# 1

#### Interp - The letter “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “just government” – the resolution must be proven true in all instances, not one particular instance

CCC Capital Community College [a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation], “Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles AG

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### “Government” is a generic indefinite singular.

Leslie 12 Leslie, Sarah-Jane. “Generics.” In Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian Russell and Delia Fara, 355–366. Routledge, 2012. <https://www.princeton.edu/~sjleslie/RoutledgeHandbookEntryGenerics.pdf> SM

GENERICS VS. EXISTENTIALS The interpretation of sentences containing bare plurals, indefinite singulars, or definite singulars can be either generic as in (1) respectively or existential/specific as in (2): (1) Tigers are striped A tiger is striped The tiger is striped. (2) Tigers are on the front lawn A tiger is on the front lawn The tiger is on the front lawn. The subjects in (1) are prima facie the same as in (2), yet their interpretations in (1) are intuitively quite different from those in (2). In (2) we are talking about some particular tigers, while in (1) we are saying something about tigers in general. There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. For example, if it is true that tigers are on the lawn, then it will also be true that animals are on the lawn. This is not so if the sentence is interpreted generically. For example, it is true that tigers are striped, but it does not follow that animals are striped (Lawler 1973 Laca 1990; Krifka et al 1995). Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification (in the sense of Lewis 1975) with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in (1) (e.g. “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in (2) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g. “tigers are usually on the front lawn). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually”.)

Applies to “just governments” – upward entailment – just doesn’t mean unjust

#### Violation – They spec US

#### Standards:

#### 1] **Limits – You can pick any government and find a flimsy definition of it being “just”. Just is super vague and it’s easy to prove any government as just. That’s over 123 countries – there are solid affs for China, US, India, South Africa, and Russia - that explodes neg prep burdens and kills clash. Generics don’t solve- infinite pre-round prep and encourages reading the same arguments which kills education.**

ITUC 20**,** (International Trade Union Confederation, “World’s Worst Countries for Workers”), ITUC, 2020, https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc\_globalrightsindex\_2020\_en.pdf // MNHS NL recut DD AG

In 2020, strikes have been severely restricted or banned in 123 out of 144 countries. In a significant number of these countries, industrial actions were brutally repressed by the authorities and workers exercising their right to strike often faced criminal prosecution and summary dismissals.

#### 2] TVA solves – just read your aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff – we don’t stop them from reading new FWs, mechanisms or advantages. a] it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff being non-T b] There’s only a small number of pics on this topic c] PICs incentivize them to write better affs that can generate solvency deficits to PICs

#### Drop the debater bc you can’t drop the arg on their advocacy

#### No rvis – they can dump on theory in the 1ar, chilling us from checking abuse

#### Competing interps – reasonability is arbtirary and causes race to the bottom

# 2

#### SCOTUS’s decision on *Roe v. Wade* hinges on Roberts’ political capital.

Robinson ’21 (Kimberly; reporter for Bloomberg Law; 6-18-2021; “Barrett Channels Roberts’ ‘Go-Slow’ Approach in Landmark Cases”; Bloomberg Law; https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/barrett-channels-roberts-go-slow-approach-in-landmark-cases; Accessed: 10-1-2021; AU)

The U.S. Supreme **Court’s** newest justice is showing signs that she’s more **aligned with** John **Roberts** and Brett Kavanaugh **in the center** than she is with her other conservative colleagues, **refusing to support** broad **rulings that** could **shake** the **court’s credibility**. Amy Coney Barrett is “starting to show her stripes” as a moderate who prefers small movements in the law, not huge shifts, South Texas College of Law Houston professor Josh Blackman said. The justices handed down victories to both liberals and conservatives on Thursday saving the Affordable Care Act again but siding with a religious group in the latest battle over LGBT protections. **Roberts**, the chief justice, is viewed as an **institutionalist** **who wants to conserve** the public’s **confidence** in the court. So far, he **favors incremental shifts** in the law. “That’s been one of the Chief’s primary goals all along,” said Case Western Reserve law professor Jonathan Adler. He recently gained an **ally in Kavanaugh** in this pursuit, **and** it appears **Barrett** may join their ranks. The court as a whole has has largely agreed in cases this year. The unanimous decision in the LGBT case was the 25th time the justices were unanimous in 41 rulings so far this term. There are 15 to go in coming days. But the **big test** for Barrett **will be** next term starting in October when the justices will tackle hot-button issues like guns, **abortion**, and possibly affirmative action. “It is a very conservative Court, even if we will only get glimpses of it this year,” said UC Berkeley law school Dean Erwin Chemerinsky. Kicking the Can Both the **A**ffordable **C**are **A**ct **and LGBT** rulings **were** “very, very **narrow**,” Georgia State law professor EricSegall said. In the Obamacare case, California v. Texas, the 7-2 majority handed down a procedural ruling to avoid undoing the landmark 2010 law. The justices said red states led by Texas didn’t have a legal basis—or standing—to challenge it. Only Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch would have voted to gut the act, long a priority of Republicans. The LGBT ruling, while unanimous in its outcome, was splintered in its reasoning. Hiding under the 9-0 breakdown was a dispute about whether to overturn the court’s divisive ruling in Employment Division v. Smith, which sparked the passage of the bipartisan Religious Freedom Protection Act and mini state versions across the country. The court in Smith refused to require an exception from Oregon’s prohibition on peyote, saying religious objectors don’t get a free pass on “generally applicable” laws. On opposite ends in the court’s LGBT ruling were the liberal justices—Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan—along with Roberts, who wanted to uphold the court’s precedent in Smith, and the court’s most conservative members—Clarence Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch—who wanted it overruled once and for all. In **the middle** was Barrett, joined by Kavanaugh, who acknowledged Smith‘s shortcomings but was **concerned with** the **fallout** should the court overrule it. “Yet what should replace Smith?” Barrett asked in a short concurrence. Both cases were a punt, Blackman said, with the issues likely to return to the court at some point in the future. End of the World But the ACA and LGBT cases, along with the extraordinary agreement all term, suggests a **majority** of the justices **don’t think** **it’s** the right **time to make major changes** in the law. “In the throes of everything"—the pandemic, Barrett’s first term, Kavanaugh’s biting confirmation, calls for Breyer to retire, and the caustic 2020 presidential election—"they didn’t want to shock the world this year,” Segall said. “**Preserving** the **court’s** own political **capital** **is** incredibly **important** to the justices because they know their only capital is the confidence of the American people,” he added. **Adler said the court has developed a sort of 3-3-3 split**—that is, three liberals, three conservative justices willing to chuck precedents they don’t agree with, and three conservative justices hesitant to overturn cases they may disagree with. **Roberts, Kavanaugh, and now, apparently, Barrett make up that last group.** Adler said that split will create some interesting pressures for the three justices in the middle next term, when—as Segall said—"the world will end.” **The end of the world was a reference—in part—to the court’s abortion case, which could call into question the landmark ruling in Roe v. Wade and later cases**.

