# 1NC Cal R3

## 1

**Interp: The affirmative must defend outer space as a general principle, not specify a specific part of space**

**Noncount nouns like outer space are generic without a determiner**

**Byrd** [“Generic Meaning,” Georgia State University, Transcript of lecture given by Pat Byrd, Department of Applied Linguistics & ESL]

Here are some things that we do know about these generic noun phrase types when they are used in context:1. The + singular: The computer has changed modern life This form is considered more formal than the others--and is not as likely to be used in conversation as the plural noun: Computers have changed modern life. Master (1987) found in the samp.le that he analyzed that this form with the was often used to introduce at topic--and came at the beginning of a paragraph and in introductions and conclusions.2. Zero + plural: Computers are machines. Computers have changed modern life. Probably the most common form for a generalization. It can be used in all contexts--including both conversation (Basketball players make too much money) and academic writing (Organisms as diverse as humans and squid share many biological processes). Perhaps used more in the hard sciences and social sciences than in the humanities. 3. A + singular: A computer is a machine. This generic structure is used to refer to individual instances of a whole group and is used to classify whatever is being discussed.The form is often used for definitions of terms. It is also often used to explain occupations. My sister is a newspaper reporter. I am a teacher. Use is limited to these "classifying" contexts. Notice that this form can't always be subtituted for the other: \*Life has been changed by a computer. \*A computer has changed modern life. 4. Zero + noncount: Life has been changed by the computer. The most basic meaning and use of noncount nouns is generic--they are fundamentally about a very abstract level of meaning. Thus, the most common use of noncount nouns is this use with no article for generic meaning. Zero Article and Generic Meaning: Most nouns without articles have generic meaning. Two types are involved.1. Zero + plural: Computers are machines. Computers have changed modern life.2. Zero + noncount: Life has been changed by the computer.

**1–Precision outweighs - anything outside the res is arbitrary and unpredictable because the topic determines prep, not being bound by it lets them jettison any word.**

**2–Limits and Ground - decimates clash by exploding limits to infinite parts of infinite outer space, each with different astrological implications, political conditions, and economic benefits which makes contesting the aff with unifying neg ground impossible and means they can always pick the most aff skewed slice of the res.**

**3–TVA – read your aff as an advantage under whole res – we still get your content education and sufficient aff ground by switching up aff advantages, frameworks, implementation, etc. But, 1ar theory checks pics and they incentivize more of them cuz nothing but cheaty generics link**

## 2

**​​Interpretation: Outer space consists of regions outside the atmospheres of celestial bodies**

**Tanabe 19** [(Rosie, updater and writer at NWE) “Outer space,” New World Encyclopedia, 1/8/2019] <https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Outer_space> JL

Outer space (often called space) consists of the relatively empty regions of the universe outside the [atmospheres](https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Atmosphere) of celestial bodies. *Outer* space is used to distinguish it from airspace and terrestrial locations. There is no clear boundary between [Earth's atmosphere](https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Earth%27s_atmosphere) and space, as the [density](https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Density) of the atmosphere gradually decreases as the altitude increases.

**Violation: Mars has an atmosphere**

**Wikipedia n/d** <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atmosphere_of_Mars> //SR

The atmosphere of Mars is the layer of gases surrounding Mars. It is primarily composed of carbon dioxide (95%), molecular nitrogen (2.8%) and argon (2%).[3] It also contains trace levels of water vapor, oxygen, carbon monoxide, hydrogen and noble gases.[3][5][2] The atmosphere of Mars is much thinner than Earth's. The average surface pressure is only about 610 pascals (0.088 psi) which is less than 1% of the Earth's value.[2] The currently thin Martian atmosphere prohibits the existence of liquid water at the surface of Mars, but many studies suggest that the Martian atmosphere was much thicker in the past.[4] The higher density during spring and fall is reduced by 25% during the winter when carbon dioxide partly freezes at the pole caps.[6] The highest atmospheric density on Mars is equal to the density found 35 km (22 mi) above the Earth's surface and is ~0.020 kg/m3.[7] The atmosphere of Mars has been losing mass to space since the planet formed, and the leakage of gases still continues today.[4][8][9]

**Vote neg for limits and ground– their interpretation means that they allow for the elimination of private appropriation on earth, asteroids, galaxies, comets, mars etc–each of which are vastly different e.g. a mars lunar heritage aff vs an asteroid mining aff and deck core neg generics like the property rights NC critiquing the ownership of nothingness or the geo satellites/mega constellations pic since those aren’t in the atmosphere but just located in space**

## 3

**Interpretation: Affirmatives must not defend the implementation of a policy action**

**Violation: They aren’t just describing why appropriation is unjust, but prescribing a policy action we should take**

**1–Precision–res is asking if appropriation is unjust–that’s descriptive**

**Merriam Webster n/d** <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is> //SR

present tense third-person singular of BE

**2–Limits and Ground–makes the aff extra T–the premise that appropriation is unjust can lead to infinite different conclusions of how to resolve that and let them pick the most obscure implementation to spike neg ground and go outside the res–it’s about what their model justifies**

**DTD–T indicts the whole aff.**

**No rvi–you shouldn’t win for being T and incentivizes baiting T just to beat it back with infinite prep while chilling T since you’ll out frame us and auto-win on 2ar ethos every round.**

