# 1

Multilateralism CP: India should convene a meeting of parties to the Outer Space Treaty and propose an Optional Protocol for review and acceptance by any state that joins a ban on the appropriation of outer space by private entities. India should ratify and implement the protocol.

#### Multilat avoids backlash.

Meyer ’18 [Paul, Senior Fellow in Space Security at The Simons Foundation Canada, Adjunct Professor of International Studies at Simon Fraser University, Fellow in International Security at Simon Fraser University’s Centre for Dialogue, “Diplomacy: The Missing Ingredient in Space Security”, Simons Papers in Security and Development, Number 67, November, p. 15-17 [Note – ‘GGE’ = Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs) in Outer Space Activities]

A Way Forward

As the leading space power appears to be bent on unilateral steps regarding space security matters, a challenge is posed to those wishing to uphold the “peaceful purposes” aims of the Outer Space Treaty. Remedial action to promote cooperative security approaches in outer space will require a far more active campaign that is not limited to states, but which also engages all constituencies within the space community. While the three multilateral processes mentioned earlier hold out some prospect of success, they are a thin reed to lean on given their inherent constraints. Any effort to revitalize space security diplomacy will need to feature several, mutually reinforcing measures. Some possible near-term steps that could be taken to avoid a drift into space conflict and which would help to restore a more constructive atmosphere include the following:

1. All states should practice strategic restraint in their military space programs, offer greater transparency as to their nature and mute the escalating threat rhetoric and belligerent posturing.

2. A representative group of states should initiate a process at the UNGA to establish an open-ended working group to elaborate an International Code of Conduct on outer space activities. Despite its problematic diplomatic roll-out by the EU, this initiative has too much useful potential to be simply set aside and abandoned.

3. Whereas through the creation of the GGE, China and Russia have managed finally to escape the moribund CD and empower a UN forum to initiate discussion of their proposed PPWT and legally binding arms control in space generally, this step needs amplification. The closed-door nature of the GGE process and its dependency on an ultimate consensus for results, makes this a risky vehicle for conducting a discussion of legally binding versus politically binding approaches to space security. The GGE could be supplemented by a series of open-ended consultations hosted by concerned states or NGOs to permit discussion of the important factors of definitions, scope and verification that have not had a thorough or transparent airing in a multilateral context.

4. Similarly, a concerted effort is made to revisit and promote the TCBMs recommended by the 2013 GGE. Greater acceptance and implementation of these TCBMs would be a powerful counter-force to those seeking to depict outer space as a battleground in which inter-state conflict is inevitable. While it would be desirable if a group of like-minded states cooperated on convening a conference to focus on TCBMs this work could also benefit from private sector and civil society involvement as well.

5. A deliberate effort is pursued to re-establish common ground concerning the regime governing outer space. As the Outer Space Treaty is the embodiment of this regime, an effort to raise its profile and remind audiences of its core principles and provisions is called for. One step of both symbolic and substantive importance would be to have a champion state or a ginger group of “Friends of the Outer Space Treaty” to convene the first ever meeting of its state’s parties. As an early multilateral accord the Outer Space Treaty was not provided with follow-up mechanisms and hence lacks the attention that annual conferences of states parties provide for most multilateral agreements. After half a century of being in effect it is overdue to bring together its membership. Such a diplomatic gathering in honor of this cornerstone treaty could help consolidate support for its key principles and obligations as well as stimulate new cooperative steps for the future. A suitable gathering of states parties could also provide an incentive for further universalization of the treaty as countries outside the treaty will likely want to attend.

These proposed actions could help revitalize diplomacy, that missing ingredient from current considerations of space security and realign the depiction of outer space as a realm of promising international cooperation rather than one of inevitable confrontation and conflict.

#### **It is physically impossible for normal means to be multilateral – indites AC solvency.**

Meyer ’14 [Paul, Senior Fellow in Space Security at The Simons Foundation Canada, Adjunct Professor of International Studies at Simon Fraser University, former career diplomat with Canada’s Foreign Service, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (2003-2007), Director-General of the Security and Intelligence Bureau of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, 3/20/14, “Space Security and Diplomatic Disconnects: A Canadian Perspective,” http://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/Space%20Security%20and%20Diplomatic%20Disconnects-A%20Canadian%20Perspective%20by%20Paul%20Meyer-2014%20Space%20Security%20Conference%2C%20Geneva.pdf

Any observer of the international system’s treatment of the subject of outer space security would have to be struck with the contrast between word and deed in this sphere of multilateral activity. On the one hand the “grave danger for international peace and security” represented by an arms race in outer space and the consequent “importance and urgency” of preventing such a calamity has been espoused for years. On the other hand, very little has been done to respond to this identified threat and even less by means of the steps specified in the guidance provided by the international community.

That guidance has primarily come in the form of a resolution of the UN General Assembly. One that has been adopted annually since the early 1980s and, in most recent years, with near universal support (no negative votes and only two abstentions). By now most in this room will know that I am referring to the resolution entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” or PAROS to its friends. This resolution (A/RES/68/29 in its most recent iteration) constitutes the expression of a consensus concerning the situation of outer space security and what needs to be done to safeguard it. The resolution represents the international community’s declared policy on the subject.

Besides its characterization of the importance and urgency to prevent an arms race in outer space already cited above, the resolution is very action oriented, and in several places, quite prescriptive as to what should be done. Take for example its preambular paragraph “Convinced that further measures should be examined in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, including the weaponization of outer space”. It clearly indicates that further measures are needed, that bilateral and multilateral agreements are a part of such measures and that the non-weaponization of outer space is a core element of the prevention of an arms race there. A subsequent preambular paragraph recalls “the importance of confidence-building measures as a means conducive to ensuring the attainment” of the PAROS objective.

This prescriptive character continues in the operational section of the resolution with OP2 reaffirming the need to “consolidate and reinforce” the existing legal regime for outer space security “and enhance its effectiveness” and OP3 emphasizing “the necessity of further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space”. Ops 5 and 6 refer to the Conference of Disarmament, noting its “primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements” and inviting it to establish a working group under its PAROS agenda item early in its 2014 session.

So the direction of the international community seems clear enough – but what about the implementation record? Here one must acknowledge that there is a major disconnect between what states collectively say what they want to happen and what actually gets done. Obviously the bilateral and multilateral agreements envisaged have not transpired. The stress on verifiable accords suggest a content of real security significance and no agreements of that nature have been forthcoming. For those based in Geneva, I needn’t point to the surreal aspect of the appeal to the CD to establish “as early as possible in its 2014 session” a PAROS working group – something the CD has been unable to do in any of its sessions since the termination of the previous WG in 1995. Needless to say that the CD’s exercise of its primary role in the negotiation of PAROS agreements has not been noticeable for its exertions to date, let alone delivering any product.

Now some in civil society might point to this disconnect and simply attribute it to the cynicism of states, equally content to sign up to various declarations and then proceed to act at variance with them. This is an appealing if not fully satisfying hypothesis. Is it that states are being consciously insincere when endorsing the PAROS resolution or does it represent a set of goals and steps that ideally they would like to see realized but for a variety of reasons this has not occurred? And is there a further explanatory factor of institutional inertia, that in the peculiar universe of the UN and the resolution-factory that is the General Assembly, it seems easier to repeat constantly past formulations which have developed a patina of frequent use, regardless of whether they are now outmoded?

While you are pondering this, let me flag that the general background of diplomatic inaction on this security file is not uniform. Over the last decade we have seen a handful of diplomatic initiatives regarding space security that have broken with the prevailing pattern of neglect. Several of these flow from actions taken by Russia, which in turn reflects the relative and sustained priority this subject has had for that country. Russia alongside China were the sponsors of the draft treaty on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space that was formally tabled at the CD in 2008 (although elements were introduced as early as 2002). If we consider the PPWT against the criteria of the PAROS resolution it certainly aligns with a substantive multilateral agreement with a major security focus, although it manages the verification criterion in an indirect “could be added latter” manner. Providing for verification would entail some expenditure, but given how much we have invested in what is up there and the costs that would be occurred if these space assets are threatened or attacked, spending something to monitor a ban would be a fiscally responsible act.

Although the draft text has received some feedback from states, the PPWT has not been the subject of a dedicated session or conference. I note with interest the statement by Russian Ambassador Alexey Borodavkin that an updated version of the PPWT is shortly to be submitted to the CD. It would be necessary in my view that any new text is accompanied by a procedural plan that ensures actual consideration of the proposal. A workable process is as important as the product itself.

Russia has been the initiating force behind a series of UNGA resolutions promoting consideration of transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBM) for outer space. Russia also initiated and chaired the UN Group of Governmental Experts that studied TCBMs and produced a consensus report in July 2013. This report outlined a variety of transparency, notification and consultative measures which it commended to states for their consideration and implementation on a voluntary basis. Russia has also encouraged states to make political commitments to the effect that they would not be the first to place weapons into outer space. It is noteworthy that in his January statement already referred to, Ambassador Borodavkin expressed Russia’s intention to introduce a resolution at this fall’s UNGA session relating to such unilateral pledges. I am troubled by this particular formulation, because while it would be terrible to have a state be the first to weaponize space, it would be just as bad to have a second, third or fourth follow suit. The ‘no first placement’ proposition could be seen as an invitation to develop space weapons in order to be in a position to retaliate in kind. Much preferable in my opinion would be a pledge not to weaponize outer space period.

While I think it is fair to describe Russia as the leading diplomatic actor on this file in recent years, it doesn’t mean that others have not contributed in some fashion as well (China most notably). The EU, starting in 2008, has championed an International Code of Conduct on Outer Space activities. The Code now in a third version after several rounds of multilateral consultation also can be seen as an attempt to respond to the UNGA space security resolutions espousing TCBMs. The Code indeed identifies itself as a regime of TCBMs “with the aim of creating mutual understanding and trust, helping both to prevent confrontation and foster national, regional and global security and stability,”(1.3). Some proposals for individual TCBM have also originated with other states. Canada, for example, proposed in 2007 and 2009 a triad of security pledges aimed at preventing the weaponization of outer space and attacks against satellites from any environment.

All of these diplomatic steps have been taken within (and perhaps motivated by) a space security situation which was seen to be deteriorating. In particular the demonstrations of ASAT capabilities by China and the US in 2007 and 2008 respectively, contributed to renewed concerns that the peaceful operating environment of outer space could be readily threatened by terrestrial systems. As the growth of space users and the number of stakeholders continues apace, we should expect a commensurate increase in the attention being paid, inside and outside of governments, to the security of outer space. This in turn should yield more engagement, than we have witnessed in several years, in the admittedly demanding work of analyzing and debating the PAROS-related proposals that have come forward.

A major impediment to such consideration is the absence of an appropriate, functioning multilateral forum for addressing this subject matter. The CD, would of course be the preferred forum, for such official PAROS relevant work, but it has been out of action for 15 years. COPOUS can deal with some sustainability and safety-related aspects, but is not mandated to take up the security aspects. The UN General Assembly’s First committee can continue to consider the topic of outer space security at its annual deliberations, but needs some more operational entity to undertake on-going work. The EU, in relation to its draft Code of Conduct, has said it intends to convene an ad hoc diplomatic conference to adopt eventually this document. This may be the diplomatic vehicle that other proponents of space security initiatives should consider utilizing if they truly wish to see a debate on their specific proposals take place. Perhaps it is time for a meeting of the states parties to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to review its implementation and the prospects for reinforcing its core legal regime for outer space with additional measures as foreseen in the PAROS resolution. If the international community is ever going to be able to overcome the diplomatic disconnect embodied in the PAROS resolution, it will need to find the means to channel its policy direction into practical results. States cannot continue to hide behind the pretext of the CD’s claim on the file, if they value their credibility and the preservation of a secure operating environment in outer space.

