# 1AC Lex Round 6

## Framing

**Permissibility and presumption affirm:**

1. **Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason – means that presuming neg is incoherent because it relies on some presumptive truths about justice and the world in general**
2. [**Unjust**](https://www.dictionary.com/browse/unjust) **is defined as “not just; lacking in justice or fairness:” so if something is neither good or bad, then it is not just which proves it is unjust**
3. **Probability - Logically safer since it’s better to be supererogatory than fail to meet an obligation**
4. **Logic - If everything is permissible so is the aff since nothing prevents us from doing it**
5. **Intuition - we naturally believe statements true e.g. if I told you my name is Shrey, you’d believe me**

**Perspectivism is true–**

1. **Opacity – we can never access another person’s perspective because we can never fully understand who someone else is or what they think. Every truth I create cannot be universalized because I can’t guarantee that they will create the same truth because they do what they want**
2. **Linguistics – Truth is constructed by language, which is completely arbitrary. Nothing tells me that a chair is a chair; I only assign it that name arbitrarily because I want to. Meaning can’t be contained within language if we make it up ourselves, and truth doesn’t exist absent language**

**Truth is not foundational and morality can only gain coherence through intersubjective social norms. Deliberation must be constitutive of normative reasoning since it’s necessary to validate the acceptance of any syllogism–other theories rely on communication to properly interpret and follow them and communicate an obligation**

**Habermas** (Jurgen, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, **1983**)

This "fact of reason" cannot be deductively grounded} but 11:can be clarified if we take the further step of conceiving argumentative speech as a special case-in, fact, a pnvlleg~d derivative of action oriented toward reaching understanding. Only when we return to the level of action theory and conceivediscourse as a continuation of communicative action by other means can we understand the true thrust of discourse ethics. The reason we can locate the content of (U) in the communicative presuppositions of argu~en.tation .is that argumentation is a reflective form of communicative action and the structuresof action oriented toward reaching understanding always alreadypresuppose those very relationships of, reciprocity and mutual recognition around which all moral ideas revolve In everyday life no less than in philosophical ethi:s. Like Ka~t'sappeal to the "fact of reason," this thrust of discourse ethics has a naturalistic ring to it, but it is by no means a naturalistic fallacy. Both Kant and the proponents of discourse ethics rely on a type of argument that draws attention to the inescapability of the general presuppositions that always already under the the communicative practice of everyday life and that cannot be picked or chosen like makes of cars or value postulates. This type of argument is made from the reflective point of view, not from the empiricist attitude of an objectivating observer.The transcendental mode of justification reflects the fact that practical discourse is embedded in contexts of communicative action. To that extent discourse ethICS pOInts to, and ltselfdepends upon, a theory of con:municative act~on. We can expecta contribution to the vertICal reconstructIo~ o~ stage~ of moral consciousness from the theory of communIcatlve actIOn, for the latter focuses on structures of linguistically mediated, norm-governed Interaction, structures that integrate what psychology analytically separates; to wit, perspective taking, moral Judgment, and action.

**Thus, the standard is consistency with pragmatic constraints–a method of pluralism that a] hijacks every other framework since only we can situate ideas into habit through practice and b] is self correcting and can build upon itself to infinitely improve and be better than any other framework, which also mean responses don’t link since prag can fix them in the future**

**Serra 09** Juan Pablo Serra. What Is and What Should Pragmatic Ethics Be? Some Remarks on Recent Scholarship*.* EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY. 2009. Francisco de Vitoria College, Humanities Department, Faculty member. https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/905