#### The court’s center is skeptical of overturning precedent in Roe, but the path’s narrow.

Feldman ‘9/2 (Noah; Bloomberg Opinion columnist and host of the podcast “Deep Background.” He is a professor of law at Harvard University and was a clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice David Souter.; “Is the Supreme Court Ready to Overturn Roe? We Don’t Know”; 9/2/21; Bloomberg; https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-09-02/supreme-court-ruling-on-texas-abortion-law-isn-t-death-knell-for-roe; Accessed 9/17/21]

Every nonlawyer on the planet — and no doubt a few lawyers, too — is likely to read this outcome as prefiguring a 5-to-4 vote to overturn Roe v. Wade, the 1973 precedent that made abortion a constitutional right. Later this year, **the court will address** a Mississippi anti-**abortion law** that lacks the cleverly diabolical enforcement mechanism of the Texas law but is equally unconstitutional. Indeed, the day after the law went into effect and before the Supreme Court ruled, many non-lawyers who were so unfamiliar with court procedures that they didn’t know it would eventually issue a ruling on the Texas law had already concluded that they knew how the upcoming Mississippi case would come out. That’s a possible interpretation of the latest opinion, to be sure. But the **opinion** for the five conservatives **explicitly denied** it. “We stress,” said the justices, “that we do not purport **to resolve** definitively any jurisdictional or **substantive claim** in the applicants’ lawsuit.” That’s lawyer-speak for **saying** both that the **law could** still **be unconstitutional** and that there might still be some procedural way to block its operation. For good measure, the opinion said the challengers “have raised serious questions regarding the constitutionality of the Texas law.” These **formulations indicate** that at least **some** of the five **conservatives** who joined it wanted to take pains **not to** **send** the **message** **that Roe** v. Wade **is sure to be overturned**. What is less clear is whether anyone on the political battlefield wants to hear that message. The pro-choice camp will doubtless spend the months until the court term ends in June whipping up public sentiment, either in the hopes of changing the outcome or turning any decision overturning Roe into the impetus for packing the court or producing a heavy Democratic turnout in the 2022 midterm elections. The pro-life camp has an equal interest in making the overturning of Roe seem inevitable. Consequently, neither side cares much for dispassionate analysis. But the fact remains that the majority in the Texas ruling did not address the underlying issues, so it would be premature to predict the outcome in the Mississippi case based on it. Taken strictly on its own terms, the **opinion** made a point that **is incorrect** in my view, **but** that is **legally plausible**. That is that there’s no clear precedent for courts to block in advance the operation of a law that creates a civil penalty — not a criminal violation — to be applied by the courts after private lawsuits by private parties. Ordinarily, when a criminal law is obviously unconstitutional, the courts issue an order to the state attorney general not to enforce it. Such an order would not have any effect in this case, since the Texas attorney general isn’t empowered to enforce the law.

#### Expanding Rights Protection is perceived as judicial activism – it strays from the Constitution and forces Roberts to expend court capital.

Tribe et al. ‘10 [Laurence; January 2010; Carl M. Loeb University Professor at Harvard Law School, et al.; "TOO HOT FOR COURTS TO HANDLE: FUEL TEMPERATURES, GLOBAL WARMING, AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE," https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/washlegal-uploads/upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/012910Tribe\_WP.pdf/]

We can stipulate that the **Constitution’s** framers were **not driven by** the **relationships** among chemistry, temperature, combustion engines, and global climate when they **assigned** **to** the **judicial process** the task of **interpreting** and applying **rules of law**, and to the political process the mission of making the basic policy choices underlying those rules. Yet the framework established by the Constitution they promulgated, refined over time but admirably constant in this fundamental respect, wisely embodied the recognition that enacting the ground rules for the conduct of commerce in all of its manifestations—including designing incentives for innovation and creative production (through regimes of intellectual property), establishing the metrics and units for commercial transactions (through regimes of weights and measures), and coping with the cross-boundary effects of economic activity (through the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce)—was a task quintessentially political rather than judicial in character. Yet the litigious **character of** American **society**, observed early in the republic’s history by deTocqueville, has ineluctably **drawn** American **courts**, federal as well as state, into problems within these spheres more properly and productively addressed by the legislative and executive branches. This has occurred in part because **political solutions** to complex problems of policy choice inevitably **leave some** citizens and consumers **dissatisfied** and inclined to seek judicial redress for their woes, real or imagined. And it has occurred in part because the toughest **political problems** appear on the horizon long before solutions can be identified, much less agreed upon, **leaving courts** to **fill the vacuum** that social forces abhor no less than nature itself. One can believe strongly in access to courts for the protection of judicially enforceable rights and the preservation of legal boundaries—as the authors of this WORKING PAPER do— while still deploring the perversion of the judicial process to meddle in matters of policy formation far removed from those judicially manageable realms. Indeed, the two concerns are mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory, for **courts squander** the **social and cultural capital** they need **in order to do** what may be **politically unpopular in preserving rights and protecting boundaries** when they yield to the temptation to treat lawsuits as ubiquitously useful devices for making the world a better place.

#### RTS is treated as an issue of corporate free speech - Robert’s legacy is built on its rejection - ensures sustained backlash.

Thomson-DeVeaux 18 (, A., 2018. Chief Justice Roberts Is Reshaping The First Amendment. [online] FiveThirtyEight. Available at: <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/chief-justice-roberts-is-reshaping-the-first-amendment/> [Accessed 5 November 2021] Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux is a senior writer at FiveThirtyEight. Before joining FiveThirtyEight’s staff, she was a regular contributor to the site and a freelance writer and editor with a wide portfolio of work. Her writing has been published in a variety of outlets, including CNN, Cosmopolitan, National Journal, and New York Magazine. She is a graduate of Princeton University and holds a master's degree in religious studies from The University of Chicago. Between degrees, she was on the staff of The American Prospect and worked as a writer and editor for PRRI, a public opinion research organization in Washington, DC.)-rahulpenu

It’s been a big year for free speech at the Supreme Court. Two of the most high-profile cases argued before the court so far have revolved around free speech rights, four other cases on the docket this term involve free speech questions, and yet another case where the issue is paramount greets the court on Tuesday.

The court today is hearing arguments on whether the state of California is trampling on the free speech rights of crisis pregnancy centers — nonprofit organizations that do not perform abortions and encourage women to seek alternatives to the procedure — by requiring them to post notices explaining patients’ ability to access abortion and other medical services. In December, attorneys for a baker at Masterpiece Cakeshop in Colorado argued that a state anti-discrimination law violates his free speech rights as a self-described cake artist by requiring him to make a wedding cake for a gay couple. Last month, the justices heard oral arguments in a case about whether state laws allowing unions to require nonmembers to pay fees violate those employees’ right to free speech.

Whichever way the rulings come down this spring and summer, it’s almost certain that the winning side will include Chief Justice John Roberts, who has spent his 12-plus years at the helm of the high court quietly carving out a space as a prolific and decisive arbiter of free speech law. Supporters and critics both agree that during his tenure, the court has dramatically expanded the reach of the First Amendment by striking down a wide range of statutes for encroaching on free speech rights. And **Roberts** has **authored** more **majority** **opinions** **on** **free** **speech** than any other justice during his tenure, signaling that this is an area where he **wants** **to** **create** a **legacy**.

But just what that legacy will be is **highly** **contested**. Roberts’s admirers argue that his commitment to the First Amendment transcends ideological boundaries. But others contend that his decisions don’t protect speech across the board. Instead, they say that **Roberts** is more than willing to **allow** the government to restrict speech when it’s speech he disagrees with — meaning **free** **speech** is becoming **a** legal **tool** **that** **favors** **corporations** **over** **individuals**.

The chief justice gets to decide who writes the majority opinion in any case where he’s on the winning side, which means that Roberts is able to stake a claim over a particular area of law if he so chooses. And that seems to be what’s happening with free speech: As of the end of the 2016 term, Roberts had written 34 percent of the free speech decisions the court has handed down since he joined its ranks, and 14 percent of his majority opinions were devoted to the topic.1 Even when he’s not writing for the majority, Roberts is rarely on the losing side: Out of the 38 free speech cases we counted,2 he voted with the minority only once.

The First Amendment appears to be a topic of deep personal interest for Roberts, and he’s not commanding the majority opinion in these cases simply to reinforce earlier decisions. Roberts has presided over — and participated in — a deliberate and systematic expansion of free speech rights in the realm of campaign finance and commercial speech. The court’s determination that campaign spending limits on corporations violated free speech in the 2010 case Citizens United v. FEC was just one in a series that struck down a range of campaign finance laws on First Amendment grounds and expanded corporations’ right to speech in other venues, like drug advertising and trademark regulations.