The international community, including the expanding group of non-governmental stakeholders, can ill afford further delay and prevarication regarding taking action to enhance space security. As the UN Secretary General noted, in his forward to the GGE report on TCBMs, “Outer space is an inherently multilateral domain. If we are to continue to take advantage of the invaluable resources that outer space provides, it is critically important for all nations to work collectively to keep it free from destabilizing conflict and to make it safe, secure and sustainable in the long term for the benefit of all humankind”.

#### Fractionalization kills space law.

Beard ’17 [Jack, Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska College of Law, Space, Cyber & Telecommunications Law Program, LLM from Georgetown University, JD from the University of Michigan School of Law, and Former Associate Deputy General Counsel (International Affairs) at the Department of Defense, Former Lieutenant Colonel in the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the U.S. Army Reserve, “Soft Law's Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities”, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Spring 2017, 38 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 335, Lexis]

Russia and China thus continue to lie beyond the reach of the Code, defeating efforts by proponents to make the Code a widely subscribed and broadly accepted instrument and greatly diminishing its purported "norm-setting" capabilities. Whatever benefits soft law instruments are asserted to have in addressing security matters, participation by only a fraction of states in the Code, particularly a fraction that fails to include all the major space-faring countries, will not provide a sound basis for establishing new norms or help to identify or isolate aggressors and other non-participating, misbehaving states. Furthermore, states facing perceived security threats in space are not likely to be assured by a fractional version of the Code in which their potential adversaries do not even participate.

In some areas of international cooperation, such as the protection of human rights, persuading only a fraction of states to initially sign multilateral instruments may be viewed as a positive, progressive [\*394] step of achievement (particularly since human rights agreements are not focused on reciprocal obligations). 240 As an arms control initiative for space, however, the Code's failure to include Russia and China and other major space stakeholders is a fundamental flaw. The absence of powerful, potential adversaries makes multilateral conventions addressing arms control or disarmament issues highly problematic for those states contemplating joining such regimes and making potentially dangerous, non-reciprocal commitments. 241 [FOOTNOTE] 241 Richard L. Williamson Jr., Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral Arms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 Chi. J. Int'l L 59, 61-62 (2003) ("Other matters can affect a treaty's effectiveness, such as the degree to which essential nations become parties to the treaty. If key parties remain outside the treaty, it increases pressure on the other states to withdraw or cheat"). [END FOOTNOTE] To the extent that soft law arrangements such as the proposed Code seek to promote arms control measures in the face of severe security dilemmas and the threat of arms races, the non-participation of powerful adversaries clearly undermines such efforts.

If the proposed Code is adopted by states in its current state of limited acceptance, a fractional soft law product will emerge which will present its own particular disadvantages and problems (beyond those associated with soft law arrangements generally). Not only would a fractionalized Code fail to identify aggressors and isolate rogue states, it could instead lead to de facto competing legal regimes in space, as subscribing states respect their own "rules of the road" while other non-participating states - especially major, non-participating space powers - seek to advance their own interests through different or less restrictive approaches. Attempts to later successfully persuade non-participating states to accede to the Code will be challenging, if not impossible, and could risk further weakening rather than improving the Code. 242

#### Extinction.

Pelton ’17 [Joseph, PhD in International Relations from Georgetown University, Director Emeritus of the Space and Advanced Communications Research Institute at George Washington University, The New Gold Rush: The Riches of Space Beckon!, p. 1-9]

Are We Humans Doomed to Extinction?

What will we do when Earth’s resources are used up by humanity? The world is now hugely over populated, with billions and billions crammed into our overcrowded cities. By 2050, we may be 9 billion strong, and by 2100 well over 11 billion people on Planet Earth. Some at the United Nations say we might even be an amazing 12 billion crawling around this small globe. And over 80 % of us will be living in congested cities. These cities will be ever more vulnerable to terrorist attack, natural disaster, and other plights that come with overcrowding and a dearth of jobs that will be fueled by rapid automation and the rise of artificial intelligence across the global economy. We are already rapidly running out of water and minerals. Climate change is threatening our very existence. Political leaders and even the Pope have cautioned us against inaction. Perhaps the naysayers are right. All humanity is at tremendous risk. Is there no hope for the future? This book is about hope. We think that there is literally heavenly hope for humanity. But we are not talking here about divine intervention. We are envisioning a new space economy that recognizes that there is more water in the skies that all our oceans. Th ere is a new wealth of natural resources and clean energy in the reaches of outer space—more than most of us could ever dream possible. There are those that say why waste money on outer space when we have severe problems here at home? Going into space is not a waste of money. It is our future. It is our hope for new jobs and resources. The great challenge of our times is to reverse public thinking to see space not as a resource drain but as the doorway to opportunity. The new space frontier can literally open up a “gold rush in the skies.” In brief, we think there is new hope for humanity. We see a new a pathway to the future via new ventures in space. For too long, space programs have been seen as a money pit. In the process, we have overlooked the great abundance available to us in the skies above. It is important to recognize there is already the beginning of a new gold rush in space—a pathway to astral abundance. “New Space” is a term increasingly used to describe radical new commercial space initiatives—many of which have come from Silicon Valley and often with backing from the group of entrepreneurs known popularly as the “space billionaires.” New space is revolutionizing the space industry with lower cost space transportation and space systems that represent significant cost savings and new technological breakthroughs. “New Commercial Space” and the “New Space Economy” represent more than a new way of looking at outer space. These new pathways to the stars could prove vital to human survival. If one does not believe in spending money to probe the mysteries of the universe then perhaps we can try what might be called “calibrated greed” on for size. One only needs to go to a cubesat workshop, or to Silicon Valley or one of many conferences like the “Disrupt Space” event in Bremen, Germany, held in April 2016 to recognize that entrepreneurial New Space initiatives are changing everything [ 1 ]. In fact, the very nature and dimensions of what outer space activities are today have changed forever. It is no longer your grandfather’s concept of outer space that was once dominated by the big national space agencies. Th e entrepreneurs are taking over. The hopeful statements in this book and the hard economic and technical data that backs them up are more than a minority opinion. It is a topic of growing interest at the World Economic Forum, where business and political heavyweights meet in Davos, Switzerland, to discuss how to stimulate new patterns of global economic growth. It is even the growing view of a group that call themselves “space ethicists.” Here is how Christopher J. Newman, at the University of Sunderland in the United Kingdom has put it: Space ethicists have offered the view that space exploration is not only desirable; it is a duty that we, as a species, must undertake in order to secure the survival of humanity over the longer term. Expanding both the resource base and, eventually, the habitats available for humanity means that any expenditure on space exploration, far from being viewed as frivolous, can legitimately be rationalized as an ethical investment choice. (Newman) On the other hand there are space ethicists and space exobiologists who argue that humans have created ecological ruin on the planet—and now space debris is starting to pollute space. Th ese countervailing thoughts by the “no growth” camp of space ethicists say we have no right to colonize other planets or to mine the Moon and asteroids—or at least no right to do so until we can prove we can sustain life here on Earth for the longer term. However, for most who are planning for the new space economy the opinion of space philosophers doesn’t really fl oat their boat. Legislators, bankers, and aspiring space entrepreneurs are far more interested in the views of the super-rich capitalists called the space billionaires. A number of these billionaires and space executives have already put some very serious money into enterprises intent on creating a new pathway to the stars. No less than fi ve billionaires with established space ventures—Elon Musk, Paul Allen, Jeff Bezos, Sir Richard Branson, and Robert Bigelow—have invested millions if not billions of dollars into commercializing space. Th ey are developing new technologies and establishing space enterprises that can bring the wealth of outer space down to Earth. Th is is not a pipe dream, but will increasingly be the economic reality of the 2020s. Th ese wealthy space entrepreneurs see major new economic opportunities. To them space represents the last great frontier for enterprising pioneers. Th us they see an ever-expanding space frontier that off ers opportunities in low-cost space transportation, satellite solar power satellites to produce clean energy 24 h a day, space mining, space manufacturing and production, and eventually space habitats and colonies as a trajectory to a better human future. Some even more visionary thinkers envision the possibility of terraforming Mars, or creating new structures in space to protect our planet from cosmic hazards and even raising Earth’s orbit to escape the rising heat levels of the Sun in millennia to come. Some, of course, will say this is sci-fi hogwash. It can’t be done. We say that this is what people would have said in 1900 about airplanes, rocket ships, cell phones and nuclear devices. The skeptics laughed at Columbus and his plan to sail across the oceans to discover new worlds. When Thomas Jefferson bought the Louisiana Purchase from France or Seward bought Alaska, there were plenty of naysayers that said such investment in the unknown was an extravagant waste of money. A healthy skepticism is useful and can play a role in economic and business success. Before one dismisses the idea of an impending major new space economy and a new gold rush, it might useful to see what has already transpired in space development in just the past fi ve decades. Th e world’s fi rst geosynchronous communications satellite had a throughput capability of about 500 kb / s. In contrast, today’s state of the art Viasat 2 —a half century later— has an impressive throughput of some 140 Gb/s. Th is means that the relative throughput is nearly 300,000 greater, while its lifetime is some ten times longer (Figs. 1.1 and 1.2 ). Each new generation of communications satellite has had more power, better antenna systems, improved pointing and stabilization, and an extended lifetime. And the capabilities represented by remote sensing satellites , meteorological satellites , and navigation and timing satellites have also expanded their capabilities and performance in an impressive manner. When satellite applications fi rst started, the market was measured in millions of dollars. Today commercial satellite services exceed a quarter of a billion dollars. Vital services such as the Internet, aircraft traffi c control and management, international banking, search and rescue and much, much more depend on application satellites. Th ose that would doubt the importance of satellites to the global economy might wish to view on You Tube the video “If Th ere Were a Day Without Satellites?” [ 2 ]. Let’s check in on what some of those very rich and smart guys think about the new space economy and its potential. (We are sorry to say that so far there are no female space billionaires, but surely this, too, will come someday soon.) Of course this twenty-fi rst century breakthrough that we call the New Space economy will not come just from new space commerce. It will also come from the amazing new technologies here on Earth. Vital new terrestrial technologies will accompany this cosmic journey into tomorrow. Information technology, robotics, artifi cial intelligence and commercial space travel systems have now set us on a course to allow us humans to harvest the amazing riches in the skies—new natural resources, new energy, and even totally new ways of looking at the purpose of human existence. If we pursue this course steadfastly, it can be the beginning of a New Space renaissance. But if we don’t seek to realize our ultimate destiny in space, Homo sapiens can end up in the dustbin of history—just like literally millions of already failed species. In each and every one of the fi ve mass extinction events that have occurred over the last 1.5 billion years on Earth, some 50–80 % of all species have gone the way of the T. Rex, the woolly mammoth, and the Dodo bird along with extinct ferns, grasses and cacti. On the other hand, the best days of the human race could be just beginning. If we are smart about how we go about discovering and using these riches in the skies and applying the best of our new technologies, it could be the start of a new beginning for humanity. Konstantin Tsiokovsky, the Russian astronautics pioneer, who fi rst conceived of practical designs for spaceships, famously said: “A planet is the cradle of mankind, but one cannot live in a cradle forever.” Well before Tsiokovsky another genius, Leonardo da Vinci, said, quite poetically: “Once you have tasted fl ight, you will forever walk the earth with your eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you will always long to return.” Th e founder of the X-Prize and of Planetary Resources, Inc., Dr. Peter Diamandis, has much more brashly said much the same thing in quite diff erent words when he said: “Th e meek shall inherit the Earth. Th e rest of us will go to Mars.” The New Space Billionaires Peter Diamandis is not alone in his thinking. From the list of “visionaries” quoted earlier, Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX; Sir Richard Branson, the founder of Virgin Galactic; and Paul Allen, the co-founder of Microsoft and the man who fi nanced SpaceShipOne, the world’s fi rst successful spaceplane have all said the future will include a vibrant new space economy. Th ey, and others, have said that we can, we should and we soon shall go into space and realize the bounty that it can off er to us. Th e New Space enterprise is today indeed being led by those so-called space billionaires , who have an exciting vision of the future. Th ey and others in the commercial space economy believe that the exploitation of outer space may open up a new golden age of astral abundance. Th ey see outer space as a new frontier that can be a great source of new materials, energy and various forms of new wealth that might even save us from excesses of the past. Th is gold rush in the skies represents a new beginning. We are not talking about expensive new space ventures funded by NASA or other space agencies in Europe, Japan, China or India. No, these eff orts which we and others call New Space are today being forged by imaginative and resourceful commercial entrepreneurs. Th ese twenty-fi rst century visionaries have the fortitude and zeal to look to the abundance above. New breakthroughs in technology and New Space enterprises may be able to create an “astral life raft” for humanity. Just as Columbus and the Vikings had the imaginative drive that led them to discover the riches of a new world, we now have a cadre of space billionaires that are now leading us into this New Space era of tomorrow. Th ese bold leaders, such as Paul Allen and Sir Richard Branson, plus other space entrepreneurs including Jeff Bezos of Amazon and Blue Origin, and Robert Bigelow, Chairman of Budget Suites and Bigelow Aerospace, not only dream of their future in the space industry but also have billions of dollars in assets. Th ese are the bright stars of an entirely new industry that are leading us into the age of New Space commerce . Th ese space billionaires, each in their own way, are proponents of a new age of astral abundance. Each of them is launching new commercial space industries. Th ey are literally transforming our vision of tomorrow. Th ese new types of entrepreneurial aerospace companies—the New Space enterprises—give new hope and new promise of transforming our world as we know it today. The New Space Frontier What happens in space in the next few decades, plus corresponding new information technologies and advanced robotics, will change our world forever. Th ese changes will redefi ne wealth, change our views of work and employment and upend almost everything we think we know about economics, wealth, jobs, and politics. Th ese changes are about truly disruptive technologies of the most fundamental kinds. If you thought the Internet, smart phones, and spandex were disruptive technologies, just hang on. You have not seen anything yet. In short, if you want to understand a transition more fundamental than the changes brought to the twentieth century world by computers, communications and the Internet, then read this book. There are truly riches in the skies. Near-Earth asteroids largely composed of platinum and rare earth metals have an incredible value. Helium-3 isotopes accessible in outer space could provide clean and abundant energy. There is far more water in outer space than is in our oceans. In the pages that follow we will explain the potential for a cosmic shift in our global economy, our ecology, and our commercial and legal systems. These can take place by the end of this century. And if these changes do not take place we will be in trouble. Our conventional petro-chemical energy systems will fail us economically and eventually blanket us with a hydrocarbon haze of smog that will threaten our health and our very survival. Our rare precious metals that we need for modern electronic appliances will skyrocket in price, and the struggle between “haves” and “have nots” will grow increasingly ugly. A lack of affordable and readily available water, natural resources, food, health care and medical supplies, plus systematic threats to urban security and systemic warfare are the alternatives to astral abundance. The choices between astral abundance and a downward spiral in global standards of living are stark. Within the next few decades these problems will be increasingly real. By then the world may almost be begging for new, out of- the-box thinking. International peace and security will be an indispensable prerequisite for exploitation of astral abundance, as will good government for all. No one nation can be rich and secure when everyone else is poor and insecure. In short, global space security and strategic space defense, mediated by global space agreements, are part of this new pathway to the future.

