**1NC vs Byram AK**

**1 - Aspec**

**Interpretation: The affirmative must only defend that one just government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike**

**Collins Dictionary:** <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/a>

A or an is the indefinite article. It is used at the beginning of noun groups that refer to only one person or thing

**Violation - “normal means is international framework agreements”**

**Standards:**

* **Real World Decision Making- decision makers can only choose from options open to them- an Israeli policymaker can’t control what India does.**
* **Depth > Breadth reading 100 pages from a book is better than 1 page from 100 and every other round solves breadth. That means we should look in depth on actors**
* **Shifty advocacy: you’ll just shift advocacies throughout the round since you’ll just extend any actor I undercovered which also makes the debate irresolvable since we’ll just go for different actors so there’s no clash.**
* **Limits--infinite permutations between multiple actors creates an infinite caselist so we never have prep which decreases nuanced engagement and reifies inequalities in debate since small schools are given an extra prep burden**

**2 - TJFs Bad**

**Interp: Debaters must not justify their frameworks by saying it is the most fair or educational. To clarify, no TJFs**

* **Phil ed--incentivizes the 1ar and 2ar just collapsing to “but we’re the most fair” instead of philosophically justifying their fw which decks phil ed and outweighs--a) phil is 100% uq to LD so its try or die and b) phil is a side constraint since every other standard presumes a philosophical justification for why we should care about it**
* **Strat Skew – they divide the FW debate into 2 layers which means they will always just collapse for 4 min on the 1 I undercover. Means we don’t discuss either in depth which is worse for clash and gives you a 2:1 skew**

**Drop the debater - severance kills 1NC strat construction—1AR restart favors aff since it’s 7-6 time skew and they get 2 speeches to my one. The whole round was skewed making dta illogical. No rvi - a) they’ll bait theory and prep it out with aff infinite prep—justifies infinite abuse and chilling us from checking abuse in fear of things like 2ar ethos which lets them recontextualize and always seem right on the issue b) forces us to read 7 minutes of theory since nothing else matters - especially when we only have the 1nc to generate offense whereas they have the 1ac AND 1ar. Competing interps - a) reasonability’s arbitrary & forces judge intervention especially with 2ar recontextualizations to always sound like the more reasonable debater b) norm setting - we find the best possible norms c) reasonability collapses - you use offense/defense paradigm to evaluate brightlines**

**3 - Hobbes NC**

**Permissibility and presumption negate—the aff has the burden of proof to show the normative claim of the resolution is true, so the neg gets anything that denies that. Ought implies a moral obligation to do something but permissibility denies the existence of said obligation**

**Ethics are not a universal truth but rather mere categories of languages created by us**

**Parrish 1** (Rick Parrish. "Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract." Theory & Event 7, no. 4 (2005) <https://muse.jhu.edu/>)

Perhaps the single most telling quote from Hobbes on this point comes from The Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society (usually known by its Latin name, De Cive), in which he states that "to know truth, is the same thing as to remember that it was made by ourselves by the very usurpation of the words." 24 "For Hobbes truth is a function of logic and language, not of the relation between language and some extralinguistic reality," 25 so the "connections between names and objects are not natural." 26 They are artificially constructed by persons, based on individual psychologies and desires. These individual desires are for Hobbes the only measure of good and bad, because value terms "are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves." 27 Since "there are no authentical doctrines concerning right and wrong, good and evil," 28 these labels are placed upon things by humans in acts of creation rather than discovered as extrinsic facts. Elaborating on this, Hobbes writes that "the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker, such as are the names of virtu es and vices; for one man calleth wisdom, what another calleth fear; and one cruelty what another justice." 29 A more simplistic understanding of the brutality of the state of nature, which David Gauthier calls the "simple rationality account," 30 has it that mere materialistic competition for goods is the cause of the war of all against all, but such rivalry is a secondary manifestation of the more fundamental competition among all persons to be the dominant creator of meaning. Certainly, Hobbes writes that persons most frequently "desire to hurt each other" because "many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword." 31 But this competition for goods only arises as the result of the more primary struggle that is inherent in the nature of persons of meaning creators. In the state of nature, "where every man is his own judge," 32 persons will "mete good and evil by diverse measures," creating labels for things as they see fit, based on individual appetites. 17. One of the most significant objects that receives diverse labels in the state of nature is 'threat'. Even if most people happen to construe threat similarly, there will be serious disagreement regarding whether or not a specific situation fits a commonly held definition. This is of course the key to the famous Security Dilemma that internationalrelations theorists spend so much time trying to overcome34 -- certain perfectly innocent actions by one person (or state) can easily be construed, and rationally must be construed, as a threat. Furthermore, any attempt by one person to allay another's fears about the threatening nature of actions must be taken as strategic disinformation, rather than as genuine explanation. Even if "I agree with you in principle about your right to preserve yourself," this agreement is useless "if I disagree about whether this is the moment for you to implement that right." 35 Given that persons "are individual in experience, they are individual in their conceptions and in their speech. Their power of reasoning with words . . . dissociates them and provokes violent competition" 36 specifically because concepts that seem simple invoke very different interpretations. If there were some universally objective and knowable set of circumstances that constituted Threat as such, the rationally self-interested persons of the state of nature would not have to seek control over all things for their own protection. All persons could both avoid actions that would be defined as threat and shed the overbearing suspicion that, taken together, make the Hobbesian state of nature so unbearably brutish.

