# 1

#### Coloniality is not a metaphor, not a joint struggle for human rights, and not a fight against whiteness – it cannot be incorporated or encapsulted into some new form of scholarship – you cannot decolonize asia by voting affirmative at a highschool debate tournament – there is no way to graft the struggle into this space, and their attempt to do so only decenters decoloniality

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Our goal in this article is to remind readers what is unsettling about decolonization. Decolonization brings about the repatriation of Indigenous land and life; it is not a metaphor for other things we want to do to improve our societies and schools. The easy adoption of decolonizing discourse by educational advocacy and scholarship, evidenced by the increasing number of calls to “decolonize our schools,” or use “decolonizing methods,” or, “decolonize student thinking”, turns decolonization into a metaphor. As important as their goals may be, social justice, critical methodologies, or approaches that decenter settler perspectives have objectives that may be incommensurable with decolonization. Because settler colonialism is built upon an entangled triad structure of settler-native-slave, the decolonial desires of white, nonwhite, immigrant, postcolonial, and oppressed people, can similarly be entangled in resettlement, reoccupation, and reinhabitation that actually further settler colonialism. The metaphorization of decolonization makes possible a set of evasions, or “settler moves to innocence”, that problematically attempt to reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity. In this article, we analyze multiple settler moves towards innocence in order to forward “an ethic of incommensurability” that recognizes what is distinct and what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects. We also point to unsettling themes within transnational/Third World decolonizations, abolition, and critical spaceplace pedagogies, which challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors, making room for more meaningful potential alliances. Keywords: decolonization, settler colonialism, settler moves to innocence, incommensurability, Indigenous land, decolonizing education 2 E. Tuck & K.W. Yang Decolonization, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a program of complete disorder. But it cannot come as a result of magical practices, nor of a natural shock, nor of a friendly understanding. Decolonization, as we know, is a historical process: that is to say it cannot be understood, it cannot become intelligible nor clear to itself except in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give it historical form and content. -Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 1963, p. 36 Let us admit it, the settler knows perfectly well that no phraseology can be a substitute for reality. -Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 1963, p. 45 Introduction For the past several years we have been working, in our writing and teaching, to bring attention to how settler colonialism has shaped schooling and educational research in the United States and other settler colonial nation-states. These are two distinct but overlapping tasks, the first concerned with how the invisibilized dynamics of settler colonialism mark the organization, governance, curricula, and assessment of compulsory learning, the other concerned with how settler perspectives and worldviews get to count as knowledge and research and how these perspectives - repackaged as data and findings - are activated in order to rationalize and maintain unfair social structures. We are doing this work alongside many others who - somewhat relentlessly, in writings, meetings, courses, and activism - don’t allow the real and symbolic violences of settler colonialism to be overlooked. Alongside this work, we have been thinking about what decolonization means, what it wants and requires. One trend we have noticed, with growing apprehension, is the ease with which the language of decolonization has been superficially adopted into education and other social sciences, supplanting prior ways of talking about social justice, critical methodologies, or approaches which decenter settler perspectives. Decolonization, which we assert is a distinct project from other civil and human rights-based social justice projects, is far too often subsumed into the directives of these projects, with no regard for how decolonization wants something different than those forms of justice. Settler scholars swap out prior civil and human rights based terms, seemingly to signal both an awareness of the significance of Indigenous and decolonizing theorizations of schooling and educational research, and to include Indigenous peoples on the list of considerations - as an additional special (ethnic) group or class. At a conference on educational research, it is not uncommon to hear speakers refer, almost casually, to the need to “decolonize our schools,” or use “decolonizing methods,” or “decolonize student thinking.” Yet, we have observed a startling number of these discussions make no mention of Indigenous peoples, our/their1 struggles for the recognition of our/their sovereignty, or the contributions of Indigenous intellectuals and activists to theories and frameworks of decolonization. Further, there is often little recognition given to the immediate context of settler colonialism on the North American lands where many of these conferences take place. Of course, dressing up in the language of decolonization is not as offensive as “Navajo print” underwear sold at a clothing chain store (Gaynor, 2012) and other appropriations of Indigenous cultures and materials that occur so frequently. Yet, this kind of inclusion is a form of enclosure, dangerous in how it domesticates decolonization. It is also a foreclosure, limiting in how it recapitulates dominant theories of social change. On the occasion of the inaugural issue of Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, & Society, we want to be sure to clarify that decolonization is not a metaphor. When metaphor invades decolonization, it kills the very possibility of decolonization; it recenters whiteness, it resettles theory, it extends innocence to the settler, it entertains a settler future. Decolonize (a verb) and decolonization (a noun) cannot easily be grafted onto pre-existing discourses/frameworks, even if they are critical, even if they are anti-racist, even if they