# 1NC Yale Octos

## 1

**Interpretation: The affirmative must only defend a permanent reduction of intellectual property protections for medicines**

**Reynolds 59** – Judge (In the Matter of Doris A. Montesani, Petitioner, v. Arthur Levitt, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al., Respondents [NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department 9 A.D.2d 51; 189 N.Y.S.2d 695; 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7391 August 13, 1959, lexis)

Section 83's counterpart with regard to nondisability pensioners, section 84, prescribes a reduction only if the pensioner should again take a public job. The disability pensioner is penalized if he takes any type of employment. The reason for the difference, of course, is that in one case the only reason pension benefits are available is because the pensioner is considered incapable of gainful employment, while in the other he has fully completed his "tour" and is considered as having earned his reward with almost no strings attached. It would be manifestly unfair to the ordinary retiree to accord the disability retiree the benefits of the System to which they both belong when the latter is otherwise capable of earning a living and had not fulfilled his service obligation. If it were to be held that withholdings under section 83 were payable whenever the pensioner died or stopped his other employment the whole purpose of the provision would be defeated, i.e., the System might just as well have continued payments during the other employment since it must later pay it anyway. [\*\*\*13] The section says "reduced", does not say that monthly payments shall be temporarily suspended; it says that the pension itself shall be reduced. The plain dictionary meaning of the word is to diminish, lower or degrade. The word "reduce" seems adequately to indicate permanency.

**Prefer - its a legal definition from the Supreme Court which is the only legally applicable and predictable one - new 1ar definitions are unpredictable and late breaking**

**Violation: One and done does not permanently decrease IP, because one patent term still exists**

**Standards:**

1. **Precision outweighs - anything outside the res is arbitrary and unpredictable because the topic determines prep, not being bound by it lets them jettison any word. Aff arguments are non-unique since a] it relies on semantics to convey those messages and b] pragmatics can be discussed anytime while we only have 2 months to discuss the wording of this unique topic**
2. **Limits and Ground - they can specify infinite different aff skewed timeframes like when innovators have incentive or when its not violating rights - infinitely unpredictable and decks core neg ground e.g. no innovation DA if there is still a period for profits, no dual use pic since you defend one term of protection, no pharma backlash if they have opportunities to cling on**

**Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and it teaches portable skills that we use lifelong. Drop the debater - severance kills 1NC strat construction—1AR restart favors aff since it’s 7-6 time skew and they get 2 speeches to my one. No rvi - a) they’ll bait theory and prep it out with aff infinite prep—justifies infinite abuse and chilling us from checking abuse in fear of things like 2ar ethos which lets them recontextualize and always seem right on the issue b) forces the NC to go 7 minutes of theory because nothing else matters--outweighs because its the longest speech and the 2nr can never recover since the nc is our only route to generate offense. Evaluate the debate after the 2nr so both of us get 2 speeches - most reciprocal. Competing interps - a) reasonability’s arbitrary & forces judge intervention especially with 2ar recontextualizations to always sound like the more reasonable debater b) norm setting - we find the best possible norms c) reasonability collapses - you use offense/defense paradigm to evaluate brightlines**

## 2

**Interp: If the 1ac reads arguments pertaining to fairness or education, they must take an explicit stance on whether fairness and education are voting issues either in the 1ac or in the first cx.**

## 3

**Permissibility and presumption negate—the aff has the burden of proof to show the normative claim of the resolution is true, so the neg gets anything that denies that. Ought implies a moral obligation to do something but permissibility denies the existence of said obligation**

**Ethics are not a universal truth but rather mere categories of languages created by us**

**Parrish 1** (Rick Parrish. "Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract." Theory & Event 7, no. 4 (2005) <https://muse.jhu.edu/>)

