# 1NC

## 1

**Interp: The affirmative must only defend “Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust”**

**Resolved means a policy**

**Find Law Legal Dictionary** <https://dictionary.findlaw.com/definition/resolve.html> //SR

2 : a legal or official determination

**Appropriation–**

Timothy Justin **Trapp**, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, **’13**, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

**Outer Space–**

**Merriam Webster** <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/outer%20space> //SR

: space immediately outside the earth's atmosphere

**Private entities–**

**USLegal** Private Entity Law and Legal Definition <https://definitions.uslegal.com/p/private-entity/> //SR

According to 2 CFR 175.25 [Title 2 Grants and Agreements; Subtitle A Office of Management and Budget Guidance for Grants and Agreements], private entity means "any entity other than a State, local government, Indian tribe, or foreign public entity. (2) This term includes: (i) A nonprofit organization, including any nonprofit institution of higher education, hospital, or tribal organization other than one included in the definition of Indian tribe (ii) A for-profit organization."

**Vote neg for limits: their model has no resolutional bound and creates the possibility for literally an infinite number of 1ACs. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months. Cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters. Counter-interpretations are arbitrary, unpredictable, and don’t solve the world of neg prep because there’s no grounding in the resolution**

**Fairness outweighs – [1] it’s an intrinsic good – debate is a game that requires rules to evaluate it--it ensures a structure to make their aff heard and to deny fairness’s value is a performative contradiction since you obviously cared about other rules such as speech times. If fairness didn’t matter, you should just hack against them and evaluate their arguments unfairly, making responses circular [2] Link turns their education offense – getting to the third and fourth level of tactical engagement is only possible with refined and well-researched positions connected to the resolutional mechanism. Repeated debates over core issues incentivize innovative argument production and improved advocacy based on feedback and nuanced responses from opponents. [3] Probability – The role of individual debate rounds on broader subject formation is white noise – can you remember what happened in (this round)? – individual rounds don’t affect our subjectivity, so fairness is the only impact your ballot can resolve. You should presume all their truth claims false because they have not been properly tested**

**Terminal defense to their model – [1] TVA solves - \_\_. Disads to the TVA prove it true since it proves there is neg ground [2] SSD solves - read it when you negate for the same content education [3] Discuss your aff out of round when people are willing to listen and not make dumb arguments for the W**

**Drop the debater for deterrence since the round has already been skewed. Competing interps--reasonability is arbitrary and causes a race to the bottom. Even if their aff is answerable, the ones they incentivize are not which means you presume the worst possible affs because people inevitably want to be as abusive as possible for the win and they create a model of self care. No rvi’s or impact turns - [1] they’d purposefully be abusive to bait us into reading bad arguments and can drill it a lot chilling us from checking abuse [2] You shouldn’t win for being T - if you win T is a bad thing then its at most just a reason we should drop it to let us learn from our mistakes [3] Only reason we read T is because we were pigeonholed and had nothing else to read [4] T just says the aff is a bad idea like any other argument, under their logic every argument for why the aff is a bad idea would also be an independent voter [5] We don’t force you to do anything - we just propose a norm that can be subject to change**

**1ar theory is bad since you get 2ar ethos to blow up a 20 second shell we overcover and responses to my counter interp will be new causing intervention. No infinite abuse: 1. Our standards means its a bad way to check infinite abuse 2. NC only has a finite amount of time 3. Preempts in the 1ac solve**

## 2

**Counterplan text: we endorse the entirety of the aff minus their performance at the top of the 1ac–to clarify, we endorse the message, ust not the form that it was read through**

**1] Poetry ignores the reader’s agency – attempting to use poetry as understanding imposes violence upon the “subject” – it also destroys the author’s identity for a “larger cause”**

**Altieri, ‘96** (Charles “Some Problems about Agency in the Theories of Radical Poetics” Contemporary Literature, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Summer, 1996), pp. 207-236 http://www.jstor.org/stable/1208873) //GY