According to legal experts, these rulings represent a clear and unprecedented reversal of previous Supreme Court interpretations of the First Amendment, particularly with regard to corporations. Those interpretations began taking shape early in the last century, as the court only began to strike down federal statutes for abridging free speech after World War I. As it did so, it at first explicitly rejected the idea that commercial speech was constitutionally protected. In the 1970s and ’80s, the justices walked this decision back somewhat as it related to certain types of ads, but they continued to maintain that advertising remained categorically different from other kinds of speech, especially when it was presenting inaccurate information.

At the same time, the justices issued groundbreaking rulings that protected the speech of unpopular individuals and groups against government censorship. It was these cases, which involved government attempts to quash union picketing, student protests of the Vietnam war, flag-burning and Nazi protests, that established free speech as an essential protection for people with minority opinions who were in danger of being silenced by the majority.

This is decidedly not the principle that the Roberts court has embraced with its rulings on campaign finance and commercial speech. Starting in the 1970s, campaign finance laws restricting the flow of money into politicians’ coffers aimed to make space for more voices in the political sphere by preventing the wealthy from buying influence. But in the Citizens United case, the court ruled that the government couldn’t restrict the free speech rights of corporations simply because they were corporations — even if citizens with fewer financial resources were less able to command the attention of their elected officials as a result.

Although the Roberts court seems to be interpreting free speech in a new way with these decisions, some historians say that free speech has always been ideologically flexible. According to Laura Weinrib, a historian and professor of law at the University of Chicago, corporate titans like the Ford Motor Company were part of the early push for broader **free** **speech** **protections** precisely because they recognized the power of the First Amendment for **advancing** **their** **own** **causes**, while organizations like the ACLU strategically accepted a “neutral” vision of free speech that **protected** the strong (**companies** like Ford) as well as the weak (union **workers** **seeking** the **right to strike**) in order to secure early victories for **labor** **rights**. Those twin forces helped **pave** the **way** **for** **today’s** understanding of **free** **speech** **under** the **Roberts** court.

It’s that question of what free speech protections should do — and whether it’s acceptable to muzzle stronger voices if they’re drowning out weak or unpopular opponents — that may help explain the Roberts court’s **rightward** **turn** **on** **corporate** **speech**.

Burt Neuborne, a law professor at New York University and a former legal director of the ACLU, said that the liberal justices are willing to tolerate some restrictions on speech because they see them as necessary to build a fair society. “In this view, you can, for example, limit free speech when it threatens our democracy,” Neuborne said. The **conservative** **justices**, on the other hand, tend to **view** **free** **speech** **itself** **as** the **goal**. “They don’t care what happens afterward or who they’re affecting — they just **want** **to** **get** the **gov**ernment **out** **of** the business of **meddling** with speech,” he said.

This explanation is complicated, though, by the fact the Roberts court — and Roberts himself — has painted a muddier picture of other speech limits. Roberts authored opinions striking down a civil judgment holding the Westboro Baptist Church liable for damages resulting from church members picketing outside a soldier’s funeral, and a law prohibiting the distribution of videos showing animal cruelty. Those rulings are clearly in line with previous ones permitting flag-burning and Nazi protests. But Roberts also issued decisions or signed onto rulings that allowed the government to restrict the speech of students, even when they’re off school property, and limit the expression of public employees in a variety of contexts.

There’s disagreement about whether the Roberts court, by upholding these government restrictions on speech, is undermining its reputation as a court dedicated to a broad view of free speech. “It’s very much to Roberts’s credit that his Supreme Court has a genuinely expansive view of free speech that can’t be explained by political favoritism,” said Michael McConnell, a professor at Stanford Law School. He acknowledged that there are a few exceptions but said they aren’t significant or frequent enough to undermine his broader characterization of Roberts’s record.

But Genevieve Lakier, another University of Chicago law professor, disagreed. “The court does make judgments about when the government needs to restrict speech,” she said. “And in contexts like schools, or when the government says there are national security needs, it’s shockingly willing to allow those restrictions.”

Whether or not it’s fair to say that the Roberts court has been broadly protective of free speech, there’s little question that the court is reshaping it in ways that will resonate for years to come. And the cases this term could play a pivotal role in defining and clarifying that legacy — especially Masterpiece Cakeshop.

Neuborne predicted that the wedding cake case would be challenging for Roberts, but that either way, it would further illuminate his stance on free speech. “This case could have serious ramifications for nondiscrimination law,” Neuborne said. “But there is a free speech claim involved, so we’ll see how much of an absolutist Roberts is willing to be.”

#### Legal Abortion key to Fetal Tissue research that creates treatments and vaccines for disease

LRM 19 Medicine, The Lancet Respiratory. "Fetal tissue research: focus on the science and not the politics." (2019): 639. (ranked as the number one journal in the fields of critical care and respiratory medicine)//Found by JM + BUBU//Re-cut by Elmer

**Stem cell** therapy **research** in lung disease is still at early stages, but the research output is **increasing** and the area is a **promising** one. However, there are **limits** to the use of MSC and other adult multipotent stem cells, because **substantial numbers** are **required for therapeutic effects**. The cells also have a shorter replicative lifespan and can only make a restricted number of specialised cell types that are specific for their organ of origin. **Fetal tissue**, by contrast, provides cell lines that grow rapidly, are able to **easily differentiate** into multiple cell types, and are **less likely to be rejected** by the body. In the future, fetal tissue might be replaced in certain areas of research with the use of induced pluripotent stem cells and organoids, which are human-cell cultures that can be crafted to replicate an organ. However, in areas such as fetal development, a suitable replacement to fetal tissue is unlikely to be found. Although research into fetal tissue alternatives is worthwhile, it will take time and until then, the use of fetal tissue is **essential** so that **research efforts**, which are crucial for the development of new therapeutic treatments in often difficult-to-treat lung diseases, are not severely hampered. And those in the field need to ensure their voices are heard. Indeed, the American Thoracic Society released a statement the day after the Trump administration announcement saying that “Scientific research with fetal tissue is **vital for** the **development of new treatments for** many **deadly** **diseases** and conditions, such as cystic fibrosis and acute lung injury. **There are no alternative research models that can replace all fetal tissue research”.** Fetal tissue has been a **key** **part of** the development of multiple **vaccines**, **treatments** for cystic fibrosis, and ongoing research into cancer immunotherapy. The major objection to fetal tissue research is that the **source of** the **fetal tissue is** **mainly from** **elective abortions**. However, there is no suggestion that the number of abortions will decrease as a result of removing funding for fetal tissue research. **Abortion is still legal** in all 50 states in the USA and fetal tissue would otherwise be discarded. **Fetal tissue research**, in fact, holds the **potential to save lives** through the development of new treatments and vaccines. Politicising scientific research in this way means denying hope to millions of patients with life-limiting diseases.

#### Diseases cause Extinction

Bar-Yam 16 Yaneer Bar-Yam 7-3-2016 “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world” <http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition> (Professor and President, New England Complex System Institute; PhD in Physics, MIT)//Elmer

Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable.