Perhaps the single most telling quote from Hobbes on this point comes from The Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society (usually known by its Latin name, De Cive), in which he states that "to know truth, is the same thing as to remember that it was made by ourselves by the very usurpation of the words." 24 "For Hobbes truth is a function of logic and language, not of the relation between language and some extralinguistic reality," 25 so the "connections between names and objects are not natural." 26 They are artificially constructed by persons, based on individual psychologies and desires. These individual desires are for Hobbes the only measure of good and bad, because value terms "are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves." 27 Since "there are no authentical doctrines concerning right and wrong, good and evil," 28 these labels are placed upon things by humans in acts of creation rather than discovered as extrinsic facts. Elaborating on this, Hobbes writes that "the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker, such as are the names of virtu es and vices; for one man calleth wisdom, what another calleth fear; and one cruelty what another justice." 29 A more simplistic understanding of the brutality of the state of nature, which David Gauthier calls the "simple rationality account," 30 has it that mere materialistic competition for goods is the cause of the war of all against all, but such rivalry is a secondary manifestation of the more fundamental competition among all persons to be the dominant creator of meaning. Certainly, Hobbes writes that persons most frequently "desire to hurt each other" because "many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword." 31 But this competition for goods only arises as the result of the more primary struggle that is inherent in the nature of persons of meaning creators. In the state of nature, "where every man is his own judge," 32 persons will "mete good and evil by diverse measures," creating labels for things as they see fit, based on individual appetites. 17. One of the most significant objects that receives diverse labels in the state of nature is 'threat'. Even if most people happen to construe threat similarly, there will be serious disagreement regarding whether or not a specific situation fits a commonly held definition. This is of course the key to the famous Security Dilemma that internationalrelations theorists spend so much time trying to overcome34 -- certain perfectly innocent actions by one person (or state) can easily be construed, and rationally must be construed, as a threat. Furthermore, any attempt by one person to allay another's fears about the threatening nature of actions must be taken as strategic disinformation, rather than as genuine explanation. Even if "I agree with you in principle about your right to preserve yourself," this agreement is useless "if I disagree about whether this is the moment for you to implement that right." 35 Given that persons "are individual in experience, they are individual in their conceptions and in their speech. Their power of reasoning with words . . . dissociates them and provokes violent competition" 36 specifically because concepts that seem simple invoke very different interpretations. If there were some universally objective and knowable set of circumstances that constituted Threat as such, the rationally self-interested persons of the state of nature would not have to seek control over all things for their own protection. All persons could both avoid actions that would be defined as threat and shed the overbearing suspicion that, taken together, make the Hobbesian state of nature so unbearably brutish.

**To escape the state of nature, people unite to imbue a sovereign with absolute authority to define ethics and enforce them at will. The sovereign is the only binding ethical force - absent it, ethics fail since everyone has competing conceptions of the good**

**Parrish 2** (Rick Parrish. "Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract." Theory & Event 7, no. 4 (2005) <https://muse.jhu.edu/>)

All of the foregoing points to the conclusion that in the commonwealth the sovereign's first and most fundamental job is to be the ultimate definer. Several other commentators have also reached this conclusion. By way of elaborating upon the importance of the moderation of individuality in Hobbes' theory of government, Richard Flathman claims that peace "is possible only if the ambiguity and disagreement that pervade general thinking and acting are eliminated by the stipulations of a sovereign. Pursuant to debunking the perennial misinterpretation of Hobbes' mention of people as wolves, PaulJohnson argues that "one of the primary functions of the sovereign is to provide the necessary unity of meaning and reference for the primary terms in which men try to conduct their social lives." 58 "The whole raison d'être of sovereign helmsmanship lies squarely in the chronic defusing of interpretive clashes," 59 without which humans would "fly off in all directions" 60 and fall inevitably into the violence of the natural condition. 26. It is not surprising that so many noted students of Hobbes have reached this conclusion, given how prominently he himself makes this claim. According to Hobbes, "in the state of nature, where every man is his own judge, and differeth from others concerning the names and appellations of things, and from those differences arise quarrels and breach of peace, it was necessary there should be a common measure of all things, that might fall in controversy." 61 The main categories of the sovereign's tasks are "to make and abrogate laws, to determine war and peace, [and] to know and judge of all controversies," 62 but each of these duties is a subspecies of its ultimate duty to be the sole and ultimate definer in matters of public importance. It is only through the sovereign's effective continued accomplishment of this duty that the people of a commonwealth avoid the definitional problems that typify the state of nature. 27. Judging controversies, which Hobbes lists as the third main task of the sovereign, is the duty most obviously about being the ultimate definer. In fact, Hobbes declares it a law of nature that "in every controversy, the parties thereto ought mutually to agree upon an arbitrator, whom they both trust; and mutually to covenant to stand to the sentence he shall give therein." 63 As I repeatedly alluded to above, this agreement to abide by the decision of a third party arbitrator, a sovereign in the commonwealth, is necessary because of the fundamentally perspectival and relative nature of persons' imputations of meaning and value into the situations they construct. Hobbes understands this problem, as evidenced by his claim that "seeing right reason is not existent, the reason ofsome man or men must supply the place thereof; and that man or men, is he or they, that have the sovereign power" 64 to dictate meanings that will be followed by all. The sovereign is even protected from potential democratic impulses, by which a 'true' meaning would be that agreed upon by the greatest number of people. Because "no one man's reason, nor the reason of any one number of men, makes the certainty," they willstill "come to blows . . . for want of a right reason constituted by nature" 65 unless both the majority and the minority agree to abide by the meanings promulgated by the sovereign. 28. These meanings are usually created and promulgated by the sovereign in the form of laws, another of the tasks with which 7/29/13 RickParrish | Derrida's Economyof Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract | Theory& Event 7:4 https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory\_and\_event/v007/7.4parrish.html 13/42 Hobbes charges it. In one of his clearest explanations of the law, Hobbes writes that "it belongs to the same chief power to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another's, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evil; that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoided in our common course of life." 66 The civil law is the set of the sovereign's definitions for ownership, justice, good, evil, and all other concepts that are important for the maintenance of peace in the commonwealth. When everyone follows the law (that is, when everyone follows the sovereign's definitions) there are far fewer conflicts among persons because everyone appeals to the same meanings. This means that people know what meanings others will use to evaluate the actions of themselves and others, so the state of nature's security dilemmas and attempts to force one's own meanings upon others are overcome.