are justice frameworks. The easy absorption, adoption, and transposing of decolonization is yet another form of settler appropriation. When we write about decolonization, we are not offering it as a metaphor; it is not an approximation of other experiences of oppression. Decolonization is not a swappable term for other things we want to do to improve our societies and schools. Decolonization doesn’t have a synonym. Our goal in this essay is to remind readers what is unsettling about decolonization - what is unsettling and what should be unsettling. Clearly, we are advocates for the analysis of settler colonialism within education and education research and we position the work of Indigenous thinkers as central in unlocking the confounding aspects of public schooling. We, at least in part, want others to join us in these efforts, so that settler colonial structuring and Indigenous critiques of that structuring are no longer rendered invisible. Yet, this joining cannot be too easy, too open, too settled. Solidarity is an uneasy, reserved, and unsettled matter that neither reconciles present grievances nor forecloses future conflict. There are parts of the decolonization project that are not easily absorbed by human rights or civil rights based approaches to educational equity. In this essay, we think about what decolonization wants. There is a long and bumbled history of non-Indigenous peoples making moves to alleviate the impacts of colonization. The too-easy adoption of decolonizing discourse (making decolonization a metaphor) is just one part of that history and it taps into pre-existing tropes that get in the way of more meaningful potential alliances. We think of the enactment of these tropes as a series of moves to innocence (Malwhinney, 1998), which problematically attempt to reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity. Here, to explain why decolonization is and requires more than a metaphor, we discuss some of these moves to innocence: 1 As an Indigenous scholar and a settler/trespasser/scholar writing together, we have used forward slashes to reflect our discrepant positionings in our pronouns throughout this essay. 4 E. Tuck & K.W. Yang i. Settler nativism ii. Fantasizing adoption iii. Colonial equivocation iv. Conscientization v. At risk-ing / Asterisk-ing Indigenous peoples vi. Re-occupation and urban homesteading Such moves ultimately represent settler fantasies of easier paths to reconciliation. Actually, we argue, attending to what is irreconcilable within settler colonial relations and what is incommensurable between decolonizing projects and other social justice projects will help to reduce the frustration of attempts at solidarity; but the attention won’t get anyone off the hook from the hard, unsettling work of decolonization. Thus, we also include a discussion of interruptions that unsettle innocence and recognize incommensurability.

#### The University is an apparatus of colonization that has never stood apart from chattel slavery and the dispossession of Indigenous peoples. A more ethical University is a settler oxymoron- attempts to reform only put a more diverse face on colonization.

Grande 18

(Sandy Grande, Quechua, Professor of Education as well as the Director of the Center for the Comparative Study of Race and Ethnicity (CCSRE) at Connecticut College, Chapter 3: REFUSING THE UNIVERSITY, TOWARD WHAT JUSTICE? Describing Diverse Dreams of Justice in Education, Edited by Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, Routledge 2018, hardback, JKS)

This analysis turns upon a theorization of the academy as an arm of the settler state—a site where the logics of elimination, capital accumulation, and dispossession are reconstituted—which is distinct from other frameworks that critique the academy as fundamentally neoliberal, Eurocentric, and/or patriarchal. I argue that this shift opens up more possibilities for coalition and collusion within and outside the university. I am particularly interested in examining the relationship between abolitionist and decolonial theorizations of the academy as articulated through Black radicalism and critical Indigenous studies, respectively. Historically, the university functioned as the institutional nexus for the capitalist and religious missions of the settler state, mirroring its histories of dispossession, enslavement, exclusion, forced assimilation and integration. As noted by Craig Wilder (2014), author of Ebony and Ivy: Race. Slavery, and the Troubled History of America’s Universities, the academy was both a “beneficiary and defender” of the same social and economic forces that “transformed the West and Central Africa through the slave trade and devastated indigenous nations in the Americas” (pp. 2–3). He writes: American colleges were not innocent or passive beneficiaries of conquest and colonial slavery. The European invasion of the Americas and the modern slave trade pulled peoples throughout the Atlantic world into each other’s lives, and colleges were among the colonial institutions that braided their histories and rendered their fates dependent and antagonistic. The academy never stood apart from American slavery – in fact it stood beside church and state as the third pillar of a civilization built on bondage. (Wilder, 2014, p. 11) Across the text, Wilder similarly registers (albeit unevenly) how the academy also never stood apart from the genocide and dispossession of Indigenous peoples. All of which illuminates the university’s history as long-time accessory in the perpetuation of settler crimes against Black and Indigenous humanity. Despite this history, student protest and charges of racism within the settler academy are often met with surprise and disbelief.1 For example, when protests erupted in early November 2015 at the University of Missouri, they were reported as “exploding” from a series of racial “incidents” and not as a response to the relent- less, decades-long, history of indiscretions of white supremacy that has character- ized the campus since 1950, when the first Black student was admitted; this, despite the fact that students organized under the hashtag #ConcernedStudent1950. Months of student and faculty protests, including a hunger strike by student leader Jonathan Butler, went relatively unnoticed2 in the national media, until the foot- ball team (players and coach) staged a boycott calling for President Tom Wolfe’s resignation; the next day,Wolfe stepped down. The students at Missouri inspired others and