**Competing interps–reasonability is arbitrary and causes a race to the bottom–finding the best model of debate is key to preserve the most substantive norms in the long terms but no frivolous race to the top since limited words in the res mean limited interps**

**T before 1ar theory–NC abuse was reactive and only 2 months to discuss T whereas we can discuss 1ar theory whenever**

## 4

**Ethics are a priori–**

**1–Separateness–if space is based on experience, it must be based on something independent of it–to interpret experience via experience is circular–we need a priori thoughts to construct proper conceptions of how to interpret experience**

**2–Is/Ought Gap–experience only describes the world but not that it should be that way so only the noumenal can derive what we should do**

**The meta ethic is practical reason–**

**1–Regress–can always ask why something matters to infinity to opt out–practical reason solves since to ask for a reason presumes a reason**

**2–Action theory–each action can be broken down into infinite sub-actions–only reason unifies them because the action is unified by our intent and what we willed through reason**

**That justifies universalizability–there is no a priori distinction between each reasoner, the same way 2+2 can’t be 4 for you but 5 for me–if I can do something, any other reasoner is morally the same so they should also be able to do it, otherwise it triggers a contradiction**

**The standard is consistency with a categorical imperative–other theories presuppose value in agents–that requires us to be ends in ourselves and worthy of even having agency / valuing pleasure in the first place**

**Now negate–prohibiting colonization violates our freedom to use our property like rocket fuel, etc in Mars which is a violation of rights–undermines reason**

**Feser 1**, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

V. Some Implications If what I have argued so far is correct, then the way is opened to the following revised case for strongly libertarian Lockean-Nozickian prop-erty rights: We are self-owners, having full property rights to our body parts, powers, talents, energies, etc. As self-owners, we also have a right, given the SOP, not to have our self-owned powers nullified —we have the right, that is, to act within the extra-personal world and thus to acquire rights to extra-personal objects that the use of our self-owned powers requires.39 This might involve the buying or leasing of certain rights or bundles of rights and, correspondingly, the acquiring of lesser or greater degrees of ownership of parts of the external world, but as long as one is able to exercise one’s powers to some degree and is not rendered incapable of acting within that world, the SOP is satisfied. In any case, such rights can only be traded after they are first established by initial acquisition. In initially acquiring a resource, an agent does no one an injustice (it was unowned, after all). Furthermore, [they] has mixed [their] labor with the resource, significantly altering it and/or bringing it under his control, and is himself solely responsible for whatever value or utility the resource has come to have. Thus, [they] has a presumptive right to it, and, if his control and/or alteration (and thus acquisition) of it is (more or less) complete, his own- ership is accordingly (more or less) full. The system of strong private property rights that follows from the acts of initial acquisition performed by countless such agents results, as a matter of empirical fact, in a market economy that inevitably and dramatically increases the number of resources available for use by individuals, and these benefited individuals include those who come along long after initial acquisition has taken place. (Indeed, it especially includes these latecomers, given that they were able to avoid the hard work of being the first to “tame the land” and draw out the value of raw materials.)40 The SOP is thus, in fact, rarely, if ever, violated. The upshot is that a system of Lockean-Nozickian private property rights is morally justified, with a strong presumption against tampering with exist- ing property titles in general. In any case, there is a strong presumption against any general egalitarian redistribution of wealth, and no case what- soever to be made for such redistribution from the general theory of prop- erty just sketched, purged as it is of the Lockean proviso, with all the egalitarian mischief-making the proviso has made possible.

**Appropriation can never be unjust–injustice requires someone wronged, but initial acquisition doesn’t violate any entity’s rights–there’s no owner of space yet**

**Feser 2**, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

There is a serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick, however. It is just this: There is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources; therefore, there is no case to be made for redistributive taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition. This is, to be sure, a bold claim. Moreover, in making it, I contradict not only Nozick’s critics, but Nozick himself, who clearly thinks it is at least possible for there to be injustices in acquisition, whether or not there have in fact been any (or, more realistically, whether or not there have been enough such injustices to justify continual redistributive taxation for the purposes of rectifying them). But here is a case where Nozick has, I think, been too generous to the other side. Rather than attempt —unsatisfactorily, in the view of his critics—to meet the challenge to show that initial acquisition has not in general been unjust, he ought instead to have insisted that there is no such challenge to be met in the first place. Giving what I shall call “the basic argument” for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves unexplained some widespread intu- itions to the effect that certain specific instances of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the application of a Lockean proviso, or are otherwise problematic. (A “Lockean proviso,” of course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these acquisitions do not leave “enough and as good” in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with the argument of Section II. Section IV completes the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acqui- sition and use of property. Section V shows how the results of the previ- ous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and considers some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for our under- standing of Nozick’s principles of transfer and rectification. II. The Basic Argument The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of justice, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example. Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisi- tion of R, B would have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7

## 5

**Reforms spurred by popular backlash are critical to Russian growth and coming now, but the plan stops them by giving Putin a foreign policy win that secures legitimacy**

Andrew **Wood 19**, Associate Fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program of Chatham House, Former British Ambassador to Belgrade and Moscow, “Putinist Rule Minus Putin?”, The American Interest, 7/29/2019, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2019/07/29/putinist-rule-minus-putin/

