# 1NC Bronx Octos

## 1

**Interpretation: The affirmative must only defend that one member nation of the WTO ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines**

1. **Real World - decisionmakers can only choose from options open to them - an Israeli policymaker can’t control what India does.**
2. **Clash - each country has different politics that can’t be generalized which requires looking on the in depth particularities of individual actors for more nuanced discussions of them - outweighs breadth since different rounds and out of round research expose us to different topics but clash is unique to the process of debating**
3. **Shiftiness - you’ll just shift advocacies throughout the round since you’ll just extend any actor I undercovered which also makes the debate irresolvable since we’ll just go for different actors so there’s no clash.**

**Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and it teaches portable skills that we use lifelong. Drop the debater - severance kills 1NC strat construction—1AR restart favors aff since it’s 7-6 time skew and they get 2 speeches to my one. No rvi - a) they’ll bait theory and prep it out with aff infinite prep—justifies infinite abuse and chilling us from checking abuse in fear of things like 2ar ethos which lets them recontextualize and always seem right on the issue b) forces the NC to go 7 minutes of theory because nothing else matters--outweighs because its the longest speech and the 2nr can never recover since the nc is our only route to generate offense. Competing interps - a) reasonability’s arbitrary & forces judge intervention especially with 2ar recontextualizations to always sound like the more reasonable debater b) norm setting - we find the best possible norms c) reasonability collapses - you use offense/defense paradigm to evaluate brightlines**

## 2

**Interpretation: The affirmative must not deny the negative an rvi to aff theory and claim an rvi to neg theory. The standard is strat skew - affs get a 2:1 theory advantage because they can either win off of my shell or their own shell while I can only win off of my shell - that creates irreciprocal theory burdens and destroys any chance of norming since either negs have to go 7 minutes all in on theory regardless of how friv it gets since nothing else matters OR they don’t read theory at all and affs get away with infinite abuse**

## 3

**The starting point of ethics is volition, the structure of the will - it defines who the subject is which is a prior question to whether they can partake in any theory and generates the primary source for all of our desires and beliefs since it generates what counts as motivational to the subject**

**However, theories to face the will have a dilemma - either they’re paternally objectivist to the extent they restrict the will by impeding agents from leading their own lives, or are weakened by subjectivism to the extent that it’s impossible to make true moral claims.**

**The solution is a theory concerned with how we will, not what we will to ensure self determination and the ability to view yourself as a practical agent able to take on a project and create new identities**

**Jaeggi 14** Rahel Jaeggi (August 2014). “Alienation.” Columbia University Press. Pg. 33-36. Translated by Frederick Neuhouser and Alan E. Smith. Edited by Frederick Neuhouser. Rahel Jaeggi is professor of social and political philosophy at the Humboldt University in Berlin. Her research focuses on ethics, social philosophy, political philosophy, philosophical anthropology, social ontology, and critical theory. SHS KS