across the 2015–2016 academic year, students at over 80 other colleges and universities issued sets of demands, registering their shared refusal to absorb the high cost of institutional racism upon their minds and bodies.3 Together the young people of #ConcernedStudent1950 and #BlackLivesMatter led a co-resistance movement that disabused the nation of its post-racial fantasy, exposing the apparatuses of state violence and institutional negligence predicated upon antiblack racism. As each day seems to bring a new campus disruption, it is increasingly evident that what is at stake is a fundamental condition, a structure—and not a momentary crisis or incident—an event. Which is to say, within settler societies, the university functions as an apparatus of colonization; one that refracts the “eliminative” practices, modes of governance, and forms of knowledge production that Wolfe (2006) defines as definitive of settler colonialism. All of which raises questions of whether the university-as-such is beyond reform; if it should be abolished or perhaps more mercifully “hospiced” toward a timely and apposite death (de Oliveira Andreotti, Stein, Ahenakew, & Hunt, 2015). In his incisive essay “Black Study, Black Struggle” (2016),4 Robin D. G. Kelley not only argues that the university is beyond reform but also that reformist strategies and politics may be complicit in the struggle against antiblack racism. He writes: the fully racialized social and epistemological architecture upon which the modern university is built cannot be radically transformed by ‘simply’ adding darker faces, safer spaces, better training, and a curriculum that acknowledges historical and contemporary oppressions. This is a bit like asking for more black police officers as a strategy to curb state violence. (Kelley, 2016) As such, he is both skeptical and critical of student desires to belong—to be of the university—and of reform-based justice projects focused on making the university “more hospitable for Black students” (Kelley, 2016). Kelley is clear that his intent is not to question,“the courageous students who have done more to disrupt university business-as-usual than any movement in the last century” but rather to draw attention to the “contradictory impulses within the movement,” identified as “the tension between reform and revolution, between desiring to belong and rejecting the university as a cog in the neolib- eral order” (Kelley, 2016).Writing from a space of both empathy and exigency, Kelley’s article reads as a kind of radical-love letter to student activists, urging them to think carefully about what it means “to seek love from an institution inca- pable of loving them.” Instead, he challenges them to (re)connect their activism to their intellectual lives and points to the long history of street-to-campus activism as well as Black scholar-activists who worked to repurpose university resources toward their own needs. He offers the Mississippi Freedom Schools, Black feminist collectives (e.g. Lessons from the Damned, 1973) and Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s (2004) theorization of the “undercommons” as examples of “fugitive spaces” where students and faculty work to cleave study and struggle, where they can be in but not of the university. Kelley’s critique of recognition-based reform projects resonates with critiques of the politics of recognition as articulated within critical Indigenous studies (CIS).5 Whether through the legal apparatus of “federal recognition” or discursive peti- tions for acknowledgement, struggles for Indigenous sovereignty have been deeply shaped and curtailed by the politics and discourses of recognition. Rooted in lib- eral theories of justice, CIS scholars argue that “recognition”—as an equal right, a fiduciary obligation, a form of acknowledgement—functions as a technology of the state by which it maintains its power (as sole arbiter of recognition) and, thus, settler colonial relations (see Coulthard, 2007, 2014). In her groundbreaking book, Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life across the Borders of Settler States, Audra Simpson (2014) posits a politic of refusal as a political alternative to recognition, accounting for the multiple ways in which the Haudenosaunee generally, and Kahnawá:ke specifically, have continually refused various forms of colonial imposition from the Canadian and American governments (including citizenship), and that these refusals are constitutive of Haudenosaunee nationhood (Innes, 2015). Since the publication of this seminal text, theorizations of “refusal” have proliferated,6 with conceptualization of the construct as a form of politics, a methodological stance, and an aesthetic.

#### Thus the alternative is one of refusal, a reshifting of posthumanist discource to interrupt settler communicative spheres like debate

King 2017 (Tiffany, Assistant Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies at the Georgia State University “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight” *Critical Ethnic Studies* 3, No. 1, pp. 163-170)

Native feminist politics of decolonial refusal and Black feminist abolitionist politics of skepticism informed by a misandry and misanthropic distrust of and animus toward the (over)representation of man/men as the human diverge from the polite, communicative acts of the public sphere, much like the politics of the “feminist killjoy.”4 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: I use “misandry” (hatred of men) and “misanthropic” (distrust or deep skepticism about humankind or humanity) to illustrate how Sylvia Wynter and other Black scholars attend to the ways that the human— and **investments in the human—and its revised forms or genres of the human as woman/feminist still reproduce violent exclusions that make the death of Black and Native people viable and in-evitable**. In other words, **neither men nor women (as humans) can absorb Black females/males/children/LGBT and trans people into their collective folds. Both the hatred of “misandry” and the distrust and pessimism of “misanthropy” are appropriate methods to describe the inflection of the critique levied by Wynter and the other Black scholars examined in this article**. END FOOTNOTE] Throughout this article, I deploy the term “feminist” both ambivalently and strategically to mark and distinguish the scholarly tradition created by Black and Native women, queer, trans, and other people marginalized within these respective communities and their