# 1AC TOC R6

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## Framework

**Permissibility and presumption affirm:**

1. **Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason – means that presuming neg is incoherent because it relies on some presumptive truths about justice and the world in general**
2. **Intuition - we naturally believe statements true e.g. if I told you my name is Shrey, you’d believe me**

**Ethics can be split between duty and character-based ethics. The former answers the question of what agents ought to do while the latter answers what agents ought to be. Prefer character-based ethics–duty-based ethics are infinitely regressive as they require a rule to follow a rule and so on, which presumes an agent properly conditioned to follow that rule. That means that character based ethics co-opt any benefit to duty based ones–good people naturally do good actions but a good action doesn’t automatically make someone a good person**

**Gyekye 2011** (Kwame [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Ghana, Visiting Professor of Philosophy and African-American studies at Temple University]. “African Ethics.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2011, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/african-ethics/.) //iLake AS RCT//SR

Good character is the essence of the African moral system, the linchpin of the moral wheel. The justification for a character-based ethics is not far to seek. For, all that a society can do, regarding moral conduct, is to impart moral knowledge to its members, making them aware of the moral values and principles of that society. In general, society satisfactorily fulfills this duty of imparting moral knowledge to its members through moral education of various forms, including, as in African societies, telling morally-freighted proverbs and folktales to its younger members. But, having moral knowledge—being made aware of the moral principles and rules of the society—is one thing; being able to lead a life consonant with the moral principles is quite another. An individual may know and may even accept a moral rule, such as, say, it is wrong to cheat the customs. But he may fail to apply this rule to a particular situation; he is, thus, not able to effect the transition from knowledge to action, to carry out the implications of his moral belief. In the Akan and other African moral systems such a moral failure would be put down to the lack of a good character (suban pa). In other words, the ability to act in accord with the moral principles and rules of the society requires the possession of a good character. Thus, in the context of the activities of the moral life—in our decisions to obey moral rules, in the struggle to do the right thing and to avoid the wrong conduct, in one's intention to carry out a moral duty, the quality of a person's character is of ultimate consequence. It is from a person's character that all his or her actions—good or bad—radiate: the performance of good or bad acts depends on the state of one's character. Wrong-doing is put down to a person's bad character. Thus, the Yoruba maxim (proverb): ‘Good character is a person's guard.’ African maxims are explicit about the formation of character: character is acquired. A person is therefore responsible for the state of his or her character, for character results from the habitual actions of a person. An Akan maxim has it that “one is not born with a bad ‘head’, but one takes it on from the earth.” The maxim means, among other things, that a bad habit is not an inborn characteristic; it is one that is acquired. It would be worthless to embark on moral instruction through moral proverbs and folktales, as it is done in African societies, if our character or habits were inborn. But the belief is that the moral narratives would help the young people to acquire and internalize the moral values of the society, including specific moral virtues, embedded in those ethical narratives. The appropriate responses to moral instruction are expected to lead to the acquisition of appropriate habits and their corresponding characters. And, because character is acquired through our actions, habits, and expected responses to moral instructions, it can, according to African moral systems, be changed or reformed. Character is defined by the Akan thinkers in terms of habits, which result from a person's deeds or actions: ‘character comes from your actions’ (or deeds: nneyee), says an Akan traditional thinker. Persistent performance of a particular action will produce a certain habit and, thus, a corresponding character. To acquire virtue, a person must perform good actions, that is, morally acceptable actions so that they become habitual. The action or deed that led to the acquisition of a newly good habit must be persistently performed in order to strengthen that habit; in this way, virtue (or, good character) is acquired. Over time such an acquired virtue becomes a habit. This is the position of Akan ethics on the development and acquisition of a good (or, bad) character, for this is what the Akan people mean when they say aka ne ho, “it has remained with him,” “it has become part of him,” “it has become his habit.” Character is, thus, a behavior pattern formed as a result of past persistent actions. Thus, moral virtues (excellences of character) or vices arise through habituation. The logic of the acquisition of our character or habits is that the original nature of the human being was morally neutral, neither good nor bad. A person's original moral neutrality will in the course of his life come to be affected, in one direction (the good) or the other direction (the bad) by his actions and responses to moral instruction, advice and persuasion. The original moral neutrality of a human being constitutes the foundation of our conception of the moral person, for it makes for—allows room for—choice, that is, moral choice. Consequently, what a person does or does not do is most crucial to the formation and development of his or her character, and, thus, to becoming moral or immoral.

**However, conceptions of character cannot come solely through academic reflection. Reflection can only foresee a finite number of circumstances while ethics need to account for infinite, which means theories cannot be divorced from social development or they would collapse into nothingness**

**McGinnis 06** (Nicholas McGinnis 6 PhD, successfully defended his dissertation, On Philosophical Intuitions, at the University of Western Ontario in the Spring of 2015 under the supervision of Dr. Robert Stainton. He was born in Montreal, Canada and attended Concordia University where he completed both his B.A. (honours) and M.A. in philosophy. He is a member of the Rotman Institute of Science and Values. His work focuses on philosophy of language, experimental philosophy, metaphysics, and non-classical logic, “Wittgenstein's Influence on the Development of Virtue Ethics”, A Thesis In The Department of Philosophy Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy at Concordia University Montreal, Quebec, Canada, August 2006) OS RCT//SR

McDowell begins with Wittgenstein's example at §185 of PI (though, for Wittgenstein, this was a return to a similar thought-experiment at §143), where a pupil is asked to extend a series (through an order which has the form +n, in this case +2), so as to produce 2, 4, 6, 8, etc. McDowell comments that we have a tendency to view iterations of this task as a type of psychological mechanism, analogous to the movement of some otherwise inert physical object being guided by an underlying structure—the common metaphor is that of rails—necessarily towards the correct answer (McDowell 1998: 58).34 This view is, McDowell notes, rather suspect. The first problem is that any rule-following behaviour or statement of understanding a rule ("I am doing this")— such as that of adding 2—is in a sense underdetermined: the potential behaviour that comes under the jurisdiction of rule is infinite (in this case we have the set of natural numbers) while at any given time we've seen, or followed ourselves, only a finite fraction of these possible cases. What evidence we have for the picture of rule-following as a set of 'rails' cannot dismiss the possibility that in the future behaviour will "diverge from what we could count as correct" (ibid., 59). Wittgenstein's example of this, also used by McDowell, is a person who continues the +2 series after reaching 1000 thusly: 1004, 1008, 1012... and does not understand that he has made a mistake, believing that he was applying the rule correctly. At this point, as Wittgenstein notes, it is no use to merely say: "But can't you see?" (cf. PI §185)—for he sees differently: a rabbit instead of a duck, as with the old optical illusion. Perhaps he believed that to correctly apply the rule, he was to "add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000, and so on", and does not admit or understand that there was a mistake (ibid., 59). The constant possibility of such behaviour runs against the supposition that to follow a rule is to be guided by these inexorable 'rails'. Concludes McDowell: "The pictured state, then, always transcends the grounds on which it is allegedly postulated" (ibid., 59). The point of these considerations is not a sceptical one, as is sometimes argued, nor to undermine confidence in our speech acts; rather it is only to remove an illusory ground we sometimes ascribe to meaning, a picture in which "the steps are really already taken, even before I take them in writing or orally or in thought" (ibid., 59). The connection between the objection sketched by McDowell earlier on and Wittgenstein's argument is clear. The 'major premise', formulated as a single universal principle, is meant to anticipate all cases of application, "as only the act of meaning can anticipate reality" (PI §188). It is precisely because of this attributed ability that it can serve as major premise, much like an algebraic formula is thought to be able to. The minor premise of the syllogism consists of the specific integers in play, which leads us, so the picture goes, necessarily to a specific conclusion, determined by the formula. Likewise, a "complete specification of the reason why the virtuous person acts as he does" is required as major premise, as mere perceptual sensitivity is insufficient to provide reasons for action (ibid., 54); recall McDowell's formulation of the objection— that both the virtuous and non-virtuous may share the same perception but fail to act in corresponding ways, showing virtue forms a composite state. The 'deliverances of sensitivity' (the 'integers'), to use McDowell's phrase, interact with something else—the universal principle and one's own volition (the 'formula'), to produce determinate answers. But this conception strikes McDowell as 'implausible', for cases would inevitably turn up in which a mechanical application of the rules would strike one as wrong—and not necessarily because one had changed one's mind; rather, one's mind on the matter was not susceptible of capture in any universal formula (ibid., 58). Wittgenstein's rule-following 'argument'—I use the term with some trepidation, for it would be somewhat of a mischaracterization to see it as a pure example of premise / conclusion philosophical dialectic—serves to dispel the notion that to act rationally is to follow the dictates of some externally-determined universal formula, and also the correlated notion that error consists in something analogous to mechanical breakdown. Consider the algebraic example. Are the steps to be taken for a series in some way 'determined'? For Wittgenstein, such a statement is perhaps referring to the fact that people are brought by their education (training) so to use the formula y = x², that they all work out the same value for y when they substitute the same number for x. [...] It may now be said: "The way the formula is meant determines which steps are taken." What is the criterion for the way the formula is meant? It is, for example, the kind of way we always use it, the way we are taught to use it. (PI §189; §190). When someone's behaviour diverges from what we would think counts as the correct answer in a given series, and does not 'see' the mistake at all, we lose the picture of rules as determining meaning in all possible application and cases. Grasping meaning is instead a function of being taught proper application of symbols. Yet for all this we do not lose confidence in our assertions or practices. Instead we see that it is largely spurious to make certain sorts of particularly stringent epistemological demands: that understanding a rule consists in letting one's mind be guided by some objectively present, mind-independent structure (such as Platonism concerning mathematics). McDowell's stressing of Wittgensteinian 'uncodifiability' connects with several of the critical aspects of virtue ethics explored in the last chapter. The point of the 'rulefollowing' argument was that what counts as rational or consistent behaviour is not wholly determined by external facts which the mind somehow grasps via abstract contemplation; this is the vanity of previous moral theories which most authors of virtue ethics attack, though they focus on different targets, after different fashions. Anscombe's criticism of Kant, recall, explicitly made use of uncodifiability: "no theoretically adequate provision can be made for exceptional circumstances," she writes, rendering it impossible to construct the appropriate type of stipulation necessary to govern descriptions of actions (Anscombe 1999: 27; 29). This is akin to McDowell's presentation of Wittgenstein; in both, there lurks the realization that concept-application is not governed by the picture of 'rails'. The relevant description of, say, a lie—Anscombe's example35 — is not something which can be adequately captured in what McDowell terms a 'universal formula', for considerations identical to those of the +2 series, as are the consequences. Speaking of the objection's equal application to utilitarianism: "any action can be so described as to make it fall under a variety of principles of utility (as I shall say for short) if it fall under any" (ibid., 28). The general nature of the problem under Anscombe's consideration here is so similar to Wittgenstein it even seems strange she would not quote him or bring the connection out. Perhaps the connection was taken to be entirely self-evident. Another link between the rule-following argument and the critiques of virtue ethics is the argument that 'pleasure', or any other good, is a heterogeneous, polycentric concept (an argument we presented through Nussbaum's writings on the topic). The opposite view is that of pleasure as a unitary and measurable object; but as the rule-following argument applies across the board, it is clear that what counts as pleasure can no more be determined from 'outside' than what counts as a lie, or what counts as following the +2 rule. The attraction to a certain species of moral theory lies precisely in the claim that we can define what 'pleasure' is, or 'lies' are, in a peculiarly binding and inexorable way, so as to 'solve' problems with no rational dissent possible from the one answer determined by the formula. If we find Wittgenstein's rule-following argument convincing, however, we should not view such projects as likely to succeed: for it seems rather unlikely, if not downright impossible, that the definitions upon which the projects ride will be found— that they are indeed such things as can be 'found'. Yet despite these rather difficult conclusions there is no reason to embrace scepticism or lose confidence in the grounds of our assertions. Where does our confidence come from, if not from determinate rules and principles, lying outside of us, as it were? According to McDowell—approvingly quoting Stanley Cavell—nothing but our 'shared forms of life', a 'whirl of organism' that consists of common discursive practices, 'routes of interest' and patterns of recognized similarity: a 'congruence of subjectivities' (McDowell 1998: 60-61). We may choose to explain the correct extension of a number series in syllogistic terms, but this should not lead us to the conclusion that the operation moves independently of our forms of life. Writes Wittgenstein about the tendency towards this sort of conclusion, "It is as if we could grasp the whole use of the word in a flash." Like what e.g.? ... But have you a model for this? No. It is just that this expression suggests itself to us. As the result of the crossing of different pictures [...] You have no model of this superlative fact, but you are seduced into using a super-expression. (PI §193). This 'flash' of insight is the seductive illusion that we mount ourselves on some external rails when we grasp the use of a rule, such as 'add 2', because we have the sensation that, despite the underdetermined nature of the picture, we see application of algebra or words into infinity. This 'strange' sensation leads us to postulate the superlative picture. Writes Wittgenstein, But there is nothing astonishing, nothing queer, about what happens. It becomes queer when we are led to think that the future development must in some way already be present in the act of grasping the use and yet isn't present. [...] Where is the connexion effected between the sense of the expression 'Let's play a game of chess' and all the rules of the game?—Well, in the list of rules of the game, in the teaching of it, in the day-to-day practice of playing. ( PI §197). The ability to project use into indefinite future context turns therefore not on some mysterious underlying mechanism churning out 'appropriate' answers, but rather on the taught practices of linguistic communities and creative decisions made within them.36 Hence the thought that calculations within the deductive paradigm ought to be 'automatically compelling' somehow above and beyond forms of life is a method of avoiding Wittgenstein's difficult conclusions about the grounds of our rationality. For McDowell, the correct standpoint, or 'cure' to this (no doubt following Wittgenstein's notion of 'therapy'), instead is to give up the idea that philosophical thought, about the sorts of practice in question, should be undertaken at some external standpoint, outside our immersion in our familiar forms of life. (McDowell 1998: 63) This is the path to the Neurathian solution advocated by Hursthouse, as we saw in the last chapter. It may seem at first glance that Hursthouse's use of eudaimonia as a naturalistic ground for her brand of virtue ethics runs counter to the line of argument presented here, in that explicit reference to human flourishing may serve as major premise in a syllogism of the form criticized by McDowell here. But Hursthouse never intends, and indeed explicitly denies, that her naturalism is meant to be convincing outside of an acquired ethical outlook, i.e. a form of life (Hursthouse 1999: 166). Such a move will seem utterly unconvincing without the background assumed by appreciation of the rather deep implications of the rule-following argument, which includes McDowell's 'cure' for the seduction by the deductive paradigm; paradigm which, as McDowell concludes his interpretation of Wittgenstein, is a deeply unsatisfactory model even standing by itself: Pupils do acquire a capacity to go on, without further advice, to novel instances. Impressed by the sparseness of the teaching, we find this remarkable. But assimilation to the deductive paradigm leaves it no less remarkable. The assimilation replaces the question "How is it that the pupil, given that sparse instruction, goes on to new instances in the right away?" with the question "How is it that the pupil, given that sparse instruction, divines from it a universal formula with the right deductive powers?". The second question is, if anything, less tractable. (McDowell 1998: 64) The first question is quite tractable, by contrast. The boundary conditions created by both human nature and shared forms of life provide sufficient explanatory content to explain extension to novel circumstance; whereas it is difficult to see how a pupil can make the 'leap of divination' McDowell views as necessary to answer the second.37 Furthermore, this is not to suggest that there are unbridgeable chasms created by forms of life or that one cannot be brought to 'see' things correctly if they have grasped usage differently. But these are topics to be addressed in the next chapter. For now, I have argued that virtue ethics—of which I chose Hursthouse's version as an exemplar—crucially depends on this interpretation of Wittgenstein's rule-following argument and the consequences drawn from it.

