence)? Madhavi Menon, in her book Indifference to Difference, poses this problem of perspectival universalism with rare care and great sensitivity. What is a queer universal? What is its function? Does universalism foster or kill difference? Is it a contradiction in terms, or is it paradoxically meaningful to conceive of a universalism based on difference? Should difference, to be truly and autonomously different, be indifferent to itself; or should it cultivate difference? How different should the procedural affirmation of difference be from the procedural affirmation of identity? What is a differential universalism? How is perspective both enfranchised and disseminated in the name of the universal? When Bartleby resolutely prefers not to, or when Afro-Pessimism demurs in perpetuity, what is the trajectory of desire that underlies this negativity without recourse? What does radical pessimism desire? Or will radical pessimism demand that the very nature, meaning, and structure of desire be revolutionized as a precondition for the affirmation of pessimist desire? Would universalism function as a premise in this project? In speaking for itself would “Black Lives” also speak for all lives, or would it question such a facile humanistic expectation? Clearly, there is something ironically punitive in the expectation that the subaltern subject should take on the twin task of both hegemonizing itself and interrogate hegemony as such, insisting on its specificity and at the same time put specificity under erasure?24 It is certainly possible to argue that relationality, or better still, relationality as structure is a more useful form of leverage to effect social change than universalism; a term forever tarnished by its European legacy and provenance, i.e., Eurocentric exceptionalism masquerading as benign universalism (Samir Amin, Eurocentrism). The debate here has to do with whether or not the time has come to abandon that term altogether rather than seek to read it against the grain and somehow make it usable again. In our own times, Alain Badiou has been that one steadfast philosopher who has endeavored to reanimate universalism away from its Enlightenment genealogy. Madhavi Menon concludes her book with a rich meditation on the possibilities as well as the pitfalls of a queer universalism. In the phrase “queer universalism” is “queer” an adjective, a particular, a denomination, a name of a name, a name under era sure? What about a Dalit or a Black universal? In my reading, Menon offers both a conjunctive and a disjunctive reading of the relationship between “queer” as a constituency in and for itself and queering as a mode of trans-local and transitive “willing” (conatus) praxis whereby “queer” loses its specificity only to be regained as a universal and/or appeal. She does not read this as a zero-sum game. Arguing along possibilities opened up by Alain Badiou, Menon has this to say about queer universalism: Keeping open the question of whether or not the self can ever coincide with itself, universalism is the language for all because it is the language of the not-all. Indeed, for Alain Badiou, universalism tears through knowability because it irrevocably shifts the protocols by which we know and the basis on which we create epistemologies: “There is no acceptable matrix of the universal.” Such a universalism militates against owning an ontological particular. It cannot ground queer theory in sexual identity even as it can highlight the queerness in not cleaving to particularity. As such, what is queer about queer theory is its ability to recognize and sympathize with longings across borders, to refuse the logic of particularity with respect to desire; to keep the door universally open rather than shutting it behind our backs; to think of desire as that which moves across rather than being confined to sexual acts and identities. (Madhavi Menon, Indifference to Difference 126–27)

#### C. Exceptionalism – it has been imposed on the Black subject by legacies of racism and colonialism – pessimism says the colonizers won and perpetuates the Master/Slave paradigm. Pre-humanization of the Black subject is a historical effect and not inaugural. Voting neg to embrace an affirmative deconstructive project that bridges African American affirmation with the deconstruction of the pasts Master/Slave binaries.