Don’t give them 1AR theory

1. It’s a bad norm because we have less speeches to have the theory debate – only three speeches
2. Leads to intervention since any counter interps or responses to the counter interps are new in the 2
3. Unfair since we only get one speech to respond so the 2ar can spin the shell and we can’t do anything about it

# 2

#### India Soft Power is high now – space is key.

Amaresh 21 Preethi Amaresh 8-6-2021 "The rise of India as a global soft power" <https://www.bridgeindia.org.uk/the-rise-of-india-as-a-global-soft-power/> (political scientist and an author of the books, "Nihonomics" and "Nanmin". She is pursuing her doctoral degree in International Relations from Geneva School of Diplomacy, Switzerland.)//Elmer

More innovative uses of soft power more recently Soft power has been expanded in diverse forms by succeeding governments in India. The government of Narendra Modi at present has been creating innovative trends in the realm of Indian diplomacy by blending contemporary elements of soft power. Today, the state has used specific soft power assets of India such as Diaspora, Yoga, Buddhism and economic support for accomplishing diplomatic triumphs and advancing the nation’s national interests. India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has determined to promote a “soft power matrix” to measure the effectiveness of the country’s soft power outreach. The goal of the MEA is going to be an indispensable test condition in the aforementioned regard. Initiatives such as ‘Destination India’ and ‘Know India’ have likewise been launched. Cultural centers like the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) even organized a national convention ‘Destination India’ initiative for the first time in 2019 which believes that India can move up fast to be a leader of the global knowledge society. ‘Namaste diplomacy’ and ‘Medical diplomacy’ of India today has become the talk post-COVID-19. India’s supremacy in space statesmanship and technology is an added principally induced soft power means with endless prospects. India’s regional diplomacy has reached outer space with the nation launching its GSAT-9, also known as the South Asia Satellite, that aimed to bestow South Asian countries with space-enabled services. As an ancient civilization, India has a throbbing democracy, the largest in the world, a secular spirit and a speedily developing marketplace that grew to become the 5th most booming economy in 2019, overtaking the United Kingdom and France. India, to boost its communication, tourism, culture and soft power, on the whole, will have to forge multilateral and bilateral collaborations with different nations by enhancing its foreign policy and diplomacy. Due to the attractiveness of India’s culture, social values, and foreign policies in addition to the nation’s economic and military might, India will be better placed to join the rank of Asia’s great powers. India, which is expected to become a superpower by 2025, also possesses soft power advantage having a democratic system compared to China’s communist belligerent system. Since the last ten years, India has likewise elevated its indispensable resources in public diplomacy, by applying traditional and innovative channels to create and anchorage its soft power.

#### Concede 1AC Gill – Private Space Industry key to India’s Space Sector writ-large – “The push for private sector participation in the space sector is a strategic necessity”.

#### Space amplifies other aspects of India’s Soft Power Projection.

Kathayat 20 Sarthak Kathayat 11-1-2020 "Soft Power and India’s Space Diplomacy" <https://niice.org.np/archives/6420> (Media graduate from Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University)//Elmer

In international relations, soft power is the ability of any country to persuade other countries to do what it wants without the use of force. According to Joseph Nye Jr., soft power is – getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them. As compared to hard power, soft power takes relatively longer to built as its intangible resources develop over a long time. Soft power tends to change other party’s attitude to the end where she acts voluntarily in a way which is different to her usual behaviour. Several characteristics of the current world order like globalisation driven economic interdependence, rise of transnational actors, resurgence of nationalism in weak states, the spread of military technology and the changed nature of international political problems have significantly reduced the effectiveness of hard power strategies. The most noteworthy example of a foreign policy misadventure based solely on hard power strategies is the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Soft power also has its own weakness. However, the ineffectiveness of soft power strategies is an exception. In longer-term, soft power strategies appear to be more effective in the contemporary world order than the hard power. One such tool of soft power is the space technology and space diplomacy. Space technology are increasingly viewed as a crucial instrument of soft power as states have now understood the direct relation between the technological feats and global prestige that follows. Expertise in rocket science puts a state on a higher pedestal than the countries who are still struggling in the domain. Moreover, expertise in rocket science ensues significant strategic implications. The output delivered has noteworthy social and economic relevance with a massive growth potential. In a broadening concept of security that encompasses other dimensions such as economic, environmental and political, Indian space programme has been distinctive and lucid in the way it simultaneously addresses the requirements of the Indian citizenry and the state collectively in all the dimensions. Despite being challenged by numerous embargoes and technology denial regimes during Cold War, Indian space programme has emerged as the most cost-effective and successful space programme in the world. India’s space programme has been a tremendous achievement for a developing country which despite being faced with many challenges used space as a crucial mechanism to lift its people out of poverty through education, social and economic programmes. With the course of time, India’s space policy has become an intrinsic part of India’s foreign policy to strengthen India’s position as a dominant power in South Asia. Indian Space Programme India’s space programme has been seen making efforts in projecting soft power which is especially evident through its new commitment to planetary exploration and human spaceflight. The Chandrayaan-1 and Mangalyaan-1 mission cleared the fact that India now looks at space as a standard of global standing. India’s soft power has witnessed a progression with an increasingly successful participation in global space economy through ISRO’s commercial arm, Antrix Corporation. India’s growing influence on the global space economy has been an indication of its changing stature in international arena. India has also been involved in capacity building initiatives. It has successfully established itself as a leader in terms of healthcare provisions through satellite-based telemedicine. India hosts the largest telemedicine network in South Asia which has also expanded to the African continent. A non-profit Indian organisation named Apollo Telemedicine Networking Foundation has been involved in telemedicine services with dedicated centres in Iraq, Yemen, Kazakhstan and Myanmar. India’s Space Diplomacy Further using space for diplomacy in order to project its soft power across the globe, India has assisted countries like Colombia in launching its satellite which boosted India-Colombia relations. Many Latin American countries are often dependent on the US for space and military matters. However, after the launch, many countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Venezuela have reached out to ISRO for launching or developing satellites. Similarly, India’s PSLV also launched Israel’s TecSar satellite in 2008 for remote sensing purposes. The launch boosted the political and strategic relations with Israel. Once a recipient of space technology from developed countries, India has demonstrated the robustness of its own space programmes by setting up joint projects and even providing assistance at the time of disaster to a number of countries. ISRO’s Oceansat-2 satellite played a pertinent role in monitoring Hurricane Sandy and helping the authorities to implement timely disaster mitigation and rescue strategies. Adding more feathers to its hat, ISRO has also launched dozens of satellites for US, Europe and Britain based companies. The recent launches of British reconnaissance satellites, NovaSAR and S1-4 are a sign of what could come next. Britain is one of the EU’s biggest spender in space sector. After Brexit, the dispute over Britain’s continued access to the European Union’s Galileo satellite navigation project will inevitably lead Britain look for alternatives and India’s space ambitions could offer a tempting proposition within the ambit of wider bilateral cooperation. As a part of India’s efforts in space diplomacy, ISRO undertook another capacity building initiative ‘Unispace Nanosatellite Assembly and Training (UNNATI)’. Under UNNATI, ISRO planned to train 45 countries in making Nano-satellites. Closer to home, India proposed a SAARC satellite in 2014 for the overall development of the region. The proposal was welcomed by SAARC nations but unfortunately the proposal couldn’t materialise as envisioned initially due to Pakistan’s backing out from the project. However, three years later, in 2017, ISRO launched the South Asia satellite or GSAT-9 to help India’s neighbouring countries in space communication. The idea of South Asia satellite ensured no political impediment as with the case of SAARC satellite. The positive spill over effect of the satellite’s launch on India’s “neighbourhood first” diplomacy was well demonstrated by the warm responses given by the leaders of South Asian countries. India’s space diplomacy with neighbours also extends on a bilateral basis. For instance, in Afghanistan, India included remote sensing satellite transmitters for acquiring space-based data in a USD 1.2 billion aid package. It is evident that soft power strategies are more relevant than the hard power strategies, especially in the contemporary world order. The rise of China as an emerging superpower is backed with its economic and military might leave less avenues for other developing nations such as India to contest China. However, soft power strategies open up another dimension for the interaction of the nations. India has utilised space as a tool of its soft power effectively in order to expand its clout. That space being an intrinsic part of India’s foreign policy has brought numerous achievements to the country, and is expected to remain an essential element for future course of India’s foreign policy.