anticolonial and abolitionist movements.5 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: See Sylvia Wynter’s afterword, “Beyond Miranda’s Meanings: Un/silencing the ‘Demonic Ground’ of Caliban’s ‘Woman,’” in Out of the Kumbla: Caribbean Women and Literature, ed. Carole Boyce Davies (Chicago, Ill.: Africa World Press, 1990) 355– 72. Wynter warns Black women in the United States and the Caribbean that they need not uncritically embrace womanism as a political position, which can effectively oppose the elisions, racism, and false universalism of white feminism. “Feminism” as well as “womanism” are bounded and exclusive terms that do not effectively throw the category of the human into continual flux. END FOOTENOTE], Until a more useful and legible term emerges, I will use “feminist” to mark the practices of refusal and skepticism (misandry/misanthropy) as ones that largely exist outside more masculinist traditions within Indigenous/Native studies and Black studies**. “Decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” depart from the kinds of masculinist anticolonial traditions that attempt to reason Native/ Black man to White Man within humanist logic in at least two significant ways**. First, **neither participate in the communicative acts of the humanist public sphere from within the terms of the debate**. Further, they do not play by the rules.6 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: See the critiques of the anticolonial tradition within Caribbean philosophy articulated by Shona Jackson in her book Creole Indigeneity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012). Jackson argues that **anticolonial Caribbean masculinist philosophy tends to argue from inside the logic of Western philosophy in order to counter it.** For instance, in a valorization of the laborer as human and inheritor of the nation-state, Caribbean philosophy tends to reproduce the Hegelian telos of labor as a humanizing agent for the slave, which inadvertently makes the slave a subordinate human and effectively erases the ostensibly “nonlaboring” humanity of Indigenous peoples in the Anglophone Caribbean. END FOOTENOTE] Specifically, the Native and Black “feminist” politics discussed throughout launch a critique of both the logic of the discussion about the human and identity as well as the mode of communication. In fact, **practices of refusal and skepticism interrupt and flout codes of civil and collegial discursive protocol to focus on and illumine the violence that structures the posthumanist discourse.** Attending to the comportment, tone, and intensity of an engagement is just as important as focusing on its content. **The** particular **manner in which Black and Native feminists push back against violence is important**. **The force**, break with decorum, and style **in which Black and Native feminists confront discursive violence can change the nature of future encounters**. Given that Black women who confront the logics of “nonrepresentational theory” are really confronting genocide and the white, whimsical disavowal of Black and Native negation on the way to subjectlessness, it is understandable that there is an equally discordant response. **Refusal and skepticism are modes of engagement that are uncooperative and force an impasse in a discursive exchange.** This article tracks how traditions of “**decolonial refusal**” and “abolitionist skepticism” that emerge from Native/Indigenous and Black studies **expose the limits and violence of contemporary nonidentitarian and nonrepresentational impulses within white “critical” theory.** Further, this article asks whether Western forms of nonrepresentational (subjectless and nonidentitarian) theory can truly transcend the human through self- critique, self-abnegation, and masochism alone. External pressure, specifically the kind of pressure that “decolonial **refusal**” and “abolitionist skepticism” as forms of resistance that **enact outright rejection of or view “posthumanist” attempts with a “hermeneutics of suspicion,**”7 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: See the work of Black feminists such as Susana M. Morris, author of Close Kin and Distant Relatives: The Paradox of Respectability in Black Women’s Literature (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014), as well as womanist theologians who appropriate the phrase “hermeneutics of suspicion” as coined by Paul Ricoeur to describe the reading and interpretive practices of Black woman who are distrustful of traditional tropes about heteronormativity or conventional ways of thinking about what is natural and normal. Further, in Morris’s case, as well as within the tradition of Black women of faith and theologians, canonical and biblical texts are interpreted through a lens that acknowledges white supremacy and misogyny, and critically challenges racism and sexism (or kyriarchy in Morris’s case). Within Black feminist and womanist traditions, it is a position that can recognize the limitations of text and that refuses to accept the doctrine, theories, or message of an ideology wholesale. END FOOTENOTE**] is needed in order to truly address the recurrent problem of the violence of the human in continental theory.** While this article does not directly stake a claim in embracing or rejecting identity per se, it does take up the category of the human. **Because the category of the human is modified by identity in ways that position certain people** (white, male, able- bodied) within greater or lesser proximity to humanness, **identity is already taken up in this discussion**. Conversations about the human are very much tethered to conversations about identity. In the final section, the article will explore how Black and Native/Indigenous absorption into the category of the human would disfigure the category of the human beyond recognition. **Engaging how forms of Native decolonization and Black abolition scrutinize the violently exclusive means in which the human has been written and conceived is generative because it sets some workable terms of engagement for interrogating Western and mainstream claims to and disavowals of identity**. Rather than answer how Native decolonization and Black abolition construe the human or identity, the article examines how Native and Black feminists use refusal and misandry to question the very systems, institutions, and order of knowledge that secure humanity as an exclusive experience and bound identity in violent ways. I consider the practices and