Jed Rasula claimed several years ago that after all the permutations of language writing that have occurred, the only two common threads are “the restoration of the reader as coproducer of the text and an emphasis on the materiality of the signifier” (319), principles which Linda Reinfeld neatly summarizes as “a commitment to writing as rescue – restoring the reader… ‘repossessing the word’” (32). But now that poets have been working with the principles for two decades, I worry that there may be emerging two substantial gaps that we have yet to reflect upon: how do we assess the transformations of enabling traditions that are taking place, and how do we get the theory that shaped these two principles to stay in conjunction with the various modes of writing that it has generated? We may be in a position where the theorizing behind radical poetics needs to confront both its immediate past and its emerging future. Let me begin with the issue of how reading is best characterized. Does the reader really need restoring? Are there any major traditional works that encourage readerly passivity, or demand readers reach any one predetermined conclusion by refusing to allow the reader space for engaging what the work has made available to them as a possible condition of the self or world? There may be academics who confuse passivity and activity, but for the most part that particular opposition does not seem likely to generate the significant difference that radical writing claims to realize. So we have to probe a bit more to understand the modes of reading and valuing reading that radical poetics foster. I think we can distinguish three interrelated ways this poetics characterizes the reader’s roles. On the most general level, Bruce Andrews and others make strong cases for a sharp opposition between the traditional hermeneutic ideal of the reader’s role as interpreter and an empirical view that emphasizes and cultivates differences among readers that bring to the fore their concrete bodily and social situatedness (5). Hemeneutic ideals demand a substantial degree of subjection – to the author’s intentions and to the projected identifications the author offers – while masking the power structures that the text imposes on our most powerful emotional orientations. And, one might add, where there is subjection there is repression dividing agents from themselves. Unable to express the desires most intimate to them, their very efforts at hermeneutic understanding are likely to produce a counterbalancing resentment and even suppressed violence over what they feel they are constantly having to surrender in order to be reading subjects at all. Charles Bernstein gives a sharp political focus for this kind of psychologizing in a brilliant reading of Pound’s fascism that locates its basic source in Pound’s own misinterpretation of the “polyvocal textuality” and “compositionally decentered multiculturalism” fundamental to the literary production developed within the *Cantos*: “Pound’s fascist ideology insists on the author’s having an extraliterary point of ‘special knowledge’ that creates a phallic order (these are Pound’s terms) over the female chaos of conflicting ideological material” (123). So Pound’s quest for an authority informing his poetry becomes a counterproductive desperation that seems to serve for Bernstein as a metaphor or parable for the structure of literary ambitions. The dream of a fixable reader (both as one who can be made to stand still and one who can be “cured”) may be more destructive for the writer than for the reader because of the blindness and anxiety over misinterpretation that come with it. And if this dream succeeds, the writer’s own actual historicity is likely to be subsumed within fantasies about exercising a shaping force over history. So for Bernstein it is safer to view writing as anticommunication than to submit it to the rhetorical theater that comes into play when communication is idealized and reading disciplined.

**2] Performatively reading poetry is intellectually corrupt**

**Groff 05** (Daniel Groff, The Peril of the Poetry Reading: The Page Versus the Performance, January 26, 2005,<https://www.poets.org/poetsorg/text/peril-poetry-reading-page-versus-performance> N.C.)

Even as the number of poetry readings has exploded in the last two decades—with all their *mmmmm*’s, their bar glasses clinking in the background, and their crackling microphones—arguments still rumble over whether they are the deathblow to poetry or its new lifeblood. Performance poetry and spoken word has burgeoned too, but with its emphasis less on text than on the poet’s presentation of the work, its aesthetics seem to be all of a piece. But for what I call “page-based” poetry—verse that flourishes primarily via the printed text—the poetry reading phenomenon is increasingly troublesome. Too often we are mistaking the poetry reading for the reading of poetry. Sure, public poetry events bring people together, creating a community for the most intimidating of the verbal arts. They allow us to encounter poets we admire or have never heard of, connecting the printed poem with the voice and mien of its creator, and adding new dimensions of meaning to the experience the page provides. Poetry readings allow a poet to test how new work reverberates, or doesn’t. And of course, for the poetry business itself, poetry readings are a hopeful sign for an art that seems paradoxically both more marginalized and more popular—especially in a culture that gauges the worth of an art by the size of its box office, where few large publishers issue books by poets, where poetry-reviewing has mostly vanished from mainstream media, and where according to the NEA fewer and fewer people read books of any kind. But even if the poem takes on a fresh life when it’s delivered in the voice of its maker, it loses more than it gains. Attending a poetry reading has as much in common with reading a poem on the page as reading a screenplay has to do with seeing a movie. Only when we acknowledge that a poem performed is no substitute for a poem read in private will we truly advance the cause of the poetic word. Debate over the worth of public poetry events has flared repeatedly over the last couple of decades and it is part of a larger aesthetic and cultural controversy. How is a poem best apprehended? In the effort to make poetry popular, is poetry-making itself debased? In his keynote address at the 1996 PEN Literary Awards, [Richard Howard](https://www.poets.org/poetsorg/poet/richard-howard) offered “a modest proposal that may yet restore an art that was once the glory and the consolation of our race to something like its ulterior status. My proposal is simply this: to make poetry, once again, a secret.” Howard continued, “We have failed…to make poetry known; we have merely made it public. If we are to save poetry, which means if we are to savor it, we must restore poetry to that status of seclusion and even secrecy that characterizes our authentic pleasures and identifies only our intimately valued actions.”