#### Indian leadership is key to stability in the South China Sea.

**Bhalla 21** [Abhishek Bhalla, Abhishek Bhalla is an Editor with India Today TV chasing news stories on defence, strategic affairs, security and conflict. His work takes him to military zones to report accurately on the ground realities. Working as a journalist since 2005, his experience spans working across platforms -- newspaper, magazine, broadcast and now trying new things on the digital space. In the past has extensively covered crime, investigationg agencies and courts. 6-16-2021, accessed on 11-2-2021, India Today, "India supports freedom of navigation in int’l waterways like South China Sea: Defence Minister Rajnath Singh ", <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-navigation-south-china-sea-defence-minister-rajnath-singh-china-1815476-2021-06-16>] Adam

India supports freedom of navigation, over flight, and unimpeded commerce in these international waterways, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said on Wednesday as he spoke about maritime security challenges and made a reference to developments in the South China Sea hinting at China’s expansionist policy. “The sea lanes of communication are critical for peace, stability, prosperity and development of the Indo-Pacific region. In this regard, developments in the South China Sea have attracted attention in the region and beyond,” Rajnath Singh said in his address at the eighth meeting of defence ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean). Rajnath Singh was referring to the escalating territorial conflict in the South China Sea. China lays claim to nearly all of South China leading to tensions over territorial rights in the waters with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Earlier this month, Malaysia scrambled jets to intercept Chinese aircraft it accused of breaching its airspace. “India hopes that the Code of Conduct negotiations will lead to outcomes that are in keeping with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and do not prejudice the legitimate rights and interests of nations that are not a party to these discussions,” he said. India calls for a free, open and inclusive order in the Indo-Pacific, based upon respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations, peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue and adherence to international rules and laws, Rajnath Singh said. The ministers gathered online for a meeting hosted by Brunei, this year's Asean chair. “India has strengthened its cooperative engagements in the Indo-Pacific based on converging visions and values for promotion of peace, stability, and prosperity in the region,” the minister said. The minister added that India supports the utilisation of Asean-led mechanisms as important platforms for the implementation of our shared vision for the Indo-Pacific. India’s engagement with the South East Asian region, of which ASEAN has been a primary component, is based on its ‘Act East Policy’ announced by PM Narendra Modi in November, 2014. Key elements of this policy are to promote economic cooperation, cultural ties and develop strategic relationships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region through continuous engagement at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. Talking about terrorism, Singh said terrorism and radicalization are the gravest threats to peace and security that the world is facing today. He said India shares global concerns about terrorism and believes that in an era when networking amongst terrorists is reaching alarming proportions, only through collective cooperation can the terror organizations and their networks be fully disrupted, the perpetrators identified and held accountable, and strong measures are undertaken against those who encourage, support and finance terrorism and provide sanctuary to terrorists. “As a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), India remains committed to combat financing of terrorism,” the minister said. He also asserted that cyber threats loom large, as demonstrated by incidents of ransomware, Wannacry attacks and cryptocurrency thefts and are a cause of concern. A multi-stakeholder approach, guided by democratic values, with a governance structure that is open and inclusive and a secure, open and stable internet with due respect to the sovereignty of countries, would drive the future of cyberspace, Singh said. He also said that India shares a deep connect with Asean and has continued its active engagement in many areas contributing to regional peace and stability, particularly through Asean-led mechanisms.

#### SCS conflict goes nuclear—that’s 1AC Talmadge.

# 3

#### India’s Economy is Growing but problems remain.

Kasturi 21 Charu Sudan Kasturi 12-28-2021 "The Indian economy is growing fast, but problems loom" <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/28/india-economy> (Charu Sudan Kasturi is a writer and editor who has led multiple award-winning investigations and projects, from the United States and Mexico to India and the Philippines. He is the recipient of a New York Foreign Press Association award, a San Francisco Press Club award and a Pulitzer fellowship and is a Webby nominee.)//Elmer

Baldev Kumar threw his head back and laughed at the mention of India’s resurgent GDP growth. **The country’s economy clocked an 8.4-percent uptick between July and September compared with the same period last year. India’s Home Minister Amit Shah has boasted that the country might emerge as the world’s fastest-growing economy in 2022**. Kumar could not care less. As far as he was concerned, the crumpled receipt in his hand told a different story: The tomatoes, onions and okra he had just bought cost nearly twice as much as they did in early November. The 47-year-old mechanic had lost his job at the start of the pandemic. The auto parts store he then joined shut shop earlier this year. Now working at a car showroom in the Bengaluru neighbourhood of Domlur, he is worried he might soon be laid off as auto sales remain low across India. He has put plans for his daughter’s wedding on hold, unsure whether he can foot the bill. He used to take a bus to work. Now he walks the five-kilometre (three-mile) distance to save a few rupees. “I don’t know which India that’s in,” he said, referring to the GDP figures. “The India I live in is struggling.” Kumar wasn’t exaggerating – even if Shah’s prognosis turns out to be correct. **Asia’s third-largest economy is indeed growing again, and faster than most major nations.** Its stock market indices, such as the Sensex and Nifty, are at levels that are significantly higher than at the start of 2021 – despite a stumble in recent weeks. **But many economists are warning that these indicators, while welcome, mask a worrying challenge – some describe it as a crisis – that India confronts as it enters 2022. November saw inflation rise by 14.23 percent, building on a pattern of double-digit increases that have hit India for several months now. Fuel and energy prices rose nearly 40 percent last month**. **Urban unemployment – most of the better-paying jobs are in cities – has been moving up since September and is now above 9 percent, according to the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, an independent think-tank.** “Inflation hits the poor the most,” said Jayati Ghosh, a leading development economist at New Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University. All of this is impacting demand: Government data shows that private consumption between April and September of 2021 was 7.7 percent lower than in 2019-2020. The economic recovery from the pandemic has so far been driven by demand from well-to-do sections of Indian society, said Sabyasachi Kar, who holds the RBI Chair at the Institute of Economic Growth. “**The real challenge will start in 2022,” he told Al Jazeera.** “We’ll need demand from poorer sections of society to also pick up in order to sustain growth.”

#### India’s Space Sector is utilized to accelerate growth.

Bose 20 Mrityunjay Bose 7-30-2020 "India must harness potential of global space industry: Kiran Kumar" <https://web.archive.org/web/20200731043752/https://www.deccanherald.com/science-and-environment/india-must-harness-potential-of-global-space-industry-kiran-kumar-867240.html> (Deccan Herald Editor)//Elmer

**"Space economy is a 400 billion dollar market from launch vehicles, satellites, applications 84services: India being one of the key players in technology, now the question is about how we can make use of it in a global economy.** Also, it is to be remembered that space is also for common good, wherein countries will continue to work together at international level," Kumar said at the Mumbai-based Nehru Science Centre's lockdown lecture on 'Space - An Opportunity for India'. Touching upon a wide range of issues including space debris, he said: "Like a city faces traffic issues, the space also faces similar issues. More and more satellites in orbit which are both functional and non-functional add to the space traffic issue. **Space traffic management is a crucial area that requires attention since the satellites in orbit can come in the way of each other."** Thus, space debris management and monitoring plays a crucial role as many countries are becoming players. **Space debris monitoring removal has estimated market revenue of around 2.7 billion dollar in the 2020s, he said. Space mining is another area with tremendous opportunities.** There are asteroids which are left over from the early days of our solar system and they have tremendous minerals in them **He said there are many countries that are providing licenses to companies for doing this work.** The huge amount of space materials when brought to earth can boost our ability for undertaking various activities. "Currently there are more than 2 million asteroids that pass closer to earth every year and value of the total asteroid mining related activities have been estimated at 5 trillion dollars' he said. "**Space tourism is another opportunity for further exploration. There are companies selling tickets, 'One Way Ticket To Mars'.** This is a booming industry where already many multi-millionaires have travelled to space as tourists," Kumar said during the online presentation. On farming solar power in the Cosmos, he said: "The availability of solar energy or the visibility of Sun is not continuous due to earth's rotation. But in space where the access to sunlight is continuous, the sunlight can be converted into various forms of energy, either by direct beaming or through other means. Thus it enables generation of tremendous amount of renewable energy." **'Human beings have been conquering land, ocean and air. Today the question is of conquering the space,' he said how every country in the world is exploring this space**. 'Today, more than 40 nations are engaged in full-fledged space activities while more than 100 nations are utilizing space systems and services. **We should remember, space technology is not only for national development but also for the benefit of entire humanity,' he added.**

#### Economic collapse ensures Modi puts all his eggs in the nationalist basket - the COVID blame won’t save him again.

Gupta 21 (, S., 2021. It isn't the economy, genius. India proves it by voting for Modi again and again. [online] ThePrint. Available at: <https://theprint.in/national-interest/it-isnt-the-economy-genius-india-proves-it-by-voting-for-modi-again-and-again/633329/> [Accessed 25 October 2021] Shekhar Gupta is an Indian journalist and author. He is the founder and the current editor-in-chief of ThePrint. He is also a columnist for the Business Standard and pens a weekly column which appears every Saturday. He has had long stints at The Indian Express and India Today. Shekhar Gupta has received assorted awards: the 1985 Inlaks award for young journalist of the year,[10] G. K. Reddy Award for Journalism,[11] and the Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed Memorial Award for National Integration.[12] He was awarded Padma Bhushan by the then UPA Government in 2009 for his contribution to journalism.[13] Under his leadership, The Indian Express won the Vienna-based International Press Institute's Award for Outstanding Journalism in the Public Interest thrice: The first time for its coverage of the Gujarat riots of 2002, the second time for uncovering the Bihar flood relief scam in 2009 and the third time for its sustained investigation into the Malegaon and Modasa blasts of 2008 and the alleged role of extremists and organisations.[14].)-rahulpenu