In “The Ethics of Antiquity and Modernity” Tugendhat raises the problem of whether it is possible to reformulate antiquity’s inquiry into the nature of happiness (or the good life) under modern conditions. A modern inquiry into the good life must, on the one hand, do justice to the view that its answer cannot “deny the autonomy and thus the interpretive sovereignty of those concerned,” and its method must be such that it avoids committing itself to a “specific and unjustifiable picture of the human being.”3 On the other hand, if modern ethical theory is to recover the interpretive content of ancient ethics, it must be able to identify an objective criterion that allows us to say “whether it is going well or badly for a person independently of their actual perceptions of their present or future well-being.” What is needed, then, is a criterion that, on the one hand, is not identical with the desires or preferences a person actually has and that, on the other hand, does not call into question the interpretive sovereignty of the person and with it the modern ideal of self-determination. Tugendhat’s proposed solution is to develop a formal conception of psycho- logical health. Starting from (what appears to him to be) an unproblematic definition of physical health in terms of “functional capacity,” he develops for psychological health a conception of the “functional capacity of willing” and its possible impairment.4 Tugendhat elaborates his criterion with the example of compulsive behavior: a volition that is compulsive in some sense would count as impaired and hence as being disturbed in its functional capacity. This provides a standpoint that is immanent to the subject’s will and, at the same time, not subjective in the sense in which contingent and unevaluated preferences are: “In this way we would attain precisely what is sought, a point of view that is independent of the respective subjective goals of our willing but that nevertheless derives its authority from the perspective of willing itself. As willing (freely choosing) beings, we always will to be unlimited in our free choosing.”5 With the standard of the “impairment of the functional capacity of willing,” which asks whether we have ourselves at our command in what we will, Tugendhat has achieved a middle ground between subjectivistic and objectivistic positions of the sort he was looking for. One could call such a position a “qualified subjectivism.”6 This provides us with a starting point for overcoming the opposition be- tween modern antipaternalism and the paternalism of a more substantial ethical theory: whether something is good for me always depends (antipat- ernalistically) on my personal view, on whether I in fact want it. This view, however, must be qualified in the sense that the volition it expresses must be a “true volition” and therefore not subject to internal constraints. I must be free in what I will; I must have my will at my command if it is to count as my own. This criterion is, in the first place, formal: it concerns the How, not the What, of willing. That is, I need not will anything in particular; rather, I must be able to will what I will in a free or self-determined manner. It is not necessary, then, to identify a “true object of willing,” but only a certain way of relating, in one’s willing, to oneself and to what one wills. As Tugendhat puts it, “the question of what we truly will concerns not the goals of our willing but the How of willing.”7 Second, this criterion is immanent: the criterion is the functional capacity of willing itself, a claim posited by the act of willing itself. When I say, “I want to be able to do what I will,” I must also mean, “I want to be able—freely—to will.” My account of the problem of alienation can be linked up with this con- ception of willing in the following way: instances of alienation can be under- stood as obstructions of volition and thereby—formulated more generally—as obstructions in the relations individuals have to themselves and the world. With the help of Tugendhat’s conception of having oneself at one’s com- mand, instances of alienation can be reconstructed in terms of disturbed ways of establishing relations to oneself and to the world. In this way the problem of alienation is tied to that of freedom. My thesis is that alienation can be understood as a particular form of the loss of freedom, as an obstruction of what could be called, following Isaiah Ber- lin, positive freedom.8 Formulating the notoriously controversial distinction as briefly as possible, freedom in this sense refers not (merely negatively) to the absence of external coercion but (positively) to the capacity to realize valuable ends. In the sense described (and criticized) by Berlin, positive freedom has a variety of implications: The “positive” sense of the word “liberty” derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer—deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them. . . . I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not.9 As unsystematic and indeterminate the various dimensions of positive free- dom might be, the important point is that conceptions of positive freedom always depict the free life as not alienated and vice versa.10 As Robert Pippin puts it, only those acts and intentions that I can “link . . . with me such that they count as due to me or count as mine” are “instances of freedom.”11 Being a human being rather than a thing means, according to this view, ascribing to oneself what one wills and does, taking responsibility for it and (therefore) being able to identify with it. Understood in this way, the concept of alienation concerns itself with the complex conditions of “linking” one’s actions and desires (or, more gener- ally, one’s life) with oneself, “counting them as due to” oneself, or making them “one’s own.” It also concerns itself with the various obstructions and disturbances that can affect these relations. One is not always already “with oneself;” one’s actions and desires are not always one’s own from the start, and one’s relation to the surrounding natural and social world is equally constitu- tive and threatened. Positively formulated, clarifying the various dimensions of alienation enables us to specify the conditions for being able to understand one’s life as one’s own (and therefore to lead one’s life freely). An unalienated life, according to this view, is not one in which specific substantial values are realized but one that is lived in a specific—unalienated—manner. The belief that everyone should be able to live her own life no longer stands in opposition, then, to the project of alienation critique. Rather, the absence of alienating impediments and the possibility of appropriating self and world without such impediments is a condition of freedom and self-determination.