**3] Poetry is commodified as a capital and brainwashes poets into conforming**

**Bowers 02** Neal Bowers. “UNIVERSITY POETRY, INC”. *Poetry*, Vol. 180, No. 4. (Jul., 2002), pp. 221-223. Edited for gendered language. EL

Within the corporate university, poetry as a noble calling is as quaint as the muse. Both have been displaced by a cal culating careerism, and the whimsical-grueling-joyous painful work of poetry has been transformed into a routine job. In the place of inspiration, poets undertake classroom assignments. For teachers and students alike, the writing process has become an academic exercise designed more for the intellect than for the heart, resulting in poems of remark able sameness. Whether in a sprawling city or an unmapped settlement with a single street, the poet lives in a one-company town. With a rate of success unmatched even by Wal-Mart, the university has driven almost all independent operations into ruin, controlling the production and distribution of poetry and regulating its worth. From a distance, the arrangement doesn't seem so bad. The poet gets paid for doing the thing he [they]most wants to do. Each published poem becomes an item on a resume that builds toward promotion and justifies pay raises, and the poet spends his [their]days talking shop with students and colleagues. Having to suffer through comniittee meetings and read reams of novice verse seems a fair trade for job security and a steady income, and most poets teaching in the university have convinced themselves they have the best of all possible deals. In practical terms, the transformation of poetry from a pas sion to a professional undertaking makes wonderful sense. The poet doesn't need to be rich to support his [their]writing, nor does he[they] have to shuffle away the hours at minimum wage. The garret has been replaced by a two-car garage, and the poet backs out each morning on his [their]way to work just like everyone else in his [their]neighborhood. Of course, the fit of poet and university hasn't always been so perfect. Think of poor Ted Roethke running manic on the campus in Seattle and of Berryman making his [their]shy wave before jumping from the bridge at the University of Minnesota. There were bound to be some rough spots at the outset, before poets could be groomed and conditioned for the academic marketplace. But things have smoothed out to such a degree over the past fifty years that poets are hard to distinguish from linguists and literary theorists during faculty chats in the coffee room. Certainly, no poet should be destitute or mad, as neither condition is a requirement for the art. Anyone can see that stability is more conducive to productivity than a shaky life among the empties or in the tattering wind at the edge of rea son. But the academy has done more than eliminate those tragic extremes; it has changed the way poets think about their work by making it part of a routine job. Across America, poets have set their internal clocks to match the nine-month academic year. Each morning, they buckle up their jeans or slither into a black pant-suit and set out for campus. In Oregon and Florida, Maine and Nevada, their students gather in little rooms, waiting to be taught the secret rites of poetry. In his [their]heart, the poet knows he [they] has [have] nothing to tell them that will transform them into poets, but because he [they]has a job to do he [they]leads them through whatever [their] syllabus he [they]has devised to fill up a semester.