**Implications:**

1. **Turns the aff fw at the highest layer - absent a sovereign we live in a state of nature where individuals can just force their own moral vision onto another which destroys any chance of productive ethics since no one can guarantee they achieve their ends in a chaotic state justifying infinite violations of their fw**
2. **The AC collapses - their fw presumes a sovereign to be able to bind and enforce it properly. Absent a legitimate sovereign, any taken action wouldn’t matter so we’re a prior question to policymaking**
3. **Only our framework explains subjectivity and motivation which is ontologically self interest, which means only we are able to properly ascribe moral obligations to agents and motivate them to be ethical**

**Thus, the standard is consistency with the Hobbesian Social Contract. Not consequentialist but concerned on if an action procedurally violates the rules of a contract**

**I’ll defend the lack of a universal obligation to the aff. Negate –**

**1] Sequencing – a sovereign can’t be obligated to do anything because they are the ones who choose what ethics and truth – the rez tries to coerce the sovereign to do something which challenges its authority**

**2] IP is implicit in the creation of a sovereign in expressing creativity**

**Ghosh 04** [Shubha Ghosh (B.A., Amherst College; Ph.D., University of Michigan; J.D., Stanford Law School; Professor of Law, University at Buffalo, SUNY, Law School; Visiting Professor, SMU Dedman School of Law). “PATENTS AND THE REGULATORY STATE: RETHINKING THE PATENT BARGAIN METAPHOR AFTER ELDRED”. BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL. 2004. Accessed 9/3/21. https://lawcat.berkeley.edu/record/1119327/files/fulltext.pdf //Xu]

As illustration of the limits of social contract theory,46 particularly the malleability of the notions of consent and promise, consider a social contract theory of intellectual property based on the thoughts of Thomas Hobbes rather than that of John Locke. No scholar has expressly developed a Hobbesian theory of patent or of copyright, but as a challenge to social contract theory, it may be useful to imagine what such a theory would look like.47 For Hobbes, humans created the leviathan-the sovereign state-to protect themselves from each other in the state of nature. 48 Without the leviathan, the state of nature was not an idyllic paradise but a condition of savagery and brutality. In the state of nature, to the extent that any creative activity occurred, the objects of creation would be cannibalized, thoughtlessly copied, adapted, distributed, and performed or used, sold, offered to sell, and made by others. Thus, intellectual property law under the leviathan would protect individuals from this state of nature by making them absolute, immutable, bountiful, and unlimited. Humans would consent to these terms if they were enforced equally for all creations, and each author and inventor would promise to all others to abide by this form of the intellectual property social contract.

## 4

**CP: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for all medicines through a one-and-done approach except for medicines created by indigenous folks, for which all ownership ought to be permanently transferred to the indigenous communities that originally developed the medicine.**

Ngoc **Tang**, 3-24-**2020**, *Finance Major, CSULB 2021,* "The Importance of Native American Intellectual Property," California State University, Long Beach, <https://www.csulb.edu/college-of-business/legal-resource-center/article/the-importance-of-native-american-intellectual> //SR \*brackets in text\*