**Thus, the standard is consistency with non-alienated relations. Prefer additionally - all theories require the ability to engage in them through the ability to act on your own purposes - otherways their fw regresses since one wouldn’t treat themselves as an agent and be held culpable for actions**

**I’ll defend the lack of an obligation to affirm. Negate:**

**[1] Objectification - Absent IP, agents aren’t recognized for their exercise of agency and freeriden off of for benefits by people who didn’t contribute - prevents further appropriation by undermining economic freedom and detaching innovators from their goods**

**[2] IP is key to self-expression - it’s alienating when it doesn’t reflect framer’s intent**

Justin **Hughes 98**, "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property," 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 330-350 (1988) [https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html] AHS//MAK recut emi Accessed 8/10/21

"On the Hegelian perspective, payments from intellectual property users to the property creator are acts of recognition." 3. Intellectual Property Under Hegel. For Hegel, intellectual property need not be justified by analogy to physical property. In fact, the analogy to physical property may distort the status Hegel ascribes to personality and mental traits in relation to the will. Hegel writes: Mental aptitudes, erudition, artistic skill, even things ecclesiastical (like sermons, masses, prayers, consecration of votive objects), inventions, and so forth, become subjects of a contract, brought on to a parity, through being bought and sold, with things recognized as things. It may be asked whether the artist, scholar, &c., is from the legal point of view in possession of his art, erudition, ability to preach a sermon, sing a mass, &c., that is, whether such attainments are "things." We may hesitate to call such abilities, attainments, aptitudes, &c., "things," for while possession of these may be the subject of business dealings and contracts, as if they were things, there is also something inward and mental about it, and for this reason the Understanding may be in perplexity about how to describe such possession in legal terms. . . . n205. Intellectual property provides a way out of this problem, by "materializing" these personal traits. Hegel goes on to say that "[a]ttainments, eruditions, talents, and so forth, are, of course, owned by free mind and are something internal and not external to it, but even so, by expressing them it may embody [\*338] them in something external and alienate them." n206.Hegel takes the position that one cannot alienate or surrender any universal element of one's self. Hence slavery is not permissible because by "alienating the whole of my time, as crystallized in my work, I would be making into another's property the substance of my being, my universal activity and actuality, my personality." n207 Similarly, there is no right to sacrifice one's life because that is the surrender of the "comprehensive sum of external activity." n208 This doctrine supplies at least a framework to answer the question of intellectual property that most concerns Hegel. It is a question we ignore today, but one that is not easy to answer: what justifies the author in alienating copies of his work while retaining the exclusive right to reproduce further copies of that work. A sculptor or painter physically embodies his will in the medium and produces one piece of art. When another artist copies this piece Hegel thinks that the hand-made copy "is essentially a product of the copyist's own mental and technical ability" and does not infringe upon the original artist's property. n209 The problem arises when a creator of intellectual property does not embody his will in an object in the same way the artist does. The writer physically manifests his will only "in a series of abstract symbols" which can be rendered into "things" by mechanical processes not requiring any talent. n210 The dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that "the purpose of a product of mind is that people other than its author should understand it and make it the possession of their ideas, memory, thinking, &c." n211 This concern for the common of ideas is familiar. In resolving this dilemma, Hegel says that the alienation of a single copy of a work need not entail the right to produce facsimiles because such reproduction is one of the "universal ways and means of expression . . . which belong to [the author]." n212 Just as he does not sell himself into slavery, the author keeps the universal aspect of expression as his own. The copy sold is for the buyer's own consumption; its only purpose is to allow the buyer to incorporate these ideas into his "self." Hegel also identifies the instrumentalist-labor justification as a consideration against granting full rights of reproduction to buyers of individual copies [\*339] of a work. Hegel admits that protecting intellectual property is "[t]he purely negative, though the primary, means of advancing the sciences and arts." n213 Beyond this, Hegel says little. He declares that intellectual property is a "capital asset" and explicitly links this label to a later section in which he defines a "capital asset." n214 There is considerable literature on how Hegel did not develop the idea of "capital" to its logical conclusions, n215 but here "capital asset" can be understood as property which has a greater tendency to permanence and a greater ability than other property to give its own economic security

## 4

**CP:**

1. **The World Trade Organization should be abolished**
2. **The originally member nations of the World Trade Organization should independently and without influence from international government reduce intellectual property protections on medicines**

**Hawley**, senator, JD Yale, **20** (Josh, 5-5, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html>)

The coronavirus emergency is not only a public health crisis. With [30 million Americans unemployed](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/us-weekly-jobless-claims.html), it is also an economic crisis. And it has exposed a hard truth about the modern global economy: it weakens American workers and has empowered China’s rise. That must change. The global economic system as we know it is a relic; it requires reform, top to bottom. We should begin with one of its leading institutions, the World Trade Organization. We should abolish it.

