# Lex Quarters

## 1

**Interp: Debaters must not justify their frameworks by saying it is the most fair or educational. To clarify, no TJFs**

1. **Phil ed--incentivizes the 1ar and 2ar just collapsing to “but we’re the most fair” instead of philosophically justifying their fw which decks phil ed and outweighs--a) phil is 100% uq to LD so its try or die and b) phil is a side constraint since every other standard presumes a philosophical justification for why we should care about it**
2. **Strat Skew – they divide the FW debate into 2 layers which means they will always just collapse for 4 min on the 1 I undercover. Means we don’t discuss either in depth which is worse for clash and gives you a 2:1 skew**

**Paradigm Issues: Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and it teaches portable skills that we use lifelong. Drop the debater - severance kills 1NC strat construction—1AR restart favors aff since it’s 7-6 time skew and they get 2 speeches to my one. No rvi - a) they’ll bait theory and prep it out with aff infinite prep—justifies infinite abuse and chilling us from checking abuse in fear of things like 2ar ethos which lets them recontextualize and always seem right on the issue b) forces the NC to go 7 minutes of theory because nothing else matters--outweighs because its the longest speech and the 2nr can never recover since the nc is our only route to generate offense. Competing interps - a) reasonability’s arbitrary & forces judge intervention especially with 2ar recontextualizations to always sound like the more reasonable debater b) norm setting - we find the best possible norms c) reasonability collapses - you use offense/defense paradigm to evaluate brightlines. Evaluate the debate after the 2nr–we both get 2 speeches so it’s the most reciprocal**

## 2

**Interpretation: The affirmative must defend a prescriptive policy action**

**Resolved means policy action**

**Louisiana State Legislature** (https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx) Ngong

A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

**Standards:**

**1–Ground - all counterplans and disads based on consequences become irrelevant if you don’t defend a policy action e.g. no process counterplans or discussions of real world mechanisms like the OST and Moon Treaty, no politics if there’s no actor, etc--core political discussions are necessary to understand real world legislative processes and spark educational discussions for political awareness, anything else means they can just shift to take out of ground**

**2–Topic Lit - space legislation is a core controversy and ambiguity in law ensures that discussions of law and its limitations create a debatable stasis point. Outweighs - they bracket out core topic controversies worsening clash and preround research is our only predictable stasis for prep–at worst neg on presumption**

Michael **Beaver**, 6-16-**2015**, "Current Space Law Limitations and Its Implications on Outer Space Conflicts," E-International Relations, <https://www.e-ir.info/2015/06/16/current-space-law-limitations-and-its-implications-on-outer-space-conflicts/> //SR