It isn’t the economy, genius. India proves it by voting for Modi again and again Flurry of economic reform suggests Modi realises his muscular nationalism script is getting jaded. Chances are he'll try for economic recovery but stick to what's worked. In his 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton immortalised the line, “It’s the economy, stupid”. Does this work in Narendra Modi’s India? In election after election, across democracies in the world, the line has been repeated. The transnational appeal of the idea was also understandable because James Carville, the famous political “consultant” who coined it for Clinton, also advised dozens of leaders across the world. A kind of globalised, American Prashant Kishor. And, whatever the language or idiom, the logic passed the test of time. Or it did, until lately. For almost a quarter century, a leader who promised or delivered a better economy won, or was re-elected. In 2016, this was the promise that brought Donald Trump to power, as also Modi in 2014. But that seems to have changed worldwide now. Let’s look at India. After Modi’s first two years, the economy has stalled, and then declined. The stall began with demonetisation in 2016-17. Lately, India has had at least 7 out of 8 quarters of growth decline. Negative growth is rightly blamed on the pandemic, but it isn’t as if this patient was in the pink of health before the virus struck. On almost every economic and even social indicator, India has been posting a decline. It shows in our crashing rankings on all key global indices. Now, we know that Modi won power in 2014 on the promise of massive economic growth, jobs and development on the ‘**Gujarat** **Model’**. But barring, say, the first 24 months to some extent, he has **never** **delivered** on that promise. If the concept of “It’s the economy, stupid” worked, he should not have swept the Uttar Pradesh elections of 2017. By that time, demonetisation had already deflated India’s economy; job losses, and trade, rural and farmer distress had set in. It didn’t bother anybody but his hapless opposition and marginalised editorialists like us. By the summer of 2019, our economy had already been in a tailspin. Worse, joblessness was already reaching a high that would be alarming in a democracy. Some of the data was so embarrassing that the Modi government had to either hide it, rewrite it, or change the formula and produce friendlier data, as on GDP numbers. Every economic indicator had gone wrong except one: Inflation. And yet, Modi returned with a larger majority in that election. It is still exactly a month before we will know what the voters decide in these five assembly elections. The numbers obviously won’t be what Amit Shah is counting after each phase in West Bengal. But whatever these are, one thing they won’t reflect is the state of India’s economy. It will be the first year of **negative** — double-digit negative — **growth** in our independent history. And while this **may** be **blamed** **on** the **pandemic**, it destroyed so many lives, jobs and savings because it came on top of three lousy years. **In** **normal** **politics**, this **would** **have** **made** these **elections** a **walkover** **for** the **opposition**. They will be anything but that. Which will make us question that 1992 Clintonism. So, what is it that works for Modi, if not the economy? Or, how does he keep winning in spite of the economy? The fact is, it isn’t an India-specific phenomenon. Donald Trump, whatever else was wrong with him, lost in spite of the economy being in a pretty good place. It helped him retain and increase his voters. But other considerations weighed on the minds of a larger number of voters. The issues of identity, colour and class, and the virus, for example. Biden’s promise wasn’t an economic boom. At the other extreme is the Putin phenomenon. In fact, this week’s National Interest was sparked by this Ruchir Sharma column in the FT, where he talks about how Putin has not only made Russia sanctions-proof, but continues to keep winning despite insignificant economic growth. We record all the qualifications on Russia’s electoral process — ours still is much cleaner in spite of some vote-filled EVMs hitching a ride in a candidate’s car in Assam. Yet, there is no denying that he’s widely popular and will win a fairer election as well. How is he able to do this without growth? Putin is **riding** the **deep** **insecurities** **of** a **people** **scarred** **by** much **instability**, political and economic, **preceding** **his** **rise**. For them, therefore, **stability** becomes the **first** **priority**. The economy can wait. If we were to build on this, **stability** **brings** **nationalistic** **self**-**esteem**. Putin fought off many separatist or religiously inspired forces, insurgency and terrorism, “taught the upstart Ukrainians a lesson” by grabbing Crimea, stood up to America, and probably even played it in the Trump period. Under him, Russia is back to being a power that enough of the world still holds in awe. How does it matter that its economy has shrunk relative to the rest? Even compared to the emerging markets. For comparison, it is just about **60** **per** **cent** **of** **India**’s at $1.7 trillion (in 2019), **with** **no** **hope** **of** **catching** **up**. **But**, **if** the **nation** **is** **together**, **can** **punch** **above** its **economic** **weight** in its neighbourhood and in the global balance of power, it is because of stability and leadership. The economy is about my self-interest. I can sacrifice it for some time. **Apply** **the** **same** **parallel** **to** **India**. By 2014, **India** still **had** the **scars** **of** 20**08** (26/11) and much **terrorism** that **preceded** **and** **followed** it, going right back to the early Vajpayee years. It was like **two** **decades** **of** **humiliation** with a much weaker neighbour hurting us often, at will. All India would do, from Vajpayee to Manmohan Singh, was to go complaining to America and the rest. On top of it, we had a prime minister so weakened by his own party that he had been reduced to a caricature of that high office. Plus, the discourse across the board was all about corruption from the opposition, and inequality even by the ruling party. Between 2003 and 2009, India had built enormous pride and optimism with a booming economy. That optimism brought the UPA back to power. In the following years, it was fully reversed. It was an incredible election where the ruling party also campaigned complaining about inequality and poverty instead of its economic successes. For the Modi proposition, if the promise of taking the ‘**Gujarat** **Model’** nationwide **was** **the** **engine**, this widespread negativity provided a 200-knot tailwind. Through these seven years, he’s mostly failed to deliver on the first promise, the economy. **But**, on the second, **national** **pride**, **standing** **up** **to** **terrorism** from the neighbourhood, on **restoring** the **majesty** **of** **the** prime minister’s **office**, **he** **scores** 10 upon 10. May be even **11** **upon** **10**. Remember, we are only talking about his voters. The belated flurry of **economic** **reform** would **suggest** **Modi** has **figured** that **his** **script** **is** getting **jaded** **and** that he **needs** **a new one**. He will try for an economic recovery but still **stick** **to** **what** **has** **worked** for him so far: The three-pronged offering of massive, efficient welfarism for the poorest; hard, visible infrastructure-building; and harder, cast-in-Hindutva **nationalism**. The engines of the economy, left to idle for long, take time gathering pace. It is likely that India will get a great year anyway on the back of a terrible one. Some equivalent of the stock markets’ dead cat bounce will come in. The larger, more widespread economic gains take time. They also, inevitably, increase inequality first. Usually, it’s some successor who will benefit from this. So, can’t count on it. **Modi** **gets** **this**. The question is, do his challengers get it? Much of their attack is still over economic distress under Modi. Two large areas, **identity** (which includes religion and culture) **and** **national** **pride**, they’ve **ceded** **to** **him** altogether. Check out the Congress and Left parties’ flip-flop on Sabarimala to understand the point on identity. Or the manner of questioning over Uri, Balakot and Galwan. These **underline** their faltering on **nationalism**. **Economic** **distress** **brings** **insecurity**, **but** it **isn’t** a **fraction** **of** **the** **visceral** **emotion** a **perceived** **threat** **to** **identity** **or** **national** **pride** **brings**. This is why demagogues across the democratic world keep winning. The reason we’d prefer to say at this point: It isn’t the economy, genius.

#### Greenlights diversionary war with Pakistan- overwhelming evidence.

Humayun et al. 20 (, F., Walt, Quinn, Tatar, Katerji, Crabtree, Agrawal, Maqsood, Walt, Gao and Moody, 2020. After India’s Skirmish With China, Is Pakistan Next?. [online] Foreign Policy. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/29/india-skirmish-china-modi-pick-fight-pakistan/> [Accessed 25 October 2021] Yale University, Ph.D., Political Science 2022 Dissertation: “Democratic Institutions & International Crisis Behaviour” Committee: Steven I. Wilkinson (Yale), Alexandre Debs (Yale), Vipin Narang (MIT) Yale University, M.A., Political Science 2019 University of Cambridge, M.Phil, International Relations 2013 London School of Economics, B.Sc, International Relations & History 2011. Research is supported by the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies, the Yale South Asian Studies Council, and International Security Studies at Yale)-rahulpenu

After India’s Skirmish With China, Is Pakistan Next? **Looking** **to** **reinvigorate** **support** at home, **Modi** could **pick** a **fight** **with** his country’s **traditional** **enemy**. The worst border skirmish between India and China in the Himalayas in decades has abated for now, but the **potential** **for** **crisis** still **looms** **large** **over** a **nuclear**-**armed** **South** **Asia**. Last week, India announced it was formally downgrading relations with its other adversary and neighbor, Pakistan, by reducing the staff at its High Commission by 50 percent. The last time India asked for a similar reduction of embassy staff was in 2001, following an attack on the Indian Parliament. Bilateral ties between the two states have been shunted since New Delhi unilaterally revoked the special status of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir on Aug. 5, 2019, and intensified a heavy-handed crackdown in the valley. So what exactly does the dust-up with China have to do with Pakistan’s relationship with India? In short, there are five reasons why this month’s Himalayan standoff increases the likelihood of a fresh India-Pakistan crisis. First: India’s muted response to China in the aftermath of the Galwan Valley skirmish has raised difficult logistical questions and reputational concerns about New Delhi’s much-touted role as counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific. Although New Delhi adopted a position of nonalignment for much of the Cold War, its potential as a regional diplomatic and military bulwark against a rising China took on new significance after U.S. President George W. Bush sought to enlist it as a strategic partner and approved the sale of U.S. nuclear technology to the country. More recently, New Delhi and Washington announced an expanded defense partnership, including $3 billion in arms sales. Yet hostile encounters with China in both 2017 and again this year have underscored for Indian policymakers the need to get along with Beijing if only to sustain a mutually feasible cohabitation; informal summits such as those in 2018 and 2019 were driven by this strategic necessity. In the aftermath of the most recent crisis, corps commander-level talks and diplomatic negotiations between Beijing and New Delhi mean India is likely to prioritize a minimum-working engagement with China over an unambiguous geopolitical rivalry that would come with fully partnering with the United States. Meanwhile, the political compulsion to demonstrate military capability—especially in the face of a conventional balance of forces that has shifted in China’s favor—may impel India to look elsewhere to offset suggestions of strategic impotency. If military capabilities drive policy choices, then the theater with Pakistan is a suitable foil for perceived Indian weaknesses compared to China. Second, since coming to power in 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra **Modi** has **demonstrated** both a **willingness** **and** a **capability** **to** **deliver** **on** **nationalistic** **pledges** at home, **especially** **when** his government’s **ability** **to** **deliver** **on** the **economic** **front** has **hit** **snags**. Although India has seen its GDP growth fall to its lowest rate in the last 11 years, Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has sought to **consolidate** its political **base** **by** **doubling** **down** on its **nationalist**ic pledges—from revoking the special status for Jammu and Kashmir (disputed between India and Pakistan since 1947) to building a Hindu temple to the god Ram on a disputed holy site where the Babri Masjid once stood. Research shows that **leaders** looking to **divert** **attention** tend to **target** **traditional** **enemies** and enduring rivals (as conflict against such persistent adversaries is most likely to promote in-group solidarity), and **diversionary** **conflicts** are particularly **likely** to **take** the **form** **of** **territorial** **disputes**. Since the controversial measures in Kashmir last year, India’s politicians have systematically upped the bilateral ante with Pakistan by declaring intent to “secure” the Pakistani administrative areas of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. Earlier this year, India’s new Army chief said the Indian Army was “**ready** **to** **seize** **control**” of Pakistan-administered Kashmir if directed by the Indian government; the same month, **Modi** **said** India needed **seven** **to** **10** **days** **to** **defeat** **Pakistan** **in** **war**. Two weeks ago, India’s defense minister reiterated that taking Pakistani Kashmir was now a “stated goal of India’s Parliament.” **Ordinarily**, **such** **statements** **might** **be** **put** **down** to cheap talk—**except**, **in** **this** **case**, the **BJP’s** own track **record** of **follow**-**through** **suggests** these **threats** should be **taken** **seriously**. Operationally, the Indian **Army** has **begun** to **set** **up** **artillery** **strikes** deep into Kashmiri villages to launch **long**-**distance** **fire** into Pakistan-administered territory. In May, after months of deliberation, the India Meteorological Department began to list several areas on the Pakistani side of the border, in its own internal weather reports—an unprecedented development. Third, while tempers and temperatures arguably cool on the Sino-Indian front, memories of a short but tense air duel between India and Pakistan last February are still fresh in both Islamabad and New Delhi. While Pakistan shot down an aging, Soviet-era Indian MiG-21 Bison and captured and returned an Indian pilot in the dogfight, India claimed it had downed a Pakistani F-16. The air duel over Kashmir quickly escalated into a war of narratives: Pakistan rejected India’s allegations and asserted it had lost no jets. In the days after the dogfight, the New York Times ran a story about the implications of India losing a plane to a country whose military was half the size and received a quarter of the funding. India’s right-wing Shiv Sena has since called for more “**surgical** **strikes**” on Pakistan to consolidate the BJP’s grip on Kashmir. Furthermore, when Indian papers ran headlines of India having killed “300-400 terrorists” in an airstrike on Balakot last February, Pakistan countered that the targets had been “little more than rocks and trees.” Since last year, India’s opposition too has on various occasion taken swipes at Modi for the Balakot episode; pollsters meanwhile have disputed the extent to which the Balakot strikes actually buoyed the BJP in its 2019 electoral victory. The “decider’s dilemma” for Modi is that the **unfinished** **business** from the Balakot standoff needs a less ambiguous final chapter, short of which the BJP risks being domestically perceived as having backed away prematurely from a weaker enemy. This leads to a fourth and crucial point: Successive **regional** **crises** **under** the **BJP** mean that the domestic costs for India’s leaders to not be seen as backing down against external adversaries are growing, not diminishing. In the standoff with China, losses incurred by the Indian Army have been a shot in the arm for India’s opposition politicians, who have been quick to condemn the BJP for its lack of preparation and in some cases for surrendering entirely. **Conflict** **with** **Pakistan** could be a **much**-**needed** **salve** **for** a **disheartened** Indian **media** that is largely controlled by the Indian ruling party: According to analysis conducted after an attack on a military convoy in Kashmir last February, **Modi** got **near**-**total** media **coverage** despite energetic campaigning by India’s opposition at the same time. Bringing up the threat of a salient out-group could help the BJP reenergize its patriotic and supportive base and paper over divisions in its coalition. A final factor that explains why the China-India **standoff** may **spill** **over** **into** **tensions** with Pakistan has to do with the White House’s current occupant: President Donald Trump. Proponents of a strong Indo-U.S. relationship have lobbied hard to present a positive image of bilateral ties, buoyed largely by symbolic spectacles. On the critical economic front leading up to the COVID-19 crisis, however, both the Indian economy and U.S.-Indian economic relations were on a downward trajectory. Trump has at least thrice offered to mediate the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, the highest U.S. official to do so since President Bill Clinton after the two sides fought a short war over Kargil. New Delhi has traditionally been allergic to the idea of third-party mediation, referring to the 1972 Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan under which both sides agreed to bilaterally resolve outstanding disputes. Ironically, the same Simla Agreement also held that neither party would unilaterally alter the situation in Jammu and Kashmir—a position India itself compromised by revoking Kashmir’s special status last August. Ties between the United States and Pakistan, meanwhile, have seen a steadying in recent years, in part because of Pakistan’s facilitation in helping the United States reach a truce with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The absence of guaranteed validation from Washington on New Delhi’s position toward Pakistan thus makes India less, not more, secure and likely more convinced that it will need to rely on its own strength and power to clearly delineate its territorial and political interests for the foreseeable future. While an India-Pakistan crisis so soon after India’s standoff with China is by no means a forgone conclusion, current trends suggests it could. In the past, **troubled** **leaders** have rationally **pursued** risky, **high**-**variance** **strategies** of **initiating** another **conflict** to gloss over the failings of earlier scrambles. With the domestic and regional environment ripe for the taking, South Asia’s next crisis may happen **sooner than we expect.**