**Agreements under the WTO are coercive, self serving, and tied to capitalism - doing the plan independently is necessary**

**Fukuda 10** [Fukuda, Yasuo. "WTO regime as a new stage of imperialism: Decaying capitalism and its alternative." World Review of Political Economy 1.3 (2010): 485. //MSJ SB]

The objectives of the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime are to liberalize trade in goods and services and force developing countries to introduce neo-liberal policies. The purpose is to advance deregulation, privatization, and free trade. T. Friedman (2006) characterized globalization after 2000 as the world becoming flat, whereby every company, organization, or individual can gain entry into a global marketplace, and where all people are free to start businesses which may benefit from a worldwide commercial network. However, this is just one side of globalization under the WTO regime. Multinational corporations as monopoly capital reap most of the benefits of the “flat” world economy. WTO Agreements have ushered in a new era of corporate globalization. The aim of this article is to show that corporate globalization represents a new stage of imperialism, whereby monopoly capital not only controls the world market, but writes the market rules as well. This new form of imperialism is nothing less than a decaying stage of capitalism in which, quite apart from people being guaranteed the chance to lead happy and stable lives, the very potential for doing so is undermined and destroyed. Finally, principles of localization are presented as an alternative to corporate globalization.Looking at contemporary capitalism from the viewpoint of Lenin’s “Imperialism,” it is clear that four of the five pillars (excepting the fifth) are still applicable to capitalism under the WTO regime. First, a small number of multinational corporations typically control more than half the market-share of major industries. For example, in the commercial seed market, the world’s top three corporations (Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta of Switzerland) control almost half of the world market. Cargill, along with its top four competitors, handle 85 percent of world grain trade. In the pharmaceutical industry, the top ten corporations hold a combined 54.8 percent share of the world market (ETC Group 2008). In banking, the world’s top 45 banks account for nearly 40 percent of the gross tier 1 capital of the top 1,000, and about 45 percent of the total assets (The Banker, June 24, 2009). It hardly needs saying that these companies enhance their power considerably through close relationships with governments, and through political contributions, lobbying, revolving doors, and the like. Second, industrial and financial monopoly capital establish political action groups as a means to advance common political goals. The negotiation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) represents a typical example of this sort of collusion between major companies of both the industrial and financial spheres. Third, no monopoly capital can survive without strategic foreign investment, including direct as well as portfolio investment. For instance, automobile companies will not survive without gaining access to Chinese and Indian markets. Fourth, in the course of intense competition over dominant market shares, large multinational corporations often collude to form price cartels (Connor 2001; Levenstein and Suslow 2001). The cartel-based character of monopoly capital culminated during GATT Uruguay Round negotiations, as large businesses cooperated to set market-rules specifically tailored to their own ends. Second, monopoly capital now dictates the rules of trade by directly involving itself in the crafting of trade policy. Big business coalitions took part in drafting the WTO Agreements. In the case of GATS, multinational corporations, including Citigroup, J. P. Morgan Chase, and Barclays Bank, drafted the proposal under the authorization of US and EU governments, and then used lobbying to push the agreement through at the time of negotiations (Balanyá et al. 2003). In the case of the negotiations for the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), it was the US Intellectual Property Committee (USIPC), a US business group, which wrote the initial draft, at the request of the US Trade Representative (Weissman 1996). Those party to the USIPC include Monsanto, Pfizer, DuPont, and IBM. Market and trade rules amount to a form of infrastructure vis-à-vis the markets. The body which decides the rules of trade has a considerable advantage over other stakeholders. Under the current setting, it is large multinationals, especially the agents of US monopoly capital, which control the rules of trade, specifically through cozy relationships with the US government. Therefore, it is the governance of trade rules which most distinguishes modern capitalism from the imperialist systems of the early 20th century. Thus, the WTO regime is nothing short of a regime of imperialism, whereby monopoly capital exercises governing power over both national markets and the world economy. Whereas the first four of the five pillars by which Lenin defined imperialism still apply under the WTO regime, in place of the fifth (colonization), monopoly capital has gained new tools of dominance, most specifically the ability to design market rules. In losing the policy space to protect and develop local firms, developing countries are obliged to become incorporated into a global network managed by monopoly capital. In this way, income is steadily transferred from the lower rungs of the global economy to monopoly capital at the top. In short, the WTO regime constitutes a new stage of imperialism, in which monopoly capital holds hegemony over market rules in place of colonization. The WTO regime was devised under the initiatives of monopoly capital as a means to promote corporate globalization. The next task is to explore what corporate globalization has brought to society. The true nature of corporate globalization is expressed in its outcomes. Lenin characterized imperialism as a decaying stage of capitalism, owing to its unproductive character, which he described as rentier capitalism. The aim of this section is to show that corporate globalization too is nothing more than a decaying stage of capitalism. The IMF and the World Bank have occupied a central role in bringing developing countries into the fold of corporate globalization. Since the 1980s, under the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), more than 100 developing countries have been forced to adopt “open door” policies with respect to investment and trade (Chossudovsky 1997, 1998). Once the door has been pried open, large multinational firms—for instance, the major players of agribusiness and infra-business—are quick to extend their reach into the newly available markets. As a result, considerable damage results to the people of developing countries through, for example, loss of traditional industries like family farming and the privatization of hitherto public resources such as community water supplies. After the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, the IMF met with severe criticism for imposing neo-liberal based readjustment regimes on the afflicted countries. Nevertheless, the IMF has continued to adhere to a neo-liberal approach with respect to the global recession which is currently underway following the collapse of the housing bubble in 2008 (Weisbrot et al. 2009). The IMF’s Structural Adjustment Program was formulated as global rules by WTO agreements. Thus, neo-liberalism has become the predominant feature with respect to international rules on trade. Liberalization of trade policy amounts to nothing but the loss on the part of national governments of the policy space to govern. Developing countries need flexible tariff systems, quantitative import controls, and capital controls to protect their local industries. They also need policies such as local content controls and export subsidies to foster new economic development. WTO agreements prohibit or strictly limit the use of these industrial policies, in spite of the fact that these very same policies were employed to great effect by developed countries during their earlier stages of development. Deprived of this policy space, developing countries are easily brought under the governance of monopoly capital.