The Russian tradition of top-down rule has a long history, but Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was not condemned to follow it over the past couple of decades. It was Putin who made the crucial decision to reinforce it further on his return to the Kremlin in 2012 by choosing repression over the cautious economic reforms that had been mooted in the Medvedev presidential interlude. He it was who seized Crimea in 2014 and invaded eastern Ukraine. He has overseen the decline in the Russian economy since 2008 and the continuing rise in corruption that has gone along with it. He is responsible for the servility of the Duma and the courts to the diktat of the executive branch, and for the predatory conduct of Russia’s various enforcement agencies. The questions for Russia now are how, and whether, present political structures can in due course cope without Putin. “Putinism” is a convenient shorthand for describing the way Russia is ruled, but that is the result of a personalized process intended to enforce the unity of the Russian state and the obligation of its citizens to obey its requirements, not a construct defined in detail from the start. Its principal achievement has been that it has both protected and enhanced the role of the center. Putin’s re-election as President in 2018 confirmed authoritarianism as a process in continuing advance, its overriding purpose being to retain power in the interests of those already wielding it, and bound by loyalty to its central figure, at present Putin. Putin does not of course literally rule alone. He cannot in the nature of things decide everything in Russia by himself. He could not, even if he wished it, prevent those holding some degree of power at any level from using it to their cumulative advantage without regard to the law, or to what most outsiders would see as common decency, for that matter. He is most immediately dependent on the support of a narrowing set of long-term collaborators, whether political-, security-, or business-related, whose interests are also dependent on the present disorder of things, together with the mutual and complicit trust among those collaborators essential to its preservation. Putin is the linchpin that holds them together. Hang together or hang separately is the English language proverb. There is no doubt a Russian one. Stability? Putin’s present term ends in May 2024. He cannot under Russia’s Constitution stand again that year. But the personalized and repressive logic of Putinism implies that a way to allow him to remain in command must nevertheless be found. As Grigory Yavlinsky rightly put it in his updated and newly translated study of what he calls peripheral authoritarianism, in Russia and in other states similarly governed: signs have become more pronounced that Russia’s autocracy is developing along the lines of long-term usurpation of power by a very close circle of people that see politics in terms of highly personal power play rather than as a mechanism to ensure the long-term survival of Russian statehood. Yavlinsky concludes that the spectrum of remaining opportunities for change has narrowed, at least for the next decade. If that proves to be so, preserving a lasting claim to continuing legitimacy without addressing Russia’s external or internal problems would in effect, if it succeeded, be to freeze those problems in place. The shadow of unknown and so far unpredictable change in 2024 has now fed into a shift in public attitudes since Putin’s re-election in 2018. Putin himself has become somewhat tarnished, losing in the process his image of being beyond politics, and of being Russia’s necessary savior. Putin is now held personally responsible for domestic problems that he could once deflect onto his Prime Minister’s shoulders. The argument that the Kremlin is the defender of “traditional values” on behalf of the Russian people has lost some of its force. The perception that Russia’s leaders are concerned for their own interests and those of their privileged dependents, rather than those of Russia’s ordinary citizens, is becoming the norm. Polls show that about 27-30 percent of the population are now ready, or at least say they are ready, to take part in street protests. These are becoming more common, not least outside Moscow, provoked for the most part by local issues and the misdeeds of local or regional office holders. But they all nevertheless reflect to some degree or another on the standing of the Kremlin. None of this is to suggest that widespread public disturbance is imminent. What triggers that in any society is always unpredictable. There are, moreover, neither widely accepted ideas for better government nor public figures of sufficient standing to articulate them in Russia, for now at least, around whom such disturbances might crystallize on a nation-wide scale. But the existing and potentially developing shift in public attitudes does indicate that, if Putin chooses to stay in effective power after 2024, then continuity in the Kremlin will be dependent on popular resignation rather than enthusiasm. Russia’s economic prospects up to and beyond 2024 are poor, and neither Putin nor his authoritarian minded supporters have serious proposals for improving them. The “National Projects” he has put forward are similar in principle to others that have been tried in vain before. Assertions that innovative investment in the defense sector will pay off in promoting diversity across the economy as a whole have proved false. Per capita income has declined over the past five years and may not easily recover. Putin and his colleagues can no longer rely, as the Kremlin did ten or more years ago, on growing income from natural resources, however ill-managed, to bolster its popular appeal and to pay off its political allies. Around three-quarters of Russia’s GDP is by now state