What is the Current Outer Space Legislative Regime (Space Law)? Space law, in a broad sense, can be described as an interdisciplinary bucket of various different types of established law that may govern or apply to man’s interaction or activities dealing with the “outer space” domain (Lyall & Larsen 2013, pg. 2). The need for a set of laws governing mankind’s interactions with outer space began with the launch of the world’s first artificial satellite, the USSR’s Sputnik, in 1957. In reaction to this world-changing event, the United Nations General Assembly issued the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space in 1962. This content of this resolution containing many of the ideas that would be essential to the creation of the five UN Treaties and Agreements on Space Law that would be ratified between 1967 and 1984 (UNOOSA 2015). The first of these five treaties was the Outer Space Treaty, which required nearly 10 years of negotiation following the launch of Sputnik in 1957 to be ratified (Weeks 2012, pg. 47). As the first effort to regulate space activities, this piece of legislation became the cornerstone of future international space law as it codified principles such as the peaceful use of outer space among space faring nations and the extension of the rule of law into outer space (Weeks 2012, pg. 47). The next four treaties signed through 1984 would largely build upon the overarching principles of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and would include topics including the rescue responsibilities for astronauts, liability for the damage caused by space objects, the identification of launched space objects, and the activities allowed by signatories on the Moon and other “celestial bodies” (UNOOSA 2015). Space Laws’ Evolution in Conjunction with Power Politics The development and implementation of laws similar to the major pieces of space legislation previously mentioned closely align with the macro-political interactions that were prevalent during the time period. Due to the fact that all five of the major international space treaties were crafted and signed during the “Cold War”, the United States and the Soviet Union played a major role as the architects of these cornerstones of space law and shaped them in accordance with the geopolitical climate between the superpowers at the time (Blount 2011, pg. 516). The primary goal for both of these countries during this time was security and the launch of Sputnik demonstrated to both superpowers that technology was progressing to the point where international ballistic missiles could deliver a nuclear payload in short order. Hence the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 was born which would allow tensions over the technological developments to ease while still enabling all signatories to pursue their own security interests regarding space activities (Blount 2011, pg. 518). Moving past the initial phase of space legislation into what Dr. Edythe Weeks, in her work titled Outer Space Development, International Relations, and Space Law: A Method of Elucidating Seeds, describes as the Second Epoch of outer space development (1980 to 1991), there is marked shift away from the Realist interactions observed previously due to security concerns to a climate in which space law development on the international level has stalled and domestic space law development is at the forefront. This reflects the global pattern at the time of a shift towards privatization and globalization as the Soviet Union and its Communist influences began to weaken. As a result, domestic policies within each state began to form dictating policy regarding commercial space activities (Weeks 2012, pg. 84). It is important to note that this time of domestic policy creation did not coincide with the development of corresponding international law on the issue of commercialization, which leads to differing views of the appropriate actions for private entities to take in outer space. With the end of the Cold War in 1991 to the present day, there has been very little action in regards to further development or modernization of existing international laws governing outer space activities and development, as there has been a continuation of domestic outer space policy development without much effort taken on the international level. The United States provides a clear example in which domestic policy updates concerning commercial space activities has outpaced its international equivalent when, in 2004, President George W. Bush announced the creation of the New Vision for U.S. Space Exploration Policy which reasserted the interest of private industry by calling for the commercialization of space exploration and “assuring appropriate property rights” are granted to “those who seek to develop space resources and infrastructure” (Weeks 2012, pg. 105). This legislation marks a clear delineation from the previous international agreement the United States is signatory to, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. This lack of action on the part of the international community to update space-related legislation has created the first issue in which this research paper uses to hypothesize the potential of conflict in future outer space activities among different states and private organizations – the limitations of current international legislation in regards to the activities of commercial actors and property rights. The Limitations of Outer Space Legislation As previously discussed, in the current international law regime governing outer space development, there are five main treaties that are active. Unfortunately, the space industry and actors have changed drastically in the last 40 years, leaving existing legislation in dire need of updates that incorporate concerns such as property rights and the activities of commercial corporations. The space industry is quickly entering an uncharted age in which commercial entities have space exploration capabilities that can at least equal those of advanced countries. Examples of these advances include the development of SpaceShipTwo by Virgin Galactic and the efforts by Bigelow Aerospace to develop a commercial orbital space complex out of modular units similar to those used by the International Space Station (Beck 2009, pg. 4). These rapid advances in commercial space technology and the possibilities for exploitation of outer space resources that come with them are occurring at a much more rapid pace than current international space legislation can account for however. A very notable example of this can be seen through close examination of the Outer Space Treaty, widely considered the most accepted piece of international space legislation with 91 signatory nations (U.S. Dept. of State). This issue with this piece of legislation is its largely ambiguous and idealist nature, indicative on the drafters’ intention for future generations to clarify emerging space related issues as the years passed (Johnson 2011, pg. 1500). Review of various articles within the Outer Space Treaty leave much room for interpretation especially regarding the idea of commercial entities undertaking space mining operations. A prime example of this openness to interpretation is the issue that the Outer Space Treaty only prohibits the national appropriation of outer space and the celestial bodies, which leaves open the possibility of an individual or private association lawfully appropriating any part of outer space (Pop 2000, pg. 276). Another example can be seen in Article One of the Outer Space Treaty, which states that outer space is the province of all mankind and that its exploration shall benefit all nations. Language such as this has been interpreted several ways, but it is generally accepted that it confirms the “freedom of use” of space because every state has an equal right to pursue space activities (Johnson 2011, pg. 1501). With this interpretation of Article One combined with the vast increase of space actors since the initial drafting of the Treaty, there exists a potential for conflict as more nations/corporations have access to the possible wealth outer space exploitation could provide. Moving on to Article Two of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits national appropriation of outer space territory, more confusion is injected to the equation. In David Johnson’s article titled Limits on the Giant Leap for Mankind: Legal Ambiguities of Extraterrestrial Resource Extraction, he identifies that when “Read together with Article 1, the prohibition on national appropriation establishes that outer space is a res communis, not subject to the common heritage doctrine, which means that states are free to use the area so long as their activities do not deprive other states of the same right. The OST fails to incorporate all of the common heritage elements: while it provides for non-appropriation, peaceful usage, and some form of benefits sharing, it does not require the establishment of an international body to manage natural resources, nor does it guarantee their preservation for future generations.” (2011, pg. 1502). In this case, the development of celestial bodies is not off limits to development as long as space actors have equal rights (or opportunity) to the asset. Without international oversight, these individual interpretations of insufficient international space law can cause conflict between space actors attempting to gain economic benefit.