## 5

**CP Text: Vote negative to inject the affirmative advocacy with a radical loss.**

**Genosko 16** - Gary Genosko, University of Ontario, Lo Sguardo, 8/29/16 “How to Lose to a Chess Playing Computer According to Jean Baudrillard” [<http://www.losguardo.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-23-Genosko.pdf>] Accessed 9/14/20 SAO

Readers of Baudrillard know that he thought about competition in sport and games in terms of failure and frailty. In For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, exchange value and symbolic ambivalence are mutually exclusive domains; in the latter, desire is not satisfied through phantasmic completion, and this entails that desire may ride failure to an ignominious counter-victory. Baudrillard found in the failure to react positively to an inducement like winning a race – captured in that bizarre American football phrase appropriated as a handle by Ronald Reagan, «Win One for the Gipper!» – the principle of a radical counter-economy of needs. Losers come in all shades. But radical losers stand apart from the crowd in the virulence of their capacity to radiate loss that they throw down as a challenge. There are those whso are irresistibly drawn to blowing it, and others who can taste failure and steal it from the jaws of victory. From the Beatles to Beck, the figure of the loser has fascinated lyricists and theorists alike as not merely sympathetic but as a foundation for a deliberate weakness in the face of overwhelming odds and the false pretenses of victory. Here I revisit Jean Baudrillard’s speculations about computer chess programs, specifically IBM’s Deep and Deeper Blue, and how best to play against them. Drawing on Baudrillard’s theory of loss in sports as an act of contempt for the fruits of victory, institutional accommodation, and the cheap inducements of prestige and glory, I examine how chess masters like Garry Kasparov have met the challenge of the brute force programs – some of which were congealed models of his own play – with appeals to a kind of unforced play and even ‘non-thought’. Considering the malevolent and fictional computer system HAL, as well as Deep Blue and subsequent programs, right up to IBM’s Jeopardy-playing computer ‘Watson’, this paper looks at ways to defeat programming power by critically regaining the counter-technical and (dys)functional skills of the loser.