postures of refusal assumed by Native/Indigenous scholars such as Audra Simpson, Eve Tuck, Jodi Byrd, and Linda Tuhiwai Smith to be particularly instructive for exposing the violence of ostensibly nonrepresentational Deleuzoguattarian rhizomes and lines of flight. While reparative readings and “working with what is productive” about Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s work is certainly a part of the Native feminist scholarly tradition, this article focuses on the underexamined ways that Native feminists refuse to entertain certain logics and foundations that actually structure Deleuzoguattarian thought.8 [I thank one of the reviewers, who reminded me that Native feminist thought’s engagement with continental theory, specifically the work of Deleuze and Guattari, can be likened more to “constellations” as it takes up Deleuzoguattarian thought rather than a single point that always departs from a place of refusal. END FOOTENOTE] Further, I discuss **“decolonial refusal**” in relation to how Black scholars like Sylvia Wynter, Zakiyyah Iman Jackson, and Amber Jamilla Musser work within a Black feminist tradition animated **by a kind of skepticism or suspicion capable of ferreting out the trace of the white liberal human within (self-)professed subjectless, futureless, and nonrepresentational white theoretical traditions.** In other words, in the work of Sylvia Wynter**, one senses a general suspicion and deep distrust of the ability of Western theory— specifically its attempt at self- critique and self- correction in the name of justice for humanity— to revise its cognitive orders to work itself out of its current “closed system,” which reproduces exclusion and structural oppositions based on the negation of the other**.9 [INSERT FOOTENOTE: See Katherine McKittrick, “Diachronic Loops/Deadweight Tonnage/Bad Made Measure,” Cultural Geographies 23, no. 1 (2016): 3– 18, doi:10.1177/14744740156 12716, for an exemplary explication of how Sylvia Wynter uses the decolonial scholarship of an “autopoiesis.” END FOOTENOTE] Wynter’s study of decolonial theory and its elaboration of autopoiesis informs her understanding of how the human and its overrepresentation as man emerges. Recognizing that humans (of various genres) write themselves through a “self- perpetuating and self- referencing closed belief system” that often prevents them from seeing or noticing “the process of recursion,” Wynter works to expose these blind spots.10 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: See McKittrick, “Diachronic Loops,” in which the author cites the importance of the work of H. Maturana and F. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living (London: D. Reidel, 1972), for the study of the human’s process of self- writing. END FOOTNOTE] Wynter understands that **one of the limitations of Western liberal thought is that it cannot see itself in the process of writing itself.** I observe a similar kind of cynicism about the way the academic left invokes “post humanism” in the work of Jackson and Musser. Musser in particular questions the capacity of queer theories to turn to sensations like masochism within the field of affect studies to overcome the subject. Further, Jackson’s and Musser’s work is skeptical that white transcendence can happen on its own terms or rely solely on its own processes of self-critique and self- correction. I read Jackson’s and Musser’s work as distrustful of the ability for “posthumanism” to be accountable to Black and Indigenous peoples or for affect theory on its own to not replicate and reinforce the subjugation of the other as it moves toward self- annihilation. Both the human and the post human are causes for suspicion within Black studies. Like Wynter, the field of Black studies has consistently made the liberal human an object of study and scrutiny, particularly the nefarious manner in which it violently produces Black existence as other than and at times nonhuman. Wynter’s empirical method of tracking the internal epistemic crises and revolutions of Europe from the outside has functioned as a model for one way that Black studies can unfurl a critique of the human as well as Western modes of thought. I use the terms “misanthropy” and “misandry” in this article to evoke how Black studies has remained attentive to, wary about, and deeply distrustful of the human condition, humankind, and the humanas-man/men in the case of Black “feminists.” Both Black studies’ distrust of the “human” and Black feminism’s distrust of humanism in its version as man/men (which at times seeks to incorporate Black men) relentlessly scrutinize how the category of the human and in this case the “posthuman” reproduce Black death. I link misandry (skepticism of humankind-as-man) to the kind of skepticism and “hermeneutics of suspicion” that Black feminist scholars like Wynter, Jackson, and Musser at times apply to their reading and engagement with revisions to or expansions of the category of the human, posthuman discourses, and nonrepresentational theory In this article, I connect discursive performance of skepticism to embodied and affective responses I have witnessed in the academy that challenge the sanctioned modes of protocol, politesse, and decorum in the university. For example, Wynter assumes a critically disinterested posture as she gazes empirically on and examines intra-European epistemic shifts over time. Paget Henry has described Wynter as an anthropologist of the Occident, as Europe becomes an object of study rather than the center of thought and humanity.11 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Paget Henry, Caliban’s Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2002), 19. END FOOTENOTE] Throughout the body of Wynter’s work, she seems to be more interested in drawing our attention to the capacity of European orders of knowledge to shift over time— or their fragility— than in celebrating the progress that European systems of knowledge have claimed to make. Wynter’s tracking is just a tracking and not a celebration of the progress narrative that Western civilization tells about itself and its capacity to define, refine, and recognize new kinds of humanity over time. This comportment of critical disinterest is often read as an affront to the codes and customs of scholarly discourse and dialogue in the academic community, particularly when it is in response to the white thinkers of the Western cannon. **Decolonial refusal and abolitionist skepticism respond to how perverse and