# 3

#### The United States Congress should recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike..

#### The counterplan builds on current legislative momentum and buys federal follow-on.

Talbot et al. ’21 (Haley; writer for NBC News; 3-9-2021; “House passes ‘Protect the Right to Organize Act,’ 255-206, sends bill to Senate”; NBC News; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/house-passes-protect-right-organize-act-225-206-sends-bill-n1260312; Accessed: 10-30-2021; AU)

WASHINGTON — With no major labor reform since the 1930s, Democrats are **seizing** on the opportunity to **strengthen workers' rights** — including their ability to unionize. The House voted 225-206 Tuesday to pass the Protect the Right to Organize Act, or PRO Act, the **most pro-worker labor reform** in decades, according to the bill's sponsors. It faces an uphill battle in the 50/50 split Senate; President Joe Biden has said labor reform is one of his administration's **top priorities**. As a presidential candidate, Biden stressed that he would be "the most pro-union president you've ever seen." Last week, while Amazon workers gathered in Alabama to vote to unionize, Biden called it "a vitally important choice." "As America grapples with the deadly pandemic, the economic crisis and the reckoning on race — what it reveals is the deep disparities that still exist in our country," Biden said on Twitter. "I urge Congress to send [the PRO Act] to my desk so we can summon a new wave of worker power and create an economy that works for everyone." The PRO Act would strengthen workers' **rights to strike** for better wages and working conditions, strengthen safeguards to ensure that workers can hold fair union elections and allow the National Labor Relations Board to fine bosses who violate workers' rights.

#### **Congress has the authority to amend the National Labor Relations Act to unilaterally expand the right to strike.**

Kreighbaum ’21 (Andrew; writer for Bloomberg Law; 3-9-2921; “Landmark Labor Law Overhaul Passes House but Senate Fate Unclear”; Bloomberg Law; https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/landmark-labor-law-overhaul-passes-house-but-senate-fate-unclear; Accessed: 10-30-2021; AU)

Worker Protections The PRO Act would **amend** the National Labor Relations Act, a federal law that **guarantees private-sector employees** the **right to** unionize, engage in collective bargaining, and take collective action such as **strikes**. Among other changes, it would bar employers from retaliating against unionization efforts, **protect workers’ right to strike**, and override state “right to work” laws that allow employees to opt out of paying dues in unionized workplaces. Companies would be **banned** under the bill, for example, from holding “captive audience” meetings, in which workers are compelled to listen to anti-union messages from their employer. The legislation also would give the National Labor Relations Board power to levy fines against companies that engage in unfair labor practices, and require arbitration when unionized workers can’t reach agreement on a contract with employers. The bill would allow employees to hold union elections off of company premises and use mail or electronic ballots, a provision that supporters say is essential during the pandemic. Electronic ballots are currently banned. The PRO Act addresses the status of independent contractors—such as gig workers at ride-hailing and food delivery companies—by **lowering** the bar for contractors to prove they are employees under federal labor law. That would allow gig workers to organize unions and protest retaliation under the NLRA—rights currently guaranteed only to employees, not contractors. The legislation would adopt the same rigid test to determine workers’ employment status as a California law known as A.B. 5. Workers for app-based services were recently carved out of the state law by a ballot initiative, Proposition 22, bankrolled by gig companies. The California law also applies to employment rules governing overtime and minimum wage. The PRO Act, however, only addresses workers’ status under the National Labor Relations Act.

# **4**

#### The Court is stimulating massive backlash over partisanship BUT liberal civil rights rulings pacify opposition.

Dr. Bruce Peabody 20, Professor of American Politics, Fairleigh Dickinson University, PhD in Government from the University of Texas at Austin, “How the Supreme Court can maintain its legitimacy amid intensifying partisanship”, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/how-the-supreme-court-can-maintain-its-legitimacy-amid-intensifying-partisanship-148126

How courts can reinforce their standing While recent polling finds an uptick in the percentage of Americans who approve of “the way the Supreme Court is handling its job,” the general trend line shows a public that has, according to the FiveThirtyEight news site, “slowly become more disillusioned” with the high court over the past three decades. But should anyone care? Isn’t the very purpose of an independent judiciary to make its decisions with little regard for public opinion and what Alexander Hamilton called the “ill humors in the society”? The truth is, the courts need public support. Judges depend upon national and local officials to uphold their opinions, such as clerks issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Law enforcement officials are required by the Supreme Court to provide certain suspects with Miranda warnings. And if the people on the losing end of court decisions believe judges are unfairly appointed and partisan, they may dismiss their judgments as illegitimate. That threatens the sense of unity and stability that Chief Justice John Roberts has said the judiciary must provide in our polarized age. Fortunately, research points to several ways courts can bolster their standing, so that when they inevitably issue controversial decisions they can withstand the ensuing storm. People, for example, are more likely to accept unfavorable judgments if they experience procedural justice – the fairness and transparency through which decisions are made. They may not like a case outcome, but they’ll go along with it if they approve of how the dispute was handled. Courts can protect procedural justice and their legitimacy by making sure each party in a case has a chance to present its story and by emphasizing respect from not only judges but clerks and other court personnel. Of course, these strategies aren’t as relevant for the millions of people who don’t have direct experience with our legal system. But judges can still reach these Americans by conveying the degree to which many decisions seem to uphold principles of law rather than giving vent to ideological beliefs. Closely divided Supreme Court decisions like the 2012 ruling upholding the Affordable Care Act, or the more recent June Medical Services v. Russo case – which struck down a Louisiana law requiring abortion providers to have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals – draw lots of attention. But it turns out that unanimous decisions on the Supreme Court are far more common. Since 2000, approximately 36% of all cases were decided 9-0. During that same span, 19% were decided 5-4. More bluntly, courts can continue to get support from ideological and partisan skeptics if these individuals can recognize victories along with their losses. Recent decisions upholding the civil rights of LGBTQ employees, for example, may blunt liberal frustration over the court’s voting rights cases, such as Shelby County v. Holder, which significantly limited the reach of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In our closely divided and polarized era, the Supreme Court can maintain some of its legitimacy by continuing to issue what law professor Tara Leigh Grove calls “a mix of conservative and progressive decisions in high-profile cases.”

#### A Right to Strike is perceived as a key Liberal Ruling.

Lim 19 Woojin Lim 12-11-2019 "The Right to Strike" <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/12/11/lim-right-to-strike/> (Philosophy BA at Harvard)//Elmer

**Strikes** are not only a means of demanding and achieving an **adequate provision of** basic **liberties** but also are themselves intrinsic, self-determined expressions of freedom and human rights. The exercise of the p**ower to strike affirms** a **quintessential** corpus of **values** **akin to liberal democracies**, notably those of dignity, liberty, and autonomy. In acts of collective defiance, strikers assert their freedoms of speech, association, and assembly. Acts of striking, marching, and picketing command the attention of the media and prompt public forums of discussion and dialogue.

#### That prevents Democratic court packing.

D. Benjamin Barros 20, Dean and Professor of Law at the University of Toledo School of Law, “How the Democrats can pack the court and de-escalate at the same time”, The Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/520190-how-the-democrats-can-pack-the-court-and-de-escalate-at-the-same-time

We may have reached a degree of disfunction that will force a fundamental change: Increasing the number of justices on the United States Supreme Court, or packing the court.

Democrats will be outraged if Republicans move forward with filling the vacancy caused by the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg so close to the election after refusing to bring President Obama’s nomination of Merrick Garland to a vote in 2016. In response to a potential election-year confirmation of President Trump’s anticipated nominee, Democrats are openly discussing packing the court if Joe Biden wins the presidency and Democrats win both houses of Congress in the November election.

Packing the court is remarkably easy to do legislatively. A bill increasing the number of seats on the court simply needs to pass both houses of Congress and be signed by the president. The Constitution does not proscribe the number of justices, and in our history we have had both fewer and more than nine members of the court at any given time.

The big impediment to court packing is political. Historically, packing the court would have been seen as a major violation of political norms that might in turn expose the party making the change to losses in the next election. In light of the Republican flip-flop on seating a justice in an election year, court packing by the Democrats would likely to be seen as par for the course, rather than particularly norm-breaking.

#### Court packing prevents extinction from environmental tipping points like warming---AND independently solves: CJR, democracy collapse and reproductive rights.