## 3

**Ilaw collapses to particularism–the idea that ethics are based on context and cannot bring universal statements**

**1–Presumes a particular context to apply ilaw**

**2–ilaw is flexible which and provides a framework for particular countries to domestically apply conceding it’s authority**

**3–ilaw is constantly adapting to new circumstances which proves it must not be universal but contextual**

**I’ll contend the lack of a universal obligation to the aff. Negate:**

1. **Conext is too significant--every private entity has different intents and each part of outer space is different with several ways to appropriate it each with different implications e.g. colonization and militarization--independently negates under their framework too because there may always be an unforeseen circumstance in which the aff is worse under their framework**
2. **Marking space as property is key to describing particular parts of space to particular actors rather than homogenizing it all as outer space writ large**

## 4

**CP: The Committee on the Peaceful use of Outer Space ought to establish an application system of property rights on celestial bodies granted upon the conditions listed in Steffen**

**Steffen 21** [Olaf Steffen, Olaf is a scientist at the Institute of Composite Structures and Adaptive Sytems at the German Aerospace Center. 12-2-2021, "Explore to Exploit: A Data-Centred Approach to Space Mining Regulation," Institute of Composite Structures and Adaptive Systems, German Aerospace Center, [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964621000515 accessed 12/12/21](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964621000515%20accessed%2012/12/21)] Adam