owned, meaning run by Putin sanctioned beneficiaries. Significant capital flight has continued and is a clear marker of distrust of the authorities. So too is the less widely noted emigration of well educated and enterprising Russians to the Western democracies since 2000, whose rate rose significantly after Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012. The total over the past 19 years is estimated to be 1.6–2 million. The Internal Backstop Economic difficulties, a sense that Putinism has exhausted its political capital and resentment at the enforcement of top down control may perhaps make a further Putin term after 2024 troublesome to implement without some sort of domestic or foreign event to make it seem necessary. There are however significant numbers of Russians able to benefit from the complexities of the present state of affairs, or unsettled enough at the thought of Putin going without a clear and reasonably trusted successor in prospect to make Putin’s continuance in effective control seem by 2023 both inevitable and acceptable. Continued stagnation from 2024 on and uncertain relations with the outside world would, on the other hand, seem likely to fuel more and more discontent. There is at present no sign of an aging Putin or his collaborators having anything fresh to offer on his home front, either before or after 2024. But he has a telling reserve of force at his disposal for the purpose of ensuring the survival of the regime in case of domestic violence. The National Guard is comparable in numbers to the Russian Armed Forces. Its declared purpose is to ensure public order, meaning in practice keeping Russian citizens in order by force, however violent. There are other internal agencies with similar powers. The extent of the network expresses ruthlessness but is also a mark of fear within the regime as to the committed loyalty of the Russian people in general. The same is true of the persistent effort made by Kremlin supporters to confine public discussion to their approved agenda of how Russia should develop, politically, economically or with regard to the rest of the world. The effect is that Russia at present exists in a state of limbo, with its governing authorities incapable of addressing the issues of most importance to its citizens, its domestic concerns. The large share of the Russian budget devoted to domestic and international security gets in the way, along with the interest of privileged state contractors in using every opportunity to pursue and price projects designed to fill their pockets rather than benefit the public as a whole. Great Power? Stephen Kotkin records in his magisterial history of the Stalin years that, by 1937, “Perceived security imperatives and a need for absolute unity once again turned the quest in Russia to build a strong state into personal rule.” Stalin has of course been restored to eminent repute in Russia under Putin, and Putin has been influenced by Stalin’s train of thought, as well as borrowing his language from time to time. But I do not quote Kotkin to show that Putin is a Stalin clone, merely to point to the fact that Putin’s aim from the beginning has been, like Stalin’s and others’ before him, to build a strong state in Russia by means of a “vertical of power,” and that the end result is, once again, personal rule. Security imperatives, as Putin would see them, have been a driving force, with the need for absolute unity in meeting them as the inescapable corollary. Like Stalin before him, Putin does not draw a distinction between what he sees as threatening at home or abroad. The two shade into one another. The tragedy of Beslan in September 2004, for instance, was by any normal criteria an internal affair, with the school seized by Chechen terrorists and the threat resolved with brutal slaughter by Russian forces. For Putin, it was also an attempt by unspecified foreign forces to seize a “juicy piece” of Russian territory, and a reason to abolish the autonomous standing of Russia’s Governors. He and his colleagues saw the 2004-05 Orange Revolution in Ukraine not as an internal crisis in that state, but as the result of foreign interference directed at Russia. He responded at home with increasingly stringent measures against non-governmental organizations in Russia, starting with any that had any form of external financial aid and the introduction and extension of measures directed against “extremism.” He argued that the street protests of 2011-12 were provoked and planned by Hillary Clinton. And so on, to the need to protect Fortress Russia today from internal Fifth Columnists and from hostile foreign powers determined to destroy it. There are of course complexities in this process of hardening attitudes in official Russia as to its relationship with its own people, with its ex-Soviet neighbors, with former members of the Warsaw Pact, and with the West in general over the Putin years, but one strain is constant: Nothing is ever Russia’s fault. Moscow is always sinned against. Putin’s historic mission is to restore his country’s status as a great power, with the right to establish and protect its hegemony over its neighbors. Those neighbors have no right to object, let alone to look to outside powers to support their independence. Putin and his colleagues have public support in Russia for such a stance, as did their tsarist predecessors in analogous circumstances. But the Russian public would at the same time by now prefer there to be a less fraught relationship with the rest of Europe, and the United States too. The euphoria provoked by the Kremlin’s bloodless seizure of Crimea in 2014 has faded. The idea that their country has a special mission to defend itself, and that this has to be done by cowing its neighbors into effective submission, is still there as a general assumption, but not as an immediate aspiration.