Jay Willis 20, J.D. from Harvard Law School, B.A. in Social Welfare from the University of California, Berkeley, Senior Contributor, The Appeal at The Justice Collaborative, “Expanding the Supreme Court is Not Radical”, The Appeal, https://theappeal.org/expand-the-supreme-court/

A 6-3 Republican Court whose life-tenured members are openly hostile to preserving reproductive rights, addressing climate change, protecting the environment, safeguarding the civil rights of minority groups, and holding free and fair elections is “radical” because it is wildly out of touch with the hundreds of millions of people whose lives their decisions will control. This Court is not a check or a balance. It is a hostage situation. The Court’s faults, however, extend far beyond the particular group of justices who currently sit on it. This institution charges nine wealthy attorneys, trained at the same tiny circle of law schools, with the herculean task of privately negotiating uneasy resolutions to America’s most contentious disputes. (Barrett, who graduated from Notre Dame Law School in 1997, would be the first justice who did not attend Yale, Stanford, or Harvard law schools to be confirmed since the Ford administration.) Every sudden vacancy kicks off months of frenzied partisan warfare, replete with breathless, competing prognostications about how a nominee, who is careful to say nothing of substance, may or may not rule on some hypothetical high-stakes case. It is a patently ridiculous system of governance, and you would immediately recognize it as such if not for the fact that this is the way we’ve always done it. Granted, the Founders likely never envisioned the justices becoming as powerful as they are today. The Constitution has surprisingly little to say about the Supreme Court beyond its existence and its members’ subjectively-defined terms of office (“during good Behaviour”). The Court’s power of judicial review, which allows it to strike down laws that conflict with the Constitution, appears nowhere in the text; it is the brainchild of Chief Justice and legendary power-grabber John Marshall, who basically created it out of whole cloth in 1803. Since then, the judiciary has continued to siphon power from the politically accountable branches of government, whose members have been increasingly happy to foist seemingly intractable problems on judges who answer to no one. Rather than answer hard questions or take tough votes or commit to convincing people of the merits of their policy preferences, lawmakers can instead pour themselves into the task of empowering like-minded jurists who (they hope) will implement those preferences by judicial fiat, solemnly asserting that the law compels a particular result—one that just so happens to comport with their personal beliefs. This feature of the federal judiciary, as New York Magazine’s Eric Levitz writes, is extremely valuable for Republicans, because it gives a party in decline the chance to nevertheless implement an unpopular policy agenda, all while flying largely under the political radar. (This feature of the federal judiciary also explains why conservatives have invested far more resources over the years to seize control of it.) Judges have slowly transformed into an entrenched cadre of robe-clad superlegislators, where the balance of power can hinge on something as arbitrary as which octogenarian lawyer decides to retire at the right moment or happens to die at the wrong one. Such a small, insular system is extremely vulnerable to exploitation and gamesmanship, especially if the side playing the game more strategically also gets a little lucky along the way. The precise timing of Ginsburg’s death may have been a fluke, but the crisis that ensued is not; it is a foreseeable result of the Court’s fundamental brokenness. Life tenure also meant something very different 230 years ago than it does today, as savvy investments in young, loyal talent can pay off over the course of multiple generations. My daughter will be born this November. When Barrett is 87—the age at which Justice Ginsburg died—my daughter will be thinking about celebrating her 40th birthday. The modern Court is functionally a conservative oligarchy on the verge of swallowing whatever remains of representative democracy, hoping you won’t notice. The Court-packing battle is just one of many debates in which reactionaries weaponize terms like “radical” to obfuscate the urgency of change. Which of these is more dangerous, more destabilizing, more harmful: reducing the legal system’s dependence on a failed mass incarceration system, or continuing to blow hundreds of billions of dollars to put people in cages instead? What strikes you as “illegitimate”: disbanding police departments, or investing even more money in an ineffective public safety regime that cannot stop killing Black and brown people? Relative to the status quo, enacting a Green New Deal might feel “radical.” Relative to the impending heat death of the planet hastened by decades of unchecked human greed, attempting to decarbonize the U.S. economy by 2050 is, I would argue, actually kind of modest. Should Democrats capture the White House and the Senate this fall—and then have the courage to use the power Americans entrust to them—expanding the Court will be a lot of things. It will be significant. It will be groundbreaking. But it will not be “radical,” because confronting an existential crisis that threatens to hollow out democracy is exactly what people should expect their government to do.

# Case

1AR theory PIs depend on shell – best norm – no infinite abuse – a] finite nc b] ac spikes solve

#### Customary I-Law guarantees a right to strike that is not unconditional – 1AC author proves

Brudney 21 [James; 2/8/21; Joseph Crowley Chair in Labor and Employment Law, Fordham Law School; “The Right to Strike as Customary International Law,” THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol 46, <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=yjil>] //sid

The international right to strike is far from absolute. It may be restricted in exceptional circumstances, or even prohibited, pursuant to national regulation. For a start, Convention 87 provides that members of the armed forces and the police may be excluded from the scope of the Convention in general, including the right to strike.57 In addition, applications by the CFA and CEACR have concluded that three distinct forms of substantive restriction on the right to strike are compatible with Convention 87. 1. Substantive Limitations One important restriction applies to certain categories of public servants. The CEACR and CFA have made clear that public employees generally enjoy the same right to strike as their counterparts in the private sector; at the same time, in order to ensure continuity of functions in the three branches of government, this right may be restricted for public servants exercising authority in the name of the State.58 Examples include officials performing tasks that involve the administration of necessary executive branch functions or that relate to the administration of justice. Each country has its own approach to classifying public servants exercising authority in the name of the State. When considering the international right under Convention 87, some public servant exceptions seem clearly applicable, such as officials auditing or collecting internal revenues, customs officers, or judges and their close judicial assistants.59 Some public servant exceptions seem inapplicable, such as teachers, or public servants in State-owned commercial enterprises.60 Whether public servants are exercising authority in the name of the State can be a close question under particular national law, one on which the CEACR and CFA have offered encouragement and guidance,61 as has the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).62 A second equally important restriction on the right to strike involves essential services in the strict sense of the term. This is an area in which both the CEACR and CFA have developed a detailed set of applications and guidelines.63 The two committees consider that essential services, for the purposes of restricting or prohibiting the right to strike, are only those “the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population.”64 This definition of essential services “in the strict sense of the term” stems from the idea that “essential services” as a limitation on the right to strike would lose its meaning if statutes or judicial decisions defined those services in too broad a manner.65 The interruption of services that cause or have the potential to cause economic hardships—even serious economic hardships—is not ordinarily sufficient to qualify the interrupted service as essential. Indeed, the very purpose of a strike is to interrupt services or production and thereby cause a degree of economic hardship. That is the leverage workers can exercise; it is what allows a strike to be effective in bringing the parties to the table and securing a negotiated settlement. The two ILO supervisory committees also have made clear that the essential services concept is not static in nature. Thus, a non-essential service may become essential if the strike exceeds a certain duration or extent, or as a function of the special characteristics of a country.66 One example is that of an island State where at some point ferry transportation services become essential to bring food and medical supplies to the population.67 When examining concrete cases, the supervisory bodies have considered a range of services, both public and private, too broad to summarize here. As illustrative, the two bodies have determined that essential services in the strict sense of the term include air traffic control services,68 telephone services,69 prison services, firefighting services, and water and electricity services.70 The CEACR and CFA also have identified a range of services that presumptively are deemed not to be essential in the strict sense of the term.71 In addition, in circumstances where a total prohibition on the right to strike is not appropriate, the magnitude of impact on the basic needs of consumers or the general public, or the need for safe operation of facilities, may justify introduction of a negotiated minimum service.72 Such a service, however, must truly be a minimum service, that is one limited to meeting the basic needs of the population or the minimum requirements of the service, while maintaining the effectiveness of the pressure brought to bear through the strike by a majority of workers.73 The third substantive restriction on the right to strike under Convention 87 relates to situations of acute national or local crisis, although only for a limited period and only to the extent necessary to meet the requirements of the situation.74 With respect to all three forms of substantive restriction, the CFA and CEACR have indicated that certain alternative options should be guaranteed for workers who are deprived of the right to strike. These options include impartial conciliation followed by arbitration procedures in which any awards are binding on both parties and are to be implemented in full and rapid terms.75

## 1N – Sua Sponte

#### Ruling sua sponte undermines the judicial process.

Poor & Goldschmidt ’15 [E. King & James E; DRI member and partner in Quarles & Brady LLP’s Chicago office, chair of the firm’s appellate practice, member of the board of directors of the Appellate Lawyers Association, author of two petitions for certiorari granted by the Supreme Court, 25 years of law experience; commercial litigation attorney, associate in Quarles & Brady LLP’s Milwaukee office; October 2015; “Sua Sponte Decisions on Appeal”; <https://www.quarles.com/content/uploads/2015/10/FTD-1510-Poor-Goldschmidt.pdf>; For the Defense, Appellate Advocacy; accessed 4/3/18; TV] \*Edited for reading clarity.