**The solution is virtue ethics–ethics is a social developmental phenomenon where agents learn from others and constantly revise their notion of ethics–our theory constantly improves over time as people learn new things while other theories cannot which means [a] our framework gets infinitely better than theirs over time and [b] disads to my fw are nuq since self revision allows it to naturally fix them**

**Reader 2k**, [Reader, Soren. [Late Professor of Philosophy, Durham University] “New Directions in Ethics: Naturalism, Reasons, and Virtue.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 3, No. 4, Dec. 2000 ]//Scopa.

Virtue is a free disposition to act in certain ways under certain conditions. Virtue ethics claims that what is to count as a good action or what is a good outcome is conceptually dependent on claims about the virtue of an agent. How is this dependence supposed to work? Where those after an explanatory account seek a conceptual connection with something like a normative 'in itself,’ virtue ethicists instead explore the concrete dependence of moral activity on the possibility of learning from already virtuous agents. They hold that the key to moral rationality is found in moral education. Ethics begins with the apprentice moral agent: the child, or the foreigner, or the damaged person in rehabilitation are all examples. These beginner-agents learn from the experienced, wise moral agent by copying, by mimicking in their actions the actions of the virtuous agent. This mimicking, or 'going on in the same way', does not presuppose that the learner agent acquires any representations of how the world is (i.e., beliefs), nor that they acquire the ability to report on or provide justifications for what they do. Virtue is learned by cottoning on to virtuous ways of doing things, going on to do the same, then going on to do the same in new ways, once they have mastered the skill. 16 The way virtue and character is supposed to be basic here is simply displayed in the analogy: there is ? and can be ? nothing 'behind' the expertise of the phronimos which can explain or jus tify it (any more than there is anything 'behind' the expertise of the doctor or the navigator, to use Aristotle's examples at NE 1104b7-l 1). Of course, plenty more can be said about it, and shortcuts can be found to aid the learn ing of those who have already mastered other skills (so competent rule-fol lowers can learn from being given rules, just as competent grammarians can learn a new language from the grammar). But we should not confuse what it is possible to say about the skill of being moral, with what constitutes it.

**Thus, the standard is promoting virtue. Impact calc:**

1. **The aff is not concerned with consequences and maximizing virtue but being consistent with it. Consequentialism fails–**
   1. **Induction fails–the logic of looking to the past to predict the future is all premised in the past, so it’s circular**
   2. **Aggregation fails–there’s no way to weigh between different forms of pain and pleasure e.g. 5 headaches vs a migraine**
   3. **Butterfly effect–each consequence has a future consequence and so on so we never know if it really did net good**
   4. **Subjectivity–everyone takes pleasure and pain in different things so we can’t know what maximizes it**
   5. **Infinite universe has infinite pleasure and pain–to add a finite amount does nothing because infinity + finity is still infinity**
   6. **Culpability–can’t be held responsible for consequences because we can’t know all of them and it’s out of our control, intents are the only verifiable basis**
   7. **Utility Monster–If the universe is infinite, there’s a utility monster that feels happy when we feel pain – it counteracts any lost value and means everything is permissible.**
   8. **Probability–you have to calculate the chance your calculations are flawed which requires further calculations, creating infinite uncertainty**
2. **Virtues that sustain philosophical inquiry and ethical communities come first–even if our interpretation is imperfect we can use practice, deliberation, and intuition as a starting point**

**Macintyre 2007** (Alasdair [Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre is a Scottish philosopher, primarily known for his contribution to moral and political philosophy, but also known for his work in history of philosophy and theology. MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981) is widely recognised as one of the most important works of Anglophone moral and political philosophy in the 20th century. He is senior research fellow at the Centre for Contemporary Aristotelian Studies in Ethics and Politics (CASEP) at London Metropolitan University, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and Permanent Senior Distinguished Research Fellow at the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture]. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. University of Notre Dame Press, Third Edition, 2007, <https://epistemh.pbworks.com/f/4.+Macintyre.pdf>.) //iLake AS \*bracketed for gendered language

It is now possible to return to the question from which this enquiry into the nature of human action and identity started: In what does the unity of an individual life consist? The answer is that its unity is the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. To ask 'What is the good for me?' is to ask how best I might live out that unity and bring it to completion. To ask 'What is the good for man?' is to ask what all answers to the former question must have in common. But now it is important to emphasize that it is the systematic asking of these two questions and the attempt to answer them in deed as well as in word which provide the moral life with its unity. The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest. Quests sometimes fail. are frustrated, abandoned or dissipated into distractions; and human lives may in all these ways also fail. But the only criteria for success or failure in a human life as a whole are the critieria of success or failure in a narrated or to-be-narrated quest. A quest for what? Two key features of the medieval conception of a quest need to be recalled. The first is that without some at least partly determinate conception of the final telos there could not be any beginning to a quest. Some conception of the good for [person] man is required. Whence is such a conception to be drawn? Precisely from those questions which led us to attempt to transcend that limited conception of the virtues which is available in and through practices. It is in looking for a conception of the good which will enable us to order other goods, for a conception of the good which will enable us to extend our understanding of the purpose and content of the virtues, for a conception of the good which will enable us to understand the place of integrity and constancy in life, that we initially define the kind of life which is a quest for the good. But secondly it is clear the medieval conception of a quest is not at all that of a search for something already adequately characterized, as miners search for gold or geologists for oil. It is in the course of the quest and only through encountering and coping with the various particular harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which provide any quest with its episodes and incidents that the goal of the quest is finally to be understood. A quest is always an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in self-knowledge. The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good. The catalogue of the virtues will therefore include the virtues required to sustain the kind of households and the kind of political communities in which men and women [people] can seek for the good together and the virtues necessary for philosophical enquiry about the character of the good. We have then arrived at a provisional conclusion about the good life for man: the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man is. We have also completed the second stage in our account of the virtues, by situating them in relation to the good life for man and not only in relation to practices. But our enquiry requires a third stage.

**Prefer additionally:**

1. **Performativity–Participating in debate concedes the authority of virtues like honesty because we don’t cheat**
2. **Other theories collapse–**
   1. **To follow a moral theory is to commit yourself to an attempting to become a better person through fostering virtue**
   2. **The reading of other frameworks is merely departing moral knowledge onto others which concedes the authority of virtue ethics**
3. **Prerequisite–The origin of philosophy had to start through a character-based paradigm since there were no preconceived notions or rules that we needed a guide towards the good; they chose to develop the good out of their own volition, so only virtue ethics is able to derive a proper conception of ethics**
4. **Specificity–space is a new domain which requires virtue ethics to create a more rigorous understanding of space ethics**

Zachary J. **Goldberg, 2021**, ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY IN SPACE EXPLORATION. Trilateral Research (Ireland) //SR

Indeed, the practical wisdom that constitutes virtue is often defined as the wisdom to establish the correct moral principle for a given case. As revealed above, the purpose of the cultivation of virtue is moral expertise. In fact, for traditional virtue theorists, virtue is synonymous with moral expertise, and expertise is constituted by knowledge and understanding (Vallor 2016, 26). Again, the ethic of responsibility is heavily influenced by virtue theory, but it contains a critical difference. At the core of the ethic of responsibility is the recognition that we cannot be certain what the correct moral principle for a given case is, and yet we must decide and act anyway. 20 The ethic of responsibility presupposes knowledge and understanding of the limits of one's knowledge and understanding. It is precisely the awareness of these limits and the need to continue questioning that makes the ethic of responsibility essential for circumstances of significant unknowns such as the context of human activities in space.