This separation of theory and practice runs parallel to another split, namely, that of ethics and morals or, better put, of ethical theory and moral practice. Peirce denies that morality is subject to rationality and thinks that ethics is valuable as a science in a broad sense. But he also regards ethics as a science which bears on human conduct only indirectly, through the examination of past actions and the self-correction of the self in view of future action. In addition, ethics would be a normative knowledge only in so far as it analyzes the adjustment of actions to ends and in so far as it studies the general way in which a good life can be lived. In morals Peirce appeals to instinct and sentiment, and in ethics he recommends the use of logical thinking —just as scientists do. However, even within the framework of his system, it’s not obvious that scientists may so easily set aside their instincts —in fact, instinct (or ‘rational instinct’ as he called it in 1908) plays a significant role in the economy of re- search. Moreover, the statement that in moral issues there may be no possibility of carrying out an inquiry that is truth-oriented is not an uncontroversial one. After all, moral inquiry is performed in a deliberative way, weighing up argumentations, beliefs and principles, and comparing them either with their probable or conceivable consequences or with lived as well as possible experiences that can be forceful or impinge upon the deliberative subject in such a way as to acquire the compulsory resistance due to reality. As Misak puts it succint- ly, “the practice of moral deliberation is responsive to experience, reason, argument, and thought experiments... Such responsiveness is part of what it is to make a moral decision and part of what it is to try to live a moral life” (2000: 52)3. Likewise, this same deliberative activity implies an effort to acquire habits, beliefs and principles that contribute to a truly free deliberation which, in turn, can result in creative conclusions. For Peirce, as you get more habit-governed, you become more creative and free, and your selfhood acquires plas- ticity and receptiveness to experience4. Vincent Colapietro has referred to Peirce’s description of human reason in terms of a deliberative rationality (1999: 24). Also, in another place he has explained that deliberation for Peirce is a process of preparation for future action which has to do with the checking of previous acts, the rehearsal in imagination of different roads to be followed by possible conduct and the nurturing of ideals (Colapietro 1997: 270, 281). It is precisely this experi- ment carried out within imagination that generates habits, because, as Peirce says in “A Survey of Pragmaticism”, “it is not the muscular action but the accompanying inward ef- forts, the acts of imagination, that produce the habit” (CP 5.479, 1907). Habits are regular ways of thinking, perceiving and interpreting that generate actions. As such, habits have a huge influence on human behavior, manifest themselves in the con- crete things we do and, at the same time, are formed within those same activities. Even more, according to Peirce, the activity takes the form of experimentation in the inner world; and the conclusion (if it comes to a definite conclusion), is that under given conditions, the interpreter will have formed the habit of acting in a given way whenever he may desire a given kind of result. The real and living logical conclusion is that habit (CP 5.491, 1907). Much more evidence could be given to support the view that habits are virtually decided (CP 2.435, c.1893) and also that intelligence comprises inward or potential actions that in- fluence the formation of habits (CP 6.286, 1893). Suffice it to say that, according to Peirce, deliberation is a function of the imagination, and that imagination is in itself an experiment which may have unexpected consequences that impose themselves upon the deliberative subject.

**Impact calc:**

1. **Deliberation plays a procedural, not substantive role in pragmatic tradition. It doesn’t say which impacts matter the most nor is it an impact to weigh, but tells us *what* questions to ask and how we determine the answers to them. This is a sequencing question - we are first concerned with the decisionmaking procedure to evaluate whether other metrics such as consequences even matter**
2. **Consequentialism fails - a] Induction fails – the logic of looking to the past to predict the future is all premised in the past, so it’s circular b] Aggregation fails – there’s no way to weigh between different forms of pain and pleasure e.g. 5 headaches vs a migraine c] Butterfly effect – each consequence has a future consequence and so on so we never know if it really did net good d] Subjectivity - everyone takes pleasure and pain in different things so we can’t know what maximizes it e] Infinite universe has infinite pleasure and pain - to add a finite amount does nothing because infinity + finity is still infinity f] Culpability -- can’t be held responsible for consequences because we can’t know all of them and it’s out of our control, intents are the only verifiable basis**
3. **Use epistemic modesty - no framework is 100% true which means we have to weigh between the correctness of each framework since 45 minutes isn’t enough to resolve thousands of years of debate. Offense under pragmatism outweighs - a] pragmatism is definitionally epistemic modesty since we include a pluralism of frameworks, so offense under my framework is procedural offense under epistemic modesty itself b] my framework encompasses the values of infinite different frameworks through deliberating between them which has infinite magnitude by incorporating offense from under every theory**
4. **Because we cannot know whether moral judgements are infinitely true, we need to solve problems in our specific context. Therefore, if I prove the res affirms in the context of my framework, any reason to negate functions in a different context and isn’t a reason not to affirm**