# 4

#### CP Text: The Republic of India should

#### End all joint missions and technology programs in outer space and outer-space related activities with the United States.

#### De-militarize its space assets.

#### The Counterplan solves 100% of the Case – 1] It solves Advantage 1 since the Aff is about how India utilizes its space operations in a bad way w/ interactions w/ the US NOT about why it’s intrinsically bad in existing – the CP ends any relation w/ the US space agency which doesn’t trigger Sino-India Tensions and 2] It solves Advantage 2 since it de-militarizes India’s space assets which means that it no longer has any incentive to attack to protect them.

# Case

### India-US Alliance

#### US-India coop staves off Chinese and Russian revisionism, Middle East instability, econ decline, and authoritarianism. Their IANS devastates their solvency – just proves that China is not upset rn and we are living in the squo means no risk of aff.

Rao 18—(India's former Foreign Secretary, former Ambassador to the United States, China and Sri Lanka for India, former Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (Harvard University), written with Richard Verma who was the U.S. ambassador to India from 2015 to 2017). Nirupama Rao. “America and India Must Forge a Strong Democratic Partnership,” The Hill. 1/16/18. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/369067-america-and-india-must-forge-a-strong-democratic-partnership.

The world is changing. China is ascending as a superpower looking to upend existing rules. European unity is under threat. Russia is playing a more destabilizing role abroad than it has since the Cold War. Unrest in the Middle East is tearing the region apart. At the same time, new technology and other economic dynamics are fueling income inequality and job losses, making it more and more difficult to spur widely shared and sustainable growth. While global dynamics are changing rapidly, at least one trend has remained constant in recent years: the upward trajectory of the U.S.-India relationship. Amidst geopolitical and economic uncertainty, the United States and India can be indispensable democratic partners and pillars of peace, prosperity, and democracy. The potential for the U.S.-India relationship cannot be overstated: They are the world’s two largest democracies, two of the world’s largest economies, and two of the world’s strongest militaries. The decisions the United States and India make will have far-reaching repercussions when it comes to global security, prosperity, and sustainable development. As new challenges strain the international system, it will be even more important for like-minded partners to cooperate to advanced shared interests. By working together, the United States and India can exponentially increase their ability to build a better world. Over the past year, we co-chaired a Center for American Progress task force on U.S.-India relations to unearth opportunities to further strengthen the relationship, looking ahead to the challenges and opportunities our two countries will have in this century. For too long, the relationship has underperformed, but those days appear to be over thanks to the effort over successive administrations in Delhi and Washington. This task force was a bilateral effort composed of 20 experts from the United States and India, covering diverse fields such as foreign policy, energy, business, and government accountability. Through the research and conversations conducted by the group, we were able to craft paths forward that we believe could help this critical relationship achieve its full potential. Our task force explored five areas for accelerated cooperation between the two countries: creating jobs and economic opportunities, building a clean energy future from the bottom up, creating a joint security advantage in Asia, strengthening democratic institutions at home and around the world, and fostering ties between their peoples. Despite our different histories and geographies, our shared future together encompasses so many of the same concerns, dreams and aspirations by our citizens. We are, in fact, natural allies, as so many leaders have pointed out in years past, and our recommendations seek to ensure that remains the case well into the future.

#### Middle East turmoil goes nuclear.

Silverstein 4/23 “Iran-Israel tensions: The threat of nuclear disaster looms large,” Richard Silverstein [writes the Tikun Olam blog, devoted to exposing the excesses of the Israeli national security state], 23 April 2021 <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/iran-israel-tensions-threat-nuclear-war-looms-large> SM

Israel had a near-miss of potentially catastrophic proportions on Thursday. As it has done hundreds of times in the past decade, the Israeli air force attacked Iranian bases inside Syria. In response, Syrian forces fired anti-aircraft missiles of a rather primitive Soviet model, one of which overflew its target and landed some 30 kilometres from Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor. Israel said recently that it was bolstering its defences around Dimona for just such an eventuality. Although an Iranian general taunted Israel, implying that Iran had some responsibility for the attack, that doesn’t appear to be the case. But the missile landing inside Israel does show that if Iran wanted to attack Dimona, it has the capacity. And despite Israel’s best efforts, an Iranian missile could hit its target. With that, one of the worst nuclear disasters in the region’s history could unfold, including a Chernobyl-type radioactive leak that could endanger not only all of Israel, but also many of its neighbours.A US general has assured a Senate committee that the Syrians weren’t intending to attack Israel. Rather, a misguided missile meant to target an Israeli warplane overshot its target. He blamed it on “incompetence”, as if that was supposed to be somehow reassuring; rather, it only reinforces how easy it is even for a mistake to cause a nuclear disaster.Campaign of terror Certainly, if either Israel or Iran wanted to bomb each other’s nuclear facilities, they could do so successfully. An Israeli attack would probably cause less catastrophic damage, but only because Iran’s nuclear programme is not nearly as developed as Israel’s. An Iranian direct hit on Dimona would cause incalculable damage due to the plutonium reactor at the facility. Nor does this happen in a vacuum: Israel has maintained a decade-long campaign of terror attacks on Iranian military bases and nuclear scientists. Most recently, it bombed the Natanz nuclear facility, destroying the power generation source and damaging older-generation centrifuges. It also attacked an Iranian Revolutionary Guard spy ship off the Yemeni coast this month. Iran has responded in its own limited way, restrained by its need to maintain good relations with nuclear-deal signatories. For Israel, the attacks are a low-risk proposition. It defies US opposition (if there is any) with a wink and a nod, and the attacks look good on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s résumé. To weather his corruption trial and retain public support, he needs external enemies (and internal enemies, but that’s a different story). Iran provides these in spades.Eliminating Israeli leverage The US could exert control over this scenario by eliminating Israeli leverage. If it agreed to lift sanctions in exchange for Iran’s return to low levels of uranium enrichment, as designated in the nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration, Israel’s rejectionist approach would become moot. The problem is that US President Joe Biden is running scared from Republican opposition to any nuclear deal with Iran. Besides, he has designated the Middle East a low priority for his administration. There is some faint hope in the US announcement that it is ready to lift a partial set of sanctions. However, the list on offer is quite limited, and will certainly not satisfy the Iranians. Such half-measures present an example of the limitations of the Biden approach. He should instead make a full-throated commitment to end this dithering once and for all. Israel is mounting a full-court press this coming week as it sends its Mossad and military intelligence chiefs, along with its army chief of staff, to Washington in an attempt to influence nuclear negotiations as they enter what may be a final stage. According to Haaretz, army chief of staff Aviv Kochavi “will also raise other issues, including Iran’s military expansion in Syria and the instability of Lebanon. Israel is concerned about the possibility that Hezbollah will try to … [foment] conflict with Israel.” The hypocrisy of Israel’s refusal to acknowledge its own massive military interventions in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and even Iraq, while decrying Iran’s involvement in Syria, is almost breathtaking. There is next to no chance that any of this will enter into the considerations of negotiators in Vienna. Unlike Israel, they are interested in doing a nuclear deal, not engaging in wishful thinking. Combustible Middle East mix Returning to the Biden administration’s global goals, the Middle East doesn’t care about presidential priorities. It contains a combustible mix of corrupt elites and overbearing dictators who do not shirk from causing mayhem in their domains. And one of them, perhaps a desperate Israeli prime minister or an ageing ayatollah eager to preserve his honour and legacy, could inadvertently (or intentionally) set the entire region aflame. If Biden doesn’t act quickly and decisively, there is a sizeable risk that another missile from one country or the other will hit a target and cause devastation. That would mark a point of no return, like the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, which led to World War One. The difference is that in 1914, armies fought with guns, bayonets and artillery. Today, they will fight with F-35s, ballistic missiles and possibly nuclear weapons.