reprehensible it is to ask Indigenous and Black people who cannot seem to escape death to move beyond the human or the desire to be human**. In fact, Black and **Indigenous people have never been fully folded into the category of the human**. As Zakiyyah Iman Jackson has argued**, It has largely gone unnoticed by posthumanists that their queries into ontology often find their homologous (even anticipatory) appearance in decolonial philosophies that confront slavery and colonialism’s inextricability from the Enlightenment humanism they are trying to displace. Perhaps this foresight on the part of decolonial theory is rather unsurprising considering that exigencies of race have crucially anticipated and shaped discourses governing the non- human** (animal, technology, object, and plant).12 [Zakkiyah Iman Jackson, “Review: Animal: New Directions in the Theorization of Race and Posthumanism,” Feminist Studies 39, no. 3 (2013): 681. END FOOTENOTE] A crucial point that Jackson emphasizes is that Black and Indigenous studies, particularly decolonial studies, has already grappled with and anticipated the late twentieth century impulses inspired by Leo Bersani and Lee Edelman to annihilate the self and jettison the future. **Indigenous and Black “sex**” (as activity, reproduction, pleasure, world-building, and not-human sexuality) **are already subsumed by death**. For some reason, white critical theory cannot seem to fathom that self- annihilation is something white people need to figure out by themselves. In other words, “they can have that.”13 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: This is a colloquialism or form of vernacular often used by Blacks and People of Color to express that they disagree with something and more specifically reject an idea and will leave that to the people whom it concerns to deal with. END FOOTNOTE] Within Native feminist theorizing, ethnographic refusal can be traced to Audra Simpson’s 2007 article, “On Ethnographic Refusal.” In this seminal work, Simpson reflects on and gains inspiration from the tradition of refusal practiced by the people of Kahnawake.14 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Simpson’s ethnographic work specifically focuses on the Kahnawake Mohawk who reside in a reservation in the territory is now referred to as southwest Quebec. END FOOTNOTE] **Simpson shares that** **Kahnawake refusals are at the core and spirit of her own ethnographic and ethical practices of refusal.** I was interested in the larger picture, in the discursive, material and moral territory that was simultaneously historical and contemporary (this “national” space) and the ways in which Kahnawakero:non, **the “people of Kahnawake,” had refused the authority of the state at almost every turn.** The ways in which their formation of the initial membership code (now replaced by a lineage code and board of elders to implement the code and determine cases) was refused; the ways in which their interactions with border guards at the international boundary line were predicated upon a refusal; how refusal worked in everyday encounters to enunciate repeatedly to ourselves and to outsiders that “this is who we are, this is who you are, these are my rights.”15 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Audra Simpson, “On Ethnographic Refusal: Indigeneity, ‘Voice’ and Colonial Citizenship,” Junctures: The Journal for Thematic Dialogue, no. 9 (December 2007): 73. END FOOTNOTE] Because Simpson was concerned with applying the political and everyday modes of Kahnawake refusal, she attended to the “collective limit” established by her and her Kahnawake participants. 16 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Ibid., 77. END FOOTNOTE] The collective limit was relationally and ethically determined by what was shared but more importantly by what was not shared. Simpson’s ability to discern the collective limit could only be achieved through a form of relational knowledge production that regards and cares for the other. Simpson recounts how one of her participants forced her to recognize a collective limit. Approaching and then arriving at the limit, Simpson experiences the following: And although I pushed him, hoping that there might be something explicit said from the space of his exclusion— or more explicit than he gave me— it was enough that he said what he said. “Enough” is certainly enough. “Enough,” I realised, was when I reached the limit of my own return and our collective arrival. Can I do this and still come home; what am I revealing here and why? Where will this get us? Who benefits from this and why? And “enough” was when they shut down (or told me to turn off the recorder), or told me outright funny things like “nobody seems to know”— when everybody does know and talks about it all the time. Dominion then has to be exercised over these representations, and that was determined when enough was said. The ethnographic limit then, was reached not just when it would cause harm (or extreme discomfort)— the limit was arrived at when the representation would bite all of us and compromise the representational territory that we have gained for ourselves in the past 100 years.17 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Ibid., 78. END FOOTNOTE] Extending her discussion of ethnographic refusal beyond the bounds of ethnographic concerns, Simpson also ponders whether this enactment of refusal can be applied to theoretical work. Simpson outright poses a question: “What is theoretically generative about these refusals?”18 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Ibid. END FOOTNOTE] The question that Simpson asks in 2007 is clarified by Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang in the 2014 essay “R- Words: Refusing Research.” **Arguing that modes of refusal extended into the theoretical and methodological terrains of knowledge production are productive and necessary,** Tuck and Yang state: For the purposes of our discussion, the most important insight to draw from Simpson’s article is her emphasis that **refusals are not subtractive, but are theoretically generative, expansive. Refusal is not just a “no,” but a redirection to ideas otherwise unacknowledged or unquestioned.