**Prefer additionally–**

1. **Performativity–responding to my framework concedes it because you are deliberating against it – outweighs because morality must prevent opting out which only constitutivism solves**
2. **Probability - disagreement is rife in the squo so most theories are wrong - prefer relative reliability. The law of large numbers proves when we test more it gets closer to true probability so when we test theories under this fw we’ll get the best calculus. This means a] even if my framework is wrong, its non-unique since it also encompasses their framework so if ours is wrong, then every framework is wrong and b] we take the premises of many theories’ claims into practice and use them in the best instances which non-uniques any net benefits to other theories**
3. **Limits–ethics are limited to how we conceptualize them–the way we cohere and understand ethics changes as we learn more about the world–only a theory that can account for new unforeseen circumstances create the most ethically rigorous solution**

**LaFollete 2K** "Pragmatic Ethics" [Hugh LaFollette](http://www.hughlafollette.com/index.htm) In [Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory](http://www.hughlafollette.com/papers/b-guide.htm) 2000. Hugh LaFollette is Marie E. and Leslie Cole Professor in Ethics at the University of South Florida St. Petersburg. He is editor-in-chief of The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Dulles AS

Pragmatic ethics takes a more aggressive approach, insisting that mankind is responsible for determining the best ethical system possible, which will be refined as new discoveries are made. Put simply; truth does not exist in some abstract realm of thought independent of social relationship or actions; instead, the truth is a function of an active … Pragmatism, according to William James, is derived from the Greek word pragma, which means action and serves as the basis of our English words practical and practice. Pragmatism originated in the United States around 1870, and now presents a growing third alternative to both analytic and Continental philosophical traditions worldwide. 1 - Acceptance . Ethics is a branch of philosophy that is responsible for studying the principles that govern the conduct of an individual. Employs criteria, but is not criterial The previous discussions enable us to say more precisely why pragmatists reject a criterial view of morality. Pragmatism's core contention that practice is primary in philosophy rules out the hope of logically prior criteria. Any meaningful criteria evolve from our attempt to live morally – in deciding what is the best action in the circumstances. Criteria are not discovered by pure reason, and they are not fixed. As ends of action, they are always revisable. As we obtain new evidence about ourselves and our world, and as our worlds changes, we find that what was appropriate for the old environment may not be conducive to survival in the new one. A style of teaching that might have been ideal for one kind institution (a progressive liberal arts college) at one time (the 60s) may be wholly ineffective in another institution (a regional state university) at another time (the 80s). But that is exactly what we would expect of an evolutionary ethic. Neither could criteria be complete. The moral world is complex and changeable. No set of criteria could give us univocal answers about how we should behave in all circumstances. If we cannot develop an algorithm for winning at chess, where there are only eighteen first moves, there is no way to develop an algorithm for living, which has a finitely large number of "first moves." Moreover, while the chess environment (the rules) stays constant, our natural and moral environments do not. We must adapt or fail. While there is always one end of chess -- the game ends when one player wins – the ends of life change as we grow, and as our environments change. Finally, we cannot resolve practical moral questions simply by applying criteria. We do not make personal or profession decisions by applying fixed, complete criteria. Why should we assume we should make moral decisions that way? Appropriates insights from other ethical theories Nonetheless, there is a perfectly good sense in which a pragmatic ethic employs what we might call criteria, but their nature and role dramatically differ from that in a criterial morality (Dewey 1985/1932) . Pragmatic criteria are not external rules we apply, but are tools we use in making informed judgements. They embody learning from previous action, they express our tentative efforts to isolate morally relevant features of those actions. These emergent criteria can become integrated into our habits, thereby informing the ways that we react to, think about, and imagine our worlds and our relations to others. This explains why pragmatists think other theories can provide guidance on how to live morally. Standard moral theories err not because they offer silly moral advice, but because they misunderstand that advice. Other moral theories can help us isolate (and habitually focus on) morally relevant features of action. And pragmatists take help wherever they can get it. Utilitarianism does not provide an algorithm for deciding how to act, but it shapes habits to help us "naturally" attend to the ways that our actions impact others. Deontology does not provide a list of general rules to follow, but it sensitizes us to ways our actions might promote or undermine respect for others. Contractarianism does not resolve all moral issues, but it sensitizes us to the need for broad consensus. That is why it is mistaken to suppose that the pragmatist makes specific moral judgements oblivious to rules, principles, virtues, and the collective wisdom of human experience. The pragmatist absorbs these insights into her habits, and thereby shapes how she habitually responds, and how she habitually deliberates when deliberation is required. This also explains why criterial moralities tend to be minimalistic. They specify minimal sets of rules to follow in order to be moral. Pragmatism, on the other hand, like virtue theories, is more concerned to emphasize exemplary behavior – to use morally relevant features of action to determine the best way to behave, not the minimally tolerable way