But these permissive exceptions are not consistently applied, and there remain ample examples of courts adhering to the principle of party presentation. See Hartmann v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 9 F.3d 1207 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying the appellate waiver rule, due to an error by counsel, against orphans whose step- mother killed their father after bribing an insurance agent to defraud the orphans). Commentators agree that such exceptions, together with balancing tests specific to various federal circuits, are susceptible to outcome-oriented application and may just be so many manifestations of the gorilla rule. Miller, supra, at 1279. “No General Rule” This patchwork of rules and exceptions leaves sua sponte decision making without any widely-accepted body of authority that is consistently applied, let alone any controlling authority on this question. As the Supreme Court summed up in Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976), “[t]he matter of what questions may be taken and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases. We announce no general rule.” If the general rule is really that there is “no general rule,” then where does that leave us? One place to begin is to ask, what happens to our adversary system and the values underlying it when a court resolves a case without hearing from the parties involved? Undermining the Adversarial Process When a court raises an issue on its own and decides it without hearing from the parties involved, it chips away at our adversary system. When a court chooses to treat a case as a vehicle to decide an issue that the court believes is an overlooked, dispositive issue, rather than one addressed by the parties, then the court has ventured away from its role as a neutral decision maker into a subjective realm. In doing so, the court concludes on its own that a particular new question will dispose of the case. It then returns to being a neutral decision maker to decide the very issue which it has selected as dis- positive. A. Milani & M. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 245, 277–78 (2002). But when a court itself selects new issues—without party participation—and then decides those very same issues, the values underlying our adversary system are compromised. The parties are far more likely than the reviewing court to explore the peculiarities and nuances of the case; after all, they have every incentive to do so. On the other hand, considerations of effciency may cause courts to be more likely to reach conclusions on issues that they them- selves have already identified as resolving the case more directly. Id. Moreover, even if identifying new issues does not actually undermine a court’s impartiality, it may still create that impression: “When [the court] a decision maker becomes an active questioner or otherwise participates in a case, she is likely to be perceived as partisan rather than neutral.” Id. at 280. Decisions reached under a court’s own initiative do not “promote respect either for the Court’s adjudicatory process or for the stability of its decisions,” and other commentators have described such decisions as “unseemly,” “not likely to be regarded favorably,” a breach of the parties’ trust, and a sacrifice of the court’s function as an adjudicator. Id. at 280–81 (quoting Justice Harlan’s dissent in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 677 (1960)). Such perceptions work against both litigants’ and society’s acceptance of judicial decisions. Id. at 284. As explained elsewhere, “If the grounds for the decision fall completely outside the framework of the argument, making all that was discussed or proved at the hearing irrelevant... the adjudicative process has become a sham, for the parties’ participation in the decision has lost all meaning.” Id. at 285 (quoting L. Fuller, e Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 388 (1978)).

#### That corrodes rule of law via abdicating judicial legitimacy.

Donaldson ’17 [Michael J; Partner at Burnet, Duckworth & Palmer, LLP, Master of Laws from Columbia; 2017; “Justice in Full Is Time Well Spent: Why the Supreme Court Should Ban Sua Sponte Dismissals”; http://www.bdplaw.com/publications/justice-in-full-is-time-well-spent-why-the-supreme-court-should-ban-sua-sponte-dismissals/; Quinnipiac Law Review, Vol 36; accessed 9/15/21; TV]

There is a lot wrong with sua sponte dismissals. They are inconsistent with the adversary system, and change the judge's role from referee to contestant.85 They can undermine respect for the legal system. And they increase the likelihood of errors, leading to unnecessary appeals and a waste of judicial resources." But most importantly, they lack the very due process the courts are supposed to safeguard.

A. Failure to Provide Due Process

Sua sponte decisions are inconsistent with due process.89 Period. There is no other way to look at it. 90 Not only does a plaintiff surprised by a sua sponte dismissal not receive "due" process, she receives no process at all.91 She has no idea her lawsuit is in jeopardy of being dismissed, no idea what the reasons for that dismissal might be, and no opportunity to respond. 92 This is the case whether the court's dismissal decision is right or wrong. 93 As Allan Vestal puts it:

When [issues are] considered sua sponte both parties are taken completely by surprise and the court decides the matter on grounds not urged by either. Neither has had any opportunity to consider the matter, and both are now bound by res judicata grounded on considerations which represent not well reasoned positions for the litigants, but rather only the fortuitous decision of a 94 wayward court.

The reference to res judicata here is important. As Milani and Smith point out, the res judicata doctrine requires a party or its privy to be a participant in the former proceeding before the court can bind him to the consequences of that proceeding because, according to the Supreme Court, "The opportunity to be heard is an essential requisite of due process of law in judicial proceedings."95 If this is the standard applied to former proceedings, how can it not apply to proceedings currently before the court? Lon Fuller once wrote of sua sponte decisionmaking:

[I]f the grounds for the decision fall completely outside the framework of the argument, making all that was discussed or proved at the hearing irrelevant ... the adjudicative process has become a sham, for the parties' participation in the decision has lost all meaning.9 6

The situation is even harder to defend when there is no hearing at all. 9

B. Undermining Respect for the Legal System

The perception that the courts are regularly failing to provide due process cannot do anything but undermine respect for the legal system.9 8 Sir Robert Megarry, in the speech quoted at the beginning of this article,99 underlined the importance of sending the unsuccessful litigant away feeling as though he has had a fair hearing.' Justice Harlan was obviously cognizant of this problem in his dissent in Mapp, when he warned that the Court's sua sponte decision in that case was "not likely to promote respect ... for the court's adjudicatory process."o

This is not a farfetched concern. Offenkrantz and Lichter note that in the Second Circuit's high-profile decision to "[sua sponte remove] Judge Shira Scheindlin from further proceedings in two stop-and-frisk cases," an order which left the Judge "completely blindsided," "newspapers were reporting that appellate courts had carte blanche to raise and decide important issues in a case without ever seeking the input of any of the parties to it."' 0 2

Megarry tells a story of a client of his who had a fatal flaw in his case, but insisted on going ahead anyway.10 3 Instead of seizing on the fatal flaw at the outset, the trial judge heard the case all the way through.1 0 4 The client won on his two collateral points, but, as expected, lost on the key issue. o Megarry tells the story of what happened next:

The course taken by the judge must have prolonged the hearing by an hour or two. But the effect on the defeated tenant was striking. True, he had lost the last point and the case as a whole; but he had been victorious on the other two points. All that nonsense about the agent's lack of authority and the letter not having been received in time had been blown away by the judge. It was a pity about the wording of the letter, of course; but he had seen his case being put in full, and none of his grievances had been left unheard or unresolved.

This is as it should be. Courts must not, as Megarry puts it, give in to "the temptation of brevity."'0 o Their very legitimacy hangs in the balance. A loss of respect for the courts marks the beginning of the unraveling of the rule of law. This is simply too high of a price to pay for efficiency.