## 3

**CP Text: Vote negative to inject the affirmative advocacy with a radical loss.**

**Genosko 16** - Gary Genosko, University of Ontario, Lo Sguardo, 8/29/16 “How to Lose to a Chess Playing Computer According to Jean Baudrillard” [<http://www.losguardo.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-23-Genosko.pdf>] Accessed 9/14/20 SAO

Readers of Baudrillard know that he thought about competition in sport and games in terms of failure and frailty. In For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, exchange value and symbolic ambivalence are mutually exclusive domains; in the latter, desire is not satisfied through phantasmic completion, and this entails that desire may ride failure to an ignominious counter-victory. Baudrillard found in the failure to react positively to an inducement like winning a race – captured in that bizarre American football phrase appropriated as a handle by Ronald Reagan, «Win One for the Gipper!» – the principle of a radical counter-economy of needs. Losers come in all shades. But radical losers stand apart from the crowd in the virulence of their capacity to radiate loss that they throw down as a challenge. There are those whso are irresistibly drawn to blowing it, and others who can taste failure and steal it from the jaws of victory. From the Beatles to Beck, the figure of the loser has fascinated lyricists and theorists alike as not merely sympathetic but as a foundation for a deliberate weakness in the face of overwhelming odds and the false pretenses of victory. Here I revisit Jean Baudrillard’s speculations about computer chess programs, specifically IBM’s Deep and Deeper Blue, and how best to play against them. Drawing on Baudrillard’s theory of loss in sports as an act of contempt for the fruits of victory, institutional accommodation, and the cheap inducements of prestige and glory, I examine how chess masters like Garry Kasparov have met the challenge of the brute force programs – some of which were congealed models of his own play – with appeals to a kind of unforced play and even ‘non-thought’. Considering the malevolent and fictional computer system HAL, as well as Deep Blue and subsequent programs, right up to IBM’s Jeopardy-playing computer ‘Watson’, this paper looks at ways to defeat programming power by critically regaining the counter-technical and (dys)functional skills of the loser.

**The Affirmative critique is assimilated to justify the moral superstructure they criticize. It’s try or die for the CP under their role of the ballot.**

**Robinson 12** - Andrew Robinson, Ceasefire, August 24th, 2012 “An A to Z of Theory | Jean Baudrillard: From Revolution to Implosion” [<https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-10/>] Accessed 3/9/20 SAO