1. **Rule Following Paradox - There is nothing inherent to a rule that tells us how we ought to follow it, which proves no internal motivation or direction to follow a particular rule, regardless of how correct the rule is. Since only our interpretation can tell us how to follow the rule, there can be no incorrect application. Only deliberation accounts for the diversity of interpretations of our norms - any other theory is illegitimate since it hasn’t been socially accepted by the people yet**
2. **Ethics must be based on experience–learning and verifiability**

**Papineau 7**, David Papineau, “Naturalism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007//SS

However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world (Harman, 1986). At first sight this may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it has very awkward epistemological consequences. For beings like us, knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them.

1. **Ethical Uncertainty - If you’re unsure what the good is, allow for deliberation because it allows people to pursue their conception of the good and discuss it.**
2. **Actor Spec - Only a radical democracy that constantly questions its own foundations can ever be open to radical revision – other systems insist on their own foundation even when that’s exclusionary or illegitimate. The aff is a better model for constructing a political institution that must secure its own legitimacy over time and to changing groups of citizens.**

## Offense

**I defend the resolution as a general principle, which means specific instances that the aff is wrong don’t disprove our general thesis, just as penguins don’t disprove birds fly. Cx and before round check all interps and K to deter frivolous theory/maximize substance and ensure the call out is genuine. Affirm:**

**[1] The appropriation of space by private entities isn’t value neutral but is sutured in a discourse of the cosmic elite and unequal IR.**

**Stockwell 20** [Samuel Stockwell (Research Project Manager, the Annenberg Institute at Brown University). “Legal ‘Black Holes’ in Outer Space: The Regulation of Private Space Companies”. E-International Relations. Jul 20 2020. Accessed 12/7/21.<https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/20/legal-black-holes-in-outer-space-the-regulation-of-private-space-companies/> //Xu]

The US government’s support for private space companies is also likely to lead to the reinforcement of Earth-bound wealth inequalities in space. Many NewSpace actors frame their long-term ambitions in space with strong anthropogenic undertones, by offering the salvation of the human race from impending extinction through off-world colonial developments (Kearnes & Dooren: 2017: 182). Yet, this type of discourse disguises the highly exclusive nature of these missions. Whilst they seem to suggest that there is a stake for ordinary citizens in the vast space frontier, the reality is that these self-described space pioneers are a member of a narrow ‘cosmic elite’ – “founders of Amazon.com, Microsoft, Pay Pal… and a smattering of games designers and hotel magnates” (Parker, 2009: 91). Indeed, private space enterprises have themselves suggested that they have no obligation to share mineral resources extracted in space with the global community (Klinger, 2017: 208). This is reflected in the speeches of individuals such as Nathan Ingraham, a senior editor at the tech site EngadAsteroid mining, who claimed that asteroid mining was “how [America is] going to move into space and develop the next Vegas Strip” (Shaer, 2016: 50). Such comments highlight a form of what Beery (2016) defines as ‘scalar politics’. In similar ways to the ‘scaling’ of unequal international relations that has constituted our relationship with outer space under the guise of the ‘global commons’ (Beery, 2016: 99), private companies – through their anthropogenic discourse – are scaling existing Earth-bound wealth inequalities and social relations into space by siphoning off extra-terrestrial resources. By constructing their endeavours in ways that appeal to the common good, NewSpace actors are therefore concealing the reality of how commercial resource extraction serves the exclusive interests of their private shareholders at the expense of the vast majority of the global population.

**[2] Appropriation is intrinsically exclusive and denies experimentation and guts deliberative procedures by creating permanent, unchanging bounds that exclude communal deliberations over certain regions through exclusivity**

Timothy Justin **Trapp**, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, **’13**, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

## Method

**Our framework moves away from abstraction and understands knowledge as changing in order to base social change and revision of ideas.**