** Unlike a settler colonial configuration of knowledge that is petulantly exasperated and resentful of limits, **a methodology of refusal regards limits on knowledge as productive, as indeed a good thing**.19 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “R- Words: Refusing Research,” in Humanizing Research: Decolonizing Qualitative Inquiry with Youth and Communities (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE, 2014), 239. END FOOTNOTE] In line with Simpson’s intervention, Tuck and Yang posit that “refusal itself could be developed into both method and theory.”20 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Ibid., 242. END FOOTNOTE] For Tuck and Yang, a generative practice of refusal and a decolonial and abolitionist tradition is making Western thought “turn back upon itself as settler colonial knowledge, as opposed to universal, liberal, or neutral knowledge without horizon.”21 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Ibid., 243. END FOOTNOTE] In fact, the coauthors suggest “making the settler colonial metanarrative the object of . . . research.”22 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Ibid., 244. END FOOTNOTE] What this move effectively does is question the uninterrogated assumptions and exposes the violent particularities of the metanarrative. **Scrutiny as a practice of refusal also slows down or perhaps halts the momentum of the machinery that allows, as Tuck and Yang argue, “knowledge to facilitate interdictions on Indigenous and Black life**.”23 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Ibid., 244. END FOOTNOTE] Taking a cue from Simpson and Tuck and Yang, I turn to Tuck’s 2010 critique of Deleuze’s notion of “desire” as an example of the theoretical practice of refusal, which Simpson wonders about and which Tuck and Yang elaborated on in 2014. Eve Tuck’s 2010 article “Breaking Up with Deleuze” refuses Deleuze’s understanding and imposition of his definition of desire for Native studies and Native resurgence in particular. Tuck refuses the Deleuzoguattarian nomadic due to its totalizing moves and specifically its evasion and refusal of Native and alternative notions of refusal that emerge from Native struggles for survival.24 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: Eve Tuck, “Breaking Up with Deleuze: Desire and Valuing the Irreconcilable,” International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 23, no. 5 (2010): 635– 50. END FOOTNOTE] For Tuck, paying attention to “the continuity of ancestors,” or genealogies, in Native and in all modes of knowledge production is imperative. For Indigenous and Native studies, it reverses the erasure enacted by continental European and settler-colonial theory, which uses a tradition of ongoing genocide to annihilate Native thinkers and subsequently their epistemologies and theories. Prior to Byrd’s indictment of Deleuzoguattarian laudatory accounts of America’s terrain of “Indians without Ancestry,” Tuck reroutes us back to ancestral and genealogical thinking as a way of asserting Indigenous presence and its epistemological systems and traditions, devoid of Cartesian boundary- making impulses and desires. Tuck’s work also prepares us in 2010 for the critique that Byrd levies in 2011, which exposes the traditions, roots, and genealogies of Western poststructuralist theory. Such theory created the conditions of possibility and emergence for Deleuzoguattarian genocidal forms of rhizomatic and nonrepresentational thought. Black Caribbean feminist Michelle V. Rowley argues we need to especially attend to a theory’s “politics and conditions of emergence.”25 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: See Michelle V. Rowley, “The Idea of Ancestry: Of Feminist Genealogies and Many Other Things,” in Feminist Theory Reader: Local and Global Perspectives, 3rd ed., ed. Carole R. McCann and Syeung Kyung Kim (New York: Routledge, 2013), 810– 81, where Rowley argues that transnational feminisms need to attend to how the white feminist wave as a metaphor and theory emerges, disciplines are thought, and more importantly how “its wins” are gained through the exploitation and suffering of women from the Global South. Rowley describes this work as attending to the “politics and conditions of emergence” of feminist metaphors and theories. END FOOTNOTE] In other words, we need to consider on whose backs or through whose blood a theory developed and then circulated while hiding its own violence.

#### The role of the ballot is to center indigenous scholarship and research. Indigenous theories must come before settler frameworks. We need to hold colonizers accountable to open the space up for new narratives and disrupt colonial institutions.

Carlson ‘16 [Elizabeth Carlson, Oct 21 2016, Anti-colonial methodologies and practices for settler colonial studies, Settler Colonial Studies, 7:4, 496-517, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1241213] [SS]

Macoun and Strakosch contend that ‘most settlers who use [settler colonial theory] are concerned to disturb rather than re-enact colonial hierarchies, and seek to contribute to Indigenous political struggles’.40 The particular research project out of which this article arises, focuses on the ways experienced white settler anti-colonial, decolonial, or solidarity activists have worked to disrupt and subvert settler colonialism within themselves, their organizations, their relationships, their pedagogies, their connections with land, their com- munities, and sometimes also in the Canadian government, with a goal of inspiring others to engage in or deepen such work, and of contributing to social change. As has been noted, **in subverting settler colonialism, the role of white settler academics is at the periphery, making space for Indigenous resurgence and knowledges, and pushing back against colonial institutions,** structures, practices, mentalities, and land theft. In order to do this, anti-colonial settler scholars can sit on departmental and university committees, supporting anti-colonial and anti-oppressive ethical choices to push for changes in Euro- centric and colonial curricula, narratives, policies, and structures**. We can seek to disrupt rather than enact colonial values and practices, and engage in anti-colonial actions within the academy.** This also applies to our writing: Settler scholars seeking to challenge colonial power relations should be doubly attentive to the operation of [colonial] narratives, and the way that we as individual scholars perform and deploy academic authority. For us, this has involved the need to interrogate our work – along with other settler cultural productions.41 **When settler scholars subvert colonialism in the academy, the ethics of their work are improved, and potentially more space is made for Indigenous scholars who wish to main- tain their own values in the academy.