#### Extinction.

Davis and Morse ’18 [Christina and Julia; September 19; Professor of Government at Harvard University; Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Santa Barbara; International Studies Quarterly, “Protecting Trade by Legalizing Political Disputes: Why Countries Bring Cases to the International Court of Justice,” vol. 62]

Trade, Conflict, and Adjudication

We argue that countries turn to international adjudication to protect trade flows under conditions of strong economic interdependence. This argument is built on two key assumptions. First, states believe that an international dispute over territory, fishing rights, or another salient issue could harm trade. Second, states view international adjudication as an effective way to end the dispute. Given the risk of harm to economic relations and the potential for courts to contribute to conflict resolution, states with high trade value vested in a relationship will be more willing to undertake costly litigation. This section elaborates on the general conditions of our theory and then explains why the ICJ is a good venue for testing the relationship between economic interdependence and international adjudication. The Adverse Impact of Conflict on Trade The premise that conflict disrupts trade is central to the theory of commercial peace. Russett and Oneal (2001) draw on the work of philosopher Immanuel Kant to argue that interdependence deters conflict by raising its costs. According to this reasoning, war interrupts trade while peace promotes stable commerce, leading states to calculate that the gains of peace are significant compared to the costs of war.4 Other perspectives focus on the informational role of interdependence to lower uncertainty between states (Reed 2003). Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (2001) contend economic interdependence allows states to signal their resolve through their willingness to bear the economic costs of confrontation.5 A host of empirical studies supports the idea that conflict reduces trade (Keshk, Reuveny, and Pollins 2004; Long 2008). Several potential channels connect trade and conflict, including direct damage to infrastructure and transportation resulting from actual conflict, sanctions policies, and informal discrimination by governments or private actors. Glick and Taylor (2010) find that the effect of war on trade is significant and persistent. At a lower level, political tensions may also suppress trade (Pollins 1989; Fuchs and Klann 2013). Consumer boycotts and financial market reactions in some cases have led to adverse market impact (Fisman, Hamao, and Wang 2014; Heilmann 2016; Pandya 2016). Simmons (2005) finds that territorial disputes have a sizable negative impact on trade even in the absence of militarized action. Others suggest states anticipate the potential adverse impact of conflict on trade, and therefore trade less to begin with if they think that war is likely. In such a scenario, the marginal economic costs of war should be insufficient to change a state's calculation for going to war (Morrow 1999; Barbieri 2002). Gowa and Hicks (2017) contend that trade is largely diverted through third-party channels, which compensate for having less direct trade with the adversary. We assume that leaders and business constituencies on average believe that conflict damages trade relations. Political conflict could lead governments to adopt sanctions against an adversary or to restrict financial flows. Violence likely disrupts trading routes and slows the movement of goods. The potential for adverse financial market reactions and consumer response adds further unpredictability about the risk of spillover from political disagreement into economic harm. Substitution through third parties could alleviate the harm, but this would still increase trade costs. The expected harm to trade motivates states to pursue the resolution of disputes. Adjudication as a Conflict Resolution Mechanism When states want to resolve an interstate dispute, why would they choose adjudication rather than negotiations, economic sanctions, or militarized action? In some cases, the decision follows an episode of military conflict as part of an effort to normalize relations. In other disputes, countries may turn to a legal venue to prevent a problem from ever reaching the stage that could produce serious political tensions or threats of force. The literature offers three broad types of explanations for why states pursue adjudication: legitimacy, informational benefits, and domestic obstacles to settlement. At the systemic level, international norms support peaceful conflict resolution. Some contend that rule of law has come to shape the identities of states, forming norms about appropriate action in both the domestic and international spheres (Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 902). When international law has been established through fair procedures and offers coherent principles, it forms a legitimate source of authority in international affairs that generates an independent “compliance pull” on state behavior (Franck 1990, 65). International courts combine both legitimacy and authority as they help states solve specific disputes about how to interpret international law; the growing role for international courts in international affairs represents an important trend (Alter 2014; Alter, Helfer, and Madsen 2016). Integration with national courts has reinforced states’ use of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which stands out for its expansive caseload and impact on state behavior (Alter 1998). The ICJ has achieved a relatively strong record of compliance with rulings (Schulte 2004; Llamzon 2007; Mitchell and Hensel 2007; Johns 2012). Legal settlement can help states coordinate policies through the provision of information. Compared to bilateral negotiations or nonbinding third-party arbitration, adjudication conveys a government's willingness to reach an agreement (Helfer and Slaughter 2005; Gent and Shannon 2010). Having taken the public step to initiate legal action, a government would appear inconsistent and incur a reputational penalty if it also took unilateral measures such as sanctions or military actions before the legal process had reached a conclusion. This shapes the diplomatic context because participants know that the matter will neither escalate into violence nor disappear through neglect. A court ruling offers a focal point amidst uncertainty about how to interpret the terms of an agreement (Ginsburg and McAdams 2004; Huth, Croco, and Appel 2011). As the record-keeper of past actions, courts support systems of tit-for-tat and reputational enforcement (Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990; Carrubba 2005; Mitchell and Hensel 2007). In these informational theories of courts, states may comply with court rulings in the absence of coercive measures or the threat of sanctions because the reputational costs of noncompliance are too high. Rather than simply interpret law, courts coordinate expectations about enforcement. Johns (2012) models the circumstances whereby mobilization of third-party actions in support of a court ruling generates endogenous enforcement that can affect outcomes. In this way, multilateral enforcement makes an international court different from the pressure available in bilateral negotiations. International courts also offer a way for states to frame settlements to appeal to domestic audiences (Fang 2008). Simmons notes that even when the same deal could be reached in negotiations or through a court decision, a negotiated settlement could be viewed as a sign of weakness while legal resolution would be a positive signal for future cooperation (Simmons 2002, 834). This dynamic occurs because “domestic groups will find it more attractive to make concessions to a disinterested institution than to a political adversary” (Simmons 2002, 834). In research on several prominent ICJ cases, Fischer (1982, 271) emphasizes the court has helped governments to save face. Consequently, those governments unable to reach agreements over domestic opposition may find it easier to do so with the involvement of a third-party ruling. Allee and Huth (2006a) show that governments with higher levels of domestic political constraints are more likely to choose adjudication over negotiation for settling territorial disputes. Domestic political constraints also increase the probability of filing complaints at the WTO (Davis 2012). The mobilization of domestic groups plays a critical role in litigation patterns at the ECJ (Alter and Vargas 2000).

# 5

#### Counterplan: A just government ought to recognize the conditional right of workers to strike with the condition that strikers are not asking for employers to discriminate and don’t utilize violence/discrimination during the strikes.