**Glaude 7’** Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (5-7). Dulles AS

In a Shade of Blue is my contribution to the tradition I have just sketched. My aim is to think through some of the more pressing conceptual problems confronting African American political life, and I do so as a Deweyan prag-matist. I should say a bit about what I mean by this self-description. John Dewey thought of philosophy as a form of cultural and social criticism. He held the view that philosophy, properly understood as a mode of wis-dom, ought to aid us in our efforts to overcome problematic situations and worrisome circumstances. The principal charge of the philosopher, then, is to deal with the problems of human beings, not simply with the problems of philosophers. For Dewey, over the course of his long career, this involved bridging the divide between science, broadly understood, and morals—a divide he traced to a conception of experience that has led philosophers over the centuries to tilt after windmills. Dewey declared, “The problem of restoring integration and co-operation between man’s beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of any philosophy that is not isolated from life.”9Dewey bases this conclusion on several features of his philosophy: (1) anti foundationalism, (2) experimentalism, (3) contextualism, and (4) soli-darity.10 Antifoundationalism, of course, is the rejection of foundations of knowledge that are beyond question. Dewey, by contrast, understands knowledge to be the fruit of our undertakings as we seek “the enrichment of our immediate experience through the control over action it exercises.”11He insists that we turn our attention from supposed givens to actual consequences, pursuing a future fundamentally grounded in values shaped by experience and realized in our actions. This view makes clear the experimental function of knowledge. Dewey emphasized that knowledge entails efforts to control and select future experience and that we are always con-fronted with the possibility of error when we act. We experiment or tinker, with the understanding that all facts are fallible and, as such, occasionally afford us the opportunity for revision.12Contextualism refers to an understanding of beliefs, choices, and actions as historically conditioned. Dewey held the view that inquiry, or the pursuit of knowledge, is value-laden, in the sense that we come to problems with interests and habits that orient us one way or another, and that such pursuits are also situational, in the sense that “knowledge is pursued and produced somewhere, some when, and by someone.”13Finally, solidarity captures the associational and cooperative dimensions of Dewey’s thinking. Dewey conceives of his pragmatism as “an instrument of social improvement” aimed principally at expanding democratic life and broadening the ground of individual self-development.14Democracy, for him, constitutes more than a body of formal procedures; it is a form of life that requires constant attention if we are to secure the ideals that purportedly animate it. Individuality is understood as developing one’s unique capacities within the context of one’s social relations and one’s community. The formation of the democratic character so important to our form of associated living involves, then, a caring disposition toward the plight of our fellows and a watchful concern for the well-being of our democratic life.

**Ceding the political is inconsistent with pragmatic institutions and inevitably makes the problem worse--solidarity is a sequencing question**

**Mouffe 16** (Chantal – professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Westminster, interviewed by Waleed Shahid, “America in Populist Times: An Interview With Chantal Mouffe,” 12/15/16, <https://www.thenation.com/article/america-in-populist-times-an-interview-with-chantal-mouffe/>)