** Arlo Kempf says that ‘where anticolonialism is a tool used to invoke resistance for the colo- nized, it is a tool used to invoke accountability for the colonizer’.**42 Relational accountability should be a cornerstone of settler colonial studies.** I believe settler colonial studies and scholars should ethically and overtly place themselves in relationship to the centuries of Indigenous oral, and later academic scholarship that conceptualizes and resists settler colonialism without necessarily using the term: SCT may be revelatory to many settler scholars, but Indigenous people have been speaking for a long time about colonial continuities based on their lived experiences. Some SCTs have sought to connect with these discussions and to foreground Indigenous resistance, survival and agency. Others, however, seem to use SCT as a pathway to explain the colonial encounter without engaging with Indigenous people and experiences – either on the grounds that this structural analysis already conceptually explains Indigenous experience, or because Indigen- ous resistance is rendered invisible.43 Ethical settler colonial theory (SCT) would recognize the foundational role Indigenous scholarship has in critiques of settler colonialism. It would acknowledge the limitations of settler scholars in articulating settler colonialism without dialogue with Indigenous peoples, and take as its norm making this dialogue evident. In my view, **it is critical that we not view settler colonial studies as a new or unique field being established, which would enact a discovery narrative and contribute to Indigenous  erasure, but rather take a longer and broader view**. Indigenous oral and academic scholars are indeed the originators of this work. This space is not empty. Of course, powerful forces of socialization and discipline impact scholars in the academy. **There is much pressure to claim unique space**, to establish a name for ourselves, and to make academic discoveries. I am suggesting that **settler colonial studies and anti-colonial scholars resist these hegemo- nic pressures and maintain a higher anti-colonial ethic.** As has been argued, ‘**the theory itself places ethical demands on us as settlers, including the demand that we actively refuse its potential to re-empower our own academic voices and to marginalize Indigen- ous resistance’**.44 As settler scholars, we can reposition our work relationally and contextually with humi- lity and accountability. **We can centre Indigenous resistance, knowledges, and scholarship in our work, and contextualize our work in Indigenous sovereignty.** We can view oral Indi- genous scholarship as legitimate scholarly sources. We can acknowledge explicitly and often the Indigenous traditions of resistance and scholarship that have taught us and pro- vided the foundations for our work. **If our work has no foundation of Indigenous scholar- ship and mentorship, I believe our contributions to settler colonial studies are even more deeply problematic.** I embody the principle of relational and epistemic accountability by acknowledging here that my interest in the larger study out of which the anti-colonial research method- ology is based was inspired by a lifetime of influences. In particular, my work in this area has been influenced by years of guidance from a number of Indigenous and African-Amer- ican mentors including Nicholas Cooper-Lewter, Nii Gaani Aki Inini (Dave Courchene Jr), Zoongigaabowitmiskoakikwe, and my late brother Byron Matwewinin.45 I entered into dis- cussions with Indigenous scholars, friends, and Elders (in particular, Zoongigaabowitmis- koakikwe, Michael Hart, Leona Star-Manoakeesick, and Gladys Rowe),46 observing their protocols of gifts and offerings for the feedback I was requesting, depending on the context. In addition, my reading of Indigenous scholarship located the study as a response to a call by Indigenous scholars that settler peoples engage in decolonization processes and work. Throughout the research and writing process I made it a point to attend Indi- genous-led community events and gatherings to stay connected to community and con- tinue to learn. When I met with Leona Star-Manoakeesick, we discussed how Ownership, Control, Access, Possession research principles might relate to my research.47 Leona challenged me to think about who constitutes the community that relates to my research as a begin- ning step, and shared that accountability to Indigenous peoples would also mean account- ability to the land. Her input greatly influenced the methodology principles and practices. As I achieved greater clarity about the study, I engaged in formal consultations with a number of other Indigenous scholars, knowledge keepers, and/or activists. Chickadee Richard, Belinda Vandenbroek, Don Robinson, Aimée Craft, Louis Sorin, and Manito Mukwa (Troy Fontaine),48 provided guidance, input, and encouragement regarding the initial research design and process, much of which shifted and strengthened my initial thoughts and was readily integrated into the research. I was gifted key insights and values on which to build the research, and meaningful ideas for interview questions and interview participants. During the initial phases of the research, I was inspired by scho- larship that urges settler peoples on Indigenous lands who wish to identify themselves in the context of Indigenous sovereignty to learn and use words that local Indigenous peoples use for them.49 A number of individuals helped me in my quest to learn about Anishinaabemowin conceptions of white people – Nii Gaani Aki Inini (Dave Courchene), Rose Roulette, Niizhosake (Sherry Copenace), Daabaasanaquwat ‘Lowcloud’ (Peter Atkin- son), Byron Matwewinin, and Pebaamibines.50 **I further sought to embody relational accountability by centring Indigenous scholarship and literatures in my research proposal and literature review.** Aspects of the data analysis process were shared with a smaller group of Indigenous scholars (Leona Star-Manoakeesick, Aimée Craft, and Dawnis Kennedy),51 who provided feedback which shaped the analysis and the writing of the research report. Towards the end of the research process, I organized a research feast, which is described further below. **Relational accountability was embodied by sharing the research with the community and receiving feedback from it.**

# Case

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