**To escape the state of nature, people unite to imbue a sovereign with absolute authority to define ethics and enforce them at will. The sovereign is the only binding ethical force - absent it, ethics fail since everyone has competing conceptions of the good**

**Parrish 2** (Rick Parrish. "Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract." Theory & Event 7, no. 4 (2005) <https://muse.jhu.edu/>)

All of the foregoing points to the conclusion that in the commonwealth the sovereign's first and most fundamental job is to be the ultimate definer. Several other commentators have also reached this conclusion. By way of elaborating upon the importance of the moderation of individuality in Hobbes' theory of government, Richard Flathman claims that peace "is possible only if the ambiguity and disagreement that pervade general thinking and acting are eliminated by the stipulations of a sovereign. Pursuant to debunking the perennial misinterpretation of Hobbes' mention of people as wolves, PaulJohnson argues that "one of the primary functions of the sovereign is to provide the necessary unity of meaning and reference for the primary terms in which men try to conduct their social lives." 58 "The whole raison d'être of sovereign helmsmanship lies squarely in the chronic defusing of interpretive clashes," 59 without which humans would "fly off in all directions" 60 and fall inevitably into the violence of the natural condition. 26. It is not surprising that so many noted students of Hobbes have reached this conclusion, given how prominently he himself makes this claim. According to Hobbes, "in the state of nature, where every man is his own judge, and differeth from others concerning the names and appellations of things, and from those differences arise quarrels and breach of peace, it was necessary there should be a common measure of all things, that might fall in controversy." 61 The main categories of the sovereign's tasks are "to make and abrogate laws, to determine war and peace, [and] to know and judge of all controversies," 62 but each of these duties is a subspecies of its ultimate duty to be the sole and ultimate definer in matters of public importance. It is only through the sovereign's effective continued accomplishment of this duty that the people of a commonwealth avoid the definitional problems that typify the state of nature. 27. Judging controversies, which Hobbes lists as the third main task of the sovereign, is the duty most obviously about being the ultimate definer. In fact, Hobbes declares it a law of nature that "in every controversy, the parties thereto ought mutually to agree upon an arbitrator, whom they both trust; and mutually to covenant to stand to the sentence he shall give therein." 63 As I repeatedly alluded to above, this agreement to abide by the decision of a third party arbitrator, a sovereign in the commonwealth, is necessary because of the fundamentally perspectival and relative nature of persons' imputations of meaning and value into the situations they construct. Hobbes understands this problem, as evidenced by his claim that "seeing right reason is not existent, the reason ofsome man or men must supply the place thereof; and that man or men, is he or they, that have the sovereign power" 64 to dictate meanings that will be followed by all. The sovereign is even protected from potential democratic impulses, by which a 'true' meaning would be that agreed upon by the greatest number of people. Because "no one man's reason, nor the reason of any one number of men, makes the certainty," they willstill "come to blows . . . for want of a right reason constituted by nature" 65 unless both the majority and the minority agree to abide by the meanings promulgated by the sovereign. 28. These meanings are usually created and promulgated by the sovereign in the form of laws, another of the tasks with which 7/29/13 RickParrish | Derrida's Economyof Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract | Theory& Event 7:4 <https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v007/7.4parrish.html> 13/42 Hobbes charges it. In one of his clearest explanations of the law, Hobbes writes that "it belongs to the same chief power to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another's, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evil; that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoided in our common course of life." 66 The civil law is the set of the sovereign's definitions for ownership, justice, good, evil, and all other concepts that are important for the maintenance of peace in the commonwealth. When everyone follows the law (that is, when everyone follows the sovereign's definitions) there are far fewer conflicts among persons because everyone appeals to the same meanings. This means that people know what meanings others will use to evaluate the actions of themselves and others, so the state of nature's security dilemmas and attempts to force one's own meanings upon others are overcome.

**Implications:**

* **Turns the aff fw at the highest layer - absent a sovereign we live in a state of nature where individuals can just force their own moral vision onto another which destroys any chance of productive ethics since no one can guarantee they achieve their ends in a chaotic state justifying infinite violations of their fw**
* **The AC collapses - their fw presumes a sovereign to be able to bind and enforce it**
* **Only our framework explains subjectivity and motivation which is ontologically self interest, which means only we are able to properly ascribe moral obligations to agents and motivate them to be ethical**

**Thus, the standard is consistency with the Hobbesian Social Contract. Not consequentialist but concerned on if an action procedurally violates the rules of a contract. Prefer the NC on jurisdiction - if the sovereign was not legitimate any action they took would no longer matter which means the state itself could not exist, making the aff a prior question to discussions of the best policy**

**I’ll defend the lack of a universal obligation to the aff. Negate – the aff obligates the state to act – this is incoherent because it implies an authority higher than the state to constrain the sovereign. The term “unconditional” means they force the sovereign to ALWAYS allow strikes, even when not doing so might increase state power. Specifically true for strikes, since they just let people demand whatever they want against the state to undermine its legitimacy**

**4 - Violent Strikes PIC**

**Counterplan: A just government ought to conditionally recognize the right of workers to strike in the case of resisting oppression without coercion.**

**Gourevitch 18** [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d//SJWen) Justin \*\*Edited for ableist language

Every liberal democracy recognizes that workers have a right to strike. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose serious problems for liberal societies. They involve violence and coercion, they often violate some basic liberal liberties, they appear to involve group rights having priority over individual ones, and they can threaten public order itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of disruptive collective protest in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ [froze] major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as statewide in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Colorado; a strike by taxi drivers played a major role in debates and court decisions regarding immigration; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements. The right to strike raises far more issues than a single essay can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its relation to coercive strike tactics. I argue that strikes present a dilemma for liberal societies because for most workers to have a reasonable chance of success they need to use some coercive strike tactics. But these coercive strike tactics both violate the law and infringe upon what are widely held to be basic liberal rights. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know why workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of understanding the right to strike is as a right to resist the oppression that workers face in the standard liberal capitalist economy. This way of understanding the right explains why the use of coercive strike tactics is not morally constrained by the requirement to respect the basic liberties nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.