#### *Authoritarianism causes Nuclear War.*

*Diamond 19, Larry. Ill winds: Saving democracy from Russian rage, Chinese ambition, and American complacency. Penguin Books, 2019. (professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University, PhD in Sociology)//Elmer*

*The most obvious response to the ill winds blowing from the world’s autocracies is to help the winds of freedom blowing in the other direction. The democracies of the West cannot save themselves if they do not stand with democrats around the world. This is truer now than ever, for several reasons. We live in a globalized world, one in which models, trends, and ideas cascade across borders. Any wind of change may gather quickly and blow with gale force. People everywhere form ideas about how to govern—or simply about which forms of government and sources of power may be irresistible—based on what they see happening elsewhere. We are now immersed in a fierce global contest of ideas, information, and norms. In the digital age, that contest is moving at lightning speed, shaping how people think about their political systems and the way the world runs. As doubts about and threats to democracy are mounting in the West, this is not a contest that the democracies can afford to lose. Globalization, with its flows of trade and information, raises the stakes for us in another way. Authoritarian and badly governed regimes increasingly pose a direct threat to popular sovereignty and the rule of law in our own democracies. Covert flows of money and influence are subverting and corrupting our democratic processes and institutions. They will not stop just because Americans and others pretend that we have no stake in the future of freedom in the world. If we want to defend the core principles of self-government, transparency, and accountability in our own democracies, we have no choice but to promote them globally. It is not enough to say that dictatorship is bad and that democracy, however flawed, is still better. Popular enthusiasm for a lesser evil cannot be sustained indefinitely. People need the inspiration of a positive vision. Democracy must demonstrate that it is a just and fair political system that advances humane values and the common good. To make our republics more perfect, established democracies must not only adopt reforms to more fully include and empower their own citizens. They must also support people, groups, and institutions struggling to achieve democratic values elsewhere. The best way to counter Russian rage and Chinese ambition is to show that Moscow and Beijing are on the wrong side of history; that people everywhere yearn to be free; and that they can make freedom work to achieve a more just, sustainable, and prosperous society. In our networked age, both idealism and the harder imperatives of global power and security argue for more democracy, not less. For one thing, if we do not worry about the quality of governance in lower-income countries, we will face more and more troubled and failing states. Famine and genocide are the curse of authoritarian states, not democratic ones. Outright state collapse is the ultimate, bitter fruit of tyranny. When countries like Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan descend into civil war; when poor states in Africa cannot generate jobs and improve their citizens’ lives due to rule by corrupt and callous strongmen; when Central American societies are held hostage by brutal gangs and kleptocratic rulers, people flee—and wash up on the shores of the democracies. Europe and the United States cannot withstand the rising pressures of immigration unless they work to support better, more stable and accountable government in troubled countries. The world has simply grown too small, too flat, and too fast to wall off rotten states and pretend they are on some other planet. Hard security interests are at stake. As even the Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy makes clear, the main threats to U.S. national security all stem from authoritarianism, whether in the form of tyrannies from Russia and China to Iran and North Korea or in the guise of antidemocratic terrorist movements such as ISIS.1 By supporting the development of democracy around the world, we can deny these authoritarian adversaries the geopolitical running room they seek. Just as Russia, China, and Iran are trying to undermine democracies to bend other countries to their will, so too can we contain these autocrats’ ambitions by helping other countries build effective, resilient democracies that can withstand the dictators’ malevolence. Of course, democratically elected governments with open societies will not support the American line on every issue. But no free society wants to mortgage its future to another country. The American national interest would best be secured by a pluralistic world of free countries—one in which autocrats can no longer use corruption and coercion to gobble up resources, alliances, and territory. If you look back over our history to see who has posed a threat to the United States and our allies, it has always been authoritarian regimes and empires. As political scientists have long noted, no two democracies have ever gone to war with each other—ever. It is not the democracies of the world that are supporting international terrorism, proliferating weapons of mass destruction, or threatening the territory of their neighbors.*

#### US-Indo Coop is key to stabilize the Indian Ocean

Mishra 17 Sylvia Mishra Fellow with Observer Research Foundation and Center for Nonproliferation Studies, PONI Nuclear Scholar and MSc in International Relations from London School of Economics, BA in Political Science from the University of Delhi, "Nuclear Weapons and Capabilities in the Indian Ocean: An Indian Perspective", CSIS Next Generation Nuclear Network, 9/25/2017, (<https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/nuclear-weapons-and-capabilities-in-the-indian-ocean-an-indian-perspective/>)//babcii

With strategic competition in South Asia shifting to the maritime space and nuclear weapon states increasingly relying on sea power, the Indian Ocean region (IOR) has become a theatre for trilateral security competition between India, Pakistan, and China. Developments over the past several years showcase the complicated nature of the situation in the IOR, and lead to a number of difficult questions about strategic stability. What are the drivers of nuclear escalation in the Indian Ocean region (IOR), as well as the implications for peace and stability in the region? Will changing threat perceptions in the IOR, especially as China’s People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) demonstrates increased capabilities, lead New Delhi to forge stronger naval ties with the United States? As states in the IOR contest for naval nuclear supremacy and project newly developed capabilities, this article examines the risk of friction and misperceptions that challenges the stability of the Indian Ocean. In 2015, China [carried out a flight test](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/18/inside-the-ring-china-tests-nuclear-missile-for-su/) of its long-range sea-based nuclear deterrent: the JL-2. With an [estimated range](https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf) of up to 7,200km, the JL-2 can target assets in continental India from Chinese waters. Moreover, Chinese nuclear submarines continue to [patrol the Indian Ocean](https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-submarine-fleet-adds-nuclear-strike-capability-altering-strategic-balance-undersea-1414164738), exemplifying Beijing’s willingness to project power in the IOR. China uses advanced military assets, such as attack submarines (SSNs), for ‘[piracy operations](http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/chinese-submarine-fighting-pirates-in-indian-ocean-shows-up-in-malaysia-1646247)’ in the IOR. However, the presence of SSNs, which are not appropriate for anti-pirate missions, intensify regional misperceptions. Beijing’s support to Pakistan’s [nuclear](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2009/01/02/why-china-helped-countries-like-pakistan-north-korea-build-nuclear-bombs) and [ballistic missile program](http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/pakistan/delivery-systems/) ([M-11 missile](http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/40814/102paul.pdf?sequence=1) technology transfers), and its recent announcement to [provide Pakistan with eight diesel-electric attack submarines](http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/china-confirms-export-of-8-submarines-to-pakistan/) have alarmed India’s strategic community, which fears that these sales will bolster [Pakistan’s sea-denial strategy](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700160208450064?journalCode=rsan20). Furthermore, Beijing’s naval assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) has raised [concerns](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/15890/china-s-neighbors-are-wary-of-its-assertiveness-in-the-south-china-sea) with Indian officials, who see a correlation between aggressive Chinese patrolling in the SCS and increasing deployments in the IOR. Some believe [China might use its bases](http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/why-india-south-china-sea-stand-matters_asingh_190816) in the SCS to project power in the Indian Ocean. The prospect of active patrols by [nuclear-armed Chinese submarines](http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/game-changers-chinese-submarines-in-the-indian-ocean/) has intensified India’s surveillance. The challenge to New Delhi’s domination in the Indian Ocean has led New Delhi to bolster its maritime partnership with the United States. The [US-India Joint Strategic Vision](http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/24728/USIndia_Joint_Strategic_Vision_for_the_AsiaPacific_and_Indian_Ocean_Region) for Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean serves as a roadmap for bilateral cooperation on safeguarding maritime security and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. On India’s other border, Pakistan [tested the Babur-3](http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/pakistans-tests-new-sub-launched-nuclear-capable-cruise-missile-what-now/) submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) in early 2017. Babur-3 is reportedly capable of carrying a nuclear payload and designed [for integration with the Agosta 90B](https://southasianvoices.org/hot-takes-pakistan-test-fires-babur-3/) diesel electric submarine. These developments augment the shifts in Pakistan’s military and nuclear force structure, which was traditionally [dominated by the army](http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-nuclear-force-structure-in-2025-pub-63912). As Pakistan’s navy develops a submarine-based nuclear deterrent, there are clear indications of accommodating the navy within Pakistan’s command and control (C2). However, questions arise regarding Islamabad’s ability to safely and reliably manage a submarine-based nuclear force given the [doubts raised over the robustness](https://my.nps.edu/documents/104111744/106151936/9+Nuclear+Learning_Mujaddid.pdf/ab328d1a-2d07-4e15-af91-332192882e6e) of Pakistan’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C412SR) systems. [Analysts](https://my.nps.edu/documents/104111744/106151936/9+Nuclear+Learning_Mujaddid.pdf/ab328d1a-2d07-4e15-af91-332192882e6e) have suggested that a balanced and effective nuclear C2 system faces challenges in Pakistan. When Pakistan’s military leadership took the reins of presidential power in 1999, the country’s civilian institutions and other services came under the army’s political control. This meant that the air force and navy chiefs could no longer contribute their views on an equal footing with the army chief. Therefore, the lack of an effective C2 has highlighted discernible [doubts](http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/pakistans-tests-new-sub-launched-nuclear-capable-cruise-missile-what-now/) regarding Pakistan’s ability to communicate with the Agosta submarines to put negative controls on weapons. Pakistan’s [stated policy of “first-use”](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/watch-out-india-pakistan-ready-use-nuclear-weapons-13284) of nuclear weapons against India coupled with a weak C2 has exacerbated India’s security concerns. India views Islamabad’s attempt to acquire second-strike capabilities as attempts to gain strategic technological and capabilities parity with India, giving impetus to the action-reaction cycle. Given security threat perceptions in IOR, Indian [naval planners and strategists](https://www.idsa-india.org/an-apr-2.01.htm) are convinced that nuclear submarines will provide the most reliable deterrent. India’s pursuit of a sea-based nuclear force is thus a logical step in its desire to achieve assured retaliatory capabilities. Few [analysts argue](https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Fall2016_Wueger.pdf) that India’s new K-4 nuclear-capable SLBM, coupled with India’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine program could lead to further destabilization and conflict in the region. There is little merit in such an argument. India’s ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force will not only improve the operational capabilities of India’s sea-based leg of its triad but also enable New Delhi to maintain balance of power in the IOR. To maintain a credible minimum deterrent vis-à-vis China and Pakistan and to ensure its arsenal’s survivability against a preemptive first strike, New Delhi must focus on developing submarine launched ballistic missiles (SSBM) technology and SSBN capabilities. The primary objective of India’s Arihant-class SSBNs is to deter conflict and coercion against India by its adversaries. [India’s 2015 maritime security strategy document](https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf) re-prioritized & reformulated deterrence as India’s first priority and war fighting as the second. Therefore, India’s SSBN force should be seen as a critical enabler of its no-first use policy. As China, India, and Pakistan employ nuclear weapons at sea, the India Ocean is slipping from a [‘Zone of Peace’](http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/34/a34res80.pdf) to a hotbed of nuclear politics. To help reduce tensions, India and the United States have engaged in cooperative [discussions about India opening up its military bases](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indian-bases-to-open-doors-to-US-warships-planes/articleshow/51802543.cms) to the United States in exchange for access to weapons technology to help it narrow the gap with China. The two sides will also hold [talks on anti-submarine warfare](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-usa-submarines-idUSKCN0XS1NS) (ASW), an area of sensitive military technology and tactics. The process of India-US security-burden sharing in the IOR should serve as a building block for an enduring navy-to-navy relationship that should grow into a shared ASW capability. At a time of a qualitative reordering of the Asia-Pacific, stability in the Indian Ocean region hinges on collaborative efforts by India and the United States to keep the seas open and peaceful.