**The plan masks the need for economic modernization**

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Today, the Russian Federation is a major actor in space and outer space governance. Its presence in space is second only to that of the US. Meanwhile, the challenges of keeping outer space ‘secure’ is growing in importance and complexity in the current context of globalisation, rapid technological change, and the increasing access to space for state and non-state actors. Russia considers outer space as a strategic region to enhance its military capabilities on earth, provide intelligence and communication functions, and achieve international status and prestige as a space power. It is sensitive to US strategy and actions and has developed counter-space technologies (e.g. electronic weapons that can jam satellites) to provide Russia with an asymmetrical edge to offset US military advantages. However, Russia’s outer space rhetoric and policy are also driven by domestic and identity issues. Outer space strategy is an instrument through which Russia pursues its goal to be a ‘great power’ and to shape the international system more closely to the new multipolar world as it sees it. It may also bring Russia economic benefits and mask internal challenges. President Vladimir Putin has taken both symmetric and asymmetric actions in outer space and increased Russia’s investment in new technologies (satellites, electronic warfare,1 strategic offensive weapon, etc.) and simultaneously pursued diplomatic initiatives to control weapons in space. During the Cold War, despite military tensions and serious concern about a possible arms race in outer space, Russia and the US negotiated internationally binding agreements related to the governance of space activities. Today, both powers are again warning of a new arms race in outer space while continuing to strengthen the roles of their militaries in the field. Since 2000, Russia has actively pursued both binding laws and non-binding norms to ban and control weapons in outer space and has advocated for non-binding, voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs). Sometimes it has done this in cooperation with other states, sometimes in opposition to them. This diplomatic endeavour may seem somewhat at odds with Russia’s growing militarisation; however, the dual role on outer space fits well within Russia’s overall foreign and security strategy which is both reactive to US policy and simultaneously pro the United Nations (UN) and consensus-based multilateral negotiations. Russia is strengthening its comprehensive power, including military, diplomatic and normative global influence, in order to make its voice heard on the international stage. Russia’s diplomatic activism is that of an aspirational great power, but it also reflects the limits of its current economic and military weaknesses. International negotiations enable Russia to be recognised as a key player in global affairs, while also benefiting from an opportunity to highlight the US/West’s declining influence and the rise of a multipolar world. This chapter examines why outer space is so important for Russia. Then, it shows how and why the Russian government’s outer space strategy and capabilities have evolved since the 1990s. The paper concludes with an appraisal of Russia’s recent diplomatic initiatives on outer space governance.2 No longer economically competitive in the race for control of outer space, Russia has attempted several strategies to enable it at least to keep in the running. It has placed its space strategy in the context of defence requirements and state military control. It is using diplomacy – working with international organisations affiliated with the UN – to discuss, cooperate on and influence the race for the militarisation of space. It works with disarmament organisations to influence and promote a collective approach to the problem, rather than one dominated by the richer and more powerful states. Russia’s securitisation of outer space: threats and opportunities The Russian state defines threats largely in traditional terms of territorial protection from military challenges and views space assets as vital for military communication and defence. Russia’s geography highlights the need to protect its extensive borders and military and economic assets and infrastructure scattered over its vast territory (Barvinenko, 2007). The state has traditionally assessed that it is surrounded by hostile powers and thus needs ‘buffers’ or a ‘sphere of influence’ to protect itself. Today, Russia has expanded this rhetoric of vulnerability to include attacks from outer space. Russians use the term ‘aerospace’ rather than outer space because of the interrelatedness of airspace and outer space in the context of contemporary threats and conflicts, and because there is no distinct boundary between the two concepts (Kupriyanov, 2005). Russia’s rhetoric on outer space broadly mirrors that of the US, stressing urgency to prepare for a possible future war there. In 2017, US Navy Vice Admiral Charles Richards, deputy commander of US Strategic Command, argued that ‘With rapidly growing threat of a degraded space environment, we must prepare for a conflict that extends into space’ (quoted in Daniels, 2017). Rapid technological advancements in the space industry have influenced perceptions that there are economic benefits from being a space power. At the same time, they have given rise to concerns about threats stemming from the militarisation of space. For example, the development of cheap miniature satellites promises speedy replacement of disabled satellites in the event of attack. Theoretically, this could allow the US military (or other actors) to use such space constellations to support operations during a conflict.3 Through technology outer space has become integrated with other domains – land, sea, air and cyber. Most recently, the first generation of hypersonic weapons has ‘set the conditions for the merger of air and missiles defence and the air and outer space domains’ (Charron and Fergusson, 2018). Of course, a healthy space industry also provides strategic resources for a state’s military and economy. In Russia’s case, the announcement of new technological developments also masks unaddressed structural and systemic weaknesses and confers domestic and international legitimacy on Russia’s aspiration to be a ‘great power’.

**Space cooperation massively boosts prestige for authoritarian regimes**

**Juul, 19** - Senior policy analyst at the Center for American Progress

Peter Juul, “Trump’s Space Force Gets the Final Frontier All Wrong,” Foreign Policy. March 20, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/20/trumps-space-force-gets-the-final-frontier-all-wrong/

But funding isn’t everything, and in the new geopolitical context, democracy must be seen to work effectively. When it comes to space exploration, that means ratcheting back U.S. space cooperation with Russia as well as forgoing any equally intimate cooperation with China and its secretive space agency. The fact that the head of Russia’s space agency remains under U.S. sanctions for his role in Moscow’s military intervention in Ukraine illustrates the hazards involved in working with autocracies in space. Deep cooperation with autocratic powers in space gives autocracies a major point of diplomatic leverage over the United States, and more generally allows them to poach unearned international prestige by working on goals set and largely carried out by the United States. In today’s world, there’s no reason for the United States to give Russia or China this sort of standing by association. Cooperation between the United States and Russia won’t grind to an immediate halt, though. With the International Space Station in orbit until at least 2024—if not longer—it will take time to disentangle the web of functional ties that have bound NASA and its Russian counterpart over the last quarter century. Significant cooperation with China should be avoided altogether, especially given its notoriously opaque and military-run space program. The space programs and agencies of other nations—NASA, the European Space Agency and its member-nation agencies, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, and even Russia’s Roscosmos—remain led and run by civilians.