1. **Debating virtue ethics is necessary for personal development to build social awareness, create radical movements, and isolate the nuances of different ethical situations**

Luigina **Mortari &** Marco **Ubbiali 17** [University of Verona, ITALY] July 10, 2017 The “MelArete” Project: Educating children to the Ethics of Virtue and of Care, European Journal of Educational Research Volume 6, Issue 3, 269 - 278. ISSN: 2165-8714 <http://www.eu-jer.com/> //SR

Abstract: The educative project MelArete proposes an interpretation of ethical education: a form of Education to Virtue Ethics in the light of the philosophy of care. Starting from the ontological assumption that care is prime in life and without it the human being cannot flourish in his/her humanity, the project is based on an interpretation of the pedagogy of care. Since the practice of care reveals to have an ethical core and that core is made of ways of being-with-the-others, the pedagogical theory of MelArete states that in order to develop a project that is in relationship with the core of life we must educate to care. Therefore, educating to care means educating to virtues. On this basis MelArete proposes activities with the aim to guide children’s attention to the concepts of care and virtues. MelArete has its many references in Plato and Aristotle; besides it assumes the distinction of Ricoeur between ethics and morality. In Plato/Socrates (Alcibiades I) ethics is an educational action that allows the others to thrive in their own existential capabilities; moreover, in Aristotle’s (Nicomachean Ethics) ethics searches for eudaimonia, a good quality of life. In our educational project with children, the educative methods are the following: conversations (promoting intersubjective thought), narratives (reading and writing stories about virtues), vignettes and games (stimulating ethical thinking through a playful language) and the “diary of virtues” (promoting a reflecting culture of virtues in everyday life). In this paper we present the theoretical background of the project and a summary of the pedagogical approach and application which we are testing in our research. Introduction The Relevance of Ethical Education The necessity of ethics In human experience there are essential and unavoidable things, even if it very often occurs that what is ontically proximal (i.e. evident in everyday life) can be unknown in its ontological meaning (Heidegger, 1996). A primary evidence is given by the phenomenon of care: care is essential because human life cannot flourish without it. Everybody feels the necessity to feel good and defend him/herself from pain: care is the required answer to this necessity (Noddings, 2002). Ancient wisdom has theorized the ontological need for care. In Phaedrus Plato affirms that care is not only a human characteristic but it is also a trait of gods: Zeus is described as a god who acts “ordering all and taking care of all” (246e). In the Republic Socrates explains to Glaucon that since philosophers can rule the polis (because of their knowledge of what is beautiful, just and good), they should “have a care and providence of others” (520a). According to Plato/Socrates care is an action that benefits the person who is the object of the action of care (Plato, Euthyphro, 13b), with the aim of the full flowering of his existential capacities (Plato, Alcibiades I, 129a). In the 20th century Martin Heidegger renewed the interest in care and developed an original reflection: care is an essential ontological trait of the Dasein, its being structure, so that everybody is what he/she does and what he/she cares about (Heidegger, 1996). Emmanuel Lévinas states that as soon as he/she comes to light every human being has the need to take care of his/her life in order to get a solid form and to be conserved in the being (Lévinas, 2000). To a deep analysis it appears that an essential trait of the human ontological substance is that of vulnerability and fragility (Mortari, 2015). Human being is fragile because he/she is not self-subsistent; he/she is in need of being and has to look for it. Human being is vulnerable because he/she is always exposed to external forces that can wound him/her. The good that is present in the being can easily fail; it can degrade. It takes very little to create a situation of discomfort, a condition of painful intolerance. The violence of gestures or words is not necessary; instead, the carelessness and indifference of the non-Samaritan suffice to turn to the other side. Our awareness of the other’s vulnerability demonstrates the necessity of responsibility for one another—the generative root of the ethical act (Pulcini, 2009). If we accept the idea that human condition is characterized by plurality (Arendt, 1958), as a plural-singularity (Nancy, 2000) and as an original sociality (Lévinas, 2000) we can affirm that being is being-with: it is not sufficient in and of itself. We need others as much as others need us. The answer to the other’s “neediness” is care. The fact that everyone needs care makes self-evident that we must take care of the others. It is the continuous exchange of care that makes life possible. Coexisting implies to take care of the others. In this sense, taking care of the others is not just a possible ontological perspective, but a necessity for the whole existence. But what is care? Care is a practice through which a person takes to heart the other in order that she/he can have what is necessary to conserve and protect her/his life, to make the existential possibilities of life flourish and to mend the wounds of soul and body. To make it possible to educate to care it results necessary to identify what are the essential qualities of a caring behaviour. At this aim, the practice of care has been investigated both trough a literature review in the philosophy of the past (ancient: Plato, Seneca; recent: Heidegger, Lévinas) and of the present (Noddings, Held, Bowden, Tronto) (the results are in Mortari, 2006; 2015), and through an empirical investigation that assumed as object the experience of caring people (mothers, teachers, nurses). From this double investigation it emerged that care, since it is a practice, reveals itself through ways of being: to pay attention, to listen to, to be present, to act with delicacy, to pronounce words that attest a thoughtful consideration for the other, to show empathy, etc. But at the core of these ways of being it emerged to be intimate ethical postures as to have respect, to be generous, to have courage, to feel oneself responsible for the other: since these postures can be identified as virtues, it is legitimate to state that the intimate core of care is an ethics of virtues. From this assumption it emerges that educating to care means educating to virtues. Towards a Definition of Ethics What is Ethics? Philosophical reflections on ethics have a very complex and articulated tradition that cannot be analysed in this context. To set up the thought of our educational project we chose the approach of Paul Ricoeur (1990, 1992), illustrious exponent of French phenomenology and hermeneutics. His position, in fact, offers a very interesting and original connection between the ethics and philosophy of care, even if he is a philosopher external to the debate about care. His starting point is a clear distinction and definition of the two typical concepts of this conversational field: ethics and morality. After the identification of a common element, he establishes a precise difference. What joins the two terms is their linguistic origin—both words have a similar meaning. “Ethos” in Greek and “mores” in Latin both indicate customs. Beyond this original commonality, Ricoeur allocates a different semantic space to the term “ethics” when compared to the word “morality”: ethics refers to an understanding of “what is evaluated as good to do”, while morality corresponds to “what is right to do”. This distinction indicates that the central concern of ethics involves understanding what makes a good life. Meanwhile, morality means defining the rules and codes of behaviour. As a result, ethics falls firmly within the Aristotelian tradition, while morality remains in the Kantian domain. Ricoeur’s thinking seems to be particularly interesting because he assigns a primacy to ethics with respect to morality. Even though many rules can be formulated, the issues of life extend beyond any such boundaries. Clearly, it is beneficial to make use of Ricoeur’s form of wisdom which considers every situation in its peculiarity. Ricoeur defines ethics as “aiming at a good life lived with and for others in just institutions” (1992, p. 172). However, as he himself notices (Ricoeur, 1990), the term “aiming” (souhait) feels too generic, and he suggests substituting it with the term “care”; as a consequence, he establishes ethics as a discourse about care for oneself, care for the others and care for the institutions (1990). Since a relationship between care and ethics is established, it becomes difficult to ignore the moral feminine thought. The thinkers of ethics of care, in particular the ones starting from a feminist point of view such as Carol Gilligan (1987), Neil Noddings (1984, 2002), Eva Kittay (1999, 2002), and Virginia Held (2006), typically describe care as involving labor and relationships, as a relational practice that emphasizes mutual recognition and development, fostering well-being, social bonds, cooperation and human interdependence. From this lens, we can talk about the situational value of the ethics of care as well as the general value of the ethics of justice. Following the reasoning formulated by Ricoeur, ethics is always situational, while morality produces rules. A phenomenological analysis of ethical reasoning highlights an important idea: even if ethical decision making is (and should be) situational, reasoning (even if it is attentive to the particular) never has to confront itself with a general dimension. Therefore, we can make a distinction between the ethics of care and the ethics of justice. However, we must do so without attributing the regulatory character of morality to the ethics of justice. Similarly, on the other side, we must not confine the ethics of care to situational thinking: if we consider the reasoning at the foundation of caregivers’ practical choices, we see dynamic thinking, analysing the particular, concrete situation while extensively considering the principles of judgement. Ethics and Virtue The ethics of justice has long been dominant, holding dominion over every cultural aspect. We find an example in Robert Coles (1986), a psychiatrist who defines morality as the capacity to distinguish what is right from what is wrong. Recently, the ethics of care has become more attractive. We consider them to be complementary, rather than opposing, forces. In fact, there exists a primacy of care in the light of which the ethics of justice starts making sense. If we specifically analyse the ethics of care, we realize that its essence involves the search for the other’s good. The most important theorists in the ethics of care (Mayeroff, 1990; Noddings, 1984; Held, 2006; Tronto, 1993) assume that the specificity of this ethical perspective consists of facilitating the other, giving shape to his humanity; this perspective implies that the caregiver feels responsibly invested in looking for the good in people, both others and himself. This vision is at the heart of ancient philosophy, in particular in the Socratic thought. According to the Aristotelian perspective, virtue is a disposition that searches for the interpretation of the best-founded thing, to feel a certain sentiment when it is the time, orienting such feeling and using knowledge for a good target in the right way (Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, book II, 6, 1106b). If thus intended, virtue becomes the condition of looking for a good quality of life (eudaimonia), the aim towards which ethics bends (Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, book I, 1094a). The specificity of Aristotelian ethics, here taken as a reference, is its orientation to an ethics of virtue: it is founded on the assumption that the search for good relates to acting according to virtues (Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, book I, 8, 1099a). One can therefore assume the following: (a) care has an ontological primacy, (b) acting with care is moved by the intention to look for what is good, so we can talk about an ethics of care, and (c) ethics, in its living nucleus, is oriented to virtue: therefore, education to virtues finds a primary ontological foundation, which is an educative one. What characterizes acting with care is being ready for the other, accepting the responsibility of putting the other at the centre of one’s preoccupations when one perceives the other to be fragile and vulnerable. It is important to be sufficiently delocalized from oneself to concentrate on the other to the point of ascertaining his state of need and weakness, making it necessary to offer help. This willingness to responsibility, which in the politically most significant forms is applied to the “first come” principle (Lévinas, 2000), is translated into actions that can be indexed in the ethics of virtues field. But Can Virtues Be Taught? According to his own maieutic style, Socrates leaves open the question (Meno 70a). Aristotle instead gives a different answer to the question posed by Meno to Socrates: virtues can be taught. According to Aristotle, virtue is not an emotion or an ability, but it is a unique set of cognition, perception/recognition, emotion, desire, motivation, behaviour and conduct or style (Kristjánsson, 2007, 2015). Virtue is a habitual disposition to well acting. Peters stresses Aristotle’s notion of moral education as habituation (Nicomachean Ethics) arguing that ‘‘the palace of reason is entered through the courtyard of habit” (Peters, 1963, pp. 54-55). But what Peters seems not to see is that “the account of moral motivation or habituation provided by Aristotle is tailored to a conception of moral wisdom or reflection as itself a matter of desiderative or affective engagement with more personal and interpersonal aspects of moral association” (Carr, 2007a, p. 392). Aristotle points out that “morality is grounded in practice – a point recognised in his famous analogy between the cultivation of virtues and the acquisition of skills” (Carr, 2007b, p. 373) and at the same time he clearly affirms that this character training is necessary but not sufficient to achieve virtue. Aristotle states that the ful l acquisition of the moral virtues of courage, temperance and justice “requires the principled reflection of practical wisdom” (p. 373), giving the chance to reconnect cognitive, social and motivational aspects of moral life which are often separated. So it is clear that the concept of virtue as a habit should not be misinterpreted as an irrational habit, but as a way of being that takes its form after the work of reason engaged in modelling its own being. In other words, virtue takes its form under the continuous and critically informed guide of reason (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993, p. 5). The debate on Aristotle’s virtue ethics is intense and articulated. What is fundamental for our research is the idea that virtues can be learned through education and practice. Perspectives on Ethical Education A new attention to ethical education has emerged since several years. The international literature generally discusses “moral education”. Our position prefers to talk about “ethical education” because ethics deals with the project of a good life, while the word moral, in our culture, is fraught with meanings that sometimes are very heavy, resounding of moralism. However, because so many international scholars use the term “moral education”, it is necessary to examine this pedagogical perspective using its own peculiar language (Tronto, 1993). The “Moral Education” Position A leading figure of the “moral education” position is William Damon. Damon, not free from moralistic tones, observes that when the moral education position is examined, it is necessary to deal with the theme of values in terms of the following question: which values should be taught to young people? (Damon, 1998). However, it is difficult to find a shared position to answer this question. In fact, there is no general agreement about values or ethical rules. Meanwhile, the educational world has to deal with the lack of wisdom that would be necessary to understand how to practice ethical education because we have not yet committed sufficient thought to this specific philosophy of education. Beyond philosophical research, we can find two different pedagogical cultures dealing with “moral education”: “character education” and “moral reasoning”. Each quoted opinion is, of course, only a definition that summarizes and identifies a very complex field in which various authors present different programs and emphasis, most of them built in strict dialogue with other theories. It is not the purpose of this article to propose a complete literature review in every field of ethics education. We just try to focus on the main common characteristics of each position, choosing some authors that could present some peculiarity and contribute to found a solid pedagogical background to our educative program. The “Character Education” Position A very related theory in ethics education is character education. Character education is a complex concept to be defined and also an articulated theory: it is founded in different disciplines and requires a multifaceted educational strategy even because the concept of character is complicated and has to integrate the different aspects of the person (e.g. conscience, empathy, moral reasoning, values, moral identity, etc.). Berkowitz (2011) defines character education as the intentional development, in educational contexts, of youth’s citizenship agency, characterized by responsibility, pro-social behaviors and respect. Howard et al. (2004) affirm that there are three main approaches to character education: “the cognitive-developmental approach (often called moral education) which gives primacy to ‘knowing the good’, the caring approach which emphasizes ‘desiring the good’, and the traditional character education, which sees ‘doing the good’ as fundamental” (p. 190). These approaches are frequently mixed in the classroom practice and applied with other educational programs: service learning programs engaging students in active experiences to promote values (Stott &. Jackson, 2005); conflict resolution programs (Howard, Berkowitz, & Schaeffer, 2004); the Child Development Project, a comprehensive longitudinal intervention project designed to enhance the social and moral development of children through systematic changes in the classroom, school, and home environments (Watson et al., 1989; Battistich et al., 1991; Solomon et al., 1992); cognitive development programs that involve classroom discussions of moral dilemmas, through story telling (or history) used to communicate virtues (Lickona, 1978; 1993; 1997). Even if the positions are different, according to Lickona (1997, p. 95) “character education is the deliberate effort to teach virtue”: it is an effort to educate good character based on core virtues that are good both for the individual and the society. This identification between character education and virtue ethics can be explained with the fact that a virtue-centred vision assumes the “character” of the person who acts to be the key factor (Schneewind, 1990). The character education position claims inspiration from the Aristotelian tradition (Sichel, 1988). Noddings (2002) describes the peculiarity of the character education position, which contrasts with “moral reasoning”: she affirms that if the moral reasoning perspective gives importance to reasoning in the moral field (problem solving and development of critical thinking), character education deals with virtue education. In such a definition, character education becomes simple socialization, uninterested in the development of thinking. In fact, Noddings (2002) considers character education to be a path of development able to introduce the person into a community characterized by strong moral cohesion. Even many authors in the tradition of character education talk about processes of “moral reasoning or cognitive development” (Howard et al., 2004; Berkowitz, 2011), including discussion based components (as opposed to social indoctrination), this approach to ethical education tends not to underline the development of autonomous and critical thinking necessary to deal with other people; its fundamental purpose seems to groom young people to enter into a tradition, a process that occurs through story telling (McIntyre, 1981). Moral Reasoning The moral reasoning position also uses stories as instruments to develop critical thinking. However, there is an important difference: moral reasoning does not consist of the prevalent habits of a certain society, but of the Enlightenment ideals. The pedagogy of moral reasoning takes as its reference the theories of Kohlberg (1981, 1984) and his associates (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989). These theorists provide radical critiques of character education theory, because they think it drifts to a form of indoctrination. They question the possibility of directly teaching virtues, noting that such an approach requires a form of modelling that diverges entirely from the authentic meaning of education. Therefore, liberal American culture positively views theories of educational ethics promoting moral reasoning; meanwhile, conservative educators tend to follow the character education position inspired by illuminist philosophy. The psychological moral development theory elaborated by Kohlberg (1981, 1984) has played an important role in the psychological and pedagogical fields. Through his research, Kohlberg intended to explain the development of moral thinking. He asserted that moral development evolves through two stages at three different levels: two at a pre-conventional level, two at a conventional level, and two at a post-conventional level. The first stage is defined as heteronomous morality; the second as individualistic morality; the third as normative interpersonal morality; the forth as social system morality; the fifth as human rights morality; the sixth as universal ethical principle morality. These processes involve the use of what Colby and Kohlberg (1987) called a “moral point of view”, defined as “a point of view that ideally all human beings should take toward one another as free and equal autonomous persons. This means equal consideration of the claims or points of view of each person affected by the moral decision to be made” (p. 30). The above-mentioned stages develop in an unvaried sequence. We can summarize the principles of Kohlberg’s theory in three assumptions: (a) the criterion for moral development is maturity of moral judgment (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, pp. 1–2), (b) moral judgment is organized in “structures of the whole” (p. 8), and (c) the new structures of moral reasoning that people acquire as they develop “transform and displace” the previous ones (p. 7). This stage vision of moral development allowed Kohlberg to theorize that only a limited percentage of people reaches the highest stages; we thus can assume that there is a so-called moral élite (Tronto, 1993). Another problematic aspect of his theory is that it does not pretend to be a descriptive theory of moral development—it also prescribes the “right” direction of this development (Tronto, 1993). The most cutting and culturally influential critique to that theory of moral development came from Carol Gilligan who stated that the people involved in Kohlberg’s studies were all male. Starting from this observation, she hypothesizes that his theory was corrupted by sexism. Conducting research according to Kohlberg’s model but with a different research design, Gilligan theorized the existence of a different moral voice in addition to justice: the voice of care. She distinguished a practice of justice, concerned with the application of rights and rules, from a morality of care, concerned with the preservation and nurturing of human relationships (Gilligan, 1982). While care assumes responsibility and relationship as central concepts, justice focuses on rights and rules. As such, the ethics of care concentrates on concrete living circumstances, while the ethics of justice concerns itself with a more formal and theoretical plan. Ultimately, care fundamentally consists of a way of acting, while justice means defining principles (Tronto, 1993). Another radical critique to Kohlberg’s, and also to Piaget’s, theory is the Domain Theory by Turiel and collegues (Turiel, 1998, 2002, 2010; Smetana, 1995, 2006; Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Nucci, 1982; Nucci & Narvaez, 2008; Killen & Smetana, 2008, 2010). Like Kohlberg, they assume a constructivist vision about children’s understanding of the world, recognize the role of cognitive development to moral understanding, and stress the role of peers interactions to moral growth. In opposition to his theory, instead, they affirm that the distinction between moral and non-moral concepts does not occur out of a global fusion of social concepts (as Kohlberg stated), through a process of differentiation and hierarchical integration. According to the Domain Theory, instead, moral, conventional, and personal domains are separated and self-regulating developmental systems: they are neither developmentally ordered, nor hierarchically oriented and coexist from early age, even if they change qualitatively with age. There are also critiques of the moral reasoning approach itself as accurately represented by moral psychology: for example, the contribution of Haidt and Greene and their Social Intuitionist approach (Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; 2007; Haidt & Graham, 2007) paid attention to the role of emotion and intuition in moral judgment and action, and was very influential in challenging the moral reasoning in educational approach that tended to forget the complexity of the “mind”. Education to the Ethics of Virtues: The Philosophy of the “MelArete” Project Taking the theory of care and Aristotle’s virtue ethics as a foundation, we propose a different interpretation of ethical education, education to the ethics of virtue according to the ethics of care. In Greek, one of the terms describing care is melete, and the term for virtue is arete. From these terms, we derived the name of our ethical educational project, MelArete (Mortari & Mazzoni, 2014). This project is based on the following pedagogical question: How can we orient the person to pay attention to virtues and to reflect about the values they can assume in order to realize a good quality of life? Education, to be considered valid, cannot demand the teaching and realization of the good according to a geometrical and unquestionable vision. At the same time, a philosophy of education must dare to follow possible educative paths based on horizons of meaning. Since the ethics field is not dogmatic, any philosophy of education must seek to maintain an open and critical perspective. Meanwhile, a coherent educational method is needed to nurture young minds and build the awareness necessary for a critical, autonomous, and reflective disposition. What is the relationship between MelArete, the character education position, and moral reasoning? Similar to the character education position, MelArete considers virtue to be a key concept for ethical education; however, we do not confuse ethics with mere socialization. Aligned with moral reasoning, MelArete gives importance to the development of reasoning, cultivating analytical, critical, and deliberative thinking while avoiding abstraction and conceptualism. MelArete is an expression of “care theory”; in this project, the acquisition of virtues does not follow a top-down, dogmatic model, but passes through a radical critical analysis of every aspect of experience. Ultimately, we can say that MelArete assumes two aims: cultivating passion for the research of the good while developing the capability to consider ethical questions analytically and critically. In our educational project with children, we obtain these aims through the following methods:  Conversations: we use conversations to promote intersubjective thought, where people can talk with others, as in “Socratic Circles” (Copeland, 2005).  Narratives: we seek a “narrative shift” (Ricoeur, 1984-88; Bruner, 1990). By reading and writing stories about virtues involving people within ethical dilemmas, learners become more able to face them.  Vignettes and games: through a playful language, we present children ethical dilemmas or critical situations, and we stimulate their creative thought in the ethical field.  The “Diary of virtues”: we invite children to write a diary in order to cultivate virtues in everyday life and reflect on their actions . The MelArete project has been proposed to children during the school year 2016-2017 and the data collected are in the phase of analysis. Starting from the philosophy referred in this essay we elaborated two different curricula (even if similar) in order to interact with different aged children: one curriculum was thought for primary school, the second for kindergarten. In our research we experimented the project with:  6 primary school 4th-grade classes, involving 106 nine y.o. children;  8 kindergarten classes, involving 57 five y.o. children. The seven schools chosen for the research were set in different Italian cities located in the North and in the Centersouthern regions, and are characterized by different social-economical backgrounds. The teachers involved were 24 (11 in primary schools and 13 in kindergartens). After a long phase of preparation of the tools and coordination with the schools, the project started with its practical phase in October 2016 and finished in June 2017. The researchers met the classrooms twice a month: the fifteen days between one meeting and the another gave children a sufficient time to reflect and a tranquil time to learn. The project consisted in 12 meetings with every class. The data collected are: conversations between children and the researcher focused on virtues, presented through narratives and ludic activities; texts written by children (tales, personal reflections and the “diary of virtue”) and drawings supported by children’s description recorded by the researcher and the teachers (in particular in kindergarten). Even if a deep and organic analysis of data has just started, the framework of the research is clear and defined. Therefore, some findings or preliminary considerations can be presented. The purpose of the research is to understand what kind of ethical thought is the project able to foster in children. Data will be analysed following a phenomenological approach (Mortari, 2007; Tarozzi & Mortari, 2010) in order to show the “essence” of children’s ethical thought. From a preliminary analysis, and after deep debate with the teachers involved, we can state that the project helped children to understand the concept of virtue (in most of cases previously totally ignored) and consider it as a granted framework in order to reflect on actions while looking for the good. Children have been able to recognize the different components of a virtuous action (thought, emotion, consequences, choice), acted or seen; and they could recognize the ethical “call” inside dilemmas of everyday life. The capacity of analysis and reflection resulted to be so increased that children have been able not only to name a specific virtue and choose a coherent action in critical situation, but also to understand the complexity of every situation and action, so that they could identify different “nuances” or different virtues in a single action.