#### Indian Ocean goes Nuclear

Colin Crawford 11. J.D. Wake Forest University School of Law. “Green Warfare: An American Grand Strategy for the 21st Century.” Wake Forest Journal of Business and Intellectual Property Law. p. Lexis.

[\*248] In addition to the potential for economic growth, even the most ardent climate change skeptics will concede that the United States' dependence on fossil fuels has implications for national security and foreign policy. Security analysts have made the case for framing this debate in terms of "natural security," as the scarcity of natural resources will inevitably affect the United States' foreign policy calculus for years to come. n24 Despite the fact that the U.S. imports most of its oil from Canada and Latin America n25 - not the Middle East - many emerging markets are just beginning their love affair with the sticky, black hydrocarbon. n26 The corresponding increase in demand from emerging economies will continue to drive up energy prices, necessitating importation of oil from countries with less friendly dispositions toward the United States. n27 It is important to note how energy policy intersects with virtually all other aspects of governance. Not only will increased prices constrain U.S. fiscal policy and make it more expensive to project American power around the globe, they create pressures that will heavily influence American foreign policy in the coming decades, whether through resource wars or climate-induced humanitarian crises. n28 International trade and maritime policy in particular will be [\*249] greatly affected. Because "90 percent of global commerce and two thirds of all petroleum supplies travel by sea," and global energy demand will continue its inexorable rise, the Indian Ocean - already heavily used by "nuclearized" powers such as Pakistan, India, China, and Israel - will dramatically increase in strategic importance to the world's great powers. n29 The proximity of nuclear states in the Asia-Pacific region, along with increased pressures commensurate with rising energy demand, are already heightening military tensions among the major players in the region, including China and Russia in particular. n30 Geopolitical constraints will become increasingly difficult to manage as fuel prices continue to rise, and intervention will be needed to combat piracy and protect merchant shipping. n31 Make no mistake, the United States' continued dependence on fossil fuels poses significant problems for the national interest. The strategic implications are clear as U.S. foreign policy throughout entire regions is framed in the context of energy. n32

#### LBL:

#### AT Mohan and Hicket – Massive disconnect between U/Q and I/L – 1AC Mohan is about “work with Washington and its allies on setting new global norms to manage space” while 1AC Hicket is about “deep technological cooperation” potentially triggering Chinese backlash – they have zero evidence that the US and India are pursuing technological cooperation now since it’s just a hypothetical warning for the US to not do it – means there isn’t a U/Q scenario for Chinese Backlash.

#### AT Pollard – U/Q overwhelms the Link – either a] Single Issues are possible to overcome – proven by the plan overcoming the Sino-India Border Conflict OR b] Border Conflict is SO prevalent that it makes every other issue insignificant.

#### AT Mizokami –

#### 1] No Sino-Indian Conflict to escalate – 1AC Hicket doesn’t say it would cause a conflict, just said “stirring tensions” but doesn’t come close to an all-out war scenario – means they can’t access the External Impact of Nuclear War since no conflict would occur – they’ve read a card for why it’s bad, not why it would happen. 1AC Hutto is horrible – isn’t even remotely related to space.

#### 2] No Sino-India War.

Max Fisher 14, Foreign Affairs Correspondent – Washington Post, M.A. in Security Studies – Johns Hopkins University, Former International Editor – The Atlantic, “The study that shows why China and India probably won’t clash over border dispute”, The Washington Post, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/05/03/the-study-that-shows-why-china-and-india-probably-wont-clash-over-a-border-dispute/

Either way, we can probably breathe easy on this one, and not just because neither China nor India would be served by a conflict. China, despite its sometimes-bellicose rhetoric and its otherwise deep interest in territorial integrity, has actually shown remarkable flexibility in resolving border disputes, according to a fascinating 2005 study by the scholar M. Taylor Fravel. Fravel, who published his research in the journal International Security, found that China has "frequently used cooperative means to manage its territorial conflicts, revealing a pattern of behavior far more complex than many portray. Since 1949, China has settled seventeen of its twenty-three territorial disputes. Moreover, it has offered substantial compromises in most of these settlements, usually receiving less than 50 percent of the contested land." China has not used its power advantages to bargain hard over contested land, especially with its weaker neighbors. Nor has it become less willing to offer concessions over disputed territory as its power has increased. Instead, China compromised in eight disputes as its power grew rapidly in the 1990s. For constructivists, the legacy of “unequal treaties” that ceded land to foreign powers in the 19th century and the central role of national unification in modern Chinese history suggest that conflicts over territory should be highly salient for China’s leaders and basically nonnegotiable. In its many compromises, however, China has accepted the general boundaries that these treaties created, except in the cases of Hong Kong and Macao. Fravel also found that "China offered many concessions despite clear incentives that its simultaneous involvement in multiple conflicts created to signal toughness and resolve, not conciliation." In other words, just because China might have wanted to project a tough image – something still true today with its island disputes in the Pacific – did not actually make it any more assertive in individual disputes. And he notes that China actually proposed a plan in 1960 to resolve Aksai Chin with India by divvying it up, along with another territory. The proposal "failed spectacularly," but the point is that China was interested in seeking a peaceful, negotiated agreement. Though China's island disputes have been in the news a lot lately, Fravel points out that these have been contested for decades and that China has not made new territorial claims even as the nation has grown in power. This is surprising because you might expect that a stronger China would become more aggressive in pushing for new or disputed territory, it would do so. But it hasn't, suggesting China is a "status quo" rather than a "revisionist" power, meaning it's happy with the current state of territorial affairs, those islands aside. All of which should **calm** any **fears** that a border dispute between India and China could devolve into something worse. Fravel's study concluded that China is more likely to compromise territorial disputes when it's worried about internal stability, and that doesn't seem to be the case right now. That suggests that the latest Aksai Chin dispute isn't likely to achieve a full resolution just yet, even if it also isn't going to lead to a conflict. Here's Fravel: Regime insecurity best explains China’s pattern of cooperation and delay in its territorial disputes. China’s leaders have compromised when faced with internal threats to regime security—the revolt in Tibet, the instability following the Great Leap Forward, the legitimacy crisis after the Tiananmen upheaval, and separatist violence in Xinjiang. The timing of compromise efforts, official documents, and statements by China’s leaders demonstrate that internal threats, not external ones, account for why and when China pursued cooperation.

### Militarization

#### No space war

**Hall 15** [Luke Penn-Hall, Analyst at The Cipher Brief, M.A. from the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, B.A. in International Relations and Religious Studies from Claremont McKenna College, “5 Reasons “Space War” Isn’t As Scary As It Sounds”, The Cipher Brief, Aug 18, 2015, <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/5-reasons-%E2%80%9Cspace-war%E2%80%9D-isn%E2%80%99t-scary-it-sounds>]

The U.S. depends heavily on military and commercial satellites. If a less satellite-dependent opponent launched an anti-satellite (ASAT) attack, it would have far greater impact on the U.S. than the attacker. However, it’s not as simple as that – for the following reasons: 1. An ASAT attack would likely be **part of a larger, terrestrial attack**. An attack on space assets would be no different than an attack on territory or other assets on earth. This means that no space war would stay limited to space. An ASAT campaign would be part of a larger conventional military conflict that would play out on earth. 2. Every country with ASAT capabilities also needs **sat**ellite**s**. While the United States is the most dependent on military satellites, most other countries need satellites to participate in the global economy. All countries that have the technical ability to play in this space – the U.S., Russia, China and India - also have a **vested interest** in preventing the militarization of space and protecting their own satellites. If any of those countries were to attack U.S. satellites, it would likely **hurt them** far more than it would hurt the United States. 3. Destruction of satellites could create a damaging chain reaction. Scientists warn that the violent destruction of satellites could result in an effect called an ablation cascade. High-velocity debris from a destroyed satellite could crash into other satellites and create more high-velocity debris. If an ablation cascade were to occur, it could render certain orbital levels completely unusable for centuries. 4. Any country that threatened access to space would threaten the global economy. Even if a full-blown ablation cascade didn’t occur, an ASAT campaign would cause debris, making operating in space more hazardous. The global economy relies on satellites and any disruption of operations would be met with worldwide disapproval and severe economic ramifications. 5. International **Prohibits** the Use of ASAT Weapons. Several international treaties expressly **prohibit signatory nations** from attacking other countries’ space assets. It is generally accepted that space should be treated as a global common area, rather than a military domain. While it remains necessary for military planners to create contingency plans for a, space war it is a **highly unlikely** scenario. All involved parties are **incentivized against** attacking. However, if a space war did occur, it would be **part of** a larger conflict **on Earth**. Those concerned about the potential for war in space should be more concerned about the potential for war, period.

#### No miscalc or escalation

**Pavur 19** [James, DPhil Researcher at the Cybersecurity Centre for Doctoral Training at Oxford University, and Ivan Martinovic, Professor of Computer Science in the Department of Computer Science at Oxford University, “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space”, 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle, <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_12_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf>]

A. Limited Accessibility Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the **resources** and **precision required** to **operate a meaningful ASAT capability**. Given this, one possible reason why **space wars have not broken out** is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420]. Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. **Limited access to orbit** necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the **fragility of an attacker’s own space assets** creates **de-escalatory pressures** due to the **deterrent effect of retaliation**. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination **towards de-escalatory space strategies** [23]. B. Attributable Norms There also exists a **long-standing normative framework** favouring the **peaceful use of space**. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (**OST**), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over **six decades of relative peace** in orbit. Over these six decades, **norms have become deeply ingrained** into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that **states perceive real costs** to breaking this normative tradition and may even **moderate their behaviours** accordingly. One further factor supporting this norms regime is the **high degree of attributability** surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, **plausible deniability** and **stealth** are essentially **impossible**. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes **high diplomatic costs** on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime. C. Environmental Interdependence A third stabilizing force relates to the **orbital debris consequences** of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the **cascade effect** of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.

#### No Escalation over Satellites:

#### 1] Planning Priorities

Bowen 18 Bleddyn Bowen 2-20-2018 “The Art of Space Deterrence” <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/> (Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester)//Elmer

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more. The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.

#### 2] Military Precedent

Zarybnisky 18, Eric J. Celestial Deterrence: Deterring Aggression in the Global Commons of Space. Naval War College Newport United States, 2018. (Senior Materiel Leader at United States Air Force)//Elmer

PREVENTING AGGRESSION IN SPACE While deterrence and the Cold War are strongly linked in the public’s mind through the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, the fundamentals of deterrence date back millennia and deterrence remains relevant. Thucydides alludes to the concept of deterrence in his telling of the Peloponnesian War when he describes rivals seeking advantages, such as recruiting allies, to dissuade an adversary from starting or expanding a conflict.6F 6 Aggression in space was successfully avoided during the Cold War because both sides viewed an attack on military satellites as highly escalatory, and such an action would likely result in general nuclear war.7F 7 In today’s more nuanced world, attacking satellites, including military satellites, does not necessarily result in nuclear war. For instance, foreign countries have used highpowered lasers against American intelligence-gathering satellites8F 8 and the United States has been reluctant to respond, let alone retaliate with nuclear weapons. This shift in policy is a result of the broader use of gray zone operations, to which countries struggle to respond while limiting escalation. Beginning with the fundamentals of deterrence illuminates how it applies to prevention of aggression in space.