**Extinction**

Bruce **Blair 19**, Co-founder of Global Zero, nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, with; Clifford Gaddy; 2019, “Russia’s Aging War Machine,” https://www.globalzero.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BB\_Russias-Aging-War-Machine\_1999.pdf

The Stakes for the United States Should Americans and their government care about Russia’s nuclear posture and its dissolution? The answer is an emphatic yes. American security is bound up in Russia’s destiny, and our immediate security depends crucially on ironclad Russian control over its nuclear arsenal. If we are very lucky, the Russian nuclear arsenal and control system will atrophy without incident, coming to a safe instead of deadly end. In such a happy scenario, this atrophy will also encourage Russia to ratify the START II arms reduction treaty and negotiate even deeper bilateral reductions, lowering the ceiling on strategic deployments from 3,500 (START II) to 2,500 (START III) or fewer.Within a decade or so Russia’s aging force could easily shrink to 500 or fewer, creating enormous latitude to negotiate vast reductions in deployments. But this scenario is wishful thinking loaded with untenable assumptions. The START process has stalled and may not be revived any time soon, leaving in place increasingly decrepit and hazardous forces that Russia might not retire after all. The decay of the Russian arsenal is certain to run growing risks of proliferation and to erode safety along with basic offensive capability. For example, a degraded early warning network is less able to detect an actual attack—but also less able to screen out false indications of attack. Similarly, failure in the nuclear command link between the General Staff in Moscow and the launch crews in the field would disrupt not only the ability of the General Staff to quickly transmit the go code, but also the feedback loop from the missiles to the General Staff that detects and prevents an unauthorized launch attempt at any subordinate level of command. Finally, the departure of security guards from their posts at weapons depots to forage for food or escape inclement weather may not only impede the authorized dispersal of those weapons during a crisis but also increase the vulnerability of the weapons to theft. And the danger is not merely theoretical. A 1996 CIA report noted that broken locking devices on some Russian nuclear weapons had not been repaired for lack of spare parts. In short, progressive nuclear deterioration in Russia increases the risks of mistaken, illicit, or accidental launch, and the loss of strict central control over Russia’s vast nuclear complex bodes ill for nonproliferation. If Russia’s nuclear designers, producers, and custodians surrender to economic pressure, they could open the floodgates to the illicit transfer of nuclear materials, weapons, and delivery technologies to America’s adversaries. A meltdown of Russian nuclear control could be catastrophic for Americans. Securing Russia’s nuclear weapons and materials and strengthening safety and control over operational deployments deserve top billing among the security priorities of the U.S. government. To alleviate the immediate danger, Russian and U.S. strategic missiles should be taken off hair-trigger alert so that none could be fired on a moment’s notice. “De-alerting” our arsenals, ideally by detaching the warheads from missiles, would reduce their susceptibility to illicit or mistaken launch.Today it takes only minutes to prepare those forces for launch. Reducing the interval to days or longer would provide a far larger margin of safety against many scenarios, ranging from the temporary loss of legitimate civilian control over Russian weapons to false warning in Russia’s early warning system—both more plausible dangers than a deliberate, cold-blooded attack by Russia or the United States against each other. The challenge of deterrence today pales beside the challenge of operational safety. But even a comprehensive nuclear stand-down falls short over the long run. As long as Russia remains mired in economic, political, and military despair, the nuclear threat will continue. Russia will not be able to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons until it can afford an adequate conventional military force. It will not be able to ensure control over its nuclear weapons and materials until it has a strong state, one based on a healthy economy and a civil society. The West’s vital stakes in this process of nation-building have not diminished, despite all the failures and frustrations of the past decade. If anything, those stakes have grown—as have the cost and effort needed to stabilize and transform Russia.

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**CP: Statesought to call a global constitutional convention and establish a constitution reflecting intergenerational concern with exclusive authority to ban appropriation of Mars by private entities and bind participating bodies to its result**

**Gardiner 1** [Stephen M. Gardiner, Professor of Philosophy and Ben Rabinowitz Endowed Professor of Human Dimensions of the Environment at the University of Washington, Seattle, “A Call for a Global Constitutional Convention Focused on Future Generations,” 2014, *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 28, Issue 3, pp. 299-315, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679414000379, EA]