Trump’s base is also part of the popular classes because they have also been abandoned by neoliberalism. The white working and middle classes used to have more social and economic rights, and Trump is using a racist populism to appeal to that feeling and construct a new political identity beyond just left versus right. “The left must create…a ‘a populist frontier’ of all the popular classes against the elites and establishment.” In response, the left must create what I call a “a populist frontier” of all the popular classes against the elites and establishment. The only candidate who could have provided this alternative was Sanders. In France, the majority of the working class is voting for Marine Le Pen. It’s easy to understand, because these sectors have become the losers in globalization. Le Pen has been able to articulate—in a xenophobic vocabulary—the demands of the popular classes. They are democratic demands. They are ordinary people who are suffering. But Le Pen comes with the discourse: “I understand that you are suffering. The people who are responsible are the immigrants.” She is establishing a frontier against immigrants. Le Pen says that she cares about the people while the French Socialist Party—like Clinton—has no discourse about people’s genuine problems with the status quo. People don’t trust the establishment leaders and parties anymore. They no longer convince. It seems to me that this is what Sanders was trying to do. He was giving another answer. The adversary is not immigrants, but it’s Wall Street and financial interests. This is left-wing populism. But it’s not only about the demands of the working class. It’s also about establishing what I call “a chain of equivalence” between different sectors: the demands of the feminists, civil rights, and different movements. A chain of equivalence is very difficult to establish on the left. It means that the groups in the chain each have their own particular relation to the power structure. But they are still able to act in a unified manner around some form of a common agenda. But the chain is not about uniting all demands into one single and homogeneous movement. This grouping of forces simply begins to see themselves in solidarity with one another and disadvantaged by the existing power structure. Each link in the chain remains distinct, but they begin to operate together, in concert. But in order to for the chain of equivalence to be established, you need to define a common adversary. That’s how it becomes a united chain. Do you think Sanders was able to establish a chain of equivalence? To some degree, yes. Over the last 10 years there has been a renaissance of movements led by young people in the United States: immigrant rights, Occupy Wall Street, the climate movement, Black Lives Matter, and Fight for 15. Sanders repeatedly called for a “political revolution” to take on Wall Street and the billionaire class. This began to establish a kind of “chain” for all the dissatisfied people who did not belong to any movements or organizations but felt activated by the fervor of the election season and Sanders’s message. But his campaign didn’t really tell a story about “America” in the same way that Trump did. And many writers criticized his campaign’s inability to narrate the connection between racism and economic inequality—perpetually central to the politics of the United States. I speak a lot about populism in Europe. But many Europeans don’t like the term “populism” because it connotes fascism or strongman leadership. But in America you do have a tradition of progressive populism. You don’t have the same stigma, do you? There was some stuff coming out of liberal and pro-Clinton sectors of the media and political class about Sanders’s angry and divisive rhetoric. One Democratic politician even called Sanders a McCarthyite because he wanted to put politicians who took money from banks on “show trials.” Some people characterized Sanders’s base as an angry mob unwilling to listen and compromise. But you’re right; I don’t think it has the same negative connotations as in Europe. I do still think that the culture of the left in the United States is somewhat averse to populism because we are averse to universalist politics. The dominant political framework on the left is intersectionality, and a particular stand of intersectional discourse has often led the left into particularism and difference rather than universalism. Solidarity among the working class has always been fraught due to the persistence of racism. Yes, this is also a major problem. But I do not like the term “universalism.” I prefer the term “establishing a collective will.” This is about how we think about different people coming together for common cause and aspirations. Do we have the right tools and language to think about this project? “In the United States, you have…too much identity politics and not enough collective struggle.” I am not talking about abandoning particular forms of struggle. But when we talk about collective will, we will inevitably create some contradictions. That is politics. The chain of equivalence is about mobilizing people together through their different struggles—we call this a convergence of struggles. And creating a bond between those struggles in a way that recognizes the specificities of different struggles but also fiercely recognizing the commonalities and solidarities among the various struggles. In the United States this is a very big problem to confront. There is a tendency in recent years in the American left toward a particular form of identity politics that doesn’t imagine itself as the powerful collective. We must recognize that there is a specificity to the feminist struggle or black struggle. Their form of domination is specific. We can’t say all of this is a product of capitalism and all we need is socialism. THE STAKES ARE HIGHER NOW THAN EVER. GET THE NATION IN YOUR INBOX. Enter Email SIGN UP! In Europe, the opposite tendency is very strong. People on the left say: “All those struggles are middle class and the main struggle is the class struggle.” It’s good to put this dogma into question. In the United States, you have the opposite problem. You have too much identity politics and not enough collective struggle. How do you bring these two things together? I discussed this with Iñigo Errejón from Podemos in our latest book, Podemos: In the Name of the People. Politics must be about establishing a collective struggle between a large “us” and a small “them.” This is the whole point. This rontier can be established in a traditional, Marxist way: working class versus the capitalists. But it doesn’t work in the United States because of racism and now will never work in Europe anymore. We need to establish a frontier in a populist way —the people versus the establishment and the elite. “The people” is a political construction. The task of the left is to construct “a people.” The difference between left and right is that we construct different forms of “the people.” The chain of equivalence is different. Left-wing populism is crucial to bring together all these struggles of identity alongside the working-class issues. Americans won’t confront the system of dominance unless you can answer this crucial question. I think that Sanders was able to put out a compelling identification and description of a “them” but he was less able to articulate an “us” or “the people.” I think President Obama, especially during his campaign in 2008, was much more adept at constructing an “us” but there was no identifiable “them” at all. I was not terribly excited about Obama. His politics was dogged by the neoliberal politics of consensus. Of course, I thought it was historic that