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So, how and why is the instance of Afro-Pessimism an exception to this general and universal wisdom? How does one read this “exceptionalist” truth claim on behalf of the Afro-Pessimist subject? Is this a cognitive or a conative claim? How is “preemption by structure” exceptional in the case of Afro-Pessimism? Wilderson’s response would be that the proletarian even in her most abject state of alienation remains human whereas the Black subject is outside the pale of the human, natally, assumptively, and paradigmatically. Even assuming that the claim of exceptionalism is will-based, what are the productive consequences of such a truth claim? In a minor disagreement with Wilderson I would contend that the pre-humanization of the Black subject is a historical effect and not an inaugural phenomenon. I would argue that exceptionalism has been imposed upon the Afro Black subject; and this a negative exceptionalism. The genesis of Afro-Pessimist exceptionalism lies in the history of Slavery. If some are born exceptionalist, some achieve exceptionalist status, and some have exceptionalism thrust upon us, then, there is no doubt where the Black subject figures in this distribution. Exceptionalism is an imposed negative legacy to the Black subject. What does any subject owe to a negative legacy? What is the reason for living and dying by an imposed legacy, a legacy that is not one’s own? I would suggest that the reason is nothing but the chronically inextinguishable desire to hoist the master/the colonized on his own petard. The memory of lynching is to be memorialized for ever, never to be forgotten in the name of superficial seductions.16 If Afro-Pessimist exceptionalism is a reaction formation to the dehumanizing brutality of Slavery, what is the advantage in perpetuating the longue duree of this mode of praxis except as a way of arraigning without recourse the criminality and guilt of Racism? Is it conceivable, that despite its overt intentionality, Afro-Pessimism is falling a prey to its own strategy, i.e., the strategy of never ever letting White Racism off the hook? The flip side of course of never ever letting white Racism off the hook is the critical prolongation of the Master/ Slave paradigm. In its very attempt to avoid the pitfalls of double-consciousness, the Afro-Pessimist subject, in its own antinomian mode, is in fact testifying to the legitimacy of double-consciousness. I am reminded here of the negritude movement, which, despite some of its short term gains, remained captive to Eurocentric interpellation. Negritude in

#### D. No aff offense – our criticism explicitly rejects policy driven moves toward Black progress. Voting negative does not endorse any form of liberal humanist coalition but rather a radical coming together of Pan African and Black Nationalist movements that actively fights the anti-humanness forced upon them – this solves the aff and avoids their fetishization of the United States as the sole determiner of Black life and humanity.

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Afro-Pessimism is right on the mark to insist that mere policy driven moves towards black amelioration are hardly worth the effort. As the leaders of Black Lives Matter made it very clear to Hillary Clinton during her Presidential campaign, what is needed is a change of hearts, and not just a change of policy. In Wilderson’s terms, a Black subject could practice a kind of successful individual politics, at the level of culture, identity, and sexual orientation. “But to be able to say, I am alive at a that paradigmatic level, that I am really and truly a human being and not the other thing . . . this can only be guaranteed to the extent to which one can say, I am not Black” (Wilderson, “The Black in the Cul-de- Sac” 66.). The crucial term for Wilderson here is “paradigmatic.” To be alive at the paradigmatic level, a structural threshold and not merely an existential or historical index, is a possibility forever closed to the Black subject. The master thinker here of course is Orlando Patterson whose corrective projects “involve looking at slavery first and foremost as a structuring relation which constitutes the paradigm of human interaction” (Wilderson, “The Black in the Cul-de- Sac” 64). Here again the conviction that underlies Wilderson’s rationale is that structural coups cannot be undone. It is at the level of structure and the paradigm that is enabled by structural architectonics that the black subject is annihilated, nullified, and rendered inhuman. It is not that other subaltern subjects are not thwarted or stymied by the obduracy of structure. Wilderson’s thesis is that in the case of the Black subject, it is not the circumstantial or historical impermeability of structure that is the hurdle, but rather, the axiomaticity of the structure. This is the difference. The flipside of this axiomaticity is the in-humanness of the Black subject. Even the Native American is not as forelorn. The Native American was genocided for land: there was so to speak, a reason for the genocide. But in the case of Blackness, oppression is pure, unreasonable. In the Black instance, Reason becomes totally and inviolably intransitive: Reason does not have to offer a reason for being unreasonable, no rationale for what it does except the will to do so. The reason for anti-Blackness is the very reason for the becoming reason of reason. Is such a thesis completely acceptable? Why can a structural relation not be redone, re-imagined, re-articulated? Well, such a revolutionary move may require its own structure, and in this sense, structure may be inescapable, omni-historical. 10 Woven into the Afro-Pessimist fabric is a dogmatic Lacanian mode of theorizing structure, and I don’t have the time to explore that dimension in this essay. All I would like to say is that Afro-Pessimism wills and chooses to tarry with the symptom insisting all along that the complexity and the deep structure of the symptom should and ought to forever surpass the opportunistic and instrumental cleverness of any proposed cure.11 No so-called remedy should be allowed to trivialize or mis-state the problem of anti-Blackness. It does indeed seem to be the case that anti-Blackness is global and archetypal,12 and in that sense omni-historical, in its reach, and ergo impervious to positivist and identitarian schemes of amelioration. The fierce strength of Afro-Pessimism lies in its insistence that any change, without a radical second order revolutionization of the very meaning of the term “human,” is not only disingenuous but very much a continuation and an ideological consolidation of anti-Black humanism. Lee Edelman’s denial of futurity is not all that different, from the point of view of queer particularism.13 (Wilderson would predictably object to such an analogical reading.)Is a radical change imaginable, doable? What lessons have been learned from history to justify epistemological attitudes such as optimism, pessimism, cynicism, skepticism, critical utopianism? If history is always ambivalent and inconclusive, and if furthermore, every document of civilization is equally a document of barbarism (Walter Benjamin, Illuminations 256), how should the will, and how should the intellect parse this indeterminacy? We are now back to our starting point: half full or half empty. I would argue for now, and I hope to flesh this out more fully in my work to come, that Afro-Pessimism has the conative option to think beyond the nation-state (Pan Africanism and Black Nationalism and Marcus Garvey come to mind), beyond America, and yoke its particular non-fungible struggle to the global omni-historical struggle of anti-black humanism. I am not suggesting a liberal humanist coalition, but a radical coming together of forces and constituencies that have had anti-humanness forced on them natally by virtue of their blackness. But such a yoking, from the point of view of Afro-Pessimism would entail 1) a deleterious self de-singularization, and 2) de-Americanization. Afro-Pessimism, I would contend, in refusing such a deterritorialization of its sovereign cause, ends up ironically, fetishizing the nation state, in this case, USA. The racializing state is perpetuated as the pharmakon, as the inescapable Oedipal Father who by his very death eternalizes “the name of the Father.” What I find troubling, in a theoretically productive way, is Afro-Pessimism’s resolutely non-diasporic orientation. Afro-Pessimism lives and dies with and by the USA.