A Constitutional Convention In my view, the above line of reasoning leads naturally to a more specific proposal: that we—concerned individuals, interested community groups, national governments, and transnational organizations—should initiate a call for a global constitutional convention focused on future generations. This proposal has two components. The first component is procedural. The proposal takes the form of a “call to action.” It is explicitly an attempt to engage a range of actors, based on a claim that they have or should take on a set of responsibilities, and a view about how to go about discharging those responsibilities. The second component is substantive. The main focus for action is a push for the creation of a constitutional convention at the global level, whose role is to pave the way for an overall constitutional system that appropriately embodies intergenerational concern. The substantive idea rests on several key ideas. Still, for the purposes of a basic proposal, I suggest that these be understood in a relatively open way that, as far as is practicable, does not prejudge the outcome of the convention, and especially its main recommendations. First, the convention itself should be understood as “a representative body called together for some occasional or temporary purpose” and “constituted by statute to represent the people in their primary relations.”14 Second, a constitutional system should be thought of in a minimalist sense as “a set of norms (rules, principles or values) creating, structuring, and possibly defining the limits of government power or authority.”15 Third, the “instigating” role of the convention should be to discuss, develop, make recommendations toward, and set in motion a process for the establishment of a constitution. Fourth, its primary subject matter should be the need to adequately reflect and embody intergenerational concern, where this would include at least the protection of future generations, the promotion of their interests (where “interests” is to be broadly conceived so as to include rights, claims, welfare, and so on), and the discharging of duties with respect to them. It may also (and in my view should) include some way of reflecting concern for past generations, including responsiveness to at least certain of their interests and views. However, I will leave that issue aside in what follows. The proposal to initiate a call for a global constitutional convention has at least two attractive features. First, it is based in a deep political reality, and does not underplay the challenge. It acknowledges the problem as it is, both specific and general, and calls attention to the heart of that problem, including to the failures of the current system, the need for an alternative, and the background issue of responsibility. Moreover, though the proposal is dramatic and rhetorically eye-catching, it is so in a way that is appropriately responsive to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the persistent political inertia surrounding more modest initiatives, and the fact that (grave though concerns about it are) climate change is only one instance of the tyranny of the contemporary (and the wider perfect moral storm), and we should expect others to arise over the coming decades and centuries. The second attractive feature of the proposal is that, though ambitious, it is not alienating. While it does not succumb to despair in the face of the challenge, neither does it needlessly polarize and divide from the outset (for example, by leaping to specific recommendations about how to fill the institutional gap). Instead, it acknowledges that there are fundamental difficulties and anxieties, but uses them to start the right kind of debate, rather than to foreclose it. As a result, the proposal is a promising candidate to serve as the subject of a wide and overlapping political consensus, at least among those who share intergenerational concern. Selective Mirroring To quell some initial anxieties, it is perhaps worth clarifying the open-ended and non-alienating character of the proposal. One temptation would be to view the call for a global constitutional convention as a fairly naked plea for world government, a prospect that would be deeply alienating—indeed anathema—to many. However, that is not my intention. Though it is possible that a global constitutional convention would lead in this direction, it is by no means certain. At a minimum, no such body could plausibly recommend any form of “world government” without simultaneously advancing detailed suggestions about how to avoid the standard threats such an institution might pose. Moreover, it seems perfectly conceivable, even likely under current ways of thinking, that a global constitutional convention would pursue what we might call a selective mirroring strategy. Specifically, a convention would seek to develop a broader system of institutions and practices that reflected the desirable features of a powerful and highly centralized global authority but neutralized the standing threats posed by it (for example, it might employ familiar strategies such as the separation of powers). In all likelihood, one feature of a selective mirroring approach would be the significant preservation of existing institutions to serve as a bulwark against the excesses of any newly created ones. Whether and how such a strategy might be made effective against the perfect moral storm, and whether something closer to a “world government” would do better, would be a central issue for discussion by the convention.

**Spills over to foster broader intergenerational representation, but independence is key**

**Gardiner 2** [Stephen M. Gardiner, Professor of Philosophy and Ben Rabinowitz Endowed Professor of Human Dimensions of the Environment at the University of Washington, Seattle, “A Call for a Global Constitutional Convention Focused on Future Generations,” 2014, *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 28, Issue 3, pp. 299-315, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679414000379, EA]

One set of guidelines concerns how the global constitutional convention relates to other institutions. The first guideline concerns relative independence: (1) Autonomy: Any global constitutional convention should have considerable autonomy from other institutions, and especially from those dominated by factors that generate or facilitate the tyranny of the contemporary (and the perfect moral storm, more generally). Thus, for example, attempts should be made to insulate the global constitutional convention from too much influence from short-term and narrowly economic forces. The second guideline concerns limits to that independence: (2) Mutual Accountability: Any global constitutional convention should be to some extent accountable to other major institutions, and they should be accountable to it. Thus, for example, though the global constitutional convention should not be able to decide unilaterally that national institutions should be radically supplanted, nevertheless such institutions should not have a simple veto on the recommendations of the convention, including those that would result in sharp limits to their powers. A third guideline concerns adequacy: (3) Functional Adequacy: The global constitutional convention should be constructed in such a way that it is highly likely to produce recommendations that are functionally adequate to the task. Thus, for example, the tasks of the global constitutional convention should not be assigned to any currently existing body whose design and authority is clearly unsuitable. In my view, this guideline rules out proposals such as the Royal Society’s suggestion that governance of geoengineering should be taken up by the United Nations’ Commission on Sustainable Development,20 or the Secretary-General’s recommendation of a new United Nations’ High Commissioner for Future Generations.21 Though such proposals may have merit for some purposes (for example, as pragmatic, incremental suggestions to highlight the importance of intergenerational issues), they are too modest, in my opinion, to reflect the gravity of the threats posed by climate change in particular, and the perfect moral storm more generally. Aims A second set of guidelines concerns the aims of the global constitutional convention. Here, the perfect moral storm analysis would suggest: (4) Comprehensiveness: The convention should be under a mandate to consider a very broad range of global, intergenerational issues, to focus on such issues at a foundational level, and to recommend institutional reform accordingly. (5) Standing Authority: Though the convention may recommend the establishment of some temporary and issue-specific bodies, its focus should be on the establishment of institutions with standing authority over the long term. These guidelines are significant in that they stand against existing issue-specific approaches to global and intergenerational problems, and encourage not only a less ad hoc but also a more proactive approach. In particular, the global constitutional convention might be expected to recommend institutions that would be charged with identifying, monitoring, and taking charge of intergenerational issues as such. For example, such institutions should address not only specific policy issues (such as climate change, large asteroid detection, and long-term nuclear waste) but also the need to identify similar threats before they arise.