**The Affirmative critique is assimilated to justify the moral superstructure they criticize. It’s try or die for the CP under their role of the ballot.**

**Robinson 12** - Andrew Robinson, Ceasefire, August 24th, 2012 “An A to Z of Theory | Jean Baudrillard: From Revolution to Implosion” [<https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-10/>] Accessed 3/9/20 SAO

Baudrillard and resistance Last week, this column explored Baudrillard’s account of the collapse or implosion of capitalism. What does all of this mean for political resistance? For one thing, it means that the dominant system must continue to be opposed. For Baudrillard, there is always something missing from the code. It is always incomplete, leaving a radical remainder. The system is based on a split. The code is differentiated from reality. It has to be, to avoid symbolic exchange. It cannot achieve the complete inclusion which comes about with generalised reversibility. Yet the code tends to take over all of social space. Its “other” disappears or becomes invisible. It tries to be a complete system, a total reality. It largely succeeds in sucking intensity from social life. Yet it also remains vulnerable, because of the exclusion on which it is based. Baudrillard theorises resistance in terms of the irruption of the symbolic in the realms controlled by the code. It is something like what Hakim Bey terms the ‘return of the primitive’. We really need the dimension of the ‘secret’. Its forced revelation is destructive and impossible. The return of the symbolic is discussed in various ways in different texts. Resistance arises when subjects come to see their own programmed death in the accumulation, production and conservation of their subjectivity. They become fiercely opposed to their reduction to the regime of work-buy-consume-die. Resistance becomes increasingly nihilistic, in response to the programming of the universe. It becomes resistance to the code as meaning, and at the same time as lack of intensity. In seeking to restore intensity, it resorts to the modalities of symbolic exchange. The impossibility of “revolution” It is important to differentiate Baudrillard’s view from standard accounts of revolution. To be sure, this is the position from which Baudrillard emerges. In the early work, The Political Economy of the Sign, Baudrillard argued that the regime of the code could only be destroyed by a total revolution. ‘Even signs must burn’. Baudrillard’s early work can be read as a call for a Situationist-style overthrow of capitalism through a revolution in the everyday, which breaks the power of the code and of signs. In more recent works, Baudrillard rethinks this view. He claims that revolution is now impossible. Baudrillard makes this claim because of the end of production. Revolution was historically seen as the liberation of the productive energy of humanity from the confines of capitalism. But if production no longer exists, this kind of vision has no hold. Labour has become another sign. There is no tendency for it to liberate itself by moving beyond capitalism. Baudrillard is deeply critical of standard leftist responses to neoliberalism. He criticises revolutionaries of his day for seeking a return to the “real”. He sees this as nostalgia for the previous, Fordist period of capitalism. People seek to get rid of the code, and go back to the earlier kind of simulation. Or they seek to identify something which is not yet signified in the system and which ought to be – for instance, excluded groups who should be included. This actually ties people to the prior forms of the dominant system. For Baudrillard, the weapons of the previous period are already neutralised in the order of the code. Revolution is a casualty of the end of the period of system-expansion. Explosions and revolutions are effects of an expanding order. This expanding order is an effect of the regime of production. But simulation is instead an inward-looking order. It is ‘saturated’ – it cannot expand any further. As a result, explosion will never again happen. It has been replaced by the ‘cold’ energy of the simulacrum. Instead, there is constant implosion. The world is saturated. The system has reached its limits. It is socially constructed as dense and irreversible, as beyond the ‘liberating explosion’. Baudrillard believes that we are past a point of no return: the system can’t be slowed down or redirected to a new end. We are in a ‘pure event’, beyond causality and without consequence, and every effort to exorcise hyperreality simply reinforces it. These are little fractal events and gradual processes of collapse which no longer create massive collapses, but exist horizontally. Events no longer resonate across spheres. It is as if the forces carrying the meaning of an event beyond itself have slowed to a standstill. The London ‘riots’ or the student fees protests, for example, do not turn into generalised rebellions in Britain as perhaps they still might in Egypt or Greece. We are in an era of ‘anomalies without consequences’. But the system will nevertheless come to an end, by other means. Even if people can’t revolt, a reaction is certain. Explosive violence is replaced by implosive violence, arising from a saturated, retracting, involuting system. The system has lost its triumphal imaginary because of its saturation. It is now in a phase of