a black man could be president of the United States. But I was always skeptical. My American friends were very enthusiastic. But he never defined a common adversary. Obama tried to reach an understanding with the Republicans and build consensus. When I came back to the United States in 2010, people on the left called him a traitor. But he never pretended to be a revolutionary. He never pretended to be radical. Some people on the left saw him as a radical. But Obama had told us all along, “We are good people, we are all going to come together.” “Like Occupy, many movements in Europe did not want any link with traditional institutions and parties.” Since Bill Clinton, the Democratic Party has become the party of Wall Street. This explains why many popular sectors are dissatisfied. The left should really try to understand this. There is no political expression for the real demands of the people other than Trump right now. Republicans have monopolized the representation of white people and what it means to be a “true American.” And Democrats have said they represent the minorities and the cosmopolitan classes. There are some among the Socialist Party in France who advocate that the party should forget the working class because they belong to Le Pen now and will never return to the Socialist Party. Now these leaders say that the Socialist Party is the party of immigrants and the cosmopolitan middle and upper classes. This is a huge problem. What do you think about the relationship between social movements and these new political parties? Like Occupy, many movements in Europe did not want any link with traditional institutions and parties. It is what we call “autonomism.” They wanted “real democracy” in the streets, no formal leaders and no parties. They were in favor of exodus from institutions and electoral politics. But after the explosion of the 15-M movement in Spain [the demonstrations in Madrid’s Puerta del Sol in May 2011], the right wing achieved an even larger majority in the next election partly because the movement told people to give up on the electoral and political system. It wasn’t that the right wing won more votes; it was because the Socialist Party lost 5 million votes due to absenteeism. This is the vacuum that Podemos stepped into because it was disastrous. “I am very critical of…a moment of total rupture with the existing status quo. This is not how revolutions work.” Movements cannot be left just to the streets. I am very critical of the idea of politics as fomenting a moment of total rupture with the existing status quo. This is not how revolutions work. At some point, mobilizations will lose steam. You cannot change things only on the horizontal level of social movements. You have to develop what Podemos calls “an electoral war machine.” You need to try to come to real power in the institutions and government. That is the line of Syriza as well. Many left-wing movements and leaders don’t want to engage in elections. This is true of movements in Greece and France. Many movement leaders say that elections are for the stupid sheep because politicians will always turn against you. There was a lot of opposition from the social movements about launching Podemos. And they are still criticized by the movement leaders for entering the parliamentary system. Many movement leaders continue to say that Podemos co-opted the movements and is now corrupted by parliamentary politics, but they are a minority. But Podemos never said that the only solution is entering into government. They say they are filling a void. Left-wing populism should see a relationship between the horizontal in the streets and vertical in the institutions. Some people say that the state and parties are corrupt so we only need social movements. Other people think that we only need to win elections and take seats in parliament. Both modes of thinking are wrong. We need an articulation of a “movement party” with a critical electoral dimension that is linked with the movements but also distinct and independent. But there is always tension between movements and parties. You write that the task of the left is to restore democracy and recover the social democratic tradition. Can you say more about this? Is social democracy still the horizon? I don’t know what people on the left mean when they talk about creating something new. The leaders of Podemos do not mean that they want the left to come back to traditional European social democracy of the mid-century. They are saying something that might be differently articulated in the United States. Podemos leaders state that there have been many social rights that have been won in the 20th century but have been dismantled by neoliberalism. The first step is to recover and expand those democratic rights. “The aim is still to radicalize democracy, but in order to radicalize it you first need to recover it.” When I wrote Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 30 years ago with Ernesto Laclau, we were still under a social-democratic hegemony. It was just the beginning of neoliberalism. Our argument was that we needed to radicalize democracy. We were saying to push forward what had been won under social democracy. We thought that social democracy had not been sensitive to new demands from the movements of feminism, anti-racism, ecology, and LGBT. These were not part of the traditional socialist agenda. Thirty years later, a lot of things that had been won have now been dismantled. When I talk about recovering democracy, we mean to recover all those rights that existed before they had been taken away. The aim is still to radicalize democracy, but in order to radicalize it you first need to recover it. We are living in post-democratic societies. We are in societies that call themselves democratic, but democracy here works in some sort of vacuum. There is no real possibility for people to exercise their rights of citizenship. We need to fight to reestablish a vibrant democracy and then fight for a radicalization of how we conceive of democracy. In the present state, we really are in a condition that is much worse than 50 years ago. The first step is to reestablish what has been lost. The ultra-left is wrong when they publicly advocate for the destruction of capitalism, of the state, and things like this. This is the part of the left that has always existed without any real influence, power, or strategy. We need a war of position where progressive forces can build real influence in civil society, the dominant institutions, mainstream culture, and the media. We need to start from the ordinary struggles that large portions of society face. There are lots of different struggles, but we need to establish a real chain of equivalence to confront the dominant struggles against a common adversary—and not simply link the struggles, which is only one step. The enemy is Wall Street, the political establishment, the oligarchy. We will always fail unless we articulate collective wills in the language of the people. This is the main problem that I see in the left in the United States. There is a huge gulf between the language of the people and the language of the movements. I understand it is not easy in the United States for a variety of reasons—there has never been a real left party in the United States and you live in an incredibly diverse country. But elections are where people must come together for common aspirations. Elections offer real opportunities to articulate different kinds of struggles in the form of a collective will. And this must be intentionally constructed. It’s latent and there, but the new political identity and bonds of solidarity must be actively constructed by leaders with care and discipline.