\*\*TW: semi-graphic depictions of anti-black violence

#### Enforcement in the card.

BPSC [Unfair Labor Practices by Union, <http://bpscllc.com/unfair-labor-practices-by-unions.html>, N.D., Business & People Strategy Consulting Group, California's trusted source for workplace human resources and employment law] [SS]

Causing or Attempting to Cause Discrimination: Section 8(b)(2) makes it **an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to cause** or attempt to cause **an employer to discriminate** against an employee in violation of Section 8(a)(3). The section is violated by agreements or arrangements with employers, other than lawful union-security agreements, that condition employment or job benefits on union membership, on the performance of union membership obligations or on arbitrary grounds. But union action that causes detriment to an individual employee does not violate Section 8(b)(2) if it is consistent with nondiscriminatory provisions of a bargaining contract negotiated for the benefit of the total bargaining unit, or if the action is based on some other legitimate purpose. **A union’s conduct, accompanied by statements advising** or suggesting **that action is expected of an employer,** may be enough to find a violation of this section **if the union’s action can be shown to be a causal factor in the employer’s discrimination.** Contracts or informal arrangements with a union under which an employer gives preferential treatment to union members also violate Section 8(b)(2). However, an employer and a union may agree that the employer will hire new employees exclusively through the union hiring hall if there is no discrimination against nonunion members on the basis of union membership obligations. In setting referral standards, a union may consider legitimate aims such as sharing available work and easing the impact of local unemployment. The union may also charge referral fees if the amount of the fee is reasonably related to the cost of operating the referral service. A union that attempts to force an employer to enter into an illegal union-security agreement, or that enters into and keeps in effect such an agreement, also violates Section 8(b)(2), as does a union that attempts to enforce such an illegal agreement by bringing about an employee’s discharge. Even when a union-security provision of a bargaining contract meets all statutory requirements, a union may not lawfully require the discharge of employees under the provision unless they were informed of the union-security agreement and their specific obligation under it. A union violates Section 8(b)(2) if it tries to use the union-security provisions of a contract to collect payments other than those lawfully required, such as assessments, fines and penalties. Other examples of Section 8(b)(2) violations include: Causing an employer to discharge employees because they circulated a petition urging a change in the union’s method of selecting shop stewards Causing an employer to discharge employees because they made speeches against a contract proposed by the union Making a contract that requires an employer to hire only members of the union or employees “satisfactory” to the union Causing an employer to reduce employees’ seniority because they engaged in anti-union acts **Refusing referral or giving preference on the basis of race** or union activities when making job referrals to units represented by the union Seeking the discharge of an employee under a union-security agreement for failure to pay a fine levied by the union

#### The East St. Louis riots lead to over 200 deaths and were one of the worst race related riots in history – it all started with a racist union striking in favor of discrimination and a lack of government intervention.

People’s World ‘17

[This week in history: East St. Louis rocked by race riot, 1917, <https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/this-week-in-history-east-st-louis-rocked-by-race-riot-1917/>, June 26 2017, voice for progressive change and socialism in the United States. It provides news and analysis of, by, and for the labor and democratic movements to our readers across the country and around the world.] [SS]

\*\*Bracketed for offensive language

**The East St. Louis riots (or massacres**) of May and July 1917 **were an outbreak of labor- and race-related violence** **that caused up to 200 deaths** and extensive property damage. East St. Louis, Ill., is an industrial city on the east bank of the Mississippi River across from St. Louis, Mo. **These incidents** of 100 years ago **have been described** as the worst case of labor-related violence and **among the worst race riots in 20th-century American history**. In 1917 the U.S. had an active economy boosted by World War I. With many workers now absent in the armed forces, industries were in need of labor. Seeking better work and living opportunities, as well as an escape from harsh conditions, the Great Migration of African Americans out of the South toward industrial centers across the North was well underway. Blacks were arriving in St. Louis during Spring 1917 at the rate of 2000 per week. Traditionally **white unions sought to strengthen their bargaining position by** hindering or **excluding black workers**, while industry owners utilized blacks as replacements or strikebreakers, adding to deep-seated societal divisions. At the same time **Louisiana farmers were worried about losing their labor force, and** had **requested** East St. Louis Mayor Fred W. Mollman’s assistance **to help discourage black migration**. Many blacks found work at the Aluminum Ore and the American Steel companies in East St. Louis. Some **whites feared job and wage security from** this **new competition**. That February, **470 African American workers were hired to replace white workers who had gone on strike** against Aluminum Ore. **Tensions** between the groups **escalated, including rumors of black men and white women fraternizing at a labor meeting** on May 28, following which some **3000 white men marched** into downtown East St. Louis **and began attacking African Americans**. The mobs stopped trolleys and streetcars, pulling black passengers out and beating them on the streets. With mobs destroying buildings and assaulting people, Ill. Gov. Frank O. Lowden called in the National Guard to prevent further rioting, and the mood eased somewhat for a few weeks. **The** East St. Louis Central **Labor Council** responded to the rioting **implying that** “southern [**black people]** Negroes **were misled** **by false advertisements and unscrupulous employment agents** to come to East St. Louis in such numbers under false pretenses of secure jobs and decent living quarters.” Little was done to prevent further problems. No precautions were taken to ensure white job security or to grant union recognition. **No reforms were made in the police force which did little to quell the violence**. This further increased the already-high level of hostilities towards African Americans. On July 2, a car occupied by white males drove through a black area of the city and several shots were fired into a standing group. An hour later, a car containing four people, including a journalist and two police officers passed through the same area. Black residents, possibly assuming they were the original suspects, opened fire, killing one officer instantly and mortally wounding another. Later that day, thousands of white spectators who assembled to view the detectives’ bloodstained automobile marched into the black section of town and started rioting. **After cutting the water hoses of the fire department, the rioters burned entire sections of the city, shot inhabitants as they escaped the flames, and lynched several [black people]** blacks. Guardsmen were called in, but according to contemporary accounts, they joined in the rioting rather than stop it. Young white women and girls brandishing clubs chased a black woman and called upon the men to kill her. After the riots, the St. Louis Argus said, “The entire country has been aroused to a sense of shame and pity by the magnitude of the national disgrace enacted by the blood-thirsty rioters in East St. Louis Monday, July 2.” According to the Post-Dispatch of St. Louis, “All the impartial witnesses agree that the police were either indifferent or encouraged the barbarities, and that **the major part of the National Guard was indifferent or inactive.** **No organized effort was made to protect the [black people]** Negroes or disperse the murdering groups…. Ten determined officers could have prevented most of the outrages. **One hundred men acting with authority** and vigor **might have prevented any outrage**.” After the riots, varying estimates of the death toll circulated. The police chief estimated that 100 blacks had been killed. The renowned journalist Ida B. Wells reported in The Chicago Defender that 40-150 black people were killed**. The NAACP estimated deaths at 100–200. Six thousand** blacks **were left homeless** after their neighborhood was burned. The coroner specified nine white deaths, but the deaths of black victims were less clearly recorded: Activists argued that the true number of deaths would never be known because many corpses were neither recovered nor had passed through the hands of undertakers. The ferocious brutality of the attacks and the failure of the authorities to protect innocent lives contributed to the radicalization of many blacks across the nation. Marcus Garvey, president of The Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), declared, “This is no time for fine words, but a time to lift one’s voice against the savagery of a people who claim to be the dispensers of democracy.” On July 6 the Chamber of Commerce met with the mayor to demand the resignation of top police officials and radical reform. In addition to the lives lost, mobs had caused extensive property damage. The Southern Railway Company’s warehouse was burned, with over 100 carloads of merchandise. A white theatre valued at more than $100,000, 44 freight cars and 312 houses were destroyed. In response to the rioting, the NAACP sent W.E.B. DuBois and Martha Gruening to investigate the incident. They compiled a report entitled “Massacre at East St. Louis,” which was published in the NAACP’s magazine, The Crisis. In New York City on July 28, 10,000 black people carrying signs marched down Fifth Avenue in a Silent Parade, protesting the riots. The march was organized by the NAACP and Du Bois, and other groups in Harlem. Women and children were dressed in white; the men were dressed in black. Authorities were slow to respond to calls for an investigation. President Woodrow Wilson stated that his Department of Justice could not find enough evidence to justify federal action in the matter. A Special Committee formed by the U.S. House of Representatives launched an investigation into police actions during the East St. Louis Riot. It found that the National Guard and the East St. Louis police force had not acted adequately during the riots, revealing that the police often fled from the scenes of murder and arson. Some even fled from station houses and refused to answer calls for help. The investigation also resulted in the indictment of several members of the East St. Louis police force. Among those brought to trial was Dr. LeRoy Bundy, a dentist and prominent leader in the East St. Louis black community, who was formally charged with inciting a riot. The trial was held in the St. Clair county court. Bundy, along with 34 defendants, of whom ten were white, were given prison time in connection to the riot.

#### It’s competitive – your card

# 2N