Native Americans are known for their distinctive cultures and special symbols. Protecting these cultures from being abused is difficult. In the article "Intellectual Property, Traditional Knowledge, and Traditional Cultural Expressions in Native American Tribal Codes,” author Dalindyebo Bafana Shabalala explains what is considered as Native American intellectual property and why it needs protection. According to Shabalala, Native American intellectual property includes traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expressions, and genetic resources (Shabalala par. 4). Traditional knowledge is skills, practices, and innovation concerning biodiversity, agriculture or health (par. 8). Various forms of art such as symbols, designs, painting, dance, music, literature, and performance are considered as cultural expressions (par. 10). Genetic resources include plants, seeds, and medicine formulas. There have been many cases where the Native American intellectual property has been used without first obtaining permission and authorization from the Native Americans. As mentioned in Shabalala’s article, Allergan, a pharmaceutical company, was using the Saint Regis Mohawk tribe’s formula to make their eye drop drug. However, that is not their original formula, so “on Friday, September 8, 2017, the pharmaceutical company” had to “[transfer] ownership of all federal U.S. patents for its Restasis drug to the Saint Regis Mohawk tribe; the tribe then licensed them back to the company” (par. 1). Another interesting case mentioned in the article is about the series Twilight ​​by author Stephanie Myers. The author of this book used the Quileute tribe’s origin story and incorporated it with the fictitious werewolf story without the permission of the tribe. Shabalala says that although the book or the movie “may have a valid copyright in the realm of federal property, the unauthorized use of the Quileute origin story may cause harm when outsiders begin viewing the unauthorized use of the cultural property as a true reflection of the source culture” (par. 11). These actions not only abuse the use of Native American intellectual property, but they also affect the images, the stories, and the cultures of the native people. With these cases of the property being misused, Shabalala raises a question of how the Native Americans protect their cultural properties and how the current federal law acts in protecting these properties. Each Native American tribe has its own laws and rules; these laws and rules are called tribal codes. In his study of a hundred tribal codes, Shabalala shows that there are only nine codes mentioned about intellectual property or something related to intellectual property. This study demonstrates that the native people are unaware in protecting their cultural property. The native people are unaware because they do not know or think that other people would use these properties for their own purposes. However, the current federal laws are not providing enough protection for Native American intellectual property. Shabalala mentions the Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act (TLTIA) and the Indian Arts and Crafts Act (IACA). The purpose of the TLTIA is “to provide international uniformity of trademark registration’ (par. 77); however, “the Congressional Record regarding TLTIA is absent of any authority or mention of providing protection to Native American tribes” (par. 83). The purpose of the IACA is to prevent fraud in the Indian arts and crafts market. However, according to Shabalala’s research, “the IACA trademark system does not provide sufficiently, and arguably any, protection for Native American tribes' cultural property, nor was it ever intended to” (par. 46). Another act is the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), an act with the purpose to provide “protection, return, and repatriation of Native American remains and artifacts found on federal or tribal lands” (par. 66). However, according to the article “An Analysis of the Lack of Protection for Intangible Tribal Cultural Property in the Digital Age,” author Chante Westmoreland states that the NAGPRA did “offer some protection for the tangible cultural property but omit protection for the sacred traditional knowledge the object conveys” (Westmoreland par. 10). There are many acts that try to provide protection concerning intellectual property, but they do not provide enough protection for the Native American intellectual property including traditional property, traditional cultural expressions, and genetic resources. According to the article called “Group Right to Cultural Survival: Intellectual Property Rights in Native American Cultural Symbols,” Terence Dougherty states that, “Intellectual property law in the context of cultural appropriation is particularly relevant to many Native Americans” (Dougherty par. 44). Dougherty also explains that with the significant misuse of the native symbols, cultural appropriation can greatly affect the cultural survival of the native people. Furthermore, in Westmoreland’s article, he states that “sacred traditional knowledge is not merely information, it is essential to the tribal way of life” (par. 9). This demonstrates that the intellectual property of the Native Americans is extremely important to them in their living and their culture. Therefore, to avoid the misuse that can cause a negative impact on the native people, anyone who wants to use the property must have authorization from the native people. Moreover, the federal government needs to provide a law that specifically protects Native American traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expressions, and genetic resources.