4. The data-centred approach to space mining regulation 4.1. Core description of the regulatory regime and mining rights acquisition process The data gathered in the exploration of a [celestial body](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/astronomical-systems) is not only of value for space mining companies for informing them whether, where and how to exploit resources from the body in question, but also for science. The irretrievability of information relating to the solar system contained in the body that will be lost during resource exploitation carries a value for humanity and future generations and can thus be assigned the characteristic of a common heritage for all mankind as invoked in the Moon Agreement. This characteristic makes exploration data an exceptional and unique candidate for use in a mechanism for acquiring mining rights because its preservation is of public interest and its disclosure in exchange for exclusive mining rights does not place any additional burden on the mining company. The following principles would form the cornerstones of the proposed regulatory regime and rights acquisition mechanism based on exploration data: Without preconditions, no entity has a right to mine the resources of a celestial body. An international regulatory body administers the existing rights of companies for mining a specific celestial body. Mining rights to such bodies can be applied for from this international regulatory body, with applications made public. The application expires after a pre-set period. Mining rights are granted on the provision and disclosure of exploration data on the celestial body within the pre-set period, proposedly gathered in situ, characterising this body and its resources in a pre-defined manner. The explorer's mining right to the resources of the celestial body is published by the regulatory body in a mining rights grant. The data concerning the celestial body are made public as part of the rights grant within the domain of all participating members of the regulatory regime. The exclusive mining rights to any specific body are tradeable. The scope of the regulatory body with respect to the granting of mining rights is not revenue-oriented. The international regulatory body would thus act as a curator of a rights register and an attached database of exploration data. The concept is superficially comparable to patent law, where exclusive rights are granted following the disclosure of an invention to incentivise the efforts made in the development process. In the following section, the characteristics of such a regulatory regime are further discussed with respect to the formation of [monopolies](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/monopolies), market dynamics, conflict avoidance, inclusivity towards less developed countries and the viability of implementation. 4.2. Discussion and means of implementation The proposed regulatory mechanism has advantages both from a business/investor and society perspective. First, it prevents already highly capitalised companies from acquiring exploitation rights in bulk to deny competitors those objects that are easiest to exploit or most valuable, which would otherwise be possible in any kind of pay-for-right mechanism and could result in preventing market access to smaller, emerging companies. Thus, early monopoly formation can be avoided. The use of data disclosure for the granting of mining rights ensures the scientific community has access to this invaluable source of information. In this way, space mining prospecting missions can lead to a boost in research on small celestial bodies at a speed unmatchable by pure government/agency funded science probes. This usefulness to the scientific community could lead to sustained partnerships between prospecting companies and scientific institutions and could even provide a source of funding for the companies through R&D grants and public-private partnerships. The results of the exploration efforts contribute to research on the formation of planets and the history of the solar system and provide valuable insight for space defence against asteroids. The transition of exploration from a tailored mission profile with a purpose-built spacecraft to a standard task in space flight would also lead to a cost reduction of the respective exploration spacecraft through [economies of scale](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/economies-of-scale). This describes the very benefits Elvis [[24](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964621000515#bib24)] and Crawford [[25](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964621000515#bib25)] imagined as possible effects of a space economy. Thus, there is an immediate return for society from the exploitation rights grant. It also reconciles the adverse interests of space development and [space science](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/space-sciences) as laid out by Schwartz [[26](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964621000515#bib26)]. It ensures that, by exploitation, information contained in celestial bodies is not lost for future generations.The application period should not be set in a manner that creates a situation that can be abused through the potential for stockpiling inventory rights. Rather, it is intended to prevent conflict in the phase before exploration data gathered by a mission, as a prerequisite to the mining rights grant, is available. In other words, only one exploration effort at a time can be permitted for a specific body. The time frame between the application and the granting of mining rights (meaning: availability of the required exploration data set) should be tight and should only consider necessary exploration time on site, transit time and possibly a reasonable launch preparation and data processing markup. These contributors to the application period make it clear that the time frame could be dynamic and individualistic, depending on the exploration target (transit time and duration of exploration) and the technology of the exploration probe (transit time). After the expiration of the application period, applications for the exploration target would again be permissible. To prevent the previously mentioned stockpiling of inventory rights, credible proof of an imminent exploration intention would need to be part of the application process, for example, a fixed launch contract or the advanced build status of the exploration probe. Such a mechanism would not contradict the statement in the OST that outer space shall be free for both exploration and scientific investigation. Applications would not apply to purely scientific exploration. An application would only be necessary as a prerequisite for mining. Even resource prospecting could take place without an application (for whatever reason), with a subsequent application comprising in situ data already gathered. For such cases, the application process would need to provide a short period for objections to enable the secretive explorer to make their efforts public. The publication of the application for the mining rights, which is nothing more than a statement of intention to explore, thus provides a strong measure for avoiding conflict. The transparency of where exploration spacecraft are located and, at a later stage, where mining activities take place, provides additional benefits for the sustainable use of space, trust building and deterrence against malign misuse of mining technology. Involuntary spacecraft collisions of competitors in deep space are prevented by the reduction of exploration efforts at the same destination through the application for mining rights by one applicant at a time. As pointed out by Newman and Williamson [[20](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964621000515#bib20)], this is relevant because space debris does not de-orbit in deep space as in the case of LEO. Deep space may be vast, but the velocities involved mean that small debris particles are no less dangerous. Considering NEO mining with fleets of small spacecraft, malfunctions and/or destructive events could create debris clouds crossing Earth's orbit around the sun on a regular basis, presenting another danger to satellites in Earth's own orbit. Thus, by effectively preventing the collision of two spacecraft, one source of debris creation can be mitigated through this regulation mechanism. With respect to Deudney's [[11](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964621000515#bib11)] scepticism of asteroid mining and the dual-use character of technology to manipulate orbits of celestial bodies, it has to be stated that this potential is truly inherent to asteroid mining. An asteroid redirect mission for scientific purposes was pursued by NASA [[49](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964621000515#bib49)] before reorientation towards a manned lunar mission. In one way or another, each type of asteroid mining will require the delivery of the targeted resource to a destination via a comparable technology as formerly envisioned by NASA, be it as a raw material or a useable resource processed in situ, even if this is not necessarily done through redirecting the whole asteroid and placing it in a lunar orbit. However, to be misused as a weapon, space mined resources would have to surpass a certain mass threshold to survive atmospheric entry at the target. This seems unfeasible for currently discussed mining concepts using small-scale spacecraft as described in this article. Redirecting larger masses or whole asteroids would require far more powerful mining vessels or small amounts of thrust over long periods of time. The continuous, (for a mining activity) untypical change in the orbit of an asteroid would make a redirect attempt with hostile intent easily identifiable, effectively deterring such an activity in the first place by ensuring the identification of the aggressor long before the projectile hits its target. The proposed database would provide a catalogue of asteroids with exploration and mining activities in place that should be tracked more closely because of their interaction with spacecraft. This would, in fact, be necessary per se as a precaution to avoid catastrophic mishaps, such as the accidental change of a NEO's orbit to intercept Earth by changing its mass through mining.