**Proactive measures mitigate a laundry list of emerging catastrophic risks – extinction**

**Beckstead et al. 14** [Nick Beckstead, Nick Bostrom, Niel Bowerman, Owen Cotton-Barratt, William MacAskill, Seán Ó hÉigeartaigh, Toby Ord, \* Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, \*\* Director, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, \*\*\* Global Priorities Project, Centre for Effective Altruism; Department of Physics, University of Oxford, \*\*\*\* Global Priorities Project, Centre for Effective Altruism; Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, \*\*\*\*\* Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, \*\*\*\*\*\* Cambridge Centre for the Study of Existential Risk; Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, \*\*\*\*\*\*\* Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology, Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford, “Policy Brief: Unprecedented Technological Risks,” 2014, *The Global Priorities Project, The Future of Humanity Institute, The Oxford Martin Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology, and The Centre for the Study of Existential Risk*, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Unprecedented-Technological-Risks.pdf, Accessed: 03/13/21, EA]

In the near future, major technological developments will give rise to new unprecedented risks. In particular, like nuclear technology, developments in synthetic biology, geoengineering, distributed manufacturing and artificial intelligence create risks of catastrophe on a global scale. These new technologies will have very large benefits to humankind. But, without proper regulation, they risk the creation of new weapons of mass destruction, the start of a new arms race, or catastrophe through accidental misuse. Some experts have suggested that these technologies are even more worrying than nuclear weapons, because they are more difficult to control. Whereas nuclear weapons require the rare and controllable resources of uranium-235 or plutonium-239, once these new technologies are developed, they will be very difficult to regulate and easily accessible to small countries or even terrorist groups. Moreover, these risks are currently underregulated, for a number of reasons. Protection against such risks is a global public good and thus undersupplied by the market. Implementation often requires cooperation among many governments, which adds political complexity. Due to the unprecedented nature of the risks, there is little or no previous experience from which to draw lessons and form policy. And the beneficiaries of preventative policy include people who have no sway over current political processes — our children and grandchildren. Given the unpredictable nature of technological progress, development of these technologies may be unexpectedly rapid. A political reaction to these technologies only when they are already on the brink of development may therefore be too late. We need to implement prudent and proactive policy measures in the near future, even if no such breakthroughs currently appear imminent.

**Maintaining sustainable use of outer space is key to future generations**

**Islam 18** [Mohammad Saiful Islam, Mohammad works for the Institute of Advanced Judicial Studies and the Beijing Institute of Technology. 4-27-2018, "The Sustainable Use of Outer Space: Complications and Legal Challenges to the Peaceful Uses and Benefit of Humankind," Beijing Law Review,<https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201> accessed 12/12/21] Adam

4.2. Ensure the Rights of Future Generations in Outer Space Sustainable development is the establishing principle for achieving present human needs without damaging the demands of future generations maintaining integrity and constancy of the natural systems. The modern idea of sustainable development is derived from the Brundtland Report in 1987. Generally considered in modern application and exploration of outer space, fundamental elements are the area must be dedicated to peaceful purposes; and the area must be preserved for future generations [(Heim, 1990)](https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201#ref17) . It is an indispensable and inordinate challenge to confirm uphold the healthy environment and make sure development without destroying the rights of future generations in space. Article IX of The Outer Space Treaty provided, in the exploration and use of outer space, States should pursue studies and conduct exploration of outer space so as to avoid harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth [(Outer Space Treaty, 1967)](https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201#ref35) . The issues of what constitutes harmful contamination in Earth’s environment have yet to be interpreted. The legal definition of “adverse” and “harmful” will also modification as Earth, indigenous sciences progress, separately or in concert, with the planetary exploration space sciences [(Robinson, 2005)](https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201#ref38) . As a result of multifaceted political, economic, scientific, technological, educational, and other global problems, there has been practicing exclusively only international cooperation for sustainable space development among the developed countries [(Noichim, 2005)](https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201#ref34) . The space faring nations should promote a supportive environment for peaceful and sustainable use of space, decrease environmental effects on Earth and protect the terrestrial environment. We should escape a regime that will ultimately reflect the over-exploitation of resources and environmental havoc [(Fountain, 2002)](https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201#ref9) .

**COPUOS is normal means**

**Halstead 10**—(B.S., Psychology, The University of Alabama; J.D., The University of Alabama School of Law; LL.M., Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University; Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General's Corps). C. Brandon Halstead. 2010. "Prometheus Unbound - Proposal for a New Legal Paradigm for Air Law and Space Law: Orbit Law," Journal of Space Law 36, no. 1, 143-206

The debate on how to distinguish airspace from outer space is as old as the space age itself. The problems emerging from space exploration first entered the agenda of the United Nations in 1957, and were later placed on the agenda before the General Assembly through the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1958.' Although this Committee initially focused on the debate of disarmament, its status was later made permanent in 1961 while its charter was expanded to include examination of all issues relating to the field of exploration and use of outer space by governmental and non-governmental organizations.16 In 1962 the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee and Legal Sub-Committee began their true substantive work and became the main center of international cooperation and coordination for exploration of peaceful uses of outer space." Successive sessions focused on general and specific issues of space law, including the establishment of a frontier between outer space and atmospheric space18.