## Underview

**A strategy that violates nothing here is 7 minutes of prag negates cards**

**[1] 1AR Theory:**

**[a] AFF gets it to check infinite neg abuse**

**[b] Drop the debater – the short 1AR irreparably skewed from abuse on substance and time investment on theory.**

**[c] No RVI – 6 minute 2n can just dump on a 20 second 1ar shell and win on sheer brute force**

**[d] Competing Interps--6 minutes on a 20 second shell is more than enough to justify their interp**

**[e] No 1NC contestation of paradigm issues because I would need to win 2 things, which is irreciprocal**

**[f] No 2NR “I meets” -- skews theory ground because they’re each a NIB for me to winning theory which kills my ability to check abuse**

**[g] Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and it teaches portable skills that we use lifelong**

**[2] If I win one layer vote aff**

**[a] Time skew--neg has 7 minutes to uplayer and makes the round impossible to win**

**[b] It forces you to engage with the aff creating substantive discussion on something we both had time to prep for**

**[3] The neg may only make one response to each argument in the aff and must answer them all**

**[a] Makes sure we have an equal number of arguments for reciprocity**

**[b] Solves flooding the 1ar since you choose the best answers**

**[4] The neg must extend all arguments twice in either the 1nc or 2nr – aff has to waste time extending twice in the 1ar and 2ar so its reciprocal**

**[5] No neg analytics – I don’t have time to cover 100 blippy arguments in the NC since you can read 7 min of analytics and extend any of them to win.**

**[6] Neg interps are counterinterps since the AC takes a stance and came lexically prior - means you re-evaluate the AC under their interp and evaluate the debate after the 1ar so both of us get one rebuttal**

**[7] Neg may not take prep time--they already have 30 minutes of pre round prep which should compensate--no prep is key to reciprocity**

**[8] Reject neg metatheory**

**[a] Both their and my shell directly indict each other but prefer mine cuz they come lexically prior**

**[b] They have 2 speeches for non preemptive violations but I only have the 1ar, means 1nc uplayering ensures we can never set the 1ar’s norms**

**[9] Reasonability w/ a bl of sufficient defense on aff counter interps**

**[a] Time-crunched 1ar can’t generate offense, weigh, and cover all standards - reasonable interps allow for leeway and time for topic ed**

**[b] 6 minute 2n brute force lets them hyper-inflate the abuse - reasonability counteracts that bias**

**[c] Affs speak in the dark and can’t predict their bidirectional shells - means we need leeway since negs always have generics to engage in but we don’t**

**[10] Drop the Arg on neg shells**

**[a] 7 minute NC to spam theory means our time crunched speeches can’t win every layer - dropping the abusive parts of the aff while still letting us win on other layers gives substance ed and resolves the skew**

**[b] They have infinite ways to negate with counter-advocacies while we only have the res - letting us kick abuse gives us infinite routes to affirm that you have to disprove as well, which is key to reciprocity**

**[11] No rvi on spikes - [a] lets them dump for 13 or 6 minutes straight and win on sheer brute force since we only have half the time which undermines our ability to collapse to the best layer [b] their speeches are double the time - forcing them to answer the shell AND win another layer splits it in half to even it out**

**[12] All K links must quote explicit lines in the AC--key to specificity so affs know which parts you’re specifically disagreeing with and ensure better clash**

**[13] The negative must concede the affirmative framework if it is not morally repugnant and the aff is topical and disclosed [a] Time skew- Winning the negative framework moots 6 minutes of 1AC offense by outframing us – that outweighs on quantifiability and reversibility – I can’t get back time lost and it’s the only way to measure abuse**