**Solves the aff–ilaw is constantly being amended–we amend it to make appropriation legal**

## 5

**CP: The appropriation of outer space is unjust except in the instance of geostationary satellites**

**It’s appropriation**

**Thornburg 18** [Matthew Thornburg, Associate Professor of History, Political Science, and Philosophy at the University of South Carolina Aiken with a PhD in Political Science from GMU, 2018, “Are the Non-appropriation Principle and the Current Regulatory Regime Governing Geostationary Orbit Equitable for All of Earth’s States?,” Michigan Journal of International Law, http://www.mjilonline.org/are-the-non-appropriation-principle-and-the-current-regulatory-regime-governing-geostationary-orbit-equitable-for-all-of-earths-states/]/Kankee

As the law currently stands, geostationary orbit – a constant orbital position above Earth’s equator – is governed by the OST and is therefore subject to the treaty’s attendant ban on national appropriation. Spaces, or slots, in geostationary orbit[2] are desired because they are exceedingly convenient for communicating with earth. They are highly limited and as a consequence, highly valuable. Moreover, these spaces are allotted on a first-come-first-served basis[3] making them virtually unattainable by less scientifically and economically advanced states[4], or those that are just plain late to the game. The ban on national appropriation is enumerated in the Second Article of the OST, which states: “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by other means.”[5] The geostationary orbital position is generally agreed upon by experts[6] as part of “outer space” and consequently, forbidden from appropriation. The OST is clear in prohibiting claims of sovereignty, but the subsequent clauses leave much to interpretation when considering what other acts constitute “national appropriation.” In other words, the question surrounding geostationary orbital slots is “whether the continued exclusive occupation by a geostationary satellite of the same physical area is a violation of the ban on national appropriation”[7] by use, occupation, or other means. In his article, Major Legal Issues Arising from the Use of the Geostationary Orbit, Stephen Gorove says that, “it is not clear that a satellite in geostationary orbit would be able to maintain its exact position and occupy the same area over a period of time…” so as to “appropriate” and thus violate Article II of the OST. The analysis should not turn on whether the satellites in geostationary orbit maintain their exact position. Instead, it is the continual use of the orbital slot that should be examined in light of the OST prohibition. The average lifespan of a geostationary satellite is 15-20 years,[8] effectively shutting out any other state’s use of that slot for at least that long. A time frame of this nature seems to be the exact type of “use or occupation” the treaty seeks to foreclose because of the consequent unequal access to the use of space, and the consequent potential to cement the economic interests of certain nations and firms. Compounding this concern is the fact that operators of the geostationary satellites need only refile with the International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”) to “renew” a slot and replace old satellites with new ones.[9] Essentially, such operators keep the orbital slot indefinitely. In light of the OST – a treaty dominated by goals of fair and equitable use and access to space – endless use of these valuable slots should rise to the level of national appropriation by means of use, occupation, or other means.

**Satellites are key to ethics–it’s key to ethical responsibility and accountability under any framework. Not consequentialist but about the intrinsic use of these satellites**

Steven **Livingston**, 6-23-**2016**, "Satellite imagery augments power and responsibility of human rights groups," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/06/23/satellite-imagery-augments-power-and-responsibility-of-human-rights-groups/> //SR