1. **Only our theory can explain violence--it's a prior question to building effective movements. History proves**

**Desai 16** [Shrey Desai, debated for four years at Saratoga High School, 4-11-2016, "Philosophy and Oppression by Shrey Desai," Briefly, https://www.vbriefly.com/2016/04/11/philosophy-and-oppression-by-shrey-desai/] AG highlighted AHS PB RCT //SR

What makes virtue ethics an attractive theory to address oppression is its emphasis on character. Moral character is achieved through societal deliberation and character traits such as respect, compassion, and benevolence are cultivated throughout the way. Virtue ethicists argue that a strong moral character is key to eudaimonia, the Greek word for “a good life.” In order to relate virtue ethics to oppression, I will use white supremacists as an example. White supremacists fundamentally believe that their race and culture is superior to those of others, such as African-Americans, Hispanics, or Asians. Through mere intuition, one can safely say that these white supremacists have inculcated a lot of vices; just to name a few, these supremacists lack empathy for the feelings of others and are definitely not humble when weighing between cultural beliefs. They are not leading “the good life,” and they are fundamentally devoid of important virtues and a strong moral character. Tessman (2005) argues that oppressors “exhibit moral vices (such as callousness, greed, self‐centeredness, dishonesty, cowardice, in addition to injustice) or at least the absence of certain specific moral virtues (perhaps compassion, generosity, cooperativeness, openness to appreciating others).” In order to cleanse themselves of their repugnant mindsets and oppressive tendencies, these oppressors must first and foremost rid themselves of these vices. Through the Aristotelian ways of moral education and practice, the oppressors can develop a moral character, ultimately solving for the root cause of their harm towards others. This phenomenon also has historical precedent. The use of virtues was empirically successful in bringing down oppressors during the Civil Rights movement. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was an important moral authority for the United States; he encouraged the discipline of nonviolence and tolerance in order to spread racial justice. The methods that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. used were morally praiseworthy, and ultimately, successful. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 proved that policymakers in the United States federal government had come to terms with their vices and were cognizant of the racism that had infiltrated the nation. The same white supremacists that had segregated African-Americans were forced to develop a moral conscience and inculcate virtues such as respect and compassion that allowed them to view the African-American people as equals. Moral integrity and the promotion of virtue were not only effective but also essential in stopping real world oppression.