Baudrillard and resistance Last week, this column explored Baudrillard’s account of the collapse or implosion of capitalism. What does all of this mean for political resistance? For one thing, it means that the dominant system must continue to be opposed. For Baudrillard, there is always something missing from the code. It is always incomplete, leaving a radical remainder. The system is based on a split. The code is differentiated from reality. It has to be, to avoid symbolic exchange. It cannot achieve the complete inclusion which comes about with generalised reversibility. Yet the code tends to take over all of social space. Its “other” disappears or becomes invisible. It tries to be a complete system, a total reality. It largely succeeds in sucking intensity from social life. Yet it also remains vulnerable, because of the exclusion on which it is based. Baudrillard theorises resistance in terms of the irruption of the symbolic in the realms controlled by the code. It is something like what Hakim Bey terms the ‘return of the primitive’. We really need the dimension of the ‘secret’. Its forced revelation is destructive and impossible. The return of the symbolic is discussed in various ways in different texts. Resistance arises when subjects come to see their own programmed death in the accumulation, production and conservation of their subjectivity. They become fiercely opposed to their reduction to the regime of work-buy-consume-die. Resistance becomes increasingly nihilistic, in response to the programming of the universe. It becomes resistance to the code as meaning, and at the same time as lack of intensity. In seeking to restore intensity, it resorts to the modalities of symbolic exchange. The impossibility of “revolution” It is important to differentiate Baudrillard’s view from standard accounts of revolution. To be sure, this is the position from which Baudrillard emerges. In the early work, The Political Economy of the Sign, Baudrillard argued that the regime of the code could only be destroyed by a total revolution. ‘Even signs must burn’. Baudrillard’s early work can be read as a call for a Situationist-style overthrow of capitalism through a revolution in the everyday, which breaks the power of the code and of signs. In more recent works, Baudrillard rethinks this view. He claims that revolution is now impossible. Baudrillard makes this claim because of the end of production. Revolution was historically seen as the liberation of the productive energy of humanity from the confines of capitalism. But if production no longer exists, this kind of vision has no hold. Labour has become another sign. There is no tendency for it to liberate itself by moving beyond capitalism. Baudrillard is deeply critical of standard leftist responses to neoliberalism. He criticises revolutionaries of his day for seeking a return to the “real”. He sees this as nostalgia for the previous, Fordist period of capitalism. People seek to get rid of the code, and go back to the earlier kind of simulation. Or they seek to identify something which is not yet signified in the system and which ought to be – for instance, excluded groups who should be included. This actually ties people to the prior forms of the dominant system. For Baudrillard, the weapons of the previous period are already neutralised in the order of the code. Revolution is a casualty of the end of the period of system-expansion. Explosions and revolutions are effects of an expanding order. This expanding order is an effect of the regime of production. But simulation is instead an inward-looking order. It is ‘saturated’ – it cannot expand any further. As a result, explosion will never again happen. It has been replaced by the ‘cold’ energy of the simulacrum. Instead, there is constant implosion. The world is saturated. The system has reached its limits. It is socially constructed as dense and irreversible, as beyond the ‘liberating explosion’. Baudrillard believes that we are past a point of no return: the system can’t be slowed down or redirected to a new end. We are in a ‘pure event’, beyond causality and without consequence, and every effort to exorcise hyperreality simply reinforces it. These are little fractal events and gradual processes of collapse which no longer create massive collapses, but exist horizontally. Events no longer resonate across spheres. It is as if the forces carrying the meaning of an event beyond itself have slowed to a standstill. The London ‘riots’ or the student fees protests, for example, do not turn into generalised rebellions in Britain as perhaps they still might in Egypt or Greece. We are in an era of ‘anomalies without consequences’. But the system will nevertheless come to an end, by other means. Even if people can’t revolt, a reaction is certain. Explosive violence is replaced by implosive violence, arising from a saturated, retracting, involuting system. The system has lost its triumphal imaginary because of its saturation. It is now in a phase of mourning, passing towards catastrophe. Things don’t get transcended anymore, but they expand to excess. Baudrillard sees this as the culmination of a kind of negative evolution. Systems pass through stages: a loose state produces liberty or personal responsibility; a denser state produces security; an even denser state produces terror, generalised responsibility, and saturation. Beyond saturation there is only implosion. Anti-consumerism is another target of critique. Criticising consumer society for doing what it claims to do – for supplanting ‘higher’ virtues with everyday pleasures – is a false critique which reinforces the core myth of consumerism. Consumer society functions as it does, precisely because it does not provide everyday pleasures. Rather, it simulates them through the code. Baudrillard also criticises moral critique and scandal, such as Watergate. He argues that the system requires a moral superstructure to operate, and the revival of such a superstructure sustains the system. What is really scandalous is that capital is fundamentally immoral or amoral. Moral panics serve to avoid awareness of this repressed fact. Similarly, critiques of ideology risk reaffirming the system’s maintenance of the illusion of truth. This helps cover up the fact that truth no longer exists in the world of the code. Since there is no reality beneath the simulacrum, such analyses are flawed. It is now the left (or the Third Way) that tries to re-inject moral order and justice into a failing system, thereby protecting it from its own collapse. Baudrillard implicitly criticises theories such as Laclau’s, which seek to re-inject meaning and intensity into politics. For Baudrillard, this task is both impossible and reactionary. Baudrillard sees the system as creating the illusion of its continued power by drawing on or simulating antagonisms and critique. There is thus a danger that critique actually sustains the system, by giving it a power it doesn’t have. Trying to confront and destroy the system thus inadvertently revives it, giving it back a little bit of symbolic power. He also sees conspiracy theories and current forms of Marxism as attempts to stave off awareness of the reality of a systematic code. In any case, the energy of the social is simply a distorted, impoverished version of the energy of “diabolical” forces (i.e. of symbolic exchange). Baudrillard thinks that societies actually come into being, not for the management of interests, but coalesce around rituals of expenditure, luxury and sacrifice. Politics itself was a pure game until the modern period, when it was called upon to represent the social. Now politics is dead, because it no longer has a referent in reality. This is because it lacks symbolic exchange. The absence of symbolic exchange leads also to an absence of possibility of redistribution, either North to South or elite to masses. Fascism also resists the death of the real, in a similar way. It tries to restore in an excessive way the phenomena of death, intensity and definite references, in order to ward off the collapse of the real. Fascist and authoritarian tendencies revive what Baudrillard terms ‘the violence necessary to life’ – they keep up some kind of symbolic power. (Baudrillard’s Lacanian heritage is clearly shown in this idea of a necessary violence). Baudrillard has a certain sympathy for the desire to escape hyperreality in this way, but also sees it as futile. People doing this – both left and right – are trying to resuscitate causes and consequences, realities and referents, and recreate an imaginary. But the system deters such efforts from succeeding. Le Pen for instance is ultimately absorbed, as the mainstream integrates and repeats his racist ideas. This analysis could also be applied to various “fundamentalisms” and ethno-nationalist movements today. This kind of resistance is ultimately reactionary, seeking to restore the declining regime of signs. But it can only be understood if its basis in energies of resistance to simulation is recognised. It is because it channels such resistance that it is able to mobilise affective forces. Baudrillard’s analysis is here similar to Agamben’s view that the sovereign gesture is now exercised everywhere because of the rise of indistinction and indeterminacy. The paradox is that the performance of fundamentalism often leads back towards the world of simulation and deterrence. Such movements map symbolic exchange onto the state, restoring some of its reality, but ultimately contributing to the persistence of simulation. Resistance from inside the regime of power is impossible because of deterrence. Baudrillard suggests that it’s now impossible to imagine a power exercised inside the enclosure created by deterrence – except for an implosive power which abolishes the energies preventing other possibilities emerging. He also suggests that the loss of the real is irreversible. Only the total collapse of the terrain of simulation will end it, not a test of reality. A truly effective revolution would have to abolish all the separations – including the separation from death. It cannot involve equality in what is separated – in survival, in social status and so on. The strategy for change is now exacberation, towards a catastrophic end of the system. Baudrillard believes that the resultant death of the social will paradoxically bring about socialism.