# 3

#### Interpreation: Non-black people shouldn’t read afropess

#### They’re not black, they shouldn’t read this – turns the K

Evans 15

Rashad. Former policy debater, and coach “On White Afropessimism”. July 2015. RP

Such was not the case with Black Nihilism. The debaters actually picked this argument up with some ease. Of course, the argument beneath the Nihilism argument is afro-pessimism. This is a super popular debate argument already so I can see how it might be attractive to young debaters. However, I wonder why there was no similar cognitive dissonance for the debaters before arguing in favor of a radical Black argument which principally focuses on white violence and the necessity of a Black revolution. I listened to the debates just as I have listened to many college debates on the argument and it became clear to me that the kids did not get the argument. The argument had been reduced to: it sucks to be the Black body. I consistently hear debaters saying things like “the Back body can never…” “the Black body always…””…to the Black body.” The is actually a reprieve from those debaters who would sometimes insert slave instead of Black body. In any event, non-Black debaters tend to use the pessimism argument to reduce Black people to a body or slave or simply an object. This is kinda the argument. But, this is the perversity of the argument in the hands of non-black debaters. One important move of afro-pessimism is to focus on anti-blackness as opposed to or in addition to white supremacy. The idea is that the world is anti-black and that anti-blackness is: (1) bigger than individual acts, (2) about more than white people and (3) foundational to humanity and civil society. In other words, all white people are implicated no matter how good or nice they are and so are non-white, non-Black people and no good can come of this world. However, that focus on anti-blackness and what makes the Black experience unique has also become an excuse for non-Black debaters to only focus on how “the Black body” is positioned by violence without theorizing about who is doing the positioning. In addition, if the world is always already anti-black then it can be difficult to see how any individual debater, judge or coach might be actually participating in anti-blackness, particularly as they engage with each other on the everyday. And, that humanity and civil society is fundamentally anti-black is merely an opportunity to explain why it has always sucked to be Black and not an opportunity to explain that the only way to affirm Blackness is to upend the entire world and at least includes a violent war against white people. Afropessimism is nothing if not an affirmation of blackness. It includes a negation of the world, but it is principally an affirming argument. For Black people. A white afropessimist makes no sense. White afropessimism is just anti-blackness. If you are a white afro-pessimist you should understand that your existence is complicit in violence against Black people and/or that your non-existence is a necessity to Black liberation. Under no circumstances should you understand your role to be to spread the gospel of pessimism further. Your engagement with\\ the argument will always be theoretical (you have no relevant experience), redundant (you can never be additive to this conversation) and objectifying (reducing black people to objects of study). Afropessimism is an argument about why Black people should be the the subjects of the the debate. It is about how Black people are always already the subject of all debates but excluded from them as such. It is not about white people. All of this assumes that we are taking the argument seriously and not speaking in metaphorical terms, something Eve Tuck warns against in the context of settler colonialism. Both the Settler Colonialism and Black Nihilism arguments rely significantly on Fanon. And Fanon’s main point is that the native/colonialist and/or black/white cannot coexist. In practical terms, this meant that Black liberation in Africa required a violent war to the end. It’s an either/or life or death choice for both sides. But, understanding that anti-black violence is foundational is to understand that you have to fight back in literal terms. To end the world is to end the world. I am not certain that debaters fully understand the implications of such. If the students in my lab understood this they would have found the Black Nihilism argument as difficult as the Settler Colonialism argument. But they did not, partially because they were introduced to the argument from the perspective of Gramsci and a theory of civil society and not from Fanon and everyday anti-Black violence, but also because I didn’t take the time to explain the argument fully. Under no circumstances should non-Black debaters be taught to advocate for afro-pessimism from a non-Black person. And under no circumstances should two white boys think they have a better shot flipping negative and running afropessimism than reading their own Aff (something I had to explain before a quarters debate at the camp tournament). When that happens something has gone wrong.