## Offense

**I affirm: The colonization of outer space by private entities is unjust.**

**Space col is:**

**New World Encyclopedia**, “space colonization” <https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/space_colonization> //SR

Space colonization (also called space settlement, space humanization, or space habitation) is the concept of permanent, autonomous (self-sufficient) human habitation of locations outside Earth. It is a major theme in science fiction, as well as a long-term goal of various national space programs.

**Cx and before round checks all interps to deter friv theory and maximize substance. Affirm:**

**1–Greed–colonization is a way for corporations to mark their territory and power, accumulating as much land as possible–excludes others from our moral calculus since we’re centering goals around ourselves**

**Ward 19** [(Peter, master’s degree in business journalism from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. His work has appeared in GQ, Bloomberg Buisnessweek, The Economist, and Newsweek.) “The unintended consequences of privatising space” 11-6-19, https://www.sciencefocus.com/space/the-unintended-consequences-of-privatising-space/] TDI

But space isn’t the bastion of free-floating freedom some think it is, and it’s ripe for exploitation by monopolies. A space station operator, for example, could decide which fibre optics manufacturer could use its facility and which could not. The fibre optics produced in a zero-gravity environment are much cleaner and more valuable than that produced on Earth, meaning that one company would have a massive advantage, and the space station would decide who had access to the best manufacturing conditions. That’s just one example of a potential monopoly, but if you go further into the future of space exploration, things only get more frightening. Imagine a colony on the Moon or Mars run by a corporation. That one company would control everything the colonists need to survive, from the water to the oxygen to the food. That’s a dangerous amount of power for any company, but it’s a very real scenario.

**2–Hubris–attempts to play god and rule the world, creating conceptions of perfection when there is always room for improvement–also destroys ethical communities by further separating and dividing us**

Robert **Sparrow, 2015**, “Terraforming, Vandalism, and Virtue Ethics” <https://robsparrow.com/wp-content/uploads/Terraforming-Vandalism-and-Virtue-Ethics-.pdf> //SR [lmk if pdf doesn’t work, i used I used brandfolder.com to convert picture to text]

The Sin of Hubris The other vice which terraforming might involve us in is the sin of hubris. Hubris is a vice, discussed in classical Greek literature and mythology, which is popularly thought to involve 'excessive pride before the gods (Fischer 1992). For Hill (1983, pp. 216-22) and Reinhardt (1982), it occurs when men (sic) wilfully ignore their limits and seek to become as the gods.' Hubris is traditionally punished by disaster. The excess of pride is the undoing of those who possess it and they are put in their place, usually roughly. The paradigmatic example of hubris (Ovid 1916, pp. 407–67, 1929, pp. 67–118), on this understanding, is given in the legend of Icarus, who flew too close to the sun in the attempt to reach heaven and lost his son as a result Planetary engineering strikes me as a good candidate for the sort of project which would demonstrate hubris. We would be playing God. This sentiment is never far from the literature. The rhetoric of terraforming is quite self-consciously a rhetoric of transformation and transcendence. Terraforming is not just another project but a project that would make us "world-makers' (Fogg 1995, p. xi; Haynes 1990). It would mark the next stage of human destiny and the beginning of conquest of space. What about someone who denies that there are any limits on human activity? Someone who holds that there are no Gods, no-one to challenge, and that human beings can and should forge a glorious destiny. It is obviously unsatisfactory to rely on religious claims about the proper place of humanity. For the argument to be convincing in modern circumstances we must be able to give a non-theistic account of hubris. There are two strategies we may pursue to develop such an account. The first and the easiest is to focus on the character and phenomenology of the vice of hubris. It is to give a description of hubris as an attitude and to show that the project of terraforming is both the result of and a source of such attitudes. As noted above, the proponents of terraforming often seem to demonstrate an attitude which is a good prima facie candidate for hubris. Classically, hubris involves glorying in one's own powers, a false optimism about them and a haste to put them to the test. A lack of self-knowledge and self-reflection is also characteristic of hubris, as is a dismissive attitude toward both critics and past failures. All of these traits are sometimes evidenced in the discussion of terraforming. The project attracts interest simply because it is so dramatic and because of the proof it could provide of the supremacy of the human spirit and our engineering skill. This enthusiasm for terraforming looks particularly damning in the light of past technological disasters on Earth. There is little self-reflection going on in the debate about terraforming (Briggs 1986; Fogg 1995; Haynes 1990; McKay 1990; Rolston 1986), which is largely a technical debate about feasibility and methods and which allows little room for questions about why we would want to engage in such a project. So the attitudes surrounding and driving terraforming seem to fit the phenomenology of hubris. However, this strategy will not, I suspect, prove effective against an entirely serious (including morally serious) and reflective advocate of terraforming who denies that any of the above attitudes are involved and who challenges the conservative and parochial consequences of the critique. Although the attitudes described above are all, as a matter of contingent fact, demonstrated by current advocates of terraforming, it remains to be argued that they are always likely to be so. In order to meet objections of this type, we need to try to show that the sin of hubris involves a reference to certain sorts of projects. The above attitudes are all part of the burning desire to transgress our limits. We need to give some account of our limits and to show that terraforming is outside them. The second strategy is thus to try and formulate a (non-theistic) account of humanity's place in the cosmos and of appropriate limits to human activities, in order to show that projects which transgress these demonstrate hubris. It is important to understand that this argument is attempting to show that seeking to transcend certain limits demonstrates hubris and is therefore wrong rather than attempting to show why seeking to transcend certain limits is wrong and therefore demonstrates hubris. It is intended to remain within an agent-based framework. ‘We need an account of our limits in order to better show when people are trying to overcome them. However, the fact that trying to do so is wrong is solely a function of whether it demonstrates hubris or not, which will also depend on any other number of things besides.” ‘How do we distinguish these limits? Again it seems to me that there are two ‘ways we might seek some guide to the limits of proper human action. ‘The first moves indirectly towards an account of our limits by focusing on the nature of our actions and arguing that certain features are characteristic of projects which seek to transcend our proper limits. There is often a significant relation between our actions and the projects they are part of. In the case of hubris, acts, of hubris are usually lange, dramatic and unprecedented acts. They are usually punished by disaster. The pride and the fall go hand in hand, The possibility of disaster then, of failure which would bring us low, operates as a sign of hubris. ‘Terraforming certainly involves the possibility of catastrophic failure. Given the scale of the project and the amount of energy involved, failures are likely to be disastrous. Instead of a habitable planet, we may produce one with a poisonous atmosphere or without water or lashed by continual typhoons. Indeed, given the amount of resources and human effort which would need to be dedicated to terraforming anything other than complete success would be a disaster. Note that itis the possibility of disaster rather than its probability which is important here. J am not arguing that the risks are too great or that the costs of failure would be too high. Instead the possibility of a catastrophic failure which would reveal our ambitions as arrogant and futile acts as an indication that the project is one which oversteps the limits of our wisdom and abilities. Secondly, we might attempt more directly to flesh out the idea of our own proper human place. We could try to gain a sense of possible limits to the ambitions 'which are appropriate to human beings. When considering terraforming, because the limit we are considering here is the physical limit of being confined to a single planet, it seems fair to invoke the metaphor of ‘our proper place’ in a spatial sense. However, this metaphor (Hill 1983, pp. 216-20; Reinhardt 1982) can also be understood more generally to pose the question of our proper place in the scheme of things or the limits of the sphere of human activity. To say that some location, ‘area is ‘our proper place’ is not an empty thought. It implies a certain relation of appropriateness in our presence there. A proper place is one in which one can flourish without too much of a struggle. Its one that we can live in and sustain, It ‘is a place in which one ‘fits’ and does not appear uncomfortable or ‘out of place’, It is prima facie implausible to suggest that Mars is our proper place. The ‘Yast amount of effort required for us to sustain a presence there, even to the point of entirely transforming the planet, indicates that itis not a natural environment for us. Our presence there would be analogous to that of a penguin in the Sahara or a rabbit underwater. If we have to wear space suits to visit and to completely remodel it in order to stay, then it's simply not our place. Another way to try 10 understand our ‘proper place” is by relating it to the idea of a home, It seems natural to say of most creatures, at least as individuals and perhaps as species, that they have @ home. This is a place which nurtures them, in which they grow up, Reproduce and which offers them some semblance of safety. It is difficult to say of ‘human beings collectively, who have colonised all reaches of the globe, where our ‘home’ is. However, ‘Earth’ looks like a plausible answer. Planets seem to have 4 certain status as possible homes for creatures because of their nature as whole self-contained systems on which life can evolve. The relation between the idea of 8 ‘home’ and the idea of our proper place that I am suggesting is an ethical one. Our proper place is at home until we have shown that we are mature enough to leave it. Whether or not people are ready to leave home depends on how well they live at home and how they look after that home. On this test, the human species does not look well qualified to start moving out to other planets, We must show ‘that we are capable of looking after our current ‘home’ before we could claim to have any place on another. For the moment, at least, our proper place is on Earth and the desire to colonise other planets is indicative of hubris. ‘These arguments are explicitly parochial. They hold that human beings are limited creatures, whose ambitions should not seek to escape these limits and with ‘@ proper place in the natural world.’ However, note that even denvine that has an beings have any fixed or proper place in the universe is not necessarily to deny that we have a proper place at the moment. It may be that humans have ultimately no fixed place in the universe, that it is in our nature to explore, wander and alter our environment. Yet this is not to say that we cannot fix our place at a given time. History and context are important here. One can grow into a place, or show that ‘one’s place has become too small or (more likely) that one is not suited to occupy one’s current place. Given the current state of this planet's ecosystem and the responsibility that human beings beat for this, I think one would be hard pressed to argue that we are morally fit to assume control over another. Until we heal the Earth we have no claim to any further space. Finally, notice that hubris is a paradigmatic example of an agent-based vice. If we think poorly of someone who demonstrates hubris it is solely because of ‘hat they have revealed about their character. Although, as I have argued, the risk of disaster plays some role in determining, what sorts of actions demonstrate Hubris, the actual consequences flowing from these actions are not relevant to course assessment. Indeed there may be no ill consequences resulting from hubris. ‘Those who commit hubris may “get away with it” and their projects succeed." ‘Nonetheless we may still deplore the character they have demonstrated.