## 4

**Text – हिंदी में करो अफीम**

**To Clarify, aff in hindi. The text does not mean only hindi is accepted, rather there should be a diversity in language usage that’s not just english**

**The normalization of normative English leads to an in-group/out-group that drive racial violence**

**Rosa et al 17** Rosa, Jonathan, and Nelson Flores. "Unsettling race and language: Toward a raciolinguistic perspective." Language in society 46.5 (2017): 621-647. (Assistant Professor of Anthropology and Linguistics and Associate Professor in the Educational Linguistics Division)//Elmer

Similar to Bucholtz & Hall's (2005) approach to identity and interaction, we are interested in how processes of raciolinguistic enregisterment emblematize particular linguistic features as authentic signs of racialized models of personhood. This is found not only in sociolinguistic accounts of the features that compose categories such as ‘African American English’ (Green 2002) or ‘Chicano English’ (Fought 2003), but also popular stereotypes and modes of linguistic appropriation such as ‘Mock Spanish’ (Hill 2008), ‘Mock Asian’ (Chun 2004), ‘Hollywood Injun English’ (Meek 2006), and ‘linguistic minstrelsy’ (Bucholtz & Lopez 2011). In each of these cases, minute features of language, including grammatical forms, prosodic patterns, and morphological particles, are emblematized as sets of signs that correspond to racial categories. Crucially, as Meek (2006) demonstrates, these forms need not correspond to empirically verifiable linguistic practices in order to undergo racial emblematization. Moreover, as Lo & Reyes (2009) point out, the imagination of groups such as Asian Americans as lacking a distinctive racialized variety of English analogous to African American English or Chicano English, must be interrogated based on the racial logics that organize stereotypes about and societal positions of different racial groups on the one hand, and perceptions of their language practices on the other. Specifically, Lo & Reyes argue that racial ideologies constructing Asian Americans as model minorities who approximate whiteness are linked to language ideologies constructing Asian Americans as lacking a racially distinctive variety of English. In related work, Chun (2016:81) shows how emblematized Mock Asian forms such as ‘ching-chong’ are located across ‘the important boundary between ‘Oriental talk’ and English’, which sustains Asian Americans alternately as model minorities and forever foreigners. Thus, we must carefully reconsider seemingly ‘distinctive’ and ‘nondistinctive’ language varieties alike, by analyzing the logics that position particular racial groups and linguistic forms in relation to one another. That is, no language variety is objectively distinctive or nondistinctive, but rather comes to be enregistered as such in particular historical, political, and economic circumstances.