mourning, passing towards catastrophe. Things don’t get transcended anymore, but they expand to excess. Baudrillard sees this as the culmination of a kind of negative evolution. Systems pass through stages: a loose state produces liberty or personal responsibility; a denser state produces security; an even denser state produces terror, generalised responsibility, and saturation. Beyond saturation there is only implosion. Anti-consumerism is another target of critique. Criticising consumer society for doing what it claims to do – for supplanting ‘higher’ virtues with everyday pleasures – is a false critique which reinforces the core myth of consumerism. Consumer society functions as it does, precisely because it does not provide everyday pleasures. Rather, it simulates them through the code. Baudrillard also criticises moral critique and scandal, such as Watergate. He argues that the system requires a moral superstructure to operate, and the revival of such a superstructure sustains the system. What is really scandalous is that capital is fundamentally immoral or amoral. Moral panics serve to avoid awareness of this repressed fact. Similarly, critiques of ideology risk reaffirming the system’s maintenance of the illusion of truth. This helps cover up the fact that truth no longer exists in the world of the code. Since there is no reality beneath the simulacrum, such analyses are flawed. It is now the left (or the Third Way) that tries to re-inject moral order and justice into a failing system, thereby protecting it from its own collapse. Baudrillard implicitly criticises theories such as Laclau’s, which seek to re-inject meaning and intensity into politics. For Baudrillard, this task is both impossible and reactionary. Baudrillard sees the system as creating the illusion of its continued power by drawing on or simulating antagonisms and critique. There is thus a danger that critique actually sustains the system, by giving it a power it doesn’t have. Trying to confront and destroy the system thus inadvertently revives it, giving it back a little bit of symbolic power. He also sees conspiracy theories and current forms of Marxism as attempts to stave off awareness of the reality of a systematic code. In any case, the energy of the social is simply a distorted, impoverished version of the energy of “diabolical” forces (i.e. of symbolic exchange). Baudrillard thinks that societies actually come into being, not for the management of interests, but coalesce around rituals of expenditure, luxury and sacrifice. Politics itself was a pure game until the modern period, when it was called upon to represent the social. Now politics is dead, because it no longer has a referent in reality. This is because it lacks symbolic exchange. The absence of symbolic exchange leads also to an absence of possibility of redistribution, either North to South or elite to masses. Fascism also resists the death of the real, in a similar way. It tries to restore in an excessive way the phenomena of death, intensity and definite references, in order to ward off the collapse of the real. Fascist and authoritarian tendencies revive what Baudrillard terms ‘the violence necessary to life’ – they keep up some kind of symbolic power. (Baudrillard’s Lacanian heritage is clearly shown in this idea of a necessary violence). Baudrillard has a certain sympathy for the desire to escape hyperreality in this way, but also sees it as futile. People doing this – both left and right – are trying to resuscitate causes and consequences, realities and referents, and recreate an imaginary. But the system deters such efforts from succeeding. Le Pen for instance is ultimately absorbed, as the mainstream integrates and repeats his racist ideas. This analysis could also be applied to various “fundamentalisms” and ethno-nationalist movements today. This kind of resistance is ultimately reactionary, seeking to restore the declining regime of signs. But it can only be understood if its basis in energies of resistance to simulation is recognised. It is because it channels such resistance that it is able to mobilise affective forces. Baudrillard’s analysis is here similar to Agamben’s view that the sovereign gesture is now exercised everywhere because of the rise of indistinction and indeterminacy. The paradox is that the performance of fundamentalism often leads back towards the world of simulation and deterrence. Such movements map symbolic exchange onto the state, restoring some of its reality, but ultimately contributing to the persistence of simulation. Resistance from inside the regime of power is impossible because of deterrence. Baudrillard suggests that it’s now impossible to imagine a power exercised inside the enclosure created by deterrence – except for an implosive power which abolishes the energies preventing other possibilities emerging. He also suggests that the loss of the real is irreversible. Only the total collapse of the terrain of simulation will end it, not a test of reality. A truly effective revolution would have to abolish all the separations – including the separation from death. It cannot involve equality in what is separated – in survival, in social status and so on. The strategy for change is now exacberation, towards a catastrophic end of the system. Baudrillard believes that the resultant death of the social will paradoxically bring about socialism. 