**3–Insensitivity–space col refuses to look at the beauty of the world around us and exploits it for our own purposes, showing ignorance and the lack of care or empathy, which removes the desire to improve or form virtuous relationships**

Robert **Sparrow, 2015**, “Terraforming, Vandalism, and Virtue Ethics” <https://robsparrow.com/wp-content/uploads/Terraforming-Vandalism-and-Virtue-Ethics-.pdf> //SR [lmk if pdf doesn’t work, i used I used brandfolder.com to convert picture to text]

An Aesthetic Insensitivity The first vice that, I believe, terraforming would demonstrate in us is a reprehensible aesthetic insensitivity - on a massive scale. Destroying the unique natural landscape of an entire planet to turn it to our own purposes reveals us to be vandals and brutes. For Sagoff (1974), it shows that we lead impoverished lives, being unable to respond appropriately to the beauty that is in the world around us. The argument (Elliot 1989; Hill 1983; Passmore 1975, p. 263) that the destruction of natural environments may reveal in us a problematic aesthetic insensitivity has been made before. What I wish to emphasise in my account, however, is that the virtue ethics I am applying allows that a vice may be demonstrated simply because of the character it reveals in the agent and regardless of any considerations of the consequences it may have. There are two arguments that suggest that an aesthetic insensitivity is a vice that may render the destruction (or neglect) of beauty wrong simply in itself. First, the act of destroying beauty is itself reprehensible independently of any consequences that may flow from it. Even if the beauty destroyed would replace itself, it would still be wrong to destroy it precisely because doing so demonstrates an aesthetic insensitivity. This is best illustrated by use of an example. Consider a person who goes hiking in the Snowy Mountains early one morning and discovers, by the edge of a cutting, a stunning array of icicles, a thing of great beauty, formed when the creek, which ran over the cutting at that point, froze over. Let us stipulate that this display is formed anew every night and occasionally disappears completely by the end of the day and, furthermore, that the hiker knows this. We also know that no one else will be hiking that path that day. Isn't it still the case that if the hiker destroys the icicles, they have demonstrated a significant defect of character and lessened themselves as a person in doing so? The person who casually runs a stick across them, thus destroying them for no reason but a petty act of will, demonstrates an insensitivity to their beauty, which is gross and disturbing. Their destruction of the icicles suggests that they have not seen them clearly. If they had truly seen and comprehended their beauty, they could not have destroyed them. The fact that they were destroyed is not important here, except in that it points to the insensitivity of the vandal. What is significant is the blindness they have displayed to beauty even though no-one else may suffer from its loss. This blindness is a failing on their part. It is a vice. The second way in which we may demonstrate a troubling insensitivity to beauty, although without destroying it, is by using it to our own purposes, which make no reference to its beauty. Again I will illustrate this by use of an example. Take the case of someone who finds an original Van Gogh - another Sunflowers, on hardboard - in the musty attic of their new house. This painting is an object of great - nay extraordinary - beauty. However, our hypothetical discoverer merely glances at it, puts it aside and later turns it upside down and places it on top of a crate in order to make a table on which they can store tins of paint. Let us suppose that doing so does not damage the painting in any way. It is merely being used for a purpose other than that for which it was created. Let us further suppose that, because no one knew of the existence of this painting, nobody suffers any loss by virtue of its use in this fashion. However, again, a person who acts in this way demonstrates that they are blind to the beauty of the world around them. The way in which they see the object is not the way they should see it. It neglects what any normal person would recognise as the most significant property of the painting - its beauty. This failure to recognise beauty is deplorable. In each of these examples, although the presence (and neglect) of beauty is necessary to demonstrate the existence of the vice, it is not the fact that beauty is destroyed or neglected that is the source of our condemnation. It is not the consequences of the action that are significant. They are, in each case, benign. Instead, it is the character flaw itself that invites our disapproval. It is true that bad consequences may flow from the vice, such as, for instance, the fact that we would lead impoverished lives if we could not see the beauty around us, but that is not the reason we should avoid the vice. To be insensitive to beauty is deplorable simply in itself, regardless of the consequences that follow from it. This account of the vice of aesthetic insensitivity would be most powerful if we possessed an objectivist account of beauty. It would then require that we be sensitive even to systems which we do not find in the first instance to be beautiful but which (we recognise) fit some objective description of beauty. However, as Willard (1980, pp. 295–7) maintains, the account would still work with a response- dependent or inter-subjective account of beauty, in which case we would only be required to respond to those systems that normal (or appropriately qualified) observers recognise as beautiful. In either case, the role played by beauty illustrates my earlier claim that an agent-based ethics need not be as human-centred as one might think. In order to avoid demonstrating a vice, we are required to respond to features of the world around us which are independent of our own interests. If an objectivist account of beauty (Slote 1992, Chapter 10) can be provided then we are required to respond to facts about the world which make no reference to facts about humans at all.?

## Advantage

**Private space col coming now**

**Sheetz 21** [(Michael, a Space Reporter for CNBC.com) “INVESTING IN SPACE Elon Musk wants SpaceX to reach Mars so humanity is not a ‘single-planet species’” CNBC, 4/23/2021. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/23/elon-musk-aiming-for-mars-so-humanity-is-not-a-single-planet-species.html] BC

SpaceX founder and CEO Elon Musk remains focused on his vision for the company: Establishing a permanent human presence on Mars, with its Starship rockets carrying people to and from the red planet. “We don’t want to be one of those single planet species, we want to be a multi-planet species,” Musk said on Friday, speaking after the company launched its Crew-2 mission to orbit. “It’s been now almost half a century since humans were last on the moon. That’s too long, we need to get back there and have a permanent base on the moon — again, like a big permanently occupied base on the moon. And then build a city on Mars to become a spacefaring civilization, a multi-planet species,” Musk also said. Starship is the enormous stainless steel rocket that SpaceX has been building and testing at its development facility in Boca Chica, Texas. Starship’s goal is to launch cargo and people on missions to the moon and Mars. Current Starship prototypes stand at about 150 feet tall, or about the size of a 15-story building, and each one is powered by three Raptor rocket engines. Musk has previously estimated that it will cost about $5 billion to fully develop Starship, although SpaceX has not disclosed how much it has spent on the program to date. The company has steadily raised funds in the past few years, to fund both Starship and its similarly ambitious Starlink project, with SpaceX’s valuation soaring to about $74 billion — making it one of the most valuable private companies in the world. Additionally, SpaceX last week won a $2.9 billion contract from NASA, to help the space agency land astronauts on the moon’s surface with the first crewed mission targeting 2024. ″[Starship has] mostly been funded internally thus far and its pretty expensive. As you can tell, if you’ve been watching videos, we’ve blown up a few of them,” Musk said. The company has performed multiple successful test flights of Starship, although landing attempts after the last four high-altitude flights ended in fiery explosions. Despite the the prototypes’ destruction, SpaceX sees the test flights as progress toward creating a rocket that is fully reusable. SpaceX’s current Falcon fleet of rockets is partially reusable, as the company can land and reuse the rocket’s boosters. But Musk hopes Starship transforms space travel into something more akin to commercial air travel. The rocket’s enormous size would also make it capable of launching several times as much cargo at once — for comparison, while SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rockets can send as many as 60 Starlink satellites at a time, SpaceX says Starship will be able to launch 400 Starlink satellites at a time. Musk remains “highly confident” that SpaceX will land humans on Mars by 2026, saying last December that it’s an achievable goal “about six years from now.” He added that SpaceX plans to send a Starship rocket without crew “in two years.” In the meantime, SpaceX has many milestones to go before Starship can carry passengers. The rocket has yet to reach orbit. Musk last year said that the company will fly “hundreds of missions with satellites before we put people on board.” Musk may be focused on Mars, but the hurdles of Starship’s development are not lost on the space billionaire. “It’s a tough vehicle to build because we’re trying to crack this nut of a rapid and fully reusable rocket,” Musk said. “But the thing that’s really important to revolutionize space is a rapidly reusable rocket that’s reliable, too.”

**Space col escalates geopolitical tensions–that ensures space weaponization**

**Duke 20** [(Sgt. Joshua, served as a US Army intelligence analyst, including 24 months in Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom I, II, III, and IV. He holds a BA in intelligence studies with a concentration in counterintelligence from American Military University and is now serving in the United States Marine Corps. Sergeant Duke’s research focus is on national security and intelligence, including new approaches to counterterrorism using counterintelligence-based models; autonomous weaponry developments and their applications to international law, armed conflict, and US national security; and the future impacts of the space domain on global economics, intelligence operations, and US national security. He is also the author of “From Missiles to Microchips: Nation-States, Non-State Actors, and the Evolution of Intelligence” (Global Security Review, 2020); “Paid to Kill: An Examination of the Evolution of Combatants for Hire” (Global Security Review, 2020); and “Cyber World War: The People’s Republic of China, Anti-American Espionage, and the Global Cyber Arms Race” (Global Security Review, 2020, forthcoming).) “Conflict and Controversy in the Space Domain: Legalities, Lethalities, and Celestial Security” Wild Blue Yonder, 9/29/2020. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Article-Display/Article/2362296/conflict-and-controversy-in-the-space-domain-legalities-lethalities-and-celesti/] BC

Part 3: Mars Domination Mars is widely accepted by the scientific community to be the most plausible planet for the first human habitation on a celestial body and, consequently, the most likely location for the first space colony and eventually a second planet for humankind. Thus, Mars is a desirable goal for nations involved in space exploration for many reasons. The territory on Mars, for example, will most likely become marketable for economic value to civilians in the long term. The Outer Space Treaty prevents ownership of territory on celestial bodies but makes no mention of ownership or sale for profit of structures built on, or items brought to, celestial bodies, just as there is no explicit language in the treaty preventing profit-based resource exploitation on celestial bodies by either governments, organizations, or private nationals.32 Additionally, the inevitability of Mars becoming a second planet inhabited by humanity must be considered, along with all of the implications of living spaces and ownership of property that will eventually follow. Denying this inevitability and claiming it as outlawed by international law due to the prohibition on appropriating territory on a celestial body would essentially equate owning property on Earth as also outlawed by international law. After all, Earth is also a celestial body. Language in the treaty encourages expansion into space and essentially says that if persons, governments, or organizations build something on a celestial body, they own that building33 and can do what they want with it, including selling it. They cannot, however, claim to own the planet's ground outside the building—yet. Resources on Mars, while still not mapped out as substantially as lunar resources have been, will likewise create new markets for economic prosperity and national wealth, including more 3He deposits from solar winds like those found in lunar regolith along with substantially high concentrations of iron.34 In addition to buildings constructed on celestial bodies, spacecraft and facilities constructed in space and on celestial bodies are also considered to be the territory of the owning nation, which means that the UN Charter applies to facilities and spacecraft in space and on celestial bodies. UN Charter Article 2(4), in particular, protects space explorers and potential future residents on Mars by prohibiting the "use of force against the territorial integrity" of another nation party to the treaty,35 which all space-faring nations are. Article 51 further dictates that if attacked, "the inherent right of . . . self-defense" shall not be impaired.36 Article V of the Outer Space Treaty prescribes that, in space, all humans are bound to "render all possible assistance to" each other as "envoys of Mankind."37 Essentially, a peaceful international course is possible—even mandated—for human expansion into space. Unfortunately, the PRC and the RF regard space and celestial bodies as territorial goals,38 leading to the assumption that attempts will be made to control and defend such territories as necessary to achieve space superiority, control over space resources, and managerial power over the future colonization of Mars. Control over Mars, in addition to affecting resource exploitation, transportation, and scientific advancements, also has implications for the direction of humanity in space. Establishment of a human colony, or human colonies, on Mars will eventually lead to territorial spaces, development of the land and air (potentially involving terraforming the planet for atmospheric enhancement), and security issues. While an established colony on the Red Planet is still likely decades away, trends within the PRC and RF governments suggest that any established colony on Mars under their jurisdiction would be authoritarian, weaponized, and secret. Given the nature of weather on Mars, fortified structures are easily justified, and the lack of a conventional weapons ban on celestial bodies makes weaponization of such a colony both legal and desirable, mainly because of the third inherently desired factor—secrecy. The inevitability of PRC and RF presence on Mars also suggests that any US developments will also include fortifications and weaponization. While the Outer Space Treaty mandates cooperation between nations on celestial bodies, the extreme distance between Earth and Mars means that a compliance verification system with effective monitoring and enforcement will be complicated, if not impossible, for the foreseeable future. For these reasons, a nation that effectively controls near-Earth space and establishes a security presence on the Moon will effectively be in a position to control Mars.

**That causes miscalc from suspicion and makes conflict exponentially more likely**

**Morton 18** [(Adam, a retired philosopher attached to the University of British Columbia. He is a philosophical generalist with a particular interest in issues about knowledge and about how people understand one another. His book Should We Colonize Other Planets?​ is available now.) “Colonizing Other Planets Could Trigger War on Earth | Opinion” News Week, 11/22/2018. https://www.newsweek.com/colonizing-other-planets-could-trigger-war-earth-and-ecological-disaster-1226630] BC

Plans for the exploration and even colonization of other planets are very much in the air, and getting to Mars in particular has become a billionaire's hobby lately. Elon Musk would like to establish a human colony on Mars in a matter of decades. (For the foreseeable future—a century, I would venture—Mars will be the only real possibility.) But planetary colonies may be a bad idea, even a disastrous idea. So, it is important to see the arguments against them, as well as their appeal. I begin with a reason that is sometimes made central to proposals for colonies—the idea that we should achieve them as soon as it is feasible. It is a call for escape from imminent danger. The idea is that nuclear war, ecological catastrophe, or the rise of artificially intelligent robots, will wipe out humans on Earth. But a colony far away might survive, so that the species continues. Stephen Hawking is among those who have argued, or usually just pronounced, for versions of this (and if you want scientific authority, it is hard to do better). But the idea has serious flaws. It is hard to think of even a post-apocalyptic Earth that is less hospitable to any terrestrial life than Mars, let alone elsewhere in the solar system, so the challenges are enormous. But let us ignore that. Suppose that a colony had a reasonable chance of surviving, would the argument from danger justify founding it soon? I think not. One danger is nuclear and biological war: One nation or ethnic group fears or hates another enough to unleash bombs or viruses. In a bad scenario they succeed. Millions die, and their territory becomes uninhabitable. In the worst scenario, the other side retaliates or the affliction spreads and eventually everyone is dead. But people survive on Mars. Which people? They will include members of one group or their opponents, so if the aim really is to wipe out this group it will be directed at the colonists as well. They are hated, and they are capable of retaliation. Bomb-bearing rockets are much simpler to make than people-bearing rockets. And someone crazy enough to push the button would be crazy enough to direct them at the hated enemy wherever they are found. So, the colony would not be safe. At any rate, it will not be not safe enough that founding it is a better bet than making war less likely on Earth. Worse, any nation party to founding a colony will arouse suspicion in its enemies that it is scheming to start and survive a war. And this makes war more rather than less likely.