In recent years, commercial remote sensing satellites have played a key role in dozens of human rights and war crimes investigations. They’ve been used to spot mass graves in Burundi, verify the destruction of two towns in northern Nigeria by Boko Haram, and reveal the massacre of at least 350 people by the Nigerian army. When the Kremlin denied involvement in the fighting in Ukraine in September 2014, satellite imagery and testimony gathered by Amnesty International (AI) indicated the Kremlin’s assertion was incorrect. And in April, Human Rights Watch (HRW) used satellites to document military and police abuses in Venezuela. In the last decade, AI and HRW, sometimes in partnership with the American Association for the Advancement of Science, have produced dozens of reports based on the analysis of commercial satellite imagery. One group, Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP), was built around the use of commercial remote sensing technology. What are the political and policy implications of the use of satellite technology by human rights organizations? First, they allow human rights NGOs to monitor places that are otherwise too distant or too dangerous to reach by conventional means. Secondly, remote sensing introduces a timeline into investigations. Because of the enormous stores of geospatial data found in archives, analysts can essentially look back in time in search of evidence. DigitalGlobe’s WorldView-3 satellite collects 1,200,000 km2 of images of the earth each day, and it is only one of the dozens of high-resolution satellites in orbit, with more coming online each year. As new satellites shrink the time between overflights, the ability to observe events is growing. Third, human rights NGOs are now in the business of anticipating events. With enough imagery over time, patterns emerge that allow for prediction. This offers the tantalizing possibility of NGO interventions in events by releasing statements and images as a warning to potential aggressors that they are being observed. While all three outcomes are important, it is perhaps the third one that raises the greatest ethical and policy challenges. Though often debated and renegotiated, a key component of AI’s mission since its founding in 1961 is to bear witness. Professor Stephen Hopgood notes that bearing witness involves an adherence to rules and procedures that seek to “construct in practical terms the kind of space – above, beyond, outside the world – in which the idea of objective morality, of a kind of universal truth, could be anchored”. It involves taking a principled but detached position. The availability of god-like views from the heavens certainly allows AI to stand aloof – literally, “above, beyond, outside the world.” Yet with satellites, AI and other groups that make use of them now have a potent form of agency to intervene indirectly in events. As the adage says, knowledge is power. As an AI analysts told me recently, “The real purpose (of the 2007 Eyes on Darfur project) was a deterrent effect.” Eyes on Darfur was one of AI’s first major remote sensing projects. Some might argue that AI has taken a step beyond bearing witness: it is using its moral authority and its technical prowess to alter events on the ground. A counter to this assertion would point out that human rights organizations have always used the tools available to them to alter the behavior of war criminals and human rights abusers. The “boomerang model” of human rights advocacy, developed by political scientists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, underscores the idea that information collected by human rights NGOs is intended to pressure abusers of rights into better compliance with broadly shared norms. In this respect, there is a direct line from writing an open letter to publishing a satellite image. Yet with satellites the burdens are greater. Getting it wrong, interpreting an image incorrectly or releasing information that undermines the wellbeing of populations constitutes an entirely different set of moral and ethical considerations. The use of satellite imagery brings human rights NGOs closer to sharing responsibility for rapidly unfolding events with the players themselves. With greater agency comes greater moral responsibility.

**Solves the aff–geoSATs are legal**

Louis De Gouyon **Matignon, 2019**, "Orbital slots and space congestion," Space Legal Issues, <https://www.spacelegalissues.com/orbital-slots-and-space-congestion/> //SR

Near-Earth space is formed of different orbital layers. Terrestrial orbits are limited common resources and inherently repugnant to any appropriation: they are not property in the sense of law. Orbits and frequencies are res communis (a Latin term derived from Roman law that preceded today’s concepts of the commons and common heritage of mankind; it has relevance in international law and common law). It’s the first-come, first-served principle that applies to orbital positioning, which without any formal acquisition of sovereignty, records a promptness behaviour to which it grants an exclusive grabbing effect of the space concerned. Geostationary orbit is a limited but permanent resource: this de facto appropriation by the first-comers – the developed countries – of the orbit and the frequencies is protected by Space Law and the International Telecommunications Law. The challenge by developing countries of grabbing these resources is therefore unjustified on the basis of existing law. Denying new entrants geostationary-access or making access more difficult does not constitute appropriation; it simply results from the traditional system of distribution of access rights. The practice of developed States is based on free access and priority given to the first satellites placed in geostationary orbit.

**PICs negate–they prove a competing general principle and are good to test specific parts of the aff in depth–they chose their advocacy so they should defend all of it– most logical and outweighs cuz it’s a side constraint to all arguments**