**The CP gives indigenous nations resources for self sovereignty and centers discussions around native demands, which better allows for the accessibility of those medicines and indigenous innovatoin**

Simon **Brascoupé and** Karin **Endemann**, Fall **1999**, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ABORIGINAL PEOPLE: A WORKING PAPER <https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/databases/creative_heritage/docs/ip_aboriginal_people.pdf> //SR

Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property The Aboriginal legacy of traditional knowledge comes in two distinct forms. On one hand, an Aboriginal community is the custodian of a store of sacred knowledge, including ceremonies, symbols, and masks that is increasingly open to unauthorized commercial exploitation by individuals, companies or institutions. Some Aboriginal people contend it is not appropriate to use IP law to protect sacred traditional knowledge. On the other hand, many products and services associated with traditional lifestyles of Aboriginal people may have commercial value that could help to support the continuation of these lifestyles and the Aboriginal goal of self-sufficiency. The limited Aboriginal use of Canada’s current IP laws suggests that these laws may not be particularly well suited to protecting either of these forms of traditional knowledge. A distinction must be made between traditional knowledge held by an Aboriginal community and the innovations or new creations of an individual or an Aboriginal company. New products and works of art by Aboriginal inventors and artists qualify for protection under existing IP laws. Music, songs, dance, stories, designs and symbols are passed on in many Aboriginal communities from memory and by word of mouth. Each community is both a conveyer and a user of traditional knowledge. This knowledge is dynamic and evolves with the culture, so it is the product of a continuing creative process. Many Aboriginal artists and artisans create works inspired by the traditional knowledge of their community, and use copyright law extensively. Issues that are not addressed widely are: how Aboriginal people relate to their community in the context of the traditional and dynamic aspects of traditional knowledge; and how traditional knowledge itself can be effectively protected. Protecting Traditional Knowledge Within an Aboriginal Community Few legal mechanisms exist to help indigenous communities protect and preserve traditional knowledge. It is urgent that such mechanisms be developed, because of the increasing pace at which control of traditional knowledge is being lost due to misappropriation and pressures from the non-indigenous world. In the meantime, the use of existing legal tools can be part of a “web” of strategies to help Aboriginal communities better protect and control their traditional knowledge, and ensure benefits are shared in a way that meets community needs. These strategies could include: ! developing local mechanisms within communities to control and protect traditional knowledge; ! more effective use of contractual arrangements to recognize traditional customs and knowledge; ! developing guidelines to ensure that third parties secure proper and informed consent before an Aboriginal community shares traditional knowledge; and ! using existing IP laws. Many Aboriginal people have said that they need to consider how they share and protect traditional knowledge within their communities before deciding whether and how they will share this knowledge with others. Once a community identifies its traditional knowledge and adopts community-based measures governing the use of this knowledge, then the community will be more secure in its ownership and more effective in any negotiations to share its knowledge. It is important that Aboriginal communities develop a strategy to protect traditional knowledge. This will help them avoid losing control over this knowledge to third parties seeking academic advancement or commercial gain. Public disclosure of traditional knowledge has the potential to jeopardize an Aboriginal community’s ability to obtain protection under Canada’s IP laws. This is because knowledge that is disclosed may no longer qualify for IP protection because it is in the public domain. Aboriginal communities considering these issues should identify the scope and nature of traditional knowledge in their community. Part of this process is to identify what knowledge is most important to the community, and how the preservation of traditional knowledge and practices is at risk. Is traditional knowledge being lost because elders have been unable to pass their wisdom to the next generation? Is knowledge being lost because Aboriginal people are being displaced from their traditional environment or because they are influenced by outside media and culture? Has traditional knowledge been allowed into the public domain or been misappropriated by commercial or scientific interests from outside the Aboriginal community? Some Aboriginal people have identified a need for dialogue about traditional ways of sharing and preserving traditional knowledge. What are the obligations of individuals to their community when they use or share traditional knowledge? These issues are just beginning to be discussed within Aboriginal communities and First Nations, at the federal level in Canada, and internationally among indigenous peoples and within international organizations. It is also important for Aboriginal communities to consider what traditional knowledge is sacred and what knowledge may be shared with others or used commercially. Only after a full dialogue will these communities be in a position to determine the best mechanisms to control access to their traditional knowledge, and what knowledge they want to share with others. A number of approaches will be needed to reflect the varied nature and use of the community’s traditional knowledge. One option may be for Aboriginal communities to develop guidelines to prevent unwanted disclosure, and to ensure that traditional knowledge remains within the community. The process of developing guidelines will help ensure that the entire community is consulted in decisions concerning the protection of traditional knowledge and control over its commercialization. These guidelines would need to be enforced by the community, since an Aboriginal community may not have any recourse to the courts if one of its members violates the guidelines. Community guidelines might include policies on the publication of traditional knowledge, its use by others or the use of the community’s symbols. Aboriginal communities may also want to ensure that sharing traditional knowledge within the community continues, and is not restricted more than it was traditionally.