**Space weaponization is an impact filter–nuclear war, deterrence collapse, and loss of R&D**

**Gilliard 19**, Alexandra. (Alexandra Gilliard is a Senior Editor and interviewer of international relations experts for the International Affairs Forum. She holds an M.S. in Global Studies and International Relations from Northeastern University, and a B.A. in International Relations from Boston University, with expertise in conflict resolution, arms control, human rights issues, and the MENA region.) “What Are the Consequences of Militarizing Outer Space?” Global Security Review, 10 June 2019, https://globalsecurityreview.com/consequences-militarization-space/. //JQ

Consequences of Armament and Aggression in Space The consequences of weapons testing and aggression in space could span generations, and current technological advances only increase the urgency for policymakers to pursue a limitations treaty. As it stands, there are three major ramifications of a potential arms race in space: The destruction of satellites As both financial and technological barriers to the space services industry have decreased, the number of governmental and private investors with assets in space has inevitably increased. There is now an abundance of satellites in space owned by multiple states and corporations. These satellites are used to not only coordinate military actions, but to perform more mundane tasks, like obtaining weather reports, or managing on-ground communications, and navigation. Should states begin weapons testing in space, debris could cloud the orbit and make positioning new satellites impossible, disrupting our current way of life. More pressing, however, is that if a country’s satellites are successfully destroyed by an enemy state, military capabilities can be severely hindered or destroyed, leaving the country vulnerable to attack and unable to coordinate its military forces on the ground. Diminished future use of near space Whether caused by weapons testing or actual aggression, the subsequent proliferation of debris around the planet would damage our future ability to access space. Not only would debris act as shrapnel to preexisting assets in space, but it would also become much more difficult to launch satellites or rockets, hindering scientific research, space exploration, and commercial operations. From the past fifty-odd years of activity in space alone, the debris left behind in Earth’s orbital field has already become hazardous to spacecraft — a main reason why the U.S. and the Soviet Union did not continue with ASAT testing during the Cold War. If greater pollution were to occur, space itself could be become unusable, resulting in the collapse of the global economic system, air travel, and various communications. Power imbalances and proliferation on the ground Only so many states currently have access to space—which means any militarization be by the few, while other states would be left to fend for themselves. This would establish a clear power imbalance that could breed distrust among nations, resulting in a more insecure world and a veritable power keg primed for war. Additionally, deterrence measures taken by states with access to space would escalate, attempting to build up weapons caches not dissimilar to the nuclear weapons stockpiling activities of the Cold War. In any arms race, it is inevitable that more advanced weaponry is created. Yet, this does not only pose a risk to assets in space. Should a terrestrial war break out, this weaponry may eventually be deployed on the ground, and space-faring states would be able to capitalize on the power imbalance by using these new developments against states that have not yet broken into the space industry or developed equally-advanced weaponry.

**Nuke war causes extinction**

**Starr 15** [Steven, Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility (www.psr.org) and Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri. Starr has published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology] “Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting To Happen.” Ratical. March 2015. https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html TG

A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that ends human history. There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food. Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making. The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.

**But, it doesn’t solve extinction–it just makes impacts on Earth 10x more likely before we even get to colonize**

**Morton 18** [ (Adam Morton is a retired philosopher attached to the University of British Columbia. He is a philosophical generalist with a particular interest in issues about knowledge and about how people understand one another. [His book Should We Colonize Other Planets?​ is available now](https://www.amazon.com/Should-Colonize-Other-Planets-Frontiers/dp/1509525122/).) Adam Morton, 11-22-2018, "Colonizing other planets could trigger war on Earth and ecological disaster," Newsweek, <https://www.newsweek.com/colonizing-other-planets-could-trigger-war-earth-and-ecological-disaster-1226630>] TDI

The third danger is ecological. We are ruining the climate and polluting the oceans. We could develop technology that mitigated or even reversed the dangers. It would be easier than developing technology for surviving on Mars*,* where we must grow food and create oxygen in a very cold and dark environment without much protection from radiation and a limited supply of water. Moreover, getting enough people to Mars to make a colony that could survive without help from home, self-sufficient technologically and with enough genetic diversity that our already rather uniform species would have a future, would involve a lot of rockets*.* Musk talks in terms of 10,000 flights*,* although some plans require more. And this would be just to get things started. We just do not know what the impact on the earth and its atmosphere of the launches and the prior manufacturing would be. It would not be positive, at any rate*.* And industrial power and scientific brains would be diverted away from the needs of earth to the well-being of the colony*.* It is not what we need; you would only think that we could afford it if you were blind to how desperate things really are. So again, the colony solution is likely to make the earthly situation even more dire*.* These are problems for human colonies as refugees on any planet. What about colonies for other purposes, from exploiting resources to the destiny of humanity? There are so many possible purposes, and the means and destinations are so varied, that there is not going to be a single simple answer*.* But some of the dangers are common to many of the plans. There is the possibility of triggering war or ecological catastrophe on earth, already mentioned. There is the folly of sending vulnerable humans to do jobs that robots can do more safely and cheaply. There is the diversion of resources, effort, and commitment from the pressing needs of our planet. To appreciate many of these, one has to take fully on board quite how inhospitable to anything like human life most planets are. Cold, radiation, lack of oxygen and lack of the food-providing soil that has built up on earth over billions of years: all of these are a problem anywhere in the solar system except for our one place. And there is the extreme neediness of human beings, who have to keep their body temperature constant and their brains constantly operating, and who flourish only when they maintain complex delicate social systems. This is a matter of biology rather than of physics; we have evolved to fit our own planet and we require enormous resources to survive anywhere else.

**Space col is infeasible and unsustainable**

**Levchenko 19** (Professors in the Plasma Sources and Applications Centre/Space Propulsion Centre, NIE, Nanyang Technological University. 2019. “Mars Colonization: Beyond Getting There.” Global Challenges, vol. 3, no. 1.)

Settlement of Mars—is it a dream or a necessity? From scientific publications to public forms, there is certainly little consensus on whether colonization of Mars is necessary or even possible, with a rich diversity of opinions that range from categorical It is a necessity!20 to equally categorical Should Humans Colonize Other Planets? No.21 A strong proponent of the idea, Orwig puts forward five reasons for Mars colonization, implicitly stating that establishing a permanent colony of humans on Mars is no longer an option but a real necessity.20 Specifically, these arguments are: Survival of humans as a species; Exploring the potential of life on Mars to sustain humans; Using space technology to positively contribute to our quality of life, from health to minimizing and reversing negative aspects of anthropogenic activity of humans on Earth; Developing as a species; Gaining political and economic leadership. The first argument captures the essence of what most space colonization proponents feel—our ever growing environmental footprint threatens the survival of human race on Earth. Indeed, a large body of evidence points to human activity as the main cause of extinction of many species, with shrinking biodiversity and depleting resources threatening the very survival of humans on this planet. Colonization of other planets could potentially increase the probability of our survival. While being at the core of such ambitious projects as Mars One, a self‐sustained colony of any size on Mars is hardly feasible in the foreseeable future. Indeed, sustaining even a small number of colonists would require a continuous supply of food, oxygen, water and basic materials. At this stage, it is not clear whether it would be possible to establish a system that would generate these resources locally, or whether it would at least in part rely on the delivery of these resources (or essential components necessary for their local production) from Earth. Beyond the supply of these very basic resources, it would be quite challenging if not impossible for the colonists to independently produce hi‐tech but vitally important assets such as medicines, electronics and robotics systems, or advanced materials that provide us with a decent quality of life. In this case, would their existence become little more than the jogtrot of life, as compared with the standards expected at the Earth?22

**Space col can’t solve–risk dynamics, reproduction, and underwater refugees–even Bostrom agrees with us!**


**Szocik**, K. (**2018**). Should and could humans go to Mars? Yes, but not now and not in the near future. Futures. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2018.08.004 (Konrad Szocik, Assistant Professor at the University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow, Poland (Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science)