#### Standards: 1] co-option 2] performativity

#### And, reps come first, meaning they should lose

#### Probability: There’s a 50/50 chance the K is true, but theres’ 100% chance that commodifying suffering is bad

#### Reversibility: once oppressive rhetoric is used it cannot be taken back

#### Norm setting: we are part of a larger debate community with extensive norms – letting racism be rampant kills the community

#### Competition: debate is an educational competition with no place for offensive rhetoric – that kills access to the lasting benefit debate provides

# Case

### Proper

#### Pessimism is wrong – antiblackness is not a fait accompli – their theory only recreates anti-blackness.

Brown, PhD Candidate, 19

(Marcus, Phil@StonyBrook, LeadOrganizer@ThirdWorldPeople’sAlliance, 8-24, https://content.redvoice.news/bad-faith-and-afropessimism-notes-toward-a-debate/)

As should by now be obvious, my intent in drafting these notes is not to call Wilderson up to the pillory. There is much to be admired in both the form and content of his books, essays, and interviews. He is a captivating narrator and prose stylist; and the thick splotches of pathos that sometimes distract from his arguments are regularly broken by ironic caesuras that prevent the reader's suffocating on Black pain. Compared with some of his colleagues and disciples, his arguments are mercifully lucid, capable of connection into something like an account of the social whole. Yet that whole turns out to be false, and not in the Adornian, but in the classical sense: Wilderson’s adopted standpoint fails to yield a coherent account of the contradictions that rend our social totality, or an actionable program for liberation from racial capitalism, because it mistakes a chimerical subject-position (the natally alienated Black subject) for the Archimedean point of a global modernity in crisis. Wilderson’s flawed standpoint has two regrettable consequences for Afropessimist thought. First, it limits Afropessimist sources of Black rebellion to our dehumanized being-for-others (the white other), rather than acknowledging positive forms of self-regard and communal recognition among Black folk that are reservoirs of resistance against white supremacy. Second, in overemphasizing the role of antiblackness in the constitution of Black and non-Black lifeworlds, Wilderson and his cohort seem deliberately to overlook the Fanonist basis for revolutionary internationalism: since the major antagonism in modern life centers on colonized versus non-colonized nations, the presence of un-reflective anti-Blackness among non-Black people of color does not prevent radical coalition with them, any more than similarly reactionary beliefs among and between Black groups cut off our shared revolutionary potential. Both positions ultimately land the Afropessimists on an error whose irony is underlined by their collective Francophilia. That error is Sartrean mauvaise-foi, or bad faith, the paradoxical human capacity to lie to ourselves about what we know to be true concerning our

**Individual rounds do not change subjectivity, even if they spur immediate reflection, those insights aren’t integrated into deep-stored memory—this means you can vote negative on presumption. Encouraging focused research is the only chance to change attitudes—this means you should prioritize our impacts about how they hurt the broader model of debate even if the aff’s good for them.**

Goodin and Niemeyer 3Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings,

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