**The performance of the 1NC is a form of Code Switching that disrupts English-centered discourses**

**Duan**, Carlina. " The Space Between: An analysis of code-switching within Asian American poetry as strategic poetic device"(English Honors) AND" Here I Go, Torching"(Creative Writing Honors). Diss. 2015. (BA in Honors English from the University of Michigan)//Elmer

In an interview with Women’s Review of Books literary magazine, Hong further discussed the strategic role of translation as a form of linguistic activism within her poetic work. When asked why she does not include translations from Korean to English within her own poetry, Hong said: “I wanted to open up these schisms, to emphasize that memory, the filtering of human experience into poetry, is often fractured and not transparent, especially experiences which have always been bisected and undercut by two languages.” She added, “I think I want to debunk the idea of easy translation—whether it be the idea of literal translation or, as I said before, the translating of one’s experience into poetry” (Hong 2002a, 15). Hong’s intentional decision to leave out English translations in her poetry creates a power dynamic between speaker and reader of the poem. Not only are “easy” translations dismantled and withheld from the reader, but, according to Hong, codeswitching — without translation — also more accurately reflects her personal experiences of cultural and linguistic movement. Hong points out that human experiences and the world of memory, especially for bilingual speakers, are “not transparent” — not captured neatly by one language, but rather, “bisected” by the complexities of belonging to two (or more) languages, implying a movement between multiple spaces. Scholars describe poetic code-switching in this way as a navigation of power. Literary scholar Benzi Zhang argues that code-switching makes apparent different levels of cultural knowledge for speaker and reader: “[T]he insertion of […] foreign words effectively renders Asian sensibilities into English and signifies different positions of cultural agency” (Zhang 131). Building upon this idea of cultural agency, I argue that Hong uses Korean to consciously expose themes of exoticism and racial stereotyping that readers themselves may be (consciously or unconsciously) participating in. As a result, Hong creates agency for her speaker through critiquing culturally appropriative behavior, in addition to an agency in knowledge; Hong’s speaker can access cultural understanding that her readers do not have. Yet, Hong does more than negotiate questions of audience access; she uses code-switching to reflect her speaker’s lived experiences of Korean-American identity, grappling with multiple languages and cultural codes. In “An Introduction to Chinese-American and Japanese American Literatures,” Jeffrey Chan et al. writes, “The minority experience does not yield itself to accurate or complete expression on the white man’s language” (qtd. Zhang 137). As Chang et al. suggest, code-switching embeds itself as a natural part of the “minority experience,” and is documented as such in Hong’s poems. Thus, the poems not only act as social critique of exoticization, but further inhabit the embodied experiences of Korean-American female identities living in the U.S. — which, as Hong reveals, are complicated experiences of rage, agency, celebration, and shifting power dynamics. Critics who have reviewed Hong’s work, such as Jan Clausen, have raised questions about the effect of Hong’s play with translation. Clausen, in a review titled “The poetics of estrangement,” published through the Women’s Review of Books, writes of Hong’s collection Translating Mo’um: “Hong deftly dismantles the romance of language as homeland, with results especially unnerving for the non-Korean-speaking reader” (Clausen 15). According to Clausen, Hong’s work with code-switching subverts traditional notions of the ‘native tongue’ as representative of “homeland,” dismantling what a reader may expect of a Korean American author: that she use Korean language to specifically discuss her ethnic culture as a hyphenated American. In other words, Hong’s code-switches function as intentional poetic protest against the reader’s expectations of the relationship between multilingual text and ethnic identity. As Clausen points out, such readings may anticipate that mother tongue is only introduced to speak about cultural difference or history, rather than used additionally as formal poetic device. In this chapter, I reveal Hong’s awareness of Korean language and code-switching as tools in identity-construction. Rather than allow others to shape her identity for her, she remains dominant in shaping her identity — and her agency — for herself.

## 5

**Interp: Debaters must disclose tournaments on the 2021-2022 NDCA LD wiki under the exact name of the tournament on tabroom for every round at said tournament.**



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**The standard is inclusion - they make debate inaccessible to novices or small schools who compete on the circuit but don’t have access to resources or have knowledge of debate lingo to know the shorthand nicknames for tournaments. Two internal links to accessibility - 1) lets debaters see if you won or lost on tab going for specific strategies or hitting specific strategies, letting debaters adapt around that and b) lets debaters see what speaks judges gave to help them see how good you were at going for x argument. Independently links into reciprocity since if I disclosed one way and you didnt’ you had the advantage in this round. Outweighs - none of their standards matter if debaters can’t access them and means reasonability is uniquely wrong since even a 1% risk of exclusion is bad, you obviously don’t say some level of exclusion is justified**