I argue, following other authors (Baum, 2009; Baum, Denkenberger, & Haqq-Misra, 2015; Jebari, 2015; Sandberg, Matheny, & Ćirković, 2008; Turchin & Green, 2017) that human space settlement is not able to reduce and/or to exclude the risk of human extinction. For this reason, it should not be perceived in terms of space refuge. In terms of both short-term and long-term perspectives of risk assessment, it would be better to protect humans on Earth.5 I reject the supportive role which could be played by human space settlement after a catastrophe on Earth, i.e., a recovery coordination mission. Due to so-called the paradox of technological progress discussed in the last section, further putative progress in space technology will be counterbalanced by increasing anthropogenic risks including, among others, overpopulation and limited resources (these anthropogenic threats are unavoidable in near future, in contrast to other risks that are only more or less probable but not unavoidable). Permanent lack of strong rationale for human mission to Mars – both now and in the near future – leads to paradoxical situation. Even if in some point in the future the minimum level of advancement in human deep-space technologies will be achieved, social, political, and economic contexts will gradually decrease the chances for real preparation of this mission. Another paradox, let’s call it the risk dynamics paradox, is that the most probable threats in the near future are, as Bostrom and Cirkovic (2008) argue, anthropogenic threats caused by civilizational and technological progress. The paradox lies in the fact that humans are not able to run from these kinds of risks that are rooted in their way of thinking, style of life, and population dynamics, risks implied by Malthus’ law. The human species can try to protect against natural disaster but not against deleterious effects of its own technological progress. In regard to possible future existential risks, I assume that their deleterious power is a little bit exaggerated, and, in any event, human space settlement is not a right way to cope with them. However, in any case, it is hard to speculate if any human space settlement must repeat the same path of human expansion as it was the case on Earth. It is unclear if human technological expansion and exploration must always lead to deleterious and self-destructive effects. In this paper, I do not discuss ethical and moral concerns which are traditionally considered when discussing the human place in space. They include such topics as the human right to explore space (it means both right to intervene in any extraterrestrial object, and human duty and rationale for space expansionism, mostly in the context of the idea of space refuge and possible catastrophic scenarios on Earth), or the value of human life and space objects. 4.1. The philosophy of space refuge Philosophers and space ethicists discuss the intrinsic value of Mars, and the human right to explore and to terraform Mars (Szocik et al., in press c;). I take for granted following Andreas Losch (2019) that survival of the human species is high intrinsic value which justifies space exploration and exploitation of space including terraforming and other activities expected to increase the survival of human spaces. As Baum et al. (2015) argues, it is worth doing this to protect human civilization. This rationale of advocates of human space missions is counterbalanced by the fact that real the existential risks are rather long-term. Earth still remains the unique human homeland, we are not multi-planetary species and this is still well beyond our capacities). Any effort to settle lifeless space must compete with care for Earth (Reiman 2009, p. 83). Treating human space mission as a rescue mission sounds like a science-fiction story given the limited technological capacities and the risk of this venture. Human space settlement could work as space refuge designed to support recovery of post catastrophe Earth population. At best, space settlement would be only a backup copy of primary Earth civilization (Baum et al. 2015). In addition to an evacuation scenario, there is a second scenario that partially overlaps with “evacuation” scenario but explores the concept of humans as multi-planetary species. Humans should settle new place in space even if in fact future risks (epidemics, nuclear war, overpopulation, limited resources, and/or environmental pollution) 6 are lethal only for some part of population. The idea of space refuge is a vicious circle. Investing in space refuge involves time and effort needed for coping with terrestrial risks. Public opinion may protest against space settlement program. Possible way to run away from the public opinion pressure is a top-secret status of space refuge, which is why Baum et al. (2015) discusses the importance of secrecy of this project. It seems doubtful that human base on Mars could be kept in secret. A selfsustainable base in space requires a financial effort that is incomparable with previous space activities including the ISS, human missions to the Moon, or current robotic missions. Inhabitants of self-sustainable space refuge may be not interested in taking a risk of reconstruction of post-catastrophe Earth which would be expensive, dangerous, and inhibiting for the development of the space refuge. The space refuge may be designed to become new human homeland or to be “only” additional human base with limited progress. In both cases, crew of space refuge cannot be obliged neither forced to support Earth. In post-catastrophic Earth landscape, space refuge may be better place to live. Reaction of its inhabitants is not clear. Tony Milligan (2011, p. 193) considers space resettlements as possible solution for demographic or climate problems. Milligan argues that space settlement program should get priority as a program oriented in saving human species. Space settlement is not able to solve anthropogenic problems because space settlers will bring these problems to other planet. Even if Mars population will not reproduce (or will reproduce to low extent needed for generational succession), overpopulation on Earth will not be inhibited by building Mars settlement. The concept of human species as endangered species is not in the center of scientific interests, as Anders Sandberg et al. point out (2008). This is interesting social fact mostly in regard to social sciences and humanities. In contrast to life scientists, philosophers do not need laboratories neither extra funds to think about future threats for human species. Despite this fact, a few philosophers and humanistic scholars consider this challenge. This tendency is seen in small numbers of institutes such as The Future of Humanity Institute at University of Oxford and academic journals as Futures or Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists devoted to discuss these issues. Philosophers in general not only are not interested in future studies but they are focused mostly on history of philosophy. This tendency is stronger in Europe than in the US. Despite historians, philosophers seem to be one of the biggest groups which is focused on history. This low interest of scholars in future studies, mostly in sub-disciplines studying risks for humanity, is at least partially affected by lack or low awareness of dangers for human survival. Humans can be aware of existential risks for other animal species but refer this to themselves less often. Sandberg et al. (2008) note that, despite the fact that the probability of one extinction-level cataclysm including asteroid impact or eruption of super volcano is very low, its lethal potential for humanity justifies anti-risk prevention policy. 4.2. Anthropogenic and exogenous risks Possible risks include nuclear winter affected by nuclear wars, asteroid impact, eruption of super volcano (the former three risks have the same effect: inhibiting the sun light, decreasing temperature, and reducing or inhibiting food production), 7 epidemics, geoengineering failure,8 biological weapon, systemic failure (global electronic, internet, and satellite connection of the world and possible global blackout), nanotechnology, and AI catastrophes (Baum et al. 2015; see also: the list of the leading existential risks in Farquhar et al. 2017). This list should be extended to include extensive fires which may be considered as a part of climate change risk. Note that two fires in Portugal in 2017 emitted total heating 68 and 142 times bigger than nuclear bomb in Hiroshima (Ribau and Hernandez 2018). The probabilities for these threats vary in regard to their short-term or long-term perspectives, their reliability and frequency. Some are based on the unpredictability of humans, as nuclear and biological weapons attack. Other threats are unpredictable due to the current state of art, e.g. nanotechnology, AI, or bioengineering. Overpopulation and limited resources are predictable and unavoidable threats. To date, the most dangerous natural threat for survival of human species was the eruption of super volcano Toba around 75,000 years ago. There were 4,000 survivors, including around 500 women in reproductive age (Rampino 2018). Similar deleterious effects of nuclear winter and global cooling of temperature might be caused by asteroid impact. The next natural catastrophe on Earth may be fatally challenging due to human dependence on technology in food, water and energy resources. Finally, if global technology collapses, human survival will be threatened even if relatively high number of individuals initially survive. Economic and social collapse may be greater than deleterious direct effects of natural disaster. 4.3. Demographic and biological challenges for human refuge in space Baum et al. (2015) are concerned with capacity of crew refuge to deal with expected tasks – with their skills, psychological and physiological well-being after some catastrophe. The number of people designed to live in refuge matters genetically (founder effect and the risk of mutation in small, isolated population). The number of astronauts planned for first human missions to Mars is small, very small. Mission planners do not treat this mission in terms of long-term, space refuge-like mission, so they do not calculate the challenge of human reproduction in space. Constraints on human reproduction in space due to physiological deprivation are discussed elsewhere (Szocik et al. 2018b). Estimated minimal number of individuals needed for generational sequence and mission success in a hypothetical interplanetary 6,300 year journey from Earth to Proxima Centauri b is calculated as 98 persons (Marin and Beluffi 2018). But the “sufficient founder population” will still remain as a population challenge (Baum et al. 2015). According to Chris Impey, minimum viable population is estimated at 500 individuals needed to avoid inbreeding, and 5,000 to avoid extinction in long-term period (Impey 2019). Mission planners should also take into account genetic mutation risk. This challenge can be solved by relatively high number of crew or by migrations and interactions between inhabitants of refuge and Earth. Mission planners may design the space mission to Mars as a rescue mission for Earth where there is a gene flow maintained between space refuge and Earth. Sufficient biological variation may decline due to post-catastrophic deprivation of Earth population. Dependently on the kind of catastrophe, Earth survivors are supposed to be modified in more or less extent due to nuclear explosion or other threats that affect human physiology. Social engineering and rigorous sexual policy should be introduced to separate crew refuge from Earth population. Mission planners may design another variant in which space base includes human reproduction. In this case (this is the case discussed by Impey but not by Baum et al.), minimum viable population is more important than in the case of reconstruction of human population on post-catastrophe Earth. In both scenarios, another important factor is at work. Because discussed scenarios require advanced technology for space refuge and effective interplanetary transport, we may expect application of substantial human enhancement practiced for interplanetary journeys (Zehr 2018). The idea of human enhancement in Mars missions may be used not only to cope with space environmental challenges including mostly altered gravity or cosmic ray but also to improve physiological and psychological capacities of deep-space astronauts and, consequently, their performance and effectiveness of mission (Szocik et al., in press a; in press b). Consequently, it is possible that the current state of biological knowledge will not be (or will be only partially) applied to enhanced humans living in space. CRISPR-Cas9 methods of genetic editing are just applied on Earth, and rapid progress in applied genetics connected with progress in human moral thinking may open space for human enhancement in space refuge. Less probable scenario of divergent evolution of humans living in space refuge and on Earth also should be considered, with all possible results including biological (physical and biological supremacy of primary enhanced space settlers; however, living in space is deleterious for physiology including, among others, immune system), cognitive, behavioral, or ethical effects of divergent evolution within multi-planetary human species. 4.4. Humans cannot survive by space missions The “species-survival” argument for space exploration fails when cosmic threats are considered. When the Sun gets too warm for life on Earth, neither Earth nor Mars will be safe. Mars and Earth are both exposed to Cosmic Ray Bursts emitted by neutron stars. Such emission could be responsible for mass extinction on Earth 570 mya (Dar et al. 1998). Asteroid impact rather does not have potential to destroy immediately the entire life on Earth but such impact initiates long-term deleterious perturbations in atmosphere (Napier 2006; 2015) including large scale biomass-burning (Wolbach et al. 2018). Greater risk is caused by centaurs moving in the solar system from the trans-Neptunian regions. Humanity should focus its attention on more distant regions of the solar system (Napier et al. 2015; Ćirković and Vukotić 2016). Risk of asteroid impact is higher on Mars than on Earth. Unless humans are not able to travel beyond the solar system, the better anti-asteroid strategy is protection on Earth (Stoner 2017, p. 340). 4.5. There is no risk on Earth sufficient to justify the expense of a space refuge Space refuge is justified only when there is at least one kind of catastrophe on Earth which will lead to extinction of the entire human species. Baum (2015) and Baum et al. (2015) do not believe that space settlement offers advantage over terrestrial refuge. If terrestrial refuge (aquatic and/or subterranean) is able to protect against the strongest catastrophes including asteroid impact, the unique serious rationale accepted by public opinion for space human mission fails. As Alexey Turchin and Brian Patrick Green (2017) show, aquatic refuges based on adaptation of nuclear submarines may effectively play their role. They may be surface independent, which is the basic criterion of any refuge (Baum et al. 2015). They are cheaper and easier in engineering terms when compared with Mars settlement. A space refuge would not be able to cope with currently-occurring risks, e.g. overpopulation and climate change. Human overpopulation can be limited only on Earth by terrestrial policy and, if this can be done, no space base is necessary. If it is not possible, then no space base can solve this problem. For example, space settlement is not able to alleviate global warming, against Milligan’s suggestion. The unique way to do that on Earth is to reduce methane emission and/or to cool Earth by turning sunlight into space, as Solar Radiation Management proposes (Farquhar et al. 2017). There is only indirect, not direct applicability of space exploration. For instance, space technology might be applied to cope with asteroid impact or increasing the Sun temperature (Crawford). But these exogenous catastrophes caused by cosmic events are unlikely in lifespan of current and future generations (Tegmark and Bostrom 2005, p. 754), and for this reason they offer poor incentive for human space program. The unique rationale for space refuge mission could be future development of the Sun which will be getting more and more warmer in next billions years. But this threat does not justify human space settlement due to its high risk and high costliness (Jebari 2015). Nick Beckstead speculates on possible disasters on Earth deleterious also for humans living in shelters, e.g. scenarios that include invasion of aliens, runaway AI, or ecophagy caused by nanotechnology (Beckstead 2015).9 Beckstead rightly adds that the big challenge is not only rate of survival immediately after catastrophe but also chances for survival in long-term scale including collapse in food production and supply chain, and associated social and political collapse. It is hard to imagine catastrophe which kills the entire Earth population excluding people living in refuge. In this case, rationale for refuge fails.

## Disclosure

**Interp: Negative debaters must disclose the status (conditional, dispositional, unconditional) of every advocacy that isn’t the status quo on the 2021-2022 NDCA LD wiki.**

**V: check ss–we’ve shown an example where they don’t, but they don’t do it the whole way through**

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**Vote neg for strat skew–knowing the status of previous positions helps affirmatives predict what they would be for their rounds and allocate time accordingly based on what they can and cannot straight turn without you kicking out of it. It independently checks infinite abuse since if you read wacky dispo conditions we can be ready to either meet those conditions or prepare a robust theory shell against them to check back against neg abuse. No regress–it was on my wiki so you could’ve predicted it.**

**Fairness and education are voters–debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and teaches portable skills we use lifelong. Drop the debater–no in round arg to drop–fixing disclosure out of round is non verifiable. No rvi–(a) you’d have 7 minutes to answer the shell and the debate ends there on brute force–you’d still have more time even if the whole aff was the shell (b) a whole year to robustly defend ur interp means you’d bait disclosure and chill us from checking abuse. Competing interps–my interps are disclosed and you had the whole season to justify your wiki so you should be able to generate offense–everyone’s wiki is different so case by case bases are too arbitrary. This is the highest layer–skews our ability to properly structure the 1ac and all speeches that precede it, which comes lexically prior**

## Underview

**[1] 1AR Theory:**

**[a] AFF gets it to check infinite neg abuse**

**[b] Drop the debater – the short 1AR irreparably skewed from abuse on substance and time investment on theory.**

**[c] No RVI – 6 minute 2n can just dump on a 20 second 1ar shell and win on sheer brute force**

**[d] Competing Interps--6 minutes on a 20 second shell is more than enough to justify their interp**

**[e] No 1NC contestation of paradigm issues because I would need to win 2 things, which is irreciprocal**

**[f] No 2NR “I meets” -- skews theory ground because they’re each a NIB for me to winning theory which kills my ability to check abuse**

**[2] If I win one layer vote aff**

**[a] Time skew--neg has 7 minutes to uplayer and makes the round impossible to win**

**[b] It forces you to engage with the aff creating substantive discussion on something we both had time to prep for**

**[3] Neg interps are counterinterps since the AC takes a stance and came lexically prior - means you re-evaluate the AC under their interp and evaluate the debate after the 1ar so both of us get one rebuttal**

**[4] Neg may not take prep time--they already have 30 minutes of pre round prep which should compensate--no prep is key to reciprocity**